First, install the packages you will likely need to conduct the text analysis.
library(dplyr)
Attaching package: 'dplyr'The following objects are masked from 'package:stats':
filter, lagThe following objects are masked from 'package:base':
intersect, setdiff, setequal, unionlibrary(tidytext)
library(stringr)In this tutorial we are going to start working with the text that we scraped last time. We will take the tidy approach to text analysis because it is fairly intuitive in that it treats text as data frames for analysis.
Furthermore, the text converted into a data frame can be converted to a variety of formats that allow it to be analyzed by other popular ra programs such as quanteda. While the examples are different and we won’t cover all of the topics in the book you can find much of this material in Text Mining with R: A Tidy Approach listed in the syllabus
This image from Text Mining with R: A Tidy Approach demonstrates the general overall process for text analysis using tidyverse:
For our analysis we need text. The raw text is the corpus that we work on. The corpus that we are interested in varies depending on our research objectives. For example, a corpus can contain a newspaper article, multiple articles, tweets about a particular topic or from a group of people. How we put together the relevant corpus depends on the objective of our analysis.
For further information see:
https://data.library.virginia.edu/reading-pdf-files-into-r-for-text-mining/
#install.packages("pdftools") #Text Extraction, Rendering and Converting of PDF Documents. See: https://docs.ropensci.org/pdftools/
library(pdftools)Using poppler version 22.02.0Create a vector of pdf file names from the pdf files in your directory (remember to set the working directory to the directory where you are keeping your files)
pdf_files <- list.files(pattern = "pdf$")pdf_content <- lapply(pdf_files, pdf_text)Verify how many documents in pdf_content were read:
[1] 5The number of pages in each document in pdf_content
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[1] 68
[[2]]
[1] 106
[[3]]
[1] 70
[[4]]
[1] 237
[[5]]
[1] 514To see the pdf_content
[[1]]
[1] " Official\n\n\n1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES\n\n2 x\n\n3 ARIZONA STATE :\n\n4 LEGISLATURE, :\n\n5 Appellant :\n\n6 v. : No. 131314\n\n7 ARIZONA INDEPENDENT :\n\n8 REDISTRICTING COMMISSION, :\n\n9 ET AL. :\n\n10 x\n\n11 Washington, D.C.\n\n12 Monday, March 2, 2015\n\n13\n\n14 The aboveentitled matter came on for oral\n\n15 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States\n\n16 at 10:05 a.m.\n\n17 APPEARANCES:\n\n18 PAUL D. CLEMENT, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of\n\n19 Appellant.\n\n20 ERIC J. FEIGIN, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor\n\n21 General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for\n\n22 United States, as amicus curiae, supporting\n\n23 Appellees.\n\n24 SETH P. WAXMAN, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of\n\n25 Appellees.\n\n\n 1\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[2] " Official\n\n\n1 C O N T E N T S\n\n2 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAGE\n\n3 PAUL D. CLEMENT, ESQ.\n\n4 On behalf of the Appellant 3\n\n5 ORAL ARGUMENT OF\n\n6 ERIC J. FEIGIN, ESQ.\n\n7 On behalf of United States, as amicus curiae,\n\n8 supporting Appellees 27\n\n9 ORAL ARGUMENT OF\n\n10 SETH P. WAXMAN, ESQ.\n\n11 On behalf of Appellees 38\n\n12 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF\n\n13 PAUL D. CLEMENT, ESQ.\n\n14 On behalf of the Appellant 53\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n\n 2\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[3] " Official\n\n\n1 P R O C E E D I N G S\n\n2 (10:05 a.m.)\n\n3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument\n\n4 first this morning in Case 131314, the Arizona State\n\n5 Legislature v. The Arizona Independent Redistricting\n\n6 Commission.\n\n7 Mr. Clement.\n\n8 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT\n\n9 ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT\n\n10 MR. CLEMENT: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it\n\n11 please the Court:\n\n12 Proposition 106 permanently divests the\n\n13 State legislature of its authority to prescribe\n\n14 congressional districts and redelegates that authority\n\n15 to an unelected and unaccountable commission. The\n\n16 Elections Clause of the Constitution clearly vests that\n\n17 authority not just in the States, but in the\n\n18 legislatures thereof. Thus, this avowed effort to\n\n19 redelegate that authority to an unelected and\n\n20 unaccountable commission is plainly repugnant to the\n\n21 Constitution's vesting of that authority in the\n\n22 legislatures of the States.\n\n23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But it's all right for\n\n24 the State redistricting. The commission is is \n\n25 there's no constitutional question with the Arizona\n\n\n 3\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[4] " Official\n\n\n1 being able to use this commission for its State\n\n2 representation.\n\n3 MR. CLEMENT: Absolutely, Justice Ginsburg.\n\n4 It only applies to the our argument only applies to\n\n5 the congressional redistricting. And, of course, that\n\n6 means that if these commissions are as effective as my\n\n7 friends on the other side say, then we will have\n\n8 nonpartisan districts that will elect the State house \n\n9 the State houses, the State representatives, and the\n\n10 State senate, and then those nonpartisanly\n\n11 gerrymandered, perfectly representative bodies will be\n\n12 the ones to take care of congressional districting.\n\n13 So \n\n14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Clement, I just want\n\n15 to clarify your position. Are you suggesting that the\n\n16 lack of legislative control is at issue only or are you\n\n17 saying that we have to overturn Hildebrant and Smiley?\n\n18 MR. CLEMENT: Oh, you certainly don't have\n\n19 to overturn Hildebrant and Smiley. We actually think\n\n20 that those decisions cut in our favor because what those\n\n21 decisions stand for is, Smiley in particular I mean,\n\n22 the Court was emphatic that the legislature was a term\n\n23 of certain meaning at the Constitution, at the framing\n\n24 of the Constitution, that it means then what it means\n\n25 now, which is a representative body of the people.\n\n\n 4\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[5] " Official\n\n\n1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's sort of hard to\n\n2 understand because we made it very clear in Smiley and\n\n3 in Hildebrant that we're defining legislature in this\n\n4 clause as meaning legislative process.\n\n5 MR. CLEMENT: With with all due respect,\n\n6 I disagree. This Court heard the argument in the briefs\n\n7 in Smiley, and one side was saying just that. The \n\n8 one side was saying, oh, legislature just means the\n\n9 legislative process in the State, whatever that is. The\n\n10 other side said, no, it means the representative body of\n\n11 the people.\n\n12 And this Court said, well, actually we don't\n\n13 have to decide that dispute, but we certainly agree that\n\n14 it means the representative body of the people, just as\n\n15 we said five years earlier in the Hawke case. So what\n\n16 the Court said is, first, the delegee is clearly the\n\n17 legislature, the representative body of the people.\n\n18 But that brings you, then, to the second\n\n19 question, which is what kind of authority is delegated\n\n20 to the State legislatures. And the authority that's\n\n21 granted under the Elections Clause is a lawmaking\n\n22 authority, so that means that the State legislature has\n\n23 to engage in lawmaking subject to the normal rules \n\n24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I but but this\n\n25 makes no sense to me, because I think it's an either/or.\n\n\n 5\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[6] " Official\n\n\n1 If the legislature has the power, how can the governor\n\n2 veto it? How can a popular referendum veto it? Either\n\n3 they have the power or they don't.\n\n4 MR. CLEMENT: I disagree \n\n5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And if a State\n\n6 constitution says that the people hold the power and\n\n7 they can choose a commission or however else they want\n\n8 to do it, isn't that the legislative process?\n\n9 MR. CLEMENT: No, it's not. But, I mean, I\n\n10 disagree with you, Justice Sotomayor, but that's not\n\n11 particularly important.\n\n12 I actually think the Court in Smiley\n\n13 disagrees with that way of thinking about it. What they\n\n14 say is that the delegee remains the same. Here, as in\n\n15 Hawke, it is the State legislature, the representative\n\n16 body. They say the function differs, so when the State\n\n17 legislature is told that it can elect somebody or ratify\n\n18 something, then there's no partial agency of anybody\n\n19 else in that process. But when they're told to\n\n20 prescribe rules, the Court says that's a delegation of\n\n21 lawmaking authority, so of course you delegate of\n\n22 course the State legislature does its lawmaking pursuant\n\n23 to the ordinary rules. And if the ordinary rules\n\n24 provide for a gubernatorial veto, if they say that it\n\n25 has to spend 30 days in committee, then those rules\n\n\n 6\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[7] " Official\n\n\n1 apply to the lawmaking under the Elections Clause, just\n\n2 as they would to other lawmaking.\n\n3 But it's a completely different matter to\n\n4 say we're going to cut the State legislature out\n\n5 entirely, and we are going to revisit the framers'\n\n6 decision to delegate this important responsibility to\n\n7 the State legislatures. And we're going to redelegate\n\n8 it to an entirely different body and a body that has the\n\n9 one feature we know that a representative body doesn't\n\n10 have, which is this commission is completely unelected\n\n11 and completely unaccountable to the people.\n\n12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Could Congress could\n\n13 Congress do that? Could Congress substitute this\n\n14 commission for the State's legislature?\n\n15 MR. CLEMENT: I don't believe that Congress\n\n16 could say that at the State level, we're going to\n\n17 redelegate this authority from the State legislatures to\n\n18 the State commissions or to independent commissions. If\n\n19 Congress wants to do it itself on the Federal level and\n\n20 set up some sort of Federal commission, I think that\n\n21 would be a very different issue because obviously\n\n22 Congress has power under the second subclause.\n\n23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But couldn't could\n\n24 Congress bless what Arizona has done by saying that's a\n\n25 matter in which Federal elections will be held?\n\n\n 7\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[8] " Official\n\n\n1 MR. CLEMENT: I don't think they could\n\n2 simply bless what Arizona has done because I think that\n\n3 would amount to revisiting the judgment that the framers\n\n4 made in the first subclause.\n\n5 I think that they could if they wanted\n\n6 to, Congress could say, we're going to actually take\n\n7 those commission districts and we're going to make them\n\n8 our own, and we're going to impose them. But that would\n\n9 be different.\n\n10 JUSTICE KENNEDY: So you're saying it has to\n\n11 be a Federal commission or a State commission, but if\n\n12 it's the latter, it can be only the legislature.\n\n13 MR. CLEMENT: I I think that's right.\n\n14 Though, of course, it could be an advisory commission.\n\n15 What we object to is not just the idea that\n\n16 there is a commission. What we object to is the\n\n17 permanent wresting of authority from the State\n\n18 legislature.\n\n19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Suppose you had a a law\n\n20 that said that the reapportion commission has must\n\n21 submit its proposal to the legislature, and the\n\n22 legislature has 30 days and can overturn it only by a\n\n23 threequarters vote.\n\n24 MR. CLEMENT: I think, Justice Kennedy, that\n\n25 would be a harder case. And I think that this Court,\n\n\n 8\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[9] " Official\n\n\n1 however they decide this case, could decide that either\n\n2 way.\n\n3 Now, the question I think you would ask is:\n\n4 Does that residual authority for the State legislature\n\n5 there amount to the authority to prescribed districts?\n\n6 And I think you could decide that either way. You could\n\n7 say, well, they're not cut out completely. They have\n\n8 the residual authority, and threefourths is tough, but\n\n9 maybe you can get it done. Or you could say and I\n\n10 think this might be the better view in my view but\n\n11 you could say, no, what you can do under Smiley and\n\n12 Hildebrandt is apply the ordinary rules for legislation\n\n13 to the State legislatures, but what you can't do is come\n\n14 up with some separate rules that apply only to\n\n15 congressional redistricting and make it much harder for\n\n16 the State legislature to act.\n\n17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Your phrase \"completely\n\n18 cut out\" probably answers the question, what about voter\n\n19 ID laws, what about absentee ballots, and so forth that\n\n20 are provisions enacted by referendum?\n\n21 MR. CLEMENT: Right.\n\n22 JUSTICE KENNEDY: You would say those are\n\n23 okay because the legislature is not completely cut out?\n\n24 MR. CLEMENT: I would say probably so.\n\n25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Or you \n\n\n 9\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[10] " Official\n\n\n1 MR. CLEMENT: I think it might depend on the\n\n2 details a little bit.\n\n3 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, Mr. Clement, how about\n\n4 that, because I thought that the legislature was\n\n5 completely cut out as to most of those things. I mean,\n\n6 you take the 2011 law in Mississippi adopting voter ID\n\n7 requirements; 2007, Oregon, voting by mail; 1962,\n\n8 Arkansas, use of voting machines. All of things \n\n9 these things were done by referendum or by initiative\n\n10 with the legislative process completely cut out. So\n\n11 would all of those be unconstitutional as well?\n\n12 And we can go further. I mean, there are\n\n13 zillions of these laws.\n\n14 MR. CLEMENT: Yes. And and let me\n\n15 address those laws, Justice Kagan, and also be\n\n16 responsive to Justice Kennedy.\n\n17 I think there is if you look at the\n\n18 various laws that are put in the Appellees' appendix,\n\n19 not one of those State constitutional provisions\n\n20 purports to, on its face, redelegate authority away from\n\n21 the State legislatures. And to the contrary, many of\n\n22 them, roughly half I counted 27 actually delegate\n\n23 authority to the State legislatures to implement them.\n\n24 So if you want to look at the North Carolina provision\n\n25 on page 27 \n\n\n 10\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[11] " Official\n\n\n1 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, they're not\n\n2 delegations or nondelegations. All they are is laws\n\n3 that are passed not through the legislative process.\n\n4 MR. CLEMENT: Exactly.\n\n5 JUSTICE KAGAN: Not through the legislature.\n\n6 MR. CLEMENT: Exactly. We don't think\n\n7 that's the defect here.\n\n8 JUSTICE KAGAN: No, but, I mean, my gosh. I\n\n9 would think that if your primary argument is legislature\n\n10 means legislature, that there has to be a legislative\n\n11 control, in none of these laws is there legislative\n\n12 control. There's no legislative participation at all.\n\n13 MR. CLEMENT: See, Justice Kagan, we\n\n14 distinguish two situations. We could be here saying,\n\n15 you know, the problem with Proposition 106 is that\n\n16 simply that it was done by initiative and not by the\n\n17 legislature, but that's actually not our position. We\n\n18 would have the same objections here if this were imposed\n\n19 by gubernatorial edict.\n\n20 And we know that the rule that should emerge\n\n21 from this case is not that nobody but the legislature\n\n22 can ever do anything with elections on a oneoff basis,\n\n23 and the way we know that is this Court has already said\n\n24 that it's okay for a judicial body let's like a State\n\n25 court, to do redistricting on a oneoff basis.\n\n\n 11\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[12] " Official\n\n\n1 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, how do you how do\n\n2 you make that consistent with the text that you are \n\n3 the textual argument that you are making? The textual\n\n4 argument that you are making is legislature means\n\n5 legislature. There's no two ways around that. But now\n\n6 you're saying that there are these many, many, many laws\n\n7 throughout the United States in which the rules are not\n\n8 being made by a legislature. And that's perfectly okay\n\n9 because the legislature isn't involved at all.\n\n10 MR. CLEMENT: Two things, Justice Kagan.\n\n11 See, our position is not the problem here is that\n\n12 somebody else got into the legislature's lane and\n\n13 purported to do something about elections. Our problem\n\n14 is once they got in that lane, they decided to wrest the\n\n15 legislature from that process entirely on a permanent\n\n16 basis.\n\n17 Now, as to a more specific answer to your\n\n18 question, I would invoke this Court's case in McPherson\n\n19 against Blacker which dealt with an analogous clause in\n\n20 Article II that gives the State legislatures the\n\n21 authority to prescribe the rules for presidential\n\n22 electors. And what this Court said there it took\n\n23 sort of a practical view of the matter, which is, look,\n\n24 if if the State legislature sort of lets other parts\n\n25 of the State do something, we're not going to jump in.\n\n\n 12\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[13] " Official\n\n\n1 We can sort of think about those as delegation of\n\n2 authorities. But the words in each \"in the\n\n3 legislatures thereof\" means something in the\n\n4 Constitution, and what they mean is it protects the\n\n5 legislature from other parts of the State coming in and\n\n6 permanently wresting that authority away \n\n7 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, I thought that the \n\n8 that generally in our separation of powers\n\n9 jurisprudence, abdication is just as consequential as\n\n10 aggrandizement.\n\n11 In other words, it doesn't matter what the\n\n12 legislature wants. The legislature could have said, oh,\n\n13 that's fine, go do it, we don't care about it. If there\n\n14 is a problem, the problem continues to exist\n\n15 irrespective of whether the legislature protests or not.\n\n16 MR. CLEMENT: Well, that's not the way the\n\n17 Court approached this issue in McPherson. And I would\n\n18 suggest that it's the same way to approach it here,\n\n19 which is to say, I think the Court recognized in\n\n20 McPherson I would certainly say it's the right view\n\n21 that nothing would prevent a State legislature from\n\n22 delegating its authority to one of these commissions.\n\n23 That's not the problem. The problem is that\n\n24 the law either by initiative or gubernatorial edict\n\n25 would be the same from without comes in and says, no,\n\n\n 13\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[14] " Official\n\n\n1 the framers thought it would be great for this to be in\n\n2 the State legislature. We disagree. We're going to\n\n3 give this power permanently \n\n4 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Suppose suppose the\n\n5 legislature proposed the initiative or the referendum \n\n6 the referendum.\n\n7 MR. CLEMENT: I don't think that would\n\n8 ultimately make a difference in my own view, but I think\n\n9 that would be a different case.\n\n10 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, but that that \n\n11 MR. CLEMENT: And you could argue \n\n12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: That's a case in which the\n\n13 legislature has, itself, made the decision.\n\n14 MR. CLEMENT: Right. And so, I mean, that's\n\n15 not the situation we're dealing with here. I do think\n\n16 that you if what they did is propose a referendum\n\n17 that then permanently wrested the authority, so they\n\n18 couldn't get it back.\n\n19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, it's not completely\n\n20 remote because the legislature in Arizona correct me\n\n21 if I'm wrong can seek to overturn what the commission\n\n22 does by putting its own referendum before the voters\n\n23 saying, please, voters, change this proposal for or\n\n24 change this districting plan and enact a different one.\n\n25 I suppose the legislature can do that. It has a it\n\n\n 14\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[15] " Official\n\n\n1 has the power to submit a referendum or an initiative\n\n2 to I guess, a referendum to to the Arizona to\n\n3 Arizona.\n\n4 MR. CLEMENT: I \n\n5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I think I'm right about\n\n6 that.\n\n7 MR. CLEMENT: I think they would have the\n\n8 power to do an initiative. I don't think they would\n\n9 have to do the power to do a referendum.\n\n10 One of the ironies is that my friends on the\n\n11 other side like to talk about the power of the people,\n\n12 but the maps that the commission promulgates are not\n\n13 subject to override by referendum the way the maps of\n\n14 the legislature were before Proposition 106 passed.\n\n15 So I think all the legislature could do is\n\n16 what any citizen could do which is to propose an\n\n17 alternative map by initiative process. But whatever\n\n18 that is, that's not the primary power to prescribe\n\n19 congressional districts or to make election regulations.\n\n20 That puts the State legislature on the same plain as the\n\n21 people, and we know \n\n22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So please tell me \n\n23 JUSTICE SCALIA: Do I understand you to say\n\n24 that it would be okay if the legislature itself\n\n25 established this commission?\n\n\n 15\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[16] " Official\n\n\n1 MR. CLEMENT: I would I would take the\n\n2 position that that is okay because that is a delegation\n\n3 of authority. If you disagree with me, I mean, you\n\n4 know, you may disagree with me, but I think my position\n\n5 is consistent with what this Court said in the McPherson\n\n6 case about the authority of the State legislatures to\n\n7 prescribe rules for electorates. They can delegate that\n\n8 to some commission and come up with it that way, but if\n\n9 they want to take the authority back, as they did in\n\n10 the in the Michigan piece of legislation at issue in\n\n11 McPherson, you bet they can do that, and if the State\n\n12 tries to stop them from taking it back, that's a\n\n13 constitutional problem.\n\n14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So \n\n15 JUSTICE KAGAN: So tell me, Mr. Clement,\n\n16 there's the State sets up this independent commission\n\n17 and the independent commission has a veto power on the\n\n18 State's redistricting. In other words, the State can do\n\n19 redistricting and then it submits it to the independent\n\n20 commission, and the independent commission can say, No,\n\n21 go back, do it again.\n\n22 MR. CLEMENT: Well, if I mean, I guess it\n\n23 depends a little bit on the details of how that works\n\n24 and whether who's got the ultimate last say in the\n\n25 matter.\n\n\n 16\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[17] " Official\n\n\n1 JUSTICE KAGAN: They have the veto. That's\n\n2 that's who has the veto, the independent commission.\n\n3 MR. CLEMENT: And is it a veto that can be\n\n4 overridden or is it just a permanent veto?\n\n5 JUSTICE KAGAN: Does it matter?\n\n6 MR. CLEMENT: I think it does or at least\n\n7 arguably it does. At the end of the day, the way I\n\n8 mean, let me say two things about that. One is, that\n\n9 would give the legislature an awful lot more authority\n\n10 than Arizona is allowed here, so it is a different case.\n\n11 The principle that would allow you to decide that case\n\n12 is to ask yourself the question of whether or not it\n\n13 allows the State legislature to prescribe the\n\n14 congressional districts. Now, you could \n\n15 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, kind of it doesn't,\n\n16 right, because there's a veto at the end of it.\n\n17 MR. CLEMENT: Kind of it doesn't, kind of it\n\n18 does, which is why it's a hard case that you can wait\n\n19 for another day to decide.\n\n20 JUSTICE KAGAN: All right. I'll take out\n\n21 the \"kind of.\" It doesn't. There's a veto at the end\n\n22 of this.\n\n23 MR. CLEMENT: If if if you think it\n\n24 doesn't then you should decide that case in favor of the\n\n25 State legislature. I think \n\n\n 17\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[18] " Official\n\n\n1 JUSTICE KAGAN: But that's what so this\n\n2 is what we're going to have to do for every time that\n\n3 they set up some process in which there's some\n\n4 independent commission involvement, what we're going to\n\n5 have to ask is what exactly?\n\n6 MR. CLEMENT: Whether or not it's consistent\n\n7 with the Constitution and what the Constitution \n\n8 JUSTICE KAGAN: No. That's that's just\n\n9 I mean tell me exactly how we're going to decide all\n\n10 these cases in which an advisory commission plays some\n\n11 role, but not not just some role, a very, very\n\n12 serious role, but there's a little piece that's left to\n\n13 the legislature.\n\n14 MR. CLEMENT: I don't think it's going to be\n\n15 that hard, Justice Kagan, and let's look at the\n\n16 commissions that exist in the real world, okay? You\n\n17 have some that are purely advisory. Now, nothing in our\n\n18 theory suggests that they are constitutionally\n\n19 problematic.\n\n20 You have others that are what are called\n\n21 backup commissions, which is they don't have a veto, but\n\n22 if the legislature, because there's a stalemate and one\n\n23 house is the democrats, one house is the republicans,\n\n24 they just can't get it done, then a backup commission\n\n25 comes in. I don't think that's problematic.\n\n\n 18\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[19] " Official\n\n\n1 JUSTICE KAGAN: What if the commission says,\n\n2 We're going to give you two maps, the legislature has to\n\n3 pick one and only one?\n\n4 MR. CLEMENT: I would think that that's\n\n5 probably unconstitutional, but I don't think that I\n\n6 mean, you know, obviously if \n\n7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But why is that\n\n8 unconstitutional and an impasse in the legislature and\n\n9 leaving it then to a thirdparty who is not the\n\n10 legislature, why is that constitutional? That's what\n\n11 you just said, that's constitutional.\n\n12 MR. CLEMENT: It is, and the reason I say\n\n13 that is because if the legislature has the primary\n\n14 authority and they can't get it done, then we know, as a\n\n15 matter of fact, that somebody else is going to provide\n\n16 that rule. Now, if they don't provide if the\n\n17 legislature gets stalemate, what happens in the real\n\n18 world of course is you can't use the existing maps\n\n19 because they violate one vote oneperson, onevote\n\n20 principles and so the State courts come in.\n\n21 Now, if a \n\n22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So that bypasses 2a(c)\n\n23 altogether?\n\n24 MR. CLEMENT: Well, sure, because everybody,\n\n25 I think, wants to bypass 2a(c) because everybody knows\n\n\n 19\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[20] " Official\n\n\n1 that at the end of that rainbow is an unconstitutional\n\n2 Federal default rule that violates oneperson, onevote\n\n3 principles.\n\n4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could I ask you this\n\n5 simple question? I know you're going to say it's a\n\n6 constitutional requirement, but if I read Hildebrant and\n\n7 Smiley differently, and I think there's plenty of\n\n8 language in there to suggest so, but if I read it\n\n9 differently to say that what the Election Clause means\n\n10 is the legislative process, isn't that just simple? We\n\n11 never have to worry about how the States experiment,\n\n12 what they do in their own selfgovernance. Why is that\n\n13 a Federal interest?\n\n14 MR. CLEMENT: Well, the Federal interest is\n\n15 because the framers thought long and hard about this\n\n16 issue and they decided \n\n17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No, they didn't,\n\n18 actually. When you look at the the the\n\n19 legislative history on this, the Federalists' papers,\n\n20 not a whole lot on this particular clause.\n\n21 MR. CLEMENT: Well, there actually is a\n\n22 tremendous amount on this particular clause. If you're\n\n23 making the point that there's less about the first\n\n24 subclause than the second subclause, I suppose I would\n\n25 grant you that, but part of the reason there was less\n\n\n 20\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[21] " Official\n\n\n1 discussion of the first subclause is it seemed so\n\n2 remarkably obvious to the framers that if this was going\n\n3 to be done at the State level by anyone, of course it\n\n4 would be done by the representative body of the people.\n\n5 And it's not like they didn't know about\n\n6 popular lawmaking. It's not like they didn't have the\n\n7 conception of what a referendum would be or an\n\n8 initiative would be, they simply said, We like\n\n9 representative government, because that way they \n\n10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought I thought \n\n11 Mr. Clement, I thought that the initiative and\n\n12 referendum came in later, that at the time of the\n\n13 founding, and the initiative and the referendum weren't\n\n14 used by State legislatures.\n\n15 MR. CLEMENT: They weren't in the\n\n16 initiative and the referendum as we came to know them in\n\n17 the early early 20th century, late 19th century were\n\n18 not in used at frame the time of the framing, but\n\n19 direct democracy was. I mean, the framers themselves\n\n20 said there ought to be conventions to approve the\n\n21 Constitution, not they shouldn't be approved just by\n\n22 votes of the State legislature.\n\n23 The framers when they formulated Article V\n\n24 and had alternative mechanisms that the Federal Congress\n\n25 could choose to provide for ratification, they gave the\n\n\n 21\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[22] " Official\n\n\n1 choice of State legislatures or the people in\n\n2 convention.\n\n3 So the Congress the framers understood\n\n4 the difference between direct democracy and\n\n5 representative democracy, and they made a conscious\n\n6 choice. And indeed, it's really hard to argue that the\n\n7 framers didn't know the difference between the people\n\n8 and the State legislatures in the context of Federal\n\n9 elections, because there they are creating a house\n\n10 elected by the people and a senate appointed by the\n\n11 State legislatures, and when they get to the voter\n\n12 qualification clause they say, Well, the people are\n\n13 going to vote for the Congress and how do we define the\n\n14 people that get to vote for the Congress? They're the\n\n15 same people that get to vote for the most numerous body\n\n16 in the State house. So at various points the framers\n\n17 obviously demonstrated \n\n18 JUSTICE KAGAN: But you see, Mr. Clement,\n\n19 that suggests a very pure rule and and on occasion\n\n20 you said something like this, a legislature means a\n\n21 legislature, and that's what it means, and so a\n\n22 legislature has to do all those things.\n\n23 But you've made many, many exemptions to\n\n24 that over the course of the last 20 minutes. You've\n\n25 said that as to anything that's not redistricting, it\n\n\n 22\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[23] " Official\n\n\n1 can be done by referendum or initiative without any\n\n2 legislative process whatsoever. You've said that all\n\n3 these kinds of different schemes about the interaction\n\n4 between a legislature and advisory commission are all\n\n5 going to be have to reviewed on a casebycase basis to\n\n6 determine whether the legislature has primary control.\n\n7 And when you get through with all that, the\n\n8 sort of purity of the originalist argument that a\n\n9 legislature means a legislature, well, we are miles away\n\n10 from that, aren't we?\n\n11 MR. CLEMENT: I don't agree with that,\n\n12 Justice Kagan. I think what I am doing is essentially\n\n13 channeling this Court's decision in Smiley, which said,\n\n14 of course the delegee is the State legislature.\n\n15 Now, when this the State legislature gets to\n\n16 do something, then the questions of whether the\n\n17 constraints that are put on the State legislature\n\n18 actually drawing these lines, those there may be some\n\n19 hard questions about that, but there's no hard question\n\n20 here. This isn't any of your hypotheticals. If the\n\n21 Election Clause means anything, it means that you can't\n\n22 completely cut out of the process the State legislature\n\n23 entirely on a permanent basis.\n\n24 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Suppose that legislative\n\n25 districting plan is challenged either on the oneperson,\n\n\n 23\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[24] " Official\n\n\n1 onevote rule or under the Voting Rights Act, and it\n\n2 goes to a State or Federal court, and it goes a year\n\n3 before the election. Does the State court have an\n\n4 obligation under the Constitution to simply pass on the\n\n5 validity or invalidity of the plan and if it doesn't\n\n6 pass, send it back to the legislature, or can it do its\n\n7 own if an election is approaching?\n\n8 MR. CLEMENT: As I read this Court's cases,\n\n9 Justice Kennedy, what they say is that the the court\n\n10 in that in that instance first of all, there\n\n11 should be a preference for the State courts over the\n\n12 Federal courts, and then the State court favors the\n\n13 legislative process so what they do is, if there's time\n\n14 for the legislature to go back and draw a new map, they\n\n15 give the State \n\n16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And you think that's\n\n17 constitutionally required?\n\n18 MR. CLEMENT: I do think ultimately it's\n\n19 constitutionally required. It's certainly if it's\n\n20 not constitutionally required, it's certainly prudent,\n\n21 and the reason that it's prudent flows from the\n\n22 recognition of this Court time and time again that\n\n23 redistricting is primarily \n\n24 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, we're talking\n\n25 about we're talking about what's required, so if \n\n\n 24\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[25] " Official\n\n\n1 if we rule in your favor, we're going to have to tell\n\n2 every court that's involved in a redistricting\n\n3 litigation that it has to submit it to the legislature.\n\n4 Even if the court made its own plan for one election, I\n\n5 think it would have to submit it to the back to the\n\n6 legislature for the next 8 years \n\n7 MR. CLEMENT: Well, I \n\n8 JUSTICE KENNEDY: under reapportionment\n\n9 schemes.\n\n10 MR. CLEMENT: Well, I think, for the most\n\n11 part, that's what this Court has already said. I mean,\n\n12 White v. Weiser says that in the initial challenge\n\n13 phase, that if there's time, you let the legislature do\n\n14 it.\n\n15 Now, this Court has also said \n\n16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, certainly you\n\n17 mean a redistricting plan, if approved by a court, has\n\n18 to have a fixed deadline? Of course the legislature\n\n19 can, I assume, pass a conforming plan, but the court's\n\n20 plan stays in place until it does. And it seems to me\n\n21 that that's as much of a displacement as what you're\n\n22 talking about here.\n\n23 MR. CLEMENT: Well, Justice \n\n24 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Not as much, but it is a\n\n25 displacement.\n\n\n 25\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[26] " Official\n\n\n1 MR. CLEMENT: Yeah, it is a displacement.\n\n2 It's not as much.\n\n3 I I may have been confusing things. I'm\n\n4 talking about there's two different circumstances,\n\n5 right? One is when the redistricting plan is challenged\n\n6 very early and there's still time for the legislature,\n\n7 essentially, to take a second crack at a\n\n8 constitutionally compliant plan.\n\n9 And I read White v. Weiser to say that if\n\n10 there is that kind of time, then you allow the State\n\n11 legislature to do it, because it's their primary task.\n\n12 Then the second question is, if there's not\n\n13 time and then there is a judicial plan, and let's say\n\n14 the first cycle of elections takes place under the\n\n15 judicial plan. Now, I actually read this Court's cases\n\n16 as generally suggesting, even then, there's nothing that\n\n17 prevents the State legislature, certainly, from going in\n\n18 and redistricting.\n\n19 And this Court, in the Perry case, for\n\n20 example, rejected the idea that it's like you got one\n\n21 shot at this and then you're done for the whole\n\n22 decennial census.\n\n23 Now, there's at least one State, Colorado,\n\n24 that's basically said that if you get into that\n\n25 situation, then you got to live with the judicial plan\n\n\n 26\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[27] " Official\n\n\n1 until the next census; but then the legislature still\n\n2 kicks in and has the primary role.\n\n3 Now, I'm inclined to think that what\n\n4 Colorado has done is inconsistent with the Elections\n\n5 Clause. But, however you decide that issue you can\n\n6 decide it either way your position in accepting our\n\n7 argument here does not foreordain the answer to that\n\n8 question.\n\n9 And that's why I'm I'm very happy to\n\n10 address the hypotheticals, but I do think it's worth\n\n11 remembering that this is about the most extreme case\n\n12 that you're going to have. So if the Election Clause\n\n13 means anything at all in terms of its delegation of this\n\n14 responsibility to the State legislatures, maybe we can\n\n15 talk about taking part of it away, but they can't take\n\n16 the entire thing away on a permanent basis and give it\n\n17 to a commission that's defining feature is that it's not\n\n18 representative.\n\n19 If I may reserve the balance of my time.\n\n20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.\n\n21 Mr. Feigin.\n\n22 ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC J. FEIGIN\n\n23 ON BEHALF OF UNITED STATES, AS AMICUS CURIAE,\n\n24 SUPPORTING APPELLEES\n\n25 MR. FEIGIN: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice,\n\n\n 27\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[28] " Official\n\n\n1 and may it please the Court:\n\n2 I'd like to make one main point on standing\n\n3 before I turn to a couple points on the statutory\n\n4 Section 2a(c) issue.\n\n5 On standing, this is an extremely unusual\n\n6 and unprecedented Federal lawsuit in which a State\n\n7 legislature is asking a Federal court for assurance that\n\n8 if it passed a certain kind of law, which it hasn't even\n\n9 alleged that it's going to pass, the law would be\n\n10 enforced by a defendant State official who hasn't even\n\n11 denied that she would enforce it.\n\n12 We don't normally conceive of legislatures\n\n13 as having an interest, let alone an interest cognizable\n\n14 under Article III, in the enforcement of laws they might\n\n15 pass. And there's nothing in the Arizona Constitution\n\n16 or the decision of the Arizona courts interpreting that\n\n17 constitution \n\n18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Feigin, isn't this a\n\n19 diminution of the power to legislate, not of a\n\n20 particular plan or of a particular law and plan? This\n\n21 is the removal of power from the legislature.\n\n22 MR. FEIGIN: No, it isn't, Your Honor,\n\n23 because I don't think there's anything that actually, as\n\n24 a practical matter, prevents the legislature from\n\n25 passing a bill that would redistrict the State, which\n\n\n 28\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[29] " Official\n\n\n1 they believe, in good faith, that they can do under\n\n2 their view of the Elections Clause.\n\n3 The there are numerous cases, some of\n\n4 which are cited in our brief at page 13, in which the\n\n5 Arizona legislature has passed laws that conflict with a\n\n6 popular initiative or conflict with the Arizona\n\n7 Constitution; and the Arizona courts do treat them as\n\n8 laws. And the consequence of their passage is and\n\n9 their unconstitutionally or their conflict with the\n\n10 initiative is simply that they are not enforceable and\n\n11 their enforcement is enjoined.\n\n12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So you want the\n\n13 legislature to pass a law that's not enforceable \n\n14 MR. FEIGIN: Well \n\n15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: and suggest they\n\n16 don't have standing to challenge what the referendum has\n\n17 done in this case until they go through that process?\n\n18 MR. FEIGIN: Well, Your Honor, I do think,\n\n19 just as in Lujan, the plaintiff had to allege that \n\n20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Which Lujan?\n\n21 MR. FEIGIN: Lujan against Defenders of\n\n22 Wildlife, the second one. The plaintiff had to allege\n\n23 that they were going to buy a plane ticket to go see the\n\n24 Nile crocodile. In order to complain about observation\n\n25 of the Nile crocodile, the legislature here should\n\n\n 29\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[30] " Official\n\n\n1 allege that it's going to do everything in its power to\n\n2 bring this to a head.\n\n3 But let me put to one side the \n\n4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, don't they\n\n5 just have to, under that theory, just allege that they\n\n6 plan to exercise what had, up to this point, been their\n\n7 normal authority to engage in the redistricting?\n\n8 MR. FEIGIN: Well, Your Honor \n\n9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I suspect the fact\n\n10 that they're litigating it implies that they have some\n\n11 interest in doing that.\n\n12 MR. FEIGIN: Well, I think that could be\n\n13 said of almost any litigation. And it may be difficult\n\n14 for them to actually coalesce on some particular\n\n15 redistricting plan, but I don't think that's a reason to\n\n16 excuse them from the normal standing requirements.\n\n17 But if I could just put their the absence\n\n18 of an allegation that they pass a law to one side for a\n\n19 second, let's assume they had passed their own\n\n20 legislative redistricting plan, presented it to the\n\n21 Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State had said,\n\n22 No, I'm going with the commission's plan because that's\n\n23 what State law requires me to do.\n\n24 I still don't think that they would have\n\n25 standing here because, again, legislatures don't have an\n\n\n 30\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[31] " Official\n\n\n1 interest in the enforcement of the laws that they pass,\n\n2 as a general matter.\n\n3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: They have an interest in\n\n4 the constitutional powers they have.\n\n5 MR. FEIGIN: Well, Your Honor, let me give\n\n6 you an example that I think is fairly analogous to this\n\n7 case and really crystallizes the point.\n\n8 Let's suppose that Congress passed a law\n\n9 that preempted State regulation in some area, and let's\n\n10 further suppose there were colorable constitutional\n\n11 challenge to that law.\n\n12 Now, I don't think anyone would believe that\n\n13 the State legislature, acting in its own name, would be\n\n14 the proper party to bring that constitutional challenge\n\n15 on the theory that its police powers have been infringed\n\n16 by the preemptive Federal statute. And although this\n\n17 case arises under the Elections Clause, the Elections\n\n18 Clause, it it doesn't give the State any more\n\n19 lawmaking power than it would ordinarily have if it \n\n20 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Are you saying that \n\n21 MR. FEIGIN: were given an interest in\n\n22 law enforcement.\n\n23 JUSTICE GINSBURG: there's no nobody\n\n24 would have standing, because it seems the legislature,\n\n25 if anyone, has standing, and they are, as an\n\n\n 31\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[32] " Official\n\n\n1 institution, affected.\n\n2 MR. FEIGIN: I think there may be people who\n\n3 are much more directly affected, such as people who\n\n4 might be put into one district versus another. If\n\n5 someone were to bring a Voting Rights Act challenge and\n\n6 have end up with an injury to bring that claim, they\n\n7 could \n\n8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, they have to \n\n9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is it part of our\n\n10 jurisprudence that if it's likely that another person is\n\n11 more directly affected, that that goes into the balance\n\n12 and we say, Well, the legislature doesn't have standing\n\n13 because there are other people out there that are more\n\n14 directly affected? Do we say this in our cases?\n\n15 MR. FEIGIN: No, Your Honor. And I I\n\n16 think, in fact, you say quite the opposite, which is\n\n17 that even if it would mean no one would have standing to\n\n18 sue, that's not a reason to find standing. And we think\n\n19 the legislature simply doesn't have standing to sue here\n\n20 regardless of whether anyone else does.\n\n21 But if the Court were to reach the merits, I\n\n22 want to make a couple of points on the statutory\n\n23 Section 2a(c) issue; and the first is I think the\n\n24 statutory issue is in this case is relatively easy\n\n25 because the Court decided all the relevant issues in\n\n\n 32\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[33] " Official\n\n\n1 Ohio against Hildebrant in construing the nearly\n\n2 wordforword identical language of the 1911 Act.\n\n3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But I don't\n\n4 understand how 2a(c) even applies. It's meant to apply\n\n5 when the State has not, under its law, redistricted.\n\n6 Here, there's no doubt the State has\n\n7 redistricted under its law. The question is whether the\n\n8 law is valid.\n\n9 MR. FEIGIN: Well, sir, Your Honor, I'd like\n\n10 to turn back to Hildebrant in a second; but just to take\n\n11 your question on, I think the operation of the prefatory\n\n12 clause here is best understood in context.\n\n13 A neighboring Federal statute, 2 U.S.C. 2c\n\n14 requires that, as a matter of Federal statutory law,\n\n15 states be divided into districts for the purpose of\n\n16 electing congressional representatives. That makes it a\n\n17 question of Federal statutory law, how that districting\n\n18 requirement is met and whether it is met.\n\n19 And that's the question that Section 2a(c)\n\n20 answers. Section 2a(c) says one of these default\n\n21 procedures that we prescribed is going to apply until a\n\n22 State is redistricted in the manner provided by the law\n\n23 thereof.\n\n24 I think the necessary and logical corollary\n\n25 of that is that once the State is redistricted in the\n\n\n 33\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[34] " Official\n\n\n1 manner divided by the law thereof, those are the\n\n2 districts that are going to be used. It's hard to\n\n3 believe Congress would have expected anything different\n\n4 and, in fact, given that they are legislating in light\n\n5 of Hildebrant, that is exactly what they would have\n\n6 expected.\n\n7 Hildebrant, in construing the nearly\n\n8 identical language of the 1911 Act, said, first of all,\n\n9 that the statutory language had the express purpose to\n\n10 provide the direct democracy features \n\n11 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I had the same thought\n\n12 as the Chief Justice. It would be one thing if Congress\n\n13 passed a law that said a State may apportion\n\n14 congressional districts in any manner consistent with\n\n15 the law of this State. But that's not what this \n\n16 that's not what this statute says.\n\n17 Now, this statute may have been enacted on\n\n18 the assumption that that would be constitutional but\n\n19 it it is not the exercise of congressional authority\n\n20 implementing that. It's just an assumption in which a\n\n21 statute that's otherwise completely irrelevant to this\n\n22 case may have been enacted.\n\n23 MR. FEIGIN: Well, Your Honor, I do think\n\n24 it's quite important that Congress was legislating\n\n25 against the backdrop of Hildebrant. Hildebrant,\n\n\n 34\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[35] " Official\n\n\n1 interpreting the same statutory language, effectively\n\n2 the same in the 1911 Act, found that it had the express\n\n3 purpose to provide the direct democracy procedures could\n\n4 be used in redistricting. The Congress was exercising\n\n5 its power to make effectuate that result insofar as\n\n6 it had the power to do it.\n\n7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Feigin \n\n8 MR. FEIGIN: And then went on to say that\n\n9 Congress did have the power to do it.\n\n10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I guess the bottomline\n\n11 question is: Let's assume 2a(c) said something totally\n\n12 different, which is we removed redistricting from the\n\n13 legislature, and we require every State to pass it by \n\n14 redistricting by referendum.\n\n15 That would are you is your position\n\n16 that Congress has the power to override the\n\n17 Constitution?\n\n18 MR. FEIGIN: Well, Your Honor, I don't think\n\n19 that would exactly be overriding the Constitution. If\n\n20 there were such a law, we might defend it, but I don't\n\n21 think we need to go that far in this case for two\n\n22 important reasons.\n\n23 First, Congress here isn't trying to force\n\n24 upon the States some process that the State doesn't\n\n25 want. Congress is simply trying to recognize that the\n\n\n 35\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[36] " Official\n\n\n1 Federal statutory requirement of districting is\n\n2 satisfied when a State redistricts in the manner that\n\n3 its decided to redistrict under its own procedures. I\n\n4 would think that the power of Congress should be at its\n\n5 apex when both Congress and the State want to do the\n\n6 same thing.\n\n7 The second thing I would say is that in this\n\n8 circumstance \n\n9 JUSTICE SCALIA: No, no, no, not not if\n\n10 the same thing violates the Constitution. I mean, just\n\n11 because Congress agrees with a State that they can do\n\n12 it, does that make it constitutional?\n\n13 MR. FEIGIN: Well, Your \n\n14 JUSTICE SCALIA: The objection here is a\n\n15 constitutional objection.\n\n16 MR. FEIGIN: Well, Your Honor, I do think\n\n17 this is within the authority of Congress. And let me\n\n18 come at it a slightly different way, which is, my friend\n\n19 just said that if the State legislature wanted to, the\n\n20 State legislature could have given this power to the\n\n21 commission. Now, under the second subclause of the\n\n22 Elections Clause, Congress can do anything that a State\n\n23 legislature can do, which means Congress could also give\n\n24 this power to the commission.\n\n25 The only difference between my friend's\n\n\n 36\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[37] " Official\n\n\n1 scenario and mine is that in my friend's scenario, the\n\n2 State legislature would retain the authority to override\n\n3 what the commission had done, but that's always the\n\n4 consequence of congressional legislation versus State\n\n5 legislation. When Congress passes a law of the sort\n\n6 that it’s allowed to pass under the second subclause of\n\n7 the Elections Clause, it's not something that a State\n\n8 legislature can override and it's simply a consequence\n\n9 of Congress's superseding authority and congruent\n\n10 authority under the second subclause of the Elections\n\n11 Clause. I also think that the constitutional \n\n12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Can the second clause be\n\n13 used to revise the first clause? That's what we're\n\n14 talking about here. The second clause can certainly \n\n15 Congress can do something on its own, but can Congress\n\n16 use the second clause to revise what the first clause\n\n17 says?\n\n18 MR. FEIGIN: Well, I guess, Your Honor, one\n\n19 thing I would want to emphasize is that I do think the\n\n20 Court settled this issue in Hildebrant when it said that\n\n21 the predecessor to Section 2a(c) was simply doing\n\n22 something that the Constitution expressly gave the right\n\n23 to do. And I don't think the right way to think about\n\n24 this is to think about Congress using the second\n\n25 subclause to rewrite the first subclause. Congress here\n\n\n 37\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[38] " Official\n\n\n1 is using the second subclause to do something that a\n\n2 State legislature could otherwise have done as my friend\n\n3 acknowledges.\n\n4 Thank you.\n\n5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.\n\n6 Mr. Waxman.\n\n7 ORAL ARGUMENT BY SETH P. WAXMAN\n\n8 ON BEHALF OF APPELLEES\n\n9 MR. WAXMAN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it\n\n10 please the Court:\n\n11 The gravamen of Appellant's suit that the\n\n12 people \"usurped\" a power of a legislative body that they\n\n13 created both raises a claim that the framers would have\n\n14 been astonished to consider that Federal district courts\n\n15 have jurisdiction to adjudicate and more fundamentally,\n\n16 is simply misconceived. Arizona defines its legislature\n\n17 in its Constitution to include both the people and two\n\n18 representative bodies. And Appellant's argument hinges\n\n19 on the premise that in drafting the Elections Clause,\n\n20 the framers intended to ignore a State's definition of\n\n21 its own legislature.\n\n22 It is deeply inconsistent with \n\n23 JUSTICE SCALIA: Whatever the State calls a\n\n24 legislature suffices under the under the Federal\n\n25 Constitution; is that right?\n\n\n 38\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[39] " Official\n\n\n1 MR. WAXMAN: The Federal \n\n2 JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, suppose the State\n\n3 says the courts are are the legislature. Will that\n\n4 suffice under the Federal Constitution?\n\n5 MR. WAXMAN: The Federal Justice Scalia,\n\n6 the Federal Constitution by using the word \"legislature\"\n\n7 in connection with its the uniform accepted\n\n8 definition of that term in the founding generation. And\n\n9 we've cited both Noah Webster and Samuel Johnson's\n\n10 dictionaries. But all of them are in accord it was\n\n11 understood that \"legislature\" meant the body that makes\n\n12 the laws.\n\n13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Give me give me one\n\n14 provision of the Constitution that uses the term\n\n15 \"legislature\" that clearly was not meant to apply to the\n\n16 body that of representatives of the people that \n\n17 that makes the laws.\n\n18 MR. WAXMAN: There is no provision \n\n19 JUSTICE SCALIA: All I want is one provision\n\n20 of the Constitution that that clearly has your\n\n21 meaning. And I looked through through them all. I\n\n22 can't find a single one.\n\n23 MR. WAXMAN: Well, the one that most clearly\n\n24 has our meaning, which accords with understanding, is\n\n25 the one in that this Court has said in Hildebrant and\n\n\n 39\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[40] " Official\n\n\n1 in Smiley and \n\n2 JUSTICE SCALIA: Oh, it's this one. This is\n\n3 the only one.\n\n4 MR. WAXMAN: This may or may not be the only\n\n5 one. It may very well be \n\n6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, if it's it's\n\n7 not it's not \n\n8 JUSTICE KENNEDY : For until 1913, for\n\n9 close to a hundred years, many States wanted to have\n\n10 direct election of the senators and they had all sorts\n\n11 of proposals, they had primaries and not one State, not\n\n12 one State displaced the legislature. It took the\n\n13 Seventeenth Amendment to do that.\n\n14 MR. WAXMAN: That's correct. And as \n\n15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: It seems to me that\n\n16 that that that history works very much against you\n\n17 because the the term \"legislature\" is not in the\n\n18 Constitution. Now it's been taken out by the\n\n19 Seventeenth Amendment. The senators shall be chosen by\n\n20 the legislature. And there was no suggestion that this\n\n21 could be displaced.\n\n22 MR. WAXMAN: So, Your Honor Justice\n\n23 Kennedy, there is no question, as this Court has\n\n24 explained repeatedly first in Smith v. Hawk, which\n\n25 distinguished Hildebrant and the legislative power that\n\n\n 40\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[41] " Official\n\n\n1 is addressed in Article Section 1 from the election of\n\n2 senators in Article I, Section 3. And again, in Smiley\n\n3 that made clear that the meaning as this Court\n\n4 reiterated just last week in Yates that the meaning\n\n5 of a term in an enactment may differ depending on the\n\n6 function that the term is serving.\n\n7 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Wait. Now now you're\n\n8 going to the statute. But just under the Constitution,\n\n9 you're you're saying that legislature in the first\n\n10 article of Section 3, the now repealed section that\n\n11 talks about it \n\n12 MR. WAXMAN: Correct.\n\n13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: choosing senators means\n\n14 something different than what it means in the following\n\n15 section in the same article.\n\n16 MR. WAXMAN: That's correct. And as this\n\n17 Court explained in Smith v. Hawk, which was which was\n\n18 decided, which was an Article V question of the meaning\n\n19 of the word \"legislature\" for purposes of ratification.\n\n20 In Smith v. Hawk, this Court said that in the Article I,\n\n21 Section 3 election of senators by the legislature and in\n\n22 Article V, the ratification power, what was at issue was\n\n23 a power that is the power to elect and the power to\n\n24 ratify that specifically comported with the elected\n\n25 representative body, and it used those as examples the\n\n\n 41\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[42] " Official\n\n\n1 Court said where often, Justice Kennedy, often the term\n\n2 legislature in the Constitution has that meaning.\n\n3 But it then Smith then goes on and\n\n4 distinguishes Hildebrant on precisely the grounds that\n\n5 we are urging, that what was at issue in Hildebrant\n\n6 under the Elections Clause is not a particular body, a\n\n7 brick and mortar legislature necessarily, it is the\n\n8 legislative power of the State. In fact \n\n9 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, I understand\n\n10 Hildebrant is very is very helpful to you. But to\n\n11 get back to Justice Scalia's question. Is there any\n\n12 other provision where legislature means anything other\n\n13 than the conventional meaning? How about applying for a\n\n14 constitutional convention? Calling on the President to\n\n15 send in troops to suppress domestic violence. Creating\n\n16 a new State out of part of of the State of Arizona,\n\n17 for example. Those all those provisions use the term\n\n18 \"legislature.\" Does it mean anything other than the \n\n19 than the conventional meaning of \"legislature\"?\n\n20 MR. WAXMAN: I don't I don't know the\n\n21 answer to that question. My \n\n22 JUSTICE ALITO: It might. Do you think it\n\n23 might?\n\n24 MR. WAXMAN: Well, this Court has never said\n\n25 that it doesn't. It's never said that it does. It has\n\n\n 42\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[43] " Official\n\n\n1 focused a lot of attention on three particular uses of\n\n2 the word \"legislature\" in the Constitution. The Article\n\n3 V ratification power, the former Article I, Section 3\n\n4 power to elect senators in the legislative body. And\n\n5 the Article I, Section 4 power to make the laws in the\n\n6 provision that's at issue here. And I think it's\n\n7 particularly important. I want to get to the language\n\n8 of Smiley, which my friend embraces, but I think \n\n9 JUSTICE BREYER: I'd like you to because as\n\n10 I read those two cases, they don't help you very much.\n\n11 I mean, Hildebrant is talking about a particular statute\n\n12 that was passed in 1911 and it helps the government with\n\n13 its statutory argument because a different statute uses\n\n14 similar words, but we don't know if it was with the same\n\n15 intent.\n\n16 Smiley talks about a sitting legislature and\n\n17 asks whether its exercise of mapdrawing power is a\n\n18 legislative exercise or, say, more like an impeachment\n\n19 exercise. It doesn't talk about what's at issue here,\n\n20 where you have people outside that building making the\n\n21 judicial making a legislative decision.\n\n22 So I didn't see those two cases as helping\n\n23 you that much, though please argue to the contrary. But\n\n24 I think the great open question here is: What happens\n\n25 when legislative power, over time, expands from a group\n\n\n 43\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[44] " Official\n\n\n1 of people sitting in the State's capitol to those people\n\n2 plus a referendum? And there, I don't find much help in\n\n3 the cases one way or the other.\n\n4 MR. WAXMAN: Well, Justice Breyer, I think\n\n5 that both that Hildebrant, Smiley, Hawke, and also\n\n6 this Court's the a case that this Court decided a\n\n7 few months after Smiley, and that was block quoted in\n\n8 the Court's opinion last week in Yates, the Atlantic\n\n9 Cleaners & Dyers case, all strongly support the reading\n\n10 of the word the meaning of the word \"legislature\"\n\n11 that we advocate, and that was, in fact, the consensus\n\n12 definition of \"legislature.\" And I agree with you that\n\n13 I'm \n\n14 JUSTICE SCALIA: The consensus definition,\n\n15 although you cannot give us a single instance in the\n\n16 Constitution in which it is clearly used, in which the\n\n17 consensus definition was clearly used? I don't think it\n\n18 was a consensus definition at all. You've plucked that\n\n19 out of out of a couple of dictionaries.\n\n20 MR. WAXMAN: Justice \n\n21 JUSTICE SCALIA: It was referring to \n\n22 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, the dictionaries, I\n\n23 take it, are your support. They say how the word is\n\n24 used. And no one defines the dictionary definition of\n\n25 \"legislature\" as \"the power\" we don't use that word\n\n\n 44\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[45] " Official\n\n\n1 \"power\" in this sense much anymore but \"the power\n\n2 that legislates.\" The power that legislates in Arizona\n\n3 is the people in the capitol plus the referendums and\n\n4 the initiatives.\n\n5 MR. WAXMAN: I I will address the cases,\n\n6 Justice Breyer, let me if I may just first \n\n7 JUSTICE BREYER: Yeah.\n\n8 MR. WAXMAN: respond to Justice Scalia's\n\n9 assertion.\n\n10 One thing is for sure: If there were any\n\n11 other Constitution if there were any other dictionary\n\n12 that had a different principal meaning, we would have\n\n13 seen it in the briefing in this case. But you only have\n\n14 to look at the framers' own use of the term. If I may:\n\n15 Charles Pinckney, for example these are collected at\n\n16 pages 39 and 40 of our brief Charles Pinckney, for\n\n17 example, who was who wanted to do away with the\n\n18 second part of the clause that gave Congress any power\n\n19 because he thought it was an impairment on the State's\n\n20 rights, said, quote, that \"America is a republic where\n\n21 the people at large, either collectively or by\n\n22 representation, form the legislature.\"\n\n23 Madison made clear in discussing the\n\n24 Constitution that when he referred to, quote, \"the\n\n25 legislatures of the States,\" he meant the existing\n\n\n 45\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[46] " Official\n\n\n1 authorities in the States that comprised the legislative\n\n2 branch of government. James Wilson repeatedly\n\n3 interspersed legislature, States, and the people acting\n\n4 by democracy.\n\n5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. Let's say let's\n\n6 say that \"legislature\" means the body we normally can\n\n7 think of as the legislature; however, at the time, there\n\n8 was no such thing as the referendum or the initiative.\n\n9 So when the dictionaries referred to \"the power\" \"the\n\n10 power that makes laws,\" it was always the legislature.\n\n11 It was never the people at large, because there was no\n\n12 such thing as as the referendum. Now that there is\n\n13 such a thing as a referendum, what about saying, \"Okay;\n\n14 'legislature' means what everybody knows a legislature\n\n15 is, plus the full citizenry, which is a level higher of\n\n16 democracy\"? But what we have here is not a level higher\n\n17 of democracy. It's it's giving this power to an\n\n18 unelected body of five people that, you know, that \n\n19 could could that body as it's as it's\n\n20 constituted here, two of them are elected, or selected,\n\n21 by the majority party, two selected by the minority\n\n22 party. What if what if Arizona decided all four\n\n23 would be selected by the majority party?\n\n24 MR. WAXMAN: Well, any Justice \n\n25 JUSTICE SCALIA: Would that be okay?\n\n\n 46\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[47] " Official\n\n\n1 MR. WAXMAN: Justice Scalia, any delegation\n\n2 question the issue in this case is: What does the\n\n3 word \"legislature\" mean? My friend concedes that\n\n4 whatever the legislature is, it can delegate its\n\n5 authority. So the delegation questions I mean, I'll\n\n6 endorse whatever, I believe, my friend would say.\n\n7 Because the Arizona legislature has delegated all manner\n\n8 of time, place, and manner regulations to a single\n\n9 person, both the Secretary of State and executive\n\n10 officer, and the the the individual counties that\n\n11 set the precinct places, the the places where you can\n\n12 vote, where you can register, et cetera. So delegation,\n\n13 I don't think is in this case.\n\n14 The question is: What is the legislature?\n\n15 And if your question is: Well, you know, now we know\n\n16 that there's something called an initiative of\n\n17 course, that we knew this, you know, 120 years ago\n\n18 when the first States first adopt started reserving\n\n19 in their constitutions legislative power to the people\n\n20 by initiative. But just to to echo something that\n\n21 Justice Kagan adverted to in the earlier argument, there\n\n22 are any we're talking here about a construction of\n\n23 the word \"legislature\" as to all time, place, or manner\n\n24 regulations. If \n\n25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Doesn't your why\n\n\n 47\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[48] " Official\n\n\n1 doesn't your interpretation make the words \"by the\n\n2 legislature thereof\" entirely superfluous? In other\n\n3 words, why didn't they just say that the rules would be\n\n4 prescribed by each State?\n\n5 MR. WAXMAN: Because \n\n6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Because any way \n\n7 MR. WAXMAN: as \n\n8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm sorry.\n\n9 MR. WAXMAN: Because as the Court explained\n\n10 in Smiley, what the framers wanted was it to be done by\n\n11 a legislation. That is, it wanted a, quote, \"complete\n\n12 code\" of holding congressional elections to be enacted.\n\n13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but I would\n\n14 have thought I understood your argument to be that as\n\n15 long as it's an exercise of legislative power, that it's\n\n16 satisfied. And if you have, for example, a governor\n\n17 doing it, it presumably would be pursuant to a\n\n18 delegation, either from the people or from the\n\n19 legislature. But either way, nothing happens until\n\n20 there's an exercise of lawmaking power by the State. So\n\n21 it should have been sufficient for the drafters of the\n\n22 Constitution to simply say it should be prescribed by\n\n23 each State, whether they do it by referendum, whether\n\n24 they do it by initiative, whether they do it by what is\n\n25 commonly understood to be the legislature, whether they\n\n\n 48\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[49] " Official\n\n\n1 do it by committee, whatever. It's up to the State.\n\n2 And then saying \"by the legislature\" seems, as I said,\n\n3 totally superfluous.\n\n4 MR. WAXMAN: It is up to the power in each\n\n5 State that makes the laws. And as to Justice Scalia's\n\n6 hypothetical about, you know, could they could they\n\n7 just delegate it to the chair or the State Democratic\n\n8 party, or just let one party choose, as Justice\n\n9 Kennedy's separate opinion in Vieth and, I think,\n\n10 Cook v. Gralike points out, there might be other\n\n11 constitutional problems with that, arising either from\n\n12 the First Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment. But\n\n13 the I think that I believe that and Mr. Clement\n\n14 would agree on rebuttal, that if the legislature \n\n15 whatever \"the legislature\" means, if the legislature\n\n16 decided, look, we are going to delegate this\n\n17 responsibility to the governor, that would be a\n\n18 constitutional delegation because it would have been a\n\n19 decision made by the lawmaking body of the State.\n\n20 If I could just make one point and then\n\n21 address Justice Breyer's question about Smiley,\n\n22 Hildebrant, and Hawke.\n\n23 It would be deeply, deeply inconsistent with\n\n24 the enterprise in Philadelphia to harbor, then to\n\n25 effectuate, the notion that our framers intended to set\n\n\n 49\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[50] " Official\n\n\n1 aside both a cornerstone principle of Federalism and\n\n2 their aim to bind the people as closely as possible to\n\n3 the national House of Representatives. Yes, it is true\n\n4 that all of the Sturm und Drang over this clause related\n\n5 to the second part, giving Congress authority, and that\n\n6 is because no one questioned the fundamental principles\n\n7 that the sovereign States could choose to allocate their\n\n8 legislative power as they wanted. If there had been any\n\n9 suggestion, the antiFederalists would have been\n\n10 screaming bloody murder that the States could not do so.\n\n11 Now, Smiley specifically said that, at,\n\n12 quote and I'm quoting from page 367 \"As the\n\n13 authority is conferred for the purpose of making laws\n\n14 for the State, it follows, in the absence of an\n\n15 indication of a contrary intent, that the exercise of\n\n16 the authority must be in accordance with the method the\n\n17 State has chosen, has prescribed for legislative\n\n18 enactments.\" If we find \n\n19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But as Mr. Clement points\n\n20 out, the legislature, in both Smiley and Hildebrant,\n\n21 remain the prime mover. And what he has objected to is\n\n22 taking the legislature out of the picture entirely.\n\n23 MR. WAXMAN: Yes, Justice Ginsburg. I we\n\n24 concede that in neither case was the initiative power at\n\n25 issue. But that distinction was never made by the\n\n\n 50\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[51] " Official\n\n\n1 Court, either in Hildebrant or Smiley. And, in fact,\n\n2 Smiley says, \"We find no suggestion in the Federal\n\n3 constitutional provision of an attempt to endow the\n\n4 legislature of a State with power to enact laws in any\n\n5 manner other than which in which the constitution of\n\n6 the State\" \n\n7 JUSTICE BREYER: But it's not it's\n\n8 not that I'm not I'm just quibbling in a sense\n\n9 about the case. But the question in the case is not\n\n10 about they say, \"the body.\" I mean, what's \"the\n\n11 body\"? Everybody agreed it was the legislature. But\n\n12 when the legislature acts in this instance, is it acting\n\n13 as an electoral body? Is it acting as a ratifying body?\n\n14 Is it acting as a consenting body, as with the\n\n15 acquisition of LAMS, or is it acting as a legislating\n\n16 body?\n\n17 MR. WAXMAN: It is acting \n\n18 JUSTICE BREYER: That's correct, and that's\n\n19 the answer they give. This is a form of legislation.\n\n20 Here, the question is about the body, and \n\n21 MR. WAXMAN: That's right. The question is,\n\n22 is are the people, by initiative, a legislative body?\n\n23 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes, that's the question.\n\n24 MR. WAXMAN: Are they the legislature as\n\n25 they themselves have chosen? And in Smiley, again,\n\n\n 51\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[52] " Official\n\n\n1 discussing Hildebrant, this is what the Court said. And\n\n2 it was because of the authority of the State to\n\n3 determine what should constitute its legislative process\n\n4 that the validity of the requirement of the State\n\n5 constitution in its application to congressional\n\n6 elections was sustained. And again \n\n7 JUSTICE SCALIA: \"Legislative process\" there\n\n8 means the process in the legislature.\n\n9 MR. WAXMAN: It \n\n10 JUSTICE SCALIA: What it takes for the\n\n11 legislature to enact a law.\n\n12 MR. WAXMAN: That was \n\n13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Once once you assume\n\n14 \"legislative\" refers to legislature, your whole argument\n\n15 for Smiley just disappears.\n\n16 MR. WAXMAN: The the State of Arizona,\n\n17 like the States of a near majority of the\n\n18 constitutions of the States of a near majority have\n\n19 defined the legislative power to include the people by\n\n20 initiative. And again, you know, in in Atlantic\n\n21 Cleaners & Dyers, which was decided a month after Smiley\n\n22 and which this Court quoted last week in Yates, it said\n\n23 that it is not unusual for the same word to be used with\n\n24 different meanings, \"and thus\" and I'm quoting \n\n25 \"and thus, for example, the meaning of the word\n\n\n 52\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[53] " Official\n\n\n1 'legislature,' used several times in the Federal\n\n2 Constitution, differs according to the connection in\n\n3 which it is employed, depending upon the character of\n\n4 the function which that body in each instance is called\n\n5 upon to exercise citing Smiley.\"\n\n6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You've you've\n\n7 said \"the Court in Yates.\" It was a plurality? Was it,\n\n8 or am I am I \n\n9 MR. WAXMAN: I Yates doesn't itself \n\n10 just to be clear, Yates doesn't talk about this. It was\n\n11 the decision in Yates. I thought \n\n12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, I know, but \n\n13 MR. WAXMAN: My point only is that the\n\n14 Supreme this Supreme Court, in the months following\n\n15 Smiley, again interpreted Smiley in the I was not\n\n16 quoting from Yates. I'm quoting from from Atlantic\n\n17 Cleaners & Dyers, itself citing Smiley.\n\n18 Thank you.\n\n19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.\n\n20 Mr. Clement, you have five minutes left.\n\n21 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT\n\n22 ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT\n\n23 MR. CLEMENT: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice,\n\n24 and may it please the Court:\n\n25 Let me start with the definition of\n\n\n 53\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[54] " Official\n\n\n1 \"legislature.\" Obviously, we can point to our favorite\n\n2 quotes from the framers. They're at 27 and 34 and 35 of\n\n3 the blue brief. The critical thing, though, is not what\n\n4 the framers meant by the legislature when they were\n\n5 talking broadly about political theory or the Swiss\n\n6 canton of Zug. What matters is when they were talking\n\n7 about assigning particular authorities in the\n\n8 Constitution to particular components of the State\n\n9 government. And in that context, as a number of you\n\n10 have pointed out, there is no doubt, every time they\n\n11 assigned an authority to the State legislature, they\n\n12 were assigning the authority to the representative body\n\n13 of the people.\n\n14 Now, that takes us to the Smiley case. And\n\n15 if the definition of \"legislature\" in the Smiley case is\n\n16 what this case turns on, then with all due respect to my\n\n17 friends on the other side, we win. Because Smiley\n\n18 specifically talked, as Justice Breyer alluded to, the\n\n19 body question, and then it defined \"the body.\" And what\n\n20 it said is, quote I'm quoting from Smiley, not Yates\n\n21 or anything else; I'm quoting from Smiley \"The term\n\n22 was not one of uncertain meaning when incorporated into\n\n23 the Constitution. What it meant when adopted, it still\n\n24 means for purposes of interpretation. A legislature was\n\n25 then the representative body which made the laws of the\n\n\n 54\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[55] " Official\n\n\n1 people.\"\n\n2 JUSTICE BREYER: That's true. But I see \n\n3 Smiley doesn't help him, I don't think, but I think it\n\n4 helps you still less, because that was the question in\n\n5 the case. Everybody assumed, nobody denied, that it's\n\n6 those people in the the bricks over there that are\n\n7 making this law. But the question is: Are they\n\n8 legislating when they're doing it? So they were \n\n9 nobody denied they were the legislative power. Here, we\n\n10 have a different question.\n\n11 MR. CLEMENT: With respect to \n\n12 JUSTICE BREYER: And that is: Is this the\n\n13 legislative power when you can proceed by referendum?\n\n14 And the reason I say Smiley might help is simply because\n\n15 it says be a little bit flexible about that.\n\n16 MR. CLEMENT: I think it says a little bit\n\n17 flexible about the lawmaking authority of the State\n\n18 legislature. So don't think you've been given some new\n\n19 key that allows you to make laws without sthe process of\n\n20 the governor being involved at all. I do think Smiley\n\n21 is very helpful because not only does it answer the body\n\n22 question, but the parties disputed this and the and\n\n23 the other side in Smiley said, oh, we win this case\n\n24 because legislature means the lawmaking authority. And\n\n25 the other side said, no, it means the body. And this\n\n\n 55\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[56] " Official\n\n\n1 Court said, you're right, it means the body, but\n\n2 critically, it's a lawmaking function. Therefore, it's\n\n3 subject to the gubernatorial veto. I think they would\n\n4 have been flabbergasted to find out that the\n\n5 legislature, which they just defined as the\n\n6 representative body of the people, could be cut out\n\n7 entirely.\n\n8 Let me give you \n\n9 JUSTICE KAGAN: But I would think, Mr.\n\n10 Clement, that the overriding principle of Smiley and\n\n11 Hildebrant and Hawke is that when it comes to this\n\n12 particular provision, and this particular provision as\n\n13 compared to the Seventeenth Amendment, which is the\n\n14 comparison and the contrast that Hawke sets up, when it\n\n15 comes to this particular provision, we need to show a\n\n16 lot of respect to the State's own decisions about how\n\n17 legislative power ought to be exercised. And that seems\n\n18 to me the overriding principle of the three cases.\n\n19 MR. CLEMENT: I think what you have to show\n\n20 is respect for the way that the State says the State\n\n21 legislature can go about lawmaking. But it is\n\n22 completely different to say it's okay to cut the State\n\n23 legislature out of the process entirely.\n\n24 Let me avert very briefly to the 1911 Act,\n\n25 which, of course, is since repealed. I think the\n\n\n 56\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[57] " Official\n\n\n1 questions show that the actual statute that's now on the\n\n2 books has nothing to do with this case. But the irony\n\n3 of my friends on the other side relying on the\n\n4 legislation the legislative history of the 1911 Act\n\n5 is, the whole point of the legislative history in 1911\n\n6 is people in 1911 could read. The statute on the books\n\n7 then said you're going to have the Federal default rule\n\n8 kick in until the State legislature redistricts. They\n\n9 realized in 1911 that the State legislature meant the\n\n10 State legislature, so they better change that law if\n\n11 they wanted to allow the referendum process.\n\n12 So the 1911 legislative history not that\n\n13 I think you should particularly spend a lot of time with\n\n14 it, but it actually cuts against them on the\n\n15 constitutional issue. It shows that there is a\n\n16 fundamental difference between the legislature and the\n\n17 people. And as the Chief Justice pointed out, if there\n\n18 weren't, then the framers could have stopped the\n\n19 Election Clause at in each State. They wouldn't have\n\n20 had to say, \"by the legislatures thereof.\"\n\n21 Now, the other side \n\n22 JUSTICE KAGAN: But, of course, you can turn\n\n23 that around and say what that provision shows is really\n\n24 exactly what I just said, is that Congress was also on\n\n25 board with this idea that the Court had, that when you\n\n\n 57\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[58] " Official\n\n\n1 look at that clause, the Elections Clause, that a lot of\n\n2 respect, a lot of deference, has to be given to the\n\n3 State's own definition.\n\n4 MR. CLEMENT: And if I may respond, Justice\n\n5 Kagan. I'm happy with giving deference to what the\n\n6 State legislature does. And if that's constrained in\n\n7 the State by the rule that you have a gubernatorial\n\n8 veto, override by referendum, something has to sit in\n\n9 committee for 30 days, then the restrictions on the\n\n10 State legislature are fine, but it has to be the State\n\n11 legislature.\n\n12 Thank you.\n\n13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.\n\n14 The case is submitted.\n\n15 (Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the case in the\n\n16 aboveentitled matter was submitted.)\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n\n 58\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[59] " Official\n Page 59\n\n A 30:1,5 approve 21:20 authorities 13:2 bloody 50:10\nabdication 13:9 alleged 28:9 approved 21:21 46:1 54:7 blue 54:3\nable 4:1 allocate 50:7 25:17 authority 3:13,14 board 57:25\naboveentitled 1:14 allow 17:11 26:10 area 31:9 3:17,19,21 5:19 bodies 4:11 38:18\n 58:16 57:11 arent 23:10 5:20,22 6:21 7:17 body 4:25 5:10,14\nabsence 30:17 allowed 17:10 37:6 arguably 17:7 8:17 9:4,5,8 10:20 5:17 6:16 7:8,8,9\n 50:14 allows 17:13 55:19 argue 14:11 22:6 10:23 12:21 13:6 11:24 21:4 22:15\nabsentee 9:19 alluded 54:18 43:23 13:22 14:17 16:3 38:12 39:11,16\nabsolutely 4:3 alternative 15:17 argument 1:15 2:2 16:6,9 17:9 19:14 41:25 42:6 43:4\naccepted 39:7 21:24 2:5,9,12 3:3,8 4:4 30:7 34:19 36:17 46:6,18,19 49:19\naccepting 27:6 altogether 19:23 5:6 11:9 12:3,4 37:2,9,10 47:5 51:10,11,13,13,14\naccord 39:10 amendment 40:13 23:8 27:7,22 38:7 50:5,13,16 52:2 51:16,20,22 53:4\naccords 39:24 40:19 49:12,12 38:18 43:13 47:21 54:11,12 55:17,24 54:12,19,19,25\nacknowledges 38:3 56:13 48:14 52:14 53:21 avert 56:24 55:21,25 56:1,6\nacquisition 51:15 america 45:20 arises 31:17 avowed 3:18 books 57:2,6\nact 9:16 24:1 32:5 amicus 1:22 2:7 arising 49:11 awful 17:9 bottomline 35:10\n 33:2 34:8 35:2 27:23 arizona 1:3,7 3:4,5 branch 46:2\n amount 8:3 9:5 3:25 7:24 8:2 B breyer 43:9 44:4,22\n 56:24 57:4\nacting 31:13 46:3 20:22 14:20 15:2,3 back 14:18 16:9,12 45:6,7 51:7,18,23\n 51:12,13,14,15,17 analogous 12:19 17:10 28:15,16 16:21 24:6,14 54:18 55:2,12\nacts 51:12 31:6 29:5,6,7 38:16 25:5 33:10 42:11 breyers 49:21\nactual 57:1 answer 12:17 27:7 42:16 45:2 46:22 backdrop 34:25 brick 42:7\naddress 10:15 42:21 51:19 55:21 47:7 52:16 backup 18:21,24 bricks 55:6\n 27:10 45:5 49:21 answers 9:18 33:20 arkansas 10:8 balance 27:19 brief 29:4 45:16\naddressed 41:1 antifederalists 50:9 article 12:20 21:23 32:11 54:3\nadjudicate 38:15 anybody 6:18 28:14 41:1,2,10 ballots 9:19 briefing 45:13\nadopt 47:18 anymore 45:1 41:15,18,20,22 basically 26:24 briefly 56:24\nadopted 54:23 apex 36:5 43:2,3,5 basis 11:22,25 briefs 5:6\nadopting 10:6 appearances 1:17 aside 50:1 12:16 23:5,23 bring 30:2 31:14\nadverted 47:21 appellant 1:5,19 asking 28:7 27:16 32:5,6\nadvisory 8:14 2:4,14 3:9 53:22 asks 43:17 behalf 1:18,24 2:4 brings 5:18\n 18:10,17 23:4 appellants 38:11,18 assertion 45:9 2:7,11,14 3:9 broadly 54:5\nadvocate 44:11 appellees 1:23,25 assigned 54:11 27:23 38:8 53:22 building 43:20\nagency 6:18 2:8,11 10:18 assigning 54:7,12 believe 7:15 29:1 buy 29:23\naggrandizement 27:24 38:8 assistant 1:20 31:12 34:3 47:6 bypass 19:25\n 13:10 appendix 10:18 assume 25:19 30:19 49:13 bypasses 19:22\nago 47:17 application 52:5 35:11 52:13 best 33:12\n applies 4:4,4 33:4 assumed 55:5 bet 16:11 C\nagree 5:13 23:11\n 44:12 49:14 apply 7:1 9:12,14 assumption 34:18 better 9:10 57:10 c 1:11,18,21,24 2:1\nagreed 51:11 33:4,21 39:15 34:20 bill 28:25 3:1 19:22,25 28:4\nagrees 36:11 applying 42:13 assurance 28:7 bind 50:2 32:23 33:4,13,19\naim 50:2 appointed 22:10 astonished 38:14 bit 10:2 16:23 33:20 35:11 37:21\nal 1:9 apportion 34:13 atlantic 44:8 52:20 55:15,16 called 18:20 47:16\nalito 34:11 42:9,22 approach 13:18 53:16 blacker 12:19 53:4\nallegation 30:18 approached 13:17 attempt 51:3 bless 7:24 8:2 calling 42:14\nallege 29:19,22 approaching 24:7 attention 43:1 block 44:7 calls 38:23\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[60] " Official\n Page 60\n\ncant 9:13 18:24 48:8,13 53:6,12 26:1 49:13 50:19 concede 50:24 43:2 44:16 45:11\n 19:14,18 23:21 53:19,23 57:17 53:20,21,23 55:11 concedes 47:3 45:24 48:22 51:5\n 27:15 39:22 58:13 55:16 56:10,19 conceive 28:12 52:5 53:2 54:8,23\ncanton 54:6 choice 22:1,6 58:4 conception 21:7 constitutional 3:25\ncapitol 44:1 45:3 choose 6:7 21:25 close 40:9 conferred 50:13 10:19 16:13 19:10\ncare 4:12 13:13 49:8 50:7 closely 50:2 conflict 29:5,6,9 19:11 20:6 31:4\ncarolina 10:24 choosing 41:13 coalesce 30:14 conforming 25:19 31:10,14 34:18\ncase 3:4 5:15 8:25 chosen 40:19 50:17 code 48:12 confusing 26:3 36:12,15 37:11\n 9:1 11:21 12:18 51:25 cognizable 28:13 congress 7:12,13 42:14 49:11,18\n 14:9,12 16:6 circumstance 36:8 collected 45:15 7:13,15,19,22,24 51:3 57:15\n 17:10,11,18,24 circumstances 26:4 collectively 45:21 8:6 21:24 22:3,13 constitutionally\n 26:19 27:11 29:17 cited 29:4 39:9 colorable 31:10 22:14 31:8 34:3 18:18 24:17,19,20\n 31:7,17 32:24 citing 53:5,17 colorado 26:23 34:12,24 35:4,9 26:8\n 34:22 35:21 44:6 citizen 15:16 27:4 35:16,23,25 36:4 constitutions 3:21\n 44:9 45:13 47:2 citizenry 46:15 come 9:13 16:8 36:5,11,17,22,23 47:19 52:18\n 47:13 50:24 51:9 claim 32:6 38:13 19:20 36:18 37:5,15,15,24,25 constrained 58:6\n 51:9 54:14,15,16 clarify 4:15 comes 13:25 18:25 45:18 50:5 57:24 constraints 23:17\n 55:5,23 57:2 clause 3:16 5:4,21 56:11,15 congressional 3:14 construction 47:22\n 58:14,15 7:1 12:19 20:9,20 coming 13:5 4:5,12 9:15 15:19 construing 33:1\ncasebycase 23:5 20:22 22:12 23:21 commission 1:8 3:6 17:14 33:16 34:14 34:7\ncases 18:10 24:8 27:5,12 29:2 3:15,20,24 4:1 6:7 34:19 37:4 48:12 context 22:8 33:12\n 26:15 29:3 32:14 31:17,18 33:12 7:10,14,20 8:7,11 52:5 54:9\n 43:10,22 44:3 36:22 37:7,11,12 8:11,14,16,20 congresss 37:9 continues 13:14\n 45:5 56:18 37:13,14,16,16 14:21 15:12,25 congruent 37:9 contrary 10:21\ncensus 26:22 27:1 38:19 42:6 45:18 16:8,16,17,20,20 connection 39:7 43:23 50:15\ncentury 21:17,17 50:4 57:19 58:1,1 17:2 18:4,10,24 53:2 contrast 56:14\ncertain 4:23 28:8 cleaners 44:9 52:21 19:1 23:4 27:17 conscious 22:5 control 4:16 11:11\ncertainly 4:18 5:13 53:17 36:21,24 37:3 consensus 44:11,14 11:12 23:6\n 13:20 24:19,20 clear 5:2 41:3 commissions 4:6 44:17,18 convention 22:2\n 25:16 26:17 37:14 45:23 53:10 7:18,18 13:22 consenting 51:14 42:14\ncetera 47:12 clearly 3:16 5:16 18:16,21 30:22 consequence 29:8 conventional 42:13\nchair 49:7 39:15,20,23 44:16 committee 6:25 37:4,8 42:19\nchallenge 25:12 44:17 49:1 58:9 consequential 13:9 conventions 21:20\n 29:16 31:11,14 clement 1:18 2:3,13 commonly 48:25 consider 38:14 cook 49:10\n 32:5 3:7,8,10 4:3,14,18 compared 56:13 consistent 12:2 cornerstone 50:1\nchallenged 23:25 5:5 6:4,9 7:15 8:1 comparison 56:14 16:5 18:6 34:14 corollary 33:24\n 26:5 8:13,24 9:21,24 complain 29:24 constitute 52:3 correct 14:20 40:14\nchange 14:23,24 10:1,3,14 11:4,6 complete 48:11 constituted 46:20 41:12,16 51:18\n 57:10 11:13 12:10 13:16 completely 7:3,10 constitution 3:16 couldnt 7:23 14:18\nchanneling 23:13 14:7,11,14 15:4,7 7:11 9:7,17,23 4:23,24 6:6 13:4 counsel 27:20 38:5\ncharacter 53:3 16:1,15,22 17:3,6 10:5,10 14:19 18:7,7 21:21 24:4 53:19 58:13\ncharles 45:15,16 17:17,23 18:6,14 23:22 34:21 56:22 28:15,17 29:7 counted 10:22\nchief 3:3,10 27:20 19:4,12,24 20:14 compliant 26:8 35:17,19 36:10 counties 47:10\n 27:25 29:12,15,20 20:21 21:11,15 components 54:8 37:22 38:17,25 couple 28:3 32:22\n 30:4,9 33:3 34:12 22:18 23:11 24:8 comported 41:24 39:4,6,14,20 44:19\n 38:5,9 47:25 48:6 24:18 25:7,10,23 comprised 46:1 40:18 41:8 42:2 course 4:5 6:21,22\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[61] " Official\n Page 61\n\n 8:14 19:18 21:3 decennial 26:22 democratic 49:7 dispute 5:13 53:17\n 22:24 23:14 25:18 decide 5:13 9:1,1,6 democrats 18:23 disputed 55:22\n 47:17 56:25 57:22 17:11,19,24 18:9 demonstrated distinction 50:25 E\ncourt 1:1,15 3:11 27:5,6 22:17 distinguish 11:14 e 2:1 3:1,1\n 4:22 5:6,12,16 decided 12:14 denied 28:11 55:5,9 distinguished earlier 5:15 47:21\n 6:12,20 8:25 20:16 32:25 36:3 department 1:21 40:25 early 21:17,17 26:6\n 11:23,25 12:22 41:18 44:6 46:22 depend 10:1 distinguishes 42:4 easy 32:24\n 13:17,19 16:5 49:16 52:21 depending 41:5 district 32:4 38:14 echo 47:20\n 24:2,3,9,12,22 decision 7:6 14:13 53:3 districting 4:12 edict 11:19 13:24\n 25:2,4,11,15,17 23:13 28:16 43:21 depends 16:23 14:24 23:25 33:17 effective 4:6\n 26:19 28:1,7 49:19 53:11 details 10:2 16:23 36:1 effectively 35:1\n 32:21,25 37:20 decisions 4:20,21 determine 23:6 districts 3:14 4:8 effectuate 35:5\n 38:10 39:25 40:23 56:16 52:3 8:7 9:5 15:19 49:25\n 41:3,17,20 42:1 deeply 38:22 49:23 dictionaries 39:10 17:14 33:15 34:2 effort 3:18\n 42:24 44:6 48:9 49:23 44:19,22 46:9 34:14 either 5:25 6:2 9:1\n 51:1 52:1,22 53:7 default 20:2 33:20 dictionary 44:24 divests 3:12 9:6 13:24 23:25\n 53:14,24 56:1 57:7 45:11 divided 33:15 34:1 27:6 45:21 48:18\n 57:25 defect 11:7 didnt 20:17 21:5,6 doesnt 7:9 13:11 48:19 49:11 51:1\ncourts 12:18 19:20 defend 35:20 22:7 43:22 48:3 17:15,17,21,24 elect 4:8 6:17 41:23\n 23:13 24:8,11,12 defendant 28:10 differ 41:5 24:5 31:18 32:12 43:4\n 25:19 26:15 28:16 defenders 29:21 difference 14:8 32:19 35:24 42:25 elected 22:10 41:24\n 29:7 38:14 39:3 deference 58:2,5 22:4,7 36:25 43:19 47:25 48:1 46:20\n 44:6,8 define 22:13 57:16 53:9,10 55:3 electing 33:16\ncrack 26:7 defined 52:19 different 7:3,8,21 doing 23:12 30:11 election 15:19 20:9\ncreated 38:13 54:19 56:5 8:9 14:9,24 17:10 37:21 48:17 55:8 23:21 24:3,7 25:4\ncreating 22:9 42:15 defines 38:16 44:24 23:3 26:4 34:3 domestic 42:15 27:12 40:10 41:1\ncritical 54:3 defining 5:3 27:17 35:12 36:18 41:14 dont 4:18 5:12 6:3 41:21 57:19\ncritically 56:2 definition 38:20 43:13 45:12 52:24 7:15 8:1 11:6 elections 3:16 5:21\ncrocodile 29:24,25 39:8 44:12,14,17 55:10 56:22 13:13 14:7 15:8 7:1,25 11:22\ncrystallizes 31:7 44:18,24 53:25 differently 20:7,9 18:14,21,25 19:5 12:13 22:9 26:14\ncuriae 1:22 2:7 54:15 58:3 differs 6:16 53:2 19:16 23:11 28:12 27:4 29:2 31:17\n 27:23 delegate 6:21 7:6 difficult 30:13 28:23 29:16 30:4 31:17 36:22 37:7\ncut 4:20 7:4 9:7,18 10:22 16:7 47:4 diminution 28:19 30:15,24,25 31:12 37:10 38:19 42:6\n 9:23 10:5,10 49:7,16 direct 21:19 22:4 33:3 35:18,20 48:12 52:6 58:1\n 23:22 56:6,22 delegated 5:19 47:7 34:10 35:3 40:10 37:23 42:20,20 electoral 51:13\ncuts 57:14 delegating 13:22 directly 32:3,11,14 43:10,14 44:2,17 electorates 16:7\ncycle 26:14 delegation 6:20 disagree 5:6 6:4,10 44:25 47:13 55:3 electors 12:22\n 13:1 16:2 27:13 14:2 16:3,4 55:18 embraces 43:8\n D 47:1,5,12 48:18 disagrees 6:13 doubt 33:6 54:10 emerge 11:20\nd 1:11,18,18,21,24 49:18 disappears 52:15 drafters 48:21 emphasize 37:19\n 2:3,13 3:1,8 53:21 delegations 11:2 discussing 45:23 drafting 38:19 emphatic 4:22\nday 17:7,19 delegee 5:16 6:14 52:1 drang 50:4 employed 53:3\ndays 6:25 8:22 58:9 23:14 discussion 21:1 draw 24:14 enact 14:24 51:4\ndeadline 25:18 democracy 21:19 displaced 40:12,21 drawing 23:18 52:11\ndealing 14:15 22:4,5 34:10 35:3 displacement 25:21 due 5:5 54:16 enacted 9:20 34:17\ndealt 12:19 46:4,16,17 25:25 26:1 dyers 44:9 52:21 34:22 48:12\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[62] " Official\n Page 62\n\nenactment 41:5 expected 34:3,6 26:14 32:23 34:8 G grounds 42:4\nenactments 50:18 experiment 20:11 35:23 37:13,16,25 g 3:1 group 43:25\nendorse 47:6 explained 40:24 40:24 41:9 45:6 general 1:21 31:2 gubernatorial 6:24\nendow 51:3 41:17 48:9 47:18,18 49:12 generally 13:8 11:19 13:24 56:3\nenforce 28:11 express 34:9 35:2 five 5:15 46:18 26:16 58:7\nenforceable 29:10 expressly 37:22 53:20 generation 39:8 guess 15:2 16:22\n 29:13 extreme 27:11 fixed 25:18 gerrymandered 35:10 37:18\nenforced 28:10 extremely 28:5 flabbergasted 56:4 4:11\nenforcement 28:14 flexible 55:15,17 H\n ginsburg 3:23 4:3\n 29:11 31:1,22 F flows 24:21 half 10:22\n 7:12,23 21:10\nengage 5:23 30:7 face 10:20 focused 43:1 31:20,23 50:19,23 happens 19:17\nenjoined 29:11 fact 19:15 30:9 following 41:14 give 14:3 17:9 19:2 43:24 48:19\nenterprise 49:24 32:16 34:4 42:8 53:14 24:15 27:16 31:5 happy 27:9 58:5\nentire 27:16 44:11 51:1 follows 50:14 31:18 36:23 39:13 harbor 49:24\nentirely 7:5,8 12:15 fairly 31:6 force 35:23 39:13 44:15 51:19 hard 5:1 17:18\n 23:23 48:2 50:22 faith 29:1 foreordain 27:7 56:8 18:15 20:15 22:6\n 56:7,23 far 35:21 form 45:22 51:19 given 31:21 34:4 23:19,19 34:2\neric 1:20 2:6 27:22 favor 4:20 17:24 former 43:3 36:20 55:18 58:2 harder 8:25 9:15\nesq 1:18,20,24 2:3 25:1 formulated 21:23 gives 12:20 hasnt 28:8,10\n 2:6,10,13 favorite 54:1 forth 9:19 giving 46:17 50:5 hawk 40:24 41:17\nessentially 23:12 favors 24:12 found 35:2 58:5 41:20\n 26:7 feature 7:9 27:17 founding 21:13 go 10:12 13:13 hawke 5:15 6:15\nestablished 15:25 features 34:10 39:8 16:21 24:14 29:17 44:5 49:22 56:11\net 1:9 47:12 federal 7:19,20,25 four 46:22 29:23 35:21 56:21 56:14\neverybody 19:24 8:11 20:2,13,14 fourteenth 49:12 goes 24:2,2 32:11 head 30:2\n 19:25 46:14 51:11 21:24 22:8 24:2 frame 21:18 42:3 hear 3:3\n 55:5 24:12 28:6,7 framers 7:5 8:3 going 7:4,5,7,16 8:6 heard 5:6\nexactly 11:4,6 18:5 31:16 33:13,14,17 14:1 20:15 21:2 8:7,8 12:25 14:2 held 7:25\n 18:9 34:5 35:19 36:1 38:14,24 21:19,23 22:3,7 18:2,4,9,14 19:2 help 43:10 44:2\n 57:24 39:1,4,5,6 51:2 22:16 38:13,20 19:15 20:5 21:2 55:3,14\nexample 26:20 31:6 53:1 57:7 45:14 48:10 49:25 22:13 23:5 25:1 helpful 42:10 55:21\n 42:17 45:15,17 federalism 50:1 54:2,4 57:18 26:17 27:12 28:9 helping 43:22\n 48:16 52:25 federalists 20:19 framing 4:23 21:18 29:23 30:1,22 helps 43:12 55:4\nexamples 41:25 feigin 1:20 2:6 friend 36:18 38:2 33:21 34:2 41:8 higher 46:15,16\nexcuse 30:16 27:21,22,25 28:18 43:8 47:3,6 49:16 57:7 hildebrandt 9:12\nexecutive 47:9 28:22 29:14,18,21 friends 4:7 15:10 good 29:1 hildebrant 4:17,19\nexemptions 22:23 30:8,12 31:5,21 36:25 37:1 54:17 gosh 11:8 5:3 20:6 33:1,10\nexercise 30:6 34:19 32:2,15 33:9 57:3 government 21:9 34:5,7,25,25\n 43:17,18,19 48:15 34:23 35:7,8,18 full 46:15 43:12 46:2 54:9 37:20 39:25 40:25\n 48:20 50:15 53:5 36:13,16 37:18 function 6:16 41:6 governor 6:1 48:16 42:4,5,10 43:11\nexercised 56:17 find 32:18 39:22 53:4 56:2 49:17 55:20 44:5 49:22 50:20\nexercising 35:4 44:2 50:18 51:2 fundamental 50:6 gralike 49:10 51:1 52:1 56:11\nexist 13:14 18:16 56:4 57:16 grant 20:25 hinges 38:18\nexisting 19:18 fine 13:13 58:10 fundamentally granted 5:21 history 20:19 40:16\n 45:25 first 3:4 5:16 8:4 38:15 gravamen 38:11 57:4,5,12\nexpands 43:25 20:23 21:1 24:10 further 10:12 31:10 great 14:1 43:24 hold 6:6\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[63] " Official\n Page 63\n\nholding 48:12 independent 1:7 issue 4:16 7:21 46:25 47:1,21,25 lane 12:12,14\nhonor 28:22 29:18 3:5 7:18 16:16,17 13:17 16:10 20:16 48:6,8,13 49:5,8 language 20:8 33:2\n 30:8 31:5 32:15 16:19,20 17:2 27:5 28:4 32:23 49:21 50:19,23 34:8,9 35:1 43:7\n 33:9 34:23 35:18 18:4 32:24 37:20 41:22 51:7,18,23 52:7 large 45:21 46:11\n 36:16 37:18 40:22 indication 50:15 42:5 43:6,19 47:2 52:10,13 53:6,12 late 21:17\nhouse 4:8 18:23,23 individual 47:10 50:25 57:15 53:19,23 54:18 law 8:19 10:6 13:24\n 22:9,16 50:3 infringed 31:15 issues 32:25 55:2,12 56:9 28:8,9,20 29:13\nhouses 4:9 initial 25:12 57:17,22 58:4,13 30:18,23 31:8,11\nhundred 40:9 initiative 10:9 J 31:22 33:5,7,8,14\nhypothetical 49:6 11:16 13:24 14:5 j 1:20 2:6 27:22 K 33:17,22 34:1,13\nhypotheticals 15:1,8,17 21:8,11 james 46:2 kagan 10:3,15 11:1 34:15 35:20 37:5\n 23:20 27:10 21:13,16 23:1 johnsons 39:9 11:5,8,13 12:1,10 52:11 55:7 57:10\n 29:6,10 46:8 judgment 8:3 13:7 16:15 17:1,5 lawmaking 5:21,23\n I 47:16,20 48:24 judicial 11:24 17:15,20 18:1,8 6:21,22 7:1,2 21:6\nid 9:19 10:6 28:2 50:24 51:22 52:20 26:13,15,25 43:21 18:15 19:1 22:18 31:19 48:20 49:19\n 33:9 43:9 initiatives 45:4 jump 12:25 23:12 47:21 56:9 55:17,24 56:2,21\nidea 8:15 26:20 injury 32:6 jurisdiction 38:15 57:22 58:5 laws 9:19 10:13,15\n 57:25 insofar 35:5 jurisprudence 13:9 kennedy 8:10,19,24 10:18 11:2,11\nidentical 33:2 34:8 instance 24:10 32:10 9:17,22,25 10:16 12:6 28:14 29:5,8\nignore 38:20 44:15 51:12 53:4 justice 1:21 3:3,10 14:4,10,12,19 31:1 39:12,17\nii 12:20 institution 32:1 3:23 4:3,14 5:1,24 15:5 23:24 24:9 43:5 46:10 49:5\niii 28:14 intended 38:20 6:5,10 7:12,23 24:16,24 25:8,16 50:13 51:4 54:25\nill 17:20 47:5 49:25 8:10,19,24 9:17 25:24 32:9 40:6,8 55:19\nim 14:21 15:5 26:3 intent 43:15 50:15 9:22,25 10:3,15 40:15,23 41:7,13 lawsuit 28:6\n 27:3,9,9 30:22 interaction 23:3 10:16 11:1,5,8,13 42:1 leaving 19:9\n 44:13 48:8 50:12 interest 20:13,14 12:1,10 13:7 14:4 kennedys 49:9 left 18:12 53:20\n 51:8,8 52:24 28:13,13 30:11 14:10,12,19 15:5 key 55:19 legislate 28:19\n 53:16 54:20,21 31:1,3,21 15:22,23 16:14,15 kick 57:8 legislates 45:2,2\n 58:5 interpretation 48:1 17:1,5,15,20 18:1 kicks 27:2 legislating 34:4,24\nimpairment 45:19 54:24 18:8,15 19:1,7,22 kind 5:19 17:15,17 51:15 55:8\nimpasse 19:8 interpreted 53:15 20:4,17 21:10 17:17,21 26:10 legislation 9:12\nimpeachment interpreting 28:16 22:18 23:12,24 28:8 16:10 37:4,5\n 43:18 35:1 24:9,16,24 25:8 kinds 23:3 48:11 51:19 57:4\nimplement 10:23 interspersed 46:3 25:16,23,24 27:20 knew 47:17 legislative 4:16 5:4\nimplementing invalidity 24:5 27:25 28:18 29:12 know 7:9 11:15,20 5:9 6:8 10:10\n 34:20 invoke 12:18 29:15,20 30:4,9 11:23 15:21 16:4 11:3,10,11,12\nimplies 30:10 involved 12:9 25:2 31:3,20,23 32:8,9 19:6,14 20:5 21:5 20:10,19 23:2,24\nimportant 6:11 7:6 55:20 33:3 34:11,12 21:16 22:7 42:20 24:13 30:20 38:12\n 34:24 35:22 43:7 involvement 18:4 35:7,10 36:9,14 43:14 46:18 47:15 40:25 42:8 43:4\nimpose 8:8 ironies 15:10 37:12 38:5,9,23 47:15,17 49:6 43:18,21,25 46:1\nimposed 11:18 irony 57:2 39:2,5,13,19 40:2 52:20 53:12 47:19 48:15 50:8\ninclined 27:3 irrelevant 34:21 40:6,8,15,22 41:7 knows 19:25 46:14 50:17 51:22 52:3\ninclude 38:17 52:19 irrespective 13:15 41:13 42:1,9,11 52:7,14,19 55:9\ninconsistent 27:4 42:22 43:9 44:4 L\n isnt 6:8 12:9 20:10 55:13 56:17 57:4\n 38:22 49:23 23:20 28:18,22 44:14,20,21,22 lack 4:16 57:5,12\nincorporated 54:22 35:23 45:6,7,8 46:5,24 lams 51:15 legislature 1:4 3:5\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[64] " Official\n Page 64\n\n 3:13 4:22 5:3,8,17 level 7:16,19 21:3 13:17,20 16:5,11 N 40:2 55:23\n 5:22 6:1,15,17,22 46:15,16 mean 4:21 6:9 10:5 n 2:1,1 3:1 ohio 33:1\n 7:4,14 8:12,18,21 light 34:4 10:12 11:8 13:4 name 31:13 okay 9:23 11:24\n 8:22 9:4,16,23 lines 23:18 14:14 16:3,22 national 50:3 12:8 15:24 16:2\n 10:4 11:5,9,10,17 litigating 30:10 17:8 18:9 19:6 near 52:17,18 18:16 46:5,13,25\n 11:21 12:4,5,8,9 litigation 25:3 21:19 25:11,17 nearly 33:1 34:7 56:22\n 12:15,24 13:5,12 30:13 32:17 36:10 39:2 necessarily 42:7 once 12:14 33:25\n 13:12,15,21 14:2 little 10:2 16:23 42:18 43:11 47:3 necessary 33:24 52:13,13\n 14:5,13,20,25 18:12 55:15,16 47:5 51:10 need 35:21 56:15 oneoff 11:22,25\n 15:14,15,20,24 live 26:25 meaning 4:23 5:4 neighboring 33:13 oneperson 19:19\n 17:9,13,25 18:13 logical 33:24 39:21,24 41:3,4 neither 50:24 20:2 23:25\n 18:22 19:2,8,10 long 20:15 48:15 41:18 42:2,13,19 never 20:11 42:24 ones 4:12\n 19:13,17 21:22 look 10:17,24 12:23 44:10 45:12 52:25 42:25 46:11 50:25 onevote 19:19 20:2\n 22:20,21,22 23:4 18:15 20:18 45:1454:22 new 24:14 42:16 24:1\n 23:6,9,9,14,15,17 49:16 58:1 meanings 52:24 55:18 open 43:24\n 23:22 24:6,14 looked 39:21 means 4:6,24,24 nile 29:24,25 operation 33:11\n 25:3,6,13,18 26:6 lot 17:9 20:20 43:1 5:8,10,14,22 noah 39:9 opinion 44:8 49:9\n 26:11,17 27:1 56:16 57:13 58:1 11:10 12:4 13:3 nondelegations opposite 32:16\n 28:7,21,24 29:5 58:2 20:9 22:20,21 11:2 oral 1:14 2:2,5,9\n 29:13,25 31:13,24 lujan 29:19,20,21 23:9,21,21 27:13 nonpartisan 4:8 3:8 27:22 38:7\n 32:12,19 35:13 36:23 41:13,14 nonpartisanly 4:10 order 29:24\n 36:19,20,23 37:2 M 42:12 46:6,14 ordinarily 31:19\n normal 5:23 30:7\n 37:8 38:2,16,21 m 1:16 3:2 58:15 49:15 52:8 54:24 30:16 ordinary 6:23,23\n 38:24 39:3,6,11 machines 10:8 55:24,25 56:1 normally 28:12 9:12\n 39:15 40:12,17,20 madison 45:23 meant 33:4 39:11 46:6 oregon 10:7\n 41:9,19,21 42:2,7 mail 10:7 39:15 45:25 54:4 north 10:24 originalist 23:8\n 42:12,18,19 43:2 main 28:2 54:23 57:9 notion 49:25 ought 21:20 56:17\n 43:16 44:10,12,25 majority 46:21,23 mechanisms 21:24 number 54:9 outside 43:20\n 45:22 46:3,6,7,10 52:17,18 merits 32:21 numerous 22:15 overridden 17:4\n 46:14,14 47:3,4,7 making 12:3,4 met 33:18,18 29:3 override 15:13\n 47:14,23 48:2,19 20:23 43:20,21 method 50:16 35:16 37:2,8 58:8\n 48:25 49:2,14,15 50:13 55:7 michigan 16:10 O overriding 35:19\n 49:15 50:20,22 manner 33:22 34:1 miles 23:9 o 2:1 3:1 56:10,18\n 51:4,11,12,24 34:14 36:2 47:7,8 mine 37:1 object 8:15,16 overturn 4:17,19\n 52:8,11,14 53:1 47:23 51:5 minority 46:21 objected 50:21 8:22 14:21\n 54:1,4,11,15,24 map 15:17 24:14 minutes 22:24 objection 36:14,15\n 55:18,24 56:5,21 mapdrawing 43:17 53:20 objections 11:18 P\n 56:23 57:8,9,10 maps 15:12,13 19:2 misconceived 38:16 obligation 24:4 p 1:24 2:10 3:1 38:7\n 57:16 58:6,10,11 19:18 mississippi 10:6 observation 29:24 page 2:2 10:25 29:4\nlegislatures 3:18,22 march 1:12 monday 1:12 obvious 21:2 50:12\n 5:20 7:7,17 9:13 matter 1:14 7:3,25 month 52:21 obviously 7:21 19:6 pages 45:16\n 10:21,23 12:12,20 12:23 13:11 16:25 months 44:7 53:14 22:17 54:1 papers 20:19\n 13:3 16:6 21:14 17:5 19:15 28:24 morning 3:4 occasion 22:19 part 20:25 25:11\n 22:1,8,11 27:14 31:2 33:14 58:16 mortar 42:7 officer 47:10 27:15 32:9 42:16\n 28:12 30:25 45:25 matters 54:6 mover 50:21 official 28:10 45:18 50:5\n 57:20 mcpherson 12:18 murder 50:10 oh 4:18 5:8 13:12 partial 6:18\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[65] " Official\n Page 65\n\nparticipation 11:12 phrase 9:17 36:20,24 38:12 probably 9:18,24 purpose 33:15 34:9\nparticular 4:21 pick 19:3 40:25 41:22,23,23 19:5 35:3 50:13\n 20:20,22 28:20,20 picture 50:22 41:23 42:8 43:3,4 problem 11:15 purposes 41:19\n 30:14 42:6 43:1 piece 16:10 18:12 43:5,17,25 44:25 12:11,13 13:14,14 54:24\n 43:11 54:7,8 pinckney 45:15,16 45:1,1,2,18 46:9 13:23,23 16:13 pursuant 6:22\n 56:12,12,15 place 25:20 26:14 46:10,17 47:19 problematic 18:19 48:17\nparticularly 6:11 47:8,23 48:15,20 49:4 18:25 put 10:18 23:17\n 43:7 57:13 places 47:11,11 50:8,24 51:4 problems 49:11 30:3,17 32:4\nparties 55:22 plain 15:20 52:19 55:9,13 procedures 33:21 puts 15:20\nparts 12:24 13:5 plainly 3:20 56:17 35:3 36:3 putting 14:22\nparty 31:14 46:21 plaintiff 29:19,22 powers 13:8 31:4 proceed 55:13\n 46:22,23 49:8,8 plan 14:24 23:25 31:15 process 5:4,9 6:8 Q\npass 24:4,6 25:19 24:5 25:4,17,19 practical 12:23 6:19 10:10 11:3 qualification 22:12\n 28:9,15 29:13 25:20 26:5,8,13 28:24 12:15 15:17 18:3 question 3:25 5:19\n 30:18 31:1 35:13 26:15,25 28:20,20 precinct 47:11 20:10 23:2,22 9:3,18 12:18\n 37:6 30:6,15,20,22 precisely 42:4 24:13 29:17 35:24 17:12 20:5 23:19\npassage 29:8 plane 29:23 predecessor 37:21 52:3,7,8 55:19 26:12 27:8 33:7\npassed 11:3 15:14 plays 18:10 preempted 31:9 56:23 57:11 33:11,17,19 35:11\n 28:8 29:5 30:19 please 3:11 14:23 preemptive 31:16 promulgates 15:12 40:23 41:18 42:11\n 31:8 34:13 43:12 15:22 28:1 38:10 prefatory 33:11 proper 31:14 42:21 43:24 47:2\npasses 37:5 43:23 53:24 preference 24:11 proposal 8:21 47:14,15 49:21\npassing 28:25 plenty 20:7 premise 38:19 14:23 51:9,20,21,23\npaul 1:18 2:3,13 plucked 44:18 prescribe 3:13 6:20 proposals 40:11 54:19 55:4,7,10\n 3:8 53:21 plurality 53:7 12:21 15:18 16:7 propose 14:16 55:22\npeople 4:25 5:11,14 plus 44:2 45:3 17:13 15:16 questioned 50:6\n 5:17 6:6 7:11 46:15 prescribed 9:5 proposed 14:5 questions 23:16,19\n 15:11,21 21:4 point 20:23 28:2 33:21 48:4,22 proposition 3:12 47:5 57:1\n 22:1,7,10,12,14 30:6 31:7 49:20 50:17 11:15 15:14 quibbling 51:8\n 22:15 32:2,3,13 53:13 54:1 57:5 presented 30:20 protects 13:4 quite 32:16 34:24\n 38:12,17 39:16 pointed 54:10 president 42:14 protests 13:15 quote 45:20,24\n 43:20 44:1,1 45:3 57:17 presidential 12:21 provide 6:24 19:15 48:11 50:12 54:20\n 45:21 46:3,11,18 points 22:16 28:3 presumably 48:17 19:16 21:25 34:10 quoted 44:7 52:22\n 47:19 48:18 50:2 32:22 49:10 50:19 prevent 13:21 35:3 quotes 54:2\n 51:22 52:19 54:13 police 31:15 prevents 26:17 provided 33:22 quoting 50:12\n 55:1,6 56:6 57:6 political 54:5 28:24 provision 10:24 52:24 53:16,16\n 57:17 popular 6:2 21:6 primaries 40:11 39:14,18,19 42:12 54:20,21\nperfectly 4:11 12:8 29:6 primarily 24:23 43:6 51:3 56:12\n R\npermanent 8:17 position 4:15 11:17 primary 11:9 15:18 56:12,15 57:23\n 12:15 17:4 23:23 12:11 16:2,4 27:6 19:13 23:6 26:11 provisions 9:20 r 3:1\n 27:16 35:15 27:2 10:19 42:17 rainbow 20:1\npermanently 3:12 possible 50:2 prime 50:21 prudent 24:20,21 raises 38:13\n 13:6 14:3,17 power 6:1,3,6 7:22 principal 45:12 pure 22:19 ratification 21:25\nperry 26:19 14:3 15:1,8,9,11 principle 17:11 purely 18:17 41:19,22 43:3\nperson 32:10 47:9 15:18 16:17 28:19 50:1 56:10,18 purity 23:8 ratify 6:17 41:24\nphase 25:13 28:21 30:1 31:19 principles 19:20 purported 12:13 ratifying 51:13\nphiladelphia 49:24 35:5,6,9,16 36:4 20:3 50:6 purports 10:20 reach 32:21\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[66] " Official\n Page 66\n\nread 20:6,8 24:8 referring 44:21 33:14 7:24 8:10 11:14 separate 9:14 49:9\n 26:9,15 43:10 refers 52:14 reserve 27:19 12:6 14:23 31:20 separation 13:8\n 57:6 regardless 32:20 reserving 47:18 41:9 46:13 49:2 serious 18:12\nreading 44:9 register 47:12 residual 9:4,8 says 6:6,20 13:25 serving 41:6\nreal 18:16 19:17 regulation 31:9 respect 5:5 54:16 19:1 25:12 33:20 set 7:20 18:3 47:11\nrealized 57:9 regulations 15:19 55:11 56:16,20 34:16 37:17 39:3 49:25\nreally 22:6 31:7 47:8,24 58:2 51:2 55:15,16 seth 1:24 2:10 38:7\n 57:23 reiterated 41:4 respond 45:8 58:4 56:20 sets 16:16 56:14\nreapportion 8:20 rejected 26:20 responsibility 7:6 scalia 15:23 32:8 settled 37:20\nreapportionment related 50:4 27:14 49:17 36:9,14 37:12 seventeenth 40:13\n 25:8 relatively 32:24 responsive 10:16 38:23 39:2,5,13 40:19 56:13\nreason 19:12 20:25 relevant 32:25 restrictions 58:9 39:19 40:2 44:14 shot 26:21\n 24:21 30:15 32:18 relying 57:3 result 35:5 44:21 46:5,25 shouldnt 21:21\n 55:14 remain 50:21 retain 37:2 47:1 52:7,10,13 show 56:15,19 57:1\nreasons 35:22 remains 6:14 reviewed 23:5 scalias 42:11 45:8 shows 57:15,23\nrebuttal 2:12 49:14 remarkably 21:2 revise 37:13,16 49:5 side 4:7 5:7,8,10\n 53:21 remembering revisit 7:5 scenario 37:1,1 15:11 30:3,18\nrecognition 24:22 27:11 revisiting 8:3 schemes 23:3 25:9 54:17 55:23,25\nrecognize 35:25 remote 14:20 rewrite 37:25 screaming 50:10 57:3,21\nrecognized 13:19 removal 28:21 right 3:23 8:13 second 5:18 7:22 similar 43:14\nredelegate 3:19 7:7 removed 35:12 9:21 13:20 14:14 20:24 26:7,12 simple 20:5,10\n 7:17 10:20 repealed 41:10 15:5 17:16,20 29:22 30:19 33:10 simply 8:2 11:16\nredelegates 3:14 56:25 26:5 37:22,23 36:7,21 37:6,10 21:8 24:4 29:10\nredistrict 28:25 repeatedly 40:24 38:25 51:21 56:1 37:12,14,16,24 32:19 35:25 37:8\n 36:3 46:2 rights 24:1 32:5 38:1 45:18 50:5 37:21 38:16 48:22\nredistricted 33:5,7 representation 4:2 45:20 secretary 30:21,21 55:14\n 33:22,25 45:22 roberts 3:3 27:20 47:9 single 39:22 44:15\nredistricting 1:8 representative 4:11 29:12,15,20 30:4 section 28:4 32:23 47:8\n 3:5,24 4:5 9:15 4:25 5:10,14,17 30:9 33:3 38:5 33:19,20 37:21 sir 33:9\n 11:25 16:18,19 6:15 7:9 21:4,9 47:25 48:6,8,13 41:1,2,10,10,15 sit 58:8\n 22:25 24:23 25:2 22:5 27:18 38:18 53:6,12,19 58:13 41:21 43:3,5 sitting 43:16 44:1\n 25:17 26:5,18 41:25 54:12,25 role 18:11,11,12 see 11:13 12:11 situation 14:15\n 30:7,15,20 35:4 56:6 27:2 22:18 29:23 43:22 26:25\n 35:12,14 representatives 4:9 roughly 10:22 55:2 situations 11:14\nredistricts 36:2 33:16 39:16 50:3 rule 11:20 19:16 seek 14:21 slightly 36:18\n 57:8 republic 45:20 20:2 22:19 24:1 seen 45:13 smiley 4:17,19,21\nreferendum 6:2 republicans 18:23 25:1 57:7 58:7 selected 46:20,21 5:2,7 6:12 9:11\n 9:20 10:9 14:5,6 repugnant 3:20 rules 5:23 6:20,23 46:23 20:7 23:13 40:1\n 14:16,22 15:1,2,9 require 35:13 6:23,25 9:12,14 selfgovernance 41:2 43:8,16 44:5\n 15:13 21:7,12,13 required 24:17,19 12:7,21 16:7 48:3 20:12 44:7 48:10 49:21\n 21:16 23:1 29:16 24:20,25 senate 4:10 22:10 50:11,20 51:1,2\n 35:14 44:2 46:8 requirement 20:6 S senators 40:10,19 51:25 52:15,21\n 46:12,13 48:23 33:18 36:1 52:4 s 2:1 3:1 33:13 37:6 41:2,13,21 43:4 53:5,15,15,17\n 55:13 57:11 58:8 requirements 10:7 samuel 39:9 send 24:6 42:15 54:14,15,17,20,21\nreferendums 45:3 30:16 satisfied 36:2 48:16 sense 5:25 45:1 55:3,14,20,23\nreferred 45:24 46:9 requires 30:23 saying 4:17 5:7,8 51:8 56:10\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[67] " Official\n Page 67\n\nsmith 40:24 41:17 30:21,23 31:9,13 submitted 58:14,16 43:11 47:22 54:5 thing 27:16 34:12\n 41:20 42:3 31:18 33:5,6,22 substitute 7:13 54:6 36:6,7,10 37:19\nsolicitor 1:20 33:25 34:13,15 sue 32:18,19 talks 41:11 43:16 45:10 46:8,12,13\nsomebody 6:17 35:13,24 36:2,5 suffice 39:4 task 26:11 54:3\n 12:12 19:15 36:11,19,20,22 suffices 38:24 tell 15:22 16:15 things 10:5,8,9\nsorry 48:8 37:2,4,7 38:2,23 sufficient 48:21 18:9 25:1 12:10 17:8 22:22\nsort 5:1 7:20 12:23 39:2 40:11,12 suggest 13:18 20:8 term 4:22 39:8,14 26:3\n 12:24 13:1 23:8 42:8,16,16 47:9 29:15 40:17 41:5,6 42:1 think 4:19 5:25\n 37:5 48:4,20,23 49:1,5 suggesting 4:15 42:17 45:14 54:21 6:12 7:20 8:1,2,5\nsorts 40:10 49:7,19 50:14,17 26:16 terms 27:13 8:13,24,25 9:3,6\nsotomayor 4:14 5:1 51:4,6 52:2,4,16 suggestion 40:20 text 12:2 9:10 10:1,17 11:6\n 5:24 6:5,10 15:22 54:8,11 55:17 50:9 51:2 textual 12:3,3 11:9 13:1,19 14:7\n 16:14 19:7,22 56:20,20,22 57:8 suggests 18:18 thank 27:20,25 14:8,15 15:5,7,8\n 20:4,17 28:18 57:9,10,19 58:6,7 22:19 38:4,5 53:18,19 15:15 16:4 17:6\n 31:3 35:7,10 58:10,10 suit 38:11 53:23 58:12,13 17:23,25 18:14,25\nsovereign 50:7 states 1:1,15,22 2:7 superfluous 48:2 thats 5:1,20 6:10,20 19:4,5,25 20:7\nspecific 12:17 3:17,22 7:14 12:7 49:3 7:24 8:13 11:7,17 23:12 24:16,18\nspecifically 41:24 16:18 20:11 27:23 superseding 37:9 12:8 13:13,16,23 25:5,10 27:3,10\n 50:11 54:18 33:15 35:24 38:20 support 44:9,23 14:12,14 15:18 28:23 29:18 30:12\nspend 6:25 57:13 40:9 44:1 45:19 supporting 1:22 16:12 17:1,2 18:1 30:15,24 31:6,12\nstalemate 18:22 45:25 46:1,3 2:8 27:24 18:8,8,12,25 19:4 32:2,16,18,23\n 19:17 47:18 50:7,10 suppose 8:19 14:4 19:10,11 22:21,25 33:11,24 34:23\nstand 4:21 52:17,18 56:16 14:4,25 20:24 24:16 25:2,11,21 35:18,21 36:4,16\nstanding 28:2,5 58:3 23:24 31:8,10 26:24 27:9,17 37:11,19,23,23,24\n 29:16 30:16,25 statute 31:16 33:13 39:2 29:13 30:15,22 42:22 43:6,8,24\n 31:24,25 32:12,17 34:16,17,21 41:8 suppress 42:15 32:18 33:19 34:15 44:4,17 46:7\n 32:18,19 43:11,13 57:1,6 supreme 1:1,15 34:16,21 37:3,13 47:13 49:9,13\nstart 53:25 statutory 28:3 53:14,14 40:14 41:16 43:6 55:3,3,16,18,20\nstarted 47:18 32:22,24 33:14,17 sure 19:24 45:10 51:18,18,21,23 56:3,9,19,25\nstate 1:3 3:4,13,24 34:9 35:1 36:1 suspect 30:9 55:2 57:1 58:6 57:13\n 4:1,8,9,9,10 5:9 43:13 sustained 52:6 theory 18:18 30:5 thinking 6:13\n 5:20,22 6:5,15,16 stays 25:20 swiss 54:5 31:15 54:5 thirdparty 19:9\n 6:22 7:4,7,16,17 sthe 55:19 thereof 3:18 13:3 thought 10:4 13:7\n 7:18 8:11,17 9:4 stop 16:12 T 33:23 34:1 48:2 14:1 20:15 21:10\n 9:13,16 10:19,21 stopped 57:18 t 2:1,1 57:20 21:10,11 34:11\n 10:23 11:24 12:20 strongly 44:9 take 4:12 8:6 10:6 theres 3:25 6:18 45:19 48:14 53:11\n 12:24,25 13:5,21 sturm 50:4 16:1,9 17:20 26:7 11:12 12:5 16:16 three 43:1 56:18\n 14:2 15:20 16:6 subclause 7:22 8:4 27:15 33:10 44:23 17:16,21 18:3,12 threefourths 9:8\n 16:11,16,18 17:13 20:24,24 21:1 taken 40:18 18:22 20:7,23 threequarters 8:23\n 17:25 19:20 21:3 36:21 37:6,10,25 takes 26:14 52:10 23:19 24:13 25:13 ticket 29:23\n 21:14,22 22:1,8 37:25 38:1 54:14 26:4,6,12,16,23 time 18:2 21:12,18\n 22:11,16 23:14,15 subject 5:23 15:13 talk 15:11 27:15 28:15,23 31:23 24:13,22,22 25:13\n 23:17,22 24:2,3 56:3 43:19 53:10 33:6 47:16 48:20 26:6,10,13 27:19\n 24:11,12,15 26:10 submit 8:21 15:1 talked 54:18 theyre 6:19 9:7 43:25 46:7 47:8\n 26:17,23 27:14 25:3,5 talking 24:24,25 11:1 22:14 30:10 47:23 54:10 57:13\n 28:6,10,25 30:21 submits 16:19 25:22 26:4 37:14 54:2 55:8 times 53:1\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[68] " Official\n Page 68\n\ntold 6:17,19 use 4:1 10:8 19:18 19:25 wrest 12:14 2\ntotally 35:11 49:3 37:16 42:17 44:25 washington 1:11 wrested 14:17 2 1:12 33:13\ntough 9:8 45:14 1:18,21,24 wresting 8:17 13:6 20 22:24\ntreat 29:7 uses 39:14 43:1,13 waxman 1:24 2:10 wrong 14:21 2007 10:7\ntremendous 20:22 usurped 38:12 38:6,7,9 39:1,5,18 2011 10:6\ntries 16:12 39:23 40:4,14,22 X\n 2015 1:12\ntroops 42:15 V 41:12,16 42:20,24 x 1:2,10 20th 21:17\ntrue 50:3 55:2 v 1:6 3:5 21:23 44:4,20 45:5,8 27 2:8 10:22,25\n 25:12 26:9 40:24 Y\ntrying 35:23,25 46:24 47:1 48:5,7 54:2\nturn 28:3 33:10 41:17,18,20,22 48:9 49:4 50:23 yates 41:4 44:8\n 52:22 53:7,9,10 2a 19:22,25 28:4\n 57:22 43:3 49:10 51:17,21,24 52:9 32:23 33:4,19,20\nturns 54:16 valid 33:8 52:12,16 53:9,13 53:11,16 54:20\n yeah 26:1 45:7 35:11 37:21\ntwo 11:14 12:5,10 validity 24:5 52:4 way 6:13 9:2,6 2c 33:13\n 17:8 19:2 26:4 various 10:18 11:23 13:16,18 year 24:2\n 35:21 38:17 43:10 22:16 15:13 16:8 17:7 years 5:15 25:6 3\n 43:22 46:20,21 versus 32:4 37:4 21:9 27:6 36:18 40:9 47:17 3 2:4 41:2,10,21\n vesting 3:21 37:23 44:3 48:6 youre 8:10 12:6 43:3\n U vests 3:16 48:19 56:20 20:5,22 25:21 30 6:25 8:22 58:9\nu 33:13 veto 6:2,2,24 16:17 ways 12:5 26:21 27:12 41:7 34 54:2\nultimate 16:24 17:1,2,3,4,16,21 webster 39:9 41:9,9 56:1 57:7 35 54:2\nultimately 14:8 18:21 56:3 58:8 week 41:4 44:8 youve 22:23,24 367 50:12\n 24:18 vieth 49:9 52:22 23:2 44:18 53:6,6 38 2:11\nunaccountable view 9:10,10 12:23 weiser 25:12 26:9 55:18 39 45:16\n 3:15,20 7:11 13:20 14:8 29:2 went 35:8 Z 4\nuncertain 54:22 violate 19:19 weve 39:9\nunconstitutional violates 20:2 36:10 whats 24:25 43:19 zillions 10:13 4 43:5\n 10:11 19:5,8 20:1 violence 42:15 zug 54:6 40 45:16\n 51:10\nunconstitutionally vote 8:23 19:19 whatsoever 23:2 0\n 29:9 22:13,14,15 47:12 white 25:12 26:9 5\n 05 1:16 3:2 53 2:14\nund 50:4 voter 9:18 10:6 whos 16:24 06 58:15\nunderstand 5:2 22:11 wildlife 29:22\n 15:23 33:4 42:9 voters 14:22,23 6\n wilson 46:2 1\nunderstanding votes 21:22 win 54:17 55:23 1 41:1 7\n 39:24 voting 10:7,8 24:1 word 39:6 41:19 10 1:16 3:2\nunderstood 22:3 32:5 43:2 44:10,10,23 106 3:12 11:15 8\n 33:12 39:11 48:14 44:25 47:3,23 15:14 8 25:6\n 48:25 W\n 52:23,25 11 58:15\nunelected 3:15,19 wait 17:18 41:7 wordforword 33:2 9\n 120 47:17\n 7:10 46:18 want 4:14 6:7 words 13:2,11 13 29:4\nuniform 39:7 10:24 16:9 29:12 16:18 43:14 48:1 131314 1:6 3:4\nunited 1:1,15,22 32:22 35:25 36:5 48:3 1911 33:2 34:8 35:2\n 2:7 12:7 27:23 37:19 39:19 43:7 works 16:23 40:16\n 43:12 56:24 57:4\nunprecedented wanted 8:5 36:19 world 18:16 19:18 57:5,6,9,12\n 28:6 40:9 45:17 48:10 worry 20:11\n 1913 40:8\nunusual 28:5 52:23 48:11 50:8 57:11 worth 27:10\n 1962 10:7\nurging 42:5 wants 7:19 13:12 wouldnt 57:19 19th 21:17\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[[2]]
[1] " Official\n\n\n1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES\n\n2 x\n\n3 MICHIGAN, ET AL., :\n\n4 Petitioners : No. 1446\n\n5 v. :\n\n6 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION :\n\n7 AGENCY, ET AL.; :\n\n8 :\n\n9 AND :\n\n10 :\n\n11 UTILITY AIR REGULATORY :\n\n12 GROUP, :\n\n13 Petitioner : No. 1447\n\n14 v. :\n\n15 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION :\n\n16 AGENCY, ET AL.; :\n\n17 :\n\n18 AND :\n\n19 :\n\n20 NATIONAL MINING ASSOCIATION, :\n\n21 Petitioner : No. 1449\n\n22 v. :\n\n23 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION :\n\n24 AGENCY, ET AL.; :\n\n25 x\n\n\n 1\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[2] " Official\n\n\n1 Washington, D.C.\n\n2 Wednesday, March 25, 2015\n\n3\n\n4 The aboveentitled matter came on for oral\n\n5 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States\n\n6 at 10:14 a.m.\n\n7 APPEARANCES:\n\n8 AARON D. LINDSTROM, ESQ., Solicitor General, Lansing,\n\n9 Mich.; on behalf of State Petitioners.\n\n10 F. WILLIAM BROWNELL, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf\n\n11 of industry Petitioners and Respondents in support.\n\n12 GEN. DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR., ESQ., Solicitor General,\n\n13 Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of\n\n14 Federal Respondents.\n\n15 PAUL M. SMITH, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of\n\n16 industry Respondents.\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n\n 2\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[3] " Official\n\n\n1 C O N T E N T S\n\n2 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAGE\n\n3 AARON D. LINDSTROM, ESQ.\n\n4 On behalf of State Petitioners 4\n\n5 ORAL ARGUMENT OF\n\n6 F. WILLIAM BROWNELL, ESQ.\n\n7 On behalf of industry Petitioners and\n\n8 Respondents in support 28\n\n9 ORAL ARGUMENT OF\n\n10 GEN. DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR., ESQ.\n\n11 On behalf of the Federal Respondents 41\n\n12 ORAL ARGUMENT OF\n\n13 PAUL M. SMITH, ESQ.\n\n14 On behalf industry Respondents 70\n\n15 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF\n\n16 AARON D. LINDSTROM, ESQ.\n\n17 On behalf of State Petitioners 86\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n\n 3\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[4] " Official\n\n\n1 P R O C E E D I N G S\n\n2 (10:14 a.m.)\n\n3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument\n\n4 this morning in Case 1446, Michigan v. The\n\n5 Environmental Protection Agency and the consolidated\n\n6 cases.\n\n7 Mr. Lindstrom.\n\n8 ORAL ARGUMENT OF AARON D. LINDSTROM\n\n9 ON BEHALF OF STATE PETITIONERS\n\n10 MR. LINDSTROM: Mr. Chief Justice, and may\n\n11 it please the Court:\n\n12 EPA's view that it can decide whether to\n\n13 regulate electric utilities without considering costs is\n\n14 contrary to the text and structure of Section 7412.\n\n15 The text sets out two distinct terms and\n\n16 thus directs EPA to consider whether it is appropriate\n\n17 to regulate and whether it is necessary to regulate.\n\n18 EPA found that it's necessary to regulate because of the\n\n19 existence of public health harms, and it found it's\n\n20 appropriate to regulate for the exact same reason, the\n\n21 existence of public health harms.\n\n22 So its interpretation \n\n23 JUSTICE KAGAN: General, I'm not sure that\n\n24 that's quite what EPA said. My understanding of what\n\n25 EPA said is that it's necessary because of public health\n\n\n 4\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[5] " Official\n\n\n1 harms and that it's appropriate because there are\n\n2 technologies that can redress or remedy those public\n\n3 health harms. So on the one hand, it said that it\n\n4 said that the phrase \"appropriate\" went to the nature of\n\n5 the harms. The phrase the phrase \"necessary\" went to\n\n6 the nature of the harms. The phrase \"appropriate\" went\n\n7 to the existence of technologies.\n\n8 MR. LINDSTROM: Justice Kagan, when they\n\n9 relied on the availability of controls, they did that\n\n10 only after having already said that we must find it's\n\n11 appropriate if a health hazard exists. So they've\n\n12 already determined that the health hazard is a necessary\n\n13 and sufficient condition so the existence of controls is\n\n14 something that's not \n\n15 JUSTICE SCALIA: Where is that? Can you\n\n16 give us a citation to their opinion? I mean, the\n\n17 language speaks for itself, I assume. What are you\n\n18 referring to?\n\n19 MR. LINDSTROM: For example, if you look \n\n20 this is in our reply brief, but if you're looking at \n\n21 JUSTICE SCALIA: In the reply brief?\n\n22 MR. LINDSTROM: Yes, Your Honor.\n\n23 I think the that points you to the actual\n\n24 final rule. That's volume 1 of the UR petition\n\n25 appendix. So the language let me find it in the\n\n\n 5\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[6] " Official\n\n\n1 reply brief. I have the UR I have the volume.\n\n2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry, what was the\n\n3 page?\n\n4 MR. LINDSTROM: Sure. If you turn to the\n\n5 UR Petition Appendix volume 1.\n\n6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Good Lord.\n\n7 MR. LINDSTROM: Page 196. This is the text\n\n8 of the final rule. Page 206A. I misspoke the first\n\n9 time. 206 says, \"We must find\" at the top of the\n\n10 page \"We must find it appropriate to regulate EGUs\n\n11 under Clean Air Act Section 112 if we determine that a\n\n12 single HAP emitted from EGUs poses a hazard to public\n\n13 health or environment.\"\n\n14 They said we must regulate. And the phrase\n\n15 \"must regulate\" means that when you get back to the\n\n16 availability of controls, then there's nothing left to\n\n17 be done. You've already said that we have to do it so\n\n18 the availability of controls isn't doing any additional\n\n19 work.\n\n20 The over \n\n21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is the government going to\n\n22 say that if the predicate for regulation exists, i.e.,\n\n23 there are emissions, then it's appropriate to regulate?\n\n24 That's what the government will say. I mean, that's \n\n25 \"appropriate\" is a capacious term.\n\n\n 6\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[7] " Official\n\n\n1 MR. LINDSTROM: It absolutely is.\n\n2 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And it would seem to me\n\n3 that the government will say, well, it's appropriate to\n\n4 regulate if there's an emission, so \n\n5 MR. LINDSTROM: It is a capacious term, but\n\n6 it, in fact, cuts against the government because one of\n\n7 the things that's encompassed within the term\n\n8 \"appropriate\" is that it looks at all of the\n\n9 circumstances in the context of determining whether or\n\n10 not you're going to regulate costs is a relevant\n\n11 circumstance. So the very fact that it's capacious cuts\n\n12 against them.\n\n13 But the fact that they're they've said we\n\n14 must find it's appropriate to regulate means that this\n\n15 other control \n\n16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, I thought \n\n17 JUSTICE KAGAN: Are you saying that they\n\n18 didn't that they didn't look at the availability of\n\n19 technologies? Is that what you're saying? That they\n\n20 thought that the availability of technologies was itself\n\n21 irrelevant to the determination? Is that your argument?\n\n22 MR. LINDSTROM: We're not saying they\n\n23 thought it was irrelevant. They thought well, I\n\n24 guess logically irrelevant. They thought that it's\n\n25 something they did look at. It's something that when\n\n\n 7\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[8] " Official\n\n\n1 they did the utility study, they examined the\n\n2 availability of controls, but then they said regardless\n\n3 of whether or not controls are available, if a health\n\n4 hazard exists, we have to regulate. So if I can give an\n\n5 example \n\n6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I I'm sorry. I\n\n7 thought they said only if it was necessary. Congress\n\n8 was motivated in not listing these sources because it\n\n9 didn't know whether the technology that was going to be\n\n10 put in place to control acid rain would reduce the HAPs\n\n11 sufficiently so that regulation wasn't necessary or a\n\n12 listing wasn't necessary.\n\n13 I had a different understanding of\n\n14 appropriate and necessary. Appropriate if there were\n\n15 HAPs, but necessary only if those HAPs were not\n\n16 sufficiently controlled by the other technology.\n\n17 MR. LINDSTROM: The necessary both of\n\n18 them looked at whether or not there was going to be an\n\n19 ongoing harm because both necessary and appropriate\n\n20 turned on the utility study. The utility study was\n\n21 something that examined what health hazards would remain\n\n22 after all the other regulations \n\n23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: The health hazard could\n\n24 have been low enough so that no no standards were\n\n25 necessary.\n\n\n 8\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[9] " Official\n\n\n1 MR. LINDSTROM: Well, they determined how\n\n2 severe the severity to the health hazard. The\n\n3 severity went into determining whether or not a public\n\n4 health hazard existed at all. So they looked at the \n\n5 the effects, and the only place they looked at severity\n\n6 in the final rule was determining whether or not a\n\n7 public hazard existed. Once there were enough health\n\n8 effects that there was a public health hazard, then they\n\n9 said we must regulate. And the fact that they said we\n\n10 must regulate, it's necessary to regulate, is exactly\n\n11 the same as what they said with appropriate, that we\n\n12 must regulate.\n\n13 JUSTICE KAGAN: Can can I step back for a\n\n14 minute, General Lindstrom? Because it seems to me that\n\n15 this quest for very particular meanings attached to each\n\n16 one of these adjectives; \"appropriate\" means X and\n\n17 \"necessary\" means Y. If we step back a little bit, I\n\n18 mean, that kind of language is used all over the U.S.\n\n19 Code and, indeed, that kind of language is used in our\n\n20 Constitution, the Necessary and Proper Clause.\n\n21 And as I understand what courts have done\n\n22 with that kind of language, that they haven't insisted\n\n23 that there be separate, defined meanings for each of\n\n24 those words. When John Marshall was doing this in\n\n25 McCulloch, in fact, he starts off with the word\n\n\n 9\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[10] " Official\n\n\n 1 \"necessary\" and then he says, no, this is a phrase and\n\n 2 we have to understand what the phrase as a whole means.\n\n 3 And why shouldn't we similarly say this idea that, you\n\n 4 know, you can catch them in a redundancy or a superfluity,\n\n 5 it's just not right because it's a complete\n\n 6 phrase.\n\n 7 MR. LINDSTROM: I think there's two\n\n 8 responses to that. First of all, under the Necessary\n\n 9 and Proper Clause, if you look at what this Court did in\n\n10 Printz v. The United States, it recognized something\n\n11 might be necessary and not necessarily proper. The\n\n12 commandeering of State legislature might be necessary\n\n13 to couch what you're trying to do \n\n14 JUSTICE SCALIA: Exactly. We we have\n\n15 separated out the two words and and said something\n\n16 could be necessary and not proper. And what Marshall\n\n17 said was that necessary doesn't mean absolutely\n\n18 indispensable. It just means useful. That's quite\n\n19 different from saying that proper has no has no role\n\n20 to play. It can be necessary; that is, useful to the\n\n21 Federal government, and yet not proper. So I \n\n22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So why do you get to\n\n23 pick what it means? I mean, I thought in in our\n\n24 agency law we repeatedly say if a term is ambiguous,\n\n25 and there is no legal definition of appropriate, it's\n\n\n\n 10\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[11] " Official\n\n\n1 contextual, yes. But, by definition, if you're saying a\n\n2 word that's not selfdefined, you have to look at in\n\n3 context, then it's ambiguous.\n\n4 MR. LINDSTROM: I don't think it's ambiguous\n\n5 in context. You can use the word \"appropriate\" in such\n\n6 a way that everyone understands what you're meaning. If\n\n7 I said we're going to take a group of people and we're\n\n8 going to go someplace and I want you to behave in an\n\n9 appropriate manner, and then I told you we're going to\n\n10 the library, everyone would know that that means be\n\n11 quiet.\n\n12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Yes. But I look at this\n\n13 statute and I see them doing the first part, the part\n\n14 at issue, and the very next provision says in 4 years\n\n15 instead of 3, do a mercury study that includes costs.\n\n16 I'm looking at it. I can very safely say one study\n\n17 doesn't use the word \"costs.\" The other does. The\n\n18 first one doesn't necessarily intend the costs to be\n\n19 looked at. What is irrational or not plausible about\n\n20 that reading?\n\n21 MR. LINDSTROM: Well \n\n22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Because we don't all\n\n23 we have to find is a plausible reading to to uphold\n\n24 the EPA's interpretation.\n\n25 MR. LINDSTROM: It's irrational because\n\n\n 11\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[12] " Official\n\n\n1 they're taking the key statutory word and treating it as\n\n2 surplusage. The language I should have pointed you to\n\n3 earlier is on page 4 of our reply brief. So the by\n\n4 treating them as doing the exactly the same work,\n\n5 they're reading a word out of the statute. And Chevron\n\n6 deference doesn't extend so far as to say we can violate\n\n7 an ordinary rule of statutory construction, which is\n\n8 that independent words have \n\n9 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the word the word\n\n10 \"appropriate,\" often it's a signal that discretion\n\n11 is what's fitting and you have an expert agency. So the\n\n12 word \"appropriate,\" I think, is commonly used to\n\n13 indicate that the expert agency will do what it finds\n\n14 fit based on its expertise. So, how you well, you\n\n15 are saying that appropriate necessarily embodies a cost\n\n16 calculation and yet this is a statute that uses cost,\n\n17 directs EPA to consider costs multiple, multiple times.\n\n18 Is there any case in all all of our\n\n19 decisions where we have said even though there was no\n\n20 instruction to consider costs, EPA is required to\n\n21 consider costs? Is there any such decision?\n\n22 MR. LINDSTROM: I don't think this no, I\n\n23 don't think this issue has arisen the same way where\n\n24 Congress has given broad discretion to an agency, told\n\n25 them to look at all of the circumstances, and the agency\n\n\n 12\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[13] " Official\n\n\n1 has said, we're going to ignore what is an important\n\n2 part of the problem. And that's why, in the way that\n\n3 Judge Kavanaugh looked at it, this is a problem under\n\n4 Chevron Step 1, 2 or under the State Farm doctrine,\n\n5 because agencies are supposed to not ignore an essential\n\n6 part of the problem as they engage in reasoned\n\n7 decisionmaking.\n\n8 JUSTICE KAGAN: But I think what Justice\n\n9 Ginsburg is getting at, General Lindstrom, is, you know,\n\n10 sometimes what we've done is we've looked at silence and\n\n11 we've said given that silence, cost considerations are\n\n12 precluded, right? So that's the example in Whitman.\n\n13 Sometimes we've said silence still allows agency\n\n14 discretion. They can do what they want with it. But\n\n15 it's so far from our most closely analogous case, which\n\n16 is Whitman, to say not only is is cost\n\n17 considerations, you know, not precluded, it's it's\n\n18 required when there's silence as to that subject.\n\n19 Now, if Congress wanted to require\n\n20 something, and clearly, Congress required this in other\n\n21 places, Congress knows how to require consideration of\n\n22 costs, to get from silence to this notion of a\n\n23 requirement seems to be a pretty big jump.\n\n24 MR. LINDSTROM: And Justice Kagan, I don't\n\n25 think it is silent when it tells the agency to look at\n\n\n 13\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[14] " Official\n\n\n1 all of the circumstances. And the material circumstance\n\n2 in the context of the question that the agency has to\n\n3 answer is should we regulate under this section, costs\n\n4 are part of the relevant materials \n\n5 JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm not even sure I agree\n\n6 with the premise that when when Congress says nothing\n\n7 about cost, the agency is entitled to disregard cost. I\n\n8 would think it's classic arbitrary and capricious agency\n\n9 action for an agency to command something that is\n\n10 outrageously expensive and and in which the expense\n\n11 vastly exceeds whatever public benefit can be can be\n\n12 achieved. I would think that's that's a violation of\n\n13 the Administrative Procedure Act.\n\n14 MR. LINDSTROM: And I think that's where \n\n15 JUSTICE SCALIA: Even without the word\n\n16 \"appropriate.\"\n\n17 MR. LINDSTROM: And I think that's where\n\n18 there's overlap between what the State \n\n19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. The study at\n\n20 issue that Congress commanded was simply a study. \"The\n\n21 administrator shall perform a study of the hazards to\n\n22 public health, reasonably anticipated to occur as a\n\n23 result of emissions by electric utility steamgenerating\n\n24 units.\" So the study that was directed to be made was\n\n25 only of public health hazards. And then it says, \"The\n\n\n 14\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[15] " Official\n\n\n1 administrator shall regulate these entities after\" \n\n2 under this section \"if it finds regulation is\n\n3 appropriate and necessary after considering the results\n\n4 of the study.\"\n\n5 So if the study is directed only at public\n\n6 health hazards, doesn't talk about it doesn't talk at\n\n7 all about cost, just public health hazards, why in the\n\n8 world would one assume that Congress was thinking about\n\n9 cost? Why didn't it do as it did with mercury? Make\n\n10 sure the study tells us how much control is going to\n\n11 cost. But it didn't do that. It just said tell us if\n\n12 they're a public health hazard.\n\n13 MR. LINDSTROM: And, Your Honor, it didn't\n\n14 limit the considerations that EPA was supposed to look\n\n15 at only the study. It says to consider the study \n\n16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But it says only the\n\n17 study.\n\n18 MR. LINDSTROM: It doesn't say only the\n\n19 study.\n\n20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: After it says it\n\n21 says, \"The administrator shall regulate if the\n\n22 administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and\n\n23 necessary after considering the results of the study.\n\n24 After considering the results of the study.\" The only\n\n25 thing that the study requires is a an evaluation of\n\n\n 15\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[16] " Official\n\n\n1 hazards to public health.\n\n2 MR. LINDSTROM: Well, first of all \n\n3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm not sure how you get\n\n4 to to to them having to do another step, when the\n\n5 only step that's a prerequisite to registration is\n\n6 studying public health hazards.\n\n7 MR. LINDSTROM: Well, first of all, even EPA\n\n8 doesn't think it's limited solely to the things that\n\n9 were studied in that utility study. They rely on\n\n10 environmental harms to justify \n\n11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But that doesn't \n\n12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Does it say after\n\n13 considering only the results of the study?\n\n14 MR. LINDSTROM: No, Your Honor. That's \n\n15 JUSTICE SCALIA: It doesn't say that, does\n\n16 it?\n\n17 MR. LINDSTROM: No, Your Honor. That's\n\n18 correct, it doesn't \n\n19 JUSTICE SCALIA: Sure. And they have to\n\n20 consider the results of the study. It doesn't say they\n\n21 can't consider everything else. And the word\n\n22 \"appropriate\" seems to suggest that they may consider\n\n23 other stuff.\n\n24 MR. LINDSTROM: Correct. So there's a study\n\n25 they're supposed to look at, but that's not the end of\n\n\n 16\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[17] " Official\n\n\n1 the analysis. They're supposed to do something else.\n\n2 That second step is to figure out whether it's also\n\n3 appropriate and necessary to regulate. So it didn't\n\n4 stop at just the study. And again, EPA agrees they can\n\n5 look beyond the results of the study. They look at\n\n6 environmental harms, which is not particularly mentioned\n\n7 here and is mentioned in (n)(1)(b).\n\n8 JUSTICE ALITO: It it seems to me that a\n\n9 very salient feature of the statutes that we have to\n\n10 interpret, maybe the most salient feature is that\n\n11 Congress chose to treat power plants differently from\n\n12 other sources. It could have treated them the same way\n\n13 and if it hadn't done that, then the the listing\n\n14 decision would not have taken into account costs, it\n\n15 would have been based on emissions, right?\n\n16 Or if it was an area source, it would have\n\n17 been based on effect of health alone. So what, if\n\n18 anything, can we infer from that, from the fact that\n\n19 Congress pointedly decided to treat power plants\n\n20 differently?\n\n21 MR. LINDSTROM: I think we can tell that\n\n22 they're trying to create a different regime. They're\n\n23 trying to do something different here than they did\n\n24 elsewhere. And That includes \n\n25 JUSTICE KAGAN: But they were trying to\n\n\n 17\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[18] " Official\n\n\n1 create a different regime, but the reason is pretty\n\n2 clear on its face. They were trying to create a\n\n3 different regime because they thought that the Acid Rain\n\n4 Program might have a real impact on what these electric\n\n5 utilities were doing. So they said, wait and see and\n\n6 let's see how the Acid Rain Program works, and let's see\n\n7 if we still have a problem to solve. And that's the\n\n8 reason why they put the electric utilities in a\n\n9 different category, isn't it?\n\n10 MR. LINDSTROM: And that highlights why\n\n11 costs are significant. The Acid Rain Program, in\n\n12 particular, was an economicallybased approach that was\n\n13 determined to regulate in a costeffective manner.\n\n14 JUSTICE KAGAN: But the point is that the\n\n15 Acid Rain Program didn't do what they Congress\n\n16 thought it might have done, and it was still left with\n\n17 this issue of continuing harm from the electric,\n\n18 utilities. And then once that happened, it seems to me\n\n19 that it's natural to take a look at the rest of the\n\n20 statute and to say, let's regulate in a similar way to\n\n21 the way all other industries are being regulated.\n\n22 MR. LINDSTROM: But if they had wanted to do\n\n23 it in the same way, there would have been no need to use\n\n24 the phrase, \"necessary and appropriate.\" They could\n\n25 have just simply gone to the tenton threshold emissions\n\n\n 18\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[19] " Official\n\n\n1 that apply to major sources and to the riskbased\n\n2 analysis that goes to area sources. So the fact that\n\n3 they used different criteria here in (n)(1) as opposed\n\n4 to criteria that's listed in 7412(c) \n\n5 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, they could have, but\n\n6 they might have thought, you know, let's take a look at\n\n7 the Acid Rain Program. Let's take a look at the problem\n\n8 that still remains, if any, and let's give the\n\n9 discretion to the agency at that point, because it will\n\n10 be years down the road in a different set of\n\n11 circumstances.\n\n12 MR. LINDSTROM: But the discretion includes\n\n13 looking at the entire problem. I mean, again, the\n\n14 language in the circumstances requires looking at the\n\n15 material circumstances, and this ties into the State\n\n16 Farm test. You have to look at all of the relevant\n\n17 circumstances if you're engaged in reasoned decision\n\n18 making. You can't ignore an important part of the\n\n19 problem. But I would like \n\n20 JUSTICE ALITO: If the if the reason for\n\n21 the separate treatment was the belief that the Acid Rain\n\n22 Program would be sufficient at some point in time to\n\n23 bring emissions from power plants below the level that\n\n24 would result in their being listed if they were other\n\n25 sources, why would it be necessary to enact this\n\n\n 19\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[20] " Official\n\n\n1 separate provision asking whether it's necessary and\n\n2 appropriate to regulate them?\n\n3 MR. LINDSTROM: It could have just \n\n4 JUSTICE ALITO: I don't see how that can be\n\n5 the explanation.\n\n6 MR. LINDSTROM: Yes, Your Honor. They could\n\n7 have just had a threeyear delay if that's all they were\n\n8 trying to do, as opposed to and then go through the\n\n9 ordinary system.\n\n10 JUSTICE KAGAN: No, because they didn't\n\n11 know. They thought it might; they thought it might not.\n\n12 They were going to wait and see. It depended on how the\n\n13 industry responded to the regulatory requirements of the\n\n14 Acid Rain Program.\n\n15 MR. LINDSTROM: That still doesn't explain,\n\n16 Your Honor, why they chose to use different criteria as\n\n17 opposed to just reiterating the criteria that are under\n\n18 7412(c) under the ordinary thing that applies to every\n\n19 other source. They're still trying to treat electric\n\n20 utilities differently.\n\n21 And I would like to return to one point\n\n22 about the Acid Rain Program, which is that, again, if\n\n23 you're addressing emissions from electric utilities in a\n\n24 program that's specifically targeting electric utilities\n\n25 as they did in the Acid Rain Program and that was\n\n\n 20\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[21] " Official\n\n\n1 entirely based on cost effectiveness, it makes little\n\n2 sense to look at what's remaining after you've already\n\n3 done that and then to say in this area of diminishing\n\n4 marginal utility, we're going to say costs are\n\n5 irrelevant. That's backwards. Costs would be\n\n6 especially relevant when you're in the area of what's\n\n7 left over.\n\n8 JUSTICE KENNEDY: When the statute refers to\n\n9 the emissions standards for the 12 percent of the best\n\n10 performing plants, will the government say that\n\n11 implicitly is a cost consideration?\n\n12 MR. LINDSTROM: I expect \n\n13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I mean, is that their\n\n14 position and if so, how do you answer?\n\n15 MR. LINDSTROM: Right. I expect they will.\n\n16 The way I would answer that is to say that that looks at\n\n17 plants across the range of how old they are. So plants\n\n18 that were built in 2005, for example, might have been\n\n19 built in such a way that they have technology where it\n\n20 was cost effective to include certain control measures.\n\n21 But if you're looking at a plant that was built in 1960,\n\n22 imposing those same control measures on an older plant\n\n23 is something that would be a lot more expensive.\n\n24 It's the difference between renovating your house and\n\n25 building it certainly in the first place.\n\n\n 21\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[22] " Official\n\n\n1 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But that's true of\n\n2 all \n\n3 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Mandated if that's a\n\n4 mandated base from which the government must operate\n\n5 and \n\n6 MR. LINDSTROM: It is.\n\n7 JUSTICE KENNEDY: and it's and I it\n\n8 seems to me like there's an implicit cost consideration\n\n9 there. You still say that's insufficient because?\n\n10 MR. LINDSTROM: Yes, Your Honor. That's\n\n11 insufficient because it's not I'm explaining why it\n\n12 doesn't necessarily take costs into effect. The fact\n\n13 that into consideration. The fact that some\n\n14 utilities were able to impose things doesn't mean it\n\n15 would be cost effective for other ones to do it.\n\n16 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes. But why isn't that\n\n17 taken care of by you see, you have to take into\n\n18 account cost somewhere. And so they they the\n\n19 other side says, well, there's room for that. But\n\n20 suppose that 25 percent of all electricity generators\n\n21 are near waterfalls. This is easy for them, okay? But\n\n22 75 percent, it's impossible and they'll all go out of\n\n23 business and we'll have no electricity. Imagine that\n\n24 were so.\n\n25 Could the EPA, under their current theory,\n\n\n 22\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[23] " Official\n\n\n1 take account of that? Well, I guess the answer you want\n\n2 to say is no, but they say yes, they can. What about\n\n3 this 12 percent rule? You know, how does that well,\n\n4 a little bit earlier in the statute, it says, \"The\n\n5 administrator may distinguish among classes, types and\n\n6 sizes of sources.\" So if you really had this situation,\n\n7 you could say, look 75 percent of the generators in the\n\n8 United States have this really old technology and\n\n9 they'll all go out of business. And EPA could say fine.\n\n10 That's a different class. Okay. I mean, if that were\n\n11 really true. So so don't they have, through that\n\n12 provision and the 12 percent and the next one, the\n\n13 ability to take into account at least serious cost\n\n14 problems?\n\n15 MR. LINDSTROM: Well, assuming they have the\n\n16 ability to take into account.\n\n17 JUSTICE BREYER: Do they? Yes or no? Do\n\n18 they yes or no?\n\n19 MR. LINDSTROM: No. I think \n\n20 JUSTICE BREYER: No, they don't. Why not?\n\n21 MR. LINDSTROM: The reason that costs are\n\n22 not directly relevant to the first one is what I was\n\n23 explaining about the 12 percent. So in other words, as\n\n24 you the example you gave shows that some might be\n\n25 able to have the lower costeffective approach just\n\n\n 23\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[24] " Official\n\n\n1 because they're near a waterfall. So relying on the\n\n2 fact that 12 percent were able to meet this \n\n3 JUSTICE BREYER: Fine. My point was I \n\n4 I want an answer to this. My point was, if in the\n\n5 imaginary situation that I've imagined, 20 percent of\n\n6 the generators, for whatever reason, can meet this\n\n7 pretty easily; the next 80 percent will require the\n\n8 entire gross national product to meet. Suppose that\n\n9 were the situation. You, I guess, could go to EPA and\n\n10 say, create, of that second group, a separate class, a\n\n11 separate type, for that's the reason it's so expensive.\n\n12 And, therefore, the 12 percent doesn't apply to them\n\n13 because they're in a separate class.\n\n14 Now, my question is: Can you legally make\n\n15 that argument? And they will take it into account. And\n\n16 that's what I want a yes or no answer to.\n\n17 MR. LINDSTROM: And I think the answer might\n\n18 be yes in the future, but now we can't do it because \n\n19 JUSTICE BREYER: Did you make the argument\n\n20 here now?\n\n21 MR. LINDSTROM: My point is that \n\n22 JUSTICE BREYER: If you're saying yes in the\n\n23 future, let's now go to this case and say, did you make\n\n24 this argument?\n\n25 MR. LINDSTROM: I don't believe either side\n\n\n 24\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[25] " Official\n\n\n1 has made that argument.\n\n2 JUSTICE BREYER: Fine. I'll I'll \n\n3 JUSTICE SCALIA: Has has the argue has\n\n4 the agency made this obvious argument?\n\n5 MR. LINDSTROM: The agency has not \n\n6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Has the agency said, we're\n\n7 going to take costs into account; we're going to use\n\n8 this this provision that Justice Breyer discovered,\n\n9 and and that's what we're going to do? Is is that\n\n10 how the agency issued its rule?\n\n11 MR. LINDSTROM: They did not. The only\n\n12 distinction \n\n13 JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't think so. I never\n\n14 heard of this argument.\n\n15 MR. LINDSTROM: It \n\n16 JUSTICE BREYER: Now, wait, because I still\n\n17 want to know a fact. I want to the fact that I want\n\n18 to know and you're familiar with this record is\n\n19 did anyone on your side of the issue ask the agency to\n\n20 take costs into account brutally, roughly, crudely, or\n\n21 did they all say we want a cost benefit analysis?\n\n22 I would like your characterization of the\n\n23 record on that point, because reading what they've said,\n\n24 it's about costbenefit analysis, that paragraph. So\n\n25 that gave me the idea that maybe everyone interested in\n\n\n 25\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[26] " Official\n\n\n1 cost asked for a costbenefit analysis.\n\n2 MR. LINDSTROM: And I think the answer is\n\n3 that we asked them to consider costs. We thought a\n\n4 costbenefit analysis is the ordinary way that a\n\n5 reasoned agency decisionmaking happens, not through\n\n6 some vague sense of what the costs are, but by doing an\n\n7 analysis. And they have said their entire position\n\n8 here is that we don't need to do that because costs are\n\n9 irrelevant. That's not something we have to consider\n\n10 under the statute.\n\n11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: As I understand \n\n12 JUSTICE KAGAN: General \n\n13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: As I understand what\n\n14 happens, listing and standards are the only things that\n\n15 you can generally appeal from. It's only a final agency\n\n16 action when the when the standards are issued. And I\n\n17 thought it was at the issuance of the standards that the\n\n18 government sometimes breaks up the sources and the\n\n19 amount of emissions that each type of source that\n\n20 Justice Breyer is talking about can have.\n\n21 So I think the listing is just of a broad\n\n22 category, because we've had plenty of cases in in\n\n23 this Court where we've looked at the agency saying this\n\n24 type of source meets these standards, that type of\n\n25 source meets another standard. Isn't that the way it\n\n\n 26\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[27] " Official\n\n\n1 works?\n\n2 MR. LINDSTROM: Well, that highlights why\n\n3 they're not treating this as separate listing versus\n\n4 regulatory decision. They did both at the exact same\n\n5 time here. Same time they made the necessary and\n\n6 appropriate finding, they also promulgated the emission\n\n7 standards. And that shows this isn't simply a typical\n\n8 listing standard.\n\n9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Once once they're\n\n10 listed, they are subject to minimum standards, aren't\n\n11 they?\n\n12 MR. LINDSTROM: That's absolutely correct,\n\n13 and must be \n\n14 JUSTICE SCALIA: And it's not up to the\n\n15 agency to calibrate standards. Once they're listed,\n\n16 minimum standards apply, right?\n\n17 MR. LINDSTROM: Absolutely.\n\n18 JUSTICE SCALIA: And the agency could have\n\n19 discretion as to whether to lift the standards further,\n\n20 but the minimums apply, right?\n\n21 MR. LINDSTROM: That's EPA's position.\n\n22 You \n\n23 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's theirs.\n\n24 MR. LINDSTROM: must regulate as soon\n\n25 as has been made.\n\n\n 27\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[28] " Official\n\n\n1 If I could reserve my time for rebuttal.\n\n2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,\n\n3 Mr. Lindstrom.\n\n4 Mr. Brownell.\n\n5 ORAL ARGUMENT OF F. WILLIAM BROWNELL\n\n6 ON BEHALF OF INDUSTRY PETITIONERS\n\n7 AND RESPONDENTS IN SUPPORT\n\n8 MR. BROWNELL: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it\n\n9 please the Court:\n\n10 I would like to make three points to\n\n11 supplement my colleague's argument: First, regarding\n\n12 the nature of power plant regulation under the Clean Air\n\n13 Act; second, the language of Subsection (n)(1)(A); and,\n\n14 third, the broader Clean Air Act context.\n\n15 To begin, power plants are the most\n\n16 regulated source category under the Clean Air Act both\n\n17 before 1990 and after the 1990 Amendments. The Court\n\n18 has talked about some of the programs. It's not only\n\n19 Title IV Acid Deposition Program, but a visibility,\n\n20 best available retrofit technology, pollution transport\n\n21 programs targeted at power plants, and a variety of\n\n22 other control programs, both control and air quality.\n\n23 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Brownell, I I would\n\n24 think that cuts the other way, that every other\n\n25 significant industry in the United States is subject to\n\n\n 28\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[29] " Official\n\n\n1 this program except for electric power plants.\n\n2 MR. BROWNELL: Your Honor, what it shows is\n\n3 that for the other industries, EPA estimated in 2010\n\n4 that for all other industries, this Air Toxics Program\n\n5 would impose compliance costs of about $840 million.\n\n6 All of these other programs for power plants would\n\n7 impose compliance costs, EPA estimated in 2011, about\n\n8 10.4 billion.\n\n9 This single regulation now on air toxics\n\n10 imposes annual costs of 9.6 billion. And what does one\n\n11 get for it? There are three standards at issue here,\n\n12 and I think that this is important to understand some of\n\n13 the questions that have been asked. There's a regulation\n\n14 for mercury, there's a regulation for nonmercury metals,\n\n15 and there's a regulation for acid gases.\n\n16 Most of the costs here the majority,\n\n17 about 5 billion annually are associated with the acid\n\n18 gas regulation which the agency has concluded presents\n\n19 no public health risk, no public health concern. The\n\n20 agency said that our modeling has consistently showed\n\n21 that powerplantrelated exposures are at least an order\n\n22 of magnitude below the conservatively determined safe\n\n23 level.\n\n24 Now, in the Title IV program, Congress\n\n25 addressed pollution with acidification potential and\n\n\n 29\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[30] " Official\n\n\n1 required reductions of 9 million tons a year at about a\n\n2 cost of 1 to 1.4 billion. The Acid Gas Program is\n\n3 projected to result in reductions of acid gases about\n\n4 40 to 50,000 tons per year at a cost of $5 billion.\n\n5 What that background shows, Your Honor, is\n\n6 that when why Congress treated power plants\n\n7 differently. It asked whether it is appropriate to\n\n8 impose further regulation of a specific type, whether\n\n9 it's appropriate to propose regulation under this\n\n10 section on the most aggressively regulated industry\n\n11 under the Clean Air Act.\n\n12 Now, what the statutory \n\n13 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Brownell, can I take you\n\n14 back to Justice Breyer's first question? And the first\n\n15 question was about the way these categories work and how\n\n16 the categories enable the EPA to mitigate certain\n\n17 dramatic or onerous costs on certain segments of the\n\n18 industry, because that's not an unknown provision of any\n\n19 kind. And, indeed, it seems to me that the provision\n\n20 very much cuts against your argument, because EPA, in\n\n21 some ways, can't even figure out the costs until it\n\n22 makes those categorization decisions. But the aggregate\n\n23 costs, not just within each category, but the aggregate\n\n24 costs obviously depend on how EPA categorizes and\n\n25 subcategorizes.\n\n\n 30\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[31] " Official\n\n\n1 So you would have the EPA make the cost\n\n2 calculation before it really can, given the structure of\n\n3 the statute.\n\n4 MR. BROWNELL: Your Your Honor, the cost\n\n5 does factor into a variety of determinations that are\n\n6 made as part of the regulatory process. When EPA issued\n\n7 its Notice of Regulatory Finding in December of 2010, it\n\n8 said this is nonfinal. EPA confirmed again and this\n\n9 is at page 555a of the UAR Petitioner's Appendix that\n\n10 the there is no final (n)(1)(A) determination or\n\n11 listing, and we are going to take comment on that as\n\n12 part of the rulemaking to examine Section 7412(d)\n\n13 emission standards.\n\n14 So as part of that, the agency addresses\n\n15 issues related to level of control, subcategorization,\n\n16 and at the end of the rulemaking comes out with a\n\n17 regulation that has certain characteristics and\n\n18 consequences. And here this regulation what\n\n19 (n)(1)(A) says is, in light of the study, address\n\n20 whether such regulation under the section is appropriate\n\n21 and necessary for power plants.\n\n22 Now, it may be necessary to regulate\n\n23 something like mercury if there's a public health risk,\n\n24 and that's the only hazardous air pollutant for which\n\n25 EPA has calculated a quantifiable public health risk,\n\n\n 31\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[32] " Official\n\n\n1 but that may not be the appropriate regulatory regime\n\n2 if, as EPA has explained here, their view of the statute\n\n3 is not to focus on whether such regulation is\n\n4 appropriate, but whether listing of power plants under\n\n5 subsection C is appropriate just like every other\n\n6 source category.\n\n7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Can can I say can I\n\n8 ask whether that listing is and and the minimum\n\n9 standards that that imposes are subject to the\n\n10 categorization device that Justice Breyer was asking\n\n11 about? Could could the agency say, well, you know,\n\n12 we're going to divide these into categories, and since\n\n13 it's too expensive for certain 80 percent of power\n\n14 plants that that don't have waterfalls nearby, we're\n\n15 going to exempt them from these minimum standards?\n\n16 Can can it do that?\n\n17 MR. BROWNELL: No, Your Honor, not at the\n\n18 listing stage. But once the source category is listed\n\n19 at the standardsetting stage, they could consider\n\n20 subcategorization \n\n21 JUSTICE SCALIA: Reduce it below \n\n22 MR. LINDSTROM: in order to \n\n23 JUSTICE SCALIA: below the the\n\n24 minimums?\n\n25 MR. BROWNELL: Not below the minimums. Your\n\n\n 32\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[33] " Official\n\n\n1 Honor is perfectly right \n\n2 JUSTICE KAGAN : No. But the minimums\n\n3 depend \n\n4 JUSTICE SCALIA: That's that's what I\n\n5 thought.\n\n6 JUSTICE KAGAN : The minimums depend on\n\n7 the categories and the subcategories. You can\n\n8 categorize in such a way that the minimums will be up\n\n9 here, or you can categorize in such a way the minimums\n\n10 will be down there.\n\n11 MR. BROWNELL: And during the rulemaking,\n\n12 Your Honor, arguments made about subcategorization, and\n\n13 EPA ultimately subcategorized the the power industry\n\n14 with respect to one limited set of sources, lignite\n\n15 sources with respect to the mercury standard. But,\n\n16 otherwise, EPA's position is once listed, it triggers an\n\n17 obligation to issue emission standards under the –\n\n18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So your answer \n\n19 JUSTICE KAGAN : It triggers an\n\n20 obligation as to some standard, but, again, the minimum\n\n21 standard can vary dramatically depending upon how the\n\n22 categories and subcategories are set up. And because\n\n23 the minimum standard can vary dramatic, so, too, will\n\n24 costs vary dramatically. So you're having the EPA\n\n25 consider costs before the EPA can know what the costs\n\n\n 33\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[34] " Official\n\n\n1 are.\n\n2 MR. BROWNELL: Your Your Honor, if I can\n\n3 respond to to that before the other question at the\n\n4 other end of the bench.\n\n5 EPA does know what the costs are through the\n\n6 rulemaking process in which it undertakes notice and\n\n7 comment with respect to both the (n)(1)(a) determination\n\n8 and the emission standard. Section 7607(d)(1)(c) of the\n\n9 Clean Air Act lists subsection N as one of the\n\n10 provisions that requires notice and comment rulemaking\n\n11 under the special Clean Air Act procedures. And this is\n\n12 why the agency explained that there's no final (n)(1)(a)\n\n13 until the end of the process, until notice and comment\n\n14 and we've taken and determined what the costs are.\n\n15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So\n\n16 interestingly and and this is then confirming what\n\n17 Justice Breyer said the point that you had an\n\n18 opportunity and apparently took advantage of it to tell\n\n19 the EPA that it should subcategorize this source, and it\n\n20 decided to subcategorize just one piece of it.\n\n21 So what you're really saying to us is it's\n\n22 not the listing. It's the way they've set up their\n\n23 emissions standards that I disagree with because they\n\n24 could have decided that there were subcategories that\n\n25 didn't require a standard at all. I'm presuming that\n\n\n 34\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[35] " Official\n\n\n1 they could have said anybody by the water doesn't have\n\n2 to do more because they're already 12 they're part of\n\n3 the 12 percent. We're going to do cost by everybody\n\n4 else that's not by the water.\n\n5 MR. BROWNELL: Conceptually, Your Honor, I\n\n6 imagine they could have subcategorized away the entire\n\n7 industry, but that's not what they did in this\n\n8 rulemaking. And with respect to certain of the\n\n9 regulations \n\n10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No, they didn't do it.\n\n11 But but you're asking us you're this is\n\n12 almost a this is a challenge to a regulation that's\n\n13 only piecemeal because you're you're arguing that\n\n14 they should have considered costs, but they obviously\n\n15 did before they issued the standards. You can't look at\n\n16 the standards and the emission in a case, and and\n\n17 the listing in a case like this in isolation.\n\n18 MR. BROWNELL: Justice Sotomayor, if I could\n\n19 try the answer to the question once again.\n\n20 The subsection N(1)(a) question is whether\n\n21 after considering the results of the study and I note\n\n22 that the study also looks at alternative control\n\n23 strategies for any emissions that may warrant\n\n24 regulation the agency determines such regulation is\n\n25 appropriate and necessary. So the focus of the\n\n\n 35\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[36] " Official\n\n\n1 determination is not on on listing and whatever may\n\n2 flow from that, but the regulation that the agency\n\n3 decides to apply to address the remaining public health\n\n4 hazard that is identified from this source category.\n\n5 JUSTICE ALITO: Mr. Brownell, when did\n\n6 EPA say we are not going to take costs into account at\n\n7 the listing stage because we will take costs into\n\n8 account through this subcategorization possibility\n\n9 that's being discussed?\n\n10 MR. BROWNELL: No, they did not, Your Honor.\n\n11 As I recall the record of the proceeding, this\n\n12 discussion of subcategorization has come up in the\n\n13 briefing afterwards.\n\n14 JUSTICE BREYER: Why why didn't they\n\n15 write you see what's try these questions are\n\n16 difficult because they're so hypothetical. It isn't\n\n17 true that 50 percent of the industry will use up\n\n18 50 all the domestic product, et cetera. But they\n\n19 wrote this thing in a way that sounds as if even if that\n\n20 had been true, they wouldn't have taken it into account.\n\n21 So so what they say is the EPA does not believe it is\n\n22 appropriate to consider costs when determining whether\n\n23 EGU is okay. You see the problem? So for me but\n\n24 the SG is telling us, don't worry. Maybe they should\n\n25 have written, knowing what we know and what is\n\n\n 36\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[37] " Official\n\n\n1 undisputed so far, we don't think that the cost problem\n\n2 is big enough for us to warrant a costbenefit analysis\n\n3 or other consideration. Okay? Then they've taken it\n\n4 into account. So there's no problem if it's within,\n\n5 it's reasonable.\n\n6 Now, they didn't write that. So that's why\n\n7 I'm looking to see is the it's really the SG, but I\n\n8 mean, is is there really a different way that they\n\n9 could eliminate this horrible scenario if it existed,\n\n10 which it didn't. You understand what I'm driving at?\n\n11 I'm trying to get your best answer on that.\n\n12 MR. BROWNELL: And and I want to\n\n13 emphasize that this is not an argument about whether or\n\n14 not to regulate mercury where there's been an identified\n\n15 public health risk. It's whether the regulatory regime\n\n16 that has been defined here under Section 7412, which the\n\n17 government says is the listing that applies to all other\n\n18 source categories, and the (d)(3) minimum controls\n\n19 technology standards that apply to all other source\n\n20 categories is the right way to do it. Regardless of how\n\n21 you subcategorize, it's going to have tremendous impacts\n\n22 as a result of acid gas regulation and for a pollutant\n\n23 that presents no public health risk. There are other\n\n24 ways \n\n25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I I suppose we\n\n\n 37\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[38] " Official\n\n\n1 can't we can't uphold an agency rule on a ground that\n\n2 they didn't adopt below, right?\n\n3 MR. BROWNELL: That's correct.\n\n4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Under Chenery?\n\n5 MR. BROWNELL: That's correct.\n\n6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So is your\n\n7 understanding correct that this is not an argument a\n\n8 basis for decision that they adopted below?\n\n9 MR. BROWNELL: That's correct, Your Honor.\n\n10 My understanding of the basis for the decision below is\n\n11 that costs are irrelevant in our determination under\n\n12 (n)(1)(a) whether or not whether to regulate the\n\n13 source category under the typical Subsection 7412 regime\n\n14 that applies to other source categories.\n\n15 JUSTICE KAGAN: But that's exactly right,\n\n16 Mr. Brownell. I mean, the the agency, at that point\n\n17 in time, was only answering the very first question, the\n\n18 very threshold issue. And at that point, the agency\n\n19 said costs were irrelevant. But costs become relevant\n\n20 later in the analysis and in a variety of ways: Through\n\n21 the 12 and a half percent, through the 12 percent,\n\n22 through the categorization and subcategorization,\n\n23 through the determination whether to raise standards\n\n24 even higher. So costs costs costs later, but as to this\n\n25 particular thing, the agency said, yes, here we don't\n\n\n 38\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[39] " Official\n\n\n1 consider costs. We could, but we don't want to because\n\n2 there's all this potential for costs to come in\n\n3 afterwards.\n\n4 MR. BROWNELL: And, Your Honor, it's costs\n\n5 costs costs under the statutory criteria that Congress\n\n6 provided for setting (d)(3) control technology standards\n\n7 and then having defined those standards at the end of\n\n8 the process, the agency finalizes its (n)(1)(a)\n\n9 determination in light of the costs and impacts and\n\n10 other factors that are mentioned in the \n\n11 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Do you think do you\n\n12 think that whenever the term \"appropriate\" is used in a\n\n13 regulatory context in the Clean Air Act, that it demands\n\n14 a costbenefit analysis?\n\n15 MR. BROWNELL: Your Honor, when you say in\n\n16 any context, that's so broad I don't think that I can\n\n17 say that it would require costbenefit in any context.\n\n18 But in a specific context here where the focus is on\n\n19 whether such regulation is appropriate and necessary,\n\n20 that regulation has certain characteristics and\n\n21 consequences that we have talked about this morning,\n\n22 including the fact that it imposes on a pollutant that\n\n23 presents no public health risk, $5 billion a year.\n\n24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But, Mr. Brownell, before\n\n25 you finish, because your time is out, can you clarify\n\n\n 39\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[40] " Official\n\n\n1 for me why this is is at this stage something that we\n\n2 should be concerned about because there is this\n\n3 regulatory impact assessment and that that has said\n\n4 that the benefits vastly exceed the costs, and\n\n5 that's that's an impact analysis and has gone through\n\n6 the OR process and OR concluded that EPA appropriately\n\n7 calculated the costs.\n\n8 MR. BROWNELL: Yes, Your Honor, Mr. Chief\n\n9 Justice. The cobenefits all of those benefits are\n\n10 cobenefits. Only 4 to 6 million dollars are associated\n\n11 with hazardous air pollutants. Those cobenefits that\n\n12 are in the regulatory impact analysis were not\n\n13 considered as part of the regulatory determination for\n\n14 good reason, because they're important questions\n\n15 regarding their legal importance and relevance under the\n\n16 proper standard. And what I mean, Your Honor, is that\n\n17 PM 2.5 is the pollutant, fine particles that is\n\n18 associated with these cobenefits. That is extensively\n\n19 regulated under the National Ambient Air Quality\n\n20 Standard program. In fact, those are quality standards\n\n21 were only recently revised to be tightened, and in the\n\n22 context of that proceeding, the agency found that the\n\n23 low levels of exposure for these cobenefits did not\n\n24 produce effects or risks that were of regulatory\n\n25 significance because they're too uncertain. So there\n\n\n 40\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[41] " Official\n\n\n1 are serious questions about legal relevance and\n\n2 importance.\n\n3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.\n\n4 MR. BROWNELL: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.\n\n5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: General Verrilli.\n\n6 ORAL ARGUMENT OF DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR.\n\n7 ON BEHALF OF FEDERAL RESPONDENTS\n\n8 GENERAL VERRILLI: Mr. Chief Justice, and\n\n9 may it please the Court:\n\n10 EPA's interpretation of Section\n\n11 7412(n)(1)(A) should be affirmed for three basic\n\n12 reasons. First, it is the most natural and certainly a\n\n13 permissible reading of the statutory text which directs\n\n14 EPA to focus on health concerns and doesn't mention\n\n15 costs.\n\n16 Second, it harmonizes the provision with\n\n17 Section 7412's structure and design, because it applies\n\n18 the same regulatory logic to power plants that Congress\n\n19 directed EPA to apply to regulate hazardous air\n\n20 pollution from every other type of source, and that is\n\n21 decide whether to list for regulation based on health\n\n22 and environmental hazards alone, and consider costs in\n\n23 setting the emission standards.\n\n24 And third, as a matter of common sense and\n\n25 sound government practice, it was certainly appropriate\n\n\n 41\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[42] " Official\n\n\n1 for EPA to list power plants for regulation based solely\n\n2 on health and environmental hazards, because that\n\n3 reflects the approach Congress chose not only in 7412,\n\n4 in this regulatory program, but in all of the major\n\n5 regulatory programs under the Clean Air Act.\n\n6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Could I go to\n\n7 your you're now three out your first first\n\n8 point. You concede, don't you, that EPA could have\n\n9 interpreted the statutory language to allow them to\n\n10 consider costs?\n\n11 GENERAL VERRILLI: I think EPA read it as \n\n12 read the best interpretation of the statute was it\n\n13 didn't provide for the consideration of costs at the\n\n14 listing stage \n\n15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But under Chevron,\n\n16 if you adopted a regulation that said appropriate and\n\n17 necessary allows us to consider cost, you think that\n\n18 would be appropriate?\n\n19 GENERAL VERRILLI: I think the phrase\n\n20 appropriate and necessary doesn't, by its terms,\n\n21 preclude the EPA from considering cost. But under\n\n22 Chevron, what the EPA has got to do is explain the\n\n23 justification for its reading of the statute, and that's\n\n24 what it did.\n\n25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Right. But since\n\n\n 42\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[43] " Official\n\n\n1 you're dealing with the term, I think this says as\n\n2 capacious as appropriate, and since you could have\n\n3 issued a regulation allowing the consideration of costs\n\n4 as appropriate, you're saying that the agency\n\n5 deliberately tied its hands and said we're not going to\n\n6 consider something. We're going to issue a rule saying\n\n7 we can't consider something that we could consider\n\n8 otherwise.\n\n9 GENERAL VERRILLI: No, I think the best way\n\n10 to think about this, Mr. Chief Justice, is what the\n\n11 agency did was decide that it was appropriate to\n\n12 approach the question of whether to regulate power\n\n13 plants in the same manner that Congress found it was not\n\n14 only appropriate, but mandated to address the question.\n\n15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: They could have \n\n16 I'm not I understand your argument that they could\n\n17 have done that, but I think it's unusual for an agency\n\n18 to say, when they want to do something, that that's the\n\n19 only thing we could do. Agencies usually like to\n\n20 maintain for themselves as much discretion as they can.\n\n21 And it strikes me as unusual, maybe the agency could go\n\n22 ahead and consider and not consider costs, but to say\n\n23 that we're prohibited from considering costs under the\n\n24 phrase appropriate, it strikes me as very unusual.\n\n25 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, it said I don't\n\n\n 43\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[44] " Official\n\n\n1 think so, Mr. Chief Justice. It said it didn't say,\n\n2 we're prohibited from considering costs. It said, we\n\n3 are not going to consider costs at the listing stage in\n\n4 making the decision about whether power plants should be\n\n5 listed for regulation under Section 7412.\n\n6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I thought I\n\n7 thought the rule was that the phrase appropriate and\n\n8 necessary did not allow them to consider costs.\n\n9 GENERAL VERRILLI: And appropriate and\n\n10 necessary goes to the question of whether power plants\n\n11 should be listed for regulation under Section 7412,\n\n12 which would then kick in the regulatory mechanism by\n\n13 which standards were set and costs are considered at the\n\n14 standardsetting \n\n15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I have the same question\n\n16 as the Chief Justice. Let me ask one more time. Could\n\n17 this agency reasonably have considered costs at stage\n\n18 one?\n\n19 GENERAL VERRILLI: I don't think the\n\n20 statutory text unambiguously forbids them from\n\n21 considering costs. But they determined that the best\n\n22 reading of the statutory text is that power plants,\n\n23 because after the study was conducted that Congress\n\n24 required, EPA determined that power plants are no\n\n25 differently situated than any other source of hazardous\n\n\n 44\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[45] " Official\n\n\n1 air pollutants regulated under Section 7412.\n\n2 And if I may Mr. Chief Justice?\n\n3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Sure.\n\n4 GENERAL VERRILLI: For every other source of\n\n5 hazardous air pollutants, what Congress mandated as\n\n6 appropriate was that you do not consider costs when you\n\n7 decide whether to regulate. You only consider health\n\n8 and environmental effects, and then you do consider\n\n9 costs under Section 7412(d) when you set the emissions\n\n10 standards.\n\n11 JUSTICE ALITO: How is that how is that\n\n12 consistent with this statutory scheme? If your argument\n\n13 is that EPA's only reason for doing this is that it\n\n14 wants to treat power plants the same as other sources,\n\n15 we know that that's what Congress didn't want or it\n\n16 would have it would not have enacted the separate\n\n17 provision for power plants.\n\n18 GENERAL VERRILLI: I agree, Justice Alito,\n\n19 that Congress proposed different treatment for power\n\n20 plants, but that doesn't answer the question. That just\n\n21 asks the question. The question is what different\n\n22 treatment did Congress prescribe. Now, what Petitioners\n\n23 are arguing is that what Congress prescribed and mandated\n\n24 was a costbenefit analysis that does not apply to any\n\n25 other source of hazardous pollutants.\n\n\n 45\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[46] " Official\n\n\n1 But that is not what the text of the statute\n\n2 says, and it's not what the history reflects. What the\n\n3 text of the statute says in (n)(1)(A) is that even\n\n4 though for every other source, regulation would proceed\n\n5 immediately; for power plants, there was uncertainty\n\n6 about whether power plants emitted hazardous pollutants\n\n7 at a level that would cause a problem, whether the acid\n\n8 rain regulations would solve the problem, and whether\n\n9 there were alternative control strategies available.\n\n10 And so if I may. I'm sorry.\n\n11 EPA what Congress told EPA to do was to\n\n12 study those three things. Those go to health\n\n13 considerations. And then once EPA was made a\n\n14 judgment about that, it was to decide whether to list\n\n15 power plants for regulation as whether it was\n\n16 appropriate and necessary to list them for regulation.\n\n17 JUSTICE ALITO: This is what I don't\n\n18 understand about your position. Congress's decision to\n\n19 treat power plants differently, it seems to me, reflects\n\n20 the fact that Congress wanted at least to hold open the\n\n21 possibility that power plants would not be listed even\n\n22 if their emissions exceeded the levels that would result\n\n23 in listing for other sources. I don't see another\n\n24 reason why they would treat them differently.\n\n25 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, I think \n\n\n 46\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[47] " Official\n\n\n1 JUSTICE ALITO: If I can just continue.\n\n2 GENERAL VERRILLI: I'm sorry.\n\n3 JUSTICE ALITO: Perhaps you may disagree\n\n4 with that, but it seems to me that that that's a\n\n5 necessary inference from this statutory scheme.\n\n6 If that is the case, what factor might\n\n7 Congress have thought would justify allowing power\n\n8 plants to emit more than would be permitted if they were\n\n9 other sources?\n\n10 Now, Petitioners have an explanation which\n\n11 is costs, and they say that power plants have to bear a\n\n12 lot of costs that other sources don't have to bear, in\n\n13 particular the Title IV program. Their emissions might\n\n14 exceed the otherwise permissible limit because they have\n\n15 participated in the cap and trade program, so they have\n\n16 contributed to the reduction in emissions in that way,\n\n17 in a way that wouldn't be reflected in their in their\n\n18 own emissions.\n\n19 So what that is an explanation. Cost is\n\n20 what's missing. I don't know what your explanation is.\n\n21 GENERAL VERRILLI: So I know Your Honor\n\n22 asked me to accept the premise, but I can't accept the\n\n23 premise because both the text of (n)(1)(A) and the\n\n24 legislative history tell you what considerations\n\n25 Congress left open, and they were all related to the\n\n\n 47\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[48] " Official\n\n\n1 possibility of health hazards. No one the argument\n\n2 that Your Honor just posed is not in the legislative\n\n3 history, and it's not in the text. And if Congress\n\n4 really thought that, then what they would have said to\n\n5 EPA is, take the push the pause button, take the\n\n6 three years and study don't subject them to the same\n\n7 schedule as everybody else and study the cost\n\n8 problem. They would have expressly told EPA to study\n\n9 costs. And they did not do that.\n\n10 JUSTICE ALITO: If all they were concerned\n\n11 about was health, why wouldn't they impose on power\n\n12 plants the same standard that's imposed on area sources?\n\n13 Just ask EPA to determine whether there is I forget\n\n14 the exact term but is there an effect on public\n\n15 health, a significant effect on public health, whatever.\n\n16 If so, list.\n\n17 GENERAL VERRILLI: I think they came very\n\n18 close to that, because what they said first of all,\n\n19 they they told EPA to make its judgment after\n\n20 considering the results of the study, and they told EPA\n\n21 to study things that went to health hazards. And so that\n\n22 comes very close, it seems to me, and the reason, I\n\n23 think, it used the appropriate and necessary language,\n\n24 rather than the language Your Honor suggests, is because\n\n25 I think Congress, when it was legislating here in 1990,\n\n\n 48\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[49] " Official\n\n\n1 understood that there might well be uncertainty at the\n\n2 end of this of the analysis that Congress directed\n\n3 the EPA to undertake. There might be uncertainty about\n\n4 the projected effects of the acid rain regulations,\n\n5 because I do I do think it's important to clear up \n\n6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I don't I think\n\n7 that's what the legislative history said.\n\n8 GENERAL VERRILLI: Right. And I do want to\n\n9 clear up a misconception about that, I think, which is\n\n10 that that the way these acid rain regulations\n\n11 unfolded, they were put in place in 1990 at the same\n\n12 time as 7412, but they were to unfold over a 10year\n\n13 period; 5 years until the first stage, and then 5 more\n\n14 years until second stage. So EPA was going to have to\n\n15 make a longterm projection here about which there could\n\n16 be some uncertainty.\n\n17 And so I think what Congress was saying to\n\n18 EPA was you may need to exercise your judgment here, and\n\n19 in fact, EPA did exercise its judgment because it\n\n20 concluded \n\n21 JUSTICE BREYER: There are two parts to this\n\n22 argument. One is what were they thinking of the word\n\n23 appropriate if it wasn't costs? All right, I see your\n\n24 answer to that. I'll think about that.\n\n25 But the second, which I think your argument\n\n\n 49\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[50] " Official\n\n\n1 very much depends on, in my mind anyway, is, well, don't\n\n2 worry, because there is a way to take into account\n\n3 costs. So, if, in fact I mean, you know, it's a lot\n\n4 of money, $9 billion, and if you divide it by the\n\n5 population, you have $30 a person for a family of four\n\n6 of $120. That's a lot of money for people, for some\n\n7 people. And to say, gee, you couldn't take it into\n\n8 account ever, suppose it would have been 500? You know,\n\n9 it begins to look a little irrational to say, I'm not\n\n10 taking it into account at all. But you say, never fear,\n\n11 because they will take it into account when they set\n\n12 standards. And at that point I read the thing about the\n\n13 12 percent. I've got the word \"similar source,\" which\n\n14 then can refer me back to the categorization of two\n\n15 things earlier, as they say maybe, and then I have,\n\n16 aside from that, hey, here's what you do. When you're\n\n17 regulating you look at the top 12 generators and that's\n\n18 the minimum standard. So they might want to say, hey,\n\n19 that's not right. I mean, it's right, it says it. But\n\n20 if you go to the bottom 50 generators, you're going to\n\n21 see it's not going to cost $120 per family, it's going\n\n22 to cost $1,000 a family. And we have the EPA saying, we\n\n23 won't even look at that.\n\n24 At that point I begin to say, oh, my\n\n25 goodness. Why? Why won't you even look at it? You\n\n\n 50\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[51] " Official\n\n\n1 could say it isn't true, but why wouldn't you even look\n\n2 at it.\n\n3 And and now the answers seems to me to be\n\n4 in that word \"similar source,\" and the classes and the\n\n5 subclasses. Because were there such an argument, maybe\n\n6 the EPA could say, don't worry. If there is such an\n\n7 argument, which there isn't, we have the power here\n\n8 under the statute to take it into account.\n\n9 Now, you know where that argument came from?\n\n10 From discussion and thought in my chambers. Now, maybe\n\n11 it came out of the briefs, too. But is what I say\n\n12 right? Can the EPA take that into account, or do they\n\n13 have to just blindly say, if it's the top 12, that's for\n\n14 everybody no matter what the cost? In which case they\n\n15 can't take it into account ever except for the word\n\n16 \"appropriate.\" Now, that's the argument I'm putting \n\n17 you got it in my argument because that's important.\n\n18 GENERAL VERRILLI: I I've got it. I'm\n\n19 going to make three points in response to it.\n\n20 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes.\n\n21 GENERAL VERRILLI: The first one goes to the\n\n22 empirical situation in this case, but then I'm going to\n\n23 get to the theoretical question you asked.\n\n24 JUSTICE BREYER: Yes.\n\n25 GENERAL VERRILLI: The first is this: Nine\n\n\n 51\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[52] " Official\n\n\n1 billion is a big number. This is an industry with $360\n\n2 billion a year in annual revenues, so you're talking\n\n3 about two to twoanda half annual revenues of annual\n\n4 revenues. And what Congress and what EPA concluded when\n\n5 it \n\n6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Revenues doesn't talk\n\n7 about profit, though.\n\n8 GENERAL VERRILLI: Right. But it's well,\n\n9 this is a cost, and the cost is about two andahalf\n\n10 percent of revenues. And then what EPA concluded was\n\n11 that this that about 2 percent of electrical\n\n12 generating capacity could go offline as a result of it\n\n13 being uneconomic. So it's not a 50 percent or a 78, 88\n\n14 percent.\n\n15 JUSTICE BREYER: Right . And as soon as\n\n16 you've said that, you've taken costs into account, which\n\n17 is what they say they wouldn't do.\n\n18 GENERAL VERRILLI: And then but then \n\n19 now, let me talk about the way EPA under this regime\n\n20 does take costs into account. The first point I would\n\n21 make is that the situation that Your Honor described in\n\n22 the hypothetical is a quite unusual one. In the normal\n\n23 case, the 12 percent rule, it's a technologyforcing\n\n24 rule, the kind that Your Honor discussed in in your\n\n25 concurring opinions in Whitman and in Entergy. It's\n\n\n 52\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[53] " Official\n\n\n1 that kind of a rule. And for and in the normal case,\n\n2 it's not going to have that effect. It means that\n\n3 this this percentage of the industry has been able to\n\n4 meet this without an operator in an economic matter and\n\n5 Congress is trying to force the rest of the industry to\n\n6 catch up. And as we know from multiple experiences, as\n\n7 Your Honor identified with respect to catalytic\n\n8 converters and motor vehicles and with respect to acid\n\n9 rain, it turned out that the cost was vastly lower on\n\n10 industry than EPA anticipated it would be; that there's\n\n11 a very great tendency to overestimate costs in that\n\n12 situation.\n\n13 But then the third point is Your Honor's\n\n14 point about subcategories. And Section 7412(c)(1),\n\n15 which is the provision that governs the listing of\n\n16 categories, it mentions the availability of\n\n17 subcategories and, in fact, the last sentence of it says\n\n18 nothing in this \n\n19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Do you have that page?\n\n20 GENERAL VERRILLI: I'm sorry, I'm sorry,\n\n21 Justice Kennedy. It's 35A of the appendix to our brief.\n\n22 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Thank you.\n\n23 GENERAL VERRILLI: And this is (c)(1)and\n\n24 it's the last sentence. And it and it talks about\n\n25 the EPA's authority and says, \"Nothing in the preceding\n\n\n 53\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[54] " Official\n\n\n1 sentence limits the administrator's authority to\n\n2 establish subcategories under this section as\n\n3 appropriate.\" And in fact, that is what \n\n4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Can can those\n\n5 subcategories apply to the minimum standards?\n\n6 GENERAL VERRILLI: Yes. That's how it would\n\n7 work, because you you identified the category and\n\n8 then you generate the standard based on who's in the\n\n9 category.\n\n10 JUSTICE SCALIA: No, but I thought the\n\n11 standards are automatic. There's certain minimums.\n\n12 Once they find on the basis of of the study that\n\n13 these things should be listed, I thought there there\n\n14 is an automatic requirement imposed on on which is\n\n15 the reason they're complaining.\n\n16 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, the the\n\n17 requirement it depends on how you categorize. And so\n\n18 if if there were a situation – let me just switch \n\n19 if there were a situation in which one segment of the\n\n20 industry was so vastly different from another segment of\n\n21 the industry in terms of its economics, in terms of its\n\n22 technology, then EPA would have the authority to break\n\n23 those into two separate subcategories and then you don't\n\n24 calculate the best performing 12 percent, which is what\n\n25 the standard is, until you know if it's the best\n\n\n 54\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[55] " Official\n\n\n1 performing 12 percent of the people you've put in the\n\n2 category.\n\n3 JUSTICE BREYER: The language that does\n\n4 that the language that does that is the first\n\n5 sentence of three, which says, \"The maximum degree that\n\n6 is deemed achievable, not less stringent than the\n\n7 emission control,\" that is achieved in practice by the\n\n8 bestcontrolled similar source as determined by the\n\n9 administrator.\" That's what allows him to break it into\n\n10 categories and apply the minimums to the to similar\n\n11 source.\n\n12 GENERAL VERRILLI: Right. And \n\n13 JUSTICE BREYER: Am I right or not?\n\n14 GENERAL VERRILLI: That's correct. And EPA\n\n15 did that in this case. It broke out power plants that\n\n16 generate power burning natural gas, and it said that's a\n\n17 separate subcategory.\n\n18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Where in the\n\n19 record where can you point me into the record where\n\n20 this argument was made or considered by the agency? As\n\n21 opposed to Justice Breyer's chambers. Because it's a\n\n22 very important principle of administrative law that we\n\n23 will only uphold a rule based on the arguments that were\n\n24 considered and addressed by the agency. So and I \n\n25 I as I said, it's not something I recall from the\n\n\n 55\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[56] " Official\n\n\n1 briefs.\n\n2 GENERAL VERRILLI: It's, of course, true,\n\n3 Mr. Chief Justice. But and you're you're exactly\n\n4 right in stating that principle. But our argument in\n\n5 this case is that this question here is under \n\n6 under (n)(1)(a), (n)(1)(a) says, \"EPA shall regulate\n\n7 under this section if it determines that such regulation\n\n8 is appropriate and necessary,\" and therefore, that when\n\n9 EPA makes a judgment to regulate under this section,\n\n10 because it is appropriate and necessary, EPA is is\n\n11 triggering all of the requirements \n\n12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, you're just saying \n\n13 you're just saying that the argument is right, not that\n\n14 the not that the agency made it, right?\n\n15 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, it's I guess\n\n16 what I would say about it, Your Honor, is \n\n17 JUSTICE SCALIA: It's not enough that the\n\n18 argument be right. The the agency must have rested\n\n19 its decision on the point.\n\n20 GENERAL VERRILLI: The I think that the\n\n21 agency in the order on being challenged here did use the\n\n22 approach. But beyond that, whether or not it would\n\n23 be one thing if this were a case in which you had a\n\n24 situation in which EPA or EPA faced a situation in\n\n25 which 50 percent or 75 percent were going to face vastly\n\n\n 56\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[57] " Official\n\n\n1 uneconomic consequences. But this case didn't present\n\n2 that situation. EPA made a judgment about \n\n3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: General, can I simplify\n\n4 your answer for you?\n\n5 (Laughter.)\n\n6 GENERAL VERRILLI: Yes. I'd be delighted if\n\n7 you did that, Justice Sotomayor.\n\n8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. Basically,\n\n9 you have consistently in your brief, and so has the\n\n10 other Respondents, basically said at the listing stage\n\n11 we don't consider costs, we consider it later. And\n\n12 everybody gave a few examples. Whether this example was\n\n13 given or not is irrelevant. The issue here was, do you\n\n14 have to do it at listing? It's only some of my\n\n15 colleagues here who are concerned that when you issue\n\n16 standards, you never consider cost.\n\n17 GENERAL VERRILLI: And that's exactly right.\n\n18 The question here is whether EPA's got to conduct a\n\n19 costbenefit analysis when it does the listing, and the\n\n20 logic of the statute of 7412 doesn't it doesn't\n\n21 operate \n\n22 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But at that point the game\n\n23 is over.\n\n24 GENERAL VERRILLI: No, I don't think it is,\n\n25 Justice Kennedy, for for several reasons. First,\n\n\n 57\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[58] " Official\n\n\n1 the the standard under Section 7412(d) for setting\n\n2 emissions emissions standards once you've decided to\n\n3 list, that is Your Honor's question to to my friend\n\n4 General Lindstrom pointed out, that does take costs into\n\n5 account in the sense that a segment of the industry can\n\n6 operate economically. Secondly \n\n7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Excuse me. I don't I\n\n8 didn't understand that. I thought that there were\n\n9 automatic requirements imposed once once the the\n\n10 plants are listed.\n\n11 GENERAL VERRILLI: Once EPA lists \n\n12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes.\n\n13 GENERAL VERRILLI: and defines the\n\n14 category for listing, then the automatic requirement\n\n15 that is applied is that everyone in the category has to\n\n16 match the performance of the best 12 percent.\n\n17 JUSTICE SCALIA: Where did this categories\n\n18 comes from? I I really don't like the fact that\n\n19 your your friend on the other side was was not\n\n20 permitted to mount an argument in opposition to this\n\n21 categorization theory that Justice Breyer's chambers\n\n22 devised. Usually usually we have arguments on both\n\n23 sides. This is an argument I never heard of and I'm not\n\n24 sure it's right. But but I certainly didn't \n\n25 didn't know the agency to say, oh, we're just listing,\n\n\n 58\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[59] " Official\n\n\n1 but we're you know, we're going to categorize the\n\n2 listing. They didn't say that.\n\n3 GENERAL VERRILLI: I understand your point\n\n4 about the focus or nonfocus on subcategories. But the\n\n5 point that we're just listing, we say that over and over\n\n6 again in our brief. And in fact, the Petitioners\n\n7 concede, and this is at page 5 and 6 of the UARG reply\n\n8 brief, that if this is just about listing, then, of\n\n9 course, costs are irrelevant. But it is just about\n\n10 listing. That is the way the statute works.\n\n11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You had responded to\n\n12 the fairly dramatic disparity your friends on the other\n\n13 say, the 6 million benefits, 9.6 million cost. You\n\n14 respond with a different calculation that looks to I\n\n15 call them collateral \n\n16 GENERAL VERRILLI: Cobenefits.\n\n17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: the ancillary \n\n18 cobenefits. And then the the argument is raised\n\n19 that that's that's not quite proper because you're\n\n20 using your your the HAP regulation to get at the\n\n21 criteria pollutants that you otherwise would have to go\n\n22 through a much more difficult process to regulate.\n\n23 In other words, you can't regulate the\n\n24 criteria pollutants through the HAP program, so you get,\n\n25 okay, here we've got this tiny bit of mercury, and so\n\n\n 59\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[60] " Official\n\n\n1 we're going to regulate, and that's how we're going to\n\n2 get additional regulation of the criteria pollutants.\n\n3 And so it's sort of an end run around the restrictions\n\n4 that would otherwise make give you less control over\n\n5 the regulation.\n\n6 What what's your response to that?\n\n7 GENERAL VERRILLI: Let me address that.\n\n8 It's there's several points, and I actually need to\n\n9 make all of them, I think, to to make this clear.\n\n10 The first point is that that's not an\n\n11 argument that any party has raised. One amicus brief\n\n12 raised it, one and it was averted to a bit more oral\n\n13 argument \n\n14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, my\n\n15 chambers found it, but \n\n16 (Laughter.)\n\n17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes.\n\n18 GENERAL VERRILLI: And and here's the\n\n19 problem with the argument: The problem with the\n\n20 argument is that it it has two problems. One is\n\n21 that once EPA concludes that a source emits a hazardous\n\n22 pollutant, and here EPA has concluded that these sources\n\n23 emit mercury at levels that are unsafe. I don't think\n\n24 Petitioners dispute that. And by the unambiguous terms\n\n25 of Section 7412(d), EPA is under an obligation to\n\n\n 60\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[61] " Official\n\n\n1 regulate all hazardous pollutants that the source emits,\n\n2 and and that's the D.C. Circuit in a case called\n\n3 National Lime 15 years ago \n\n4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, no, no, no. I\n\n5 understand \n\n6 GENERAL VERRILLI: interpreted it that\n\n7 way \n\n8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I understand how\n\n9 the end run works.\n\n10 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, it's not \n\n11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm I'm just\n\n12 questioning \n\n13 GENERAL VERRILLI: It's not a \n\n14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, I'm just\n\n15 questioning the legitimacy of it \n\n16 GENERAL VERRILLI: Yes.\n\n17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: because what they\n\n18 would say, okay, you found, you know, a a HAP that \n\n19 that you want to list, but you ought to consider only\n\n20 the benefits of regulating that. You shouldn't consider\n\n21 the the bootstrapped \n\n22 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, I guess the \n\n23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: benefits that\n\n24 should be addressed through the other \n\n25 GENERAL VERRILLI: I guess the next point I\n\n\n 61\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[62] " Official\n\n\n1 would make, Mr. Chief Justice, is that it's not an end\n\n2 run, and it's not a bootstrap. This is a well \n\n3 regulating the surrogates, regulating the surrogates, is\n\n4 a wellrecognized methodology that goes back decades,\n\n5 that EPA has used for decades, that the D.C. Circuit has\n\n6 upheld for decades, that that is a perfectly appropriate\n\n7 way to to deal with getting at metals and and\n\n8 other pollutants that would be hard to get at directly.\n\n9 And, in fact, the very argument that Your Honor is\n\n10 positing here as a as an end run is one that was made\n\n11 in this same National Lime case to the D.C. Circuit\n\n12 15 years ago and the D.C. Circuit rejected.\n\n13 So what EPA is doing here basically what\n\n14 the D.C. Circuit said, that Section 7412(d) required\n\n15 them to do with respect to regulating every hazardous\n\n16 pollutant that the that the sources emit, and what\n\n17 the EPA has said, and what the D.C. Circuit has said for\n\n18 decades, EPA \n\n19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, right. But, I\n\n20 mean, the \n\n21 GENERAL VERRILLI: is permitted to do,\n\n22 and that it isn't an end run at all. It's just a normal\n\n23 way in which you regulate \n\n24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but the issue\n\n25 that I think raises the red flag, at least, is that\n\n\n 62\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[63] " Official\n\n\n1 there's such a tiny proportion of benefit from the HAP\n\n2 program and such a disproportionate amount of benefit\n\n3 that would normally be addressed under the criteria \n\n4 GENERAL VERRILLI: So \n\n5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: program. So \n\n6 so it's not just that, yes, where you're regulating one,\n\n7 if it's a good thing if it also has benefits with\n\n8 respect to other pollutants. But if your basis for\n\n9 regulating what what is the benefit from the\n\n10 copollutants that you get?\n\n11 GENERAL VERRILLI: The oh, it's many,\n\n12 many billions of dollars.\n\n13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Do you remember how\n\n14 much it is? It's sort of 30 \n\n15 GENERAL VERRILLI: 30 to $90 billion.\n\n16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: 30 to 90 billion.\n\n17 The benefit from the mercury is, what, 4 million?\n\n18 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well \n\n19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So you say, we get\n\n20 to regulate this. We get to regulate it because there's\n\n21 a $4 million impact on mercury. But when we do that, we\n\n22 get to regulate 35 billion in a way that gives us\n\n23 $35 billion in cost on the other side.\n\n24 GENERAL VERRILLI: So \n\n25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So I understand the\n\n\n 63\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[64] " Official\n\n\n1 idea that you can have you know, it's a good thing if\n\n2 your regulation also benefits in other ways. But when\n\n3 it's such a disproportion, you begin to wonder whether\n\n4 it's an illegitimate way of avoiding the different \n\n5 quite different limitations on EPA that apply in the\n\n6 criteria program.\n\n7 GENERAL VERRILLI: So I don't I I\n\n8 really don't think that. I understand that Petitioners\n\n9 have put the case that way, Mr. Chief Justice. I don't\n\n10 think that's a fair way to put it.\n\n11 What EPA did with respect to mercury was\n\n12 quantify one of the public health benefits. It did not\n\n13 quantify many of the other public health benefits. If\n\n14 you'll look in the Joint Appendix and I think this is\n\n15 about page 910 to about page 940, there's page after\n\n16 page of charts in which EPA has listed the other\n\n17 benefits that come from regulating mercury and the\n\n18 hazardous substances that it didn't try to quantify.\n\n19 Part of the reason it didn't try to quantify\n\n20 is because quantifying those kinds of benefits can be\n\n21 very difficult and challenging. And, frankly, that is\n\n22 one of the key reasons that Congress adopted not only in\n\n23 7412, but under the NAAQS Program and the Motor Vehicle\n\n24 Program and the New Source Performance Standard Program,\n\n25 the approach it did of not taking costs into\n\n\n 64\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[65] " Official\n\n\n1 consideration at the listing stage, but only at the\n\n2 regulatory stage \n\n3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could you tell me\n\n4 about \n\n5 GENERAL VERRILLI: because \n\n6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: the natural gas? You\n\n7 were cut off earlier.\n\n8 GENERAL VERRILLI: Sure. EPA reached the\n\n9 conclusion that they ought to have that natural gas\n\n10 power plants ought to be a separate category and and\n\n11 because they didn't generate public health problems at\n\n12 the level that would make them comparable to the \n\n13 the the coal and \n\n14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So they were \n\n15 JUSTICE ALITO: Now, on this issue of \n\n16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: part of the listing,\n\n17 but not \n\n18 JUSTICE ALITO: I'll wait.\n\n19 GENERAL VERRILLI: Correct.\n\n20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: They were part of the\n\n21 listing, but they were not regulated, because you just\n\n22 sort of turn it off.\n\n23 GENERAL VERRILLI: Yes, Your Honor.\n\n24 JUSTICE ALITO: Can I ask you another\n\n25 question about these subcategories?\n\n\n 65\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[66] " Official\n\n\n1 Your your argument is that under the last\n\n2 sentence of 7412(c)(1), the EPA can create subcategories\n\n3 based, in whole or in part, on costs; is that right?\n\n4 GENERAL VERRILLI: I I think I think\n\n5 it's more subtle than that. I think that if I\n\n6 think and it's not just that provision. It's \n\n7 there are numerous provisions within 7412 that allow for\n\n8 subcategorization. But I think that if there is such a\n\n9 vast difference in the tech in the in the\n\n10 technologies that the that the group of entities is\n\n11 using, that there would be that vast a difference in\n\n12 cost, that there might well be a basis to treat them as\n\n13 a different subcategory.\n\n14 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, why didn't the EPA\n\n15 say that? I thought the EPA said, we are not going to\n\n16 take into account costs with regard to the listing.\n\n17 Now, they could have said, we're going to take into\n\n18 account costs as to whether some categories should be\n\n19 listed and other categories shouldn't be listed. That's\n\n20 not what they said. They said, we will not take into\n\n21 account costs with regard to listing. We list all \n\n22 GENERAL VERRILLI: Here here's what \n\n23 JUSTICE SCALIA: of of these \n\n24 GENERAL VERRILLI: here's what they\n\n25 said \n\n\n 66\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[67] " Official\n\n\n1 JUSTICE SCALIA: utilities.\n\n2 GENERAL VERRILLI: Justice Scalia, and\n\n3 I and here's why they said it, and I think this is\n\n4 critical.\n\n5 What they said was that we think it is\n\n6 appropriate, with respect to power plants, not to\n\n7 consider costs at listing and to consider costs \n\n8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Right.\n\n9 GENERAL VERRILLI: at emission standard\n\n10 setting. And the reason we think it is appropriate is\n\n11 because that is the standard, that is the regulatory\n\n12 logic that Congress deemed not only appropriate, but\n\n13 mandatory for every other source category. And so one\n\n14 would have to conclude, then, that what Congress said\n\n15 was mandatory, and therefore necessarily appropriate for\n\n16 every other category, was inappropriate, and even\n\n17 additionally goes so far as to say \n\n18 JUSTICE SCALIA: That that that's how\n\n19 I understood their argument \n\n20 JUSTICE KAGAN: But \n\n21 JUSTICE SCALIA: entirely. And I did not\n\n22 understand it to say, we you know, we we can we\n\n23 can exempt some people from these minimum standards\n\n24 because we categorize them differently. It it\n\n25 definitely was not allowing \n\n\n 67\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[68] " Official\n\n\n1 GENERAL VERRILLI: That that is their\n\n2 main argument, but I do think the point what the\n\n3 point of the point of the logic of EPA's position\n\n4 here is that you make the listing decision, and then you\n\n5 regulate, as (n)(1)(A) says, under Section 7412, and\n\n6 these are provisions in Section 7412 that give EPA the\n\n7 authority to \n\n8 JUSTICE KAGAN: And, General, as \n\n9 JUSTICE ALITO: Are their regulations\n\n10 that \n\n11 JUSTICE KAGAN: as I understood it \n\n12 please.\n\n13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Alito.\n\n14 JUSTICE ALITO: Are there regulations that\n\n15 set out the criteria for creating these subcategories?\n\n16 GENERAL VERRILLI: I'm I'm not aware that\n\n17 there are. I'm not I just don't know the answer to\n\n18 that, Your Honor.\n\n19 JUSTICE ALITO: So, well, without them, we\n\n20 really don't know to what extent, if any, costs are\n\n21 taken into account in creating subcategories, do we?\n\n22 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, I I think\n\n23 that I no, I do think that if it's it's\n\n24 going to be based on differences in technology and\n\n25 operation, I think, from which you might be able to\n\n\n 68\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[69] " Official\n\n\n1 infer costs.\n\n2 But that's hypothetical in this case because\n\n3 this is not a case in which EPA needed to confront that\n\n4 question, except with respect to naturalgasfired power\n\n5 plants, which they did find to be so different that\n\n6 they they warranted different treatment, because it\n\n7 didn't have the kind of problem that Justice Breyer's\n\n8 hypothetical raised. You you didn't have that kind\n\n9 of problem. You didn't need to face this issue in these\n\n10 cases, so the EPA didn't.\n\n11 And if I could just make this point, because\n\n12 I think it's quite I think it's quite critical.\n\n13 Given that 7412's regulatory logic provides for listing\n\n14 based on health, emissions standardsetting based on \n\n15 on costs, including consideration of costs, and based on\n\n16 the and and given that that's exactly the same\n\n17 logic under the NAAQS Program, it's exactly the same\n\n18 logic under the Motor Vehicle Program, it's exactly the\n\n19 same logic under the New Source Performance Standards\n\n20 Program, that if Congress intended to mandate that EPA\n\n21 cut so deeply against the grain and make such a\n\n22 radically different approach with respect to this one\n\n23 category of sources, you would expect to see very clear\n\n24 legislative language to that effect. You would expect\n\n25 to see a a direction to EPA in 7412 to study costs\n\n\n 69\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[70] " Official\n\n\n1 before making this judgment.\n\n2 JUSTICE SCALIA: General Verrilli, let me \n\n3 let me ask a question about costs. There there are\n\n4 economic costs. There are other costs. Is it is it\n\n5 the Agency's position that no cost can be taken into\n\n6 account? For example, it it may find that that a\n\n7 particular material has an effect on health, but it may\n\n8 find that eliminating it will have other effects that\n\n9 are even more deleterious to health. Could that cost be\n\n10 taken into account?\n\n11 GENERAL VERRILLI: If I may answer,\n\n12 Mr. Chief Justice. I think that cost would be taken\n\n13 into account in the OIRA regulatory impact analysis.\n\n14 JUSTICE SCALIA: But not for the listing.\n\n15 GENERAL VERRILLI: But but not for the\n\n16 listing.\n\n17 JUSTICE SCALIA: Not for the listing.\n\n18 That's right.\n\n19 GENERAL VERRILLI: Thank you.\n\n20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, General.\n\n21 Mr. Smith.\n\n22 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL M. SMITH\n\n23 ON BEHALF OF INDUSTRY RESPONDENTS\n\n24 MR. SMITH: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it\n\n25 please the Court:\n\n\n 70\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[71] " Official\n\n\n1 We agree with the government that the EPA\n\n2 was not required to engage in a costbenefit analysis\n\n3 before making the initial listing decision to regulate\n\n4 hazardous pollutants emitted by power plants from\n\n5 power applying the appropriate and necessary\n\n6 standard. And I I certainly want to acknowledge at\n\n7 the beginning, clearly, Congress did think that power\n\n8 plants needed to be treated differently, but what did\n\n9 they give them? They gave them a 3year pause in which\n\n10 the EPA was instructed to take account of the health\n\n11 effects of the particular pollutants emitted by power\n\n12 plants, and it did this under an appropriate and\n\n13 necessary standard.\n\n14 And if I could address the issue of what\n\n15 those two words mean in the reading of the EPA, I would\n\n16 refer the Court to pages 226 and 227 of the National\n\n17 Mining Association certpetition appendix. I don't think\n\n18 it's necessary to read from it, but what the EPA said\n\n19 consistently throughout this record is we looked at two\n\n20 things. There was a claim made in the legislative\n\n21 history that these chemicals are simply not harmful\n\n22 enough to require any further regulation, that their\n\n23 effects are negligible, and they looked at that issue\n\n24 under the appropriateness rubric. And they said these\n\n25 are harmful chemicals, particularly mercury.\n\n\n 71\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[72] " Official\n\n\n1 In addition, under the appropriateness\n\n2 rubric, they looked at the question of whether or not\n\n3 there were technologies available to regulate them. The\n\n4 necessary rubric was used to look at the postClean Air\n\n5 Act postacid rain health effects that would persist.\n\n6 So they said, A, these are harmful chemicals harmful\n\n7 pollutants; and B, under necessary, they will continue\n\n8 to be harmful after the Acid Rain Program has kicked in.\n\n9 And that's how the Court the EPA saw the two\n\n10 different words, and it's a perfectly logical way for\n\n11 them to proceed.\n\n12 JUSTICE SCALIA: Who who would have\n\n13 guessed? I mean, that seems such an artificial division\n\n14 of of necessary and appropriate. Why describe it\n\n15 again. I really didn't didn't quite understand it.\n\n16 Necessary means what?\n\n17 MR. SMITH: The claim everybody concedes\n\n18 that necessary means that there will still be health\n\n19 problems after the Acid Rain Program kicks in.\n\n20 JUSTICE SCALIA: All right. And appropriate\n\n21 means?\n\n22 MR. SMITH: The appropriate was intended to\n\n23 meet the claim made by the the industry that these\n\n24 chemicals already are sufficiently harmfree that we\n\n25 don't need to regulate here regardless of the effects.\n\n\n 72\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[73] " Official\n\n\n1 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why isn't that part of the\n\n2 first one? I mean \n\n3 MR. SMITH: Well, it could have been done\n\n4 that way. They read them separately \n\n5 JUSTICE SCALIA: I see.\n\n6 MR. SMITH: Your Honor.\n\n7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay.\n\n8 MR. SMITH: That's the way the government\n\n9 read them.\n\n10 JUSTICE SCALIA: It's a silly way to read\n\n11 them, I think.\n\n12 MR. SMITH: Perhaps so, Your Honor. But the\n\n13 key thing is, the issues that they were directed to\n\n14 study, the issues that were then supposed to control the\n\n15 listing decision were the health effects of the\n\n16 pollutants that come out of these power plants. And\n\n17 they then deferred the issue of considering a cost to\n\n18 the second stage just as occurs with every single other\n\n19 source of the same 189 hazardous pollutants that they\n\n20 were dealing with.\n\n21 And if I could pause here and just clarify\n\n22 one thing about what happened at that listing stage.\n\n23 Natural gasfired plants were not turned into a\n\n24 category. They looked at the health effects of natural\n\n25 gasfired plants and said we are exempting them entirely\n\n\n 73\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[74] " Official\n\n\n1 from regulation under this section, under the\n\n2 appropriate and necessary standard because they simply\n\n3 don't emit these chemicals in more than trace amounts,\n\n4 and there's simply nothing for us to regulate. So\n\n5 natural gas plants get taken out at the listing stage.\n\n6 We then have coalfired and oilfired plants\n\n7 as to which they begin to apply the subsection (d)\n\n8 standards, standards which were designed by Congress to\n\n9 limit the emission regulation to reasonable amounts,\n\n10 designed because the floors are, in fact, limited to\n\n11 what has already been achieved by comparable plants in\n\n12 the same category.\n\n13 Now, there was some question raised about\n\n14 whether or not this categorization was something that\n\n15 EPA recognized it could use to effect the emissions\n\n16 standards and make them reasonable. In fact, as\n\n17 Mr. Brownell acknowledged, they did use create a\n\n18 category a separate category of coalburning plants\n\n19 that burned Lignite, because it turns out that none of\n\n20 the Lignite plants could meet the the standards that\n\n21 would otherwise have have applied with respect to\n\n22 mercury if they were in the category with the other\n\n23 coalfired plants.\n\n24 They then through this whole process looked\n\n25 at the issue of categorization. They started out with\n\n\n 74\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[75] " Official\n\n\n1 two coalfired categories. They ended up with and as\n\n2 far as that, with one oilfired category. In the final\n\n3 rule, there are four separate categories of oilfired\n\n4 plants, depending on what they burn and how they\n\n5 operate. So this whole process of separating out these\n\n6 categories to produce emissions standards that make\n\n7 sense and are practicable was built into that process\n\n8 under subsection (d) \n\n9 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Smith, could could\n\n10 you just clarify for me that the the categorization\n\n11 happens after the listing; is that correct?\n\n12 MR. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor. What they\n\n13 listed was all coalfired plants and all oilfired\n\n14 plants, but no natural gas plants. They then go to the\n\n15 question of what emissions standards should occur. And\n\n16 with respect to other sources, that's sometimes years\n\n17 after the listing decision is made. But they then have\n\n18 a process of saying, what are our categories going to\n\n19 be? We have to put out we have to get information at\n\n20 that point. What of the top 12 percent of the category\n\n21 would, in fact, are there emissions? You have to \n\n22 they have to report in. They make a calculation about\n\n23 that.\n\n24 JUSTICE SCALIA: Aren't aren't these just\n\n25 requirements above the minimums that automatically\n\n\n 75\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[76] " Official\n\n\n1 apply?\n\n2 MR. SMITH: No, Your Honor. The the\n\n3 minimums are established by what the top 12 percent in\n\n4 the category that the EPA has \n\n5 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes. But I'm I'm saying\n\n6 the categorization that allows you to you know, to\n\n7 reduce some people and and not to reduce others, that\n\n8 applies to requirements above the minimums. No?\n\n9 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, the the minimums\n\n10 are the things that are set by mathematical calculation\n\n11 from the categories. Everything else above the minimums\n\n12 is done taking cost into account under (d)(2) expressly.\n\n13 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes.\n\n14 MR. SMITH: So the only thing that is done\n\n15 using not express consideration of cost, but\n\n16 consideration of cost indirectly basing the regulations\n\n17 on what the top 12 percent are doing is the minimums.\n\n18 And the minimums are then altered, depending on what\n\n19 categories you establish. That is the way that the\n\n20 regulation has worked for all of the sources that they\n\n21 regulated. That is the the practical mechanism \n\n22 JUSTICE KAGAN: So just to clarify that just\n\n23 for for my own purpose, Mr. Smith. It's just you\n\n24 categorize one way, the minimums are down here. You\n\n25 categorize another way, the minimums are up there.\n\n\n 76\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[77] " Official\n\n\n1 MR. SMITH: That's correct, Your Honor.\n\n2 JUSTICE KAGAN: It can make a huge\n\n3 difference in terms of what the minimums are.\n\n4 MR. SMITH: Right. And there's a notice and\n\n5 comment process. They put out proposed categories.\n\n6 They tell them what we empirically what we found\n\n7 about what the top 10 12 percent are doing. They\n\n8 then get comments in and they as they happened\n\n9 here they make different categories in the final rule\n\n10 adjusting.\n\n11 JUSTICE ALITO: How can we how can we\n\n12 tell the degree to which costs are taken into account,\n\n13 if they are at all, without knowing what the criteria\n\n14 are for creating these subcategories?\n\n15 MR. SMITH: Well, Your Honor, it's in the\n\n16 statute that they create the categories in applying this\n\n17 12 percent. I don't \n\n18 JUSTICE ALITO: No, no. The 12 percent I\n\n19 thought the 12 percent came into play after you've\n\n20 created the category the subcategory.\n\n21 MR. SMITH: Right, as part of the process.\n\n22 It's part of the process.\n\n23 JUSTICE ALITO: But how do I know how they\n\n24 create the subcategories?\n\n25 MR. SMITH: Well, it's you can see it in\n\n\n 77\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[78] " Official\n\n\n1 the notice of proposed rulemaking. They say here are\n\n2 our proposed categories: Two coal categories, one oil\n\n3 category. Then they get comment about how we are\n\n4 not what happens, then, is the people that comment\n\n5 say we're so different from that category. We have\n\n6 these special problems. We need our own separate\n\n7 category.\n\n8 JUSTICE KAGAN: And it's a rulemaking after\n\n9 the rulemaking that applies to the listing; is that\n\n10 right?\n\n11 MR. SMITH: It's totally after that, Your\n\n12 Honor. It's a second phase. It it happened here\n\n13 that they announced it all at the same time, but only\n\n14 because there had been an 11year delay.\n\n15 JUSTICE BREYER: You you confirm it was\n\n16 not made up in my chambers.\n\n17 (Laughter.)\n\n18 JUSTICE BREYER: The fact the fact is \n\n19 MR. SMITH: Although they did a wonderful\n\n20 job figuring it out again, Your Honor.\n\n21 (Laughter.)\n\n22 JUSTICE BREYER: You're right. The the\n\n23 brief said Congress the SG's brief unambiguously\n\n24 required EPA to consider costs at the second stage of\n\n25 the regulatory process. That's what it said. A few\n\n\n 78\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[79] " Official\n\n\n1 pages later, they have the statute. So not\n\n2 surprisingly, I read the statute. And and reading\n\n3 the statute leads me to think it works along the lines\n\n4 you just said.\n\n5 MR. SMITH: That's correct your honor.\n\n6 JUSTICE BREYER: But if you did have the\n\n7 most expensive set of generators in the world, you would\n\n8 ask EPA to create a separate category for them in which\n\n9 case the top 12 percent would no longer be in your\n\n10 category and you wouldn't have to do it.\n\n11 MR. SMITH: And that's what happened with \n\n12 JUSTICE BREYER: Now, what I'm asking is if\n\n13 that you think it's the system, that's what I read in\n\n14 the statute. The SG thinks that's the system, but is\n\n15 there a treatise? Is there a an explanation that EPA\n\n16 has put out so that it is clear that it was not made up,\n\n17 that it's clear that this is the system that they\n\n18 follow? Would you refer me to a source?\n\n19 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, the only source that\n\n20 I can refer you to and perhaps the government can\n\n21 supply something after is is the notice of\n\n22 proposed rulemaking in the final rule in which all of\n\n23 this categorization process is laid out in in\n\n24 exquisite detail. And and you can see the comments\n\n25 that come in and say the categories don't work, we need\n\n\n 79\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[80] " Official\n\n\n1 different categories, and they then produce different\n\n2 categories.\n\n3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I think that Justice\n\n4 Alito \n\n5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Is there something\n\n6 in the excuse me. Is there something in the\n\n7 administrative record where EPA adopts that? When\n\n8 somebody says you're not considering cost. It's a bad\n\n9 thing. We're going to go to the Supreme Court if you\n\n10 don't consider cost, and EPA says, oh, no we're going to\n\n11 consider cost. We're going to consider cost when we\n\n12 categorize the power plants. Is there a reference to\n\n13 the administrative record where there's something like\n\n14 that?\n\n15 MR. SMITH: Well, they certainly said, Your\n\n16 Honor, in the notice of proposed rulemaking, that we\n\n17 interpret the listing decision as being something that\n\n18 is based solely on health and not on cost.\n\n19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: The listing decision\n\n20 is not based on cost.\n\n21 MR. SMITH: Right.\n\n22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I want to know if\n\n23 there's anything there that says, but don't worry\n\n24 because we're going to consider cost through the\n\n25 categorization process.\n\n\n 80\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[81] " Official\n\n\n1 MR. SMITH: I don't know whether they said\n\n2 that explicitly. That was so implicit in the whole\n\n3 system. This is a system that's been in operation for\n\n4 other sources for since 1990.\n\n5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, implicit\n\n6 usually doesn't work when you're talking about an\n\n7 administrative record.\n\n8 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, they gave everybody\n\n9 the opportunity to attack the categories that they, in\n\n10 fact, proposed, based on the argument that they were\n\n11 impractical for them.\n\n12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But I thought your\n\n13 position was that you didn't need to consider costs at\n\n14 the first step, and that that would include your initial\n\n15 category.\n\n16 MR. SMITH: No, Your Honor, the categories\n\n17 are at the second step. The categories have the only\n\n18 thing that they did at the first step is say \n\n19 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But you didn't take that\n\n20 second step.\n\n21 MR. SMITH: They did, Your Honor. They\n\n22 categorized oilfired plants into four categories. They\n\n23 categorized coalfired plants into various categories.\n\n24 And that was all done through a notice and comment\n\n25 process which led, then, to different emission\n\n\n 81\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[82] " Official\n\n\n1 standards.\n\n2 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And are you saying that\n\n3 was done based on cost?\n\n4 MR. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor, it was done \n\n5 what what was feasible for these different\n\n6 technologies.\n\n7 JUSTICE SCALIA: I see. How much money did\n\n8 that save? I mean, do we know how much of the $9.6\n\n9 billion cost would be reduced by this categorization?\n\n10 MR. SMITH: Well, Your Honor \n\n11 JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, that's the problem\n\n12 here, isn't it?\n\n13 MR. SMITH: I don't have that calculus, but\n\n14 I would point out that it's important to recognize that\n\n15 something like 90 percent of that 9.6 billion 90\n\n16 percent of the capital cost, which is most of that 9.6\n\n17 billion, has now already been spent. And the industry\n\n18 has not experienced the kinds of upheavals that are\n\n19 being described. The rule takes effect in the middle of\n\n20 April, and so the idea that the result here was somehow\n\n21 ludicrous or outlandishly expensive is belied by the\n\n22 fact that the industry is bringing itself into full\n\n23 compliance.\n\n24 JUSTICE SCALIA: Instead of going to jail?\n\n25 Is that it?\n\n\n 82\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[83] " Official\n\n\n1 MR. SMITH: Complying with Federal law \n\n2 JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, it might still be\n\n3 ludicrous, but it had to be done.\n\n4 MR. SMITH: Well, the other thing I would\n\n5 say is the idea that the $4.6 million benefit is the\n\n6 proper comparator is wrong on so many different levels.\n\n7 First of all, that was a single one single health\n\n8 benefit related to mercury. They didn't think \n\n9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Is the $9 billion a year\n\n10 recurring annually, or are you saying that most of this\n\n11 is capital investment one time?\n\n12 MR. SMITH: Most of it is amortization of\n\n13 the capital expenditures that have already been made.\n\n14 That's in all the briefs from the Petitioners. There\n\n15 will be something like 40 percent will be operating\n\n16 costs and 60 percent is amortized capital costs, Your\n\n17 Honor.\n\n18 The industry has been able to do this, and\n\n19 the situation now is we're ready to finally have\n\n20 national standards, which means it's not the States\n\n21 that have been regulating in this area very strenuously\n\n22 won't continue to have mercury flowing across state\n\n23 lines as they have. And we have this national, highly\n\n24 competitive electricity market, where some companies\n\n25 have marginal costs that reflect that they're in\n\n\n 83\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[84] " Official\n\n\n1 compliance, and some don't. And that is a problem that\n\n2 really needs to be solved.\n\n3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Smith, I just want\n\n4 you to finish your thought. The four million the\n\n5 four billion that they are referring to is only mercury.\n\n6 The agency did not quantify all of the other costs for\n\n7 the other HAPs, correct?\n\n8 MR. SMITH: Actually, it didn't quantity\n\n9 many, if not most, of the costs for mercury, because\n\n10 mercury causes developmental delays, attention deficit\n\n11 disorder \n\n12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, let's put that\n\n13 aside.\n\n14 MR. SMITH: all these other things that\n\n15 are not quantified in the rule. It causes\n\n16 cardiovascular problems that are not a lot of things\n\n17 mercury does, it's an extremely poisonous neurotoxin.\n\n18 The other thing about the 30 billion to 90\n\n19 billion, that is particulate reduction, and some of the\n\n20 particulate that is reduced is, in fact, HAPs. It is\n\n21 nonmercury metals that go out in the form of particles.\n\n22 It is mercury that sometimes goes out in the form of\n\n23 particles. It is the acid gases, which when they get\n\n24 out into the atmosphere turn into particles because they\n\n25 become aerosolized, they go into your lungs as tiny\n\n\n 84\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[85] " Official\n\n\n1 droplets.\n\n2 So all of those are, in fact, being taken\n\n3 care of in the controls of particulate. It is true that\n\n4 in controlling those HAPs, you use the same technology\n\n5 and you end up controlling a lot of other kinds of\n\n6 particulate, primarily sulfur dioxide, which causes\n\n7 premature deaths. And so when they did the calculation,\n\n8 they said we put these particulate controls in to\n\n9 control HAPs. It happens to also save a lot of lives,\n\n10 because of sulfur dioxide that's not otherwise being\n\n11 controlled. And so we'll tell you all the lives we're\n\n12 saving, not just some of those lives.\n\n13 JUSTICE ALITO: Was this the basis for the\n\n14 EPA's decision? I thought the EPA I thought the\n\n15 EPA's position was, it doesn't matter how much the\n\n16 benefit how much the costs exceed the benefits, we\n\n17 just will not take costs into account at the listing\n\n18 stage.\n\n19 MR. SMITH: That is correct, Your Honor.\n\n20 They did not consider the costbenefit analysis at the\n\n21 listing stage. That's based on their reasonable \n\n22 quite reasonable, I think, interpretation of the\n\n23 statute. The statute, which with respect to every other\n\n24 source, it's conceded you don't do the costbenefit\n\n25 analysis upfront. This statute came out of a period of\n\n\n 85\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[86] " Official\n\n\n1 regulatory paralysis of 20 years, where the EPA just\n\n2 wasn't regulating effectively.\n\n3 And Congress came in and said we're going to\n\n4 force regulation of these chemicals that are being\n\n5 spewed into the environment and causing all these health\n\n6 effects. It gave one benefit to the power plant\n\n7 industry and said you have three years. You can prove\n\n8 that there wasn't there aren't really health effects\n\n9 that are serious. But it didn't give them the benefit\n\n10 of having a costbenefit analysis done upfront, or\n\n11 create all the discretion in the world on the part of\n\n12 EPA simply to say, we don't think you should regulate\n\n13 this particular category.\n\n14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,\n\n15 Mr. Smith.\n\n16 Mr. Lindstrom, you have four minutes\n\n17 remaining.\n\n18 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF AARON D. LINDSTROM\n\n19 ON BEHALF OF STATE PETITIONERS\n\n20 MR. LINDSTROM: Thank you, Mr. Chief\n\n21 Justice.\n\n22 Any subcategorization that was going to\n\n23 happen has already occurred, because we're talking about\n\n24 the rule that's been promulgated, and despite any\n\n25 subcategorization that happened, there's still $9.6\n\n\n 86\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[87] " Official\n\n\n1 billion in costs that are being imposed on an annual\n\n2 basis \n\n3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You're asking us it\n\n4 wasn't the question presented. Is the question\n\n5 presented that not that you have to take that into\n\n6 account at listing, but that somehow that ratio makes\n\n7 any emissions standards wrong \n\n8 MR. LINDSTROM: The question is whether \n\n9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: even if, for some\n\n10 people, it's really not backbreaking to do it?\n\n11 MR. LINDSTROM: The question is whether\n\n12 costs have to be considered under (n)(1) when you're\n\n13 regulating electric utilities. And there's one thing\n\n14 I'd like to \n\n15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: They do say it does when\n\n16 you’re regulating at the emission standard.\n\n17 MR. LINDSTROM: They say that it's being\n\n18 done I guess if you think about this, what happens\n\n19 under 7412(c) is you've got a listing decision, first\n\n20 stage. Then you've got a floor standard. And then\n\n21 you've got an abovethefloor standard.\n\n22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That's not what \n\n23 MR. LINDSTROM: In their approach \n\n24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You're taking out the\n\n25 categorization. They don't establish the floor until\n\n\n 87\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[88] " Official\n\n\n1 they categorize, correct?\n\n2 MR. LINDSTROM: So categorization could\n\n3 happen here, but my point is, what happens under (n)(1)\n\n4 is these first two steps are merged. You're making the\n\n5 necessary and appropriate determination, when you're\n\n6 looking not to list, but whether such regulation is\n\n7 appropriate and necessary. That's the language in the\n\n8 statute. It says, is such regulation appropriate and\n\n9 necessary.\n\n10 So it's not just whether it's going to be\n\n11 listed. It's looking at what's actually going to\n\n12 happen, so that's why it's that's why they did both\n\n13 at the same time. Why they made the appropriate and\n\n14 necessary finding at the same time they published the\n\n15 emissions standards. They were looking at the costs\n\n16 ahead because they didn't know what the costs were going\n\n17 to be to figure out if such regulation \n\n18 JUSTICE SCALIA: Are you saying that they\n\n19 purported to make the categorization decision without\n\n20 taking into account costs?\n\n21 MR. LINDSTROM: Yes, any categorization\n\n22 they've done has already been done, and they didn't\n\n23 consider costs.\n\n24 JUSTICE SCALIA: And didn't consider cost.\n\n25 MR. LINDSTROM: That's correct. And again,\n\n\n 88\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[89] " Official\n\n\n1 I'd like to return to one of the big picture principles,\n\n2 which is, this is an administrative law case, so it does\n\n3 this turns or falls on what the agency actually did\n\n4 below. So they've already actually made determinations.\n\n5 They've said costs are not relevant. They've ignored an\n\n6 important part of the regulatory problem, and adopted \n\n7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry. They\n\n8 proposed categories, and everybody had the opportunity\n\n9 to say it's the wrong category, correct?\n\n10 MR. LINDSTROM: Yes, Your Honor.\n\n11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And argue why it's the\n\n12 wrong category.\n\n13 MR. LINDSTROM: And the categories have been\n\n14 adopted\n\n15 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And some people\n\n16 submitted complaints about costs relative to their\n\n17 technology and their kinds of plants, correct?\n\n18 MR. LINDSTROM: Yes, Your Honor.\n\n19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So, it's not true that\n\n20 they proposed them, but everybody gets a chance to\n\n21 tell them, these are this technology is different\n\n22 from the others, or this kind of plant is different from\n\n23 the others, and it imposes a cost much greater than you\n\n24 are anticipating.\n\n25 MR. LINDSTROM: I'm saying we're already\n\n\n 89\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[90] " Official\n\n\n1 past that phase. They've already any categorization\n\n2 they were going to do has already been done.\n\n3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No, what you're saying,\n\n4 it's already past. It's past because that's been the\n\n5 final rule has been issued.\n\n6 MR. LINDSTROM: Correct.\n\n7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm talking during the\n\n8 rulemaking process. The rulemaking process does permit\n\n9 the agency to consider the cost of technology in setting\n\n10 up categorizations.\n\n11 MR. LINDSTROM: They've adopted the exact\n\n12 opposite position, which is that costs do not matter.\n\n13 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, I thought we just\n\n14 heard I thought we just heard that say the Lignite\n\n15 people, I can't remember if that's the right name, but\n\n16 they said, look, we have special ways of producing\n\n17 this our stuff, and they are much more expensive, so\n\n18 please don't put us in the same category as you put the\n\n19 other people in. Okay? For the purposes of figuring\n\n20 the best 12 percent, and the agency said, right, okay,\n\n21 separate. Now, did that happen?\n\n22 MR. LINDSTROM: Yes.\n\n23 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. Then how would\n\n24 you do that without considering cost? Because their\n\n25 basis was the Lignite people were saying our costs are\n\n\n 90\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[91] " Official\n\n\n1 more expensive?\n\n2 MR. LINDSTROM: We don't know how they I\n\n3 don't know how they did it, but they've said throughout\n\n4 that we're not considering costs.\n\n5 Thank you, Your Honor.\n\n6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.\n\n7 The case is submitted.\n\n8 (Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the case in the\n\n9 aboveentitled matter was submitted.)\n\n10\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n\n 91\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[92] " Official\n Page 92\n\n A 60:2 agree 14:5 45:18 announced 78:13 12:15 14:16 15:3\naaron 2:8 3:3,16 additionally 67:17 71:1 annual 29:10 52:2 15:22 16:22 17:3\n 4:8 86:18 address 31:19 36:3 agrees 17:4 52:3,3 87:1 18:24 20:2 27:6\nability 23:13,16 43:14 60:7 71:14 ahead 43:22 88:16 annually 29:17 30:7,9 31:20 32:1\nable 22:14 23:25 addressed 29:25 air 1:11 6:11 28:12 83:10 32:4,5 35:25\n 24:2 53:3 68:25 55:24 61:24 63:3 28:14,16,22 29:4 answer 14:3 21:14 36:22 39:12,19\n 83:18 addresses 31:14 29:9 30:11 31:24 21:16 23:1 24:4 41:25 42:16,18,20\naboveentitled 2:4 addressing 20:23 34:9,11 39:13 24:16,17 26:2 43:2,4,11,14,24\n 91:9 adjectives 9:16 40:11,19 41:19 33:18 35:19 37:11 44:7,9 45:6 46:16\nabovethefloor adjusting 77:10 42:5 45:1,5 72:4 45:20 49:24 57:4 48:23 49:23 51:16\n 87:21 administrative al 1:3,7,16,24 68:17 70:11 54:3 56:8,10 62:6\nabsolutely 7:1 14:13 55:22 80:7 alito 17:8 19:20 answering 38:17 67:6,10,12,15\n 10:17 27:12,17 80:13 81:7 89:2 20:4 36:5 45:11 answers 51:3 71:5,12 72:14,20\naccept 47:22,22 administrator 45:18 46:17 47:1 anticipated 14:22 72:22 74:2 88:5,7\naccount 17:14 14:21 15:1,21,22 47:3 48:10 65:15 53:10 88:8,13\n 22:18 23:1,13,16 23:5 55:9 65:18,24 68:9,13 anticipating 89:24 appropriately 40:6\n 24:15 25:7,20 administrators 68:14,19 77:11,18 anybody 35:1 appropriateness\n 36:6,8,20 37:4 54:1 77:23 80:4 85:13 anyway 50:1 71:24 72:1\n 50:2,8,10,11 51:8 adopt 38:2 allow 42:9 44:8 apparently 34:18 april 82:20\n 51:12,15 52:16,20 adopted 38:8 42:16 66:7 appeal 26:15 arbitrary 14:8\n 58:5 66:16,18,21 64:22 89:6,14 allowing 43:3 47:7 appearances 2:7 area 17:16 19:2\n 68:21 70:6,10,13 90:11 67:25 appendix 5:25 6:5 21:3,6 48:12\n 71:10 76:12 77:12 adopts 80:7 allows 13:13 42:17 31:9 53:21 64:14 83:21\n 85:17 87:6 88:20 advantage 34:18 55:9 76:6 71:17 arent 27:10 75:24\nachievable 55:6 aerosolized 84:25 altered 76:18 applied 58:15 75:24 86:8\nachieved 14:12 affirmed 41:11 alternative 35:22 74:21 argue 25:3 89:11\n 55:7 74:11 agencies 13:5 43:19 46:9 applies 20:18 37:17 arguing 35:13\nacid 8:10 18:3,6,11 agency 1:7,16,24 ambient 40:19 38:14 41:17 76:8 45:23\n 18:15 19:7,21 4:5 10:24 12:11 ambiguous 10:24 78:9 argument 2:5 3:2,5\n 20:14,22,25 28:19 12:13,24,25 13:13 11:3,4 apply 19:1 24:12 3:9,12,15 4:3,8\n 29:15,17 30:2,3 13:25 14:2,7,8,9 amendments 28:17 27:16,20 36:3 7:21 24:15,19,24\n 37:22 46:7 49:4 19:9 25:4,5,6,10 amicus 60:11 37:19 41:19 45:24 25:1,4,14 28:5,11\n 49:10 53:8 72:8 25:19 26:5,15,23 amortization 83:12 54:5 55:10 64:5 30:20 37:13 38:7\n 72:19 84:23 27:15,18 29:18,20 amortized 83:16 74:7 76:1 41:6 43:16 45:12\nacidification 29:25 31:14 32:11 34:12 amount 26:19 63:2 applying 71:5 48:1 49:22,25\nacknowledge 71:6 35:24 36:2 38:1 amounts 74:3,9 77:16 51:5,7,9,16,17\nacknowledged 38:16,18,25 39:8 analogous 13:15 approach 18:12 55:20 56:4,13,18\n 74:17 40:22 43:4,11,17 analysis 17:1 19:2 23:25 42:3 43:12 58:20,23 59:18\nact 6:11 14:13 43:21 44:17 55:20 25:21,24 26:1,4,7 56:22 64:25 69:22 60:11,13,19,20\n 28:13,14,16 30:11 55:24 56:14,18,21 37:2 38:20 39:14 87:23 62:9 66:1 67:19\n 34:9,11 39:13 58:25 84:6 89:3 40:5,12 45:24 appropriate 4:16 68:2 70:22 81:10\n 42:5 72:5 90:9,20 49:2 57:19 70:13 4:20 5:1,4,6,11 86:18\naction 14:9 26:16 agencys 70:5 71:2 85:20,25 6:10,23,25 7:3,8 arguments 33:12\nactual 5:23 aggregate 30:22,23 86:10 7:14 8:14,14,19 55:23 58:22\naddition 72:1 aggressively 30:10 ancillary 59:17 9:11,16 10:25 arisen 12:23\nadditional 6:18 ago 61:3 62:12 andahalf 52:9 11:5,9 12:10,12 artificial 72:13\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[93] " Official\n Page 93\n\naside 50:16 84:13 66:3 68:24 69:14 blindly 51:13 button 48:5 32:12 33:7,22\nasked 26:1,3 29:13 69:14,15 80:18,20 bootstrap 62:2 37:18,20 38:14\n 30:7 47:22 51:23 81:10 82:3 85:21 bootstrapped C 53:16 55:10 58:17\nasking 20:1 32:10 basic 41:11 61:21 c 2:1,10,13,15 3:1 66:18,19 75:1,3,6\n 35:11 79:12 87:3 basically 57:8,10 bottom 50:20 4:1 19:4 20:18 75:18 76:11,19\nasks 45:21 62:13 break 54:22 55:9 32:5 34:8 53:14 77:5,9,16 78:2,2\nassessment 40:3 basing 76:16 breaks 26:18 53:23 61:2 62:5 79:25 80:1,2 81:9\nassociated 29:17 basis 38:8,10 54:12 breyer 22:16 23:17 62:11,12,14,17 81:16,17,22,23\n 40:10,18 63:8 66:12 85:13 23:20 24:3,19,22 66:2 87:19 89:8,13\nassociation 1:20 87:2 90:25 25:2,8,16 26:20 calculate 54:24 categorization\n 71:17 bear 47:11,12 32:10 34:17 36:14 calculated 31:25 30:22 32:10 38:22\nassume 5:17 15:8 beginning 71:7 49:21 51:20,24 40:7 50:14 58:21 74:14\nassuming 23:15 begins 50:9 52:15 55:3,13 calculation 12:16 74:25 75:10 76:6\natmosphere 84:24 behalf 2:9,10,13,15 78:15,18,22 79:6 31:2 59:14 75:22 79:23 80:25 82:9\nattached 9:15 3:4,7,11,14,17 4:9 79:12 90:13,23 76:10 85:7 87:25 88:2,19,21\nattack 81:9 28:6 41:7 70:23 breyers 30:14 calculus 82:13 90:1\nattention 84:10 86:19 55:21 58:21 69:7 calibrate 27:15 categorizations\nauthority 53:25 behave 11:8 brief 5:20,21 6:1 call 59:15 90:10\n 54:1,22 68:7 belied 82:21 12:3 53:21 57:9 called 61:2 categorize 33:8,9\nautomatic 54:11,14 belief 19:21 59:6,8 60:11 cant 16:21 19:18 54:17 59:1 67:24\n 58:9,14 believe 24:25 36:21 78:23,23 24:18 30:21 35:15 76:24,25 80:12\nautomatically bench 34:4 briefing 36:13 38:1,1 43:7 47:22 88:1\n 75:25 benefit 14:11 25:21 briefs 51:11 56:1 51:15 59:23 90:15 categorized 81:22\navailability 5:9 63:1,2,9,17 83:5,8 83:14 cap 47:15 81:23\n 6:16,18 7:18,20 85:16 86:6,9 bring 19:23 capacious 6:25 7:5 categorizes 30:24\n 8:2 53:16 benefits 40:4,9 bringing 82:22 7:11 43:2 category 18:9\navailable 8:3 28:20 59:13 61:20,23 broad 12:24 26:21 capacity 52:12 26:22 28:16 30:23\n 46:9 72:3 63:7 64:2,12,13 39:16 capital 82:16 83:11 32:6,18 36:4\naverted 60:12 64:17,20 85:16 broader 28:14 83:13,16 38:13 54:7,9 55:2\navoiding 64:4 best 21:9 28:20 broke 55:15 capricious 14:8 58:14,15 65:10\naware 68:16 37:11 42:12 43:9 brownell 2:10 3:6 cardiovascular 67:13,16 69:23\n 44:21 54:24,25 28:4,5,8,23 29:2 84:16 73:24 74:12,18,18\n B 58:16 90:20 30:13 31:4 32:17 care 22:17 85:3 74:22 75:2,20\nb 2:12 3:10 17:7 bestcontrolled 55:8 32:25 33:11 34:2 case 4:4 12:18 76:4 77:20 78:3,5\n 41:6 72:7 beyond 17:5 56:22 35:5,18 36:5,10 13:15 24:23 35:16 78:7 79:8,10\nback 6:15 9:13,17 big 13:23 37:2 52:1 37:12 38:3,5,9,16 35:17 47:6 51:14 81:15 86:13 89:9\n 30:14 50:14 62:4 89:1 39:4,15,24 40:8 51:22 52:23 53:1 89:12 90:18\nbackbreaking billion 29:8,10,17 41:4 74:17 55:15 56:5,23 cause 46:7\n 87:10 30:2,4 39:23 50:4 brutally 25:20 57:1 61:2 62:11 causes 84:10,15\nbackground 30:5 52:1,2 63:15,16 building 21:25 64:9 69:2,3 79:9 85:6\nbackwards 21:5 63:22,23 82:9,15 built 21:18,19,21 89:2 91:7,8 causing 86:5\nbad 80:8 82:17 83:9 84:5 75:7 cases 4:6 26:22 certain 21:20 30:16\nbase 22:4 84:18,19 87:1 burn 75:4 69:10 30:17 31:17 32:13\nbased 12:14 17:15 billions 63:12 burned 74:19 catalytic 53:7 35:8 39:20 54:11\n 17:17 21:1 41:21 bit 9:17 23:4 59:25 burning 55:16 catch 10:4 53:6 certainly 21:25\n 42:1 54:8 55:23 60:12 business 22:23 23:9 categories 30:15,16 41:12,25 58:24\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[94] " Official\n Page 94\n\n 71:6 80:15 clarify 39:25 73:21 competitive 83:24 29:22 control 7:15 8:10\ncertpetition 71:17 75:10 76:22 complaining 54:15 consider 4:16 12:17 15:10 21:20,22\ncetera 36:18 class 23:10 24:10 complaints 89:16 12:20,21 15:15 28:22,22 31:15\nchallenge 35:12 24:13 complete 10:5 16:20,21,22 26:3 35:22 39:6 46:9\nchallenged 56:21 classes 23:5 51:4 compliance 29:5,7 26:9 32:19 33:25 55:7 60:4 73:14\nchallenging 64:21 classic 14:8 82:23 84:1 36:22 39:1 41:22 85:9\nchambers 51:10 clause 9:20 10:9 complying 83:1 42:10,17 43:6,7,7 controlled 8:16\n 55:21 58:21 60:15 clean 6:11 28:12,14 concede 42:8 59:7 43:22,22 44:3,8 85:11\n 78:16 28:16 30:11 34:9 conceded 85:24 45:6,7,8 57:11,11 controlling 85:4,5\nchance 89:20 34:11 39:13 42:5 concedes 72:17 57:16 61:19,20 controls 5:9,13\ncharacteristics clear 18:2 49:5,9 conceptually 35:5 67:7,7 78:24 6:16,18 8:2,3\n 31:17 39:20 60:9 69:23 79:16 concern 29:19 80:10,11,11,24 37:18 85:3,8\ncharacterization 79:17 concerned 40:2 81:13 85:20 88:23 converters 53:8\n 25:22 clearly 13:20 71:7 48:10 57:15 88:24 90:9 copollutants 63:10\ncharts 64:16 close 48:18,22 concerns 41:14 consideration correct 16:18,24\nchemicals 71:21,25 closely 13:15 conclude 67:14 13:21 21:11 22:8 27:12 38:3,5,7,9\n 72:6,24 74:3 86:4 coal 65:13 78:2 concluded 29:18 22:13 37:3 42:13 55:14 65:19 75:11\nchenery 38:4 coalburning 74:18 40:6 49:20 52:4 43:3 65:1 69:15 77:1 79:5 84:7\nchevron 12:5 13:4 coalfired 74:6,23 52:10 60:22 76:15,16 85:19 88:1,25\n 42:15,22 75:1,13 81:23 concludes 60:21 considerations 89:9,17 90:6\nchief 4:3,10 28:2,8 cobenefits 40:9,10 conclusion 65:9 13:11,17 15:14 cost 12:15,16 13:11\n 37:25 38:4,6 40:8 40:11,18,23 59:16 concurring 52:25 46:13 47:24 13:16 14:7,7 15:7\n 41:3,4,5,8 42:6,15 59:18 condition 5:13 considered 35:14 15:9,11 21:1,11\n 42:25 43:10,15 code 9:19 conduct 57:18 40:13 44:13,17 21:20 22:8,15,18\n 44:1,6,16 45:2,3 collateral 59:15 conducted 44:23 55:20,24 87:12 23:13 25:21 26:1\n 55:18 56:3 59:11 colleagues 28:11 confirm 78:15 considering 4:13 30:2,4 31:1,4 35:3\n 59:17 60:14,17 57:15 confirmed 31:8 15:3,23,24 16:13 37:1 42:17,21\n 61:4,8,11,14,17 come 36:12 39:2 confirming 34:16 35:21 42:21 43:23 47:19 48:7 50:21\n 61:23 62:1,19,24 64:17 73:16 79:25 confront 69:3 44:2,21 48:20 50:22 51:14 52:9\n 63:5,13,16,19,25 comes 31:16 48:22 congress 8:7 12:24 73:17 80:8 90:24 52:9 53:9 57:16\n 64:9 68:13 70:12 58:18 13:19,20,21 14:6 91:4 59:13 63:23 66:12\n 70:20,24 80:5,19 command 14:9 14:20 15:8 17:11 consistent 45:12 70:5,9,12 73:17\n 80:22 81:5 86:14 commanded 14:20 17:19 18:15 29:24 consistently 29:20 76:12,15,16 80:8\n 86:20 91:6 commandeering 30:6 39:5 41:18 57:9 71:19 80:10,11,11,18,20\nchose 17:11 20:16 10:12 42:3 43:13 44:23 consolidated 4:5 80:24 82:3,9,16\n 42:3 comment 31:11 45:5,15,19,22,23 constitution 9:20 88:24 89:23 90:9\ncircuit 61:2 62:5,11 34:7,10,13 77:5 46:11,20 47:7,25 construction 12:7 90:24\n 62:12,14,17 78:3,4 81:24 48:3,25 49:2,17 context 7:9 11:3,5 costbenefit 25:24\ncircumstance 7:11 comments 77:8 52:4 53:5 64:22 14:2 28:14 39:13 26:1,4 37:2 39:14\n 14:1 79:24 67:12,14 69:20 39:16,17,18 40:22 39:17 45:24 57:19\ncircumstances 7:9 common 41:24 71:7 74:8 78:23 contextual 11:1 71:2 85:20,24\n 12:25 14:1 19:11 commonly 12:12 86:3 continue 47:1 72:7 86:10\n 19:14,15,17 companies 83:24 congresss 46:18 83:22 costeffective 18:13\ncitation 5:16 comparable 65:12 consequences continuing 18:17 23:25\nclaim 71:20 72:17 74:11 31:18 39:21 57:1 contrary 4:14 costs 4:13 7:10\n 72:23 comparator 83:6 conservatively contributed 47:16 11:15,17,18 12:17\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[95] " Official\n Page 95\n\n 12:20,21 13:22 20:16,17 39:5 39:7 devised 58:22 52:24\n 14:3 17:14 18:11 59:21,24 60:2 defines 58:13 didnt 7:18,18 8:9 discussion 36:12\n 21:4,5 22:12 63:3 64:6 68:15 definitely 67:25 15:9,11,13 17:3 51:10\n 23:21 25:7,20 77:13 definition 10:25 18:15 20:10 34:25 disorder 84:11\n 26:3,6,8 29:5,7,10 critical 67:4 69:12 11:1 35:10 36:14 37:6 disparity 59:12\n 29:16 30:17,21,23 crudely 25:20 degree 55:5 77:12 37:10 38:2 42:13 disproportion 64:3\n 30:24 33:24,25,25 current 22:25 delay 20:7 78:14 44:1 45:15 57:1 disproportionate\n 34:5,14 35:14 cut 65:7 69:21 delays 84:10 58:8,24,25 59:2 63:2\n 36:6,7,22 38:11 cuts 7:6,11 28:24 deleterious 70:9 64:18,19 65:11 dispute 60:24\n 38:19,19,24,24,24 30:20 deliberately 43:5 66:14 69:7,8,9,10 disregard 14:7\n 39:1,2,4,5,5,9 delighted 57:6 72:15,15 81:13,19 distinct 4:15\n 40:4,7 41:15,22 D demands 39:13 83:8 84:8 86:9 distinction 25:12\n 42:10,13 43:3,22 d 2:1,8,10,13,15 3:3 department 2:13 88:16,22,24 distinguish 23:5\n 43:23 44:2,3,8,13 3:16 4:1,8 31:12 depend 30:24 33:3 difference 21:24 divide 32:12 50:4\n 44:17,21 45:6,9 34:8 37:18 39:6 33:6 66:9,11 77:3 division 72:13\n 47:11,12 48:9 45:9 58:1 60:25 depended 20:12 differences 68:24 doctrine 13:4\n 49:23 50:3 52:16 61:2 62:5,11,12 depending 33:21 different 8:13 doesnt 10:17 11:17\n 52:20 53:11 57:11 62:14,14,17 74:7 75:4 76:18 10:19 17:22,23 11:18 12:6 15:6,6\n 58:4 59:9 64:25 75:8 76:12 86:18 depends 50:1 54:17 18:1,3,9 19:3,10 15:18 16:8,11,15\n 66:3,16,18,21 deal 62:7 deposition 28:19 20:16 23:10 37:8 16:18,20 20:15\n 67:7,7 68:20 69:1 dealing 43:1 73:20 describe 72:14 45:19,21 54:20 22:12,14 24:12\n 69:15,15,25 70:3 deaths 85:7 described 52:21 59:14 64:4,5 35:1 41:14 42:20\n 70:4,4 77:12 decades 62:4,5,6,18 82:19 66:13 69:5,6,22 45:20 52:6 57:20\n 78:24 81:13 83:16 december 31:7 design 41:17 72:10 77:9 78:5 57:20 81:6 85:15\n 83:16,25 84:6,9 decide 4:12 41:21 designed 74:8,10 80:1,1 81:25 82:5 doing 6:18 9:24\n 85:16,17 87:1,12 43:11 45:7 46:14 despite 86:24 83:6 89:21,22 11:13 12:4 18:5\n 88:15,16,20,23 decided 17:19 detail 79:24 differently 17:11 26:6 45:13 62:13\n 89:5,16 90:12,25 34:20,24 58:2 determination 7:21 17:20 20:20 30:7 76:17 77:7\n 91:4 decides 36:3 31:10 34:7 36:1 44:25 46:19,24 dollars 40:10 63:12\ncouch 10:13 decision 12:21 38:11,23 39:9 67:24 71:8 domestic 36:18\ncouldnt 50:7 17:14 19:17 27:4 40:13 88:5 difficult 36:16 donald 2:12 3:10\ncounsel 41:3 91:6 38:8,10 44:4 determinations 59:22 64:21 41:6\ncourse 56:2 59:9 46:18 56:19 68:4 31:5 89:4 diminishing 21:3 dont 11:4,22 12:22\ncourt 1:1 2:5 4:11 71:3 73:15 75:17 determine 6:11 dioxide 85:6,10 12:23 13:24 20:4\n 10:9 26:23 28:9 80:17,19 85:14 48:13 directed 14:24 15:5 23:11,20 24:25\n 28:17 41:9 70:25 87:19 88:19 determined 5:12 41:19 49:2 73:13 25:13 26:8 32:14\n 71:16 72:9 80:9 decisionmaking 9:1 18:13 29:22 direction 69:25 36:24 37:1 38:25\ncourts 9:21 13:7 26:5 34:14 44:21,24 directly 23:22 62:8 39:1,16 42:8\ncreate 17:22 18:1,2 decisions 12:19 55:8 directs 4:16 12:17 43:25 44:19 46:17\n 24:10 66:2 74:17 30:22 determines 35:24 41:13 46:23 47:12,20\n 77:16,24 79:8 deemed 55:6 67:12 56:7 disagree 34:23 47:3 48:6 49:6 50:1\n 86:11 deeply 69:21 determining 7:9 discovered 25:8 51:6 54:23 57:11\ncreated 77:20 deference 12:6 9:3,6 36:22 discretion 12:10,24 57:24 58:7,18\ncreating 68:15,21 deferred 73:17 developmental 13:14 19:9,12 60:23 64:7,8,9\n 77:14 deficit 84:10 84:10 27:19 43:20 86:11 68:17,20 71:17\ncriteria 19:3,4 defined 9:23 37:16 device 32:10 discussed 36:9 72:25 74:3 77:17\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[96] " Official\n Page 96\n\n 79:25 80:10,23 embodies 12:15 23:9 24:9 29:3,7 12:4 38:15 56:3 extend 12:6\n 81:1 82:13 84:1 emission 7:4 27:6 30:16,20,24 31:1 57:17 69:16,17,18 extensively 40:18\n 85:24 86:12 87:25 31:13 33:17 34:8 31:6,8,25 32:2 examine 31:12 extent 68:20\n 90:18 91:2,3 35:16 41:23 55:7 33:13,24,25 34:5 examined 8:1,21 extremely 84:17\ndramatic 30:17 67:9 74:9 81:25 34:19 36:6,21 example 5:19 8:5\n 33:23 59:12 87:16 40:6 41:14,19 13:12 21:18 23:24 F\ndramatically 33:21 emissions 6:23 42:1,8,11,21,22 57:12 70:6 f 2:10 3:6 28:5\n 33:24 14:23 17:15 18:25 44:24 46:11,11,13 examples 57:12 face 18:2 56:25\ndriving 37:10 19:23 20:23 21:9 48:5,8,13,19,20 exceed 40:4 47:14 69:9\ndroplets 85:1 26:19 34:23 35:23 49:3,14,18,19 85:16 faced 56:24\n 45:9 46:22 47:13 50:22 51:6,12 exceeded 46:22 fact 7:6,11,13 9:9\n E 47:16,18 58:2,2 52:4,10,19 53:10 exceeds 14:11 9:25 17:18 19:2\ne 3:1 4:1,1 6:22 69:14 74:15 75:6 54:22 55:14 56:6 excuse 58:7 80:6 22:12,13 24:2\nearlier 12:3 23:4 75:15,21 87:7 56:9,10,24,24 exempt 32:15 67:23 25:17,17 39:22\n 50:15 65:7 88:15 57:2 58:11 60:21 exempting 73:25 40:20 46:20 49:19\neasily 24:7 emit 47:8 60:23 60:22,25 62:5,13 exercise 49:18,19 50:3 53:17 54:3\neasy 22:21 62:16 74:3 62:17,18 64:5,11 existed 9:4,7 37:9 58:18 59:6 62:9\neconomic 53:4 70:4 emits 60:21 61:1 64:16 65:8 66:2 existence 4:19,21 74:10,16 75:21\neconomically 58:6 emitted 6:12 46:6 66:14,15 68:6 5:7,13 78:18,18 81:10\neconomicallybased 71:4,11 69:3,10,20,25 exists 5:11 6:22 8:4 82:22 84:20 85:2\n 18:12 emphasize 37:13 71:1,10,15,18 expect 21:12,15 factor 31:5 47:6\neconomics 54:21 empirical 51:22 72:9 74:15 76:4 69:23,24 factors 39:10\neffect 17:17 22:12 empirically 77:6 78:24 79:8,15 expenditures 83:13 fair 64:10\n 48:14,15 53:2 enable 30:16 80:7,10 85:14 expense 14:10 fairly 59:12\n 69:24 70:7 74:15 enact 19:25 86:1,12 expensive 14:10 falls 89:3\n 82:19 enacted 45:16 epas 4:12 11:24 21:23 24:11 32:13 familiar 25:18\neffective 21:20 encompassed 7:7 27:21 33:16 41:10 79:7 82:21 90:17 family 50:5,21,22\n 22:15 ended 75:1 45:13 53:25 57:18 91:1 far 12:6 13:15 37:1\neffectively 86:2 engage 13:6 71:2 68:3 85:14,15 experienced 82:18 67:17 75:2\neffectiveness 21:1 engaged 19:17 especially 21:6 experiences 53:6 farm 13:4 19:16\neffects 9:5,8 40:24 entergy 52:25 esq 2:8,10,12,15 expert 12:11,13 fear 50:10\n 45:8 49:4 70:8 entire 19:13 24:8 3:3,6,10,13,16 expertise 12:14 feasible 82:5\n 71:11,23 72:5,25 26:7 35:6 essential 13:5 explain 20:15 42:22 feature 17:9,10\n 73:15,24 86:6,8 entirely 21:1 67:21 establish 54:2 explained 32:2 federal 2:14 3:11\negu 36:23 73:25 76:19 87:25 34:12 10:21 41:7 83:1\negus 6:10,12 entities 15:1 66:10 established 76:3 explaining 22:11 figure 17:2 30:21\neither 24:25 entitled 14:7 estimated 29:3,7 23:23 88:17\nelectric 4:13 14:23 environment 6:13 et 1:3,7,16,24 36:18 explanation 20:5 figuring 78:20\n 18:4,8,17 20:19 86:5 evaluation 15:25 47:10,19,20 79:15 90:19\n 20:23,24 29:1 environmental 1:6 everybody 35:3 explicitly 81:2 final 5:24 6:8 9:6\n 87:13 1:15,23 4:5 16:10 48:7 51:14 57:12 exposure 40:23 26:15 31:10 34:12\nelectrical 52:11 17:6 41:22 42:2 72:17 81:8 89:8 exposures 29:21 75:2 77:9 79:22\nelectricity 22:20,23 45:8 89:20 express 76:15 90:5\n 83:24 epa 4:16,18,24,25 exact 4:20 27:4 expressly 48:8 finalizes 39:8\neliminate 37:9 12:17,20 15:14 48:14 90:11 76:12 finally 83:19\neliminating 70:8 16:7 17:4 22:25 exactly 9:10 10:14 exquisite 79:24 find 5:10,25 6:9,10\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[97] " Official\n Page 97\n\n 7:14 11:23 54:12 G 69:16 hadnt 17:13 45:7 46:12 48:1\n 69:5 70:6,8 g 4:1 gives 63:22 half 38:21 52:3 48:11,15,15,21\nfinding 27:6 31:7 game 57:22 go 11:8 20:8 22:22 hand 5:3 64:12,13 65:11\n 88:14 gas 29:18 30:2 23:9 24:9,23 42:6 hands 43:5 69:14 70:7,9\nfinds 12:13 15:2,22 37:22 55:16 65:6 43:21 46:12 50:20 hap 6:12 59:20,24 71:10 72:5,18\nfine 23:9 24:3 25:2 65:9 74:5 75:14 52:12 59:21 75:14 61:18 63:1 73:15,24 80:18\n 40:17 gases 29:15 30:3 80:9 84:21,25 happen 86:23 88:3 83:7 86:5,8\nfinish 39:25 84:4 84:23 goes 19:2 44:10 88:12 90:21 hear 4:3\nfirst 6:8 10:8 11:13 gasfired 73:23,25 51:21 62:4 67:17 happened 18:18 heard 25:14 58:23\n 11:18 16:2,7 gee 50:7 84:22 73:22 77:8 78:12 90:14,14\n 21:25 23:22 28:11 gen 2:12 3:10 going 6:21 7:10 8:9 79:11 86:25 heres 50:16 60:18\n 30:14,14 38:17 general 2:8,12 4:23 8:18 11:7,8,9 13:1 happens 26:5,14 66:22,24 67:3\n 41:12 42:7,7 9:14 13:9 26:12 15:10 20:12 21:4 75:11 78:4 85:9 hey 50:16,18\n 48:18 49:13 51:21 41:5,8 42:11,19 25:7,7,9 31:11 87:18 88:3 higher 38:24\n 51:25 52:20 55:4 43:9,25 44:9,19 32:12,15 35:3 haps 8:10,15,15 highlights 18:10\n 57:25 60:10 73:2 45:4,18 46:25 36:6 37:21 43:5,6 84:7,20 85:4,9 27:2\n 81:14,18 83:7 47:2,21 48:17 44:3 49:14 50:20 hard 62:8 highly 83:23\n 87:19 88:4 49:8 51:18,21,25 50:21,21 51:19,22 harm 8:19 18:17 history 46:2 47:24\nfit 12:14 52:8,18 53:20,23 53:2 56:25 59:1 harmfree 72:24 48:3 49:7 71:21\nfitting 12:11 54:6,16 55:12,14 60:1,1 66:15,17 harmful 71:21,25 hold 46:20\nflag 62:25 56:2,15,20 57:3,6 68:24 75:18 80:9 72:6,6,8 honor 5:22 15:13\nfloor 87:20,25 57:17,24 58:4,11 80:10,11,24 82:24 harmonizes 41:16 16:14,17 20:6,16\nfloors 74:10 58:13 59:3,16 86:3,22 88:10,11 harms 4:19,21 5:1 22:10 29:2 30:5\nflow 36:2 60:7,18 61:6,10 88:16 90:2 5:3,5,6 16:10 17:6 31:4 32:17 33:1\nflowing 83:22 61:13,16,22,25 good 6:6 40:14 63:7 havent 9:22 33:12 34:2 35:5\nfocus 32:3 35:25 62:21 63:4,11,15 64:1 hazard 5:11,12 36:10 38:9 39:4\n 39:18 41:14 59:4 63:18,24 64:7 goodness 50:25 6:12 8:4,23 9:2,4 39:15 40:8,16\nfollow 79:18 65:5,8,19,23 66:4 government 6:21 9:7,8 15:12 36:4 47:21 48:2,24\nforbids 44:20 66:22,24 67:2,9 6:24 7:3,6 10:21 hazardous 31:24 52:21,24 53:7\nforce 53:5 86:4 68:1,8,16,22 70:2 21:10 22:4 26:18 40:11 41:19 44:25 56:16 62:9 65:23\nforget 48:13 70:11,15,19,20 37:17 41:25 71:1 45:5,25 46:6 68:18 73:6,12\nform 84:21,22 generally 26:15 73:8 79:20 60:21 61:1 62:15 75:12 76:2,9 77:1\nfound 4:18,19 generate 54:8 governs 53:15 64:18 71:4 73:19 77:15 78:12,20\n 40:22 43:13 60:15 55:16 65:11 grain 69:21 hazards 8:21 14:21 79:5,19 80:16\n 61:18 77:6 generating 52:12 great 53:11 14:25 15:6,7 16:1 81:8,16,21 82:4\nfour 50:5 75:3 generators 22:20 greater 89:23 16:6 41:22 42:2 82:10 83:17 85:19\n 81:22 84:4,5 23:7 24:6 50:17 gross 24:8 48:1,21 89:10,18 91:5\n 86:16 50:20 79:7 ground 38:1 health 4:19,21,25 honors 53:13 58:3\nfrankly 64:21 getting 13:9 62:7 group 1:12 11:7 5:3,11,12 6:13 8:3 horrible 37:9\nfriend 58:3,19 ginsburg 12:9 13:9 24:10 66:10 8:21,23 9:2,4,7,8 house 21:24\nfriends 59:12 39:24 guess 7:24 23:1 14:22,25 15:6,7 huge 77:2\nfull 82:22 give 5:16 8:4 19:8 24:9 56:15 61:22 15:12 16:1,6 hypothetical 36:16\nfurther 27:19 30:8 60:4 68:6 71:9 61:25 87:18 17:17 29:19,19 52:22 69:2,8\n 71:22 86:9 guessed 72:13 31:23,25 36:3\nfuture 24:18,23 37:15,23 39:23 I\n given 12:24 13:11\n H 41:14,21 42:2 id 57:6 87:14 89:1\n 31:2 57:13 69:13\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[98] " Official\n Page 98\n\nidea 10:3 25:25 include 21:20 81:14 59:9 22:1,3,7,16 23:17 88:24 89:7,11,15\n 64:1 82:20 83:5 includes 11:15 isnt 6:18 18:9 22:16 23:20 24:3,19,22 89:19 90:3,7,13\nidentified 36:4 17:24 19:12 26:25 27:7 36:16 25:2,3,6,8,13,16 90:23 91:6\n 37:14 53:7 54:7 including 39:22 51:1,7 62:22 73:1 26:11,12,13,20 justification 42:23\nignore 13:1,5 19:18 69:15 82:12 27:9,14,18,23 justify 16:10 47:7\nignored 89:5 independent 12:8 isolation 35:17 28:2,8,23 30:13\nill 25:2,2 49:24 indicate 12:13 issuance 26:17 30:14 32:7,10,21 K\n 65:18 indirectly 76:16 issue 11:14 12:23 32:23 33:2,4,6,18 kagan 4:23 5:8\nillegitimate 64:4 indispensable 14:20 18:17 25:19 33:19 34:15,17 7:17 9:13 13:8,24\nim 4:23 6:2 8:6 10:18 29:11 33:17 38:18 35:10,18 36:5,14 17:25 18:14 19:5\n 11:16 14:5,19 industries 18:21 43:6 57:13,15 37:25 38:4,6,15 20:10 26:12 28:23\n 16:3 22:11 34:25 29:3,4 62:24 65:15 69:9 39:11,24 40:9 30:13 33:2,6,19\n 37:7,10,11 43:16 industry 2:11,16 71:14,23 73:17 41:3,4,5,8 42:6,15 38:15 67:20 68:8\n 46:10 47:2 50:9 3:7,14 20:13 28:6 74:25 42:25 43:10,15 68:11 75:9 76:22\n 51:16,18,22 53:20 28:25 30:10,18 issued 25:10 26:16 44:1,6,15,16 45:2 77:2 78:8\n 53:20 58:23 61:11 33:13 35:7 36:17 31:6 35:15 43:3 45:3,11,18 46:17 kavanaugh 13:3\n 61:11,14 68:16,16 52:1 53:3,5,10 90:5 47:1,3 48:10 49:6 kennedy 6:21 7:2\n 68:17 76:5,5 54:20,21 58:5 issues 31:15 73:13 49:21 51:20,24 21:8,13 22:3,7\n 79:12 89:7,25 70:23 72:23 82:17 73:14 52:6,15 53:19,21 39:11 44:15 53:19\n 90:7 82:22 83:18 86:7 iv 28:19 29:24 53:22 54:4,10 53:21,22 57:22,25\nimaginary 24:5 infer 17:18 69:1 47:13 55:3,13,18,21 81:12,19 82:2\nimagine 22:23 35:6 inference 47:5 ive 24:5 50:13 56:3,12,17 57:3,7 83:9\nimagined 24:5 information 75:19 51:18 57:8,22,25 58:7 key 12:1 64:22\nimmediately 46:5 initial 71:3 81:14 58:12,17,21 59:11 73:13\nimpact 18:4 40:3,5 insisted 9:22 J 59:17 60:14,17 kick 44:12\n 40:12 63:21 70:13 instructed 71:10 jail 82:24 61:4,8,11,14,17 kicked 72:8\nimpacts 37:21 39:9 instruction 12:20 job 78:20 61:23 62:1,19,24 kicks 72:19\nimplicit 22:8 81:2,5 insufficient 22:9,11 john 9:24 63:5,13,16,19,25 kind 9:18,19,22\nimplicitly 21:11 intend 11:18 joint 64:14 64:9 65:3,6,14,15 30:19 52:24 53:1\nimportance 40:15 intended 69:20 jr 2:12 3:10 41:6 65:16,18,20,24 69:7,8 89:22\n 41:2 72:22 judge 13:3 66:14,23 67:1,2,8 kinds 64:20 82:18\nimportant 13:1 interested 25:25 judgment 46:14 67:18,20,21 68:8 85:5 89:17\n 19:18 29:12 40:14 interestingly 34:16 48:19 49:18,19 68:9,11,13,14,19 know 8:9 10:4\n 49:5 51:17 55:22 interpret 17:10 56:9 57:2 70:1 69:7 70:2,12,14 11:10 13:9,17\n 82:14 89:6 80:17 jump 13:23 70:17,20,24 72:12 19:6 20:11 23:3\nimpose 22:14 29:5 interpretation 4:22 justice 2:13 4:3,10 72:20 73:1,5,7,10 25:17,18 32:11\n 29:7 30:8 48:11 11:24 41:10 42:12 4:23 5:8,15,21 6:2 75:9,24 76:5,13 33:25 34:5 36:25\nimposed 48:12 85:22 6:6,21 7:2,16,17 76:22 77:2,11,18 45:15 47:20,21\n 54:14 58:9 87:1 interpreted 42:9 8:6,23 9:13 10:14 77:23 78:8,15,18 50:3,8 51:9 53:6\nimposes 29:10 32:9 61:6 10:22 11:12,22 78:22 79:6,12 54:25 58:25 59:1\n 39:22 89:23 investment 83:11 12:9 13:8,8,24 80:3,3,5,19,22 61:18 64:1 67:22\nimposing 21:22 irrational 11:19,25 14:5,15,19 15:16 81:5,12,19 82:2,7 68:17,20 76:6\nimpossible 22:22 50:9 15:20 16:3,11,12 82:11,24 83:2,9 77:23 80:22 81:1\nimpractical 81:11 irrelevant 7:21,23 16:15,19 17:8,25 84:3,12 85:13 82:8 88:16 91:2,3\ninappropriate 7:24 21:5 26:9 18:14 19:5,20 86:14,21 87:3,9 knowing 36:25\n 67:16 38:11,19 57:13 20:4,10 21:8,13 87:15,22,24 88:18 77:13\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[99] " Official\n Page 99\n\nknows 13:21 7:5,22 8:17 9:1,14 50:9 70:1 71:3 88:4 39:10\n 10:7 11:4,21,25 lives 85:9,11,12 mandate 69:20 mentions 53:16\n L 12:22 13:9,24 logic 41:18 57:20 mandated 22:3,4 mercury 11:15\nlaid 79:23 14:14,17 15:13,18 67:12 68:3 69:13 43:14 45:5,23 15:9 29:14 31:23\nlanguage 5:17,25 16:2,7,14,17,24 69:17,18,19 mandatory 67:13 33:15 37:14 59:25\n 9:18,19,22 12:2 17:21 18:10,22 logical 72:10 67:15 60:23 63:17,21\n 19:14 28:13 42:9 19:12 20:3,6,15 logically 7:24 manner 11:9 18:13 64:11,17 71:25\n 48:23,24 55:3,4 21:12,15 22:6,10 longer 79:9 43:13 74:22 83:8,22\n 69:24 88:7 23:15,19,21 24:17 longterm 49:15 march 2:2 84:5,9,10,17,22\nlansing 2:8 24:21,25 25:5,11 look 5:19 7:18,25 marginal 21:4 merged 88:4\nlaughter 57:5 60:16 25:15 26:2 27:2 10:9 11:2,12 83:25 metals 29:14 62:7\n 78:17,21 27:12,17,21,24 12:25 13:25 15:14 market 83:24 84:21\nlaw 10:24 55:22 28:3 32:22 58:4 16:25 17:5,5 marshall 9:24 methodology 62:4\n 83:1 89:2 86:16,18,20 87:8 18:19 19:6,7,16 10:16 mich 2:9\nleads 79:3 87:11,17,23 88:2 21:2 23:7 35:15 match 58:16 michigan 1:3 4:4\nled 81:25 88:21,25 89:10,13 50:9,17,23,25 material 14:1 19:15 middle 82:19\nleft 6:16 18:16 21:7 89:18,25 90:6,11 51:1 64:14 72:4 70:7 million 29:5 30:1\n 47:25 90:22 91:2 90:16 materials 14:4 40:10 59:13,13\nlegal 10:25 40:15 lines 79:3 83:23 looked 8:18 9:4,5 mathematical 63:17,21 83:5\n 41:1 list 41:21 42:1 11:19 13:3,10 76:10 84:4\nlegally 24:14 46:14,16 48:16 26:23 71:19,23 matter 2:4 41:24 mind 50:1\nlegislating 48:25 58:3 61:19 66:21 72:2 73:24 74:24 51:14 53:4 85:15 minimum 27:10,16\nlegislative 47:24 88:6 looking 5:20 11:16 90:12 91:9 32:8,15 33:20,23\n 48:2 49:7 69:24 listed 19:4,24 27:10 19:13,14 21:21 maximum 55:5 37:18 50:18 54:5\n 71:20 27:15 32:18 33:16 37:7 88:6,11,15 mcculloch 9:25 67:23\nlegislature 10:12 44:5,11 46:21 looks 7:8 21:16 mean 5:16 6:24 minimums 27:20\nlegitimacy 61:15 54:13 58:10 64:16 35:22 59:14 9:18 10:17,23 32:24,25 33:2,6,8\nlevel 19:23 29:23 66:19,19 75:13 lord 6:6 19:13 21:13 22:14 33:9 54:11 55:10\n 31:15 46:7 65:12 88:11 lot 21:23 47:12 23:10 37:8 38:16 75:25 76:3,8,9,11\nlevels 40:23 46:22 listing 8:8,12 17:13 50:3,6 84:16 85:5 40:16 50:3,19 76:17,18,24,25\n 60:23 83:6 26:14,21 27:3,8 85:9 62:20 71:15 72:13 77:3\nlibrary 11:10 31:11 32:4,8,18 low 8:24 40:23 73:2 82:8,11 83:2 mining 1:20 71:17\nlift 27:19 34:22 35:17 36:1 lower 23:25 53:9 meaning 11:6 minute 9:14\nlight 31:19 39:9 36:7 37:17 42:14 ludicrous 82:21 meanings 9:15,23 minutes 86:16\nlignite 33:14 74:19 44:3 46:23 53:15 83:3 means 6:15 7:14 misconception 49:9\n 74:20 90:14,25 57:10,14,19 58:14 lungs 84:25 9:16,17 10:2,18 missing 47:20\nlime 61:3 62:11 58:25 59:2,5,8,10 10:23 11:10 53:2 misspoke 6:8\nlimit 15:14 47:14 65:1,16,21 66:16 M 72:16,18,21 83:20 mitigate 30:16\n 74:9 66:21 67:7 68:4 m 2:6,15 3:13 4:2 measures 21:20,22 modeling 29:20\nlimitations 64:5 69:13 70:14,16,17 70:22 91:8 mechanism 44:12 money 50:4,6 82:7\nlimited 16:8 33:14 71:3 73:15,22 magnitude 29:22 76:21 morning 4:4 39:21\n 74:10 74:5 75:11,17 main 68:2 meet 24:2,6,8 53:4 motivated 8:8\nlimits 54:1 78:9 80:17,19 maintain 43:20 72:23 74:20 motor 53:8 64:23\nlindstrom 2:8 3:3 85:17,21 87:6,19 major 19:1 42:4 meets 26:24,25 69:18\n 3:16 4:7,8,10 5:8 lists 34:9 58:11 majority 29:16 mention 41:14 mount 58:20\n 5:19,22 6:4,7 7:1 little 9:17 21:1 23:4 making 19:18 44:4 mentioned 17:6,7 multiple 12:17,17\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[100] " Official\n Page 100\n\n 53:6 needed 69:3 71:8 once 9:7 18:18 27:9 part 11:13,13 13:2 54:24 55:1\n needs 84:2 27:9,15 32:18 13:6 14:4 19:18 period 49:13 85:25\n N negligible 71:23 33:16 35:19 46:13 31:6,12,14 35:2 permissible 41:13\nn 3:1,1 4:1 17:7 neurotoxin 84:17 54:12 58:2,9,9,11 40:13 64:19 65:16 47:14\n 19:3 28:13 31:10 never 25:13 50:10 60:21 65:20 66:3 73:1 permit 90:8\n 31:19 34:7,9,12 57:16 58:23 onerous 30:17 77:21,22 86:11 permitted 47:8\n 35:20 38:12 39:8 new 64:24 69:19 ones 22:15 89:6 58:20 62:21\n 41:11 46:3 47:23 nine 51:25 ongoing 8:19 participated 47:15 persist 72:5\n 56:6,6 68:5 87:12 nonfinal 31:8 open 46:20 47:25 particles 40:17 person 50:5\n 88:3 nonfocus 59:4 operate 22:4 57:21 84:21,23,24 petition 5:24 6:5\nnaaqs 64:23 69:17 nonmercury 29:14 58:6 75:5 particular 9:15 petitioner 1:13,21\nname 90:15 84:21 operating 83:15 18:12 38:25 47:13 petitioners 1:4 2:9\nnational 1:20 24:8 normal 52:22 53:1 operation 68:25 70:7 71:11 86:13 2:11 3:4,7,17 4:9\n 40:19 61:3 62:11 62:22 81:3 particularly 17:6 28:6 31:9 45:22\n 71:16 83:20,23 normally 63:3 operator 53:4 71:25 47:10 59:6 60:24\nnatural 18:19 note 35:21 opinion 5:16 particulate 84:19 64:8 83:14 86:19\n 41:12 55:16 65:6 notice 31:7 34:6,10 opinions 52:25 84:20 85:3,6,8 phase 78:12 90:1\n 65:9 73:23,24 34:13 77:4 78:1 opportunity 34:18 parts 49:21 phrase 5:4,5,5,6\n 74:5 75:14 79:21 80:16 81:24 81:9 89:8 party 60:11 6:14 10:1,2,6\nnaturalgasfired notion 13:22 opposed 19:3 20:8 paul 2:15 3:13 18:24 42:19 43:24\n 69:4 number 52:1 20:17 55:21 70:22 44:7\nnature 5:4,6 28:12 numerous 66:7 opposite 90:12 pause 48:5 71:9 pick 10:23\nnear 22:21 24:1 opposition 58:20 73:21 picture 89:1\nnearby 32:14 O oral 2:4 3:2,5,9,12 people 11:7 50:6,7 piece 34:20\nnecessarily 10:11 o 3:1 4:1 4:8 28:5 41:6 55:1 67:23 76:7 piecemeal 35:13\n 11:18 12:15 22:12 obligation 33:17,20 60:12 70:22 78:4 87:10 89:15 place 8:10 9:5\n 67:15 60:25 order 29:21 32:22 90:15,19,25 21:25 49:11\nnecessary 4:17,18 obvious 25:4 56:21 percent 21:9 22:20 places 13:21\n 4:25 5:5,12 8:7,11 obviously 30:24 ordinary 12:7 20:9 22:22 23:3,7,12 plant 21:21,22\n 8:12,14,15,17,19 35:14 20:18 26:4 23:23 24:2,5,7,12 28:12 86:6 89:22\n 8:25 9:10,17,20 occur 14:22 75:15 ought 61:19 65:9 32:13 35:3 36:17 plants 17:11,19\n 10:1,8,11,12,16 occurred 86:23 65:10 38:21,21 50:13 19:23 21:10,17,17\n 10:17,20 15:3,23 occurs 73:18 outlandishly 82:21 52:10,11,13,14,23 28:15,21 29:1,6\n 17:3 18:24 19:25 offline 52:12 outrageously 14:10 54:24 55:1 56:25 30:6 31:21 32:4\n 20:1 27:5 31:21 oh 50:24 58:25 overestimate 53:11 56:25 58:16 75:20 32:14 41:18 42:1\n 31:22 35:25 39:19 63:11 80:10 overlap 14:18 76:3,17 77:7,17 43:13 44:4,10,22\n 42:17,20 44:8,10 oil 78:2 77:18,19 79:9 44:24 45:14,17,20\n 46:16 47:5 48:23 oilfired 74:6 75:2,3 P 82:15,16 83:15,16 46:5,6,15,19,21\n 56:8,10 71:5,13 75:13 81:22 p 4:1 90:20 47:8,11 48:12\n 71:18 72:4,7,14 oira 70:13 page 3:2 6:3,7,8,10 percentage 53:3 55:15 58:10 65:10\n 72:16,18 74:2 okay 22:21 23:10 12:3 31:9 53:19 perfectly 33:1 62:6 67:6 69:5 71:4,8\n 88:5,7,9,14 36:23 37:3 59:25 59:7 64:15,15,15 72:10 71:12 73:16,23,25\nneed 18:23 26:8 61:18 73:7 90:19 64:16 perform 14:21 74:5,6,11,18,20\n 49:18 60:8 69:9 90:20 pages 71:16 79:1 performance 58:16 74:23 75:4,13,14\n 72:25 78:6 79:25 old 21:17 23:8 paragraph 25:24 64:24 69:19 75:14 80:12 81:22\n 81:13 older 21:22 paralysis 86:1 performing 21:10 81:23 89:17\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[101] " Official\n Page 101\n\nplausible 11:19,23 39:2 82:11 84:1 89:6 89:20 43:12,14 44:10,15\nplay 10:20 77:19 power 17:11,19 problems 23:14 protection 1:6,15 45:20,21,21 51:23\nplease 4:11 28:9 19:23 28:12,15,21 60:20 65:11 72:19 1:23 4:5 56:5 57:18 58:3\n 41:9 68:12 70:25 29:1,6 30:6 31:21 78:6 84:16 prove 86:7 65:25 69:4 70:3\n 90:18 32:4,13 33:13 procedure 14:13 provide 42:13 72:2 74:13 75:15\nplenty 26:22 41:18 42:1 43:12 procedures 34:11 provided 39:6 87:4,4,8,11\npm 40:17 44:4,10,22,24 proceed 46:4 72:11 provides 69:13 questioning 61:12\npoint 18:14 19:9,22 45:14,17,19 46:5 proceeding 36:11 provision 11:14 61:15\n 20:21 24:3,4,21 46:6,15,19,21 40:22 20:1 23:12 25:8 questions 29:13\n 25:23 34:17 38:16 47:7,11 48:11 process 31:6 34:6 30:18,19 41:16 36:15 40:14 41:1\n 38:18 42:8 50:12 51:7 55:15,16 34:13 39:8 40:6 45:17 53:15 66:6 quiet 11:11\n 50:24 52:20 53:13 65:10 67:6 69:4 59:22 74:24 75:5 provisions 34:10 quite 4:24 10:18\n 53:14 55:19 56:19 71:4,5,7,11 73:16 75:7,18 77:5,21 66:7 68:6 52:22 59:19 64:5\n 57:22 59:3,5 80:12 86:6 77:22 78:25 79:23 public 4:19,21,25 69:12,12 72:15\n 60:10 61:25 68:2 powerplantrelated 80:25 81:25 90:8 5:2 6:12 9:3,7,8 85:22\n 68:3,3 69:11 29:21 90:8 14:11,22,25 15:5\n 75:20 82:14 88:3 practicable 75:7 produce 40:24 75:6 15:7,12 16:1,6 R\npointed 12:2 58:4 practical 76:21 80:1 29:19,19 31:23,25 r 4:1\npointedly 17:19 practice 41:25 55:7 producing 90:16 36:3 37:15,23 radically 69:22\npoints 5:23 28:10 preceding 53:25 product 24:8 36:18 39:23 48:14,15 rain 8:10 18:3,6,11\n 51:19 60:8 preclude 42:21 profit 52:7 64:12,13 65:11 18:15 19:7,21\npoisonous 84:17 precluded 13:12,17 program 18:4,6,11 published 88:14 20:14,22,25 46:8\npollutant 31:24 predicate 6:22 18:15 19:7,22 purported 88:19 49:4,10 53:9 72:5\n 37:22 39:22 40:17 premature 85:7 20:14,22,24,25 purpose 76:23 72:8,19\n 60:22 62:16 premise 14:6 47:22 28:19 29:1,4,24 purposes 90:19 raise 38:23\npollutants 40:11 47:23 30:2 40:20 42:4 push 48:5 raised 59:18 60:11\n 45:1,5,25 46:6 prerequisite 16:5 47:13,15 59:24 put 8:10 18:8 49:11 60:12 69:8 74:13\n 59:21,24 60:2 prescribe 45:22 63:2,5 64:6,23,24 55:1 64:9,10 raises 62:25\n 61:1 62:8 63:8 prescribed 45:23 64:24 69:17,18,20 75:19 77:5 79:16 range 21:17\n 71:4,11 72:7 present 57:1 72:8,19 84:12 85:8 90:18 ratio 87:6\n 73:16,19 presented 87:4,5 programs 28:18,21 90:18 reached 65:8\npollution 28:20 presents 29:18 28:22 29:6 42:5 putting 51:16 read 42:11,12\n 29:25 41:20 37:23 39:23 prohibited 43:23 50:12 71:18 73:4\npopulation 50:5 presuming 34:25 44:2 Q 73:9,10 79:2,13\nposed 48:2 pretty 13:23 18:1 projected 30:3 49:4 quality 28:22 40:19 reading 11:20,23\nposes 6:12 24:7 projection 49:15 40:20 12:5 25:23 41:13\npositing 62:10 primarily 85:6 promulgated 27:6 quantifiable 31:25 42:23 44:22 71:15\nposition 21:14 26:7 principle 55:22 86:24 quantified 84:15 79:2\n 27:21 33:16 46:18 56:4 proper 9:20 10:9 quantify 64:12,13 ready 83:19\n 68:3 70:5 81:13 principles 89:1 10:11,16,19,21 64:18,19 84:6 real 18:4\n 85:15 90:12 printz 10:10 40:16 59:19 83:6 quantifying 64:20 really 23:6,8,11\npossibility 36:8 problem 13:2,3,6 proportion 63:1 quantity 84:8 31:2 34:21 37:7,8\n 46:21 48:1 18:7 19:7,13,19 propose 30:9 quest 9:15 48:4 58:18 64:8\npostacid 72:5 36:23 37:1,4 46:7 proposed 45:19 question 14:2 24:14 68:20 72:15 84:2\npostclean 72:4 46:8 48:8 60:19 77:5 78:1,2 79:22 30:14,15 34:3 86:8 87:10\npotential 29:25 60:19 69:7,9 80:16 81:10 89:8 35:19,20 38:17 reason 4:20 18:1,8\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[102] " Official\n Page 102\n\n 19:20 23:21 24:6 regime 17:22 18:1 41:18 42:4,5 62:15 63:8 64:11 41:5 42:6,15,25\n 24:11 40:14 45:13 18:3 32:1 37:15 44:12 65:2 67:11 67:6 69:4,22 43:15 44:6 45:3\n 46:24 48:22 54:15 38:13 52:19 69:13 70:13 78:25 74:21 75:16 85:23 55:18 59:11,17\n 64:19 67:10 registration 16:5 86:1 89:6 respond 34:3 59:14 60:14,17 61:4,8\nreasonable 37:5 regulate 4:13,17,17 reiterating 20:17 responded 20:13 61:11,14,17,23\n 74:9,16 85:21,22 4:18,20 6:10,14 rejected 62:12 59:11 62:19,24 63:5,13\nreasonably 14:22 6:15,23 7:4,10,14 related 31:15 47:25 respondents 2:11 63:16,19,25 68:13\n 44:17 8:4 9:9,10,10,12 83:8 2:14,16 3:8,11,14 70:20 80:5,19,22\nreasoned 13:6 14:3 15:1,21 17:3 relative 89:16 28:7 41:7 57:10 81:5 86:14 91:6\n 19:17 26:5 18:13,20 20:2 relevance 40:15 70:23 role 10:19\nreasons 41:12 27:24 31:22 37:14 41:1 response 51:19 room 22:19\n 57:25 64:22 38:12 41:19 43:12 relevant 7:10 14:4 60:6 roughly 25:20\nrebuttal 3:15 28:1 45:7 56:6,9 59:22 19:16 21:6 23:22 responses 10:8 rubric 71:24 72:2,4\n 86:18 59:23 60:1 61:1 38:19 89:5 rest 18:19 53:5 rule 5:24 6:8 9:6\nrecall 36:11 55:25 62:23 63:20,20,22 relied 5:9 rested 56:18 12:7 23:3 25:10\nrecognize 82:14 68:5 71:3 72:3,25 rely 16:9 restrictions 60:3 38:1 43:6 44:7\nrecognized 10:10 74:4 86:12 relying 24:1 result 14:23 19:24 52:23,24 53:1\n 74:15 regulated 18:21 remain 8:21 30:3 37:22 46:22 55:23 75:3 77:9\nrecord 25:18,23 28:16 30:10 40:19 remaining 21:2 52:12 82:20 79:22 82:19 84:15\n 36:11 55:19,19 45:1 65:21 76:21 36:3 86:17 results 15:3,23,24 86:24 90:5\n 71:19 80:7,13 regulating 50:17 remains 19:8 16:13,20 17:5 rulemaking 31:12\n 81:7 61:20 62:3,3,15 remedy 5:2 35:21 48:20 31:16 33:11 34:6\nrecurring 83:10 63:6,9 64:17 remember 63:13 retrofit 28:20 34:10 35:8 78:1,8\nred 62:25 83:21 86:2 87:13 90:15 return 20:21 89:1 78:9 79:22 80:16\nredress 5:2 87:16 renovating 21:24 revenues 52:2,3,4,6 90:8,8\nreduce 8:10 32:21 regulation 6:22 repeatedly 10:24 52:10 run 60:3 61:9 62:2\n 76:7,7 8:11 15:2,22 reply 5:20,21 6:1 revised 40:21 62:10,22\nreduced 82:9 84:20 28:12 29:9,13,14 12:3 59:7 right 10:5 13:12\nreduction 47:16 29:15,18 30:8,9 report 75:22 17:15 21:15 27:16 S\n 84:19 31:17,18,20 32:3 require 13:19,21 27:20 33:1 37:20 s 3:1 4:1 9:18\nreductions 30:1,3 35:12,24,24 36:2 24:7 34:25 39:17 38:2,15 42:25 safe 29:22\nredundancy 10:4 37:22 39:19,20 71:22 49:8,23 50:19,19 safely 11:16\nrefer 50:14 71:16 41:21 42:1,16 required 12:20 51:12 52:8,15 salient 17:9,10\n 79:18,20 43:3 44:5,11 46:4 13:18,20 30:1 55:12,13 56:4,13 save 82:8 85:9\nreference 80:12 46:15,16 56:7 44:24 62:14 71:2 56:14,18 57:8,17 saving 85:12\nreferring 5:18 84:5 59:20 60:2,5 64:2 78:24 58:24 62:19 66:3 saw 72:9\nrefers 21:8 71:22 74:1,9 requirement 13:23 67:8 70:18 72:20 saying 7:17,19,22\nreflect 83:25 76:20 86:4 88:6,8 54:14,17 58:14 77:4,21 78:10,22 10:19 11:1 12:15\nreflected 47:17 88:17 requirements 80:21 90:15,20,23 24:22 26:23 34:21\nreflects 42:3 46:2 regulations 8:22 20:13 56:11 58:9 risk 29:19 31:23,25 43:4,6 49:17\n 46:19 35:9 46:8 49:4,10 75:25 76:8 37:15,23 39:23 50:22 56:12,13\nregard 66:16,21 68:9,14 76:16 requires 15:25 riskbased 19:1 75:18 76:5 82:2\nregarding 28:11 regulatory 1:11 19:14 34:10 risks 40:24 83:10 88:18 89:25\n 40:15 20:13 27:4 31:6,7 reserve 28:1 road 19:10 90:3,25\nregardless 8:2 32:1 37:15 39:13 respect 33:14,15 roberts 4:3 28:2 says 6:9 10:1 11:14\n 37:20 72:25 40:3,12,13,24 34:7 35:8 53:7,8 37:25 38:4,6 41:3 14:6,25 15:15,16\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[103] " Official\n Page 103\n\n 15:20,21 22:19 sense 21:2 26:6 simply 14:20 18:25 87:22,24 89:7,11 26:24 27:7,10,15\n 23:4 31:19 37:17 41:24 58:5 75:7 27:7 71:21 74:2,4 89:15,19 90:3,7 27:16,19 29:11\n 43:1 46:2,3 50:19 sentence 53:17,24 86:12 sound 41:25 31:13 32:9,15\n 53:17,25 55:5 54:1 55:5 66:2 single 6:12 29:9 sounds 36:19 33:17 34:23 35:15\n 56:6 68:5 80:8,10 separate 9:23 19:21 73:18 83:7,7 source 17:16 20:19 35:16 37:19 38:23\n 80:23 88:8 20:1 24:10,11,13 situated 44:25 26:19,24,25 28:16 39:6,7 40:20\nscalia 5:15,21 6:6 27:3 45:16 54:23 situation 23:6 24:5 32:6,18 34:19 41:23 44:13 45:10\n 10:14 14:5,15 55:17 65:10 74:18 24:9 51:22 52:21 36:4 37:18,19 50:12 54:5,11\n 16:12,15,19 25:3 75:3 78:6 79:8 53:12 54:18,19 38:13,14 41:20 57:16 58:2 67:23\n 25:6,13 27:9,14 90:21 56:24,24 57:2 44:25 45:4,25 69:19 74:8,8,16\n 27:18,23 32:7,21 separated 10:15 83:19 46:4 50:13 51:4 74:20 75:6,15\n 32:23 33:4 54:4 separately 73:4 sizes 23:6 55:8,11 60:21 82:1 83:20 87:7\n 54:10 56:12,17 separating 75:5 smith 2:15 3:13 61:1 64:24 67:13 88:15\n 58:7,12,17 66:14 serious 23:13 41:1 70:21,22,24 72:17 69:19 73:19 79:18 standardsetting\n 66:23 67:1,2,8,18 86:9 72:22 73:3,6,8,12 79:19 85:24 32:19 44:14 69:14\n 67:21 70:2,14,17 set 19:10 33:14,22 75:9,12 76:2,9,14 sources 8:8 17:12 started 74:25\n 72:12,20 73:1,5,7 34:22 44:13 45:9 76:23 77:1,4,15 19:1,2,25 23:6 starts 9:25\n 73:10 75:24 76:5 50:11 68:15 76:10 77:21,25 78:11,19 26:18 33:14,15 state 2:9 3:4,17 4:9\n 76:13 82:7,11,24 79:7 79:5,11,19 80:15 45:14 46:23 47:9 10:12 13:4 14:18\n 83:2 88:18,24 sets 4:15 80:21 81:1,8,16 47:12 48:12 60:22 19:15 83:22 86:19\nscenario 37:9 setting 39:6 41:23 81:21 82:4,10,13 62:16 69:23 75:16 states 1:1 2:5 10:10\nschedule 48:7 58:1 67:10 90:9 83:1,4,12 84:3,8 76:20 81:4 23:8 28:25 83:20\nscheme 45:12 47:5 severe 9:2 84:14 85:19 86:15 speaks 5:17 stating 56:4\nsecond 17:2 24:10 severity 9:2,3,5 solely 16:8 42:1 special 34:11 78:6 statute 11:13 12:5\n 28:13 41:16 49:14 sg 36:24 37:7 79:14 80:18 90:16 12:16 18:20 21:8\n 49:25 73:18 78:12 sgs 78:23 solicitor 2:8,12 specific 30:8 39:18 23:4 26:10 31:3\n 78:24 81:17,20 shouldnt 10:3 solve 18:7 46:8 specifically 20:24 32:2 42:12,23\nsecondly 58:6 61:20 66:19 solved 84:2 spent 82:17 46:1,3 51:8 57:20\nsection 4:14 6:11 showed 29:20 somebody 80:8 spewed 86:5 59:10 77:16 79:1\n 14:3 15:2 30:10 shows 23:24 27:7 someplace 11:8 stage 32:18,19 36:7 79:2,3,14 85:23\n 31:12,20 34:8 29:2 30:5 soon 27:24 52:15 40:1 42:14 44:3 85:23,25 88:8\n 37:16 41:10,17 side 22:19 24:25 sorry 6:2 8:6 14:19 44:17 49:13,14 statutes 17:9\n 44:5,11 45:1,9 25:19 58:19 63:23 46:10 47:2 53:20 57:10 65:1,2 statutory 12:1,7\n 53:14 54:2 56:7,9 sides 58:23 53:20 89:7 73:18,22 74:5 30:12 39:5 41:13\n 58:1 60:25 62:14 signal 12:10 sort 60:3 63:14 78:24 85:18,21 42:9 44:20,22\n 68:5,6 74:1 significance 40:25 65:22 87:20 45:12 47:5\nsee 11:13 18:5,6,6 significant 18:11 sotomayor 6:2 7:16 standard 26:25 steamgenerating\n 20:4,12 22:17 28:25 48:15 8:6,23 10:22 27:8 33:15,20,21 14:23\n 36:15,23 37:7 silence 13:10,11,13 11:12,22 14:19 33:23 34:8,25 step 9:13,17 13:4\n 46:23 49:23 50:21 13:18,22 15:16,20 16:3,11 40:16,20 48:12 16:4,5 17:2 81:14\n 69:23,25 73:5 silent 13:25 22:1 26:11,13 50:18 54:8,25 81:17,18,20\n 77:25 79:24 82:7 silly 73:10 33:18 34:15 35:10 58:1 64:24 67:9 steps 88:4\nsegment 54:19,20 similar 18:20 50:13 35:18 49:6 52:6 67:11 71:6,13 stop 17:4\n 58:5 51:4 55:8,10 57:3,7,8 65:3,6,14 74:2 87:16,20,21 strategies 35:23\nsegments 30:17 similarly 10:3 65:16,20 80:3 standards 8:24 46:9\nselfdefined 11:2 simplify 57:3 84:3,12 87:3,9,15 21:9 26:14,16,17 strenuously 83:21\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[104] " Official\n Page 104\n\nstrikes 43:21,24 sufficiently 8:11,16talked 28:18 39:21 25:9 26:9 27:12 thing 15:25 20:18\nstringent 55:6 72:24 talking 26:20 52:2 27:21,23 30:18 36:19 38:25 43:19\nstructure 4:14 31:2 suggest 16:22 81:6 86:23 90:7 31:24 33:4,4 35:4 50:12 56:23 63:7\n 41:17 suggests 48:24 talks 53:24 35:7,12 36:9 37:6 64:1 73:13,22\nstudied 16:9 sulfur 85:6,10 targeted 28:21 38:3,5,9,15 39:16 76:14 80:9 81:18\nstudy 8:1,20,20 superfluity 10:4 targeting 20:24 40:5,5 42:23 83:4 84:18 87:13\n 11:15,16 14:19,20 supplement 28:11 tech 66:9 43:18 45:15 47:4 things 7:7 16:8\n 14:21,24 15:4,5 supply 79:21 technologies 5:2,7 48:12 49:7 50:6 22:14 26:14 46:12\n 15:10,15,15,17,19 support 2:11 3:8 7:19,20 66:10 50:17,19 51:13,16 48:21 50:15 54:13\n 15:23,24,25 16:9 28:7 72:3 82:6 51:17 54:6 55:9 71:20 76:10 84:14\n 16:13,20,24 17:4 suppose 22:20 24:8 technology 8:9,16 55:14,16 57:17 84:16\n 17:5 31:19 35:21 37:25 50:8 21:19 23:8 28:20 59:19,19 60:1,10 think 5:23 10:7\n 35:22 44:23 46:12 supposed 13:5 37:19 39:6 54:22 61:2 64:10 66:19 11:4 12:12,22,23\n 48:6,7,8,20,21 15:14 16:25 17:1 68:24 85:4 89:17 67:18 69:2,16 13:8,25 14:8,12\n 54:12 69:25 73:14 73:14 89:21 90:9 70:18 72:9 73:8 14:14,17 16:8\nstudying 16:6 supreme 1:1 2:5 technologyforcing 75:16 77:1 78:25 17:21 23:19 24:17\nstuff 16:23 90:17 80:9 52:23 79:5,11,13,14 25:13 26:2,21\nsubcategories 33:7 sure 4:23 6:4 14:5 tell 15:11 17:21 81:3 82:11 83:14 28:24 29:12 37:1\n 33:22 34:24 53:14 15:10 16:3,19 34:18 47:24 65:3 85:10,21 86:24 39:11,12,16 42:11\n 53:17 54:2,5,23 45:3 58:24 65:8 77:6,12 85:11 87:22 88:7,12,12 42:17,19 43:1,9\n 59:4 65:25 66:2 surplusage 12:2 89:21 88:25 90:4,15 43:10,17 44:1,19\n 68:15,21 77:14,24 surprisingly 79:2 telling 36:24 theirs 27:23 46:25 48:17,23,25\nsubcategorization surrogates 62:3,3 tells 13:25 15:10 theoretical 51:23 49:5,6,9,17,24,25\n 31:15 32:20 33:12 switch 54:18 tendency 53:11 theory 22:25 58:21 56:20 57:24 60:9\n 36:8,12 38:22 system 20:9 79:13 tenton 18:25 theres 6:16 7:4 60:23 62:25 64:8\n 66:8 86:22,25 79:14,17 81:3,3 term 6:25 7:5,7 10:7 13:18 14:18 64:10,14 66:4,4,5\nsubcategorize 10:24 39:12 43:1 16:24 22:8,19 66:6,8 67:3,5,10\n 34:19,20 37:21 T 48:14 29:13,14,15 31:23 68:2,22,23,25\nsubcategorized t 3:1,1 terms 4:15 42:20 34:12 37:4,14 69:12,12 70:12\n 33:13 35:6 take 11:7 18:19 54:21,21 60:24 39:2 53:10 54:11 71:7,17 73:11\nsubcategorizes 19:6,7 22:12,17 77:3 60:8 63:1,20 79:3,13 80:3 83:8\n 30:25 23:1,13,16 24:15 test 19:16 64:15 74:4 77:4 85:22 86:12 87:18\nsubcategory 55:17 25:7,20 30:13 text 4:14,15 6:7 80:13,23 86:25 thinking 15:8\n 66:13 77:20 31:11 36:6,7 48:5 41:13 44:20,22 87:13 49:22\nsubclasses 51:5 48:5 50:2,7,11 46:1,3 47:23 48:3 theyll 22:22 23:9 thinks 79:14\nsubject 13:18 27:10 51:8,12,15 52:20 thank 28:2 41:3,4 theyre 7:13 12:1,5 third 28:14 41:24\n 28:25 32:9 48:6 58:4 66:16,17,20 53:22 70:19,20 15:12 16:25 17:1 53:13\nsubmitted 89:16 71:10 81:19 85:17 86:14,20 91:5,6 17:22,22 20:19 thought 7:16,20,23\n 91:7,9 87:5 thats 4:24 5:14,24 24:1,13 27:3,9,15 7:23,24 8:7 10:23\nsubsection 28:13 taken 17:14 22:17 6:24,24 7:7 10:18 35:2,2 36:16 18:3,16 19:6\n 32:5 34:9 35:20 34:14 36:20 37:3 11:2 13:2,12 40:14,25 54:15 20:11,11 26:3,17\n 38:13 74:7 75:8 52:16 68:21 70:5 14:12,12,14,17 83:25 33:5 44:6,7 47:7\nsubstances 64:18 70:10,12 74:5 16:5,14,17,25 theyve 5:11 7:13 48:4 51:10 54:10\nsubtle 66:5 77:12 85:2 18:7 19:4 20:7,24 25:23 34:22 37:3 54:13 58:8 66:15\nsufficient 5:13 takes 82:19 21:5 22:1,3,9,10 88:22 89:4,5,5 77:19 81:12 84:4\n 19:22 talk 15:6,6 52:6,19 23:10 24:11,16 90:1,11 91:3 85:14,14 90:13,14\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[105] " Official\n Page 105\n\nthree 28:10 29:11 56:2 85:3 89:19 undertake 49:3 53:9 54:20 56:25 49:23 86:2,8 87:4\n 41:11 42:7 46:12 try 35:19 36:15 undertakes 34:6 vehicle 64:23 69:18water 35:1,4\n 48:6 51:19 55:5 64:18,19 undisputed 37:1 vehicles 53:8 waterfall 24:1\n 86:7 trying 10:13 17:22 uneconomic 52:13 verrilli 2:12 3:10 waterfalls 22:21\nthreeyear 20:7 17:23,25 18:2 57:1 41:5,6,8 42:11,19 32:14\nthreshold 18:25 20:8,19 37:11 unfold 49:12 43:9,25 44:9,19 way 11:6 12:23\n 38:18 53:5 unfolded 49:11 45:4,18 46:25 13:2 17:12 18:20\ntied 43:5 turn 6:4 65:22 united 1:1 2:5 47:2,21 48:17 18:21,23 21:16,19\nties 19:15 84:24 10:10 23:8 28:25 49:8 51:18,21,25 26:4,25 28:24\ntightened 40:21 turned 8:20 53:9 units 14:24 52:8,18 53:20,23 30:15 33:8,9\ntime 6:9 19:22 27:5 73:23 unknown 30:18 54:6,16 55:12,14 34:22 36:19 37:8\n 27:5 28:1 38:17 turns 74:19 89:3 unsafe 60:23 56:2,15,20 57:6 37:20 43:9 47:16\n 39:25 44:16 49:12 two 4:15 10:7,15 unusual 43:17,21 57:17,24 58:11,13 47:17 49:10 50:2\n 78:13 83:11 88:13 49:21 50:14 52:3 43:24 52:22 59:3,16 60:7,18 52:19 59:10 61:7\n 88:14 52:9 54:23 60:20 upfront 85:25 61:6,10,13,16,22 62:7,23 63:22\ntimes 12:17 71:15,19 72:9 86:10 61:25 62:21 63:4 64:4,9,10 72:10\ntiny 59:25 63:1 75:1 78:2 88:4 upheavals 82:18 63:11,15,18,24 73:4,8,10 76:19\n 84:25 twoanda 52:3 upheld 62:6 64:7 65:5,8,19,23 76:24,25\ntitle 28:19 29:24 type 24:11 26:19,24 uphold 11:23 38:1 66:4,22,24 67:2,9ways 30:21 37:24\n 47:13 26:24 30:8 41:20 55:23 68:1,16,22 70:2 38:20 64:2 90:16\ntold 11:9 12:24 types 23:5 ur 5:24 6:1,5 70:11,15,19 wednesday 2:2\n 46:11 48:8,19,20 typical 27:7 38:13 use 11:5,17 18:23 versus 27:3 wellrecognized\ntons 30:1,4 20:16 25:7 36:17 view 4:12 32:2 62:4\ntop 6:9 50:17 51:13 U 56:21 74:15,17 violate 12:6 went 5:4,5,6 9:3\n 75:20 76:3,17 u 9:18 85:4 violation 14:12 48:21\n 77:7 79:9 uar 31:9 useful 10:18,20 visibility 28:19 weve 13:10,10,11\ntotally 78:11 uarg 59:7 uses 12:16 volume 5:24 6:1,5 13:13 26:22,23\ntoxics 29:4,9 ultimately 33:13 usually 43:19 58:22 34:14 59:25\ntrace 74:3 unambiguous 58:22 81:6 W whats 12:11 21:2,6\ntrade 47:15 60:24 utilities 4:13 18:5,8 wait 18:5 20:12 36:15 47:20 60:6\ntransport 28:20 unambiguously 18:18 20:20,23,24 25:16 65:18 88:11\ntreat 17:11,19 44:20 78:23 22:14 67:1 87:13 want 11:8 13:14 whitman 13:12,16\n 20:19 45:14 46:19 uncertain 40:25 utility 1:11 8:1,20 23:1 24:4,16 52:25\n 46:24 66:12 uncertainty 46:5 8:20 14:23 16:9 25:17,17,17,21 whos 54:8\ntreated 17:12 30:6 49:1,3,16 21:4 37:12 39:1 43:18 william 2:10 3:6\n 71:8 understand 9:21 45:15 49:8 50:18 28:5\ntreating 12:1,4 10:2 26:11,13 V 61:19 71:6 80:22 wonder 64:3\n 27:3 29:12 37:10 43:16 v 1:5,14,22 4:4 84:3 wonderful 78:19\ntreatise 79:15 46:18 58:8 59:3 10:10 wanted 13:19 18:22 wont 50:23,25\ntreatment 19:21 61:5,8 63:25 64:8 vague 26:6 46:20 83:22\n 45:19,22 69:6 67:22 72:15 variety 28:21 31:5 wants 45:14 word 9:25 11:2,5\ntremendous 37:21 understanding 38:20 warrant 35:23 37:2 11:17 12:1,5,9,9\ntriggering 56:11 4:24 8:13 38:7,10 various 81:23 warranted 69:6 12:12 14:15 16:21\ntriggers 33:16,19 understands 11:6 vary 33:21,23,24 washington 2:1,10 49:22 50:13 51:4\ntrue 22:1 23:11 understood 49:1 vast 66:9,11 2:13,15 51:15\n 36:17,20 51:1 67:19 68:11 vastly 14:11 40:4 wasnt 8:11,12 words 9:24 10:15\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[106] " Official\n Page 106\n\n 12:8 23:23 59:23 58:2 77:19 87:19 2010 29:3 31:7 44:5,11 45:1,9\n 71:15 72:10 87:20,21 2011 29:7 49:12 53:14 57:20\nwork 6:19 12:4 2015 2:2 58:1 60:25 62:14\n 30:15 54:7 79:25 Z 206 6:9 64:23 66:2,7 68:5\n 81:6 206a 6:8 68:6 69:25 87:19\n 0\nworked 76:20 226 71:16 7412s 41:17 69:13\nworks 18:6 27:1 000 30:4 50:22 227 71:16 75 22:22 23:7 56:25\n 59:10 61:9 79:3 1 25 2:2 22:20 7607 34:8\nworld 15:8 79:7 28 3:8 78 52:13\n 1 5:24 6:5 13:4 17:7\n 86:11\n 19:3 28:13 30:2,2 3 8\nworry 36:24 50:2\n 31:10,19 34:7,8 3 11:15 37:18 39:6 80 24:7 32:13\n 51:6 80:23\n 34:12 35:20 38:12 30 50:5 63:14,15,16 840 29:5\nwouldnt 36:20\n 39:8 41:11 46:3 84:18 86 3:17\n 47:17 48:11 51:1\n 47:23 50:22 53:14 35 63:22,23 88 52:13\n 52:17 79:10\n 53:23 56:6,6 66:2 35a 53:21\nwrite 36:15 37:6\n 68:5 87:12 88:3 360 52:1 9\nwritten 36:25\n 10 2:6 4:2 29:8 77:7 3year 71:9 9 29:10 30:1 50:4\nwrong 83:6 87:7\n 10year 49:12 59:13 82:8,15,16\n 89:9,12\n 11 91:8 4 83:9 86:25\nwrote 36:19\n 112 6:11 4 3:4 11:14 12:3 90 63:15,16 82:15\n X 11year 78:14 29:8 30:2 40:10 82:15 84:18\nx 1:2,25 9:16 12 21:9 23:3,12,23 63:17,21 83:5 910 64:15\n 24:2,12 35:2,3 40 30:4 83:15 940 64:15\n Y 38:21,21 50:13,17 41 3:11\ny 9:17 51:13 52:23 54:24 46 91:8\nyear 30:1,4 39:23 55:1 58:16 75:20\n 52:2 83:9 76:3,17 77:7,17 5\nyears 11:14 19:10 77:18,19 79:9 5 29:17 30:4 39:23\n 48:6 49:13,14 90:20 40:17 49:13,13\n 61:3 62:12 75:16 120 50:6,21 59:7\n 86:1,7 14 2:6 4:2 50 30:4 36:17,18\nyoull 64:14 1446 1:4 4:4 50:20 52:13 56:25\nyoure 5:20 7:10,19 1447 1:13 500 50:8\n 10:13 11:1,6 1449 1:21 555a 31:9\n 19:17 20:23 21:6 15 61:3 62:12\n 6\n 21:21 24:22 25:18 189 73:19\n 33:24 34:21 35:11 196 6:7 6 29:10 40:10 59:7\n 35:11,13,13 42:7 1960 21:21 59:13,13 82:8,15\n 43:1,4 50:16,20 1990 28:17,17 82:16 83:5 86:25\n 52:2 56:3,3,12,13 48:25 49:11 81:4 60 83:16\n 59:19 63:6 78:22 7\n 2\n 80:8 81:6 87:3,12\n 70 3:14\n 87:24 88:4,5 90:3 2 13:4 40:17 52:11\n 76:12 7412 4:14 19:4\nyouve 6:17 21:2\n 20 24:5 86:1 20:18 31:12 37:16\n 52:16,16 55:1\n 2005 21:18 38:13 41:11 42:3\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
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[1] " Official\n\n 1\n1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES\n\n2 x\n\n3 RICHARD E. GLOSSIP, ET AL., :\n\n4 Petitioners : No. 147955\n\n5 v. :\n\n6 KEVIN J. GROSS, ET AL. :\n\n7 x\n\n8 Washington, D.C.\n\n9 Wednesday, April 29, 2015\n\n10\n\n11 The aboveentitled matter came on for oral\n\n12 argument before the Supreme Court of the United States\n\n13 at 10:15 a.m.\n\n14 APPEARANCES:\n\n15 ROBIN C. KONRAD, ESQ., Phoenix, Ariz.; on behalf of\n\n16 Petitioners.\n\n17 PATRICK R. WYRICK, ESQ., Solicitor General, Oklahoma\n\n18 City, Okla.; on behalf of Respondent.\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[2] " Official\n\n 2\n1 C O N T E N T S\n\n2 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAGE\n\n3 ROBIN C. KONRAD, ESQ.\n\n4 On behalf of the Petitioners 3\n\n5 ORAL ARGUMENT OF\n\n6 PATRICK R. WYRICK, ESQ.\n\n7 On behalf of the Respondents 25\n\n8 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF\n\n9 ROBIN C. KONRAD, ESQ.\n\n10 On behalf of the Petitioners 55\n\n11\n\n12\n\n13\n\n14\n\n15\n\n16\n\n17\n\n18\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[3] " Official\n\n 3\n1 P R O C E E D I N G S\n\n2 (10:15 a.m.)\n\n3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument\n\n4 first this morning in Case 147955, Glossip v. Gross.\n\n5 Ms. Konrad.\n\n6 ORAL ARGUMENT OF ROBIN C. KONRAD\n\n7 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS\n\n8 MS. KONRAD: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it\n\n9 please the Court:\n\n10 Oklahoma chooses to execute our clients with\n\n11 a threedrug formula that includes a paralytic and\n\n12 potassium chloride, drugs that cause intense pain and\n\n13 suffering. The second and third drugs are\n\n14 constitutional only if a prisoner will not feel the pain\n\n15 and be aware of the suffocation caused by those drugs.\n\n16 The district court erred as a matter of law\n\n17 and as a matter of fact when it found that midazolam as\n\n18 the first drug is constitutionally tolerable.\n\n19 JUSTICE SCALIA: Why is that a matter of\n\n20 law? I mean, as I see it, it's just just a fact\n\n21 question, and and the district court found that it \n\n22 it did eliminate the pain. And you're asking us to find\n\n23 that the district court was clearly erroneous in that\n\n24 determination? Do we usually do that kind of thing?\n\n25 MS. KONRAD: Justice Scalia, the there's\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[4] " Official\n\n 4\n1 a question of law and there's a question of fact.\n\n2 JUSTICE SCALIA: What's the question of law?\n\n3 MS. KONRAD: The question of law includes\n\n4 the the fact that the district court found that this\n\n5 threedrug formula was constitutionally tolerable in\n\n6 spite of two facts, the first one being that there is a\n\n7 medical consensus that this drug cannot be used as the\n\n8 sole drug \n\n9 JUSTICE SCALIA: It's a question of fact.\n\n10 That's a question of fact.\n\n11 MS. KONRAD: That \n\n12 JUSTICE SCALIA: You're saying the question\n\n13 of law is that the the district court ignored two\n\n14 facts. Ignoring two facts does not make it a question\n\n15 of law; it's still a question of fact.\n\n16 MS. KONRAD: The if if I can, Justice\n\n17 Scalia, the second point is the question of law also\n\n18 involves that the district court found that this drug\n\n19 creates a greater risk of harm than sodium thiopental,\n\n20 but that it could not quantify. So it found that this\n\n21 drug that creates a greater risk of harm that it could\n\n22 not quantify and it also had before it evidence that\n\n23 this drug is not used for the purpose that which the\n\n24 State intends it to be used.\n\n25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Could you the way\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[5] " Official\n\n 5\n1 I've thought of this and I know that in your brief\n\n2 you think de novo review goes to everything. If I\n\n3 disagree with you, if I think that I have to give\n\n4 deference to the district court's factual finding on how\n\n5 this drug works, the how do you call it the \n\n6 MS. KONRAD: The midazolam.\n\n7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Midazolam, but that it's\n\n8 a legal question of whether how that drug works creates\n\n9 a risk of harm that's constitutionally intolerable. Is\n\n10 that how you divide up the legal end?\n\n11 MS. KONRAD: Yes, Justice Sotomayor, and \n\n12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So the facts are now.\n\n13 Now let's go to my real question, okay? That a judge\n\n14 ignores evidence is not necessarily an abuse of\n\n15 discretion or a clear error. But so what are the\n\n16 clear errors in terms of the reasoning that the district\n\n17 court used?\n\n18 MS. KONRAD: So the clear errors in this\n\n19 case, we have to look at what this case is about. And\n\n20 this case is about known information and undisputed\n\n21 facts that were before the court. This drug, midazolam,\n\n22 is in a different class than barbiturates, this drug is\n\n23 not known, it's not a pain reliever. The district court\n\n24 recognized these two facts at 76 of the Joint Appendix.\n\n25 It's known that this drug has a ceiling\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[6] " Official\n\n 6\n1 effect, so there's a certain point at which giving more\n\n2 of the drug is not going to matter. The district court\n\n3 recognized that at 78. The State's expert recognized\n\n4 that. The Petitioners' experts recognized that.\n\n5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, but what the\n\n6 district court determined is that it was was not able\n\n7 to tell precisely when the ceiling effect kicked in,\n\n8 precisely when they hit the ceiling, right?\n\n9 MS. KONRAD: That is \n\n10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And that that is\n\n11 your theory for when pain is possible, when it hits the\n\n12 ceiling, right?\n\n13 MS. KONRAD: What the district court found,\n\n14 Mr. Chief Justice, is whatever the ceiling effect may\n\n15 be, it takes effect only at the spinal cord and that 500\n\n16 milligrams of midazolam will, quote, \"create a\n\n17 phenomenon which is not anesthesia,\" but effectively\n\n18 paralyzes the brain and eliminates awareness of pain.\n\n19 Now, that finding, we have to we have to\n\n20 look at what undisputed facts were before the court in\n\n21 making that finding to \n\n22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, is it\n\n23 undisputed facts? I thought you had the burden of\n\n24 showing that the determinations were clearly erroneous.\n\n25 So it's certainly not a case where the facts have to be\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[7] " Official\n\n 7\n1 undisputed.\n\n2 MS. KONRAD: And I'm sorry if I misspoke,\n\n3 Mr. Chief Justice. What we have to look at before in\n\n4 order to show why this was a clearly erroneous finding\n\n5 is what the undisputed facts were before the district\n\n6 court in order for it to reach that conclusion.\n\n7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do you even have to go\n\n8 that far? The State here doesn't even propose that\n\n9 their doctor was right on this point.\n\n10 MS. KONRAD: Well, that \n\n11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: They're not defending\n\n12 it, they don't say it's true. They I conceded,\n\n13 as I read their brief, that it does not work the way\n\n14 the doctor said it worked, that it does not paralyze\n\n15 the brain, correct?\n\n16 MS. KONRAD: That is correct, Justice\n\n17 Sotomayor.\n\n18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So it's clear error.\n\n19 Now we've got an admission that the expert\n\n20 was plainly wrong. So how what else, I guess \n\n21 there was nothing else that the district court could\n\n22 have based its conclusion on, correct?\n\n23 MS. KONRAD: That is correct. And and\n\n24 the the district court reached this decision based\n\n25 on no scientific evidence and with a medical consensus\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[8] " Official\n\n 8\n1 to the contrary that this drug is not able to\n\n2 pharmacologically do what the States' expert said that\n\n3 it could in fact do. And that clear error is\n\n4 combined and as the district court said at Joint\n\n5 Appendix 47, that this is partially a mixed question of\n\n6 fact and mixed question of law.\n\n7 JUSTICE KAGAN: Ms. Konrad, can I make sure\n\n8 I understand this because, you know, I read that the\n\n9 part of the opinion that you're referring to and I just\n\n10 really couldn't figure it out.\n\n11 So is it that the court said, well, we don't\n\n12 know what the ceiling effect is generally, but the\n\n13 ceiling effect only goes to how something operates at\n\n14 the spinal cord level, it doesn't go to how it operates\n\n15 at the brain and this and this this takes \n\n16 what we what we care about is how it operates at the\n\n17 brain, so we don't even have to worry about ceiling\n\n18 effect; is that right?\n\n19 MS. KONRAD: That's \n\n20 JUSTICE KAGAN: Is that \n\n21 MS. KONRAD: That is \n\n22 JUSTICE KAGAN: Is that what the court said?\n\n23 MS. KONRAD: Justice Kagan, that is what the\n\n24 district court found based on the testimony of the\n\n25 State's experts that's not supported by any scientific\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[9] " Official\n\n 9\n1 literature, any any medical information and, in fact,\n\n2 is inconsistent with the State's expert's own testimony.\n\n3 Because he testified and explained that the way this\n\n4 drug works is it works throughout the central nervous\n\n5 system. He said \n\n6 JUSTICE KAGAN: So you're saying we do have\n\n7 to worry about the ceiling effect. There isn't this\n\n8 dichotomy between the drug at the spinal cord and the\n\n9 drug at the brain, and the it's actually crucial what\n\n10 kind of ceiling effect this drug has in in\n\n11 contradiction to what the court said, which was we\n\n12 didn't have to worry about ceiling effect. Is that \n\n13 MS. KONRAD: That \n\n14 JUSTICE KAGAN: Is that how it goes?\n\n15 MS. KONRAD: Yes, Justice Kagan. And\n\n16 this \n\n17 JUSTICE ALITO: Did you introduce any\n\n18 evidence to show the dosage at which the ceiling effect\n\n19 would occur?\n\n20 MS. KONRAD: We had testimony from our\n\n21 expert who who indicated that it could be calculated,\n\n22 but it was not calculated. But, Justice Alito, that\n\n23 doesn't matter because what matters is that we know that\n\n24 the drug has a ceiling effect, and that is what matters.\n\n25 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, what if the ceiling\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[10] " Official\n\n 10\n1 effect is 1,000 milligrams?\n\n2 MS. KONRAD: There is no evidence in the\n\n3 record to support that. And in fact \n\n4 JUSTICE ALITO: No. I'm just saying is\n\n5 there any evidence to show that it is any amount below\n\n6 500?\n\n7 MS. KONRAD: It doesn't matter. It\n\n8 doesn't \n\n9 JUSTICE ALITO: Of course it matters.\n\n10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, the one proof we\n\n11 do have is the Wood execution, not the one that was\n\n12 botched, but Mr. Wood was given 750 milligrams, correct?\n\n13 MS. KONRAD: Yes, Justice Sotomayor.\n\n14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And he laid writhing in\n\n15 pain for 20 minutes? 25 minutes? I don't remember how\n\n16 long.\n\n17 MS. KONRAD: Mr. Wood was 2 hours.\n\n18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry, 2 hours.\n\n19 Now, there's been some defense that the 750 wasn't\n\n20 immediately delivered, but it was still 750 that went\n\n21 into his system and caused that kind of pain, correct?\n\n22 MS. KONRAD: Yes. And our expert testified\n\n23 that Mr. Wood's execution demonstrates the ceiling\n\n24 effect; that giving more of this drug is not going to\n\n25 put a prisoner into a deep comalike \n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[11] " Official\n\n 11\n1 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, how many executions\n\n2 have been carried out using this drug?\n\n3 MS. KONRAD: Using midazolam?\n\n4 JUSTICE ALITO: Yes.\n\n5 MS. KONRAD: 15.\n\n6 JUSTICE ALITO: Okay. And you're talking\n\n7 about one.\n\n8 MS. KONRAD: No, we're actually talking of\n\n9 several executions that the execution in this case,\n\n10 in Oklahoma, that happened a year ago of Mr. Lockett\n\n11 demonstrates why midazolam is not a proper drug that can\n\n12 do what the State intends it to do and put a prisoner in\n\n13 a deep comalike unconscious.\n\n14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I thought there were\n\n15 issues of the administration of the drug, you know,\n\n16 the the nature of the veins and so forth. Weren't\n\n17 those present or have I got a different one in mind than\n\n18 the Lockett case?\n\n19 MS. KONRAD: No, Mr. Chief Justice.\n\n20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: No? I'm sorry.\n\n21 \"No\" what? That was not that or were were there\n\n22 issues about I thought there were issues involving\n\n23 the veins and the ability to make an intravenous\n\n24 connection?\n\n25 MS. KONRAD: There were problems with the\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[12] " Official\n\n 12\n1 catheter, but but Mr. Lockett received enough\n\n2 midazolam such that he was unconscious and the doctor \n\n3 the physician executioner found that he was unconscious\n\n4 and then he regained consciousness. And that is the key\n\n5 issue here before this Court, that \n\n6 JUSTICE SCALIA: Not if he didn't not if\n\n7 he didn't receive the proper dosage. So you're saying\n\n8 it's okay that he didn't receive the proper dosage so\n\n9 long as he was unconscious.\n\n10 MS. KONRAD: He \n\n11 JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't I don't see how\n\n12 that follows. I mean, if in fact the execution was not\n\n13 properly conducted, I don't see how you can blame it on\n\n14 the on the drug.\n\n15 MS. KONRAD: What we know about this drug,\n\n16 Justice Scalia, is that it can never maintain the deep\n\n17 comalike unconsciousness that is necessary to prevent\n\n18 a prisoner from feeling the painful effects of the \n\n19 I'm sorry, of the potassium chloride.\n\n20 JUSTICE KAGAN: How do we know that? I\n\n21 thought that what we knew was something different. I\n\n22 thought that what we knew was just what we can't know;\n\n23 in other words, that there's this huge range of\n\n24 uncertainty about what happens when somebody is is\n\n25 given this drug.\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[13] " Official\n\n 13\n1 You're suggesting something more than that,\n\n2 which is that we know what happens, we know that the\n\n3 drug can't maintain deep deep unconsciousness.\n\n4 Which which is right?\n\n5 MS. KONRAD: Justice Kagan, we know because\n\n6 of the pharmacological properties of this drug, the way\n\n7 that that when the drug was being tested and being\n\n8 introduced, it is not used for the sole purpose of\n\n9 preventing somebody from feeling pain during a painful\n\n10 procedure.\n\n11 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, I thought it wasn't\n\n12 used for that purpose just because we don't know whether\n\n13 it's capable of being used for that purpose, as opposed\n\n14 to we know it's incapable of being used for that\n\n15 purpose, if you see the difference.\n\n16 MS. KONRAD: I do see the difference, but I\n\n17 think what's important here is this Court in Baze\n\n18 explained that it's important to reemphasize that a\n\n19 proper dose of sodium thiopental obviates the concern\n\n20 that the prisoner will not be sufficiently sedated.\n\n21 That was the key aspect of Baze. And in \n\n22 JUSTICE ALITO: And why is Oklahoma not\n\n23 using sodium thiopental? Why is it not using that drug?\n\n24 MS. KONRAD: It isn't using it you'll \n\n25 you could ask my friend here, but \n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[14] " Official\n\n 14\n1 JUSTICE ALITO: You don't know?\n\n2 MS. KONRAD: The the finding here is that\n\n3 it was unavailable at that time of the hearing.\n\n4 JUSTICE ALITO: Yes. I mean, let's be\n\n5 honest about what's going on here. Executions could be\n\n6 carried out painlessly. There are many jurisdictions \n\n7 there are jurisdictions in this country, there are\n\n8 jurisdictions abroad that allow assisted suicide, and I\n\n9 assume that those are carried out with little, if any,\n\n10 pain. Oklahoma and other States could carry out\n\n11 executions painlessly.\n\n12 Now, this Court has held that the death\n\n13 penalty is constitutional. It's controversial as a\n\n14 constitutional matter. It certainly is controversial as\n\n15 a policy matter. Those who oppose the death penalty are\n\n16 free to try to persuade legislatures to abolish the\n\n17 death penalty. Some of those efforts have been\n\n18 successful. They're free to ask this Court to overrule\n\n19 the death penalty.\n\n20 But until that occurs, is it appropriate for\n\n21 the judiciary to countenance what amounts to a guerilla\n\n22 war against the death penalty which consists of efforts\n\n23 to make it impossible for the States to obtain drugs\n\n24 that could be used to carry out capital punishment with\n\n25 little, if any, pain? And so the States are reduced to\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[15] " Official\n\n 15\n1 using drugs like this one which give rise to disputes\n\n2 about whether, in fact, every possibility of pain is\n\n3 eliminated.\n\n4 Now, what is your response to that?\n\n5 MS. KONRAD: Well, Justice Alito, the\n\n6 purpose of the courts is to decide whether a method of\n\n7 execution or the way that the State is going to carry\n\n8 out an execution is, in fact, constitutional, and it \n\n9 whether we're going to tolerate is it objectively\n\n10 intolerable to allow the States to carry out a method in\n\n11 this way. And so \n\n12 JUSTICE SCALIA: And I guess I guess I\n\n13 would be more inclined to find that it was intolerable\n\n14 if there was even some doubt about this drug when there\n\n15 was a perfectly safe other drug available. But the\n\n16 States have gone through two different drugs, and those\n\n17 drugs have been rendered unavailable by the abolitionist\n\n18 movement putting pressure on the companies that\n\n19 manufacture them so that the States cannot obtain those\n\n20 two other drugs.\n\n21 And now you want to come before the Court\n\n22 and say, well, this third drug is not 100 percent sure.\n\n23 The reason it isn't 100 percent sure is because the\n\n24 abolitionists have rendered it impossible to get the\n\n25 100 percent sure drugs, and you think we should not view\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[16] " Official\n\n 16\n1 that as as relevant to the decision that that\n\n2 you're putting before us?\n\n3 MS. KONRAD: Justice Scalia, I don't think\n\n4 that it's relevant to the decision as to what's\n\n5 available because what this Court needs to look at is\n\n6 whether the drug that the State is intending to use to\n\n7 cause what they say is a put the prisoner in a in\n\n8 a place where he will not feel pain, that that drug is\n\n9 good enough. This drug is anything \n\n10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counselor, I \n\n11 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Is any State is any\n\n12 State using a lethal injection protocol without this\n\n13 questionable drug? We know that two are not available.\n\n14 Is there another combination that has been used by\n\n15 States that doesn't involve this questionable drug?\n\n16 MS. KONRAD: Yes, Justice Ginsburg. And, in\n\n17 fact, there have been 11 executions using pentobarbital\n\n18 just this year by other States.\n\n19 JUSTICE SCALIA: But is that \n\n20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: That doesn't answer\n\n21 Justice Scalia's and Justice Alito's question. The\n\n22 question is: What bearing, if any, should we put on the\n\n23 fact that there is a method, but that it's not available\n\n24 because of because of opposition to the death\n\n25 penalty? What relevance does that have? None?\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[17] " Official\n\n 17\n1 MS. KONRAD: Justice Kennedy, the fact that\n\n2 the State chooses a certain method should not should\n\n3 not have bearing on whether that method is\n\n4 constitutional.\n\n5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Counsel, if there is\n\n6 no \n\n7 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I I would like an\n\n8 answer to the question. You've been interrupted several\n\n9 times, and you still haven't given is it relevant or\n\n10 not?\n\n11 MS. KONRAD: No. It's not relevant. The\n\n12 availability of another \n\n13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: There are other ways to\n\n14 kill people regrettably.\n\n15 MS. KONRAD: There are, Justice Sotomayor.\n\n16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That are painless. It\n\n17 doesn't have to be a drug protocol that we elect that\n\n18 has a substantial risk of burning a person alive who's\n\n19 paralyzed, correct?\n\n20 MS. KONRAD: That is correct, Justice\n\n21 Sotomayor.\n\n22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I know that you'll get\n\n23 up and argue that those other ways are are not\n\n24 constitutional either potentially, but people do that\n\n25 with every protocol. But the little bit of research\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[18] " Official\n\n 18\n1 I've done has shown that the reason people don't use the\n\n2 other methods it's because it offends them to look at\n\n3 them. Like you could use gas, that renders people not\n\n4 even knowing that they're going to sleep to die. And\n\n5 people probably don't want to use that protocol because\n\n6 of what happened during World War II. But there are\n\n7 alternatives. Oklahoma has found some. It's it can\n\n8 use the a firing squad now.\n\n9 So I don't know what the absence of a drug,\n\n10 what pertinence it has when alternatives exist.\n\n11 MS. KONRAD: I would agree, Justice\n\n12 Sotomayor, that \n\n13 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Doesn't doesn't a\n\n14 firing squad cause pain?\n\n15 MS. KONRAD: Justice Ginsburg, we don't\n\n16 know we don't know how, if the State chose to carry\n\n17 out an execution by firing squad, whether, in fact, it\n\n18 would cause rise to the level of unconstitutional\n\n19 pain and suffering under the Eighth Amendment.\n\n20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, you don't\n\n21 know. Do you have a guess? I mean, is there a reason\n\n22 that the States moved progressively to what I understand\n\n23 to be more humane methods of execution? Hanging, firing\n\n24 squad, electric chair, death you know, gas chamber?\n\n25 MS. KONRAD: Yes.\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[19] " Official\n\n 19\n1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And and you're\n\n2 not suggesting that those other methods are preferable\n\n3 to the method in this case, are you?\n\n4 MS. KONRAD: I'm not suggesting that, Mr.\n\n5 Chief Justice, but the reason why States moved to more\n\n6 humane methods is, as we learn more, and as we learn\n\n7 more about science, and develop, then, as a society, we\n\n8 move forward. We have evolving standards of decency.\n\n9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But you have no\n\n10 suggestion as what to what would be an acceptable\n\n11 alternative to what you propose right now for Oklahoma.\n\n12 Do you have any I mean, the case comes to us in a\n\n13 posture where it's recognized that your client is guilty\n\n14 of a capital offense, it's recognized that your client\n\n15 is eligible for the death penalty, that that has been\n\n16 duly imposed. And yet you put us in a position with\n\n17 your argument that he can't be executed, even though he\n\n18 satisfies all of those requirements.\n\n19 MS. KONRAD: I would \n\n20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And you have no\n\n21 suggested alternative that is more humane.\n\n22 MS. KONRAD: I would actually disagree with\n\n23 the characterization that it's that he can't be\n\n24 executed. Oklahoma has just passed a new statute, and\n\n25 they are continuously looking for methods and ways to \n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[20] " Official\n\n 20\n1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What does the new\n\n2 statute provide?\n\n3 MS. KONRAD: The new statute provides that\n\n4 if the lethal injection protocol is found\n\n5 unconstitutional, or drugs are unavailable, then they\n\n6 can go to other methods.\n\n7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: What other method?\n\n8 MS. KONRAD: They go to nitrogen gas, and\n\n9 then go to \n\n10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And are you\n\n11 suggesting that that's okay with you?\n\n12 MS. KONRAD: I'm not I don't know\n\n13 anything about that protocol. They have not \n\n14 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, what do you\n\n15 think? Do you have an instinct about whether or not the\n\n16 gas chamber is preferable to this lethal injection or\n\n17 not?\n\n18 MS. KONRAD: Mr. Chief Justice, it's hard\n\n19 for me in the abstract to say whether it's preferable.\n\n20 The the legislature has said that this could be a\n\n21 painless method. I don't know they haven't come out\n\n22 with any information about how it will be carried out.\n\n23 JUSTICE BREYER: Suppose it were true \n\n24 JUSTICE SCALIA: If I understand the facts\n\n25 here, your client was already in jail with a life\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[21] " Official\n\n 21\n1 sentence, right, for murder? And while in jail on that\n\n2 life sentence, he stabbed and killed a prison guard, and\n\n3 that's the crime for which Oklahoma is seeking to\n\n4 execute him. That's the facts we have before us, isn't\n\n5 it?\n\n6 MS. KONRAD: One of the Petitioners here\n\n7 before the Court, but \n\n8 JUSTICE BREYER: Perhaps there is that\n\n9 larger question, that if, in fact, for whatever set of\n\n10 reasons, it's not you, you didn't purposely hide these\n\n11 other kinds of drugs, if there is no method of executing\n\n12 a person that does not cause unacceptable pain, that, in\n\n13 addition to other things, might show that the death\n\n14 penalty is not consistent with the Eighth Amendment. Is\n\n15 that so or not, in your opinion?\n\n16 MS. KONRAD: That that perhaps could be\n\n17 true, Justice Breyer, but the narrow issue \n\n18 JUSTICE ALITO: And is that is that your\n\n19 argument?\n\n20 MS. KONRAD: No.\n\n21 JUSTICE ALITO: You're marking you can\n\n22 make one of two arguments. And one is that the death\n\n23 penalty is unconstitutional because there is no method\n\n24 that has been used in the past or that can be devised\n\n25 that is capable of carrying that sentence out without\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[22] " Official\n\n 22\n1 inflicting some pain, pain that's unacceptable. That's\n\n2 an argument that you can make. But I don't understand\n\n3 you to be making that argument; am I right?\n\n4 MS. KONRAD: You are correct, Justice Alito.\n\n5 JUSTICE ALITO: So you are arguing you\n\n6 want us to reverse a finding of fact of the district\n\n7 court on the ground that it is clearly erroneous. When\n\n8 was the last time we did that?\n\n9 MS. KONRAD: The Court in Comcast in we\n\n10 cited that opinion, it was a few years ago, and\n\n11 explained that where there are clearly clearly\n\n12 erroneous findings. In this case, this is obviously an\n\n13 exceptionally erroneous. Looking at the the findings\n\n14 based on no scientific evidence, no studies, and all of\n\n15 the evidence shows that this drug does not work in the\n\n16 way that the State intended it to work.\n\n17 JUSTICE ALITO: But 500 milligrams is a\n\n18 lethal dose, isn't it?\n\n19 MS. KONRAD: That \n\n20 JUSTICE ALITO: Itself it's capable of\n\n21 causing death; is that right?\n\n22 MS. KONRAD: That, I don't know, Justice\n\n23 Alito, that if the the expert who testified for\n\n24 the State talked about a potential toxic dose, but\n\n25 there's no information of of, yes, this dose will\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[23] " Official\n\n 23\n1 cause death. We don't know that, and that's not \n\n2 JUSTICE ALITO: Well \n\n3 JUSTICE KAGAN: Does the \n\n4 JUSTICE ALITO: isn't there a therapeutic\n\n5 dose is there is it ever administered in that\n\n6 quantity for any therapeutic reason?\n\n7 MS. KONRAD: No, but \n\n8 JUSTICE KAGAN: Does the fact that something\n\n9 is a lethal dose necessarily mean that it's not\n\n10 incredibly painful?\n\n11 MS. KONRAD: No, Justice Kagan, and that's\n\n12 \n\n13 JUSTICE KAGAN: It could be a lethal dose\n\n14 and be incredibly painful.\n\n15 JUSTICE ALITO: No, that but that's not\n\n16 the point. The point is, if it's a lethal dose, or it's\n\n17 potentially a lethal dose, then how are you going to do\n\n18 a study to determine whether, in fact, it renders the\n\n19 person insensate?\n\n20 MS. KONRAD: Justice Alito, you don't need\n\n21 to do a study in this case because we already know from\n\n22 science and the pharmacology of the drug, how the drug\n\n23 works. And so that's what the district court got wrong,\n\n24 and there's clear error here.\n\n25 JUSTICE BREYER: Is it now let's get to\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[24] " Official\n\n 24\n1 that I'd like to get \n\n2 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, maybe to the extent\n\n3 that you can't \n\n4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Kagan, I\n\n5 think it's your turn.\n\n6 JUSTICE KAGAN: Please, go ahead.\n\n7 JUSTICE BREYER: I'd just like since\n\n8 we're on the narrow question. The narrow question that\n\n9 you want to present, I would like to hear the argument.\n\n10 As far as I know, we held in Baze in this context that\n\n11 if a person is not rendered unconscious where the other\n\n12 two drugs come in, there is a constitutionally\n\n13 unacceptable risk of suffocation and pain. That's the\n\n14 holding.\n\n15 And in this case, the court of appeals says\n\n16 that the district court found that this drug that you're\n\n17 talking about, midazolam, will result in central nervous\n\n18 depression, rendering the person unconscious and\n\n19 insensate during the rest of the procedure, a sufficient\n\n20 level of unconsciousness to resist the major stimuli of\n\n21 the later two drugs. That's his finding.\n\n22 You had an expert testify that that is not\n\n23 the case. That expert said that I'm citing an\n\n24 article. He said that it would not reliably put the\n\n25 person in a coma. Isn't that what he said?\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[25] " Official\n\n 25\n1 MS. KONRAD: That is correct, Justice\n\n2 Breyer.\n\n3 JUSTICE BREYER: All right. Then the other\n\n4 side produced the expert which just said the contrary.\n\n5 All right. So you have to say that that conclusion,\n\n6 namely, quote, the 500 milligrams will be at a will\n\n7 make it a virtual certainty that he will be at a\n\n8 sufficient level of unconsciousness to resist the\n\n9 stimuli of the other two drugs. So I'm sorry, you\n\n10 don't I've run out of your time. Maybe I'll ask the\n\n11 other side the same question. I want to know what\n\n12 underlies that sufficient to make you say, clearly\n\n13 wrong. But the other side is just as good to ask that\n\n14 question. And I want you to reserve your time.\n\n15 MS. KONRAD: Okay.\n\n16 JUSTICE BREYER: Okay.\n\n17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Wyrick.\n\n18 MR. WYRICK: That's better.\n\n19 JUSTICE SCALIA: You could ask me, maybe.\n\n20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Wyrick.\n\n21 ORAL ARGUMENT OF PATRICK R. WYRICK\n\n22 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS\n\n23 MR. WYRICK: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it\n\n24 please the Court:\n\n25 The district court found, as a matter of\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[26] " Official\n\n 26\n1 fact, that a 500milligram dose of midazolam would, with\n\n2 near certainty, render these Petitioners unconscious and\n\n3 unable to feel pain. Now, regardless of our other\n\n4 disagreements about proper legal standards, all parties\n\n5 agree that Petitioners bear the threshold burden of\n\n6 establishing that there is a substantial or objectively\n\n7 intolerable risk that they will feel the pain from the\n\n8 second and third drugs.\n\n9 Unless that finding of fact, a finding of\n\n10 fact affirmed by the court of appeals, mirrored by three\n\n11 other trial courts in Florida, affirmed by three other\n\n12 appeals courts in Florida, is set aside, they cannot\n\n13 satisfy that threshold burden. Now \n\n14 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Wyrick, as as I\n\n15 understand it, there were three subsidiary findings that\n\n16 underlay this conclusion.\n\n17 The first is the one that we talked a little\n\n18 bit about with Ms. Konrad, which has to do with the\n\n19 ceiling effect, which, as I understand it you, don't at\n\n20 all defend.\n\n21 The second is the idea that 500 milligrams\n\n22 of this drug would likely kill a patient in 30 minutes\n\n23 or an hour, which seems to me irrelevant given that a\n\n24 lethal dose is completely consistent with unbearable\n\n25 pain.\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[27] " Official\n\n 27\n1 And the third is that that dose of midazolam\n\n2 would keep a patient unconscious while a needle is\n\n3 inserted into his thigh, which also seems irrelevant\n\n4 given the what everybody understands to be the much,\n\n5 much, much greater potential for pain of potassium\n\n6 chloride.\n\n7 So those were the three subsidiary findings.\n\n8 One of them nobody thinks is anything other than\n\n9 gobbledygook, and the other two are irrelevant. Is that\n\n10 not the case?\n\n11 MR. WYRICK: Well, I'm going to take those\n\n12 in reverse order. I I think the third actually is\n\n13 relevant. These Petitioners, in their amended\n\n14 complaint, at paragraph 139, described the setting of a\n\n15 femoral IV as an invasive surgical procedure involving\n\n16 not just pain, great pain. That's how they described\n\n17 it.\n\n18 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, it does not sound\n\n19 pleasant to have a needle put in your thigh. But when\n\n20 you read these descriptions of what midazolam does, that\n\n21 it gives the feeling of being burned alive, it sounds\n\n22 really considerably more than having a needle put in\n\n23 your thigh.\n\n24 MR. WYRICK: And and this is what I want\n\n25 to clarify as to your first point. Midazolam itself,\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[28] " Official\n\n 28\n1 there is no evidence and no one no one argues that it\n\n2 causes any pain upon upon injection. It is a\n\n3 sedative hypnotic. It is the second and third drug \n\n4 JUSTICE KAGAN: No, no, no. I'm sorry.\n\n5 Potassium chloride.\n\n6 MR. WYRICK: it's talking about. So, you\n\n7 know, earlier some of the questions you said about\n\n8 whether this is lethal or not is irrelevant because it\n\n9 would involve great pain, no, a lethal dose of\n\n10 midazolam would not cause pain. It it just not \n\n11 JUSTICE KAGAN: No, no, no.\n\n12 MR. WYRICK: It's a central \n\n13 JUSTICE KAGAN: There's \n\n14 MR. WYRICK: nervous system \n\n15 JUSTICE KAGAN: No, no, no. That's not \n\n16 that's not the point. It's a lethal dose of\n\n17 potassium of midazolam, it will take 30 minutes to\n\n18 die. In the meantime, the potassium chloride can be\n\n19 wreaking extraordinary pain on the individual. So in\n\n20 that sense, the fact that this is a lethal dose of\n\n21 midazolam has nothing to do with the question that is\n\n22 before us, whether, before that 30 minutes or hour\n\n23 passes, the potassium chloride is wreaking unbearable\n\n24 pain on the individual.\n\n25 MR. WYRICK: The question before the Court\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[29] " Official\n\n 29\n1 is whether the district court's factual finding that\n\n2 they would be unconscious and insensate is clearly\n\n3 erroneous.\n\n4 And on that point, let's look at the record\n\n5 case that these Petitioners put on before the district\n\n6 court. They said that there were three reasons why\n\n7 midazolam was inappropriate.\n\n8 They said paradoxical reactions. Those have\n\n9 disappeared from the case. You won't even see those in\n\n10 the reply brief. We pointed out that they're\n\n11 extraordinarily rare, and to the extent that they\n\n12 happen, trained medical our trained medical staff\n\n13 would catch those and never call the person unconscious.\n\n14 Secondly, they said lack of lack of\n\n15 analgesia. We pointed out sodium thiopental and\n\n16 pentobarbital, those weren't analgesics either. That's\n\n17 never been relevant to the question because the question\n\n18 is, does the drug render them unconscious and insensate.\n\n19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Would any doctor would\n\n20 any doctor \n\n21 JUSTICE KAGAN: They are pain relief\n\n22 medications.\n\n23 JUSTICE SCALIA: What what's the third\n\n24 point you had? I I was anxious to hear your third\n\n25 point.\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[30] " Official\n\n 30\n1 JUSTICE KENNEDY: As was I.\n\n2 MR. WYRICK: In response to Justice Kagan's\n\n3 question?\n\n4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Yes.\n\n5 MR. WYRICK: Yes. Your I forget now your\n\n6 second point, your the second factual finding or\n\n7 second underpinning \n\n8 JUSTICE KAGAN: You know \n\n9 MR. WYRICK: which was a factual\n\n10 finding \n\n11 JUSTICE KAGAN: There is \n\n12 MR. WYRICK: but \n\n13 JUSTICE KAGAN: There is the fact that this\n\n14 is a lethal dose, again, completely consistent with the\n\n15 possibility of potassium chloride causing great pain.\n\n16 There is the fact that it rendered it keeps a patient\n\n17 unconscious with a needle, completely consistent with it\n\n18 not keeping a patient unconscious with potassium\n\n19 chloride running through his body, and, again, this \n\n20 this statement that nobody can figure out about the\n\n21 ceilingeffect.\n\n22 MR. WYRICK: Right. And it's the ceiling\n\n23 effect that I want to focus on, because the what the\n\n24 district court said is whatever the ceiling effect may\n\n25 be, what we're concerned about is whether this can keep\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[31] " Official\n\n 31\n1 someone unconscious and unaware of pain. And what he\n\n2 talked about that's the phenomenon that's not\n\n3 anesthesia, what he was referring to is their expert,\n\n4 Dr. Lubarsky, he said in the medical sense, to have true\n\n5 anesthesia, you have to have unconsciousness, inability\n\n6 to feel pain and immobility.\n\n7 Our district court was saying, well, what we\n\n8 care about with midazolam is it will it render them\n\n9 unconscious and unable to feel pain. Under their\n\n10 expert's definition, they may not that may not be\n\n11 anesthesia in the medical sense, but it's the\n\n12 constitutionally relevant question.\n\n13 JUSTICE GINSBURG: What do we do with this\n\n14 brief of the pharmacology professors that state, flat\n\n15 out, midazolam cannot induce comalike unconsciousness?\n\n16 MR. WYRICK: They actually go further and\n\n17 say, you know, in several respects that it can induce\n\n18 unconsciousness, and that's something that no one agrees\n\n19 with. Even the FDA label indicates that induction of\n\n20 anesthesia is a commonly accepted use.\n\n21 JUSTICE BREYER: Can I can I ask \n\n22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: What what's the \n\n23 JUSTICE BREYER: the same question, which\n\n24 is I I've had this one question, and that is, as I\n\n25 read this record you remember what I said was the\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[32] " Official\n\n 32\n1 standard from Baze. You remember what I said was the\n\n2 district court's finding. You remember that I believe\n\n3 that what this is about is whether that finding is\n\n4 clearly erroneous. And what I have are two sentences.\n\n5 The first sentence is from their expert.\n\n6 And he, quote, when you could be unconscious, he means\n\n7 that this drug, midazolam, is an antianxiety drug, like\n\n8 Xanax. People use it to go to sleep every night, and it\n\n9 can render you unconscious and not reacting to minor\n\n10 stimuli. That's their expert.\n\n11 But when major stimuli such as the\n\n12 introduction of the next two drugs that we're talking\n\n13 about here come into play, you are jolted into\n\n14 consciousness, and you are quite aware, and you wake up.\n\n15 Now, if we stop there, you'd lose, right?\n\n16 MR. WYRICK: If any of that were \n\n17 JUSTICE BREYER: If we stop there.\n\n18 MR. WYRICK: If any of that were supported\n\n19 by the medical literature.\n\n20 JUSTICE BREYER: But he pointed to he\n\n21 pointed to two articles. He based that statement but\n\n22 I'll look at the two articles. It seemed to me he was\n\n23 basing the statement on medical articles, but, okay, we\n\n24 have to look at the support for that.\n\n25 MR. WYRICK: Yes. And, Justice \n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[33] " Official\n\n 33\n1 JUSTICE BREYER: Now let's look at the other\n\n2 side, because your side then says he says right here\n\n3 that he says it will put you into a coma. That's his\n\n4 point. But his reasoning was that if you take enough of\n\n5 it, you'll be dead. And then he says this is\n\n6 essentially an extrapolation from a toxic effect, by\n\n7 which he means if you take a lot, you'll be dead, but\n\n8 before you're dead, you're in a coma. And that's his\n\n9 reasoning. And I didn't find any other reasoning.\n\n10 Now, the obvious thing are two. One, a\n\n11 lot of things kill you without putting you into a coma,\n\n12 such as the next two drugs. Lots of things do. And,\n\n13 two, he didn't point to anything in support of this\n\n14 putting into a coma. It was just the extrapolation.\n\n15 Now, that's what I want you to focus on,\n\n16 because if what I've just said is correct, then I think\n\n17 there is no support in this record for his conclusion.\n\n18 If what I have said is incorrect, there might be\n\n19 support.\n\n20 MR. WYRICK: Well, a couple of things.\n\n21 First, that assumes that a deep comalike level of\n\n22 unconsciousness is the relevant question. They argue\n\n23 that this Court's cases and the Constitution requires\n\n24 that.\n\n25 Now, that's beyond a surgical plane of\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[34] " Official\n\n 34\n1 anesthesia that we would use in an operating room to\n\n2 remove one of your limbs. A coma is is braindead,\n\n3 EEG silence.\n\n4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Would any doctor \n\n5 MR. WYRICK: It's beyond \n\n6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: use this drug any\n\n7 doctor who is conducting a surgical procedure, doesn't\n\n8 want the patient to suffer pain, wants to induce this\n\n9 unconscious state, would any doctor in the country give\n\n10 this as the drug to induce that that comalike\n\n11 unconsciousness?\n\n12 MR. WYRICK: It is routinely used to induce\n\n13 anesthesia. It is not commonly used anymore for the\n\n14 maintenance of anesthesia for for hours for\n\n15 surgeries. Now, their source, this is the Saari\n\n16 article, and that's spelled SAARI, that their expert\n\n17 cited and you can find this in the JA at 243 in his\n\n18 report. He cited this article. And if you actually\n\n19 read the article, it explains why midazolam is no longer\n\n20 used for maintenance of general anesthesia. It says,\n\n21 and I'm quoting, \"Midazolam has been used to induce and\n\n22 maintain general anesthesia. The recovery period of\n\n23 midazolam is approximately three times longer than\n\n24 propofol.\" Propofol is the drug that's more commonly\n\n25 used now. \"Therefore the genuine use of midazolam is\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[35] " Official\n\n 35\n1 the sole induction and maintenance agent for general\n\n2 anesthesia. It is nowadays exceptionally uncommon and\n\n3 has been replaced by induction and maintenance of\n\n4 fusions of propofol. For organizational and economic\n\n5 reasons, fasttrack recovery has gained popularity.\n\n6 That's why midazolam\" \n\n7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I I have a real\n\n8 problem with whatever you're reading, because I'm going\n\n9 to have to go back to that article. I am substantially\n\n10 disturbed that in your brief you made factual statements\n\n11 that were not supported by the cited of those sources\n\n12 and in fact directly contradicted.\n\n13 I'm going to give you just three small\n\n14 examples among many I found. So nothing you say or read\n\n15 to me am I going to believe, frankly, until I see it\n\n16 with my own eyes the context, okay?\n\n17 I'll give you a the three examples. On\n\n18 pages 4 and 5 of your brief you cite, \"This drug's FDA\n\n19 approved label as holding that\" \"that this drug can\n\n20 get you to mild sedation and to deep levels of sedation\n\n21 virtually equivalent to the state of general anesthesia\n\n22 where the patient may require external support for vital\n\n23 functions.\"\n\n24 But this quote was not on general use. This\n\n25 quote came from the section of the FDA label where it\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[36] " Official\n\n 36\n1 was saying that this drug's effects, when taken with\n\n2 other drugs that suppress the central nervous system,\n\n3 this can happen. That to me is really there is no\n\n4 other central nervous system drug at play in this\n\n5 protocol.\n\n6 On page 6, you cite the \n\n7 JUSTICE SCALIA: Do you have an answer to\n\n8 that one?\n\n9 MR. WYRICK: Respectfully, Justice\n\n10 Sotomayor, in the brief we explained that \n\n11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No, sir. Go \n\n12 MR. WYRICK: The FDA the FDA label says\n\n13 that the effects of the drug depend upon three things:\n\n14 The rate of infusion I think it's the the\n\n15 maintenance the infusion the rate the dosage of\n\n16 the rate of infusion and whether it's used in\n\n17 conjunction with other CNS depressants and \n\n18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But you didn't you\n\n19 quoted this for the proposition that it could cause a\n\n20 fatality because of the depression of or it could\n\n21 produce general anesthesia.\n\n22 MR. WYRICK: At JA 217, their expert agrees\n\n23 that it can cause a fatality. He agrees that it caused\n\n24 80 fatalities.\n\n25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Sure, but he said it's\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[37] " Official\n\n 37\n1 in old people.\n\n2 I'm you know, there have been 80 deaths\n\n3 from therapeutic doses of this drug. It's this is\n\n4 almost like you saying because 80 people have died from\n\n5 the use of one aspirin, that means that if I give people\n\n6 100 aspirins, they're going to die. It's just not\n\n7 logical. Obviously, people die from anything that you\n\n8 give them, that's why there are hospital fatalities in\n\n9 every procedure and why there's that but 80 among\n\n10 the millions that are given this drug don't die.\n\n11 So my point is, what the FDA is saying\n\n12 the general anesthesia effect is only going to happen\n\n13 when you have a central nervous drug central nervous\n\n14 system drug.\n\n15 MR. WYRICK: The FDA has said no such thing.\n\n16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, they put it in\n\n17 that section.\n\n18 MR. WYRICK: They described in that section\n\n19 the potential effects and they described they said 3\n\n20 things matter when you're looking at the effects. How\n\n21 much of the drug you're giving, the rate at which you're\n\n22 giving it, and whether it's given with another drug.\n\n23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Exactly.\n\n24 MR. WYRICK: Now, their their expert\n\n25 said unqualifiedly he said the FDA tested this drug\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[38] " Official\n\n 38\n1 and injected \n\n2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. Let me give\n\n3 you a second example: The Melvin study. The Melvin\n\n4 study says this is how it happened. It gave this drug\n\n5 in doses of .02 to .06, and what it showed was that at\n\n6 .06 dose, there was less effect than at .02.\n\n7 And he said, this suggests that there is a\n\n8 ceiling effect to this drug and that it is less potent\n\n9 as you go in higher doses.\n\n10 Now, you quoted for saying and you took\n\n11 out the eclipse there may be a ceiling you quote\n\n12 it by saying that, \"The Melvin study for the position\n\n13 that studies on humans have found that the anesthetic\n\n14 effect of midazolam increased linearly with dosage and\n\n15 estimate that 2 milligrams is enough for full surgical\n\n16 anesthetic.\"\n\n17 But what Melvin actually said, after\n\n18 pointing out that the ceiling effect is shown by his\n\n19 study, he says, \"But presuming there were no ceiling\n\n20 effect, extrapolation of our data suggests that such a\n\n21 dose would be sufficient.\" You took out that \n\n22 MR. WYRICK: Respectfully, Justice\n\n23 Sotomayor, what they were comparing was a .2 milligram\n\n24 per kilogram dose of a different drug to a .6 milligram\n\n25 dose per kilogram dose of midazolam. They said we\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[39] " Official\n\n 39\n1 would have expected midazolam to have a greater effect\n\n2 than the other drug because it's more potent than the\n\n3 other drug. But as it turns out, there's two things\n\n4 going on. Either there's some dosedependent\n\n5 relationship with the other drug, or they said, there\n\n6 may be some ceiling effect here. They they\n\n7 hypothesized that there may be.\n\n8 They say if there's not a ceiling effect and\n\n9 you extrapolate out what we know about the drug, you get\n\n10 the full anesthesia 2 milligrams per kilogram.\n\n11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, we're back. Well,\n\n12 we're back to is their a ceiling effect? The judge here\n\n13 said, does it matter?\n\n14 MR. WYRICK: And let's talk about their\n\n15 evidence. First of all, neither of their experts could\n\n16 say at what level a ceiling effect occurs. And it's not\n\n17 relevant whether there is or is not a ceiling effect.\n\n18 Their expert said all drugs have a ceiling effect at\n\n19 some point.\n\n20 What matters is, is there a ceiling effect\n\n21 that kicks in before we get to a level where they're\n\n22 unconscious and unaware of the pain? That's the\n\n23 constitutionally relevant inquiry. And on this point,\n\n24 they presented the district court with two pieces of\n\n25 evidence: Dr. Lubarsky, a Material Safety Data Sheet\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[40] " Official\n\n 40\n1 for midazolam, that as we pointed out in our brief,\n\n2 never even mentioned ceiling effect.\n\n3 JUSTICE KAGAN: But Mr. Wyrick, it would be\n\n4 very different if the court had said, look, we don't\n\n5 think you've presented enough evidence that the ceiling\n\n6 effect kicks in at this point, right? But that's not\n\n7 what the court said. The court had this alternative\n\n8 theory, which is that it didn't have to concern itself\n\n9 with whether the ceiling effect had kicked in. And\n\n10 that's the thing that not you don't defend as well.\n\n11 But that was what the court said.\n\n12 MR. WYRICK: I I that's not quite how\n\n13 we read the district court's opinion. What we said \n\n14 he recounted their explanation of what the ceiling\n\n15 effect was I think this is at JA 77 or 78 and\n\n16 says whatever it may be with respect to anesthesia, he\n\n17 said, which occurs at the spinal cord level, he said \n\n18 JUSTICE KAGAN: Yes. Whatever it might be,\n\n19 we don't have to worry about it because all we have to\n\n20 worry about is the brain and not the spinal cord, and in\n\n21 the brain, there is no ceiling effect. And that's just\n\n22 wrong. You know that's wrong.\n\n23 MR. WYRICK: We know the central nervous\n\n24 system depressant works throughout the central nervous\n\n25 system, right? So it it's affecting these GABA\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[41] " Official\n\n 41\n1 receptors which are located in the spinal cord and in\n\n2 the brain.\n\n3 Now, his point was perhaps those GABA\n\n4 receptors could be fully saturated with GABA at the\n\n5 spinal cord level, but the question is at the brain\n\n6 level. Are we, in his words, paralyzing the brain to\n\n7 such an extent that the person is unconscious and\n\n8 unaware of pain? And he said he thought the evidence\n\n9 was sufficient to to conclude that it was. And we\n\n10 look at the evidence \n\n11 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, I just read it I\n\n12 think if we go back and read it, it will show that what\n\n13 he was saying was we just don't have to worry about the\n\n14 ceiling effect because at the brain level, the ceiling\n\n15 effect has no relevance.\n\n16 Let me ask you another question. Maybe this\n\n17 is one we'll agree on. Maybe not. I'm not sure.\n\n18 Do you think that if we conclude that there\n\n19 is just a lot of uncertainty about this drug, in other\n\n20 words, you know, you might be right, or Ms. Konrad might\n\n21 be right, and it's really just impossible to tell.\n\n22 Given that nobody does studies on this drug, it would be\n\n23 unethical to do studies on this drug, we simply can't\n\n24 know the answer to these questions. If that's the state\n\n25 of the world, do you think it's a violation of the\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[42] " Official\n\n 42\n1 Eighth Amendment to use it?\n\n2 MR. WYRICK: If there is a risk of serious\n\n3 pain that rises to a substantial or objectively\n\n4 intolerable.\n\n5 JUSTICE KAGAN: No. Well, you're just\n\n6 repeating the standard. But I'm giving you a set of \n\n7 we just don't know. It might be substantial pain; it\n\n8 might not be substantial pain. I mean, we can't we\n\n9 can't we can't quantify it at all.\n\n10 MR. WYRICK: If what you're suggesting is\n\n11 shifting the burden to the State to show that there's\n\n12 some medical consensus that a drug can, in fact, do this\n\n13 at these dosages, we know that \n\n14 JUSTICE KAGAN: I guess I'm not talking\n\n15 about burdens. I'm talking about a district court who's\n\n16 presented with evidence. Just put yourself in the\n\n17 position of a district judge. And the evidence is who\n\n18 can tell? Nobody can tell. What is a district court\n\n19 supposed to do at that point?\n\n20 MR. WYRICK: Well, this Court in Brewer v.\n\n21 Landrigan, which was an appeal from the Ninth Circuit in\n\n22 a of a similarly postured case, it was a temporary\n\n23 injunction, that was a challenge to the efficacy of\n\n24 lethal injection drugs vacated a a temporary\n\n25 injunction granted by lower courts and said the burden\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[43] " Official\n\n 43\n1 is on the petitioner to show that it is sure or very\n\n2 likely that they will suffer from the harm. They said\n\n3 speculative evidence isn't enough. So that's the burden\n\n4 that they bear.\n\n5 JUSTICE KAGAN: So then I think I have not\n\n6 found a place where I agree with you, because that\n\n7 seems that seems quite something to me. I mean, that\n\n8 would be like saying people say that this potassium\n\n9 chloride, it's like being burned alive. We've actually\n\n10 talked about being burned at the stake, and and\n\n11 everybody agrees that that's cruel and unusual\n\n12 punishment.\n\n13 So suppose that we said, we're going to burn\n\n14 you at the stake, but before we do, we're going to use\n\n15 an anesthetic of completely unknown properties and\n\n16 unknown effects. Maybe you won't feel it, maybe you\n\n17 will. We just can't tell. And and you think that\n\n18 that would be okay.\n\n19 MR. WYRICK: I think that that a\n\n20 Petitioner in that case would have no trouble meeting \n\n21 satisfying the burden this Court imposed in Baze, which\n\n22 is showing that that puts me at a substantial risk,\n\n23 objectively intolerable risk of severe pain. That \n\n24 that threshold showing would be incredibly easy to make\n\n25 in that case.\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[44] " Official\n\n 44\n1 JUSTICE KAGAN: No, I'm I'm saying,\n\n2 because you just don't know about the anesthesia. Maybe\n\n3 the anesthesia will cover all that the pain of being\n\n4 burned at the stake or maybe it won't. The court\n\n5 doesn't know.\n\n6 MR. WYRICK: That isn't the world that we\n\n7 live in, and it's certainly not the world that this\n\n8 district court lived in. We know we know for a fact,\n\n9 these are the conceded facts. Their expert said, this\n\n10 dosage of midazolam will render these Petitioners\n\n11 unconscious in no more than 60 to 90 seconds. We know\n\n12 that induction of anesthesia is an FDAapproved\n\n13 indication for this drug.\n\n14 JUSTICE KAGAN: Induction, but not\n\n15 maintenance.\n\n16 MR. WYRICK: For certain, yes.\n\n17 JUSTICE KAGAN: And there is the world of\n\n18 difference between the two, isn't there?\n\n19 MR. WYRICK: Induction is the creation of\n\n20 anesthesia. Maintenance is the keeping it at that state\n\n21 for many hours for a surgery. That's not we're\n\n22 not \n\n23 JUSTICE KAGAN: Or for or for the time it\n\n24 takes for the potassium chloride to kill somebody.\n\n25 MR. WYRICK: And we also put on evidence\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[45] " Official\n\n 45\n1 that this drug is approved for usage and is commonly\n\n2 used for painful, invasive procedures like setting of a\n\n3 femoral IV. I think the intubation example is a very\n\n4 good example, because we pointed out that this drug,\n\n5 midazolam, is regularly and routinely used for rapid\n\n6 sequence intubation.\n\n7 JUSTICE BREYER: What you have here, their\n\n8 expert saying, as I previously said, that this drug will\n\n9 not keep you asleep. Once these two others are\n\n10 introduced, you will be jolted into consciousness; that\n\n11 is his testimony. I believe he supported that with\n\n12 medical articles, but I'll look to see.\n\n13 If it turns out it is supported, we have to\n\n14 look to the other side to see what was refuting it. And\n\n15 what on the other side is refuting it, on 327 and I\n\n16 agree with you that this ceiling effect is a big red\n\n17 herring here what actually he said that would go\n\n18 against it was that he said there is an extrapolation\n\n19 from his conclusion that 500 milligrams could cause\n\n20 death, and so if that much is likely to cause death,\n\n21 it's certainly likely to cause a coma. And a coma would\n\n22 prevent the person from from pain.\n\n23 But his evidence for that was zero. We know\n\n24 that, in fact, lots of drugs can kill people without\n\n25 first putting them into a coma. And so we look to see\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[46] " Official\n\n 46\n1 what is it he thinks that if this kills you will first\n\n2 put you into a coma. And when I looked or asked my\n\n3 clerks and others to look we found zero.\n\n4 Now, that's my question. What can you point\n\n5 me to which will show that what I think is the key\n\n6 refutation of their expert rests upon zero, that's what\n\n7 I'm asking you. That's what I've tried to ask,\n\n8 inarticulately, perhaps, but now it's more articulate,\n\n9 so \n\n10 MR. WYRICK: Again, and I have to make this\n\n11 point, whether it creates a coma or not is not the\n\n12 constitutionally relevant question.\n\n13 JUSTICE BREYER: Oh, well \n\n14 MR. WYRICK: But based on how a central\n\n15 nervous system depressant works, that a central nervous\n\n16 \n\n17 JUSTICE BREYER: Let me put it differently.\n\n18 Not the word \"coma\". I think what he was driving at,\n\n19 your expert, was that you were in a state such that you\n\n20 would feel no pain. And the reason he thought you were\n\n21 in that state is because 500 mg will probably kill you.\n\n22 And if it's going to kill you, it must, of course, at\n\n23 least first put you in that state.\n\n24 So I'm asking the same question, but I am\n\n25 using the words \"that state\" in substitution for the\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[47] " Official\n\n 47\n1 word \"coma\".\n\n2 MR. WYRICK: Because of how a central\n\n3 nervous system depressant works. It works by\n\n4 depressing \n\n5 JUSTICE BREYER: I'm not asking you for\n\n6 even I really want to know where in the record does\n\n7 he provide support for that statement, that the, quote,\n\n8 that state, end quote, precedes the death caused by this\n\n9 drug.\n\n10 MR. WYRICK: Well, he describes a couple of\n\n11 things. First, he describes the action by which the\n\n12 drug works as a central nervous system depressant.\n\n13 It it by causing death \n\n14 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But \n\n15 MR. WYRICK: it works by paralyzing the\n\n16 brain to such an extent that your respiratory drive is\n\n17 knocked out. Your brain \n\n18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But that's the clear\n\n19 error here. It starts right there. Because the reason\n\n20 Evans thought that it worked paralyzed the brain is\n\n21 because he thought this worked on the spinal cord. And\n\n22 nobody argues it works on the spinal cord, number one.\n\n23 And, number two, this is not a central nervous system\n\n24 drug. That's the barbiturates. This is works very\n\n25 differently than barbiturates.\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[48] " Official\n\n 48\n1 MR. WYRICK: This is a central nervous\n\n2 system depressant, just like a barbiturate.\n\n3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Depressant, but it's\n\n4 not a \n\n5 MR. WYRICK: It's not it's not a\n\n6 barbiturate, but makes they are both \n\n7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Exactly. It has no\n\n8 painrelieving qualities.\n\n9 MR. WYRICK: No, but they're both central\n\n10 nervous system depressants. The barbiturates have no\n\n11 painrelieving qualities either. That's that's\n\n12 undisputed on the record. So I want \n\n13 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You're right, it \n\n14 it but it's still I don't know where you're\n\n15 getting Justice Justice Breyer said, the proof of\n\n16 that.\n\n17 MR. WYRICK: Because it's a conceded fact on\n\n18 this record that a 500 milligram dose will render them\n\n19 unconscious within a matter of 60 to 90 seconds. That\n\n20 means that the central nervous system depressant is\n\n21 working to such a state to paralyze their brain and\n\n22 render them unconscious. It is a conceded fact that\n\n23 they will be \n\n24 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: You're unconscious, but\n\n25 that doesn't tell me that you're not feeling pain, or\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[49] " Official\n\n 49\n1 that a noxious stimulant like being burned alive won't\n\n2 cause pain.\n\n3 Look at what happens with the intubations.\n\n4 They paralyze your throat, they give you this drug, but\n\n5 they're paralyzing your throat, and that has its own\n\n6 anesthetic effect and pain relief.\n\n7 So what you're arguing is very different\n\n8 from what's happening here. They're putting a chemical\n\n9 inside of you that's burning you to death. That is the\n\n10 most noxious stimuli I can think of.\n\n11 MR. WYRICK: Respectfully, you have that\n\n12 backwards on intubation. They give the paralytic the\n\n13 same paralytic that's the second drug here first to\n\n14 keep the patient from or they give the midazolam\n\n15 first to anesthetize them, and then give them the\n\n16 paralytic to keep them from moving. The same paralytic\n\n17 that these Petitioners say cause the unconstitutional\n\n18 agonizing suffering. And I'm telling you, rapid\n\n19 sequence intubation is done routinely, giving patients a\n\n20 small dose of midazolam, paralyzing them with that\n\n21 paralytic, causing the same \n\n22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: No, they paralyze them\n\n23 also with the throat local anesthetic. I mean, I read\n\n24 it.\n\n25 MR. WYRICK: The rapid sequence intubation\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[50] " Official\n\n 50\n1 describes midazolam as the firstline choice.\n\n2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Sure, it's a first line\n\n3 in a lot of things \n\n4 MR. WYRICK: But we also \n\n5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But it doesn't keep you\n\n6 in an anesthetic state forever. It doesn't keep you\n\n7 during the procedure \n\n8 MR. WYRICK: I \n\n9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: during surgeries.\n\n10 MR. WYRICK: It can.\n\n11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: In some.\n\n12 MR. WYRICK: Look at the Saari article cited\n\n13 by their experts which describes the use of the\n\n14 anesthetic.\n\n15 The other thing I want to point out is the\n\n16 16 professors' brief, because this really is their\n\n17 ceiling effect in a nutshell, this this figure that's\n\n18 in the brief. It shows that a benzodiazepine puts you\n\n19 right to a surgical plane of anesthesia, but not beyond.\n\n20 Now, first we would say a surgical plane of anesthesia\n\n21 is sufficient. But go to that source. The source that\n\n22 they cite for that chart, it's the Brenner textbook, and\n\n23 read what it actually says with respect to this chart.\n\n24 Here's what it says: Benzodiazepines\n\n25 exhibit a ceiling effect which precludes severe CNS\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[51] " Official\n\n 51\n1 depression after oral administration of these drugs.\n\n2 Intravenous administration of benzodiazepines can\n\n3 produce anesthesia. That's what the text actually says.\n\n4 That's what the Saari article actually says.\n\n5 You can produce anesthesia with these drugs. The fact\n\n6 that they're not commonly used as general anesthetics is\n\n7 because we have better choices, not because the drug is\n\n8 incapable of producing that effect.\n\n9 Now, remember, here's where their experts\n\n10 started, here's where they started in the blue brief.\n\n11 They said that because of the ceiling effect, this drug\n\n12 is incapable of producing a coma. We said someone\n\n13 forgot to tell the FDA, because the warning is right\n\n14 there in the FDA label about coma. So they have\n\n15 retreated now in the reply brief to, well, it can't\n\n16 reliably produce a coma.\n\n17 Well, if it can get someone to a coma, where\n\n18 is the ceiling effect? Is there some basic\n\n19 pharmacological principle with this drug that prevents\n\n20 the drug from ever getting to a coma or not? We have\n\n21 established there is not.\n\n22 We ask you to also look at the cases out of\n\n23 Florida. There, for instance, Dr. Markeith, an\n\n24 anesthesiologist who was the anesthesiologist for inmate\n\n25 Baze, in Baze v. Rees, testifying for an inmate in\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[52] " Official\n\n 52\n1 Florida \n\n2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: If I come out of this\n\n3 argument, because you presented a lot of things to us\n\n4 that wasn't before either the district court or the\n\n5 court of appeals, wouldn't be and I believe that your\n\n6 experts didn't prove their point at all and that they\n\n7 showed enough. Why don't we let the district court\n\n8 below sort out whether it still holds to its opinion\n\n9 based on a plethora of materials you've given us?\n\n10 MR. WYRICK: Two quick responses.\n\n11 One is they didn't meet their burden under\n\n12 Brewer v. Landrigan, a showing that is sure or very\n\n13 likely on the record that they presented. Second, we\n\n14 put plenty of rebuttal evidence on, enough to support\n\n15 the district court's finding. There's no clear error\n\n16 here. And the twocourt rule applies, because we have a\n\n17 court of appeals affirming that district court finding.\n\n18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Wyrick, to an\n\n19 extent that's unusual even in this Court, you have been\n\n20 listening rather than talking. And so I'm happy to give\n\n21 you an extra five minutes, if you'd like.\n\n22 And, of course, we'll give additional time\n\n23 to you, as well, Ms. Konrad. And hopefully we'll have a\n\n24 chance to hear what you have to say.\n\n25 MR. WYRICK: I appreciate that. And I want\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[53] " Official\n\n 53\n1 to continue my point about ceiling effect and what\n\n2 evidence they put on. I I told you about the first\n\n3 source, which was the Material Safety Data Sheet. It\n\n4 says nothing about a ceiling effect. We pointed that\n\n5 out. Nothing in the reply brief on that.\n\n6 Their second was the study about rats, the\n\n7 Hovinga study. We pointed out again we read that\n\n8 study. There's no mention of a ceiling effect. Again,\n\n9 no response in the reply brief. Now, that's the\n\n10 evidence that they put before the district court on what\n\n11 they said clearly demonstrates that there's a ceiling\n\n12 effect.\n\n13 Now, after the fact, when we were at the\n\n14 court of appeals, their expert submitted an additional\n\n15 declaration and cited two more sources. He cited this\n\n16 Hall study, which was the dog study, where they took 5\n\n17 dogs, gave them a big dose of midazolam and clamped\n\n18 their tails. And that study concluded, well, we see the\n\n19 midazolam the effect of the drug begins to slow at a\n\n20 certain point and hypothesized, well, there may be a\n\n21 ceiling effect, because the drug the the effects\n\n22 of the drug are beginning to slow.\n\n23 But that study concluded, as we pointed out\n\n24 in the response brief, that if you take the results and\n\n25 you extrapolate out, once you get to about 30 milligrams\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[54] " Official\n\n 54\n1 per kilogram for a dog, you would achieve full surgical\n\n2 anesthesia, full surgical anesthesia.\n\n3 Now, their other expert, he cited the Saari\n\n4 article for the proposition that there is a ceiling\n\n5 effect. It just cites back to Hall, the dog study, and\n\n6 says, well, there may be a ceiling effect. And then it\n\n7 goes on to say that, in fact, this drug has been used\n\n8 for general anesthesia as the sole drug, and that its\n\n9 use was discontinued because propofol came along, and it\n\n10 was a better choice.\n\n11 That was their record case for a ceiling\n\n12 effect. So when they stand up and say that they clearly\n\n13 demonstrated that there was, in fact, a ceiling effect,\n\n14 they're just wrong.\n\n15 Now, the other study that Dr. Lubarsky cited\n\n16 in his afterthefact declaration that was never\n\n17 submitted to the district court, was the Greenblatt\n\n18 study. And he claimed that that study showed that at .3\n\n19 milligrams per kilogram there was a ceiling effect. We\n\n20 went and read the study. .3 milligrams per kilogram\n\n21 were were never given to the patients in that study.\n\n22 That study was about what happens if we give .1\n\n23 milligrams per kilogram of this drug? At varying\n\n24 dosages, what happens? We pointed that in that out\n\n25 in the response brief. Nothing in the reply.\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[55] " Official\n\n 55\n1 Their evidence on this ceiling effect is\n\n2 indefensible because if you go and read the sources,\n\n3 they just don't say what Dr. Lubarsky said that they\n\n4 say.\n\n5 Paradoxical effects have fallen out of the\n\n6 case. This lack of analgesia, again, we've pointed out,\n\n7 is only relevant if someone's not unconscious and\n\n8 insensate. They just can't avoid the fact that the\n\n9 district court here made this factual finding and said\n\n10 it's a virtual certainty. If it's a virtual certainty\n\n11 that they're unconscious and unaware of the pain, they\n\n12 cannot establish a substantial probability or an\n\n13 objectively intolerable risk.\n\n14 Thank you.\n\n15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.\n\n16 Ms. Konrad, why don't you take 8 minutes, up\n\n17 to 8 minutes.\n\n18 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ROBIN C. KONRAD\n\n19 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS\n\n20 MS. KONRAD: Justice Kagan, I wanted to\n\n21 address your hypothetical. And it in this case, if\n\n22 the risk from using midazolam, if Petitioners are\n\n23 correct, manifests itself, then there will be\n\n24 unconstitutional pain and suffering. And my friend\n\n25 admitted that, that if, in fact, a person is burned\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[56] " Official\n\n 56\n1 alive and didn't have appropriate anesthesia, that would\n\n2 be unconstitutional.\n\n3 JUSTICE KAGAN: I guess the question I was\n\n4 asking was if a person was burned alive and we didn't\n\n5 know whether he had appropriate anesthesia, would that\n\n6 be unconstitutional, too?\n\n7 MS. KONRAD: That would be, Justice Kagan,\n\n8 and that's the point here is that the district court\n\n9 below found that there is a greater risk in using\n\n10 midazolam, but found it was unquantifiable. And so if\n\n11 that risk, in fact, manifests itself, there will be a\n\n12 constitutionally intolerable execution. And this case\n\n13 is different than Brewer v. Landrigan because in that\n\n14 case, the drug formula at issue was using sodium\n\n15 thiopental, which \n\n16 JUSTICE ALITO: If an if an\n\n17 anesthesiologist rendered a person completely\n\n18 unconscious, and then the person was burned alive, would\n\n19 that be cruel and unusual punishment?\n\n20 MS. KONRAD: Justice Alito, I think the\n\n21 problem isn't rendering somebody unconscious. What the\n\n22 problem is, and what is necessary, is to ensure that the\n\n23 person maintains a a deep level of unconsciousness.\n\n24 JUSTICE ALITO: Yes. So an anesthesiologist\n\n25 is called in to make sure that this person feels no pain\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[57] " Official\n\n 57\n1 whatsoever while being burned alive, and then the person\n\n2 is burned alive, would that not be a violation of the\n\n3 Eighth Amendment anyway?\n\n4 MS. KONRAD: It could be. That's not the\n\n5 question, though, before this Court, and the the \n\n6 JUSTICE KAGAN: Because potassium\n\n7 chloride \n\n8 MS. KONRAD: An \n\n9 JUSTICE KAGAN: is kind of like that,\n\n10 isn't it? It's being burned alive from the inside.\n\n11 That's what it is.\n\n12 MS. KONRAD: That's exactly what it is,\n\n13 Justice Kagan, but what \n\n14 JUSTICE ALITO: But you're not sure that\n\n15 being burned alive that you think there are\n\n16 circumstances in which burning somebody at the stake\n\n17 would be consistent with the Eighth Amendment?\n\n18 MS. KONRAD: It is \n\n19 JUSTICE ALITO: It's an irrelevant point,\n\n20 but you're you're not certain about that?\n\n21 MS. KONRAD: Well, what I'm saying is that\n\n22 this Court has the founders say burning at the stake\n\n23 is unconstitutional. It creates an Eighth Amendment\n\n24 violation. It's cruel and unusual. But in your\n\n25 hypothetical, if there was a way to ensure that that was\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[58] " Official\n\n 58\n1 done in a humane way, there could perhaps be. That I\n\n2 don't think that any any State would go to try to do\n\n3 that, because we move forward evolving \n\n4 JUSTICE ALITO: That's an incredible answer.\n\n5 You think that there are circumstances in which burning\n\n6 alive would not be a violation of the Eighth Amendment?\n\n7 Burning somebody alive would not be a violation of the\n\n8 Eighth Amendment?\n\n9 JUSTICE KAGAN: You see, but potassium\n\n10 chloride is burning somebody alive. It's just doing it\n\n11 through the use in a of a drug.\n\n12 MS. KONRAD: Which is what we have here and\n\n13 here the district court found a risk, a risk that it\n\n14 could not quantify. And that risk violates the Eighth\n\n15 Amendment. Again, what this Court needs to understand\n\n16 is that the barbiturates function differently.\n\n17 In Baze and in Landrigan, the there was a\n\n18 use of a barbiturate that was known to produce a deep\n\n19 comalike unconsciousness. And the reason why that's\n\n20 important, it doesn't matter that barbiturates also\n\n21 don't have analgesic properties because we know \n\n22 science and medicine tells us that those drugs will\n\n23 reliably induce a deep comalike unconsciousness.\n\n24 Midazolam cannot do this.\n\n25 And the my friend has has said that\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[59] " Official\n\n 59\n1 there is no support for the ceiling effect. And we\n\n2 would disagree. And and our expert cited studies.\n\n3 The study on the rats that was cited in as Exhibit 2,\n\n4 shows the sigmoidal Emax curve, which he explained in\n\n5 his testimony. The State's expert had no explanation,\n\n6 had no support for the testimony that he presented.\n\n7 When he testified, he did not have data to\n\n8 cite. He was incorrect. He made a mathematical error.\n\n9 And, again, what this Court needs to understand is that\n\n10 giving the drug, even if it could potentially cause a\n\n11 toxic effect, that will not protect against the\n\n12 unconstitutional pain and suffering from the second and\n\n13 third drugs.\n\n14 Thank you.\n\n15 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.\n\n16 The case is submitted.\n\n17 (Whereupon, at 11:19 a.m., the case in the\n\n18 aboveentitled matter was submitted.)\n\n19\n\n20\n\n21\n\n22\n\n23\n\n24\n\n25\n\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[60] " Official\n Page 60\n\n A alive 17:18 27:21 appendix 5:24 8:5 backwards 49:12 21:17 23:25 24:7\nability 11:23 43:9 49:1 56:1,4 applies 52:16 barbiturate 48:2,6 25:2,3,16 31:21\nable 6:6 8:1 56:18 57:1,2,10 appreciate 52:25 58:18 31:23 32:17,20\nabolish 14:16 57:15 58:6,7,10 appropriate 14:20 barbiturates 5:22 33:1 45:7 46:13\nabolitionist 15:17 allow 14:8 15:10 56:1,5 47:24,25 48:10 46:17 47:5 48:15\nabolitionists 15:24 alternative 19:11 approved 35:19 58:16,20 brief 5:1 7:13 29:10\naboveentitled 1:11 19:21 40:7 45:1 based 7:22,24 8:24 31:14 35:10,18\n 59:18 alternatives 18:7 approximately 22:14 32:21 46:14 36:10 40:1 50:16\nabroad 14:8 18:10 34:23 52:9 50:18 51:10,15\nabsence 18:9 amended 27:13 april 1:9 basic 51:18 53:5,9,24 54:25\nabstract 20:19 amendment 18:19 argue 17:23 33:22 basing 32:23 burden 6:23 26:5\nabuse 5:14 21:14 42:1 57:3 argues 28:1 47:22 baze 13:17,21 26:13 42:11,25\nacceptable 19:10 57:17,23 58:6,8 arguing 22:5 49:7 24:10 32:1 43:21 43:3,21 52:11\naccepted 31:20 58:15 argument 1:12 2:2 51:25,25 58:17 burdens 42:15\nachieve 54:1 amount 10:5 2:5,8 3:3,6 19:17 bear 26:5 43:4 burn 43:13\naction 47:11 amounts 14:21 21:19 22:2,3 24:9 bearing 16:22 17:3 burned 27:21 43:9\naddition 21:13 analgesia 29:15 25:21 52:3 55:18 beginning 53:22 43:10 44:4 49:1\nadditional 52:22 55:6 arguments 21:22 begins 53:19 55:25 56:4,18\n 53:14 analgesic 58:21 ariz 1:15 behalf 1:15,18 2:4 57:1,2,10,15\naddress 55:21 analgesics 29:16 article 24:24 34:16 2:7,10 3:7 25:22 burning 17:18 49:9\nadministered 23:5 anesthesia 6:17 34:18,19 35:9 55:19 57:16,22 58:5,7\nadministration 31:3,5,11,20 34:1 50:12 51:4 54:4 believe 32:2 35:15 58:10\n 11:15 51:1,2 34:13,14,20,22 articles 32:21,22,23 45:11 52:5\n 35:2,21 36:21 45:12 benzodiazepine C\nadmission 7:19\nadmitted 55:25 37:12 39:10 40:16 articulate 46:8 50:18 c 1:8,15 2:1,3,9 3:1\naffirmed 26:10,11 44:2,3,12,20 aside 26:12 benzodiazepines 3:6 55:18\naffirming 52:17 50:19,20 51:3,5 asked 46:2 50:24 51:2 calculated 9:21,22\nafterthefact 54:16 54:2,2,8 56:1,5 asking 3:22 46:7,24 better 25:18 51:7 call 5:5 29:13\nagent 35:1 anesthesiologist 47:5 56:4 54:10 called 56:25\nago 11:10 22:10 51:24,24 56:17,24 asleep 45:9 beyond 33:25 34:5 cant 12:22 13:3\nagonizing 49:18 anesthetic 38:13,16 aspect 13:21 50:19 19:17,23 24:3\nagree 18:11 26:5 43:15 49:6,23 aspirin 37:5 big 45:16 53:17 41:23 42:8,9,9\n 41:17 43:6 45:16 50:6,14 aspirins 37:6 bit 17:25 26:18 43:17 51:15 55:8\nagrees 31:18 36:22 anesthetics 51:6 assisted 14:8 blame 12:13 capable 13:13\n 36:23 43:11 anesthetize 49:15 assume 14:9 blue 51:10 21:25 22:20\nahead 24:6 answer 16:20 17:8 assumes 33:21 body 30:19 capital 14:24 19:14\nal 1:3,6 36:7 41:24 58:4 availability 17:12 botched 10:12 care 8:16 31:8\nalito 9:17,22,25 antianxiety 32:7 available 15:15 brain 6:18 7:15 carried 11:2 14:6,9\n 10:4,9 11:1,4,6 anxious 29:24 16:5,13,23 8:15,17 9:9 40:20 20:22\n 13:22 14:1,4 15:5 anymore 34:13 avoid 55:8 40:21 41:2,5,6,14 carry 14:10,24 15:7\n 21:18,21 22:4,5 anyway 57:3 aware 3:15 32:14 47:16,17,20 48:21 15:10 18:16\n 22:17,20,23 23:2 appeal 42:21 awareness 6:18 braindead 34:2 carrying 21:25\n 23:4,15,20 56:16 appeals 24:15 brenner 50:22 case 3:4 5:19,19,20\n 26:10,12 52:5,17 B brewer 42:20 52:12 6:25 11:9,18 19:3\n 56:20,24 57:14,19\n 58:4 53:14 back 35:9 39:11,12 56:13 19:12 22:12 23:21\nalitos 16:21 appearances 1:14 41:12 54:5 breyer 20:23 21:8 24:15,23 27:10\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[61] " Official\n Page 61\n\n 29:5,9 42:22 20:16 20:25 26:24 30:14,17 40:4,7,7,11 42:15\n 43:20,25 54:11 chance 52:24 clients 3:10 57:17 42:18,20 43:21\n 55:6,21 56:12,14 characterization cns 36:17 50:25 consists 14:22 44:4,8 52:4,5,7,17\n 59:16,17 19:23 coma 24:25 33:3,8 constitution 33:23 52:17,19 53:10,14\ncases 33:23 51:22 chart 50:22,23 33:11,14 34:2 constitutional 3:14 54:17 55:9 56:8\ncatch 29:13 chemical 49:8 45:21,21,25 46:2 14:13,14 15:8 57:5,22 58:13,15\ncatheter 12:1 chief 3:3,8 6:5,10 46:11,18 47:1 17:4,24 59:9\ncause 3:12 16:7 6:14,22 7:3 11:14 51:12,14,16,17,20 constitutionally courts 5:4 15:6\n 18:14,18 21:12 11:19,20 18:20 comalike 10:25 3:18 4:5 5:9 26:11,12 29:1\n 23:1 28:10 36:19 19:1,5,9,20 20:1,7 11:13 12:17 31:15 24:12 31:12 39:23 32:2 33:23 40:13\n 36:23 45:19,20,21 20:10,14,18 24:4 33:21 34:10 58:19 46:12 56:12 42:25 52:15\n 49:2,17 59:10 25:17,20,23 30:4 58:23 context 24:10 35:16 cover 44:3\ncaused 3:15 10:21 52:18 55:15 59:15 combination 16:14 continue 53:1 create 6:16\n 36:23 47:8 chloride 3:12 12:19 combined 8:4 continuously 19:25 creates 4:19,21 5:8\ncauses 28:2 27:6 28:5,18,23 comcast 22:9 contradicted 35:12 46:11 57:23\ncausing 22:21 30:15,19 43:9 come 15:21 20:21 contradiction 9:11 creation 44:19\n 30:15 47:13 49:21 44:24 57:7 58:10 24:12 32:13 52:2 contrary 8:1 25:4 crime 21:3\nceiling 5:25 6:7,8 choice 50:1 54:10 comes 19:12 controversial 14:13 crucial 9:9\n 6:12,14 8:12,13 choices 51:7 commonly 31:20 14:14 cruel 43:11 56:19\n 8:17 9:7,10,12,18 chooses 3:10 17:2 34:13,24 45:1 cord 6:15 8:14 9:8 57:24\n 9:24,25 10:23 chose 18:16 51:6 40:17,20 41:1,5 curve 59:4\n 26:19 30:22,24 circuit 42:21 companies 15:18 47:21,22\n 38:8,11,18,19 circumstances comparing 38:23 correct 7:15,16,22 D\n 39:6,8,12,16,17 57:16 58:5 complaint 27:14 7:23 10:12,21 d 1:8 3:1\n 39:18,20 40:2,5,9 cite 35:18 36:6 completely 26:24 17:19,20 22:4 data 38:20 39:25\n 40:14,21 41:14,14 50:22 59:8 30:14,17 43:15 25:1 33:16 55:23 53:3 59:7\n 45:16 50:17,25 cited 22:10 34:17 56:17 couldnt 8:10 de 5:2\n 51:11,18 53:1,4,8 34:18 35:11 50:12 conceded 7:12 44:9 counsel 17:5 55:15 dead 33:5,7,8\n 53:11,21 54:4,6 53:15,15 54:3,15 48:17,22 59:15 death 14:12,15,17\n 54:11,13,19 55:1 59:2,3 concern 13:19 40:8 counselor 16:10 14:19,22 16:24\n 59:1 cites 54:5 concerned 30:25 countenance 14:21 18:24 19:15 21:13\nceilingeffect 30:21 citing 24:23 conclude 41:9,18 country 14:7 34:9 21:22 22:21 23:1\ncentral 9:4 24:17 city 1:18 concluded 53:18,23 couple 33:20 47:10 45:20,20 47:8,13\n 28:12 36:2,4 claimed 54:18 conclusion 7:6,22 course 10:9 46:22 49:9\n 37:13,13 40:23,24 clamped 53:17 25:5 26:16 33:17 52:22 deaths 37:2\n 46:14,15 47:2,12 clarify 27:25 45:19 court 1:1,12 3:9,16 decency 19:8\n 47:23 48:1,9,20 class 5:22 conducted 12:13 3:21,23 4:4,13,18 decide 15:6\ncertain 6:1 17:2 clear 5:15,16,18 conducting 34:7 5:17,21,23 6:2,6 decision 7:24 16:1\n 44:16 53:20 57:20 7:18 8:3 23:24 conjunction 36:17 6:13,20 7:6,21,24 16:4\ncertainly 6:25 47:18 52:15 connection 11:24 8:4,11,22,24 9:11 declaration 53:15\n 14:14 44:7 45:21 clearly 3:23 6:24 consciousness 12:4 12:5 13:17 14:12 54:16\ncertainty 25:7 26:2 7:4 22:7,11,11 32:14 45:10 14:18 15:21 16:5 deep 10:25 11:13\n 55:10,10 25:12 29:2 32:4 consensus 4:7 7:25 21:7 22:7,9 23:23 12:16 13:3,3\nchair 18:24 53:11 54:12 42:12 24:15,16 25:24,25 33:21 35:20 56:23\nchallenge 42:23 clerks 46:3 considerably 27:22 26:10 28:25 29:6 58:18,23\nchamber 18:24 client 19:13,14 consistent 21:14 30:24 31:7 39:24 defend 26:20 40:10\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[62] " Official\n Page 62\n\ndefending 7:11 directly 35:12 dosages 42:13 36:2 39:18 42:24 erred 3:16\ndefense 10:19 disagree 5:3 19:22 54:24 45:24 51:1,5 erroneous 3:23\ndeference 5:4 59:2 dose 13:19 22:18 58:22 59:13 6:24 7:4 22:7,12\ndefinition 31:10 disagreements 26:4 22:24,25 23:5,9 duly 19:16 22:13 29:3 32:4\ndelivered 10:20 disappeared 29:9 23:13,16,17 26:1 error 5:15 7:18 8:3\ndemonstrated discontinued 54:9 26:24 27:1 28:9 E 23:24 47:19 52:15\n 54:13 discretion 5:15 28:16,20 30:14 e 1:3 2:1 3:1,1 59:8\ndemonstrates disputes 15:1 38:6,21,24,25,25 earlier 28:7 errors 5:16,18\n 10:23 11:11 53:11 district 3:16,21,23 48:18 49:20 53:17 easy 43:24 esq 1:15,17 2:3,6,9\ndepend 36:13 4:4,13,18 5:4,16 dosedependent eclipse 38:11 essentially 33:6\ndepressant 40:24 5:23 6:2,6,13 7:5 39:4 economic 35:4 establish 55:12\n 46:15 47:3,12 7:21,24 8:4,24 doses 37:3 38:5,9 eeg 34:3 established 51:21\n 48:2,3,20 22:6 23:23 24:16 doubt 15:14 effect 6:1,7,14,15 establishing 26:6\ndepressants 36:17 25:25 29:1,5 dr 31:4 39:25 51:23 8:12,13,18 9:7,10 estimate 38:15\n 48:10 30:24 31:7 32:2 54:15 55:3 9:12,18,24 10:1 et 1:3,6\ndepressing 47:4 39:24 40:13 42:15 drive 47:16 10:24 26:19 30:23 evans 47:20\ndepression 24:18 42:17,18 44:8 driving 46:18 30:24 33:6 37:12 everybody 27:4\n 36:20 51:1 52:4,7,15,17 drug 3:18 4:7,8,18 38:6,8,14,18,20 43:11\ndescribed 27:14,16 53:10 54:17 55:9 4:21,23 5:5,8,21 39:1,6,8,12,16,17 evidence 4:22 5:14\n 37:18,19 56:8 58:13 5:22,25 6:2 8:1 39:18,20 40:2,6,9 7:25 9:18 10:2,5\ndescribes 47:10,11 disturbed 35:10 9:4,8,9,10,24 40:15,21 41:14,15 22:14,15 28:1\n 50:1,13 divide 5:10 10:24 11:2,11,15 45:16 49:6 50:17 39:15,25 40:5\ndescriptions 27:20 doctor 7:9,14 12:2 12:14,15,25 13:3 50:25 51:8,11,18 41:8,10 42:16,17\ndetermination 3:24 29:19,20 34:4,7,9 13:6,7,23 15:14 53:1,4,8,12,19,21 43:3 44:25 45:23\ndeterminations doesnt 7:8 8:14 15:15,22 16:6,8,9 54:5,6,12,13,19 52:14 53:2,10\n 6:24 9:23 10:7,8 16:15 16:13,15 17:17 55:1 59:1,11 55:1\ndetermine 23:18 16:20 17:17 18:13 18:9 22:15 23:22 effectively 6:17 evolving 19:8 58:3\ndetermined 6:6 18:13 34:7 44:5 23:22 24:16 26:22 effects 12:18 36:1 exactly 37:23 48:7\ndevelop 19:7 48:25 50:5,6 28:3 29:18 32:7,7 36:13 37:19,20 57:12\ndevised 21:24 58:20 34:6,10,24 35:19 43:16 53:21 55:5 example 38:3 45:3\ndichotomy 9:8 dog 53:16 54:1,5 36:4,13 37:3,10 efficacy 42:23 45:4\ndidnt 9:12 12:6,7,8 dogs 53:17 37:13,14,21,22,25 efforts 14:17,22 examples 35:14,17\n 21:10 33:9,13 doing 58:10 38:4,8,24 39:2,3,5 eighth 18:19 21:14 exceptionally 22:13\n 36:18 40:8 52:6 dont 7:12 8:11,17 39:9 41:19,22,23 42:1 57:3,17,23 35:2\n 52:11 56:1,4 10:15 12:11,11,13 42:12 44:13 45:1 58:6,8,14 execute 3:10 21:4\ndie 18:4 28:18 37:6 13:12 14:1 16:3 45:4,8 47:9,12,24 either 17:24 29:16 executed 19:17,24\n 37:7,10 18:1,5,9,15,16,20 49:4,13 51:7,11 39:4 48:11 52:4 executing 21:11\ndied 37:4 20:12,21 22:2,22 51:19,20 53:19,21 elect 17:17 execution 10:11,23\ndifference 13:15,16 23:1,20 25:10 53:22 54:7,8,23 electric 18:24 11:9 12:12 15:7,8\n 44:18 26:19 37:10 40:4 56:14 58:11 59:10 eligible 19:15 18:17,23 56:12\ndifferent 5:22 40:10,19 41:13 drugs 3:12,13,15 eliminate 3:22 executioner 12:3\n 11:17 12:21 15:16 42:7 44:2 48:14 14:23 15:1,16,17 eliminated 15:3 executions 11:1,9\n 38:24 40:4 49:7 52:7 55:3,16 58:2 15:20,25 20:5 eliminates 6:18 14:5,11 16:17\n 56:13 58:21 21:11 24:12,21 emax 59:4 exhibit 50:25 59:3\ndifferently 46:17 dosage 9:18 12:7,8 25:9 26:8 32:12 ensure 56:22 57:25 exist 18:10\n 47:25 58:16 36:15 38:14 44:10 33:12 35:18 36:1 equivalent 35:21 expected 39:1\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[63] " Official\n Page 63\n\nexpert 6:3 7:19 8:2 21:4 44:9 forget 30:5 17:9 26:23 27:4 happening 49:8\n 9:21 10:22 22:23 factual 5:4 29:1 forgot 51:13 37:10,22 41:22 happens 12:24 13:2\n 24:22,23 25:4 30:6,9 35:10 55:9 formula 3:11 4:5 52:9 54:21 49:3 54:22,24\n 31:3 32:5,10 fallen 55:5 56:14 gives 27:21 happy 52:20\n 34:16 36:22 37:24 far 7:8 24:10 forth 11:16 giving 6:1 10:24 hard 20:18\n 39:18 44:9 45:8 fasttrack 35:5 forward 19:8 58:3 37:21,22 42:6 harm 4:19,21 5:9\n 46:6,19 53:14 fatalities 36:24 found 3:17,21 4:4 49:19 59:10 43:2\n 54:3 59:2,5 37:8 4:18,20 6:13 8:24 glossip 1:3 3:4 havent 17:9 20:21\nexperts 6:4 8:25 fatality 36:20,23 12:3 18:7 20:4 go 5:13 7:7 8:14 hear 3:3 24:9 29:24\n 9:2 31:10 39:15 fda 31:19 35:18,25 24:16 25:25 35:14 20:6,8,9 24:6 52:24\n 50:13 51:9 52:6 36:12,12 37:11,15 38:13 43:6 46:3 31:16 32:8 35:9 hearing 14:3\nexplained 9:3 13:18 37:25 51:13,14 56:9,10 58:13 36:11 38:9 41:12 held 14:12 24:10\n 22:11 36:10 59:4 fdaapproved 44:12 founders 57:22 45:17 50:21 55:2 heres 50:24 51:9,10\nexplains 34:19 feel 3:14 16:8 26:3 frankly 35:15 58:2 herring 45:17\nexplanation 40:14 26:7 31:6,9 43:16 free 14:16,18 gobbledygook 27:9 hide 21:10\n 59:5 46:20 friend 13:25 55:24 goes 5:2 8:13 9:14 higher 38:9\nextent 24:2 29:11 feeling 12:18 13:9 58:25 54:7 hit 6:8\n 41:7 47:16 52:19 27:21 48:25 full 38:15 39:10 going 6:2 10:24 hits 6:11\nexternal 35:22 feels 56:25 54:1,2 14:5 15:7,9 18:4 holding 24:14\nextra 52:21 femoral 27:15 45:3 fully 41:4 23:17 27:11 35:8 35:19\nextraordinarily figure 8:10 30:20 function 58:16 35:13,15 37:6,12 holds 52:8\n 29:11 50:17 functions 35:23 39:4 43:13,14 honest 14:5\nextraordinary find 3:22 15:13 further 31:16 46:22 hopefully 52:23\n 28:19 33:9 34:17 fusions 35:4 good 16:9 25:13 hospital 37:8\nextrapolate 39:9 finding 5:4 6:19,21 45:4 hour 26:23 28:22\n 53:25 7:4 14:2 22:6 G granted 42:25 hours 10:17,18\nextrapolation 33:6 24:21 26:9,9 29:1 g 3:1 great 27:16 28:9 34:14 44:21\n 33:14 38:20 45:18 30:6,10 32:2,3 gaba 40:25 41:3,4 30:15 hovinga 53:7\neyes 35:16 52:15,17 55:9 gained 35:5 greater 4:19,21 huge 12:23\n findings 22:12,13 gas 18:3,24 20:8,16 27:5 39:1 56:9 humane 18:23 19:6\n F 26:15 27:7 general 1:17 34:20 greenblatt 54:17 19:21 58:1\nfact 3:17,20 4:1,4,9 firing 18:8,14,17,23 34:22 35:1,21,24 gross 1:6 3:4 humans 38:13\n 4:10,15 8:3,6 9:1 first 3:4,18 4:6 36:21 37:12 51:6 ground 22:7 hypnotic 28:3\n 10:3 12:12 15:2,8 26:17 27:25 32:5 54:8 guard 21:2 hypothesized 39:7\n 16:17,23 17:1 33:21 39:15 45:25 generally 8:12 guerilla 14:21 53:20\n 18:17 21:9 22:6 46:1,23 47:11 genuine 34:25 guess 7:20 15:12,12 hypothetical 55:21\n 23:8,18 26:1,9,10 49:13,15 50:2,20 getting 48:15 51:20 18:21 42:14 56:3 57:25\n 28:20 30:13,16 53:2 ginsburg 16:11,16 guilty 19:13\n 35:12 42:12 44:8 firstline 50:1 18:13,15 29:19 I\n 45:24 48:17,22 five 52:21 31:13 34:4,6 H id 24:1,7\n 51:5 53:13 54:7 flat 31:14 give 5:3 15:1 34:9 hall 53:16 54:5 idea 26:21\n 54:13 55:8,25 florida 26:11,12 35:13,17 37:5,8 hanging 18:23 ignored 4:13\n 56:11 51:23 52:1 38:2 49:4,12,14 happen 29:12 36:3 ignores 5:14\nfacts 4:6,14,14 5:12 focus 30:23 33:15 49:15 52:20,22 37:12 ignoring 4:14\n 5:21,24 6:20,23 follows 12:12 54:22 happened 11:10 ii 18:6\n 6:25 7:5 20:24 forever 50:6 given 10:12 12:25 18:6 38:4 ill 25:10 32:22\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[64] " Official\n Page 64\n\n 35:17 45:12 infusion 36:14,15 56:14 31:21,22,23 32:17 46:21,22\nim 7:2 10:4,18 36:16 issues 11:15,22,22 32:20,25 33:1 killed 21:2\n 11:20 12:19 19:4 injected 38:1 iv 27:15 45:3 34:4,6 35:7 36:7,9 kills 46:1\n 20:12 24:23 25:9 injection 16:12 ive 5:1 18:1 25:10 36:11,18,25 37:16 kilogram 38:24,25\n 27:11 28:4 34:21 20:4,16 28:2 31:24 33:16 46:7 37:23 38:2,22 39:10 54:1,19,20\n 35:8,13 37:2 42:24 39:11 40:3,18 54:23\n 41:17 42:6,14,15 injunction 42:23,25 J 41:11 42:5,14 kind 3:24 9:10\n 44:1,1 46:7,24 inmate 51:24,25 j 1:6 43:5 44:1,14,17 10:21 57:9\n 47:5 49:18 52:20 inquiry 39:23 ja 34:17 36:22 44:23 45:7 46:13 kinds 21:11\n 57:21 insensate 23:19 40:15 46:17 47:5,14,18 knew 12:21,22\nimmediately 10:20 24:19 29:2,18 jail 20:25 21:1 48:3,7,13,15,15 knocked 47:17\nimmobility 31:6 55:8 joint 5:24 8:4 48:24 49:22 50:2 know 5:1 8:8,12\nimportant 13:17,18 inserted 27:3 jolted 32:13 45:10 50:5,9,11 52:2,18 9:23 11:15 12:15\n 58:20 inside 49:9 57:10 judge 5:13 39:12 55:15,20 56:3,7 12:20,22 13:2,2,5\nimposed 19:16 instance 51:23 42:17 56:16,20,24 57:6 13:12,14 14:1\n 43:21 instinct 20:15 judiciary 14:21 57:9,13,14,19 16:13 17:22 18:9\nimpossible 14:23 intended 22:16 jurisdictions 14:6,7 58:4,9 59:15 18:16,16,21,24\n 15:24 41:21 intending 16:6 14:8 20:12,21 22:22\ninability 31:5 intends 4:24 11:12 justice 3:3,8,19,25 K 23:1,21 24:10\ninappropriate 29:7 intense 3:12 4:2,9,12,16,25 5:7 kagan 8:7,20,22,23 25:11 28:7 30:8\ninarticulately 46:8 interrupted 17:8 5:11,12 6:5,10,14 9:6,14,15 12:20 31:17 37:2 39:9\nincapable 13:14 intolerable 5:9 6:22 7:3,7,11,16 13:5,11 23:3,8,11 40:22,23 41:20,24\n 51:8,12 15:10,13 26:7 7:18 8:7,20,22,23 23:13 24:2,4,6 42:7,13 44:2,5,8,8\ninclined 15:13 42:4 43:23 55:13 9:6,14,15,17,22 26:14 27:18 28:4 44:11 45:23 47:6\nincludes 3:11 4:3 56:12 9:25 10:4,9,10,13 28:11,13,15 29:21 48:14 56:5 58:21\ninconsistent 9:2 intravenous 11:23 10:14,18 11:1,4,6 30:8,11,13 40:3 knowing 18:4\nincorrect 33:18 51:2 11:14,19,20 12:6 40:18 41:11 42:5 known 5:20,23,25\n 59:8 introduce 9:17 12:11,16,20 13:5 42:14 43:5 44:1 58:18\nincreased 38:14 introduced 13:8 13:11,22 14:1,4 44:14,17,23 55:20 konrad 1:15 2:3,9\nincredible 58:4 45:10 15:5,12 16:3,10 56:3,7 57:6,9,13 3:5,6,8,25 4:3,11\nincredibly 23:10,14 introduction 32:12 16:11,16,19,20,21 58:9 4:16 5:6,11,18 6:9\n 43:24 intubation 45:3,6 16:21 17:1,5,7,13 kagans 30:2 6:13 7:2,10,16,23\nindefensible 55:2 49:12,19,25 17:15,16,20,22 keep 27:2 30:25 8:7,19,21,23 9:13\nindicated 9:21 intubations 49:3 18:11,13,15,20 45:9 49:14,16 9:15,20 10:2,7,13\nindicates 31:19 invasive 27:15 45:2 19:1,5,9,20 20:1,7 50:5,6 10:17,22 11:3,5,8\nindication 44:13 involve 16:15 28:9 20:10,14,18,23,24 keeping 30:18 11:19,25 12:10,15\nindividual 28:19,24 involves 4:18 21:8,17,18,21 44:20 13:5,16,24 14:2\ninduce 31:15,17 involving 11:22 22:4,5,17,20,22 keeps 30:16 15:5 16:3,16 17:1\n 34:8,10,12,21 27:15 23:2,3,4,8,11,13 kennedy 16:20 17:1 17:11,15,20 18:11\n 58:23 irrelevant 26:23 23:15,20,25 24:2 17:7 30:1 18:15,25 19:4,19\ninduction 31:19 27:3,9 28:8 57:19 24:4,4,6,7 25:1,3 kevin 1:6 19:22 20:3,8,12\n 35:1,3 44:12,14 isnt 9:7 13:24 15:23 25:16,17,19,20,23 key 12:4 13:21 46:5 20:18 21:6,16,20\n 44:19 21:4 22:18 23:4 26:14 27:18 28:4 kicked 6:7 40:9 22:4,9,19,22 23:7\ninflicting 22:1 24:25 43:3 44:6 28:11,13,15 29:19 kicks 39:21 40:6 23:11,20 25:1,15\ninformation 5:20 44:18 56:21 57:10 29:21,23 30:1,2,4 kill 17:14 26:22 26:18 41:20 52:23\n 9:1 20:22 22:25 issue 12:5 21:17 30:8,11,13 31:13 33:11 44:24 45:24 55:16,18,20 56:7\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[65] " Official\n Page 65\n\n 56:20 57:4,8,12 32:22,24 33:1 medical 4:7 7:25 morning 3:4 obtain 14:23 15:19\n 57:18,21 58:12 40:4 41:10 45:12 9:1 29:12,12 31:4 move 19:8 58:3 obviates 13:19\n 45:14,25 46:3 31:11 32:19,23 moved 18:22 19:5 obvious 33:10\n L 49:3 50:12 51:22 42:12 45:12 movement 15:18 obviously 22:12\nlabel 31:19 35:19 looked 46:2 medications 29:22 moving 49:16 37:7\n 35:25 36:12 51:14 looking 19:25 medicine 58:22 murder 21:1 occur 9:19\nlack 29:14,14 55:6 22:13 37:20 meet 52:11 occurs 14:20 39:16\nlaid 10:14 lose 32:15 meeting 43:20 N 40:17\nlandrigan 42:21 lot 33:7,11 41:19 melvin 38:3,3,12,17 n 2:1,1 3:1 offends 18:2\n 52:12 56:13 58:17 50:3 52:3 mention 53:8 narrow 21:17 24:8 offense 19:14\nlarger 21:9 lots 33:12 45:24 mentioned 40:2 24:8 oh 46:13\nlaw 3:16,20 4:1,2,3 lower 42:25 method 15:6,10 nature 11:16 okay 5:13 11:6 12:8\n 4:13,15,17 8:6 lubarsky 31:4 16:23 17:2,3 19:3 near 26:2 20:11 25:15,16\nlearn 19:6,6 39:25 54:15 55:3 20:7,21 21:11,23 necessarily 5:14 32:23 35:16 43:18\nlegal 5:8,10 26:4 methods 18:2,23 23:9 okla 1:18\nlegislature 20:20 M 19:2,6,25 20:6 necessary 12:17 oklahoma 1:17\nlegislatures 14:16 m 1:13 3:2 59:17 mg 46:21 56:22 3:10 11:10 13:22\nlethal 16:12 20:4 maintain 12:16 midazolam 3:17 need 23:20 14:10 18:7 19:11\n 20:16 22:18 23:9 13:3 34:22 5:6,7,21 6:16 11:3 needle 27:2,19,22 19:24 21:3\n 23:13,16,17 26:24 maintains 56:23 11:11 12:2 24:17 30:17 old 37:1\n 28:8,9,16,20 maintenance 34:14 26:1 27:1,20,25 needs 16:5 58:15 once 45:9 53:25\n 30:14 42:24 34:20 35:1,3 28:10,17,21 29:7 59:9 operates 8:13,14,16\nlevel 8:14 18:18 36:15 44:15,20 31:8,15 32:7 neither 39:15 operating 34:1\n 24:20 25:8 33:21 major 24:20 32:11 34:19,21,23,25 nervous 9:4 24:17 opinion 8:9 21:15\n 39:16,21 40:17 making 6:21 22:3 35:6 38:14,25 28:14 36:2,4 22:10 40:13 52:8\n 41:5,6,14 56:23 manifests 55:23 39:1 40:1 44:10 37:13,13 40:23,24 oppose 14:15\nlevels 35:20 56:11 45:5 49:14,20 46:15,15 47:3,12 opposed 13:13\nlife 20:25 21:2 manufacture 15:19 50:1 53:17,19 47:23 48:1,10,20 opposition 16:24\nlimbs 34:2 markeith 51:23 55:22 56:10 58:24 never 12:16 29:13 oral 1:11 2:2,5 3:6\nline 50:2 marking 21:21 mild 35:20 29:17 40:2 54:16 25:21 51:1\nlinearly 38:14 material 39:25 53:3 milligram 38:23,24 54:21 order 7:4,6 27:12\nlistening 52:20 materials 52:9 48:18 new 19:24 20:1,3 organizational\nliterature 9:1 32:19 mathematical 59:8 milligrams 6:16 night 32:8 35:4\nlittle 14:9,25 17:25 matter 1:11 3:16,17 10:1,12 22:17 ninth 42:21 overrule 14:18\n 26:17 3:19 6:2 9:23 25:6 26:21 38:15 nitrogen 20:8\nlive 44:7 10:7 14:14,15 39:10 45:19 53:25 novo 5:2 P\nlived 44:8 25:25 37:20 39:13 54:19,20,23 nowadays 35:2 p 3:1\nlocal 49:23 48:19 58:20 59:18 millions 37:10 noxious 49:1,10 page 2:2 36:6\nlocated 41:1 matters 9:23,24 mind 11:17 number 47:22,23 pages 35:18\nlockett 11:10,18 10:9 39:20 minor 32:9 nutshell 50:17 pain 3:12,14,22\n 12:1 mean 3:20 12:12 minutes 10:15,15 5:23 6:11,18\nlogical 37:7 14:4 18:21 19:12 O 10:15,21 13:9\n 26:22 28:17,22\nlong 10:16 12:9 23:9 42:8 43:7 52:21 55:16,17 o 2:1 3:1 14:10,25 15:2\nlonger 34:19,23 49:23 mirrored 26:10 objectively 15:9 16:8 18:14,19\nlook 5:19 6:20 7:3 means 32:6 33:7 misspoke 7:2 26:6 42:3 43:23 21:12 22:1,1\n 16:5 18:2 29:4 37:5 48:20 mixed 8:5,6 55:13 24:13 26:3,7,25\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[66] " Official\n Page 66\n\n 27:5,16,16 28:2,9 18:1,3,5 32:8 37:1 40:6 41:3 42:19 prisoner 3:14 10:25 24:24 27:19,22\n 28:10,19,24 29:21 37:4,5,7 43:8 46:4,11 50:15 11:12 12:18 13:20 29:5 33:3 37:16\n 30:15 31:1,6,9 45:24 52:6 53:1,20 56:8 16:7 42:16 44:25 46:2\n 34:8 39:22 41:8 percent 15:22,23 57:19 probability 55:12 46:17,23 52:14\n 42:3,7,8 43:23 15:25 pointed 29:10,15 probably 18:5 53:2,10\n 44:3 45:22 46:20 perfectly 15:15 32:20,21 40:1 46:21 puts 43:22 50:18\n 48:25 49:2,6 period 34:22 45:4 53:4,7,23 problem 35:8 56:21 putting 15:18 16:2\n 55:11,24 56:25 person 17:18 21:12 54:24 55:6 56:22 33:11,14 45:25\n 59:12 23:19 24:11,18,25 pointing 38:18 problems 11:25 49:8\npainful 12:18 13:9 29:13 41:7 45:22 policy 14:15 procedure 13:10\n 23:10,14 45:2 55:25 56:4,17,18 popularity 35:5 24:19 27:15 34:7 Q\npainless 17:16 56:23,25 57:1 position 19:16 37:9 50:7 qualities 48:8,11\n 20:21 persuade 14:16 38:12 42:17 procedures 45:2 quantify 4:20,22\npainlessly 14:6,11 pertinence 18:10 possibility 15:2 produce 36:21 51:3 42:9 58:14\npainrelieving 48:8 petitioner 43:1,20 30:15 51:5,16 58:18 quantity 23:6\n 48:11 petitioners 1:4,16 possible 6:11 produced 25:4 question 3:21 4:1,1\nparadoxical 29:8 2:4,10 3:7 6:4 posture 19:13 producing 51:8,12 4:2,3,9,10,12,14\n 55:5 21:6 26:2,5 27:13 postured 42:22 professors 31:14 4:15,17 5:8,13 8:5\nparagraph 27:14 29:5 44:10 49:17 potassium 3:12 50:16 8:6 16:21,22 17:8\nparalytic 3:11 55:19,22 12:19 27:5 28:5 progressively 21:9 24:8,8 25:11\n 49:12,13,16,16,21 pharmacological 28:17,18,23 30:15 18:22 25:14 28:21,25\nparalyze 7:14 13:6 51:19 30:18 43:8 44:24 proof 10:10 48:15 29:17,17 30:3\n 48:21 49:4,22 pharmacologically 57:6 58:9 proper 11:11 12:7 31:12,23,24 33:22\nparalyzed 17:19 8:2 potent 38:8 39:2 12:8 13:19 26:4 41:5,16 46:4,12\n 47:20 pharmacology potential 22:24 properly 12:13 46:24 56:3 57:5\nparalyzes 6:18 23:22 31:14 27:5 37:19 properties 13:6 questionable 16:13\nparalyzing 41:6 phenomenon 6:17 potentially 17:24 43:15 58:21 16:15\n 47:15 49:5,20 31:2 23:17 59:10 propofol 34:24,24 questions 28:7\npart 8:9 phoenix 1:15 precedes 47:8 35:4 54:9 41:24\npartially 8:5 physician 12:3 precisely 6:7,8 propose 7:8 19:11 quick 52:10\nparties 26:4 pieces 39:24 precludes 50:25 proposition 36:19 quite 32:14 40:12\npassed 19:24 place 16:8 43:6 preferable 19:2 54:4 43:7\npasses 28:23 plainly 7:20 20:16,19 protect 59:11 quote 6:16 25:6\npatient 26:22 27:2 plane 33:25 50:19 present 11:17 24:9 protocol 16:12 32:6 35:24,25\n 30:16,18 34:8 50:20 presented 39:24 17:17,25 18:5 38:11 47:7,8\n 35:22 49:14 play 32:13 36:4 40:5 42:16 52:3 20:4,13 36:5 quoted 36:19 38:10\npatients 49:19 pleasant 27:19 52:13 59:6 prove 52:6 quoting 34:21\n 54:21 please 3:9 24:6 pressure 15:18 provide 20:2 47:7\n R\npatrick 1:17 2:6 25:24 presuming 38:19 provides 20:3\n 25:21 plenty 52:14 prevent 12:17 punishment 14:24 r 1:17 2:6 3:1 25:21\npenalty 14:13,15 plethora 52:9 45:22 43:12 56:19 range 12:23\n 14:17,19,22 16:25 point 4:17 6:1 7:9 preventing 13:9 purpose 4:23 13:8 rapid 45:5 49:18,25\n 19:15 21:14,23 23:16,16 27:25 prevents 51:19 13:12,13,15 15:6 rare 29:11\npentobarbital 28:16 29:4,24,25 previously 45:8 purposely 21:10 rate 36:14,15,16\n 16:17 29:16 30:6 33:4,13 principle 51:19 put 10:25 11:12 37:21\npeople 17:14,24 37:11 39:19,23 prison 21:2 16:7,22 19:16 rats 53:6 59:3\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[67] " Official\n Page 67\n\nreach 7:6 relationship 39:5 rest 24:19 saturated 41:4 set 21:9 26:12 42:6\nreached 7:24 relevance 16:25 rests 46:6 saying 4:12 9:6 setting 27:14 45:2\nreacting 32:9 41:15 result 24:17 10:4 12:7 31:7 severe 43:23 50:25\nreactions 29:8 relevant 16:1,4 results 53:24 36:1 37:4,11 sheet 39:25 53:3\nread 7:13 8:8 27:20 17:9,11 27:13 retreated 51:15 38:10,12 41:13 shifting 42:11\n 31:25 34:19 35:14 29:17 31:12 33:22 reverse 22:6 27:12 43:8 44:1 45:8 show 7:4 9:18 10:5\n 40:13 41:11,12 39:17,23 46:12 review 5:2 57:21 21:13 41:12 42:11\n 49:23 50:23 53:7 55:7 richard 1:3 says 24:15 33:2,2,3 43:1 46:5\n 54:20 55:2 reliably 24:24 right 6:8,12 7:9 33:5 34:20 36:12 showed 38:5 52:7\nreading 35:8 51:16 58:23 8:18 13:4 19:11 38:4,19 40:16 54:18\nreal 5:13 35:7 relief 29:21 49:6 21:1 22:3,21 25:3 50:23,24 51:3,4 showing 6:24 43:22\nreally 8:10 27:22 reliever 5:23 25:5 30:22 32:15 53:4 54:6 43:24 52:12\n 36:3 41:21 47:6 remember 10:15 33:2 38:2 40:6,25 scalia 3:19,25 4:2,9 shown 18:1 38:18\n 50:16 31:25 32:1,2 51:9 41:20,21 47:19 4:12,17 12:6,11 shows 22:15 50:18\nreason 15:23 18:1 remove 34:2 48:13 50:19 51:13 12:16 15:12 16:3 59:4\n 18:21 19:5 23:6 render 26:2 29:18 rise 15:1 18:18 16:19 20:24 25:19 side 25:4,11,13\n 46:20 47:19 58:19 31:8 32:9 44:10 rises 42:3 29:23 36:7 33:2,2 45:14,15\nreasoning 5:16 48:18,22 risk 4:19,21 5:9 scalias 16:21 sigmoidal 59:4\n 33:4,9,9 rendered 15:17,24 17:18 24:13 26:7 science 19:7 23:22 silence 34:3\nreasons 21:10 29:6 24:11 30:16 56:17 42:2 43:22,23 58:22 similarly 42:22\n 35:5 rendering 24:18 55:13,22 56:9,11 scientific 7:25 8:25 simply 41:23\nrebuttal 2:8 52:14 56:21 58:13,13,14 22:14 sir 36:11\n 55:18 renders 18:3 23:18 roberts 3:3 6:5,10 second 3:13 4:17 sleep 18:4 32:8\nreceive 12:7,8 repeating 42:6 6:22 11:14,20 26:8,21 28:3 30:6 slow 53:19,22\nreceived 12:1 replaced 35:3 18:20 19:1,9,20 30:6,7 38:3 49:13 small 35:13 49:20\nreceptors 41:1,4 reply 29:10 51:15 20:1,7,10,14 24:4 52:13 53:6 59:12 society 19:7\nrecognized 5:24 6:3 53:5,9 54:25 25:17,20 30:4 secondly 29:14 sodium 4:19 13:19\n 6:3,4 19:13,14 report 34:18 52:18 55:15 59:15 seconds 44:11 13:23 29:15 56:14\nrecord 10:3 29:4 require 35:22 robin 1:15 2:3,9 3:6 48:19 sole 4:8 13:8 35:1\n 31:25 33:17 47:6 requirements 55:18 section 35:25 37:17 54:8\n 48:12,18 52:13 19:18 room 34:1 37:18 solicitor 1:17\n 54:11 requires 33:23 routinely 34:12 sedated 13:20 somebody 12:24\nrecounted 40:14 research 17:25 45:5 49:19 sedation 35:20,20 13:9 44:24 56:21\nrecovery 34:22 reserve 25:14 rule 52:16 sedative 28:3 57:16 58:7,10\n 35:5 resist 24:20 25:8 run 25:10 see 3:20 12:11,13 someones 55:7\nred 45:16 respect 40:16 50:23 running 30:19 13:15,16 29:9 sorry 7:2 10:18\nreduced 14:25 respectfully 36:9 35:15 45:12,14,25 11:20 12:19 25:9\nreemphasize 13:18 38:22 49:11 S 53:18 58:9 28:4\nrees 51:25 respects 31:17 s 2:1 3:1 seeking 21:3 sort 52:8\nreferring 8:9 31:3 respiratory 47:16 saari 34:15,16 sense 28:20 31:4,11 sotomayor 4:25 5:7\nrefutation 46:6 respondent 1:18 50:12 51:4 54:3 sentence 21:1,2,25 5:11,12 7:7,11,17\nrefuting 45:14,15 respondents 2:7 safe 15:15 32:5 7:18 10:10,13,14\nregained 12:4 25:22 safety 39:25 53:3 sentences 32:4 10:18 16:10 17:5\nregardless 26:3 response 15:4 30:2 satisfies 19:18 sequence 45:6 17:13,15,16,21,22\nregrettably 17:14 53:9,24 54:25 satisfy 26:13 49:19,25 18:12 31:22 35:7\nregularly 45:5 responses 52:10 satisfying 43:21 serious 42:2 36:10,11,18,25\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[68] " Official\n Page 68\n\n 37:16,23 38:2,23 20:3 43:13 testify 24:22 15:25 16:3 20:15\n 39:11 47:14,18 stimulant 49:1 supposed 42:19 testifying 51:25 24:5 27:12 33:16\n 48:3,7,13,24 stimuli 24:20 25:9 suppress 36:2 testimony 8:24 9:2 36:14 40:5,15\n 49:22 50:2,5,9,11 32:10,11 49:10 supreme 1:1,12 9:20 45:11 59:5,6 41:12,18,25 43:5\n 52:2 stop 32:15,17 sure 8:7 15:22,23 text 51:3 43:17,19 45:3\nsound 27:18 studies 22:14 38:13 15:25 36:25 41:17 textbook 50:22 46:5,18 49:10\nsounds 27:21 41:22,23 59:2 43:1 50:2 52:12 thank 55:14,15 56:20 57:15 58:2\nsource 34:15 50:21 study 23:18,21 38:3 56:25 57:14 59:14,15 58:5\n 50:21 53:3 38:4,12,19 53:6,7 surgeries 34:15 thats 4:10 5:9 8:19 thinks 27:8 46:1\nsources 35:11 53:8,16,16,18,23 50:9 8:25 20:11 21:3,4 thiopental 4:19\n 53:15 55:2 54:5,15,18,18,20 surgery 44:21 22:1,1 23:1,11,15 13:19,23 29:15\nspeculative 43:3 54:21,22 59:3 surgical 27:15 23:23 24:13,21 56:15\nspelled 34:16 submitted 53:14 33:25 34:7 38:15 25:18 27:16 28:15 third 3:13 15:22\nspinal 6:15 8:14 9:8 54:17 59:16,18 50:19,20 54:1,2 28:16 29:16 31:2 26:8 27:1,12 28:3\n 40:17,20 41:1,5 subsidiary 26:15 system 9:5 10:21 31:2,18 32:10 29:23,24 59:13\n 47:21,22 27:7 28:14 36:2,4 33:3,8,15,25 thought 5:1 6:23\nspite 4:6 substantial 17:18 37:14 40:24,25 34:16,24 35:6 11:14,22 12:21,22\nsquad 18:8,14,17 26:6 42:3,7,8 46:15 47:3,12,23 37:8 39:22 40:6 13:11 41:8 46:20\n 18:24 43:22 55:12 48:2,10,20 40:10,12,21,22 47:20,21\nstabbed 21:2 substantially 35:9 41:24 43:3,11 three 26:10,11,15\nstaff 29:12 substitution 46:25 T 44:21 46:4,6,7 27:7 29:6 34:23\nstake 43:10,14 44:4 successful 14:18 t 2:1,1 47:18,24 48:11,11 35:13,17 36:13\n 57:16,22 suffer 34:8 43:2 tails 53:18 49:9,13 50:17 threedrug 3:11 4:5\nstand 54:12 suffering 3:13 take 27:11 28:17 51:3,4 52:19 53:9 threshold 26:5,13\nstandard 32:1 42:6 18:19 49:18 55:24 33:4,7 53:24 56:8 57:4,11,12 43:24\nstandards 19:8 59:12 55:16 58:4,19 throat 49:4,5,23\n 26:4 sufficient 24:19 taken 36:1 theory 6:11 40:8 time 14:3 22:8\nstarted 51:10,10 25:8,12 38:21 takes 6:15 8:15 therapeutic 23:4,6 25:10,14 44:23\nstarts 47:19 41:9 50:21 44:24 37:3 52:22\nstate 4:24 7:8 11:12 sufficiently 13:20 talk 39:14 theres 3:25 4:1 6:1 times 17:9 34:23\n 15:7 16:6,11,12 suffocation 3:15 talked 22:24 26:17 10:19 12:23 22:25 told 53:2\n 17:2 18:16 22:16 24:13 31:2 43:10 23:24 28:13 37:9 tolerable 3:18 4:5\n 22:24 31:14 34:9 suggested 19:21 talking 11:6,8 39:3,4,8 42:11 tolerate 15:9\n 35:21 41:24 42:11 suggesting 13:1 24:17 28:6 32:12 52:15 53:8,11 toxic 22:24 33:6\n 44:20 46:19,21,23 19:2,4 20:11 42:14,15 52:20 theyre 7:11 14:18 59:11\n 46:25 47:8 48:21 42:10 tell 6:7 41:21 42:18 18:4 29:10 37:6 trained 29:12,12\n 50:6 58:2 suggestion 19:10 42:18 43:17 48:25 39:21 48:9 49:5,8 trial 26:11\nstatement 30:20 suggests 38:7,20 51:13 51:6 54:14 55:11 tried 46:7\n 32:21,23 47:7 suicide 14:8 telling 49:18 thigh 27:3,19,23 trouble 43:20\nstatements 35:10 support 10:3 32:24 tells 58:22 thing 3:24 33:10 true 7:12 20:23\nstates 1:1,12 6:3 33:13,17,19 35:22 temporary 42:22 37:15 40:10 50:15 21:17 31:4\n 8:2,25 9:2 14:10 47:7 52:14 59:1,6 42:24 things 21:13 33:11 try 14:16 58:2\n 14:23,25 15:10,16 supported 8:25 terms 5:16 33:12,20 36:13 turn 24:5\n 15:19 16:15,18 32:18 35:11 45:11 tested 13:7 37:25 37:20 39:3 47:11 turns 39:3 45:13\n 18:22 19:5 59:5 45:13 testified 9:3 10:22 50:3 52:3 two 4:6,13,14 5:24\nstatute 19:24 20:2 suppose 20:23 22:23 59:7 think 5:2,3 13:17 15:16,20 16:13\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[69] " Official\n Page 69\n\n 21:22 24:12,21 undisputed 5:20 washington 1:8 30:2,5,9,12,22 37:6\n 25:9 27:9 32:4,12 6:20,23 7:1,5 wasnt 10:19 13:11 31:16 32:16,18,25 11 16:17 59:17\n 32:21,22 33:10,12 48:12 52:4 33:20 34:5,12 139 27:14\n 33:13 39:3,24 unethical 41:23 way 4:25 7:13 9:3 36:9,12,22 37:15 147955 1:4 3:4\n 44:18 45:9 47:23 united 1:1,12 13:6 15:7,11 37:18,24 38:22 15 1:13 3:2 11:5\n 52:10 53:15 unknown 43:15,16 22:16 57:25 58:1 39:14 40:3,12,23 16 50:16\ntwocourt 52:16 unqualifiedly ways 17:13,23 42:2,10,20 43:19 19 59:17\n 37:25 19:25 44:6,16,19,25\n U unquantifiable wednesday 1:9 46:10,14 47:2,10 2\nunable 26:3 31:9 56:10 went 10:20 54:20 47:15 48:1,5,9,17 2 10:17,18 38:15,23\nunacceptable 21:12 unusual 43:11 weve 7:19 43:9 49:11,25 50:4,8 39:10 59:3\n 22:1 24:13 52:19 56:19 57:24 55:6 50:10,12 52:10,18 20 10:15\nunavailable 14:3 usage 45:1 whats 4:2 13:17 52:25 2015 1:9\n 15:17 20:5 use 16:6 18:1,3,5,8 14:5 16:4 29:23 217 36:22\nunaware 31:1 31:20 32:8 34:1,6 31:22 49:8 X 243 34:17\n 39:22 41:8 55:11 34:25 35:24 37:5 whatsoever 57:1 x 1:2,7 25 2:7 10:15\nunbearable 26:24 42:1 43:14 50:13 whos 17:18 42:15 xanax 32:8 29 1:9\n 28:23 54:9 58:11,18 wont 29:9 43:16\nuncertainty 12:24 Y 3\n usually 3:24 44:4 49:1\n 41:19 wood 10:11,12,17 year 11:10 16:18 3 2:4 37:19 54:18\nuncommon 35:2 V woods 10:23 years 22:10 54:20\nunconscious 11:13 v 1:5 3:4 42:20 word 46:18 47:1 youd 32:15 52:21 30 26:22 28:17,22\n 12:2,3,9 24:11,18 51:25 52:12 56:13 words 12:23 41:6 youll 13:24 17:22 53:25\n 26:2 27:2 29:2,13 vacated 42:24 41:20 46:25 33:5,7 327 45:15\n 29:18 30:17,18 varying 54:23 work 7:13 22:15,16 youre 3:22 4:12 8:9\n 9:6 11:6 12:7 4\n 31:1,9 32:6,9 34:9 veins 11:16,23 worked 7:14 47:20\n 39:22 41:7 44:11 view 15:25 13:1 16:2 19:1 4 35:18\n 47:21\n 48:19,22,24 55:7 violates 58:14 21:21 24:16 33:8 47 8:5\n working 48:21\n 55:11 56:18,21 violation 41:25 works 5:5,8 9:4,4 33:8 35:8 37:20\n 5\nunconsciousness 57:2,24 58:6,7 23:23 40:24 46:15 37:21,21 42:5,10\n 48:13,14,24,25 5 35:18 53:16\n 12:17 13:3 24:20 virtual 25:7 55:10 47:3,3,12,15,22\n 49:7 57:14,20,20 500 6:15 10:6 22:17\n 25:8 31:5,15,18 55:10 47:24\n youve 17:8 40:5 25:6 26:21 45:19\n 33:22 34:11 56:23 virtually 35:21 world 18:6 41:25\n 52:9 46:21 48:18\n 58:19,23 vital 35:22 44:6,7,17 500milligram 26:1\nunconstitutional worry 8:17 9:7,12\n W Z 55 2:10\n 18:18 20:5 21:23 40:19,20 41:13\n 49:17 55:24 56:2 wake 32:14 zero 45:23 46:3,6\n wouldnt 52:5 6\n 56:6 57:23 59:12 want 15:21 18:5 wreaking 28:19,23 0 6 36:6 38:24\nunderlay 26:16 22:6 24:9 25:11 writhing 10:14 000 10:1 60 44:11 48:19\nunderlies 25:12 25:14 27:24 30:23 wrong 7:20 23:23\n 33:15 34:8 47:6 02 38:5,6\nunderpinning 30:7 25:13 40:22,22 7\n 48:12 50:15 52:25 06 38:5,6\nunderstand 8:8 54:14 750 10:12,19,20\n 18:22 20:24 22:2 wanted 55:20 wyrick 1:17 2:6 1 76 5:24\n 26:15,19 58:15 wants 34:8 25:17,18,20,21,23 77 40:15\n 1 10:1 54:22\n 59:9 war 14:22 18:6 26:14 27:11,24 78 6:3 40:15\n 10 1:13 3:2\nunderstands 27:4 warning 51:13 28:6,12,14,25 100 15:22,23,25\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[70] " Official\n Page 70\n\n 8\n8 55:16,17\n80 36:24 37:2,4,9\n 9\n90 44:11 48:19\n\n\n\n\n Alderson Reporting Company\n"
[[4]]
[1] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nthe report of the Secretary-General, and decides to keep the 8. Welcomes the initiative of the Force in organizing\nmatter under review; successful bicommunal events, urges the leaders of both\n communities to promote tolerance, confidence and\n 5. Expresses concern about the continuing\n reconciliation between the two communities as recommended in\nmodernization and upgrading of military forces in the Republic\n the relevant reports of the Secretary-General, and calls\nof Cyprus and the lack of progress towards a significant\n uponthem to promote further bicommunal contacts and to\nreduction in the number of foreign troops in the Republic of\n remove obstacles to such contacts;\nCyprus, urges once again all concerned to commit themselves to\nsuch a reduction and to a reduction of defence spending in the 9. Welcomes the Secretary-General’s decision to\nRepublic of Cyprus to help restore confidence between the continue contacts with the two leaders to make every effort to\nparties and as a first step towards the withdrawal of non-Cypriot find common ground for the basis for a resumption of direct\nforces as described in the set of ideas, and calls upon the talks;\nSecretary-General to promote efforts in this direction;\n 10. Reaffirms the importance it attaches to early\n 6. Expresses concern also about the failure by the progress being made on the substance of the Cyprus question\nmilitary authorities on both sides to take reciprocal measures to and on the implementation of the confidence-building measures\nprohibit along the ceasefire lines live ammunition or weapons as called for in resolution 939 (1994) of 29 July 1994;\nother than those which are hand-held and to prohibit also the\n 11. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report\nfiring of weapons within sight or hearing of the buffer zone, and\n during the coming mandate period on his mission of good\ncalls upon those authorities to enter into discussions with the\n offices, including a full assessment of his efforts towards\nForce on this matter in line with paragraph 3 of resolution 839\n reaching a settlement of the situation in Cyprus;\n(1993) of 11 June 1993;\n 12. Also requests the Secretary-General to submit a\n 7. Regrets the failure to reach agreement on the\n report by 10 June 1996 on the implementation of the present\nextension of the 1989 unmanning agreement to cover all areas of\n resolution;\nthe buffer zone where the two sides are in close proximity to\neach other, and calls upon the military authorities on both sides 13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\nto cooperate urgently with the Force to this end;\n\n\n 21. Items relating to the situation in the former Yugoslavia\n A. The situation in the Republic of Bosnia The representative of Turkey made a similar\n and Herzegovina request by a letter of the same date addressed to the\n President of the Security Council.2\n Decision of 8 January 1993 (3159th meeting): At its 3159th meeting, on 8 January 1993, the\n statement by the President Council included the above-mentioned letters in its\n By a letter dated 8 January 1993 addressed to the agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\nPresident of the Security Council, 1 the representative Council invited the representatives of Bosnia and\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina informed the Council that Herzegovina and Turkey, at their request, to participate\nthe Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs of the in the discussion without the right to vote. The\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzego`vina had been killed President (Japan) then stated that, after consultations\nby Serbian extremists, as he was returning from the among members of the Security Council, he had been\nairport in a convoy of the United Nations Protection authorized to make the following statement on behalf\nForce (UNPROFOR). Bosnia and Herzegovina of the Council:3\nrequested an emergency meeting of the Security The Security Council is profoundly shocked to learn of\nCouncil to consider immediate and resolute action, the killing of Mr. Hakija Turajlic, Deputy Prime Minister for\nincluding the use of force under Chapter VII of the Economic Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nCharter. by Bosnian Serb forces, while he was under the protection of the\n United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).\n__________________\n 1 S/25074.\n The Council strongly condemns this outrageous act of\n terrorism which is a grave violation of international\n __________________\n 2 S/25077.\n 3 S/25079.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 721\n"
[2] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nhumanitarian law and a flagrant challenge to the authority and party which would oppose an overall political settlement against\nthe inviolability of UNPROFOR, as well as to the serious efforts the consequences of such an attitude; lack of cooperation and\nundertaken with the aim of achieving an overall political non-compliance with its relevant resolutions will compel the\nsettlement of the crisis. Council to review the situation in an urgent and most serious\n manner and to consider further necessary measures.\n The Council urges all parties and others concerned to\nexercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from taking any\naction which might further exacerbate the situation. Decision of 25 January 1993 (3164th meeting):\n statement by the President\n The Council requests the Secretary-General to undertake a\nfull investigation of the incident and to report to it without At its 3164th meeting, on 25 January 1993, the\ndelay. Upon receipt of that report the Council will consider the Council resumed its consideration of the situation in\nmatter forthwith. the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following\n The members of the Council extend their sincere the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\ncondolences to the bereaved family of Mr. Turajlic and to the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\npeople and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and request, to participate in the discussion without the\nHerzegovina. right to vote.\n\n Decision of 8 January 1993 (3160th meeting): The President (Japan) then stated that, after\n statement by the President consultations among members of the Security Council,\n he had been authorized to make the following\n At its 3160th meeting, on 8 January 1993, the statement on behalf of the Council:5\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the situation in\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following The Security Council notes with appreciation the efforts\n of the international community to alleviate the plight of the\nthe adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the civilian population in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his whose lives have been severely affected by the fighting there.\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the The Council has the highest regard for the efforts of the brave\nright to vote. people who have undertaken to deliver urgently needed\n humanitarian assistance under extremely trying conditions to the\n The President then stated that, after consultations civilian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular, the\namong members of the Security Council, he had been efforts of the United Nations Protection Force and the United\nauthorized to make the following statement on behalf Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. However, the\nof the Council:4 Council deeply regrets that the situation there has imposed great\n limits on the international community in the fulfilment of its\n The Security Council fully supports the efforts of the humanitarian mandate.\nCo-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia aimed at achieving an The Council reaffirms its demand that all parties and\noverall political settlement of the crisis through a complete others concerned, in particular Serb paramilitary units, cease and\ncessation of hostilities and the establishment of a constitutional desist forthwith from all violations of international humanitarian\nframework for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this law being committed in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nconnection, the Council reaffirms the need to respect fully the including in particular the deliberate interference with\nsovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of humanitarian convoys. The Council warns the parties concerned\nBosnia and Herzegovina. of serious consequences, in accordance with relevant resolutions\n of the Security Council, if they continue to impede the delivery\n The Council fully endorses the view of the Secretary- of humanitarian relief assistance.\nGeneral described in his report that it is the duty of all the\nparties involved in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Council invites the Secretary-General to keep under\ndespite the recent provocation, to cooperate with the continuous review the possibility of air dropping humanitarian\nCo-Chairmen in bringing this conflict to an end swiftly. assistance to areas isolated by the conflict in Bosnia and\n Herzegovina.\n The Council appeals to all the parties involved to\ncooperate to the fullest with the peace efforts and warns any The Council will remain actively seized of the matter.\n__________________\n __________________\n 4 S/25080.\n 5 S/25162.\n\n\n\n\n722 07-63109\n"
[3] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n Decision of 17 February 1993 (3173rd meeting): he had been authorized to make the following\n statement by the President statement on behalf of the Council:7\n At its 3173rd meeting, on 17 February 1993, the The Security Council, having heard a report from the\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the situation in Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, is concerned that the\n present opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement in Bosnia\nthe adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the and Herzegovina should not be allowed to slip by. It endorses\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his fully the statement by the President of the United States of\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the America and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on\nright to vote. 23 February, calling on the leaders of the parties involved in the\n peace talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina to come to New York\n The President (Morocco) then stated that, after immediately to resume discussions with a view to the early\nconsultations among members of the Security Council, conclusion of an agreement to end the conflict. The Council\nhe had been authorized to make the following urges these leaders to respond quickly and positively to that call\nstatement on behalf of the Council: 6 and stands ready to give its full support to the efforts of the\n Co-Chairmen to bring the talks to a successful conclusion.\n The Security Council recalls all relevant resolutions of the\nCouncil and its statement of 25 January concerning the\nprovision of humanitarian relief in the Republic of Bosnia and\n Decision of 25 February 1993 (3177th meeting):\nHerzegovina. It notes with deep concern that, notwithstanding statement by the President\nthe Council’s demand in that statement, relief efforts continue to At its 3177th meeting, on 25 February 1993, the\nbe impeded. It condemns the blocking of humanitarian convoys\nand the impeding of relief supplies, which place at risk the\n Council resumed its consideration of the situation in\ncivilian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina and endanger the the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following\nlives of personnel delivering such supplies. It remains deeply the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nconcerned at reports of pressing humanitarian need in Bosnia representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\nand Herzegovina, particularly in the eastern part of the country. request, to participate in the discussion without the\n The Council reiterates its demand that the parties and all right to vote.\nothers concerned allow immediate and unimpeded access to The President (Morocco) then stated that, after\nhumanitarian relief supplies. It further demands that the parties\nand others concerned give the United Nations High\n consultations among members of the Security Council,\nCommissioner for Refugees the guarantees she has sought that he had been authorized to make the following\nthey will abide by the promises they have made to comply with statement on behalf of the Council:8\nthe Council’s decisions in this regard and thus facilitate the\n The Security Council, having received a report from the\nresumption of the full humanitarian relief programme, to which\n Secretary-General, recalls all its relevant resolutions and its\nthe Council attaches the greatest importance.\n statements of 25 January and 17 February 1993 concerning the\n provision of humanitarian relief in the Republic of Bosnia and\n Decision of 24 February 1993 (3176th meeting): Herzegovina. It is deeply concerned that, in spite of its repeated\n statement by the President demands, relief efforts continue to be impeded by Serb\n paramilitary units, especially in the eastern part of the country,\n At its 3176th meeting, on 24 February 1993, the namely in the enclaves of Srebrenica, Cerska, Gorazde and\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the situation in Zepa.\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following\n The Council deplores the deterioration of the\nthe adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the humanitarian situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina at a time\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his when discussions are to resume with a view to reaching a just\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the and durable agreement to end the conflict. It regards the\nright to vote. blockade of relief efforts as a serious impediment to a negotiated\n settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the efforts of the\n The President (Morocco) then stated that, after Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International\nconsultations among members of the Security Council, Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. It notes with concern that\n__________________ the measures taken by Serb paramilitary units to interdict\n 6 S/25302. humanitarian convoys, in flagrant violation of relevant Council\n __________________\n 7 S/25328.\n 8 S/25334.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 723\n"
[4] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nresolutions, expose the personnel of the United Nations request, to participate in the discussion without the\nProtection Force and the Office of the United Nations High right to vote.\nCommissioner for Refugees as well as other humanitarian\norganizations to physical harm. The President (New Zealand) then stated that,\n The deliberate impeding of the delivery of food and\n after consultations among members of the Security\nhumanitarian relief essential for the survival of the civilian Council, he had been authorized to make the following\npopulation in Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes a violation of statement on behalf of the Council:11\nthe Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the Council is committed\n The Security Council, recalling all its relevant resolutions\nto ensuring that individuals responsible for such acts are brought\n and statements, expresses its grave concern at and condemns the\nto justice.\n continuing unacceptable military attacks in eastern Bosnia and\n The Council strongly condemns once again the blocking the resulting deterioration in the humanitarian situation in that\nof humanitarian convoys that has impeded the delivery of region. It is appalled that even as peace talks are continuing,\nhumanitarian supplies. It reiterates its demand that the Bosnian attacks by Serb paramilitary units, including, reportedly, the\nparties grant immediate and unimpeded access for humanitarian killings of innocent civilians, continue in eastern Bosnia. In this\nconvoys and fully comply with the Council’s decisions in this connection, the Council is particularly concerned about the fall\nregard. The Council expresses its strong support for the use, in of the town of Cerska and the imminent fall of neighbouring\nfull coordination with the United Nations and in accordance villages. The Council demands that the killings and atrocities\nwith the relevant Security Council resolutions, of humanitarian must stop and reaffirms that those guilty of crimes against\nair drops in isolated areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina that are in international humanitarian law will be held individually\ncritical need of humanitarian supplies and cannot be reached by responsible by the world community.\nground convoys. It reaffirms its firm commitment to the full\n The Council demands that the leaders of all the parties to\nimplementation of the humanitarian relief programme in Bosnia\n the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina remain\nand Herzegovina.\n fully engaged in New York in a sustained effort with the\n The Council remains actively seized of the matter and Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International\ncontinues its consideration of further steps, in accordance with Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to reach quickly a fair and\nits relevant resolutions. workable settlement. In this connection, the Council also\n demands that all sides immediately cease all forms of military\n Decision of 3 March 1993 (3180th meeting): action throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, cease acts of\n violence against civilians, comply with their previous\n statement by the President commitments including the ceasefire, and redouble their efforts\n By a letter dated 3 March 1993 addressed to the to settle the conflict.\nPresident of the Security Council, 9 the representative The Council further demands that the Bosnian Serb side\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina informed the Council that as well as all other parties refrain from taking any action which\nSerbian and Montenegrin extremist forces had overrun might endanger the lives and well-being of the inhabitants of\nthe town of Cerska in a new round of expulsions and eastern Bosnia, particularly in the areas near the town of Cerska,\ngenocide and that they were threatening the region of and that all concerned allow the unimpeded access of\n humanitarian relief supplies throughout Bosnia and\nSrebrenica. They had also blocked all humanitarian Herzegovina, especially humanitarian access to the besieged\nconvoys. Bosnia and Herzegovina requested an cities of eastern Bosnia, and permit the evacuation of the\nemergency meeting of the Council. wounded.\n The representative of the United States made a Having determined in the relevant resolutions that this\nsimilar request by a letter of the same date.10 situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security,\n the Council insists that these steps must be taken immediately.\n At its 3180th meeting, on 3 March 1993, the\nCouncil included those letters in its agenda. Following The Council also requests the Secretary-General to take\n immediate steps to increase the presence of the United Nations\nthe adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the Protection Force in eastern Bosnia.\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\n__________________ The Council remains seized of the matter and is ready to\n 9 S/25358. meet at any moment to consider further action.\n 10 S/25353.\n __________________\n 11 S/25361.\n\n\n\n\n724 07-63109\n"
[5] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n Decision of 17 March 1993 (3184th meeting): to launch air attacks against the territory of the Republic of\n statement by the President Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n\n At its 3184th meeting, on 17 March 1993, the The Council has mandated its President to convey to the\n Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the situation in Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and to the leader of the\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following Bosnian Serbs its deepest concern about the above-mentioned\nthe adoption of the agenda, the President (New developments and its demand that they take immediate action to\nZealand) stated that, after consultations among prevent any repetitions of these attacks.\nmembers of the Security Council, he had been The Council will continue to consider what additional\nauthorized to make the following statement on behalf steps may be required to secure implementation of the\nof the Council:12 provisions of relevant Security Council resolutions.\n The Security Council has been informed by the Secretary-\nGeneral in a letter dated 12 March 1993 of the violation on Decision of 25 March 1993 (3186th meeting):\n11 March 1993 by military jets, proceeding from the airport of statement by the President\nBanja Luka, of Council resolution 781 (1992) of 9 October\n1992, relating to the prohibition of military flights in the At its 3186th meeting, on 25 March 1993, the\nairspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Council resumed its consideration of the situation in\nnotwithstanding the fact that the Bosnian Serbs at the airport had the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following\nreceived appropriate notification by United Nations observers the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nthat such flights would constitute a violation of the said representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\nresolution. request, to participate in the discussion without the\n The Council equally takes note of the report by the right to vote.\nSecretary-General in his letter of 16 March 1993 indicating that\non 13 March 1993 new violations of the no-fly zone took place The President (New Zealand) then stated that,\nby planes that proceeded to bomb the villages of Gladovici and after consultations among members of the Security\nOsatica in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina before Council, he had been authorized to make the following\nleaving in the direction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia statement on behalf of the Council:13\n(Serbia and Montenegro). The above flights are the first\nviolations of resolution 781 (1992) observed by the United The Security Council warmly welcomes the signature by\nNations Protection Force which involved combat activity. President Alija Izetbegovic and Mr. Mate Boban of all four\n documents of the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina\n The Council strongly condemns all violations of its worked out by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of\nrelevant resolutions and underlines the fact that since the the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.\nbeginning of the monitoring operations in early November 1992,\nthe United Nations has reported 465 violations of the no-fly On this important occasion the Council pays tribute to the\nzone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. untiring efforts of the Co-Chairmen, Secretary Vance and Lord\n Owen.\n The Council demands that these violations cease forthwith\nand reiterates its strong determination to ensure full respect for The Council commends the action of the two parties who\nits resolutions. It particularly underlines its condemnation of all have signed all the documents and calls on the remaining party\nviolations, especially those reported by the Secretary-General in to sign without delay the two documents of the peace plan that it\nhis letters referred to above, at a time when the peace process has not already signed and to cease its violence, offensive\nhas reached a critical juncture and when humanitarian relief military actions, “ethnic cleansing” and obstruction of\nefforts require full cooperation by all parties. humanitarian assistance.\n\n The Council demands from the Bosnian Serbs an The Council calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities\nimmediate explanation of the aforementioned violations and by all parties.\nparticularly of the aerial bombardment of the villages of The Council looks forward to receiving a report from the\nGladovici and Osatica. Secretary-General on the developments in the International\n It requests the Secretary-General to ensure that an Conference and stands ready to take action to follow up on the\ninvestigation is made of the reported possible use of the territory report and to take the steps required to bring about the peace\nof the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) settlement.\n__________________ __________________\n 12 S/25426.\n 13 S/25471.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 725\n"
[6] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n Decision of 31 March 1993 (3191st meeting): Speaking before the vote, the representative of\n resolution 816 (1993) France stated that the Security Council was meeting to\n adopt a resolution of great political importance. The\n By a letter dated 18 March 1993 addressed to the\n previous week the Council had welcomed decisive\nPresident of the Security Council,14 the representative\n progress in the search for a peaceful solution, with the\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina informed the Council that\n signing by two of the parties concerned of the Vance-\nSrebrenica and Sarajevo had been attacked by Serbian\n Owen peace plan. All that was lacking was the\nforces, and that non-Serb citizens of Bjelina were\n agreement of the Bosnian Serb side. It was in that\nissued an ultimatum to leave immediately or face the\n context that the Council would be adopting under\nconsequences. Bosnia and Herzegovina requested an\n Chapter VII, a resolution authorizing the use of force\nemergency meeting of the Security Council, in the light\n to ensure compliance with the ban on flights in the\nof continuing hostilities directed against its citizens,\n no-fly zone established by resolution 781 (1992). It\ngross violations of Security Council resolution 781\n was essential that the Serbian side understand that a\n(1992), grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and\n new stage had been reached in the conflict and that the\nacts of foreign aggression against a Member State.\n Security Council had decided to have recourse to force\n The representative of Turkey made a similar to see that its decisions were respected. The resolution\nrequest on behalf of the Contact Group of the that the Council was about to adopt would mark the\nOrganization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) by a involvement of new actors — States or regional\nletter of the same date addressed to the President of the organizations arrangements — which would intervene\nSecurity Council,15 urging the Council to take effective in new circumstances, as peacemakers and not simply\nmeasures to deal with the continuing challenge to the as peacekeepers. The speaker also welcomed the fact\nUnited Nations including, in particular, the adoption of that a balance had been struck between the technical\na resolution to enforce the “no-fly zone” established necessity of setting up effective military structures and\nunder resolution 781 (1992). the political need to place them under the authority of\n the Security Council, in close coordination with the\n At its 3191st meeting, held on 31 March 1993 in\n Secretary-General. Those principles should serve as a\nresponse to the requests contained in the above-\n model for future peacekeeping or peacemaking\nmentioned letters, the Council resumed its\n operations, to be carried out with Member States acting\nconsideration of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia\n in their national capacity or in the framework of\nand Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the\n regional organizations or arrangements.18\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate The representative of the United Kingdom\nin the discussion without the right to vote. The believed that the Council should be slow to authorize\nPresident (New Zealand) then drew the attention of the the use of force. However, combat flights, that had\nCouncil members to the text of a draft resolution been flown against East Bosnian villages a few days\nsubmitted by France, Morocco, Pakistan, Spain, the earlier, had been a step too far to tolerate under any\nUnited Kingdom and the United States16 and to several circumstances. He noted that the enforcement of the\nother documents.17 no-fly zone, which the Council would authorize under\n__________________ the draft resolution before it, would not be directed\n 14 S/25434.\n against any one party. All sides had violated the no-fly\n 15 S/25437. zone, although the Serb parties had done so more than\n 16 S/25440. others. Nor did the no-fly zone require the use of force;\n 17 Communications dated 6, 13, 20, 27 November and no force would need to be used if no flights violated\n 4 December 1992 and 12, 16, 19 and 22 March 1993 the no-fly zone. If the Serbs in Bosnia and the\n from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of authorities in Belgrade did not heed the Council, then\n the Security Council (S/24783, S/24810, S/24840, the prospects would be grim indeed, with increasing\n S/24870, S/24900 and Add.1-31, S/25443, S/25444,\n isolation, both economic and political. If they did heed\n S/25456 and S/25457, respectively); letter dated __________________\n 22 March 1993 from the representative of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security addressed to the President of the Security Council\n Council (S/25459); letters dated 22 and 23 March, (S/25450 and S/25467).\n 18 S/PV.3191, pp. 3-5.\n respectively, from the representative of Yugoslavia\n\n\n\n726 07-63109\n"
[7] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nthe Council’s message, however, then all the republics Herzegovina, of humanitarian flights and other flights consistent\nof the former Yugoslavia would be able to take their with relevant resolutions of the Council;\nplaces as European States, with the prospect of putting 3. Also requests the Force to continue to monitor\nthe horrors of the previous two years behind them. 19 compliance with the ban on flights in the airspace of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina, and calls on all parties urgently to cooperate with\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and the Force in making practical arrangements for the close\nadopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (China) monitoring of authorized flights and improving the notification\nas resolution 816 (1993), which reads: procedures;\n The Security Council, 4. Authorizes Member States, seven days after the\n adoption of the present resolution, acting nationally or through\n Recalling its resolutions 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992\n regional organizations or arrangements, to take, under the\nand 786 (1992) of 10 November 1992,\n authority of the Security Council and subject to close\n Recalling also paragraph 6 of resolution 781 (1992) and coordination with the Secretary-General and the Force, all\nparagraph 6 of resolution 786 (1992) in which the Council necessary measures in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nundertook to consider urgently, in the case of violations of the in the event of further violations, to ensure compliance with the\nban on military flights in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia ban on flights referred to in paragraph 1 above, and\nand Herzegovina, the further measures necessary to enforce the proportionate to the specific circumstances and the nature of the\nban, flights;\n\n Deploring the failure of some parties concerned to 5. Requests the Member States concerned, the\ncooperate fully with airfield monitors of the United Nations Secretary-General and the Force to coordinate closely on the\nProtection Force in the implementation of resolutions 781 measures they are taking to implement paragraph 4 above,\n(1992) and 786 (1992), including the rules of engagement, and on the starting date of its\n implementation, which should be no later than seven days from\n Deeply concerned by the various reports of the Secretary- the date when the authority conferred by paragraph 4 above\nGeneral concerning violations of the ban on military flights in takes effect, and to report the starting date to the Council\nthe airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through the Secretary-General;\n Deeply concerned in particular by the letters dated 12 and 6. Decides that, in the event of the Co-Chairmen of\n16 March 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the\nthe Security Council concerning new blatant violations of the Former Yugoslavia notifying the Council that all the Bosnian\nban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and parties have accepted their proposals on a settlement before the\nHerzegovina, and recalling in this regard the statement by the starting date referred to in paragraph 5 above, the measures set\nPresident of the Security Council of 17 March 1993, and in forth in the present resolution will be subsumed into the\nparticular the reference to the bombing of villages in Bosnia and measures for implementing that settlement;\nHerzegovina,\n 7. Also requests the Member States concerned to\n Recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of inform the Secretary-General immediately of any actions they\nthe United Nations, take in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 4 above;\n Determining that the grave situation in Bosnia and 8. Requests the Secretary-General to report regularly\nHerzegovina continues to be a threat to international peace and to the Council on the matter and to inform it immediately of any\nsecurity, actions taken by the Member States concerned in exercise of the\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, authority conferred by paragraph 4 above;\n\n 1. Decides to extend the ban established by resolution 9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n781 (1992) to cover flights by all fixed wing and rotary wing Speaking after the vote, the representative of\naircraft in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, this ban not to apply to flights authorized by the\n Brazil stated that enforcement actions under Chapter\nUnited Nations Protection Force in accordance with paragraph 2 VII should be a last resort. The resolution just adopted\nbelow; derived not only from non-compliance with previous\n relevant resolutions, but also from changes in the\n 2. Requests the Force to modify the mechanism\nreferred to in paragraph 3 of resolution 781 (1992) so as to\n qualitative nature of the violations. Brazil attached\nprovide for the authorization, in the airspace of Bosnia and particular importance to the fact that, in accordance\n__________________ with the resolution just adopted, the implementation of\n 19 Ibid., pp. 16-17. the authorization contained in operative paragraph 4\n would be conducted with the Secretary-General and\n\n\n\n07-63109 727\n"
[8] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nUNPROFOR; the Security Council would be kept noted that the Secretary-General had sent a letter to the\nthoroughly informed of the relevant actions; the President of the Security Council dated 22 March\nmeasures to be taken in the airspace of Bosnia and 1993, stating that the Force Commander of\nHerzegovina in the event of further violations would be UNPROFOR had taken the view that the enforcement\nproportionate to the specific circumstances and the action authorized by the resolution would have\nnature of the flights; regional organizations or negative consequences for the viability of UNPROFOR\narrangements involved in the action would be doing so within its existing mandate. In view of those\nunder the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter; considerations, the Chinese delegation had abstained in\nand all care would be taken to ensure the safety on the the vote on the resolution just adopted.22\nground of the personnel of the United Nations and of\n The representative of the Russian Federation\nhumanitarian organizations. His delegation also\n observed that no one had the right to violate Security\nunderstood that the measures taken would be of limited\n Council resolutions and yet all three Bosnian parties,\nduration and that, as soon as the situation were to\n notwithstanding the ban on unauthorized military\nwarrant it, the Council, which would remain actively\n flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nseized of the matter, would proceed to review these\n established by the Council in resolution 781 (1992),\nmeasures.20\n had perpetrated acts that ran counter to the demands of\n The representative of the United States stated that the Security Council. The resolution just adopted\nthe Bosnian Serbs must understand that the resolution envisaged the application of enforcement measures\njust adopted was evidence of the international against those who violated the airspace of Bosnia and\ncommunity’s growing concern with, and intolerance of, Herzegovina. That included the possibility of\ntheir acts of aggression. The credibility of the United appropriate self-defence measures on the part of the\nNations and its entire approach to resolving the conflict monitoring aircraft. The speaker drew attention to the\nrested on its willingness to act strongly and effectively, fact that the appropriate rules of conduct of the\nas the Council was doing through the resolution just operation must, as stated in paragraph 5 of the\nadopted. The resolution just adopted should send the resolution, be coordinated with the Secretary-General\nmessage that, if the Bosnian Serbs wanted to rejoin the and with UNPROFOR. The provision of the resolution\nfamily of nations, then their behaviour must conform to regarding the 14-day deferral of the start of the\ninternational norms. The speaker also observed that, implementation of the measures envisaged in the\nwhile the international community had a duty to resolution was also important. The Russian Federation\nencourage the parties to reach a settlement, it also hoped that the adoption of the resolution would send a\nneeded to demonstrate that signing pieces of paper serious message to all Bosnian parties regarding the\nwithout intent to implement them was not enough. By resolve of the Security Council to seek a speedy end to\nshowing its will to enforce agreements, the Council the Bosnian conflict through implementation of the\nhad demonstrated its commitment to peace and its Vance-Owen peace plan. For its part, it would continue\nresolve to end the conflict.21 to do everything to promote the attainment of that\n goal. 23\n The representative of China stated that, in\nprinciple, his delegation did not oppose the Other speakers also stressed that the action taken by\nestablishment of a no-fly zone in Bosnia and the Council should be supplemented by other measures\nHerzegovina, with the consent of the parties concerned, and, in particular, a ban on the use of heavy weapons and\nwith a view to easing the tension and ensuring the effective international control of such weapons.24\nsmooth conduct of international humanitarian relief\nactivities. However, China’s principled position on __________________\nSecurity Council resolution 781 (1992) remained 22 Ibid., p. 22.\n 23 Ibid., pp. 23-25.\nunchanged. The Chinese delegation had reservations on\n 24 Ibid., pp. 13-15 (Cape Verde); and pp. 29-31 (Pakistan).\nthe invocation of Chapter VII to authorize countries to\nuse force in implementing the no-fly zone. Moreover, it\n__________________\n 20 Ibid., pp. 17-20.\n 21 Ibid., pp. 19-21.\n\n\n\n\n728 07-63109\n"
[9] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n Decision of 3 April 1993 (3192nd meeting): Recognizing the imperative need to alleviate, with the\n statement by the President utmost urgency, the sufferings of the population in and around\n Srebrenica who are in desperate need of food, medicine, clothes\n By a letter dated 2 April 1993,25 the Secretary- and shelter, the Council demands that the Bosnian Serb party\nGeneral transmitted to the President of the Security cease and desist forthwith from all violations of international\nCouncil a letter from the United Nations High humanitarian law, including in particular the deliberate\nCommissioner for Refugees. The letter described the interference with humanitarian convoys, and allow all such\n convoys unhindered access to the town of Srebrenica and other\ndisturbing situation that had developed in Srebrenica parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council demands that the\nfollowing the decision of Bosnian Serb military Bosnian Serb party strictly comply with all relevant resolutions\nauthorities not to permit any further aid to be delivered of the Council. It further demands that the Bosnian Serb party\nto that town and proposed two options. The first option honour forthwith its most recent commitment “to guarantee the\nwould be to turn Srebrenica into a United Nations free movement of humanitarian convoys and the protection of\nprotected area, and the second to organize a large-scale endangered civilians”. The Council also reaffirms that those\nevacuation of the population. The Secretary-General guilty of crimes against international humanitarian law will be\n held individually responsible by the world community.\nnoted that the Force Commander of UNPROFOR had\nbeen instructed to take the matter up immediately with The Council commends and strongly supports the efforts\nthe Bosnian Serb leadership and to insist that the of the brave people who have undertaken to deliver urgently\nOffice of the United Nations High Commissioner for needed humanitarian assistance, under extremely trying\n conditions, to the civilian population in Bosnia and\nRefugees (UNHCR) be permitted to resume delivering Herzegovina, and in particular the efforts of the United Nations\naid to Srebrenica. In the meantime, he suggested that High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations\nthe members of the Security Council might wish to Protection Force.\nconsider supportive action in relation to the situation.\n The Council recalls the request it made to the Secretary-\n At its 3192nd meeting, on 3 April 1993, the General in its statement of 3 March 1993 to take immediate\nCouncil included the above-mentioned letter in its steps to increase the presence of the Force in eastern Bosnia,\nagenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the welcomes the action taken already in that respect, and urges the\n Secretary-General and the High Commissioner to use all the\nCouncil invited the representative of Bosnia and resources at their disposal within the scope of the relevant\nHerzegovina, at his request, to participate in the resolutions of the Council to reinforce the existing humanitarian\ndiscussion without the right to vote. operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n The President (Pakistan) then stated that, after The Council will remain actively seized of the matter.\nconsultations among members of the Security Council,\nhe had been authorized to make the following Decision of 8 April 1993: statement by the\nstatement on behalf of the Council: 26 President\n The Security Council is shocked by and extremely On 8 April 1993, after consultations with the\nalarmed at the dire and worsening humanitarian situation which members of the Council, the President made the\nhas developed in Srebrenica in the eastern part of the Republic following statement to the media on behalf of the\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina following the unacceptable decision\nof the Bosnian Serb party not to permit any further humanitarian\n members of the Council:27\naid to be delivered to that town and to allow only evacuation of The members of the Security Council express their\nits civilian population. The relevant facts are contained in a concern at the report of the International Committee of the Red\nletter dated 2 April 1993, addressed to the Secretary-General by Cross (ICRC), according to which 17 detainees lost their lives\nthe United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. on 26 March 1993 in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n when the vehicle transporting them from the Batkovic Camp\n The Council recalls and reaffirms all its relevant\n (under the control of Serb forces) for work at the front was\nresolutions and statements and condemns the continuing\n ambushed.\ndisregard and wilful flouting of them by the Bosnian Serb party,\nwhich once again, in pursuit of its unlawful, unacceptable and The members of the Council, recalling all the relevant\nabhorrent policy of “ethnic cleansing” aimed at territorial resolutions and statements of the Council, remind all the parties\naggrandizement, has blocked the United Nations humanitarian that they are responsible at all times for the detainees’ safety and\nrelief efforts. that they must not compel detainees to do work of a military\n__________________ nature or destined to serve a military purpose. The ICRC had\n __________________\n 25 S/25519.\n 27 S/25557.\n 26 S/25520.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 729\n"
[10] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nalready repeatedly called on all parties to the conflict in Bosnia Your letter dated 9 April 1993 has been brought to the\nand Herzegovina strictly to observe the provisions of attention of the Security Council.\ninternational humanitarian law.\n The Council takes note that the operations authorized by\n The members of the Council condemn all violations of the its resolution 816 (1993) will start on Monday, 12 April 1993 at\nThird and Fourth Geneva Conventions, which the parties have 1200 GMT, in accordance with the modalities described in the\nundertaken to respect, and reaffirm once again that those who annex to your above-mentioned letter.\ncommit or order the commission of such acts will be held\npersonally responsible. Decision of 16 April 1993 (3199th meeting):\n The members of the Council request the Commission of resolution 819 (1993)\nExperts established pursuant to resolution 780 (1992) to carry\nout an investigation of these abominable practices and to make a\n At its 3199th meeting, on 16 April 1993, the\nreport. Council resumed its consideration of the situation in\n the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following\n Decision of 9 April 1993: letter from the the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\n President to the Secretary-General representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\n request, to participate in the discussion without the\n By a letter dated 9 April 1993 addressed to the right to vote. The President (Pakistan) then drew the\nPresident of the Security Council,28 the Secretary- attention of the Council members to the text of a draft\nGeneral, referring to resolution 816 (1993) of resolution prepared in the course of the Council’s prior\n31 March 1993, reported that Member States consultations 30 and to several other documents. 31\nconcerned, acting nationally as well as through the\nregional arrangement of the North Atlantic Treaty The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nOrganization (NATO), had been closely coordinating adopted unanimously as resolution 819 (1993), which\nwith him and UNPROFOR on the measures they were reads:\ntaking to ensure compliance with the ban on all flights The Security Council,\nin the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He also\n Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September\nreported that the NATO Secretary-General had 1991 and all its subsequent relevant resolutions,\ninformed him, in a letter dated 8 April 1993, that the\nNorth Atlantic Council had adopted the necessary Noting that the International Court of Justice in its Order\narrangements. The Secretary-General further noted that of 8 April 1993 in the case concerning application of the\n Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of\nthe rules of engagement established by the Member Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nStates concerned were in conformity with the Montenegro)) unanimously indicated as a provisional measure\nrequirements set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 816 that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n(1993), and that, as requested in paragraph 2 of that (Serbia and Montenegro) should immediately, in pursuance of its\nresolution, UNPROFOR had modified the mechanism undertaking in the Convention on the Prevention and\nreferred to in paragraph 3 of Council resolution 781 Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December 1948, take\n(1992). The revised guidelines for the authorization of all measures within its power to prevent the commission of the\n crime of genocide,\nnon-UNPROFOR and non-UNHCR flights in the\nairspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina were attached as Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and\nan annex to the letter. The Secretary-General, lastly, political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and\nreported that the NATO Secretary-General had Herzegovina,\ninformed him that his military authorities were Reaffirming also its call on the parties and others\nprepared to begin the operation at noon GMT on concerned to observe immediately the ceasefire throughout\nMonday, 12 April 1993. Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n __________________\n By a letter dated 10 April 1993,29 the President of\n 30 S/25617.\nthe Security Council informed the Secretary-General of\n 31 Letters dated 5, 15 and 16 April 1993, respectively, from\nthe following:\n the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed\n__________________ to the President of the Security Council (S/25529,\n 28 S/25567. S/25609 and S/25616).\n 29 S/25568.\n\n\n\n\n730 07-63109\n"
[11] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n Reaffirming further its condemnation of all violations of 5. Reaffirms that any taking or acquisition of territory\ninternational humanitarian law, including, in particular, the by the threat or use of force, including through the practice of\npractice of “ethnic cleansing”, “ethnic cleansing”, is unlawful and unacceptable;\n Concerned by the pattern of hostilities by Bosnian Serb 6. Condemns and rejects the deliberate actions of the\nparamilitary units against towns and villages in eastern Bosnia, Bosnian Serb party to force the evacuation of the civilian\nand in this regard reaffirming that any taking or acquisition of population from Srebrenica and its surrounding areas as well as\nterritory by the threat or use of force, including through the from other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of its overall\npractice of “ethnic cleansing”, is unlawful and unacceptable, abhorrent campaign of “ethnic cleansing”;\n Deeply alarmed at the information provided by the 7. Reaffirms its condemnation of all violations of\nSecretary-General to the Security Council on 16 April 1993 on international humanitarian law, in particular the practice of\nthe rapid deterioration of the situation in Srebrenica and its “ethnic cleansing”, and reaffirms that those who commit or\nsurrounding areas, as a result of the continued deliberate armed order the commission of such acts shall be held individually\nattacks and shelling of the innocent civilian population by responsible in respect of such acts;\nBosnian Serb paramilitary units,\n 8. Demands the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian\n Strongly condemning the deliberate interdiction by assistance to all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular\nBosnian Serb paramilitary units of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population of Srebrenica and its surrounding\nconvoys, areas, and recalls that such impediments to the delivery of\n humanitarian assistance constitute a serious violation of\n Also strongly condemning the actions taken by Bosnian\n international humanitarian law;\nSerb paramilitary units against the United Nations Protection\nForce, in particular, their refusal to guarantee the safety and 9. Urges the Secretary-General and the United\nfreedom of movement of Force personnel, Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to use all the\n resources at their disposal within the scope of the relevant\n Aware that a tragic humanitarian emergency has already\n resolutions of the Council to reinforce the existing humanitarian\ndeveloped in Srebrenica and its surrounding areas as a direct\n operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular Srebrenica\nconsequence of the brutal actions of Bosnian Serb paramilitary\n and its surroundings;\nunits, forcing the large scale displacement of civilians, in\nparticular women, children and the elderly, 10. Also demands that all parties guarantee the safety\n and full freedom of movement of the United Nations Protection\n Recalling the provisions of resolution 815 (1993) of\n Force and of all other United Nations personnel as well as\n30 March 1993 on the mandate of the Force, and in that context\n members of humanitarian organizations;\nacting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 11. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation\n 1. Demands that all parties and others concerned treat\n with the High Commissioner and the Force, to arrange for the\nSrebrenica and its surroundings as a safe area which should be\n safe transfer of the wounded and ill civilians from Srebrenica\nfree from any armed attack or any other hostile act;\n and its surrounding areas and urgently to report thereon to the\n 2. Demands also to that effect the immediate Council;\ncessation of armed attacks by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units\n 12. Decides to send, as soon as possible, a mission of\nagainst Srebrenica and their immediate withdrawal from the\n members of the Council to Bosnia and Herzegovina to ascertain\nareas surrounding Srebrenica;\n the situation and report thereon to the Council;\n 3. Demands further that the Federal Republic of\n l3. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) immediately cease the\n to consider further steps to achieve a solution in conformity with\nsupply of military arms, equipment and services to the Bosnian\n its relevant resolutions.\nSerb paramilitary units in the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina;\n Decision of 17 April 1993 (3200th meeting):\n 4. Requests the Secretary-General, with a view to resolution 820 (1993)\nmonitoring the humanitarian situation in the safe area, to take\nimmediate steps to increase the presence of the United Nations By a letter dated 17 April 1993 addressed to the\nProtection Force in Srebrenica and its surroundings, demands President of the Security Council,32 the representative\nthat all parties and others concerned cooperate fully and of France requested an immediate meeting of the\npromptly with the Force towards that end, and requests the Council to discuss the situation in Bosnia and\nSecretary-General to report urgently thereon to the Security\nCouncil;\n Herzegovina.\n __________________\n 32 S/25622.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 731\n"
[12] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n In a letter of the same date addressed to the the Secretary-General informed the Council on the\nPresident of the Council,33 the representatives of Cape latest round of peace talks held from 16 to 25 March\nVerde, Djibouti, Morocco, Pakistan and Venezuela also 1993 by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of\nrequested an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the Conference with the three sides to the conflict. The\nthe situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Government had\nHerzegovina, particularly in Srebrenica, and to take signed all the elements of the peace package put\naction on a proposed draft resolution,34 since the forward by the Co-Chairmen, namely the\nconditions justifying the adoption of resolution 819 Constitutional Principles, the map of provincial\n(1993) had not been met. boundaries, the military agreement and the interim\n arrangements whereas the Bosnian Serbs had declined\n At its 3200th meeting, held on 17 April 1993 in\n to sign the provincial map and the agreement on\nresponse to the requests contained in the above-\n interim arrangements. The Secretary-General urged the\nmentioned letters, the Council included the letters in its\n Council to approve the peace package proposed by the\nagenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\n Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\nCouncil invited the representative of Bosnia and\n International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and\nHerzegovina, at his request, to participate in the\n to call upon the Bosnian Serbs side to sign the\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The Council also\n remaining two parts of the peace plan. He also\ninvited Ambassador Dragomir Djokic, at his request, to\n recommended the early establishment of an\ntake a seat at the Council table, and it extended an\n International Human Rights Monitoring Mission,\ninvitation to Mr. Cyrus Vance, Co-Chairman of the\n which all three sides had accepted.\nSteering Committee of the International Conference on\nthe Former Yugoslavia. Mr. Vance stated that the Co-Chairmen of the\n International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia\n The President (Pakistan) then drew the attention\n hoped that the Council would adopt the draft resolution\nof the Council members to the text of a draft resolution\n forthwith, and thus send the clear message to the\nsubmitted by Cape Verde, Djibouti, France, Morocco,\n Bosnian Serb side and its supporters that time was\nSpain, the United Kingdom, the United States and\n running out and the international community would\nVenezuela and read out revisions to be made to the\n wait no longer. Should the measures envisaged in it fail\ndraft. 35 He also drew attention to a series of reports of\n to achieve the desired effect, they should be followed\nthe Secretary-General,36 including a report on the\n by additional measures of sterner persuasion. The\nactivities of the International Conference on the\n speaker added that everything possible must be done to\nFormer Yugoslavia dated 26 March 1993, and to\n bring humanitarian relief and assistance to the\nseveral other documents.37 In his report of 26 March,38\n__________________ suffering communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n 33 S/25623.\n There could be no excuse for obstructing humanitarian\n 34 S/25558. convoys.39\n 35 Ibid.\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of\n 36 S/25221, S/25248, S/25403, S/25479 and S/25490.\n 37 Letter dated 6 April from the representatives of France,\n France noted that, by agreeing, as a last concession, to\n Spain and the United Kingdom addressed to the\n postpone the adoption of the draft resolution, his\n __________________\n President of the Security Council (S/25546); letter dated\n 22 February 1993 from the representatives of Bulgaria, President of the Security Council (S/25604); letter dated\n Romania and Ukraine addressed to the President of the 15 April 1993 from the representative of Venezuela\n Security Council (S/25322); letter dated 6 April 1993 addressed to the President of the Security Council\n from the representative of Italy addressed to the (S/25605); letter dated 15 April 1993 from the\n Secretary-General (S/25551); letter dated 8 April 1993 representative of Turkey addressed to the President of\n from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina the Security Council (S/25607); letter dated 14 April\n addressed to the President of the Security Council 1993 from the representative of Yugoslavia addressed to\n (S/25566); letter dated 12 April 1993 from the the President of the Security Council (S/25619); and\n representatives of France, Spain, the United Kingdom letter dated 17 April 1993 from the representative of\n and the United States addressed to the President of the Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of\n Security Council (S/25580); letter dated 15 April 1993 the Security Council (S/25624).\n 38 S/25479.\n from the representatives of Cape Verde, Djibouti,\n 39 S/PV.3200, pp. 6-7.\n Morocco, Pakistan and Venezuela addressed to the\n\n\n\n732 07-63109\n"
[13] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\ndelegation had hoped that the situation on the ground enter into force only nine days after its adoption,\nwould stabilize and that there would be progress in unless an agreement were to be signed on the Vance-\nnegotiating the Vance-Owen plan. On the contrary, the Owen plan. Nevertheless, it retained serious\nSerbian side had taken advantage of that postponement misgivings about the possible negative consequences\nto take control of Srebrenica, while at the same time of the Council’s haste, and it would abstain in the\nrejecting the peace plan. His delegation believed that voting on the draft resolution. 41\nthe Council should vote to strengthen the sanctions. He\n The representative of Brazil stated that the draft\nfurther observed that the draft resolution, by\n resolution presented three fundamental aspects. The\nstrengthening the provisions of resolution 757 (1992),\n first aspect was the support by the Security Council for\nmarked the total economic and financial isolation of\n the Vance-Owen peace plan. In that respect, his\nSerbia. France was prepared to take immediate steps to\n delegation believed that the Security Council should\nmake the implementation of the resolution effective\n always favour the resort to and the exhaustion of the\nand was working on setting up assistance to the\n peaceful and negotiated means for the settlement of\ncountries along the Danube to suspend all river traffic\n disputes. The second aspect was the strengthening of\ndestined for Serbia. Stating that the measures contained\n the measures imposed by earlier resolutions. As a\nin the draft resolution were not “sanctions for\n matter of principle, Brazil had always held that action\nsanctions’ sake”, but rather part of a global political\n under Chapter VII of the Charter should be taken only\nplan, the speaker observed that the Council’s support\n in extreme circumstances. In the case before it, the\nfor the Vance-Owen plan sent a clear signal to the\n grave deterioration of the situation in Bosnia and\nSerbs that there was a path other than conflict. In that\n Herzegovina justified such an exceptional course of\nrespect, section C of the draft resolution was something\n action. Brazil was aware that the measures that the\nnew and reflected the desire to see the Federal\n Council was about to approve would entail complex\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) rejoin\n considerations of a legal, economic, financial and\nthe international community, provided that it fully\n administrative order. While some of these measures\nrespected the relevant United Nations resolutions. 40\n could be readily implemented, others might require the\n The representative of the Russian Federation enactment of appropriate enabling legislation. He\nstated that the adoption, at that juncture, of a resolution stated that his Government would take all necessary\nstrengthening the sanctions, was quite untimely. The steps to put such legislation in place as soon as\nRussian Federation supported all the provisions of possible. It was his understanding that the specific\nsection A of the draft resolution, under which the provisions of paragraph 29 of the draft resolution, as\nSecurity Council would call upon all sides to reach a they referred to the territorial sea of the Federal\nrapid and peaceful solution. It was important to give Republic of Yugoslavia, were of an exceptional nature,\nthe parties the possibility, through international related specifically to the particular situation, and that\nmediation, of reaching an agreement on the Vance- they could not be considered as a precedent that in any\nOwen plan, and of completing the intensive way altered or derogated from the regime of coastal-\nnegotiations that were proceeding at that time. It was State rights in that territorial sea, in accordance with\nthe Russian Federation’s view, however, that the the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the\nSecurity Council should provide one last chance — Sea and other relevant norms of international law. The\nwhich should be used primarily by the Serbian side — third aspect — namely, the provisions of section C of\nfor the achievement of a realistic agreement by the draft resolution, to which Brazil attached\nobserving a ceasefire and refraining from any actions importance, made it clear that the exceptional measures\nthat might be regarded as “ethnic cleansing”. The most contained in section B were not irreversible. He hoped\nreasonable approach would have been to delay voting that they might soon lead to the creation of conditions\non the draft resolution until 26 April. Since the that would permit resort to the review mechanisms\nmajority of the Council members, however, had provided for in paragraph 31 of the draft resolution.42\ninsisted upon an immediate vote, the Russian __________________\nFederation would not hinder the adoption of that 41 Ibid., pp. 11-12.\ndecision, particularly in view of the fact that it would 42 Ibid., pp. 12-13.\n__________________\n 40 Ibid., pp. 7-10.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 733\n"
[14] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n The representative of Spain noted that the draft Reaffirming in this regard its resolution 808 (1993) of\nresolution before the Council incorporated essential 22 February 1993 in which it decided that an international\nelements for a package proposed by the European tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons\n responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian\nCommunity with a view to increasing the effectiveness law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since\nof the sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of 1991 and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report at\nYugoslavia and at the same time opened up other the earliest possible date,\nprospects if there was a radical change in the attitude\n Deeply alarmed and concerned about the magnitude of\nof the Bosnian Serbs. Indeed, if the Bosnian Serbs the plight of innocent victims of the conflict in Bosnia and\naccepted the peace plan and implemented it fully and Herzegovina,\nin good faith, it would make possible a gradual easing\nof the pressure brought to bear on them and the Federal Expressing its condemnation of all the activities carried\n out in violation of resolutions 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992 and\nRepublic of Yugoslavia; it would pave the way for a 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992 between the territory of the\nreview of the sanctions and their eventual lifting. If, on Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and\nthe contrary, the Bosnian Serbs did not desist from Serb-controlled areas in the Republic of Croatia and the\ntheir current policy, they and the Federal Republic of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nYugoslavia would remain isolated from the rest of the Deeply concerned by the position of the Bosnian Serb\ninternational community and would suffer the full party as reported in paragraphs 17, 18 and 19 of the report of the\neffects of the Council’s sanctions. The speaker further Secretary-General of 26 March 1993,\nnoted that the time allowed by the Council, as a gesture\n Recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of\nof goodwill had in fact been used to create de facto the United Nations,\nsituations in the field. These situations were contrary to\nthe objectives sought by the international community A\nas embodied in the Vance-Owen plan. In these 1. Commends the peace plan for Bosnia and\ncircumstances, his Government had reached the Herzegovina in the form agreed to by two of the Bosnian parties\nconclusion that the draft resolution must be put to a and set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 26 March\nvote without further delay. 43 1993, namely the Agreement on Interim Arrangements (annex I),\n the nine Constitutional Principles (annex II), the provisional\n The draft resolution, as orally revised in its provincial map (annex III) and the Agreement for Peace in\nprovisional form, was then put to the vote, and was Bosnia and Herzegovina (annex IV);\nadopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (China, 2. Welcomes the fact that this plan has now been\nRussian Federation), as resolution 820 (1993), which accepted in full by two of the Bosnian parties;\nreads:\n 3. Expresses its grave concern at the refusal so far of\n The Security Council, the Bosnian Serb party to accept the Agreement on Interim\n Arrangements and the provisional provincial map, and calls on\n Reaffirming all its earlier relevant resolutions,\n that party to accept the peace plan in full;\n Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of\n 4. Demands that all parties and others concerned\n2 and 8 February and 12 and 26 March 1993 on the peace talks\n continue to observe the ceasefire and refrain from any further\nheld by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\n hostilities;\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,\n 5. Also demands full respect for the right of the\n Reaffirming the need for a lasting peace settlement to be\n United Nations Protection Force and the international\nsigned by all of the Bosnian parties,\n humanitarian agencies to free and unimpeded access to all areas\n Reaffirming also the sovereignty, territorial integrity and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that all parties, in particular the\npolitical independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Bosnian Serb party and others concerned, cooperate fully with\nHerzegovina, them and take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of their\n personnel;\n Reaffirming once again that any taking of territory by\nforce or any practice of “ethnic cleansing” is unlawful and 6. Condemns once again all violations of international\ntotally unacceptable, and insisting that all displaced persons be humanitarian law, including in particular the practice of “ethnic\nenabled to return in peace to their former homes, cleansing” and the massive, organized and systematic detention\n and rape of women, and reaffirms that those who commit or\n__________________\n have committed or order or have ordered the commission of\n 43 Ibid., pp. 16-19.\n\n\n\n\n734 07-63109\n"
[15] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nsuch acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nacts; respectively;\n 7. Reaffirms its endorsement of the principles that all 13. Decides that all States, in implementing the\nstatements or commitments made under duress, particularly measures imposed by resolutions 757 (1992), 760 (1992) of\nthose relating to land and property, are wholly null and void and 18 June 1992, 787 (1992) and the present resolution, shall take\nthat all displaced persons have the right to return in peace to steps to prevent diversion to the territory of the Federal\ntheir former homes and should be assisted to do so; Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of\n commodities and products said to be destined for other places, in\n 8. Declares its readiness to take all the necessary\n particular the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia and\nmeasures to assist the parties in the effective implementation of\n those areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of\nthe peace plan once it has been agreed in full by all the parties,\n Bosnian Serb forces;\nand requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council at\nthe earliest possible date, and if possible not later than nine days 14. Demands that all parties and others concerned\nafter the adoption of the present resolution, a report containing cooperate fully with the United Nations Protection Force in the\nan account of the preparatory work for the implementation of the fulfilment of its immigration and customs control functions\nproposals referred to in paragraph 28 of his report of 26 March deriving from resolution 769 (1992) of 7 August 1992;\n1993 and detailed proposals for the implementation of the peace\n 15. Decides that transshipment of commodities and\nplan, including arrangements for the effective international\n products through the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\ncontrol of heavy weapons, based, inter alia, on consultations\n Montenegro) on the Danube shall be permitted only if\nwith Member States, acting nationally or through regional\n specifically authorized by the Security Council Committee\norganizations or arrangements;\n established by resolution 724 (1991) and that each vessel so\n 9. Encourages Member States, acting nationally or authorized must be subject to effective monitoring while passing\nthrough regional organizations or arrangements, to cooperate along the Danube between Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs;\neffectively with the Secretary-General in his efforts to assist the\n 16. Confirms that no vessels (a) registered in the\nparties in implementing the peace plan in accordance with\n Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or\nparagraph 8 above;\n (b) in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person\n B or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or (c) suspected of having\n Determined to strengthen the implementation of the\n violated or being in violation of resolutions 713 (1991) of\nmeasures imposed by its earlier relevant resolutions,\n 25 September 1991, 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United resolution shall be permitted to pass through installations,\nNations, including river locks or canals within the territory of Member\n States, and calls upon the riparian States to ensure that adequate\n 10. Decides that the provisions set forth in paragraphs monitoring is provided to all cabotage traffic involving points\n12 to 30 below shall, to the extent that they establish obligations that are situated between Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs;\nbeyond those established by its earlier relevant resolutions,\ncome into force nine days after the date of the adoption of the 17. Reaffirms the responsibility of riparian States to\npresent resolution unless the Secretary-General has reported to take necessary measures to ensure that shipping on the Danube\nthe Council that the Bosnian Serb party has joined the other is in accordance with resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787\nparties in signing the peace plan and in implementing it and that (1992) and the present resolution, including any measures under\nthe Bosnian Serbs have ceased their military attacks; the authority of the Security Council to halt or otherwise control\n all shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and\n 11. Decides also that if, at any time after the destinations, to ensure effective monitoring and to ensure strict\nsubmission of the above-mentioned report of the Secretary- implementation of the relevant resolutions, and reiterates its\nGeneral, the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the request in resolution 787 (1992) to all States, including\nBosnian Serbs have renewed their military attacks or failed to non-riparian States, to provide, acting nationally or through\ncomply with the peace plan, the provisions set forth in regional organizations or arrangements, such assistance as may\nparagraphs 12 to 30 below shall come into force immediately; be required by the riparian States, notwithstanding the\n 12. Decides that import to, export from and restrictions on navigation set out in the international agreements\ntransshipment through the United Nations Protected Areas in the which apply to the Danube;\nRepublic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia 18. Requests the Committee established by resolution\nand Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, with 724 (1991) to make periodic reports to the Security Council on\nthe exception of essential humanitarian supplies including information submitted to the Committee regarding alleged\nmedical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by international violations of the relevant resolutions, identifying where possible\nhumanitarian agencies, shall be permitted only with proper persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in\nauthorization from the Government of the Republic of Croatia or such violations;\n\n\n\n07-63109 735\n"
[16] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n 19. Reminds States of the importance of strict 23. Decides that each State neighbouring the Federal\nenforcement of measures imposed under Chapter VII of the Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall prevent\nCharter, and calls upon them to bring proceedings against the passage of all freight vehicles and rolling stock into or out of\npersons and entities violating the measures imposed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),\nresolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and the present except at a strictly limited number of road and rail border\nresolution and to impose appropriate penalties; crossing points, the location of which shall be notified by each\n neighbouring State to the Committee established by resolution\n 20. Welcomes the role of the international Sanctions\n 724 (1991) and approved by the Committee;\nAssistance Missions in support of the implementation of the\nmeasures imposed under resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 24. Decides that all States shall impound all vessels,\n787 (1992) and the present resolution and the appointment of the freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in their territories in\nSanctions Coordinator by the Conference on Security and which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or\nCooperation in Europe, and invites the Sanctions Coordinator undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of\nand the Sanctions Assistance Missions to work in close Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and that these vessels,\ncooperation with the Committee established by resolution 724 freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft may be forfeit to the\n(1991); seizing State upon a determination that they have been in\n violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or\n 21. Decides that States in which there are funds,\n the present resolution;\nincluding any funds derived from property, (a) of the authorities\nin the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), 25. Decides that all States shall detain pending\nor (b) of commercial, industrial or public utility undertakings in investigation all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock, aircraft\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or and cargoes found in their territories and suspected of having\n(c) controlled directly or indirectly by such authorities or violated or being in violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757\nundertakings or by entities, wherever located or organized, (1992), 787 (1992) or the present resolution, and that, upon a\nowned or controlled by such authorities or undertakings, shall determination that they have been in violation, such vessels,\nrequire all persons and entities within their own territories freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft shall be impounded\nholding such funds to freeze them to ensure that they are not and, where appropriate, they and their cargoes may be forfeit to\nmade available directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of the the detaining State;\nauthorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n 26. Confirms that States may charge the expense of\nMontenegro) or to any commercial, industrial or public utility\n impounding vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft\nundertaking in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n to their owners;\nMontenegro), and calls on all States to report to the Committee\nestablished by resolution 724 (1991) on actions taken pursuant 27. Decides to prohibit the provision of services, both\nto this paragraph; financial and non-financial, to any person or body for purposes\n of any business carried on in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n 22. Decides to prohibit the transport of all commodities\n (Serbia and Montenegro), the only exceptions being\nand products across the land borders or to or from the ports of\n telecommunications, postal services, legal services consistent\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),\n with resolution 757 (1992) and, as approved on a case by case\nthe only exceptions being:\n basis by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991),\n (a) The importation of medical supplies and foodstuffs services whose supply may be necessary for humanitarian or\ninto the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and other exceptional purposes;\nMontenegro) as provided for in resolution 757 (1992), in which\n 28. Decides to prohibit all commercial maritime traffic\nconnection the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991)\n from entering the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of\nwill draw up rules for monitoring to ensure full compliance with\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) except when authorized on\nthis and other relevant resolutions;\n a case by case basis by the Committee established by resolution\n (b) The importation of other essential humanitarian 724 (1991) or in case of force majeure;\nsupplies into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n 29. Reaffirms the authority of States acting under\nMontenegro) approved on a case by case basis under the no\n paragraph 12 of resolution 787 (1992) to use such measures\nobjection procedure by the Committee established by resolution\n commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be\n724 (1991);\n necessary under the authority of the Security Council to enforce\n (c) Strictly limited transshipment through the territory the present resolution and its other relevant resolutions,\nof the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), including in the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of\nwhen authorized on an exceptional basis by the Committee Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);\nestablished by resolution 724 (1991), provided that nothing in\n 30. Confirms that the provisions set forth in paragraphs\nthis paragraph shall affect transshipment on the Danube in\n 12 to 29 above, strengthening the implementation of the\naccordance with paragraph 15 above;\n measures imposed by its earlier relevant resolutions, do not\n apply to activities related to the United Nations Protection\n\n\n\n736 07-63109\n"
[17] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nForce, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia or impunity, were legitimate means of manifesting the\nthe European Community Monitor Mission; right to self-determination. It was also necessary to\n C curtail any claim that ethnic, cultural or religious ties\n gave States the right to interfere in the internal crises\n Desirous of achieving the full readmittance of the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the\n of any other State.45\ninternational community once it has fully implemented the The representative of China noted that the\nrelevant resolutions of the Council, resolution just adopted commended the unremitting\n 31. Expresses its readiness, after all three Bosnian efforts of the Co-Chairmen in the peace negotiations,\nparties have accepted the peace plan and on the basis of verified reiterated the necessity of achieving a lasting peace\nevidence, provided by the Secretary-General, that the Bosnian acceptable to all the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nSerb party is cooperating in good faith in effective and emphasized the importance of ensuring the\nimplementation of the plan, to review all the measures in the\npresent resolution and its other relevant resolutions with a view\n sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of\nto gradually lifting them; Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those elements were in\n conformity with China’s principled position and it\n 32. Invites all States to consider what contribution they therefore welcomed and supported them in the\ncan make to the reconstruction of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina;\n resolution. At the same time, however, China found it\n difficult to support such elements in the resolution as\n 33. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. the invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter of the\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United Nations, the adoption of enforcement measures\nUnited Kingdom said that the resolution just adopted and the authorization of measures to strengthen and\nhad a triple purpose. The first purpose was to throw the expand the existing sanctions regime against the\nweight of the Council firmly behind the peace process Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. History had shown\nof the two Co-Chairmen and to get across to the that it was impossible to find lasting solutions to\nBosnian Serbs that signature of these documents conflicts and disputes by exerting pressure externally\nrepresented the only way to assure their future as a and adopting such enforcement actions as sanctions.\ndistinct community within Bosnia. The second purpose The speaker contended that the actions authorized by\nwas to bring home to the Bosnian Serbs and their the resolution would not only bring suffering to the\nbackers in Belgrade the consequences of rejection, in people in the country targeted by the sanctions regime,\nthe form of tightened sanctions and complete isolation. but would also be gravely detrimental to the economies\nThe third was to show that acceptance and of the third countries implementing such sanctions\nimplementation of the peace process and the plan, and provisions. From the long-term point of view, such a\nthe cessation of all military attacks, would bring real practice would create adverse political and economic\nbenefits to all Serbs in the form of a gradual lifting of consequences for the regions concerned. It was China’s\nsanctions and a reintegration into the international view that the international community should continue\nfamily. 44 to explore all possibilities to promote peace\n negotiations and that it should avoid taking action that\n The representative of Venezuela stated that only might further complicate the issue. China had also\nthe acceptance of the proposed Peace Agreements noted that there were also some elements in the\noffered the international community a chance to resolution just adopted that ran counter to the principle\nimprove the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The of respect for sovereignty contained in the Charter.\nresolution just adopted was still aimed at applying Since the resolution contained both elements that\npressure for peace. He warned, however, that as long as China could support and elements that it could not\nthe Security Council did not act to put under real and support, the Chinese delegation had abstained in the\neffective control the heavy arms that were solely in the vote. 46\nhands of the Serbs, little would be achieved through\neconomic sanctions, whose effects took time. The representative of Hungary stated that the\nVenezuela believed that it was essential to discourage resolution just adopted was a dilemma for his\n __________________\nthe illusion that war and genocide, carried out with\n 45 Ibid., pp. 28-31.\n__________________\n 46 Ibid., pp. 31-32.\n 44 Ibid., pp. 26-27.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 737\n"
[18] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\ndelegation. He contended that the general arms Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina to exercise their\nembargo as well as the economic sanctions regime inherent right of self-defence.48\nwere not producing the results that the international\ncommunity had expected because of the specific Deliberations of 19 and 20 April 1993 (3201st,\nconditions in the former Yugoslavia, the particular 3202nd and 3203rd meetings)\nfeatures resulting from the geographic situation of the\n The Council began its consideration of the item at\ncountry, the establishment of domestic mitigating\n its 3201st and continued until its 3203rd meeting.\narrangements, and the nature of any sanctions regime\n Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\nwhich was porous. The Hungarian economy had\n invited the following, at their request, to participate in\nsuffered important losses because of the sanctions\n the discussion without the right to vote. At the 3201st\nregime and the strengthening of the sanctions was\n meeting, the representatives of Afghanistan, Albania,\ngoing to engender further economic difficulties.\n Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bosnia and\nHowever, everything had to be done to put an end to\n Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, the Comoros, Croatia,\nthe activity between the territory of the Federal\n Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, the\nRepublic of Yugoslavia and the zones controlled by the\n Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jordan,\nSerbs in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and\n Lithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Qatar, Romania, Saudi\nthat the military machine of the Serbs in Bosnia was\n Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Sweden,\nimmobilized. In conclusion, his delegation had voted in\n Turkey, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates; and at\nfavour of the resolution just adopted because it was an\n the 3202nd meeting, the representative of the Czech\nimportant step toward a settlement of the crisis in the\n Republic. The Council also extended invitations, at its\nformer Yugoslavia. It had also voted in favour because\n 3201st meeting, to Mr. Engin Ansay, Permanent\nof the resolution’s stipulations reaffirming the\n Observer of OIC, and, at his request, to Ambassador\nsovereignty, territorial integrity and political\n Dragomir Djokic to address the Council in the course\nindependence of the Republic of Bosnia and\n of the discussion of the item. At the 3202nd meeting,\nHerzegovina, the illegality and unacceptable nature of\n the President drew the attention of the Council\nany acquisition of territory by force and of any practice\n members to a letter dated 19 April 1993 from the\nof “ethnic cleansing”, as well as the international\n representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran\ncommunity’s readiness to take all necessary measures\n addressed to the Secretary-General. 49\nto help implement the peace plan for Bosnia and\nHerzegovina.47 Commencing the discussion, the representative of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that the international\n The President, speaking in his capacity as the\n community had an obligation to take concrete steps to\nrepresentative of Pakistan, stated that his delegation\n halt immediately genocide and aggression in his\nhad consistently declared that the time had come for\n country. Genocide and aggression were the reality of\nthe international community to demonstrate its firm\n Bosnia and Herzegovina, no matter what attempts were\nresolve in compelling the Bosnian Serb party to accept\n made to exclude those words from the relevant\nin full the Vance-Owen peace package. In that context,\n resolutions. The International Court of Justice had\nit believed that the Council should take immediate\n defined the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina as\nmeasures for the immobilization of heavy weapons in\n genocide and the Security Council had failed to fulfil\nBosnia and Herzegovina, and place them under\n its responsibility to stop the aggression and genocide.\neffective international control; that the Council should\n Nevertheless, the efforts of the non-aligned caucus and\nadopt appropriate measures to ensure the interdiction\n other members of the Security Council, in promoting\nof arms supplies to the Bosnian Serb party; and that\n the swift adoption of resolutions 819 (1993) and 820\nfurther measures, including stringent financial\n (1993), and in calling for a more legally and ethically\nsanctions, be imposed against the Federal Republic of\n responsible answer to genocide and aggression against\nYugoslavia. Pakistan was also of the view that\n Bosnia were most consistent with the principles of the\nimmediate measures should be taken for the partial\n United Nations and international law. Bosnia and\nlifting of the arms embargo in order to enable the __________________\n__________________\n 48 Ibid., pp. 44-45.\n 47 Ibid., pp. 33-42.\n 49 S/25632.\n\n\n\n\n738 07-63109\n"
[19] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nHerzegovina fully endorsed the draft resolution before the Assembly had urged the Security Council to\nthe Council and demanded that the following measures consider measures on an urgent basis, no later than\nbe considered: (a) to take control of or neutralize, by 15 January 1993, using all necessary means to stop the\nall necessary means, heavy weapons; (b) to interdict Serbian aggression, including the lifting of the arms\nsupply lines from Serbia and Montenegro to Bosnia embargo, he observed that that date had passed long\nand Herzegovina; and (c) to clarify that the arms ago and there had only been further destruction and\nembargo did not apply to the defence forces of Bosnia additional territory “ethnically cleansed” by Serbian\nand Herzegovina. Should these measures pose an forces. The fact that Serbian extremists were openly\nunacceptable risk to UNPROFOR, the Government of refusing to honour the relevant Security Council\nBosnia and Herzegovina would request that such resolutions emphasizing the commitment to ensure\nmission be modified and that its personnel take respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of\nprecautionary measures or withdraw if necessary.50 Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina must lead to\n appropriate United Nations action. The UNPROFOR\n The representative of Slovenia noted that the need\n mandate should be strengthened and the force should\nfor action by the international community was\n be changed from a peacekeeping to a peacemaking\nbecoming more and more compelling. While resolution\n force. The Security Council, acting under Chapter VII,\n820 (1993) represented a step in the right direction,\n should immediately take the strongest possible\nfurther thought should be given to the adoption of\n measures against the Serbian aggressors. The United\nmeasures to assist in the implementation of peace,\n Nations must at least lift the arms embargo against\nparticularly in the case the Vance-Owen plan was not\n Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and provide the\naccepted by all parties or if it was accepted in bad faith.\n Croats and Muslims the opportunity to defend their\nThe speaker recalled the proposal made on\n freedom and human dignity. The speaker concluded by\n8 April 1993 by the Foreign Minister of Slovenia,\n saying that the legitimate right to self-defence\nnoting that its main thrust was the immediate\n inscribed in the Charter of the United Nations must not\ndeployment of the United Nations peacekeeping forces\n be limited for the sake of “dubious political\nin the territories controlled by the parties which had\n pragmatism”. 52\naccepted the Vance-Owen peace plan. Several reasons\nsupported that line of action. First, the troops would be Mr. Ansay, Permanent Observer of OIC to the\ndeployed in areas in which United Nations protection United Nations, stated that the Secretary-General of\nwas accepted. Secondly, the troops would have a OIC regarded resolutions 819 (1993) and 820 (1993)\npreventive role as a deterrent to further acts of on Srebrenica and the economic sanctions adopted as\naggression. Thirdly, such deployment would provide an inadequate and insufficient. For OIC, the fall of\nopportunity to develop a more robust mandate of the Srebrenica would sound the “death knell” of the\npeacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina and ongoing peace efforts under the auspices of the United\nfourthly, the proposed action was compatible with the Nations and the European Community. Those tragic\nexisting humanitarian missions. He stressed that further events constituted an “affront” to the authority of the\naction by the Council should not be made contingent United Nations and compelled a reassessment of the\nupon agreement of the Serbs to the Vance-Owen peace efficacy of the principle of collective security. The\nplan.51 speaker noted that the question before the Council was\n no longer one of acting with a view to isolating Serbia\n The representative of Croatia, referring to the\n or decreeing new economic sanctions against it. Rather,\nresolution of the General Assembly of 18 December\n the tragic course of events called for vigorous and\n1992, in which the General Assembly had expressed\n determined action on the part of the Security Council.\ndetermination to restore peace in Bosnia and\n OIC called for the immediate lifting of the “iniquitous”\nHerzegovina as well as to preserve its unity,\n arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\nsovereignty, political independence and territorial\n adoption of effective military measures under the aegis\nintegrity, pointed out that none of those goals had been\n of the Security Council to bring the Serbian aggression\nachieved. Noting that in paragraph 7 of that resolution\n__________________ to an end. Those measures included, inter alia,\n 50 S/PV.3201, pp. 6-11.\n interdicting the supply line from Serbia and\n __________________\n 51 Ibid., pp. 48-52.\n 52 Ibid., pp. 73-80.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 739\n"
[20] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nMontenegro and placing all heavy weapons under the of the entire Balkan region. The closing of the Danube\ncontrol of the international community.53 was itself a measure which posed a great danger to the\n region and the introduction of new punitive measures\n The representative of Ukraine said that in his\n could only cause more innocent victims, suffering and\ndelegation’s view, enforcement measures taken so far\n instability. The speaker concluded by saying that the\nby the Council against the Federal Republic of\n Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remained fully\nYugoslavia were designed to bring about a speedy\n committed to the policy of peace and to overcoming\nresolution to the crisis in the region. At the same time,\n the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina by political\nit was incumbent upon the Security Council to adopt\n means, on the basis of equal respect for the legitimate\nmeasures to mitigate the negative consequences of the\n rights of all three constituent peoples. In that regard,\nsanctions for those States which not only complied\n the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would continue to\nwith the sanctions, but were also entrusted with the\n cooperate closely with the United Nations and its\ntask of ensuring the enforcement of the sanctions\n representatives. It would, however, firmly defend its\nregime. Ukraine believed that the time had come,\n sovereignty and territorial integrity if forced to do so. 55\nespecially after the adoption of resolution 820 (1993),\nto find practical ways to implement Article 50 of the In the course of the discussions, several speakers\nCharter. Such a decision would make sanctions an agreed that the situation on the ground in Bosnia called\neffective instrument, enjoying the support of the for more decisive action to be taken by the Council.\ninternational community as a whole. It was necessary Proposed measures included the following: (a) placing\nto remember that Security Council sanctions were heavy weapons under United Nations control;\ndirected against a specific State or States, and that (b) establishing additional safe areas; (c) interdicting\nother countries of the region must not be the eventual the supply lines of the Serbian forces in Bosnia; and\nor unintentional targets of enforcement measures. (d) lifting the arms embargo in order to allow the\nThus, there should be close cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to exercise its\nsanctions Committees and regional arrangements, right to self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.56\nincluding sanctions assistance missions. 54 Concerning the lifting of the arms embargo, some\n speakers, however, were of the view that such measure\n Mr. Djokic noted that despite the fact that his\n would more likely lead to further escalation of\ndelegation had stated on numerous occasion that the\n violence.57\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia had no territorial\nclaims on its neighbours and that, since May 1992, not A number of speakers argued that if the Council\na single soldier of the Yugoslav army had remained in did not shoulder its responsibilities and did not act,\nthe territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the then the Members of the United Nations should\ninternational community continued to label Yugoslavia consider convening a special session of the General\nas the aggressor and called for its punishment and Assembly to take action.58\nisolation. Moreover, the positive role of the Federal\n Several speakers drew attention to the effects of\nRepublic of Yugoslavia in the peace process had been\n economic sanctions on neighbouring countries and to\nignored by the Security Council in all its relevant __________________\nresolutions. While the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 55 S/PV.3203, pp. 26-38.\nshared the concern and impatience of the international 56 S/PV.3201, pp. 11-18 (Turkey); pp. 18-22 (Austria);\ncommunity and understood the responsibility of the pp. 23-27 (Malaysia); pp. 27-31 (Senegal); pp. 31-37\nSecurity Council in its effort to reinstate peace and (Islamic Republic of Iran); pp. 38-43 (Indonesia); and\nsecurity in the region, it believed, however, that peace pp. 67-72 (Afghanistan); S/PV.3202, pp. 10-13 (United\nand security could not be achieved by isolating one Arab Emirates); pp. 13-22 (Comoros); and pp. 22-30\nside and imposing new sanctions on the people of the (Egypt); and S/PV.3203, pp. 3-8 (Jordan); pp. 12-16\n (Algeria); and pp. 16-21 (Saudi Arabia).\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia. The isolation of the 57 S/PV.3201, pp. 43-47 (Sweden); and S/PV.3203,\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia could not lead to pp. 46-48 (Denmark); and pp. 57-62 (Argentina).\npeace, but could only contribute to the destabilization 58 S/PV.3201, pp. 23-27 (Malaysia); and S/PV.3202,\n__________________ pp. 22-30 (Egypt).\n 53 Ibid., pp. 81-85.\n 54 S/PV.3202, pp. 31-35.\n\n\n\n\n740 07-63109\n"
[21] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nthe need for the international community and the to settle the conflict. They call upon all the parties to cooperate\nSecurity Council to address that issue. 59 with the current efforts in this regard by UNPROFOR and Lord\n Owen, Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the\n International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.\n Decision of 21 April 1993: note by the President\n The members of the Council also demand that the\n On 21 April 1993, after consultations with the Bosnian Serbs fully implement resolution 819 (1993) of 16 April\nmembers of the Council, the President issued the 1993, including the immediate withdrawal from the areas\nfollowing note on behalf of the members of the surrounding Srebrenica, and allow UNPROFOR personnel\nCouncil:60 unimpeded access to the town.\n\n The President of the Security Council wishes to refer to\nresolution 819 (1993) adopted by the Council at its 3199th\n Decision of 6 May 1993 (3208th meeting):\nmeeting on 16 April 1993 in connection with the situation in the resolution 824 (1993)\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By a letter dated 30 April 1993 addressed to the\n In paragraph 12 of the resolution, the Council decided to President of the Security Council,62 the Security\nsend, as soon as possible, a mission of members of the Council Council mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, pursuant\nto Bosnia and Herzegovina to ascertain the situation and report to resolution 819 (1993), transmitted its report to the\nthereon to the Council. Council. The mission composed by France, Hungary,\n In accordance with that decision, the President wishes to New Zealand, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and\nreport that he has had consultations with the members of the Venezuela reported that it had travelled to the region\nCouncil and that agreement has been reached that the mission from 22 to 27 April 1993 and met with the leaders of\nwill be composed of the following six members of the Council: all the parties to the conflict in Bosnia and\nFrance, Hungary, New Zealand, Pakistan, Russian Federation\nand Venezuela.\n Herzegovina, as well as with the President of Croatia,\n the Vice-President of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\n Decision of 21 April 1993: statement by the Force Commander of UNPROFOR. The mission found\n President that Srebrenica was under siege and that the conditions\n there were inhuman. As for Gorazde, Zepa, Tuzla and\n On 21 April 1993, after consultations with the Sarajevo they should be declared immediately safe\nmembers of the Council, the President made the areas. In its conclusions, the mission recognized that\nfollowing statement to the media on behalf of the the designation of those towns as safe areas would\nmembers of the Council:61 require a larger UNPROFOR presence and a revised\n The members of the Security Council are deeply mandate to encompass ceasefire/safe area monitoring,\nconcerned by the reports on the outbreak of military hostilities and different rules of engagement. Enforcement\nbetween Bosnian governmental forces and Bosnian Croat measures could be considered at a later stage if the\nparamilitary units north and west of Sarajevo. They are appalled Serbs were to ignore the integrity of Security Council\nby the reports corroborated by the United Nations Protection safe areas.\nForce (UNPROFOR) of atrocities and killings, in particular the\nsetting on fire of Muslim houses and the shooting of entire At its 3208th meeting, on 6 May 1993, the\nfamilies in two villages by Bosnian Croat paramilitary units. Council included that report in its agenda. Following\n The members of the Council strongly condemn this new the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\noutbreak of violence undermining the overall efforts to establish representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\na ceasefire and achieve a political solution of the conflict in the request, to participate in the discussion without the\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and demand that Bosnian right to vote. The President (the Russian Federation)\ngovernmental forces and Bosnian Croat paramilitary units cease then drew the attention of the Council members to the\nimmediately those hostilities and that all parties refrain from text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the\ntaking any action which endangers the lives and well-being of __________________\nthe inhabitants of the region, strictly comply with their previous\n 62 S/25700.\ncommitments including the ceasefire, and redouble their efforts\n__________________\n 59 S/PV.3201, pp. 59-66 (Romania); S/PV.3202, pp. 3-10\n\n (Bulgaria); and S/PV.3203, pp. 57-62 (Argentina).\n 60 S/25645.\n 61 S/25646.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 741\n"
[22] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nCouncil’s prior consultations63 and to several other by resolution 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993, and in particular its\ndocuments.64 recommendations that the concept of safe areas be extended to\n other towns in need of safety,\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of\n Reaffirming again its condemnation of all violations of\nFrance stated that the draft resolution was intended to international humanitarian law, in particular “ethnic cleansing”\nconvey the concern of the Council in the face of a and all practices conducive thereto, as well as the denial or the\nfurther deterioration in the situation in Bosnia and obstruction of access of civilians to humanitarian aid and\nHerzegovina, and a growing threat to the security of services such as medical assistance and basic utilities,\nthe civilian population in a number of communities, Taking into consideration the urgent security and\nparticularly in the eastern part of the country. The humanitarian needs faced by several towns in Bosnia and\nCouncil’s concern had been heightened by the fact that Herzegovina as exacerbated by the constant influx of large\nUNPROFOR military observers had recently been numbers of displaced persons including, in particular, the sick\nprevented from reaching the city of Zepa, where they and wounded,\nhad intended to gain an overview of the situation. In Taking also into consideration the formal request\nrequesting that the parties treat the cities of Zepa, submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nGorazde, Tuzla, Bihac and Sarajevo as safe areas, free\n Deeply concerned at the continuing armed hostilities by\nfrom armed attacks and from other hostile acts likely to Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against several towns in Bosnia\nendanger the well-being and safety of their inhabitants, and Herzegovina, and determined to ensure peace and stability\nthe Security Council was sending a signal to the throughout the country, most immediately in the towns of\nparties: the civilian population must no longer be made Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac, as well as\nto bear the consequences of the Bosnian conflict. In Srebrenica,\nthat regard, the example of Srebrenica had provided a Convinced that the threatened towns and their\nvaluable experience by showing both the limits and the surroundings should be treated as safe areas, free from armed\nadvantages arising from the establishment of a safe attacks and from any other hostile acts which endanger the well-\narea. The most important thing was to save human being and the safety of their inhabitants,\nlives seriously threatened by the extension of the Aware in this context of the unique character of the city of\nconflict.65 Sarajevo, as a multicultural, multi-ethnic and plurireligious\n centre which exemplifies the viability of coexistence and\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and interrelations between all the communities of Bosnia and\nadopted unanimously as resolution 824 (1993), which Herzegovina, and of the need to preserve it and avoid its further\nreads: destruction,\n The Security Council, Affirming that nothing in the present resolution should be\n construed as contradicting or in any way departing from the\n Reaffirming all its earlier relevant resolutions,\n spirit or the letter of the peace plan for the Republic of Bosnia\n Reaffirming also the sovereignty, territorial integrity and and Herzegovina,\npolitical independence of the Republic of Bosnia and\n Convinced that treating the towns referred to above as\nHerzegovina,\n safe areas will contribute to the early implementation of the\n Having considered the report of the Security Council peace plan,\nmission to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina authorized\n__________________ Convinced also that further steps must be taken as\n necessary to achieve the security of all such safe areas,\n 63 S/25722.\n 64 Letter dated 30 April 1993 from the representative of Recalling the provisions of resolution 815 (1993) of\n Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security 30 March 1993 on the mandate of the United Nations Protection\n Council (S/25170); letter dated 30 April 1993 from the Force, and in that context acting under Chapter VII of the\n representative of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary- Charter of the United Nations,\n General (S/25714); letters dated 4 and 5 May,\n 1. Welcomes the report of the Security Council\n respectively, from the representative of Bosnia and\n mission established pursuant to resolution 819 (1993), and in\n Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security\n particular its recommendations concerning safe areas;\n Council (S/25718, S/25728 and S/25730); and letter\n dated 6 May 1993 from the representative of Bosnia and 2. Demands that any taking of territory by force cease\n Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security immediately;\n Council (S/25731).\n 65 S/PV.3208, pp. 8-10.\n\n\n\n\n742 07-63109\n"
[23] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n 3. Declares that the capital city of the Republic of the rest of the international community would have to\nBosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, and other such threatened decide that the use of force was inevitable.66\nareas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and\nBihac, as well as Srebrenica, and their surroundings should be The representative of Pakistan stated that his\ntreated as safe areas by all the parties concerned and should be delegation was pleased at the unanimous adoption of\nfree from armed attacks and from any other hostile act; resolution 824 (1993). Pakistan believed that declaring\n 4. Also declares that in these safe areas the following those threatened areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be\nshould be observed: safe areas would go a long way to ensuring the safety\n (a) The immediate cessation of armed attacks or any\n of civilian populations in the region. He observed that\nhostile act against these safe areas, and the withdrawal of all the international community was witnessing escalating\nBosnian Serb military or paramilitary units from these towns to defiance of its will by the Bosnian Serbs. In total\na distance wherefrom they cease to constitute a menace to their disregard of the mandatory resolutions of the Security\nsecurity and that of their inhabitants, to be monitored by United Council, the Bosnian Serbs had persisted in their\nNations military observers; “repulsive” policy of “ethnic cleansing” and genocide.\n (b) Full respect by all parties of the rights of the The time had come for the Council to compel the\nUnited Nations Protection Force and the international Serbian side to accept the Vance-Owen peace plan.\nhumanitarian agencies to free and unimpeded access to all safe Pakistan believed that the Council should take\nareas in Bosnia and Herzegovina and full respect for the safety immediate appropriate measures, including the\nof the personnel engaged in these operations; authorization of the use of force under Chapter VII of\n 5. Demands to that end that all parties and others the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure (a) that all\nconcerned cooperate fully with the Force and take any necessary heavy weapons in Bosnia and Herzegovina were placed\nmeasures to respect these safe areas; under effective international physical control or\n 6. Requests the Secretary-General to take appropriate neutralized; (b) the interdiction of all arms supplies to\nmeasures with a view to monitoring the humanitarian situation the Bosnian Serbs; (c) the institution of appropriate\nin the safe areas, authorizes to that end the strengthening of the measures for reparations for the Government of Bosnia\nForce by an additional fifty United Nations military observers, and Herzegovina by Serbia and Montenegro; (d) that\ntogether with related equipment and logistical support, and in Serbia and Montenegro was liable, under international\nthis connection also demands that all parties and all others\nconcerned cooperate fully and promptly with the Force;\n law, for any direct loss or damage, including\n environmental damage, or injury to foreign\n 7. Declares its readiness, in the event of the failure by Governments, nationals or corporations as a result of\nany party to comply with the present resolution, to consider its aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina; and\nimmediately the adoption of any additional measures necessary\nwith a view to its full implementation, including to ensure\n (e) the effective imposition of a comprehensive\nrespect for the safety of United Nations personnel; economic and financial blockade against Serbia and\n Montenegro. Pakistan also believed that States\n 8. Declares that arrangements pursuant to the present Members of the United Nations should extend their\nresolution shall remain in force until the provisions for the\ncessation of hostilities, separation of forces and supervision of\n cooperation to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the exercise\nheavy weaponry as envisaged in the peace plan for the Republic of its inherent right of individual and collective\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina are implemented; self-defence, in accordance with Article 51 of the\n Charter, including the supply of arms to enable them to\n 9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n defend themselves. 67\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the\n The representative of Hungary noted that the\nUnited States reminded the Bosnian Serb leadership\n resolution just adopted reaffirmed the inadmissibility\nthat her Government had made it clear that it was\n of any acquisition of territory by force. Hungary\nconsulting with its allies about new, stronger and\n believed that the resolution could be seen, on the one\ntougher measures. The implementation, or lack thereof,\n hand, as part of the process of implementation of the\nof the resolution just adopted and all other relevant\n Vance-Owen plan and, on the other hand, as a follow-\nSecurity Council resolutions over the following few\n up to the preventive diplomacy efforts. The Council\ndays would determine whether the United States and __________________\n 66 Ibid., pp. 11-13.\n 67 Ibid., pp. 14-16.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 743\n"
[24] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nmust be prepared, if necessary, to consider immediately The Security Council, recalling its statement of 21 April\nthe necessary steps to ensure implementation of 1993 concerning the atrocities and killings in areas north and\nresolution 824 (1993). 68 west of Sarajevo, expresses its grave concern at the major new\n military offensive launched by Bosnian Croat paramilitary units\n The President, speaking in his capacity as in the areas of Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica.\nrepresentative of the Russian Federation, noted that his The Council strongly condemns this major military\ncountry’s leaders had repeatedly said that there was no offensive launched by Bosnian Croat paramilitary units, which\nalternative to the Vance-Owen plan, and that they had is totally inconsistent with the signature of the peace plan for the\npointed out that any party that did not adopt the plan Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Bosnian Croat party.\nbore a heavy responsibility. Following the talks in The Council demands that the attacks against the areas of\nAthens, there should be no further obstacles to the Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica cease forthwith, that Bosnian\n Croat paramilitary units withdraw immediately from the area\nimplementation of the Vance-Owen plan. If the plan and that all the parties strictly comply with their previous\nwas not adopted and carried out, the Russian commitments as well as with the ceasefire agreed to today\nFederation delegation was prepared to discuss further between the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and\nand harsher steps, to put an end to attempts to attain Herzegovina and the Bosnian Croat party.\nfurther territorial gains by military force, to any actions The Council also expresses its deep concern that the\nthat resulted in suffering for the Bosnian people and in battalion of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)\nviolations of international humanitarian law. The in the area has been forced under fire to redeploy as a result of\nRussian Federation supported the creation of additional this latest offensive and condemns the refusal of Bosnian Croat\nsafe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and had paramilitary units to allow the presence of United Nations\ntherefore voted in favour of the resolution just adopted. military observers, in particular in the city of Mostar.\nIt believed that the creation of safe areas, with the The Council once again reiterates its demand that\npresence of United Nations personnel, would help to UNPROFOR personnel be allowed unimpeded access\nimprove the humanitarian situation in Bosnia and throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in this particular case\nHerzegovina and to achieve a peaceful settlement.69 demands that the Bosnian Croat paramilitary units ensure the\n safety and security of UNPROFOR as well as all United Nations\n personnel in the areas of Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica. In this\n Decision of 10 May 1993 (3210th meeting): connection, the Council expresses its deep concern at the\n statement by the President increasing hostile attitude of Bosnian Croat paramilitary units\n At its 3210th meeting, on 10 May 1993, the towards UNPROFOR personnel.\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the situation in The Council calls upon the Republic of Croatia, in\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following accordance with the commitments under the Zagreb agreement\nthe adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the of 25 April 1993, to exert all its influence on the Bosnian Croat\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his leadership and paramilitary units with a view to ceasing\n immediately their attacks particularly in the areas of Mostar,\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the Jablanica and Dreznica. It further calls on Croatia to adhere\nright to vote. The President (the Russian Federation) strictly to its obligations under Council resolution 752 (1992) of\nthen stated that, after consultations among members of 15 May 1992, including putting an end to all forms of\nthe Security Council, he had been authorized to make interference and respecting the territorial integrity of Bosnia and\nthe following statement on behalf of the Council, Herzegovina.\nwhich included a number of revisions agreed upon by The Council once again reaffirms the sovereignty,\nCouncil members:70 territorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Bosnia\n__________________ and Herzegovina and the unacceptability of the acquisition of\n territory by force and the practice of “ethnic cleansing”.\n 68 Ibid., pp. 18-20.\n 69 Ibid., pp. 24-26. The Council remains seized of the matter and is ready to\n 70 S/25746. consider further measures to ensure that all parties and others\n concerned abide by their commitments and fully respect relevant\n Council decisions.\n\n\n\n\n744 07-63109\n"
[25] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n Decision of 22 May 1993: letter from the Decision of 4 June 1993 (3228th meeting):\n President to the Secretary-General resolution 836 (1993)\n By a letter dated 14 May 1993 addressed to the At its 3228th meeting, on 4 June 1993, the\nPresident of the Security Council,71 the Secretary- Council resumed its consideration of the situation in\nGeneral referred to recent developments in Bosnia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following\nHerzegovina and attached the text of an agreement on the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nthe cessation of hostilities, concluded between the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey,\nBosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim sides on 12 May at their request, to participate in the discussion without\n1993, in Mostar. The Secretary-General noted that in the right to vote. The President (Spain) then drew the\nterms of its mandate under resolution 776 (1992), attention of the Council members to the text of a draft\nUNPROFOR had found that the fighting in Mostar was resolution submitted by France, the Russian\nextremely disruptive for the delivery of humanitarian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United\nrelief aid. The Force therefore had no choice but to States, 73 and to several other documents.74\nintervene if its original mandate were to be\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nimplemented. Recalling resolution 824 (1993), in\n stated that, although his delegation had not been\nwhich the Council had declared a number of safe areas\n consulted on the content of the draft resolution, it had\nand had referred to “other such threatened areas”, the\n nevertheless made a number of key suggestions which\nSecretary-General observed that Mostar qualified as a\n had been rejected. First, the safe areas concept should\n“threatened area.” That consideration had helped to set\n be applied more broadly to address the threats against\nthe terms of the active involvement of UNPROFOR in\n other population centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nwitnessing the agreement concluded on 12 May 1993\n Second, a time frame should be established in which\nand in, inter alia, deploying a company of the Spanish\n there would be a shift from the temporary relief offered\nBattalion in an interposition role. The presence of\n by the safe areas programme to the implementation of\nUNPROFOR was an integral part of the ceasefire\n the Vance-Owen plan. Third, if the Bosnian Serbs were\nagreement and had without doubt helped to defuse the\n unwilling to accept the Vance-Owen plan by a\ntension and stabilize the situation. Nonetheless, some __________________\nconcern had been expressed in the Security Council 73 S/25870.\nabout the formal mandate of UNPROFOR in that 74 Note verbale dated 19 May 1993 from the representative\nregard. That concern also applied to the involvement of of France addressed to the President of the Security\ncivilian police officers provided for in the agreement of Council (S/25800); letter dated 21 May 1993 from the\n12 May 1993, for which no authorization from the representative of Italy addressed to the Secretary-\nSecurity Council existed. In order to clarify the General (S/25823); letter dated 24 May 1993 from the\nmandate, the Secretary-General requested confirmation representatives of France, the Russian Federation, Spain,\n the United Kingdom and the United States addressed to\nas to whether the above interpretation of the mandate\n the President of the Security Council, enclosing a joint\nof UNPROFOR was acceptable to the Security action programme on Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nCouncil. formulated by the Foreign Ministers of those States in\n Washington, D.C., on 22 May 1995 (S/25829); letter\n By a letter dated 22 May 1993,72 the President of\n dated 14 May 1993 from the representative of Pakistan\nthe Security Council informed the Secretary-General of addressed to the President of the Security Council,\nthe following: transmitting a memorandum on the situation in Bosnia\n and Herzegovina formulated by the members of the\n I have the honour to inform you that your letter\n Council that were members of the Non-Aligned\ndated 14 May 1993 concerning the United Nations Movement (S/25782); letter dated 25 May 1993 from the\nProtection Force (UNPROFOR) has been brought to representative of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-\nthe attention of the members of the Council. Regarding General, transmitting a declaration on the situation in\nthe situation in the area of Mostar, they agree with the Bosnia and Herzegovina, adopted by the Organization of\ninterpretation of the mandate of UNPROFOR the Islamic Conference in New York on 29 May 1993\ncontained in your letter. (S/25860); letters dated 30 May 2 June 1993 from the\n representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to\n__________________ the President of the Security Council (S/25872, S/25877\n 71 S/25824. and S/25878).\n 72 S/25825.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 745\n"
[26] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nstipulated date, then either all necessary measures and by occupying several key points on the ground.\nshould be employed to restore peace, or the right of Furthermore, the draft resolution explicitly provided\nBosnia and Herzegovina to act in self-defence, for the possibility of using force to respond to\nconsistent with Article 51, should be fully recognized. bombardments against the safe freedom of movement\nFourth, the United Nations should develop a mandate, of UNPROFOR and of humanitarian convoys. It also\ndrawing on all the resources necessary to defend the provided for the use of air power within and around the\nsafe areas, and produce a realistic plan for safe areas, if necessary to support UNPROFOR in the\nimplementing and enforcing that mandate. Fifth, the fulfilment of its mandate. 77\nperiod for reviewing the implementation of the\n The representative of Venezuela noted that the\nresolution should have been shortened from 60 days to\n draft resolution had been put to the vote despite a\n30 days.75\n request made by his delegation to wait for a report by\n The representative of Turkey observed that the the Secretary-General on the means he would need to\ndraft resolution fell short of his delegation’s implement the resolution. He contended that the draft\nexpectations. The draft resolution should have included resolution was incomplete in scope and contrary to its\na deadline for initiating the implementation of the own objectives. Furthermore, his delegation was of the\nVance-Owen plan; a guarantee of effective enforcement view that safe areas should be temporary, intermediate\nmeasures to reverse the consequences of the use of steps in the peace process. They should not be a\nforce; and an acknowledgement of Bosnia and substitute for peace. Safe areas should guarantee\nHerzegovina’s inherent right to self-defence. He freedom of movement into and out of the area;\nstressed that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be international military presence, unrestricted presence\nexempted without delay from the arms embargo, in of humanitarian agencies; the right to humanitarian\naccordance with its inherent right of collective assistance; respect for human rights; uninterrupted\nself-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the access to basic services; and access to economic\nUnited Nations.76 activities. In addition to being provided security, these\n areas should be able to restore their civil government,\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of\n local police and social services. These conditions were\nFrance noted that, following the adoption by France,\n almost the exact opposite of these existing today in the\nthe Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the\n so-called safe areas and the draft resolution before the\nUnited States of a joint programme of action on the\n Council did not address their main points. The speaker\nsituation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on 22 May 1993\n further noted that the Government of Bosnia and\nin Washington, France and its partners had proposed\n Herzegovina had communicated to the Council its\nthat the Council adopt a resolution ensuring full respect\n rejection of the particular modality of “safe areas” as\nfor the safe areas named in resolution 824 (1993) and\n contained in the draft resolution but that position had\nextending the mandate of UNPROFOR. The draft\n not even been considered by the Council. He also\nresolution addressed an “immediate, vital humanitarian\n recalled that his delegation had taken an active part in\nobjective” of ensuring the survival of civilian\n working on the resolutions that provided for the\npopulations in the safe areas, as well as a “paramount\n creation of “safe areas” for Sarajevo and other cities\npolitical objective” of maintaining the territorial basis\n and it could thus never be opposed to the concept. His\nnecessary for the development and implementation of\n delegation was opposed to the shape that humanitarian\nthe Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Stressing\n modality had taken in practice. The speaker concluded\nthat the designation and protection of safe areas was a\n by saying that while there had been an attempt to\ntemporary measure and not an end in itself, the speaker\n negotiate the Peace Plan, Bosnia had lost two thirds of\nstated that the Vance-Owen plan remained the basis for\n its territory and its people had been the victims of\nany settlement. He added that the draft resolution\n crimes and violations on an unprecedented scale. That\nwould strengthen UNPROFOR, enabling it to protect\n was the time for the Council to really take action, not\nthe safe areas by deterring attacks, monitoring the\n just appear to be taking action. For all these reasons,\nceasefire, promoting the withdrawal of military units, __________________\n__________________\n 77 Ibid., pp. 11-14.\n 75 S/PV.3228, pp. 3-8.\n 76 Ibid., pp. 8-11.\n\n\n\n\n746 07-63109\n"
[27] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nhis delegation would abstain from the vote on the draft Condemning military attacks, and actions that do not\nresolution.78 respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political\n independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, as a State\n The representative of Pakistan recalled that his Member of the United Nations, enjoys the rights provided for in\ncountry, together with other non-aligned members of the Charter of the United Nations,\nthe Council, had been the proponent of the concept of Reiterating its alarm at the grave and intolerable situation\nsafe areas. The experience in Srebrenica, Zepa and in Bosnia and Herzegovina arising from serious violations of\nGorazde, however, had revealed fundamental international humanitarian law,\nshortcomings in that concept in the absence of the Reaffirming once again that any taking of territory by\ninternational community’s commitment to endorse the force or any practice of “ethnic cleansing” is unlawful and\nVance-Owen peace plan. Turning to the draft totally unacceptable,\nresolution, he stated that in his delegation view, the\n Commending the Government of the Republic of Bosnia\ndraft resolution did not address certain core issues in and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Croat party for having signed\nthe conflict. Unless the measures contained in the draft the Vance-Owen plan,\nresolution were supplemented by enforcement actions\nin a given time frame and as part of an overall plan, the Gravely concerned at the persistent refusal of the Bosnian\n Serb party to accept the Vance-Owen plan, and calling upon that\nsituation on the ground might be frozen to the party to accept the peace plan for the Republic of Bosnia and\nadvantage of the Serbs. Moreover, the modality of safe Herzegovina in full,\nareas as contained in the draft resolution was not in full\nconformity with Pakistan’s political and humanitarian Deeply concerned by the continuing armed hostilities in\n the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina which run totally\nconcerns. The concept of safe area would only be counter to the peace plan,\nacceptable to the Pakistani delegation if the\ninternational community committed itself to the full Alarmed by the resulting plight of the civilian population\nimplementation of the Vance-Owen peace plan, and in in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular in\n Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Tuzla and Zepa,\nparticular to its provisions on territorial arrangements\nfor Bosnian Muslim communities. All Bosnian Muslim Condemning the obstruction, primarily by the Bosnian\nregions, as specified in the peace plan, and Sarajevo, Serb party, of the delivery of humanitarian assistance,\nshould be declared safe areas, and those regions Determined to ensure the protection of the civilian\nalready identified as safe areas should be given the population in safe areas and to promote a lasting political\nmaximum possible protection. For these reasons, his solution,\ndelegation would abstain in the vote on the draft Confirming the ban on military flights in the airspace of\nresolution.79 Bosnia and Herzegovina, established by resolutions 781 (1992)\n of 9 October 1992, 786 (1992) of 10 November 1992 and 816\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and (1993) of 31 March 1993,\nadopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions\n(Pakistan, Venezuela) as resolution 836 (1993), which Affirming that the concept of safe areas in Bosnia and\nreads: Herzegovina as contained in resolutions 819 (1993) and 824\n (1993) was adopted to respond to an emergency situation, and\n The Security Council, noting that the concept proposed by France in document\n S/25800 and by others could make a valuable contribution and\n Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September\n should not in any way be taken as an end in itself, but as a part\n1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,\n of the Vance-Owen process and as a first step towards a just and\n Reaffirming in particular its resolutions 819 (1993) of lasting political solution,\n16 April 1993 and 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993, in which it\n Convinced that treating the towns and surrounding areas\ndemanded that certain towns and their surrounding areas in the\n referred to above as safe areas will contribute to the early\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be treated as safe\n implementation of that objective,\nareas,\n Stressing that the lasting solution to the conflict in Bosnia\n Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and\n and Herzegovina must be based on the following principles:\npolitical independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\n immediate and complete cessation of hostilities, withdrawal\nresponsibility of the Security Council in this regard,\n from territories seized by the use of force and “ethnic\n__________________ cleansing”, reversal of the consequences of “ethnic cleansing”\n 78 Ibid., pp. 14-26. and recognition of the right of all refugees to return to their\n 79 Ibid., pp. 27-30.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 747\n"
[28] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nhomes, and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and provisions regarding the safe areas, expresses its gratitude to\npolitical independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Member States already providing forces for that purpose, and\n invites the Secretary-General to seek additional contingents\n Noting the crucial work being done throughout Bosnia\n from other Member States;\nand Herzegovina by the United Nations Protection Force and the\nimportance of such work continuing, 9. Authorizes the Force, in addition to the mandate\n defined in resolutions 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992 and\n Determining that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina\n 776 (1992), in carrying out the mandate defined in paragraph 5\ncontinues to be a threat to international peace and security,\n above, acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the\n safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them\n 1. Calls for the full and immediate implementation of or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those\nall its relevant resolutions; areas to the freedom of movement of the Force or of protected\n 2. Commends the peace plan for the Republic of humanitarian convoys;\nBosnia and Herzegovina as contained in document S/25479; 10. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraph 1 of\n 3. Reaffirms the unacceptability of the acquisition of resolution 816 (1993), Member States, acting nationally or\nterritory by the use of force and the need to restore the full through regional organizations or arrangements, may take, under\nsovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the authority of the Security Council and subject to close\nBosnia and Herzegovina; coordination with the Secretary-General and the Force, all\n necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around\n 4. Decides to ensure full respect for the safe areas the safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support the Force\nreferred to in resolution 824 (1993); in the performance of its mandate set out in paragraphs 5 and 9\n above;\n 5. Also decides to extend to that end the mandate of\nthe United Nations Protection Force in order to enable it, in the 11. Requests the Member States concerned, the\nsafe areas referred to in resolution 824 (1993), to deter attacks Secretary-General and the Force to coordinate closely on the\nagainst the safe areas, to monitor the ceasefire, to promote the measures they are taking to implement paragraph 10 above and\nwithdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of to report to the Council through the Secretary-General;\nthe Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and\nto occupy some key points on the ground, in addition to 12. Invites the Secretary-General to report to the\nparticipating in the delivery of humanitarian relief to the Council, for decision, if possible within seven days of the\npopulation as provided for in resolution 776 (1992) of adoption of the present resolution, on the modalities of its\n14 September 1992; implementation, including its financial implications;\n\n 6. Affirms that these safe areas are a temporary 13. Also invites the Secretary-General to submit to the\nmeasure and that the primary objective remains to reverse the Council, not later than two months after the adoption of the\nconsequences of the use of force and to allow all persons present resolution, a report on the implementation of and\ndisplaced from their homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina to return compliance with the present resolution;\nto their homes in peace, beginning, inter alia, with the prompt 14. Emphasizes that it will keep open other options for\nimplementation of the provisions of the Vance-Owen plan in new and tougher measures, none of which is prejudged or\nareas where those have been agreed by the parties directly excluded from consideration;\nconcerned;\n 15. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter, and\n 7. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation, undertakes to take prompt action, as required.\ninter alia, with the Governments of the Member States\ncontributing forces to the Force: Speaking after the vote, the representative of\n (a) To make the adjustments or reinforcement of the\n Brazil observed that the resolution just adopted was to\nForce which might be required by the implementation of the be understood as a temporary measure, with the\npresent resolution, and to consider assigning elements of the twofold objective of preserving the safety of the\nForce in support of the elements entrusted with protection of populations in the safe areas and restoring normalcy to\nsafe areas, with the agreement of the Governments contributing those areas. Referring to the concern that the\nforces; implementation of the safe areas concept might lead to\n (b) To direct the Force Commander to redeploy to the a freezing of the existing situation, thus rewarding\nextent possible the forces under his command in Bosnia and “military might” to the detriment of the Muslim\nHerzegovina; community, the speaker noted that Brazil considered it\n 8. Calls upon Member States to contribute forces, essential that, in due course, the resolution just adopted\nincluding logistic support, to facilitate the implementation of the be complemented by appropriate additional measures.\n\n\n\n748 07-63109\n"
[29] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nBrazil continued to believe that the ultimate solution to temporary measure, even though they could not\nthe conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina must come provide a fundamental solution to the conflict, and they\nthrough negotiation and peaceful means, and that the could not supplant the Vance-Owen plan for a\nVance-Owen plan therefore retained its “full value”.80 comprehensive political solution to the conflict.\n Reiterating China’s position that international disputes\n The representative of the Russian Federation\n should be settled through dialogue and negotiation,\nstated that the tragic events that had recently taken\n rather than through the threat or use of force, the\nplace in safe areas made it necessary to expand the\n speaker stated that his delegation had reservations\nUNPROFOR mandate, in order to ensure the safe\n regarding the invocation of Chapter VII in the\nareas, deter aggression, monitor the ceasefire, and\n resolution just adopted, as it feared that further military\nallow for the unhindered delivery of humanitarian\n action might complicate the issue and adversely affect\nassistance. The Russian Federation was convinced that\n the peace process.83\nthe implementation of the resolution just adopted\nwould help to curb the violence. Henceforth, any The representative of the United Kingdom,\nmilitary attacks against, shelling of, incursions into, or acknowledging that the safe areas would not stop the\nhindrance of humanitarian deliveries to, the safe areas, war and were therefore a temporary measure, argued\nwould be responded to by United Nations forces that they could nevertheless provide areas of stability\nthrough the use of all necessary measures, including and complement the important efforts undertaken by\nthe use of armed force. That would be an important United Nations forces throughout Bosnia. Referring to\nfactor in stabilizing the situation in those areas and for suggestions that the policy of safe areas might be\nlessening the suffering of the civilian population. The combined with a lifting of the arms embargo, the\nspeaker further contended that by adopting the speaker noted that the two policies were “distinct and\nresolution, the Council had taken a concrete step alternative” and contended that it would be hard to\ntowards the implementation of the joint programme of reconcile the supply of arms with United Nations\naction adopted at Washington on 22 May by the peacekeeping on the ground. He concluded by stating\nMinisters for Foreign Affairs of France, the Russian that as the resolution made clear, neither the\nFederation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United Washington Agreement, nor the view of his\nStates. He noted in that regard that the Washington Government ruled out other stronger measures as the\nprogramme did not exclude the adoption of new, firmer situation developed.84\nmeasures.81\n Decision of 10 June 1993 (3234th meeting):\n The representative of the United States observed\n resolution 838 (1993)\nthat the resolution just adopted was an intermediate\nstep. Both the Security Council and the Governments At its 3234th meeting, on 10 June 1993, the\nthat had developed the Washington programme of Council resumed its consideration of the situation in\naction had agreed that they would keep open options the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following\nfor new and tougher measures. Her Government’s view the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nof what these tougher measures should be had not representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina at his\nchanged. It expected full cooperation of the Bosnian request, to participate in the discussion without the\nSerb party in implementing the resolution. If that right to vote. The President then drew the attention of\ncooperation was not forthcoming, the United States the Council members to the text of a draft resolution\nwould move to seek further action in the Council. 82 submitted by France, the Russian Federation, Spain,\n the United Kingdom and the United States,85 and read\n The representative of China stated that the\n out a revision to be made to the draft. He also drew the\ncontinued escalation of the conflict in Bosnia and\n attention of the Council members to several other\nHerzegovina constituted a great threat to peace and __________________\nsecurity in the region. Under those circumstances, the 83 Ibid., pp. 48-49.\nestablishment of safe areas might as well be tried as a 84 Ibid., pp. 56-58.\n__________________ 85 S/25798.\n 80 Ibid., pp. 42-43.\n 81 Ibid., pp. 43-47.\n 82 Ibid., pp. 47-48.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 749\n"
[30] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\ndocuments.86 The draft resolution, as orally revised in Bosnia and Herzegovina provided for in the Vance-Owen peace\nits provisional form, was then put to the vote and plan,\nadopted unanimously as resolution 838 (1993), which Bearing in mind paragraph 4 (a) of its resolution 757\nreads: (1992) concerning the prevention by all States of imports into\n their territories of all commodities and products originating in or\n The Security Council,\n exported from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September Montenegro) and paragraph 12 of its resolution 820 (1993)\n1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, concerning import to, export from and trans-shipment through\n those areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of\n Reaffirming also the sovereignty, territorial integrity and Bosnian Serb forces,\npolitical independence of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina and the responsibility of the Security Council in 1. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the\nthis regard, Council as soon as possible a further report on options for the\n deployment of international observers to monitor effectively the\n Reiterating the demands in its resolution 752 (1992) of implementation of the relevant Council resolutions, to be drawn\n15 May 1992 and subsequent relevant resolutions that all forms from the United Nations and, if appropriate, from Member\nof interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina cease States acting nationally or through regional organizations and\nimmediately and that its neighbours take swift action to end all arrangements, on the borders of the Republic of Bosnia and\ninterference and respect its territorial integrity, Herzegovina, giving priority to the border between the Republic\n Recalling the demand in its resolution 819 (1993) of of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of\n16 April 1993 that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and taking into account\nand Montenegro) immediately cease the supply of military arms, developments since his report of 21 December 1992 as well as\nequipment and services to Bosnian Serb paramilitary units, the differing circumstances affecting the various sectors of the\n borders and the need for appropriate coordination mechanisms;\n Taking into account the report of the Secretary-General of\n21 December 1992 on the possible deployment of observers on 2. Invites the Secretary-General to contact\nthe borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, immediately Member States, nationally or through regional\n organizations or arrangements, to ensure the availability to him\n Expressing its condemnation of all activities carried out in on a continuing basis of any relevant material derived from\nviolation of resolutions 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992, 787 (1992) aerial surveillance and to report thereon to the Security Council;\nof 16 November 1992 and 820 (1993) of 17 April 1993 between\nthe territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 3. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\nMontenegro) and the United Nations Protected Areas in the Speaking after the vote, the representative of the\nRepublic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces,\n United Kingdom noted that the resolution just adopted\n was an important element of the immediate steps that\n Considering that, in order to facilitate the implementation his Government believed needed to be taken straight\nof the relevant Security Council resolutions, observers should be way. The placing of border monitors, particularly on\ndeployed on the borders of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, as indicated in its resolution 787 (1992),\n the border between Bosnia and the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia was of considerable significance since it\n Noting the earlier preparedness of the authorities in the could bring home to the Bosnian Serbs the bankruptcy\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to stop of their present policies and the need to reconsider\nall but humanitarian supplies to the Bosnian Serb party, and\nurging full implementation of that commitment,\n their rejection of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. The\n decision taken a month ago by the authorities of the\n Considering that all appropriate measures should be Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to limit to\nundertaken to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict in humanitarian supplies any traffic across the border\n__________________\n between Bosnia and the Federal Republic of\n 86 Letter dated 24 May 1993 from the representatives of\n Yugoslavia had been welcome but it was essential to\n France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United\n Kingdom and the United States addressed to the\n put that policy to the test by deploying monitors along\n President of the Council (S/25829); letter dated 1 June that border.87\n 1993 from the representative of Croatia addressed to the\n The representative of France stated that the aim\n President of the Council (S/25874); and letter dated\n 8 June 1993 from the representative of Bosnia and\n of the resolution just adopted was to show the intent of\n Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Council the Council to deploy the necessary observers for\n (S/25907). __________________\n 87 S/PV.3234, pp. 6-7.\n\n\n\n\n750 07-63109\n"
[31] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\neffective monitoring of the application of sanctions affirmative vote did not represent a change in its\nagainst the territories controlled by the Bosnian Serbs. position vis-à-vis sanctions against the Federal\nBy controlling the conditions for applications of the Republic of Yugoslavia.90\nembargo against the territories controlled by the Serbs\nof Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs would be led to end their Decision of 18 June 1993 (3241st meeting):\nattacks and the practice of “ethnic cleansing”, and resolution 844 (1993)\nfinally to start out along the road towards a peaceful\n On 14 June 1993, pursuant to resolution\nsettlement in the accordance with the provisions set out\n 836 (1993), the Secretary-General submitted to the\nin the Vance-Owen Plan. He further stated that the\n Council a report containing an analysis of the\nreaction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and in\n modalities for implementation of that resolution.91 The\nparticular that of Serbia, to the resolution would be\n analysis indicated that such implementation would\nsignificant. If the authorities of these countries were to\n require the deployment of additional troops on the\ndecide to reject the deployment of observers on their\n ground as well as the provision of air support. While an\nside of the frontier with Bosnia, the situation would\n additional troop requirement of approximately 34,000\nbecome clear and the Council would then have to draw\n would be necessary, it would be possible, however, to\nthe necessary conclusions.88\n start implementing the resolution under a light option\n The representative of Hungary stated that his envisaging a troop reinforcement of around 7,600. 92\ndelegation had voted in favour of the resolution just The Secretary-General noted that while that option\nadopted, as it was convinced that all foreign could not completely guarantee the defence of safe\ninterference in Bosnia and Herzegovina must cease areas, it relied on the threat of air action against any\nimmediately and that the neighbours of that country belligerents. He indicated in that regard that he had\nmust respect its territorial integrity. It was clear that invited NATO to coordinate with him the use of air\nthere could not be a settlement and lasting peace while power in support of UNPROFOR. It was understood\nsuch interference persisted. It was also clear that such a that the first decision to initiate the use of air power\nsettlement would become possible only with the firm would be taken by him in consultation with the\ndetermination of the international community. Hungary Security Council. The Secretary-General further noted\nattached particular importance to the fact that the that such option represented an initial approach and\nresolution was in strict conformity with previous had limited objectives. It assumed the consent and\nCouncil resolutions concerning the sanctions regime cooperation of the parties and provided a basic level of\nimposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The deterrence. In conclusion, he recommended that the\nspeaker further stated that his delegation considered Council approve the arrangements outlined in his\nthe resolution primarily as a declaration of intent that report. At the same time, he stressed the overwhelming\nwould have to be followed up as soon as possible by a importance of seeking a comprehensive political\nreport from the Secretary-General and a resolution on solution to the conflict, noting that a negotiated and\nthe deployment. In that context there were some equitable settlement would enable the international\nimportant questions that would have to be clarified community to devote its resources to reconstruction\nconcerning the mandate, emplacement and other and development rather than to successive expansions\naspects of the observers’ activities.89 of the United Nations activities in the former\n Yugoslavia.\n The representative of China reiterated China’s\nsupport for a political settlement of the conflict in At its 3241st meeting, on 18 June 1993, the\nBosnia and Herzegovina, within the framework of the Council included the report of the Secretary-General in\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\nChina hoped that the measures envisaged by the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and\nresolution just adopted would help to realize that Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the\nobjective, and based on that consideration it had voted discussion without the right to vote. The President\nin favour of the resolution. At the same time, China’s (Spain) then drew the attention of the Council members\n__________________ __________________\n 88 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 90 Ibid., pp. 11-12.\n 89 Ibid., pp. 8-10. 91 S/25939 and Corr.1 and Add.1.\n 92 For further details see S/25939 and Corr.1, para. 6.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 751\n"
[32] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nto the text of a draft resolution submitted by France, 6. Invites the Secretary-General to report to the\nthe Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom93 Council on a regular basis on the implementation of resolution\nand the United States. He also referred to several other 836 (1993) and the present resolution;\ndocuments.94 7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and Speaking after the vote, the representative of\nadopted unanimously as resolution 844 (1993), which Hungary stated that his delegation’s vote in favour of\nreads: the resolution just adopted, reflected its conviction that\n The Security Council,\n resolution 836 (1993) establishing safe areas in Bosnia\n and Herzegovina must be implemented as quickly as\n Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September possible. For Hungary, the only remaining question\n1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, related to the specific modalities to do that and the\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of modalities outlined in the resolution just adopted were\n14 and 17 June 1993 pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 836 not entirely what it had hoped for. They were\n(1993) concerning the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and acceptable only to the extent that under the present\nHerzegovina, circumstances, the international community was\n Reiterating once again its alarm at the grave and neither in a position, nor was it inclined to do more.\nintolerable situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina arising from Hungary hoped that the measures proposed in the\nserious violations of international humanitarian law, report of the Secretary-General would be taken as soon\n Recalling the overwhelming importance of seeking a as possible and in such a way as to make possible\ncomprehensive political solution to the conflict in Bosnia and progress towards a fair overall settlement of the\nHerzegovina, Bosnian crisis.95\n Determined to implement fully the provisions of The representative of the United States stated that\nresolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, his delegation had voted in favour of the resolution just\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United adopted as an intermediate step that did not foreclose\nNations, options involving tougher measures. The United States\n 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General; continued to expect the full cooperation of the Bosnian\n Serb party in implementing the resolution. If that\n 2. Decides to authorize the reinforcement of the cooperation was not forthcoming, then the United\nUnited Nations Protection Force to meet the additional force\nrequirements mentioned in paragraph 6 of the report of the\n States would seek further action in the Security\nSecretary-General as an initial approach; Council to stop the violence. 96\n 3. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the The representative of France said that, although\nconsultations, inter alia, with the Governments of the Member the deployment of reinforcements was what might be\nStates contributing forces to the Force, called for in resolution called “the light option”, it was nevertheless the only\n836 (1993); realistic option at that time, given the means available\n 4. Reaffirms its decision in paragraph 10 of resolution to UNPROFOR in the short term. France believed that\n836 (1993) on the use of air power in and around the safe areas those measures, coupled with the threat of air strikes,\nto support the Force in the performance of its mandate, and could deter attacks against the safe areas, in conformity\nencourages Member States, acting nationally or through regional with resolution 836 (1993).97\norganizations or arrangements, to coordinate closely with the\nSecretary-General in this regard; The representative of the Russian Federation\n 5. Calls upon Member States to contribute forces,\n noted that his delegation shared the Secretary-\nincluding logistic support and equipment, to facilitate the General’s view that the implementation of the decision\nimplementation of the provisions regarding the safe areas; to set up safe areas, needed to be predicated upon the\n consent and cooperation of all the Bosnian parties. The\n__________________\n Russian Federation called upon them to cooperate with\n 93 S/25966.\n 94 Letters dated 5, 6, 11, 13 and 16 June 1993 from the\n UNPROFOR in implementing the Council’s resolutions\n __________________\n representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to\n 95 S/PV.3241, pp. 6-8.\n the President of the Security Council (S/25908, S/25909,\n 96 Ibid., p. 8.\n S/25933, S/25943 and S/25959).\n 97 Ibid., pp. 8-10.\n\n\n\n\n752 07-63109\n"
[33] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\non the safe areas. The parties needed to realize that if Herzegovina be halted forthwith and the consequences\nthey refused such cooperation, then new, tougher of hostilities against the Republic of Bosnia and\nmeasures might be adopted. 98 Herzegovina be reversed in accordance with the\n principles outlined above. It would have also decided\n Decision of 29 June 1993 (3247th meeting): to exempt the Government of the Republic of Bosnia\n rejection of a draft resolution and Herzegovina from the arms embargo imposed on\n former Yugoslavia by its resolution 713 (1991) with the\n At its 3247th meeting, on 29 June 1993, the\n sole purpose of enabling the Republic of Bosnia and\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the situation in\n Herzegovina to exercise its inherent right of self-\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following\n defence.\nthe adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentatives of Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, The representative of Cape Verde contended that\nBangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Comoros, the failure of the Council to implement effectively the\nCosta Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Estonia, Indonesia, the Charter collective security provisions in respect of the\nIslamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Latvia, the Libyan situation in Bosnia, would have a negative impact on\nArab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Senegal, Slovenia, the the outcome of current and future conflicts. He\nSyrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and the cautioned that one of the most negative lessons that\nUnited Arab Emirates, at their request, to participate in might be drawn from the Bosnian conflict was that\nthe discussion without the right to vote. The Council countries might have to rely on their own capacity to\nalso invited Ambassador Dragomir Djokic, at his defend themselves in future. For small nations, which\nrequest, to address the Council. The President (Spain) were the majority of the Members of the Organization,\nthen drew the attention of the Council members to the and which could meet their security needs only by\ntext of a draft resolution submitted by Cape Verde, relying on respect for the principles and norms of\nDjibouti, Morocco, Pakistan and Venezuela,99 who international law and on the effective implementation\nwere joined as sponsors by Afghanistan, Algeria, the of the decisions of the Security Council, especially its\nComoros, Egypt, Estonia, Latvia, Malaysia, Senegal, Chapter VII decisions, the Bosnian experience was\nthe Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey. 100 very disturbing. For a long time, calls for United\n Nations action to defend the Bosnian civilian\n Under the draft resolution, in its preambular part,\n population had gone unheeded, whilst safe areas\nthe Council, inter alia, would have stressed that a\n declared under Chapter VII continued to be\nsolution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina\n jeopardized. In submitting the draft resolution, the\nmust be based on the following principles:\n caucus of non-aligned members of the Security Council\n(a) immediate cessation of hostilities; (b) withdrawal\n was responding to a moral call aimed at enabling the\nfrom the territories occupied by forces and ethnic\n victims of aggression and ethnic cleansing to exercise\ncleansing; (c) reversal of the consequences of the\n their inherent right of self-defence, as recognized in the\nreprehensible policy of ethnic cleansing and\n Charter of the United Nations. If the United Nations\nrecognition of the right of all Bosnian refugees to\n did not have the political will to take prompt and\nreturn to their homes; and (d) restoration of the\n effective action to stop the killing of Bosnian Muslim\nterritorial integrity and unity of the Republic of Bosnia\n civilians, then it should at least allow them legitimately\nand Herzegovina. In the operative part of the draft\n to defend themselves. Indeed, the draft resolution made\nresolution, the Council would have reaffirmed the\n it clear that the sole purpose of lifting the arms\nsovereignty, territorial integrity and political\n embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina was to\nindependence of the Republic of Bosnia and\n enable that Republic to defend itself from attacks. 101\nHerzegovina; and demanded that all hostilities within\nthe territory of the Republic of Bosnia and The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n__________________ contended that two questions were relevant in\n 98 Ibid., p. 11. evaluating the merit of the draft resolution. First, had\n 99 S/25997.\n the Security Council compelled the necessary means to\n 100 During the 3247th meeting, the following also joined in\n stop the aggression and genocide against Bosnia and\n sponsoring the draft resolution: Albania, Indonesia, the __________________\n Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, the Libyan Arab 101 S/PV.3247, pp. 6-10.\n Jamahiriya, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates.\n\n\n\n07-63109 753\n"
[34] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nHerzegovina? Second, if not, what were the measures measure had been proposed by a majority of the United\nthat should be taken to stop the aggression and, Nations membership in General Assembly resolution\nparticularly should the arms embargo against Bosnia 47/121 of 18 December 1992. It was also consistent\nand Herzegovina be declared invalid in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. The speaker concluded\nwith the United Nations Charter’s guarantee of the by stating that the options available to the Security\nright of self-defence? Noting that Bosnia and Council were stark: either the international community,\nHerzegovina had waited for over a year for “the most in accordance with the collective security system\nempowered members of the Council” to fulfil their envisaged in the Charter, should take effective\ncommitment to confront the Serbians, the speaker measures to defend Bosnia and Herzegovina, or it\npointed out that his country had sought to reassert its should remove the shackles preventing the victim from\nright to obtain the means of self-defence only after exercising its inherent right of self-defence. 103\nthose members had failed to meet their commitment.\n The representative of Croatia said that it was\nThe speaker further stated that the Bosnians must be\n unfortunate that the Security Council had not endorsed,\nprovided with the leverage to undertake fair and\n nor been prepared to enforce, the Vance-Owen plan.\npromising negotiations or to confront the undiminished\n Although it was necessary for the international\naggression.102\n community to stop the tragedy taking place in Bosnia\n The representative of Pakistan argued that Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia did not believe that\nand Herzegovina had been at a “grave disadvantage” in providing more arms to Bosnian Muslims would\nresponding to aggression, not only because of the large accomplish that purpose. If the arms embargo were to\nand well-equipped Serb army and paramilitary units, be lifted, the Croatian Government could only support\nbut also because it had been prevented by the United a general lifting for all the victims of Serbian\nNations from acquiring the means for self-defence. He aggression. A selective approach to the issue would\nalso contended that it had become clear that Serbian only aggravate the ongoing situation.104\nforces would not be deterred by the exhortations of the\n The representative of Morocco contended that the\nCouncil so long as it was not prepared to take\n arms embargo, which the Council had adopted with a\nenforcement measures, including the use of force under\n view to reducing violence and suffering, had\nChapter VII of the Charter. The speaker further stated\n unfortunately not had any effect on either the Serbs or\nthat his country could not accept and legitimize the\n the Croats. Rather, it had increased the military\nconsequences of blatant acts of aggression against a\n superiority of the Serbs. He argued that, as long as an\nState Member of the United Nations, nor could it\n imbalance existed, the Serbs would continue to impose\naccept the “disintegration” of a sovereign State. He\n conditions and refuse to compromise, as they had done\nwarned that the consequences of accepting the situation\n with respect to the Vance-Owen plan. The legitimate\nin Bosnia and Herzegovina would be terrible not only\n Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina had suffered\nfor the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina but for the\n the most from the arms embargo. Authorizing the\ninternational community as a whole. It would\n Bosnian Government to acquire the means to defend its\nencourage those who believed that force could be a\n civilian population would help deter the Serbs from\nviable instrument for territorial expansion and political\n pursuing policies of aggression and occupation. It was\ndomination, and it would erode the credibility of the\n therefore essential to exempt it from the provisions of\nSecurity Council as an instrument of peace and justice,\n resolution 713 (1991). The speaker also argued that the\nnot only in respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also\n lifting of the arms embargo should be accompanied by\nin relation to other conflicts and disputes. Furthermore,\n strengthened monitoring of the sanctions regime, in\nit would revive the global arms race, as all nations\n order to prevent the Bosnian Serbs from continuing to\nexposed to aggression and domination would seek to\n acquire additional weapons and territory.105\narm themselves against such threats. Referring to the\ndraft resolution, the speaker stated that the most Mr. Djokic stated that the Government of the\nimportant provision was the one exempting Bosnia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia strongly opposed\nHerzegovina from the arms embargo imposed against __________________\nthe former Yugoslavia by resolution 713 (1991). That 103 Ibid., pp. 17-26.\n\n__________________ 104 Ibid., pp. 33-37.\n 105 Ibid., pp. 47-52.\n 102 Ibid., pp. 9-17.\n\n\n\n\n754 07-63109\n"
[35] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nexempting one side from the arms embargo imposed by already been adopted by the Security Council. It\nresolution 713 (1991). He warned that, should the draft suggested that an important step might be to put under\nresolution be adopted, the Security Council would, effective United Nations control all heavy weapons at\nunder the pretext of protecting the inherent right to the disposal of the Bosnian Serbs. In its opinion, such a\nself-defence, merely be contravening its past efforts to step would lower the level of military confrontation in\ncontain the crisis and find a lasting solution. He further the region and would remove from the agenda the\nargued that lifting the arms embargo and supplying question of lifting the arms embargo. 108\narms to one side would invariably lead to an arms race\n During the debate, other speakers also referred to\nbetween the warring parties in Bosnia and\n the inability of the Security Council to fulfil its\nHerzegovina, with unforeseeable consequences. The\n responsibilities under Article 24 of the Charter and to\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia, despite the unfair and\n enforce its resolutions adopted under Chapter VII.\ninhumane sanctions imposed against it, would spare no\n They reaffirmed the right of Bosnia and Herzegovina\neffort to help prevent further bloodshed between the\n to self-defence in accordance with Article 51 and urged\n“three constituent nations” and to find a solution based\n the Council to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia\non their legitimate interests and rights. Before\n and Herzegovina.109\nconcluding, the speaker contended that the draft\nresolution was one of war rather than of peace and he Speaking before the vote, the representative of\nurged the Security Council, not to adopt it. 106 the United Kingdom regretted that a political\n settlement had not yet been achieved. But the United\n The representative of Slovenia noted that\n Nations could not simply impose a political solution.\nalthough the Council had devoted much of its time to\n While acknowledging that the existing situation in\nthe conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina the previous\n Bosnia and Herzegovina was “deeply worrying”, the\nmonths, the resolutions adopted so far had not yielded\n speaker stated that his Government nevertheless did\nthe expected results and had in some cases avoided the\n not see a reason for adopting what it regarded as a\ncrucial issues. He also stressed the following basic\n “solution of despair”, which was how it viewed the\nprinciples. First, the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina\n proposal to lift the arms embargo. He contended that\nwas neither a civil war, nor an ethnic conflict. It was a\n lifting the arms embargo would clearly result in an\nwar of aggression perpetrated from outside Bosnia and\n increase in fighting and would provide an “irresistible\nHerzegovina, and it was a war for territory. Every State\n temptation” to the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats\nhad the inherent right, in accordance with Article 51 of\n to intensify their military efforts and to ensure that, by\nthe Charter, to legitimate self-defence and that right\n the time any substantial delivery of weapons was made\nshould not be denied to Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n to the Government of Bosnia, the military threat it\nSecond, genocide must be stopped, and deeds rather\n posed to them had been neutralized. In addition to\nthan words were necessary to do so. Third, the Security\n these drawbacks, the United Kingdom did not see how\nCouncil needed to find a way to preserve the existence\n the United Nations current efforts in Bosnia and\nof a United Nations Member State, or else the whole\n Herzegovina could be sustained following a decision to\nsystem of collective security would be put in jeopardy.\n lift the arms embargo. The United Kingdom was of the\nFourth, preservation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a\n view that the adoption of the draft resolution would be\nvital requirement for peace and political stability in\n seen as a signal that the United Nations was turning its\nsouth-eastern Europe and in Europe as a whole. 107\n back on Bosnia and leaving its inhabitants to “fight it\n The representative of Ukraine urged the Council out, come what may”. It could not therefore support the\nto consider additional effective measures to protect draft. The speaker further stated that his delegation\nUnited Nations peacekeepers in Bosnia and __________________\nHerzegovina, and expressed concern at the possibility 108 Ibid., pp. 111-113.\n 109 Ibid., pp. 26-33 (Egypt); pp. 38-41 (Malaysia); pp. 41-47\nthat hostilities would be intensified if the arms\nembargo were lifted in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It (Jordan); pp. 52-54 (Albania); pp. 54-59 (Indonesia);\n pp. 60-63 (Turkey); pp. 72-77 (Islamic Republic of\nfavoured strict compliance with the resolutions that had\n__________________ Iran); pp. 77-83 (United Arab Emirates); pp. 83-88\n (Senegal); pp. 92-96 (Algeria); pp. 96-102 (Libyan Arab\n 106 Ibid., pp. 89-91.\n Jamahiriya); pp. 102-106 (Bangladesh); and pp. 106-108\n 107 Ibid., pp. 108-110.\n (Costa Rica).\n\n\n\n07-63109 755\n"
[36] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nregretted that the issue of lifting the arms embargo, building up an international presence in Bosnia and\nwhich was “so divisive”, was being pressed to a vote. Herzegovina, as one way of making progress towards a\nThe unity of the Council was an “absolute peaceful settlement. 112\nprerequisite” to achieving results in handling what was\n The representative of Hungary stated that his\nthe “most complex and difficult” international issue in\n delegation continued to endorse the principles set out\nrecent years. The United Kingdom believed that\n in the draft resolution, including the cessation of\npriority should be given to making the safe areas safer.\n hostilities, the withdrawal from territories occupied by\nIn addition, the economic sanctions against Serbia and\n force, reversal of the consequences of the policy of\nMontenegro should be sustained and strengthened. It\n “ethnic cleansing”, and restoration of the territorial\nwas crucial that the Bosnian Serbs and the authorities\n integrity of Bosnia. Furthermore, Hungary thought that\nin Belgrade understood that there would be no easing\n it was “enormously important” to make a clear\nor lifting of the sanctions until the conditions set out in\n distinction between the aggressor and the victim of\nthe Security Council’s resolutions, most recently in\n aggression. It was also intolerable that one of the\nresolution 820 (1993), had been fulfilled. The United\n parties to the conflict continued to be supplied with\nKingdom also believed that the Council should do\n weapons from outside sources, while another party had\neverything in its power to sustain and nourish the peace\n no such ability. The point was to halt all supplies of\nprocess. 110\n weapons and ammunition to Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n The representative of France stated that his To that end, international inspection facilities should be\nGovernment did not believe that the draft resolution set up along all of the borders of Bosnia and\nshould be adopted for reasons of principle, timing and Herzegovina, as had been indicated in resolution 838\nsubstance. He argued that the role of the United (1993). The Serbs’ heavy weapons should be placed\nNations and the Security Council was not to organize under effective control, as they were the weapons that\nfor war or to wage war. According to the Charter, its were responsible for so much of the violence. The\nrole was to contribute to the settlement of conflict by Security Council needed only to apply its own\npeaceful means. Deciding to lift the arms embargo resolutions. The speaker further stated that the question\nselectively would mean, contrary to the principles of before the Council was whether, in the existing\nthe Charter, setting out on the path of war rather than circumstances, the actions envisaged in the draft\nof peace. Moreover, lifting the arm embargo would put resolution would promote a solution to the Bosnian\nan end to the safe areas and could have dangerous problem. After carefully weighing the various\nconsequences for the very existence of Bosnia and arguments concerning the draft resolution, however,\nHerzegovina.111 Hungary had concluded that lifting the arms embargo\n against Bosnia and Herzegovina would not necessarily\n The representative of the Russian Federation\n have a positive impact on subsequent developments in\nstated that his delegation could not accept the draft\n that country and the vicinity. In Hungary’s opinion,\nresolution. The position of principle of the Russian\n lifting the arms embargo would be to admit the\nFederation on the crisis in Bosnia was that there should\n irreversible failure of efforts for a negotiated, political\nbe a halt in hostilities and a peaceful settlement, which\n solution.113\nwould satisfy all three sides within the context of the\nterritorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Lifting The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nthe arms embargo would not increase the chance of received 6 votes to none, with 9 abstentions (Brazil,\nachieving such a settlement; on the contrary, it would China, France, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Russian\nopen the “floodgates” for an escalation of the war, Federation, Spain and United Kingdom), and was not\npotentially leading to results completely contradictory adopted as it had not obtained the required number of\nto the goals proclaimed in the draft. It might actually votes.\nneutralize the entire United Nations operation in\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the\nBosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Federation\n United States recalled that her Government had\ncontinued to support the concept of safe areas and of\n__________________ consistently advocated lifting the arms embargo on the\n __________________\n 110 Ibid., pp. 132-135.\n 112 Ibid., pp. 138-142.\n 111 Ibid., pp. 136-138.\n 113 Ibid., pp. 143-147.\n\n\n\n\n756 07-63109\n"
[37] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nGovernment of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By voting in should avoid the risk that, as a consequence of its\nfavour of the draft resolution, the United States actions and decisions, war might escalate or expand.\nreaffirmed its belief that Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a Furthermore, there appeared to be grounds to fear that\nsovereign State and Member of the United Nations, had some of the measures envisaged in the draft resolution,\na right to defend itself. The speaker warned that, if they were to be implemented, might prompt drastic\nalthough the Council had not acted on the arms actions which would affect the very populations that\nembargo, it would be a grave mistake for the Bosnian the Security Council would be trying to protect. The\nSerbs to interpret that action as an endorsement of their international community should not give up on the\nintransigence or of their attempts to use military force hope of reaching a peaceful solution to the conflict.116\nto change international boundaries and destroy a\n The representative of New Zealand noted that his\nneighbour. Nor should the vote be seen as an indication\n delegation shared a deep sense of frustration about the\nthat the international community was willing to turn a\n situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It believed,\nblind eye to the gross violations of human rights\n however, that a durable solution to the situation in\ncommitted in Bosnia, primarily by the Bosnian Serbs.\n Bosnia and Herzegovina should come through\nThe United States would continue to insist that, if the\n intensified efforts towards a political settlement. New\nauthorities in Belgrade wanted to rejoin the family of\n Zealand continued to support United Nations\nnations, they would have to stop the violence and\n humanitarian efforts and Security Council measures,\ncomply with all relevant Security Council resolutions.\n such as sanctions, designed to persuade the parties of\nUntil that day, the Council would have no choice but to\n the need to look for a political solution, but the action\nmaintain the pressure. The goal remained a negotiated\n proposed in the draft resolution had been of quite a\nsettlement freely agreed to by all the parties, and the\n different nature. Lifting the arms embargo would, in\nUnited States continued to believe that exempting\n New Zealand’s view, immediately intensify the\nBosnia and Herzegovina from the arms embargo was a\n military pressure on the Bosnian forces, inevitably\nmeans to that end. 114\n resulting in more civilian casualties and more refugees.\n The representative of China stated that his It would also force an end to the United Nations\ndelegation held that the sovereignty, political humanitarian operations. The speaker cautioned that\nindependence and territorial integrity of all United the Council’s decision should not be misinterpreted as\nNations Member States should be fully respected by meaning that the Council had turned its back on the\nthe international community. It therefore supported Bosnian people. On the contrary, the Council had\nsuch elements in the draft. Based on China’s principled established safe areas under resolution 836 (1993) and\nposition, the Chinese delegation had abstained on the had decided to respond with force if those areas were\nvote on the draft resolution. 115 threatened. It was necessary to address urgently the\n practical implementation of the safe areas. 117\n The representative of Brazil stated that his\ndelegation had supported many of the elements in the The President, speaking in his capacity as the\ndraft resolution, including that there should be an representative of Spain, stated that his delegation\nimmediate cessation of hostilities, a halt to the shared, in large measure, the motivations of the\nabhorrent practice of ethnic cleansing, and that the countries that had sponsored the draft resolution. It was\nacquisition of territories by the use of force could not Spain’s view, however, that lifting the arms embargo\nbe tolerated. Notwithstanding those considerations, would lead to an escalation of the violence and would\nhowever, the Brazilian delegation had not been in a only increase the suffering of the civilian population.\nposition to vote in favour of the draft resolution. Brazil Moreover, the measures proposed in the draft\ncontinued to believe in the overwhelming importance resolution would escalate the risk of an expansion of\nof seeking a comprehensive political solution to the the conflict, with potentially serious consequences for\nBosnian conflict. It maintained that the international the entire region. In addition, lifting the arms embargo\ncommunity needed to aim its actions and decisions at would be incompatible with the maintenance of the\nrestraining and putting an end to the armed conflict and presence of UNPROFOR and that therefore the\n__________________ __________________\n 114 Ibid., pp. 148-149. 116 Ibid., pp. 151-153.\n 115 Ibid., pp. 150-151. 117 Ibid., pp. 153-155.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 757\n"
[38] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nhumanitarian agencies would not be able to operate. By a letter dated 7 July 1993,120 the President of\nSpain believed that the Council should not abandon its the Security Council informed the Secretary-General of\nefforts to achieve the implementation of resolutions the following:\n836 (1993) and 844 (1993), on the safe areas. He noted The members of the Security Council have considered\nthat, if all else failed, Spain was prepared to consider your report of 1 July 1993 on options for the deployment of\nrecourse to more forceful measures, without prejudging international observers on the borders of the Republic of Bosnia\nor excluding consideration of any of them. 118 and Herzegovina. The continue to believe that, in order to\n facilitate the implementation of the relevant Council resolutions,\n Decision of 7 July 1993: letter from the international observers should be deployed on the borders of\n President to the Secretary-General Bosnia and Herzegovina, with priority being given to the border\n between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\n On 1 July 1993, pursuant to resolution Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).\n838 (1993), the Secretary-General submitted to the Bearing in mind the observations in your report, they\nCouncil a report on options for the deployment of invite you to contact Member States in order to establish\ninternational observers on the borders of the Republic whether they are ready, individually or through regional\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina.119 The Secretary-General organizations or arrangements, to make qualified personnel\nnoted that the relevant resolutions of the Security available to act as observers along the borders of Bosnia and\nCouncil would require border monitors to address Herzegovina and to continue to explore all possibilities for\n implementation of the border monitors concept. They also invite\nmovements of regular and irregular military personnel, you to pursue the question of implementation with a view to\nweapons and other military equipment and supplies, as obtaining full cooperation from the authorities in the\nwell as goods subject to sanctions from neighbouring neighbouring countries.\ncountries destined for Bosnia and Herzegovina or the\n The members of the Council look forward to receiving\nUnited Nations Protected Areas of Croatia. Two further information on the contacts proposed in the previous\noptions were proposed, the first consisting of border paragraph, as well as reports pursuant to paragraph 2 of\nmonitoring and the second consisting of border control. resolution 838 (1993) of 10 June 1993 concerning material\nBoth options were based on the following assumptions: derived from aerial surveillance.\n(a) border monitoring arrangements would require the\nfull cooperation of all parties concerned; (b) border Decision of 22 July 1993 (3257th meeting):\nmonitoring would include all international borders of statement by the President\nBosnia and Herzegovina, with priority given to those\n By a letter dated 19 July 1993 addressed to the\nwith the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; (c) given the\n President of the Security Council,121 the representative\nnature of the terrain and the length of the borders, only\n of Bosnia and Herzegovina transmitted a letter of the\nmajor crossing points could be effectively monitored;\n same date from the President of Bosnia and\nand (d) where applicable, UNPROFOR would focus its\n Herzegovina in which he reported that Serbian forces\nmonitoring activity on the work of the national border\n had launched an offensive towards the Sarajevo safe\ncontrol agencies.\n zone, and that forces had been also directed to Mount\n The Secretary-General noted that option two Igman. He called upon the Council to intervene\nwould be unrealistic taking into account that the world- immediately to stop the aggression against Bosnia and\nwide resources for additional peacekeeping troops were Herzegovina.\nincreasingly stretched. Option one, however, would\n At its 3257th meeting, on 22 July 1993, the\nalso required substantial additional resources in terms\n Council included the letter from the representative of\nof observers and equipment. He further noted that even\n Bosnia and Herzegovina in its agenda. Following the\nif the necessary personnel and financial resources were\n adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\navailable, the effectiveness of the first option would\n representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\ndepend entirely on the cooperation of the neighbouring\n request, to participate in the discussion without the\ncountries and of the parties concerned.\n right to vote. The President (United Kingdom) stated\n__________________ that, after consultations among members of the\n 118 Ibid., pp. 156-159. __________________\n 119 S/26018 and Corr.1 and Add.1. 120 S/26049.\n 121 S/26107.\n\n\n\n\n758 07-63109\n"
[39] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nSecurity Council, he had been authorized to make the Decision of 24 August 1993 (3269th meeting):\nfollowing statement on behalf of the Council:122 resolution 859 (1993)\n The Security Council has noted with grave concern the At its 3269th meeting, on 24 August 1993, the\nletter of 19 July 1993 from the President of the Presidency of the Council resumed its consideration of the situation in\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following\nof the Security Council about the Bosnian Serb military\noffensive in the area of Mount Igman, close to Sarajevo, a city\n the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nwhich has stood for centuries as an outstanding example of a representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\nmulticultural, multi-ethnic and plurireligious society, which request, to participate in the discussion without the\nneeds to be protected and preserved. right to vote. The President (United States) then drew\n The Council renews its demand that all hostilities in\n the attention of the Council members to letters dated 3,\nBosnia and Herzegovina cease and that the parties and others 6, 20 and 23 August 1993 from the Secretary-General\nconcerned refrain from any hostile acts. It supports the call from addressed to the President of the Security Council,123\nthe Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former conveying reports dated 2, 5 and 20 August 1993 of the\nYugoslavia in this regard, designed to facilitate the peace talks. Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\n The Council reaffirms its resolutions 824 (1993) of 6 May International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, as\n1993 and 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, in the first of which it well as to the text of a draft resolution prepared in the\ndeclared Sarajevo a safe area that should be free from armed course of the Council’s prior consultations 124 and a\nattacks and any hostile acts, and from which Bosnian Serb number of other documents. 125\nmilitary or paramilitary units should be withdrawn to a distance\nwherefrom they cease to constitute a menace to its security and The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nthat of its inhabitants. It condemns the offensive by the Bosnian stated that the last time he had spoken before the\nSerbs on Mount Igman aimed at further isolating Sarajevo and Council, his country had been told that its right to\nescalating the recent unprecedented and unacceptable pressures obtain defensive weapons and fully exercise\non the Government and people of the Republic of Bosnia and self-defence would pose a threat to United Nations\nHerzegovina before the forthcoming talks in Geneva. It demands\nan immediate end to this offensive and to all attacks on\n forces and prolong the war. Now it was being\nSarajevo. It also demands an immediate end to all violations of suggested that the reemphasis of the principles of the\ninternational humanitarian law. It demands an end to the Charter of the United Nations, international law,\ndisruption of public utilities (including water, electricity, fuel Security Council resolutions, decisions of the\nand communications) by the Bosnian Serb party and to the International Court of Justice and the London\nblocking of, and interference with, the delivery of humanitarian Conference on the Former Yugoslavia would somehow\nrelief by both the Bosnian Serb and the Bosnian Croat parties. undermine the chances for a negotiated settlement. He\n The Council calls on the parties to meet in Geneva under urged the Security Council to adhere to its resolutions\nthe auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference and commitments, warning that failure to do so would\non the Former Yugoslavia. It calls on the parties to negotiate in be “catastrophic”, not only for the people of Bosnia\nearnest with the aim of achieving a just and equitable settlement and Herzegovina, but also for the people of the world,\non the basis of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political\nindependence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the principles\n who deserved and commanded the very ideals upon\nagreed at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia which the Council had been established. Turning to the\nin London on 26 August 1992 and supported by the Council in draft resolution he stated that it was timely, in that it\nits statement of 2 September 1992. In particular it reaffirms the was being adopted prior to the resumption of the\nunacceptability of ethnic cleansing, or the acquisition of __________________\nterritory by the use of force, or any dissolution of the Republic 123 S/25233, S/26260 and S/26337 and Add.1, respectively.\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina. 124 S/26182.\n 125 Letters dated 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 16 and 23 August 1993,\n The Council emphasizes that it will keep open all options,\nnone of which is prejudged or excluded from consideration. respectively, from the representative of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security\n__________________ Council (S/26227, S/26232, S/26244, S/26245, S/26256,\n 122 S/26134. S/26309, S/26340 and S/26342); letters dated 6 August\n 1993 from the representative of Morocco addressed to\n the President of the Security Council (S/26257 and\n S/26266); and letter dated 9 August 1993 from the\n representative of Croatia addressed to the Secretary-\n General (S/26281).\n\n\n\n07-63109 759\n"
[40] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nGeneva process to find a just and durable peace. there is still no compliance with all relevant Council resolutions,\nBosnia and Herzegovina hoped that the members of the in particular by the Bosnian Serb party,\nSecurity Council would remain committed to the Condemning once again all war crimes and other\napplication of the draft resolution’s principles and that violations of international humanitarian law, by whomsoever\nthey would ensure that the Co-Chairmen of the committed, Bosnian Serbs or other individuals,\nConference would promote those principles in Deeply concerned at the deterioration of humanitarian\nGeneva.126 conditions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in and around\n Mostar, and determined to support in every possible way the\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of efforts by the United Nations Protection Force and the United\nPakistan noted that the non-aligned members of the Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to continue providing\nSecurity Council had originally submitted the draft humanitarian assistance to civilian populations in need,\nresolution with a view to achieving two fundamental\n Concerned about the continuing siege of Sarajevo, Mostar\nobjectives: first, to ensure a complete ceasefire and and other threatened cities,\ncessation of all hostilities throughout Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, which was an essential prerequisite for a Strongly condemning the disruption of public utilities\njust and equitable political solution to the conflict (including water, electricity, fuel and communications), in\n particular by the Bosnian Serb party, and calling upon all parties\nthrough peaceful negotiations; and second, to set out a concerned to cooperate in restoring them,\nframework of principles which should constitute the\nfundamental basis for peace and a politically Recalling the principles for a political solution adopted by\nnegotiated settlement of the crisis. Despite the the London International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,\nunanimous view that the tragedy in Bosnia and Reaffirming once again the unacceptability of the\nHerzegovina was caused by flagrant violations of acquisition of territory through the use of force and the practice\ninternational law and the principles enshrined in the of “ethnic cleansing”,\nCharter, the political will to end it appeared to be Stressing that an end to the hostilities in Bosnia and\ndeficient. The draft resolution came at a crucial time, Herzegovina is necessary to achieve meaningful progress in the\nand Pakistan therefore hoped that its successful peace process,\nadoption would help to create the conditions necessary Mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter for\nfor transparent and free negotiations among the parties the maintenance of international peace and security,\nconcerned.127\n Taking into account the reports of the Co-Chairmen of the\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and Steering Committee of the International Conference on the\nadopted unanimously as resolution 859 (1993), which Former Yugoslavia contained in documents S/26233, S/26260\nreads: and S/26337,\n Determining that the grave situation in Bosnia and\n The Security Council,\n Herzegovina continues to be a threat to international peace and\n Recalling all its previous resolutions on the conflict in the security,\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,\n Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and\n 1. Notes with appreciation the report by the Special\npolitical independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\n Representative of the Secretary-General on the latest\nresponsibility of the Security Council in this regard,\n developments at the Geneva peace talks, and urges the parties,\n Reaffirming also that Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a State in cooperation with the Co-Chairmen, to conclude as soon as\nMember of the United Nations, enjoys the rights provided for in possible a just and comprehensive political settlement freely\nthe Charter of the United Nations, agreed by all of them;\n Noting that Bosnia and Herzegovina has continued to be 2. Calls for an immediate ceasefire and cessation of\nsubject to armed hostilities in contravention of Security Council hostilities throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nresolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and other relevant as essential for achieving a just and equitable political solution\nCouncil resolutions and that, despite all efforts by the United to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina through peaceful\nNations as well as regional organizations and arrangements, negotiations;\n__________________\n 3. Demands that all concerned facilitate the\n 126 S/PV.3269, pp. 7-15.\n unhindered flow of humanitarian assistance, including the\n 127 Ibid., pp. 22-23.\n provision of food, water, electricity, fuel and communications, in\n particular to the safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n\n\n\n760 07-63109\n"
[41] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n 4. Demands also that the safety and operational through a union of three member Republics; a\neffectiveness of personnel of the United Nations Protection territorial base for each of the three communities, but\nForce and of the Office of the United Nations High above all for the most sorely tried community, the\nCommissioner for Refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina be fully\nrespected by all parties at all times;\n Bosnian Muslims, economically viable areas; and\n finally the maintenance of Sarajevo as the united\n 5. Takes notes with appreciation of the letter of the capital of that entity. Another essential element, the\nSecretary-General dated 18 August 1993 stating that the United continued membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina in\nNations has now the initial operational capability for the use of\nair power in support of the Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n the United Nations, was presently assured by the\n Council. Therefore, in his Government view, such an\n 6. Affirms that a solution to the conflict in Bosnia and accord, if scrupulously adhered to, would be a realistic\nHerzegovina must be in conformity with the Charter of the solution, permitting the foundation of a lasting\nUnited Nations and the principles of international law, and also\naffirms the continuing relevance in this context of:\n agreement. His delegation welcomed the fact that the\n Council had stressed its readiness to take immediately\n (a) The sovereignty, territorial integrity and political the necessary measures to implement a political\nindependence of Bosnia and Herzegovina; solution. The speaker noted that such action clearly\n (b) The fact that neither a change in the name of the benefited the party who was in a situation of weakness.\nState nor changes regarding the internal organization of the State A massive United Nations presence in Bosnia was the\nsuch as those contained in the constitutional agreement annexed best guarantee of the rights of the weakest. 128\nto the Co-Chairmen’s report in document S/26337 would affect\nthe continued membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the The representative of New Zealand noted that for\nUnited Nations; the past months the Council had been seriously divided\n (c) The principles adopted by the London International on how to respond to the increasingly tragic situation\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia, including the need for a in Bosnia. That division, and the consequent inaction,\ncessation of hostilities, the principle of a negotiated solution had put at risk not only the interests of Bosnia but also\nfreely arrived at, the unacceptability of the acquisition of the longer-term credibility of the United Nations\nterritory by force or by “ethnic cleansing” and the right of system and the Council’s role in collective security.\nrefugees and others who have suffered losses to compensation in His delegation was pleased that the Council had finally\naccordance with the statement on Bosnia adopted by the London\nConference;\n rose to the challenge. The small and the vulnerable\n must be able to depend on the collective security\n (d) Recognition and respect for the right of all mechanism of the United Nations, and that meant that\ndisplaced persons to return to their homes in safety and honour; the Council must be willing to act when it was seized\n (e) The maintenance of Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia and of an issue. The speaker further stated that the\nHerzegovina, as a united city and a multicultural, multi-ethnic resolution just adopted underlined the importance the\nand plurireligious centre; Council attached to backing up UNPROFOR with\n 7. Recalls the principle of individual responsibility for force, and it emphasized the support that the Secretary-\nthe perpetration of war crimes and other violations of General enjoyed on that issue. The resolution also\ninternational humanitarian law and its decision in resolution 827 addressed three other matters that his delegation\n(1993) of 25 May 1993 to establish an international tribunal; believed to be essential for any fair and freely accepted\n 8. Declares its readiness to consider taking the settlement: first, the continuity of the Bosnian State;\nnecessary measures to assist the parties in the effective secondly, the special status of Sarajevo as a unified\nimplementation of a fair and equitable settlement once it has capital; and, thirdly, the reiteration of the general\nbeen freely agreed by the parties, which would require a principles under which the negotiations had proceeded.\ndecision by the Council; On the question of the implementation of the\n 9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. settlement, his delegation was very pleased that the\n resolution looked forward to the role that the Council\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of\n would have to play once a settlement was\nFrance contended that the terms for a comprehensive\n concluded. 129\nsettlement as defined after the most recent negotiations\ncertainly did not represent an ideal solution. However, __________________\nthey had the merit of preserving what was essential: the 128 Ibid., pp. 26-27.\n 129 Ibid., pp. 33-36.\ncontinued existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n\n\n\n07-63109 761\n"
[42] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation Council resolutions, to the problem of the United\nstated that his delegation had voted in favour of the Nations protected areas in Croatia. Similarly, the\nresolution just adopted on the basis of its firm parties must cooperate with the international war\nconviction that all steps taken by the Security Council crimes tribunal. The speaker reiterated her\non the issue of a Bosnian settlement must be aimed Government’s belief that signing a political agreement\nsolely at assisting the negotiations in Geneva, which was not enough; a willingness effectively to implement\nprovided a “unique opportunity” to halt the bloodshed what they had signed would be the real test of any of\nand lead to a political settlement. It was the Russian the parties’ good will.131\nFederation’s fundamental position that the international\ncommunity, through the Security Council, must give Decision of 14 September 1993 (3276th\nclear signals promoting peacemaking and not actions meeting): statement by the President\nlikely to impede the negotiating process. The speaker\n At its 3276th meeting, on 14 September 1993, the\ncontended that there remained “unbalanced and biased\n Council resumed its consideration of the situation in\nelements” in the resolution concerning one of the\n the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following\nparties to the conflict, thus incorrectly reflecting the\n the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nstate of affairs existing in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\nMoreover, in connection with paragraph 5, The Russian\n request, to participate in the discussion without the\nFederation unequivocally believed in the need for the\n right to vote. The President (Venezuela) then stated\nSecretary-General to hold consultations with members\n that, after consultations among members of the\nof the Security Council before adopting a decision on\n Security Council, he had been authorized to make the\nair support for UNPROFOR. He warned that there\n following statement on behalf of the Council:132\nshould be no “automatic response” on that important\nquestion. The Russian Federation also emphasized that The Security Council expresses its profound concern over\nsuch air power could only be used in support of recent reports that Bosnian Croats have been holding Bosnian\nUNPROFOR, as provided in resolution 836 (1993). In Muslims in detention camps under deplorable conditions. The\n Council recalls the international revulsion and condemnation\nconclusion, the speaker stated that, in the view of his that accompanied revelations last year of the conditions under\ndelegation, the Security Council must not only promote which Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats were being held in\nthe speedy achievement of an agreement on Bosnia and Bosnian Serb detention camps.\nHerzegovina, but it should also specify its own role as\n The Council reiterates the principle that the International\na guarantor of the agreement’s implementation. Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) must be given access to all\nImmediately after the signing of the Geneva package, detainees in Bosnia wherever they may be held. It notes that the\nthe Security Council should therefore adopt a ICRC has recently been given access to some detainees, but\nsupporting resolution, providing not only for active, recalls with condemnation the obstacles which the Bosnian\npositive steps to implement the agreements, but also Croats have previously placed in the way of the ICRC’s attempts\nfor stricter measures concerning those who violated to gain access to the camps in order to ascertain the conditions\nthem.130 of the detained. It also notes the recent appeal addressed by the\n President of Croatia to the Bosnian Croats.\n The President, speaking in her capacity as The Council emphasizes the fact that inhumane treatment\nrepresentative of the United States, stated that the and abuses in detention centres violate international\nresolution just adopted, fairly and properly urged the humanitarian law. Moreover, as the Council has previously\nparties to reach a just and comprehensive political recalled, persons who commit or order the commission of grave\nsettlement as soon as possible. The resolution did not breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 are\ntake a stand on the points that the parties had taken to individually responsible in respect of such breaches.\ntheir constituencies from the Geneva negotiations. The The Council calls upon the Bosnian Croats to supply\ndecision had to remain with the parties. It was also immediately to the ICRC complete information on all camps\nnecessary to keep in mind that signing a political where Bosnian Muslim and other prisoners are being held, and\nsettlement was only the first step towards a return to to assure the ICRC and all other legitimately concerned\n __________________\nnormalcy. The United States would continue to support\n 131 Ibid., pp. 58-59.\nefforts to reach a solution, consistent with Security\n 132 S/26437.\n__________________\n 130 Ibid., pp. 47-50.\n\n\n\n\n762 07-63109\n"
[43] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\ninternational bodies free and unhindered access to the detained, Decisions of 9 November 1993 (3308th meeting):\nwherever they may be held. statements by the President\n The Council believes that the Government of Croatia has At its 3308th meeting, on 9 November 1993, the\na responsibility to use its influence with the Bosnian Croats to\nsecure compliance with this statement and calls on the\n Council resumed its consideration of the situation in\nGovernment of Croatia to take immediate steps to that end. the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following\n the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\n The Council further reaffirms that all parties to the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\nconflict are bound to comply with their obligations under\ninternational humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva\n request, to participate in the discussion without the\nConventions, and reminds them of its willingness to consider right to vote. The President (Cape Verde) drew the\nappropriate actions if any of them should fail to abide attention of the members of the Council to several\nscrupulously by their obligations. documents 134 and stated that, after consultations\n The Council decides to remain seized of the matter.\n among members of the Security Council, he had been\n authorized to make two statements on behalf of the\n Decision of 28 October 1993: statement by Council:\n the President The first statement 135 reads:\n On 28 October 1993, after consultations with the The Security Council expresses its deep concern at the\nmembers of the Council, the President made the reports on the deterioration of the situation in central Bosnia\nfollowing statement on behalf of the members of the where increased military activities are seriously threatening\nCouncil:133 security of the civilian population.\n The Council demands that all parties and others\n The members of the Security Council have heard an initial\n concerned refrain from taking any action that threatens the\noral report by the Secretariat concerning the massacre of the\n safety and well being of the civilian population.\ncivilian population in the village of Stupni Do on 23 October\n1993 by troops of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO). They The Council is equally concerned at the overall\nalso heard accounts of attacks against the United Nations humanitarian situation prevailing in the Republic of Bosnia and\nProtection Force (UNPROFOR) by armed persons bearing Herzegovina. It reiterates its demand to all parties and others\nuniforms of the Bosnian Government forces, and of an attack to concerned to guarantee unimpeded access for humanitarian\nwhich an humanitarian convoy under the protection of assistance.\nUNPROFOR was subjected on 25 October 1993 in central\nBosnia. The Council, aware of the heavy burden that these\n developments add to the existing precarious humanitarian\n The members of the Council unreservedly condemn these situation of the refugees and displaced persons in Bosnia and\nacts of violence. They express their profound concern about the Herzegovina and in the surrounding countries, calls on all\npreliminary information to the effect that regular and organized parties to assist the competent United Nations agencies and\narmed forces were probably involved. They have requested the other humanitarian organizations in their efforts to provide relief\nSecretary-General to submit as soon as possible a complete to the affected civilian population in those countries.\nreport on the responsibility for these acts. The members of the\nCouncil are prepared to draw all the relevant conclusions from The Council urges all parties and others concerned to\nthis report, which will also be transmitted to the Commission of exert the utmost restraint and refrain from taking any action\nExperts established by resolution 780 (1992). which might exacerbate the situation.\n\n The members of the Council reiterate their demand that The second statement 136 reads:\nall the parties in the former Yugoslavia comply with their\n The Security Council is profoundly shocked to learn of\nobligations under international humanitarian law, and that those\n the incident which took place on 8 November 1993 in which two\nresponsible for such violations of international humanitarian law\n persons were taken hostage by the Bosnian Serb forces, while\nshould be held accountable in accordance with the relevant __________________\nCouncil resolutions. The members of the Council call upon all\n 134 Letters dated 3 and 9 November 1993, respectively, from\nthe parties in the former Yugoslavia to guarantee the unimpeded\naccess of humanitarian assistance and the security of the the representative of Croatia addressed to the President\npersonnel responsible for it. of the Security Council (S/26690 and S/26715); and\n letter dated 8 November 1993 from the representative of\n__________________ Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of\n the Security Council (S/26692).\n 133 S/26661.\n 135 S/26716.\n 136 S/26717.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 763\n"
[44] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nmembers of a delegation headed by Monsignor Vinko Puljic, the Herzegovina. It deplores the failure of the parties to honour the\nArchbishop of Sarajevo, travelling to the city of Vares on a agreements they have already signed, in the context of the\nmission of peace under the protection of the United Nations International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, to\nProtection Force (UNPROFOR). implement a ceasefire and to permit the delivery of humanitarian\n assistance. It condemns the flagrant violations of international\n The Council strongly condemns this outrageous act,\n humanitarian law which have occurred, for which it holds the\nwhich is a flagrant challenge to the authority and inviolability of\n perpetrators personally responsible.\nUNPROFOR.\n The Council condemns any hostilities in the United\n The Council notes that, despite the prompt and\n Nations-designated safe areas, especially in the Sarajevo area. In\ncommendable intervention of the Special Representative of the\n particular, it strongly condemns the continuing military pressure\nSecretary-General, neither of the hostages has been released,\n on and the relentless bombardment by Bosnian Serb forces of\nand it demands that the Bosnian Serb forces proceed\n the capital city, Sarajevo. It demands the immediate end to\nimmediately to release them. The Council reminds the\n attacks against Sarajevo, which have resulted in a high number\nperpetrators of this act that they are obligated to ensure that no\n of civilian casualties, seriously disrupted essential services and\nharm comes to the individuals being held and that those\n aggravated an already severe humanitarian situation. In this\nresponsible for violations of international humanitarian law will\n regard, the Council once again reaffirms its commitment to\nbe held personally accountable for their actions.\n implement fully all its relevant resolutions, in particular\n The Council requests the Secretary-General to undertake a resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993.\nthorough investigation of the incident and to report to the\n The Council strongly deplores the abhorrent practice of\nCouncil without delay. It urges all parties and others concerned\n deliberate obstruction of humanitarian relief convoys by any\nto refrain from taking any action which might further exacerbate\n party and reiterates its demand that there be unimpeded access\nthe situation.\n of humanitarian relief assistance to their intended destinations.\n The Council condemns all attacks and hostile acts against The Council further demands that all parties fully abide by their\nUNPROFOR by all parties in the Republic of Bosnia and commitments in this regard and facilitate timely delivery of\nHerzegovina, as well as in the Republic of Croatia, which have humanitarian aid.\nbecome more frequent over the last weeks, and demands that\n The Council also condemns recent attacks against the\nthey cease forthwith.\n personnel of the United Nations Protection Force as well as of\n the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for\n Decision of 7 January 1994 (3327th meeting): Refugees and other humanitarian organizations. It reiterates the\n statement by the President demand that all parties ensure the safety and security of the\n Force, as well as all other United Nations personnel and those of\n At its 3327th meeting, on 7 January 1994, the non-governmental organizations, and their unimpeded access\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the situation in throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nBosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the\n The Council calls on all the parties to cease hostilities\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to\nBosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate honour the commitments they have entered into. It calls upon\nin the discussion without the right to vote. The them to negotiate in earnest in the framework of the\nPresident (Czech Republic) drew the attention of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to achieve\nmembers of the Council to a letter dated 6 January an early settlement.\n1994 from the representative of Bosnia and The Council remains seized of the matter and is ready to\nHerzegovina addressed to the President of the Security consider further measures to ensure that all parties and others\nCouncil, 137 transmitting a letter of the same date from concerned abide by their commitments and fully respect relevant\nthe President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Council resolutions.\nHerzegovina addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil. The President then stated that, after Decision of 3 February 1994 (3333rd meeting):\nconsultations among members of the Security Council, statement by the President\nhe had been authorized to make the following By a letter dated 28 January 1994 addressed to\nstatement on behalf of the Council: 138 the President of the Security Council,139 the\n The Security Council expresses its deep concern at the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina transmitted a\ncontinuing widespread hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and letter of the same date from the Prime Minister of\n__________________ Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the Security\n 137 S/1994/15. __________________\n 138 S/PRST/1994/1.\n 139 S/1994/95.\n\n\n\n\n764 07-63109\n"
[45] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nCouncil, in which he requested an emergency meeting The Council requests the Secretary-General to monitor the\nof the Council pursuant to a military intervention of the situation closely and report to the Council within two weeks\narmed forces of Croatia against Bosnia and from the date of the present statement on progress towards the\n complete and full withdrawal of all elements of the Croatian\nHerzegovina. He further requested the Security Army, as well as military equipment, from the Republic of\nCouncil to condemn firmly Croatia’s military activities Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nand to take all the necessary measures in accordance\nwith Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations The Council will consider other serious measures if the\n Republic of Croatia fails to put an immediate end to all forms of\nand all of the relevant General Assembly and Security interference in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nCouncil resolutions.\n The Council reiterates its presidential statement of\n At its 3333rd meeting, held on 3 February 1994 7 January 1994, in which it expressed its deep concern at the\nin response to the request contained in the above- continuing widespread hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and\nmentioned letter, the Council included the letter of the Herzegovina. The Council calls once more on all the parties to\nrepresentative of Bosnia in its agenda. Following the cease hostilities throughout the Republic of Bosnia and\nadoption of the agenda, the President (Djibouti) drew Herzegovina and to honour the commitments they have entered\n into and refrain from actions which escalate or widen the\nthe attention of the members of the Council to several conflict. It calls upon them to negotiate in earnest in the\ndocuments 140 and stated that, after consultations framework of the International Conference on the Former\namong members of the Security Council, he had been Yugoslavia to achieve an early settlement.\nauthorized to make the following statement on behalf\n The Council will remain seized of the matter.\nof the Council:141\n The Security Council is deeply concerned that the Deliberations of 14 and 15 February 1994\nRepublic of Croatia has deployed elements of the Croatian Army (3336th meeting)\nalong with heavy military equipment in the central and southern\nparts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as described in By a letter dated 5 February 1994 addressed to\nthe letter from the Secretary-General dated 1 February 1994. the President of the Security Council,142 the\n The Council strongly condemns the Republic of Croatia representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina transmitted a\nfor this serious hostile act against a State Member of the United letter from the Prime Minister of Bosnia and\nNations, which constitutes a violation of international law, the Herzegovina in which he reported that Serbian gunners\nCharter of the United Nations and relevant Council resolutions, had shelled a market in Sarajevo, killing 66 civilians\nin particular resolution 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992, in which the and wounding 197 civilians. The Prime Minister\nCouncil demanded an immediate end to all forms of interference requested an emergency meeting of the Security\nand full respect for the territorial integrity of the Republic of\nBosnia and Herzegovina.\n Council to determine why the existing mandate given\n by the Council under resolution 836 (1993) to “deter\n The Council demands that the Republic of Croatia attacks against the safe area” had not been utilized to\nwithdraw forthwith all elements of the Croatian Army along confront those who had committed these acts.\nwith military equipment and fully respect the territorial integrity\nof the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By a letter dated 8 February 1994 addressed to\n The Council once again reaffirms the sovereignty, the President of the Security Council,143 the\nterritorial integrity and independence of the Republic of Bosnia representative of Pakistan requested, on behalf of the\nand Herzegovina and the unacceptability of the acquisition of OIC Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina,144 that\nterritory by force or ethnic cleansing, and condemns such an urgent meeting of the Council be convened, to\nacquisition, as well as the practice of ethnic cleansing, by consider the extremely grave situation in Sarajevo.\nwhomsoever committed.\n By a letter dated 10 February 1994 addressed to\n__________________\n the President of the Security Council,145 the\n 140 Letter dated 1 February 1994 from the Secretary-General\n representative of the Russian Federation transmitted a\n addressed to the President of the Security Council __________________\n (S/1994/109); and letters dated 30 January and\n 142 S/1994/124.\n 2 February 1994, respectively, from the representative of\n 143 S/1994/135.\n Croatia addressed to the President of the Security\n 144 Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan,\n Council (S/1994/101 and S/1994/110).\n 141 S/PRST/1994/6. Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Turkey.\n 145 S/1994/152.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 765\n"
[46] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nstatement dated 10 February 1994 by the Ministry of The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nForeign Affairs of the Russian Federation containing a welcomed the NATO ultimatum to the Serbian forces\nrequest for an urgent meeting of the Security Council besieging Sarajevo and commended the Secretary-\nto consider practical ways to demilitarize Sarajevo and General for initiating the use of air strikes to deter\nintroduce a United Nations administration. further attacks. He observed in that regard, that\n resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) did not require\n At its 3336th meeting, held on 14 and\n any further action or consultation by the Security\n15 February 1994 in response to the requests contained\n Council, if the terms of those resolutions and\nin the above-mentioned letters, the Council included\n ultimatum were not met by the Serbians. The\nthe letters in its agenda. Following the adoption of the\n conditions of resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993)\nagenda, the Council invited the representatives of\n and the withdrawal of Serbian forces and their weapons\nAfghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Austria, Azerbaijan,\n should be executed fully and in a timely manner. The\nBangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei\n speaker added that the Secretary-General and NATO\nDarussalam, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark,\n had been delegated that responsibility, and the\nEgypt, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Indonesia,\n international community and Member States expected\nthe Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan,\n that those delegated obligations and commitments\nJordan, Kuwait, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia,\n would be carried out without equivocation. Noting that\nMorocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Saudi\n the plight of Sarajevo was “only the tip of the iceberg”\nArabia, Senegal, Slovenia, the Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia,\n of the suffering of the Bosnian people, the speaker\nTurkey, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates, at their\n stressed that, if peace were to be secured and the\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the __________________\nright to vote. The Council also invited Ambassador\n General (S/1994/129); letter dated 8 February 1994 from\nDragomir Djokic, at his request, to address the Council the representative of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-\nin the course of its consideration of the item. The General (S/1994/136); letter dated 7 February 1994 from\nCouncil further extended invitations to Mr. Mohammed the representatives of France, Spain and the United\nPeyrovi, Deputy Permanent Observer of OIC, and Kingdom addressed to the President of the Security\nMr. Ahmet Engin Ansay, Permanent Observer of OIC Council (S/1994/137); letter dated 7 February 1994 from\nto the United Nations. the representative of the Russian Federation addressed to\n the Secretary-General (S/1994/138); letter dated\n The President (Djibouti) then drew the attention 8 February 1994 from the representative of Egypt\nof the Council members to several documents. 146 addressed to the President of the Security Council\n (S/1994/139); letter dated 9 February 1994 from the\n__________________ representative of the Sudan addressed to the President of\n 146 Letter dated 5 February 1994 from the Prime Minister of the Security Council (S/1994/143); letter dated\n Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of 9 February 1994 from the representative of Azerbaijan\n the Council, transmitted by a letter of the same date from addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1994/144); letter\n the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed dated 7 February 1994 from the representative of Algeria\n to the President of the Council (S/1994/124); letter dated addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1994/145); letter\n 8 February 1994 from the representative of Pakistan dated 9 February 1994 from the representative of\n addressed, on behalf of the members of the OIC Contact Malaysia addressed to the President of the Security\n Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina, to the President of Council (S/1994/146); note verbale dated 5 February\n the Council (S/1994/135); letter dated 10 February 1994 1994 from the representative of Tunisia addressed to the\n from the representative of the Russian Federation Secretary-General (S/1994/148); letter dated 10 February\n addressed to the President of the Council (S/1994/152); 1994 from the representative of Lithuania addressed to\n letters dated 4, 8 and 9 February 1994, respectively, from the Secretary-General (S/1994/153); letter dated\n the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed 10 February 1994 from the representative of Israel\n to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/123, addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1994/158); letter\n S/1994/134 and S/1994/142); letter dated 7 February dated 11 February 1994 from the representative of\n 1994 from the representative of Turkey addressed to the Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General\n President of the Security Council (S/1994/126); letter (S/1994/166); and letter dated 14 February 1994 from\n dated 6 February 1994 from the representative of the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the\n Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General Council, transmitting the report of the Co-Chairmen of\n (S/1994/127); letter dated 7 February 1994 from the the Steering Committee of the International Conference\n representative of Slovenia addressed to the Secretary- on the Former Yugoslavia (S/1994/173).\n\n\n\n\n766 07-63109\n"
[47] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\ncredibility of the negotiating process established, the call into question the decisions of the NATO Council,\ninternational community must implement resolutions which should be implemented fully.148\n824 (1993) and 836 (1993) in the other five safe areas\n The representative of the United States stated that\nand take the necessary measures to secure the safety of\n her Government believed that the conflict should be\nBosnians throughout the country. He contended that the\n resolved at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield.\nCouncil’s commitment to ensure full and timely\n She argued, however, that diplomacy must be backed\ncompliance with resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993)\n by a willingness to use force, when essential, in the\naround Sarajevo, and to extend that commitment to the\n cause of peace, for it was only “force plus diplomacy”\nother safe areas and the remainder of the country\n that could stop the “slaughter” in Sarajevo and break\nwould be critical in determining the necessity for\n the “stalemate” in Geneva. Referring to the decisions\nBosnia and Herzegovina to exercise its full rights\n taken by the NATO Council, she stated that those steps\nunder Article 51. He added that although his delegation\n were consistent with resolutions adopted by the\nwas prepared to consider United Nations\n Council, and did not require further Council action.\ndemilitarization and administration of Sarajevo as part\n She recalled in that regard that the decision to initiate\nof a final and overall peace plan, such premature\n air strikes lay in the hands of the Secretary-General\nattempts could only delay the taking of the necessary\n and that it had been the Council that had placed it\nsteps and deviate from the desired conclusion. In\n there. Acknowledging that neither NATO nor the\nconclusion, Bosnia and Herzegovina would support\n Security Council should impose a settlement upon the\nany efforts to broaden the involvement of the Security\n parties, as such a settlement would not be lasting, the\nCouncil and Member States in the peace process, and\n speaker stated that by seeking to reduce the level of\nin that context it backed the relocation of talks to New\n violence around Sarajevo, it was hoped that the\nYork. 147\n negotiating process would be reinvigorated. She also\n The representative of France stated that the only noted that, for the first time, a regional security\npurpose of recent decisions of States members of organization, NATO, had acted to implement a decision\nNATO was to make available to the United Nations the of the Council to use force under Chapter VII of the\nmeans to implement Security Council decisions, and Charter. Cooperation between NATO and the United\nthus to improve the chances for peace. In that Nations would be essential, not only for the citizens of\nperspective, the top priority was to lift the siege of Sarajevo and the other safe areas in Bosnia, but also\nSarajevo, to begin the demilitarization of the city, by for the precedent it would set for the future of\ngiving UNPROFOR control of heavy weapons, and to collective security.149\nplace the city under provisional United Nations\n The representative of Pakistan recalled that his\nadministration as contemplated in the European Union\n country had consistently urged the international\nplan. He contended that the NATO decisions fell\n community to act decisively in order to halt and\n“squarely” within the framework of resolutions 824\n reverse aggression against the Bosnian Government.\n(1993) and 836 (1993). There was thus no need for the\n Pakistan had advocated resolute action, including the\ndecisions of the NATO Council to be submitted to the\n use of force, and in particular air strikes, to enforce and\nSecurity Council for any further decision. Moreover,\n implement the mandatory decisions of the Council.\nthe Government of France believed that the Secretary-\n Regrettably, despite the fact that most of the Council\nGeneral had been acting within his authority and in\n resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina were adopted\naccordance with Security Council resolutions when he\n under Chapter VII, they remained by and large\nhad contacted NATO. The Government of France also\n unimplemented. His delegation believed that only the\ntook note of the desire of the Russian Federation that\n decisive use of force, through the use of “surgical,\nthe Security Council consider steps to raise the siege of\n punitive air strikes”, would make the Serbs conform to\nSarajevo, and to place the city under United Nations\n Security Council resolutions. It further considered that\nadministration. While it shared that objective, it\n the requisite legal framework for such action existed in\nbelieved that such a consideration should in no way\n__________________ Security Council resolutions, and in particular in\n __________________\n 147 S/PV.3336, pp. 7-13.\n 148 Ibid., pp. 14-18.\n 149 Ibid., pp. 18-21.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 767\n"
[48] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nresolution 836 (1993). The speaker also reiterated the protection for UNPROFOR personnel, in accordance\nview that the arms embargo against Bosnia and with Security Council decisions.151\nHerzegovina was “selective” and “contrary” to\n The representative of China believed that the\nArticle 51 of the Charter, arguing that it had prevented\n fundamental solution to the conflict in Bosnia and\nthe victim of aggression from exercising its legitimate\n Herzegovina would come in the form of a political\nright of self-defence. He observed that the need to\n settlement, which depended on the parties themselves.\nallow the Government of Bosnia to defend itself had\n Recalling that China had always advocated the\nbecame all the more urgent given recent reports of the\n peaceful settlement of conflict through dialogue and\npresence of regular troops of the Serbian and Croatian\n negotiation, he noted that his delegation was opposed\narmies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His delegation was\n to the use or threat of force. He contended that the\nawaiting with “keen interest” a report by the Secretary-\n peace process was at a crucial juncture and further\nGeneral on the full withdrawal of Croatian army troops\n military actions would not help achieve a political\nand military equipment from Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n settlement. Rather, such actions would entail negative\nIf Croatia failed to comply with the demands of the\n consequences. His delegation’s understanding with\nCouncil than stringent sanctions should be imposed\n regard to the use of air power in Bosnia and\nagainst that country. In conclusion, his delegation\n Herzegovina was that such actions should be limited to\nshared the view that the peace negotiations should be\n self-defence by UNPROFOR. The speaker also\nmoved to New York, so that they would be under the\n expressed his country anxiety at the possible serious\n“direct supervision” of the Security Council.150\n consequences of air strikes for the safety of\n The representative of the Russian Federation UNPROFOR and humanitarian personnel. It was\nstated that the proposal to convene an immediate therefore necessary to act prudently and refrain from\nmeeting of the Council to consider practical ways to taking hasty action.152\ndemilitarize Sarajevo and introduce United Nations\n The representative of Germany welcomed the\ncontrol had been put forward by his country, in view of\n decision by the NATO Council, noting that the\nthe need for the international community to take the\n decisions taken by the NATO Council and the Council\nmost decisive action to put an end to the escalating\n of Europe were part of the political process towards a\nviolence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His delegation\n negotiated settlement. Only when a political solution\nwelcomed the agreement between the Bosnian Serbs\n proved impossible was the use of force permitted to\nand the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on a\n achieve the aims set out in Security Council resolutions\nceasefire and on action towards ensuring that all sides\n 824 (1993) and 836 (1993). The decision of the NATO\neither placed their heavy weapons in the Sarajevo area\n Council was aimed at demilitarizing Sarajevo and\nunder UNPROFOR control or withdrew them from the\n placing it under United Nations administration, through\narea. Such steps would constitute major progress\n negotiations and in agreement with the European\ntowards settling the conflict. The speaker noted,\n Union’s Action Plan. Germany had always supported\nhowever, that as past ceasefires and agreements\n the Bosnian Muslims in the search for a solution which\nbetween the parties had often broken down, it was of\n secured the physical and political survival of the\ngreat importance that the Security Council “back up”\n Muslims as a nation in their home State of Bosnia and\nits demands with a strong decision supporting the\n Herzegovina. That implied a satisfactory territorial\nSecretary-General’s request to NATO, encouraging\n solution, including access to the Sava River and to the\npositive progress in Sarajevo, and supporting the\n sea. The speaker also argued that the city of Mostar\nprompt conclusion of an agreement on an effective\n should be placed under the administration of the\nceasefire in and around Sarajevo; the withdrawal or\n European Union and noted that Germany had offered to\nplacing under United Nations control of heavy\n provide an administrator for that city. 153\nweapons; and ensuring strict compliance with the\nsecurity regime in the Sarajevo area, including The representative of Malaysia stated that his\n__________________ Government had always maintained that firmness of\n 150 Ibid., pp. 36-41. __________________\n 151 Ibid., pp. 41-44.\n 152 S/PV.3336 (Resumption 1), pp. 68-70.\n 153 Ibid., pp. 76-79.\n\n\n\n\n768 07-63109\n"
[49] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nauthority and commitment were necessary to make the Security Council resolutions 787 (1992) and 838\nSerbs respond positively or comply. It would appeal to (1993), and that it had called for a ceasefire agreement\nthe United States and other members of NATO that the between the Bosnian Croat army and the Bosnian\nrecourse to credible threat of force should not apply Muslim army within seven days. 155\nonly to Sarajevo. His Government further opposed the\n The representative of Egypt stated that the\nidea of a United Nations administration in Sarajevo,\n Council must take the following measures. First, it\ncontending that Sarajevo was the political capital,\n should implement previous resolutions such as those\nsymbol and heart of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s\n concerning a ceasefire and the use of international\nresistance against genocide and aggression. It was also\n force, including air strikes. Secondly, it should exempt\nof the view that the efforts so far had not taken fully\n Bosnia and Herzegovina from the arms embargo, so\ninto account the serious implications of the provisions\n that the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina could\nof the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of\n ensure its self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.\nthe Crime of Genocide. That raised the question again\n Thirdly, it was necessary to ensure that any settlement\nof whether the Council arms embargo on Bosnia and\n was peaceful and just. In that regard, the speaker\nHerzegovina remained valid in the presence of\n stressed that the Council must exercise its prerogatives\nevidence that maintaining the embargo favoured or\n in order to bring about a peaceful resolution. The\ncontributed to the commission of genocide. In such\n Council, in that regard, should examine existing\ncircumstances, resolution 713 (1991) could not apply\n settlement plans to ensure that they were in accordance\nto Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus making the lifting of\n with the Charter, norms of international law and\nthe arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina the\n Council resolutions. It must also directly oversee the\nmost pressing issue before the Council. The speaker\n negotiations, because it was the body which\nalso noted that his Government had always maintained\n determined the mandate of the Secretary-General’s\nthat the central authority and responsibility for\n Special Representative. He stressed that the Special\nbringing about a comprehensive and honourable peace\n Representative must in no circumstances deviate from\nin Bosnia and Herzegovina lay with the Security\n the mandate given to him by the Council. He must also\nCouncil and not with the efforts in Geneva, which\n return to the Council and report to it and he must not\nMalaysia contended had deviated from the relevant\n make any amendments to the settlement plan contrary\nSecurity Council resolutions. Malaysia therefore felt\n to Council’s resolutions without its prior authorization.\nthat it was time for the negotiations to be held directly\n The speaker noted that it was time to change the\nunder the auspices of the Council, in New York.154\n mandate of the negotiations in Geneva, as well as the\n The representative of Croatia believed that the team charged with those negotiations. Neighbouring\ndecision of NATO to relieve the siege of Sarajevo was States, States which had contributed to United Nations\nmandated by the Council’s existing resolutions. What forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and States members\nwas needed in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a carefully of the Islamic contact group dealing with Bosnia and\nbalanced policy of a credible threat of force and Herzegovina should be included in the negotiations. 156\nstraight forward support for the peace plans. Croatia\n The representative of Slovenia noted that many\nhad always advocated a peaceful, political settlement\n lessons could be draw from the efforts made so far for\nof the conflict. It had accepted the Vance plan for\n peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The most important\nCroatia and it was now advocating the European Union\n lesson was that diplomacy could not produce good\nAction Plan for Croatia and for Bosnia. Furthermore, it\n results without realistic and well-informed analysis.\nwas the view of the Croatian Government that the\n Another major lesson was that diplomacy without\nCouncil should also give its unequivocal support to\n strength was fruitless when confronted with the forces\nthat plan. Stressing that the recent joint statement made\n of aggression. Noting that the efforts for peace had\nby the Foreign Minister of Croatia and the Prime\n been evolving for two years, he stressed the need to\nMinister of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a further step\n develop an imaginative framework for these efforts. In\ntowards peace, the speaker noted that the statement\n that context, the speaker recalled that his Government\nhad, inter alia, requested international control of the __________________\nborders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with 155 Ibid., pp. 85-90.\n__________________\n 156 Ibid., pp. 95-101.\n 154 Ibid., pp. 79-85.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 769\n"
[50] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nhad recently formulated a four-point appeal containing including force, to address deliberate hostile acts\nthe core elements of a framework to resolve the against areas of deployment of United Nations\nsituation. First, heavy weapons should be withdrawn contingents, where there was no other option to stop\nfrom the vicinity of Sarajevo and other areas with a the killing of innocent people. Such a course of action\nhigh concentration of civilians. Second, there should be should be undertaken only in the event of a clearly\nunimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to the expressed decision by the international community,\ncivilian population. Third, private property should be namely the Security Council, and not as a result of a\nrestored and places of worship safeguarded. Fourth, decision by an individual State. The seriousness of the\nterritories seized by force and “ethnic cleansing” matter required that all relevant procedures be\nshould be returned without delay.157 employed, in accordance with the Charter, in order to\n reaffirm previous Council resolutions regarding the\n Mr. Djokic stated that his country strongly\n complex situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Ukraine\nopposed the NATO decision to use air strikes. That\n shared the view that a viable solution to the crisis\ndecision was politically and military unwise and could\n might include a ceasefire, placing heavy weapons\nhave serious consequence on the ground. He further\n under UNPROFOR control, the withdrawal of Serb\nargued that it did not fall within the purview of the\n units from Sarajevo, and the takeover of their positions\nrelevant resolutions of the Security Council authorizing\n by UNPROFOR. The demilitarization of Sarajevo and\nair strikes and that any attempt to carry out air strikes\n the introduction of United Nations administrative\non the basis of that decision would represent a direct\n control in the city would stop the “senseless\ninvolvement in the civil war, on one side. He also\n bloodshed” and serve as a starting-point for the\ncontended that while the Muslim side had rejected all\n achievement of lasting peace. Before concluding, the\npeace projects, the Serbian Serbs had proved their\n speaker stated that the time had come to address the\nreadiness to accept a viable compromise by offering\n question of the effectiveness of the economic sanctions\nnumerous concessions. Yugoslavia expected that, in the\n against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the\nlight of that situation, the international community\n context of an overall settlement, with the aim of\nwould made it clear to the Muslim side that it only\n mitigating the adverse consequences of the sanctions\nstood to lose if it persisted with the war option.\n regime on the economies of third countries, in\nInstead, some influential countries were ready to use\n accordance with Article 50 of the Charter.159\nforce, thus jeopardizing the results of the negotiations\nreached so far. The speaker concluded by stating that The representative of Greece noted that his\npeace could not be achieved in Bosnia and Government had expressed reservations with regard to\nHerzegovina through “one-sided accusations” or the advisability and the repercussions of eventual air\n“irrational demands” for the lifting of the arms strikes, and the ensuing escalation of the conflict in\nembargo for one of the sides, nor through the Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ultimate goal was the\nescalation of military activities. The only possible restoration of peace in former Yugoslavia, and the\nsolution was a political one. 158 consequences of such air strikes ought to be evaluated\n very carefully. Greece was one of the countries that\n While considering the NATO decision as another\n were closest to the crisis area and as such, all its\nimportant element of international efforts aimed at\n initiatives were geared towards the exhaustion of all\nresolving the Yugoslav crisis that under certain\n possible means, rather than the resort to force. It could\ncircumstances could bring about positive results, the\n not become involved in military activities and no other\nrepresentative of Ukraine warned that that decision\n country in the region should.160\ncould have negative consequences, such as bringing\nabout new suffering, jeopardizing the delivery of Mr. Ansay recalled that an extraordinary\ninternational humanitarian aid, and placing Ministerial Meeting of the OIC Contact Group on\nUNPROFOR personnel at risk of retaliatory strikes by Bosnia and Herzegovina, held in Geneva on 17 January\nthe Serb forces. His delegation, however, did not rule 1994, had stressed that, in order to have any success\nout the possibility of using all necessary means, and legitimacy, the peace process must ensure the\n__________________ __________________\n 157 S/PV.3336 (Resumption 2), pp. 141-145. 159 Ibid., pp. 199-203.\n 158 Ibid., pp. 194-199. 160 S/PV.3336 (Resumption 3), pp. 223-226.\n\n\n\n\n770 07-63109\n"
[51] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nfollowing: the independence, territorial integrity and number of them, however, stressed that the use of force\nsovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina; a should always be an instrument of last resort. 163 Others\ngeographically and economically viable and defensible advocated the extension of use of force to the other\nterritory for Bosnia and Herzegovina; the return of all five safe areas.164\nlands seized by force and “ethnic cleansing”; the\n Some speakers supported the proposal to place\nretention by Bosnia and Herzegovina of access to the\n Sarajevo under temporary United Nations\nSava river and the Adriatic Sea; the retention of\n administration.165\nSarajevo as the undivided capital of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina; the return of refugees and displaced Several speakers reiterated that Bosnia and\npersons to their homes; and international guarantees for Herzegovina should be allowed to exercise its right of\nthe implementation of a peace agreement and self-defence and demanded that the Council lift the\nguarantees for future security. The OIC Ministers had arms embargo against the Government of Bosnia. 166\nalso called for the reopening of the Tuzla airport, as\n A number of speakers called for the perpetrators\nwell as the lifting of the siege against Sarajevo. The\n of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed\nspeaker noted that OIC saw the decision of the NATO\n on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be\nCouncil as “a step in the right direction”, but that it __________________\nbelieved that the international community should also\n (Netherlands); pp. 136-139 (Canada); and pp. 139-140\npay attention to the security of the civilian population (Japan); S/PV.3336 (Resumption 2), pp. 146-148\nin all “safe areas”, and that it supported the concept of (Algeria); pp. 148-156 (Jordan); pp. 157-163 (Tunisia);\ndeclaring the city of Mostar a “safe area”. OIC also pp. 164-167 (Albania); pp. 167-174 (Senegal); pp. 174-\nbelieved that the International Tribunal should start 177 (Colombia); pp. 178-179 (Finland); pp. 179-181\nfunctioning without further delay. Reiterating the full (Belgium); pp. 181-187 (Saudi Arabia); pp. 187-190\nsupport of OIC for the right of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Sudan); pp. 190-193 (Ireland); pp. 204-207 (Portugal);\n pp. 207-210 (Luxembourg); and pp. 210-211 (Denmark);\nto defend itself under Article 51 of the Charter, the\n and S/PV.3336 (Resumption 3), pp. 213-216 (Morocco);\nspeaker called for the lifting of the arms embargo pp. 216-219 (Bangladesh); pp. 219-223 (United Arab\nagainst Bosnia and Herzegovina. Referring to reports Emirates); pp. 226-231 (Kuwait); pp. 232-235 (Estonia);\nof the presence of regular troops of the Serbian and pp. 235-236 (Brunei Darussalam); and pp. 242-244\nCroatian armies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the (Lithuania).\n 163 S/PV.3336, pp. 44-49 (New Zealand); pp. 90-92\nspeaker noted that OIC was awaiting with keen interest\nthe report by the Secretary-General regarding the full (Austria); and pp. 112-116 (Sweden); and S/PV.3336\n (Resumption 2), pp. 178-179 (Finland).\nwithdrawal of Croatian army elements from Bosnia. If 164 S/PV.3336, pp. 73-76 (Djibouti); and pp. 120-124\nthe Croats failed to comply with the Council’s demand (Islamic Republic of Iran); S/PV.3336 (Resumption 2),\non that score, then stringent economic sanctions should pp. 157-163 (Tunisia); pp. 167-174 (Senegal); and\nbe imposed on Croatia immediately. 161 pp. 181-187 (Saudi Arabia); and S/PV.3336\n (Resumption 3), pp. 213-216 (Morocco); pp. 216-219\n Most of the speakers in the debate supported the (Bangladesh); pp. 219-223 (United Arab Emirates); and\nuse of air strikes by NATO to deter further attacks pp. 226-231 (Kuwait).\nagainst Sarajevo by Bosnian Serbs, and shared the 165 S/PV.3336, pp. 54-59 (Argentina); and S/PV.3336\n\nview that the decisions taken by NATO were consistent (Resumption 2), pp. 204-207 (Portugal).\n 166 S/PV.3336, pp. 49-54 (Nigeria); and pp. 60-63 (Oman);\nwith resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) and did not\nrequire further approval by the Security Council. 162 A S/PV.3336 (Resumption 1), pp. 71-73 (Rwanda);\n__________________ pp. 102-106 (Afghanistan); pp. 107-111 (Turkey);\n 161 Ibid., pp. 237-242.\n pp. 120-124 (Islamic Republic of Iran); pp. 124-129\n 162 S/PV.3336, pp. 22-25 (United Kingdom); pp. 25-32\n (Azerbaijan); and pp. 129-133 (Indonesia); S/PV.3336\n (Resumption 2), pp. 146-148 (Algeria); pp. 148-156\n (Spain); pp. 44-49 (New Zealand); pp. 49-54 (Nigeria);\n (Jordan); pp. 157-163 (Tunisia); pp. 164-167 (Albania);\n pp. 54-59 (Argentina); pp. 60-63 (Oman); and pp. 64-67\n pp. 181-187 (Saudi Arabia); and pp. 187-190 (Sudan);\n (Czech Republic); S/PV.3336 (Resumption 1), pp. 71-73\n and S/PV.3336 (Resumption 3), pp. 219-223 (United\n (Rwanda); pp. 73-76 (Djibouti); pp. 90-92 (Austria);\n Arab Emirates); pp. 226-231 (Kuwait); and pp. 232-235\n pp. 93-95 (Norway); pp. 102-106 (Afghanistan);\n (Estonia).\n pp. 107-111 (Turkey); pp. 112-116 (Sweden);\n pp. 116-120 (Italy); pp. 120-124 (Islamic Republic of\n Iran); pp. 129-133 (Indonesia); pp. 133-136\n\n\n\n07-63109 771\n"
[52] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nbrought before the International Tribunal on the as possible and would be grateful if they could be kept informed\nFormer Yugoslavia. 167 of the progress of the investigations.\n\n Some speakers endorsed the proposal that the Decision of 4 March 1994 (3344th meeting):\npeace talks be relocated to New York, in the proximity resolution 900 (1994)\nof the Security Council.168\n At its 3344th meeting, on 4 March 1994, the\n Decision of 25 February 1994: letter from the Council resumed its consideration of the situation in\n President to the Secretary-General the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following\n the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\n On 10 February 1994, pursuant to the statement representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\nby the President dated 28 October 1993, 169 the request, to participate in the discussion without the\nSecretary-General submitted to the Council a report on right to vote. The President (France) then drew the\nthe massacre of the civilian population in Stupni Do, attention of the Council members to the text of a draft\non 23 October 1993.170 The Secretary-General reported resolution submitted by France, the Russian\non the findings of the investigation carried out by Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United\nUNPROFOR military police. Twenty-three victims so States, 172 and to several other documents.173\nfar had been clearly identified, with a further\n13 villagers unaccounted for and presumed dead. The The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nmain suspects for the crimes appeared to be extremist noted that three recent developments had created a\nelements of the Croatian Defence Council. sense of optimism. First, the NATO ultimatum to the\nInvestigations were continuing in order to gather as Bosnian Serbs had resulted in the cessation of the\nmuch evidence as possible, with a view to identifying shelling of Sarajevo. Second, NATO aircraft had\nthe perpetrators for eventual trial before the recently confronted Serbian aircraft violating the no-fly\nInternational Tribunal. zone over the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n Third, there had been an agreement between Croatia,\n By a letter dated 25 February 1994,171 the Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnian Croat elements\nPresident of the Security Council informed the\nSecretary-General of the following: establishing a confederation between Croatia and\n Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as a federation within\n The members of the Security Council are grateful for your Bosnia and Herzegovina. The speaker felt that the draft\nreport of 10 February 1994 on the massacre of the civilian resolution before the Council should aim for the full\npopulation in Stupni Do, Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n implementation of resolutions 824 (1993) and 836\n The members of the Council are greatly disturbed by the (1993) in regard to Sarajevo, thus resulting in the full\nfindings of the investigation contained in your report and thus withdrawal of Serb forces, the full lifting of the road\nrequest you to transmit the report, as well as all information at blocks and the restoration of essential services to the\nthe disposal of the Secretariat that may reveal serious violations\nof international humanitarian law committed in the territory of\n city and its population. He stressed that unless the draft\nthe Former Yugoslavia, to the Prosecutor of the International resolution was correctly implemented, Sarajevo would\nTribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious remain under siege. While the Government of Bosnia\nViolations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the and Herzegovina welcomed the assistance of all\nTerritory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. Governments in trying to bring peace, it would not feel\n The members of the Council welcome the fact that bound by agreements reached between forces\n __________________\ninvestigations are continuing in order to gain as much evidence\n__________________ 172 S/1994/224.\n 173 Letter dated 24 February 1994 from the representative of\n 167 S/PV.3336, pp. 107-111 (Turkey); and pp. 124-129\n\n (Azerbaijan); S/PV.3336 (Resumption 2), pp. 148-156 Croatia addressed to the President of the Security\n (Jordan); and S/PV.3336 (Resumption 3), pp. 219-223 Council (S/1994/216); letter dated 24 February 1994\n (United Arab Emirates); and pp. 226-231 (Kuwait). from the representative of Indonesia addressed to the\n 168 S/PV.3336 (Resumption 2), pp. 157-163 (Tunisia); and Secretary-General (S/1994/221); letter dated 3 March\n S/PV.3336 (Resumption 3), pp. 226-231 (Kuwait). 1994 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n 169 S/26661. addressed to the President of the Security Council\n 170 S/1994/154. (S/1994/249); and letter dated 3 March 1994 from the\n 171 S/1994/217. representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia\n addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1994/255).\n\n\n\n772 07-63109\n"
[53] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\noccupying Bosnia and Herzegovina and members of draft welcomed the significant developments that had\nthe Security Council, unless such agreements were taken place in negotiations between Bosnia and\nconsistent with the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina Herzegovina, Croatia and the Bosnian Croats, there\nas a Member of the United Nations and with its still remained the “vexing” question of the involvement\nsovereignty and territorial integrity. 174 of Croatian troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those\n troops must leave, as the Council had demanded in its\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of\n presidential statement of the previous month. 176\nPakistan, while welcoming the progress that had\nresulted from the NATO ultimatum, expressed concern The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nover the fact that the Bosnian Serbs were persisting adopted unanimously as resolution 900 (1994), which\nwith the siege of Sarajevo and were refusing to remove reads:\nall their heavy weaponry from certain locations around The Security Council,\nthe city. He warned that the international community\nshould not become complacent, nor relent in its resolve Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the\nto secure the safety and security of the civilian conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\npopulation in all designated “safe areas” and other Taking note of the positive developments in and around\nthreatened towns and cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Sarajevo, which constitute only a first step towards the\nTurning to the draft resolution, the speaker noted that restoration of peace and security throughout the Republic of\nthe draft resolution reflected the determination of the Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of a negotiated settlement\n between the parties, recalling the measures taken in and around\ninternational community to secure the end of the siege Sarajevo under resolutions 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993 and\nof Sarajevo, including the restoration of essential 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, and welcoming the agreement\nservices and a return to normal life, in accordance with between the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and\nthe objectives set by the Council in resolution Herzegovina and the Special Representative of the Secretary-\n824 (1993). It, however, could have been reinforced by General for the Former Yugoslavia and between the Bosnian\na reference to the threat of air strikes, in the event that Serb party and the Special Representative of the Secretary-\nthe aggressors were to resume bombardment of General on the ceasefire and measures related to heavy weapons\n in and around Sarajevo, reached on 9 February 1994,\nSarajevo or to redeploy heavy weapons in the\nexclusion zone. The speaker further noted that with the Emphasizing the crucial importance of achieving\nadoption of the draft resolution, the Council would be complete freedom of movement for the civilian population and\nsetting in motion a process which could lead to the humanitarian goods and of the restoration of normal life in\n Sarajevo,\neffective lifting of the siege of Sarajevo. It should also\nlead to a mechanism to secure the protection of other Determined to restore essential public services in\nsafe areas and threatened towns such as Maglaj, Mostar Sarajevo,\nand Vitez.175 Welcoming, as part of the international effort to restore\n normal life to the city, the intention of the Governments of the\n The representative of the Czech Republic stated United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the\nthat the draft resolution before the Council was United States of America, announced on 2 March 1994, to send\ndirected at capitalizing on the Sarajevo success. immediately a joint civil mission to Sarajevo to assess the\nSeveral warning points, however, had to be made in requirements for the restoration of essential public services,\nthat context. First, the Security Council had declared as within the United Nations framework,\nsafe areas not just Sarajevo, nor the three cities Reaffirming in this context the sovereignty, territorial\nmentioned in the preamble of the draft resolution, but integrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia\nsix cities, including Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac. It was and Herzegovina,\nnecessary to pay heed to seeing that earlier Reiterating the importance of maintaining Sarajevo,\ncommitments made by the Council were met as well. capital of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a united\nSecondly, UNPROFOR was already stretched thin and city and a multicultural, multi-ethnic and plurireligious centre,\nit was important that its size be commensurate to the\n Welcoming the goal of achieving the prompt rotation of\ntasks it was given by the Council. Thirdly, while the United Nations Protection Force personnel in Srebrenica and the\n__________________\n early reopening of the Tuzla airport,\n 174 S/PV.3344, pp. 2-4.\n 175 Ibid., pp. 4-5. __________________\n 176 Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 773\n"
[54] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n Mindful of the serious discussions which have taken place 5. Requests the Secretary-General to present within\non the issue of Sarajevo, as part of an overall settlement, at the one week of the adoption of the present resolution a report on\nnegotiations in the context of the International Conference on ways and means for, including the estimated cost of, the\nthe Former Yugoslavia, implementation of the objectives set forth above;\n Deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation in Maglaj, 6. Calls upon States and other donors to assist the\n Secretary-General, in particular by contributing personnel and\n Deeply concerned also by the situation of the civilian\n equipment, in the implementation of the relevant Security\npopulation in other parts of the territory of the Republic of\n Council resolutions concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina;\nBosnia and Herzegovina, including in and around Mostar and\nVitez, 7. Further requests the Secretary-General to report\n within ten days of the adoption of the present resolution on the\n Welcoming in this context the recent significant\n feasibility and modalities for the application of the protection,\ndevelopments in peace negotiations between the Government of\n defined in resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993), to Maglaj,\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Croat\n Mostar and Vitez, taking into account all developments both on\nparty and with the Government of the Republic of Croatia, as\n the ground and in the negotiations between the parties;\nsteps towards an overall political settlement, as well as\nnegotiations involving the Bosnian Serb party, 8. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n Bearing in mind the importance of facilitating the return Speaking after the vote, the representative of\nof refugees and displaced persons to their homes, China noted that the main purpose of the resolution just\n Stressing the importance it attaches to full compliance adopted was to improve the humanitarian situation in\nwith international humanitarian law in all its aspects in the Sarajevo and to restore essential services. On the basis\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of humanitarian considerations, the Chinese delegation\n Recalling the provisions of its resolution 824 (1993) had voted in favour. Reiterating the Chinese position\nconcerning safe areas, determining that the situation in the that conflicts should be settled by peaceful means, the\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to constitute a speaker expressed his delegation’s reservations on the\nthreat to international peace and security, and in this context resolution’s invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter.\nacting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, China also maintained that the establishment of safe\n 1. Calls for all parties to cooperate with the United areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina was only a temporary\nNations Protection Force in the consolidation of the ceasefire in measure and not a fundamental solution. When\nand around Sarajevo; considering additional safe areas, it would be necessary\n 2. Calls upon all parties, with the assistance of the to conduct a serious review of whether the expected\nUnited Nations, to achieve complete freedom of movement for results had been achieved in the safe areas already\nthe civilian population and humanitarian goods to, from and established and whether, in existing circumstances,\nwithin Sarajevo, to remove any hindrance to such freedom of UNPROFOR possessed sufficient human and financial\nmovement, and to help restore normal life to the city; resources to perform additional tasks.177\n 3. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, as a The President, speaking in his capacity as the\nmatter of urgency, for a limited period, a senior civilian official,\nwho will act under the authority of the Special Representative of\n representative of France, noted that the Council had\nthe Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia, to draw up an adopted the resolution under Chapter VII of the\noverall assessment and plan of action, in conjunction with the Charter, as the other resolutions on Bosnia had been\nGovernment of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and since August 1992. In the existing context, not to have\nalso in consultation with all relevant local authorities, for the resorted to Chapter VII would have been “the worst of\nrestoration of essential public services in the various opstine of signals”. Beyond that, the application of Chapter VII,\nSarajevo, other than the city of Pale; this official will be which did not imply an automatic resort to force,\nempowered to assist the Government of the Republic of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina and, in close coordination with all relevant\n would give UNPROFOR the authority necessary to\nlocal authorities and the local representatives of the United surmount obstacles that might complicate the execution\nNations, to work to implement the plan; of its mandate. 178\n 4. Invites the Secretary-General to establish a __________________\nvoluntary trust fund, to be disbursed within the framework set\n 177 Ibid., p. 11.\nout in paragraph 3 above, for the restoration of essential public\n 178 Ibid., pp. 14-15.\nservices in Sarajevo to promote a return to normal life in the\ncity, and encourages States and other donors to contribute\nthereto;\n\n\n\n774 07-63109\n"
[55] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n Decision of 14 March 1994 (3349th meeting): authorized to make the following statement on behalf\n statement by the President of the Council:181\n On 11 March 1994, pursuant to resolution 900 The Security Council remains gravely concerned at the\n(1994), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council continuing hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and\na report on the feasibility of extending the safe area Herzegovina. It especially deplores the rapidly deteriorating\n situation in the Maglaj area and the threat it poses to the survival\nconcept to the cities of Maglaj, Mostar and Vitez.179 of the remaining civilian population. It notes that this intolerable\nThe report also provided an outline of the major situation has been perpetuated by the intensity of the nine-month\nconcepts and requirements of UNPROFOR. The siege of the town, for which the Bosnian Serb party is primarily\nSecretary-General noted that the utility of extending responsible.\nthe concept of safe areas to Mostar and Vitez must be The Council strongly condemns the indiscriminate\nconsidered in the larger context of the overall situation shelling by the Bosnian Serb party of the civilian population of\non the ground. Had the conflict still been in progress, Maglaj, which has resulted in heavy casualties, loss of life and\nthe prospect of deterring attacks might have warranted material destruction.\nsuch a step. With the ceasefire signed on 23 February The Council notes with particular concern reports of the\nbetween Bosnia and Croatia, new priorities recurrent obstruction and looting of humanitarian aid convoys\ncommended themselves. UNPROFOR did not believe destined for the civilian population of Maglaj, including the\nthere was, at that point, a need to apply the protection most recent incident which took place on 10 March 1994, in\ndefined in resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) to which six aid trucks were prevented from reaching the town. It\nMostar and Vitez. It, however, believed that there is appalled that not one convoy has reached the town since\nmight be merit, in extending the safe area concept to 25 October 1993. The Council notes that the civilian population\n has been totally dependent on airdrops and commends those who\nMaglaj, in view of the continuing hostilities there. At have provided these vital missions. The Council demands that\nthe same time, it was clear that UNPROFOR would not the Bosnian Serb party and the Bosnian Croat party allow\nbe able to provide the protection concerned with its forthwith and without conditions passage to all humanitarian\npresent resources. The Secretary-General observed in convoys and the immediate evacuation of those in need of\nthat regard that should the Council decide to declare urgent medical attention. The Council also demands that the\nMaglaj a safe area, an additional 1,500 troops would be siege of Maglaj be ended immediately.\nrequired. In addition, implementation of resolution 900 The Council welcomes the fact that United Nations\n(1994) would require an increase of the authorized Protection Force personnel have now obtained access to Maglaj.\nstrength of UNPROFOR by a total of 8,250 troops. He It demands that the Bosnian Serb party permit unimpeded and\ntherefore recommended that the Council authorize such continuing access by the Force to Maglaj.\nan increase in order to enable UNPROFOR to The Council also condemns recent attacks against the\ndemilitarize Sarajavo, restore normal life to the city personnel of the Force as well as of the Office of the United\nand preserve peace in central Bosnia. Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other\n humanitarian organizations. It reiterates its demands that all\n At its 3349th meeting, on 14 March 1994, the parties ensure the safety and security of the Force as well as all\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item. other United Nations personnel and those of non-governmental\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council organizations and their unimpeded freedom of movement\ninvited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nat his request, to participate in the discussion without The Council affirms its determination to maintain and\nthe right to vote. The President (France) then drew the build upon the recent positive developments towards peace in\nattention of the members of the Council to the report of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in this context\nthe Secretary-General and to a letter dated 11 March notes the importance of protecting Maglaj and its civilian\n1994 from the representative of Bosnia and population from further hostilities. It will consider the situation\n in Maglaj further in the context of its examination of the report\nHerzegovina addressed to the Secretary-General.180 of the Secretary-General pursuant to its resolution 900 (1994) of\nThe President then stated that, after consultations 4 March 1994.\namong members of the Security Council, he had been\n__________________ __________________\n 179 S/1994/291.\n 181 S/PRST/1994/11.\n 180 S/1994/293.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 775\n"
[56] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n Decision of 6 April 1994 (3359th meeting): Secretariat and in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the report of the\n statement by the President Secretary-General of 11 March and paragraphs 29 and 30 of his\n report of 16 March 1994, calls for an end to any provocative\n By a letter dated 2 April 1994 addressed to the actions by whomsoever committed in and around the safe areas.\nPresident of the Security Council,182 the representative The Council strongly condemns the shelling and infantry\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina transmitted a letter dated and artillery attacks by the besieging Bosnian Serb forces\n1 April 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of against the safe area of Gorazde in which many civilians have\nBosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of lost their lives and several hundreds have been wounded. The\nthe Security Council. In that letter, the Prime Minister Council takes serious note of the continuing defiance of the\nreported that a new Serb offensive was under way relevant Council resolutions, in particular of resolutions 824\nagainst the besieged town of Gorazde, in defiance of (1993) of 6 May 1993 and 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993 related to\n the protection of safe areas. The Council demands the immediate\nrelevant Council resolutions, and particularly cessation of any further attacks against the safe area of Gorazde\nresolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993), according to and its population and calls upon those concerned to take all\nwhich Gorazde had been designated a “safe area”. He measures to ensure full respect for the status of the safe areas in\nrequested that the Security Council convene an accordance with the relevant provisions of resolution 824\nemergency session to determine why the mandate to (1993).\n“deter attacks against the safe area” given by resolution The Council welcomes the measures being taken by the\n836 (1993) had not been utilized to confront those who United Nations Protection Force to strengthen its presence in\nhad attacked the United Nations designated “safe area” Gorazde, and the impending visit of the Force Commander for\nof Gorazde. Bosnia and Herzegovina to assess the situation further. The\n Council calls upon the parties to ensure that troops of the Force\n At its 3359th meeting, held on 6 April 1994 in have unimpeded access to the area in and around Gorazde and to\nresponse to the request contained in the above- assure the safety and security of those troops. The Council\nmentioned letter, the Council included the letter in its underlines the importance it attaches to ensuring the safety and\nagenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the security of the troops of the Force in and around Gorazde.\nCouncil invited the representative of Bosnia and The Council stresses the need to achieve normal\nHerzegovina, at his request, to participate in the conditions of life in Gorazde, including restoration of essential\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The President public services, with the assistance of the United Nations and\n(New Zealand) then drew the attention of the members with the cooperation of the parties.\nof the Council to several documents 183 and stated that, The Council deplores recent acts of violence and terror\nafter consultations among members of the Security including ethnic cleansing, particularly in Prijedor and Banja\nCouncil, he had been authorized to make the following Luka. It reaffirms that the International Tribunal was established\nstatement on behalf of the Council: 184 under its resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 for the purpose\n of investigating crimes of this sort and trying persons accused of\n The Security Council is deeply concerned at the committing such crimes. The Council stresses the importance it\ncontinuing violence in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, attaches to full compliance with international humanitarian law\nparticularly the attacks on the safe area of Gorazde and the in all its aspects throughout the Republic of Bosnia and\nrecent acts of violence and terror, including reported acts of Herzegovina.\nethnic cleansing in Banja Luka and Prijedor.\n The Council calls upon all parties to join the negotiation\n The Council takes note of the letter dated 1 April 1994 process aimed at the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the\nfrom the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and further calls for an\nand Herzegovina, in which he reported, inter alia, on the immediate ceasefire, the cessation of hostilities and an exchange\nhostilities in the eastern parts of his country. The Council, taking of all persons imprisoned as a result of the war. The Council\nnote also of the assessment of the situation provided by the welcomes the planned meeting between the military\n__________________ commanders in Sarajevo under the auspices of the Force.\n 182 S/1994/378.\n 183 Letters dated 30 March and 4 April 1994 from the\n The Council affirms its determination to remain seized of\n the matter.\n representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to\n the President of the Security Council (S/1994/364,\n S/1994/382 and S/1994/386); and letters dated 5 and\n 6 April 1994, respectively, from the representative of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of\n the Security Council (S/1994/396 and S/1994/400).\n 184 S/PRST/1994/14.\n\n\n\n\n776 07-63109\n"
[57] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n Decision of 14 April 1994 (3364th meeting): The President (New Zealand) then drew the\n statement by the President attention of the Council members to the text of a draft\n resolution submitted by France, the Russian\n At its 3364th meeting, on 14 April 1994, the\n Federation, Spain and the United Kingdom, 186 and to\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item.\n several other documents.187\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the President\n(New Zealand) stated that, after consultations among The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nmembers of the Security Council, he had been endorsed the letter dated 18 April 1994 from the\nauthorized to make the following statement on behalf Secretary-General of the United Nations to the\nof the Council:185 Secretary-General of NATO, in which he requested the\n The Security Council is deeply concerned at recent\n latter to authorize the launching of air strikes against\nincidents in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina affecting Serbian positions in and around the five other safe\nthe safety and freedom of movement of United Nations areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the draft\nProtection Force personnel as reported by the Secretariat. These resolution before the Council. He also welcomed\nincidents constitute clear violations of the Council’s resolutions, President Clinton’s course of action with respect to\nwhich bind the parties. The Council condemns such incidents NATO. The speaker noted, however, that none of these\nand warns those responsible of the serious consequences of their __________________\nactions. 186 S/1994/465.\n\n The Council affirms its full support for the Force in its 187 Letters dated 6, 7, 9, 13, 15, 17 and 19 April 1994,\n\nexecution of the Council’s relevant resolutions. It demands that respectively, from the representative of Bosnia and\nall parties, in particular the Bosnian Serb party, allow the Force Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security\nunimpeded freedom of movement and refrain from any further Council (S/1994/400, S/1994/404, S/1994/412,\nactions which could threaten the safety of Force personnel. It S/1994/426, S/1994/451, S/1994/456 and S/1994/467);\ncalls upon them to work closely with the Force, to cease all letter dated 7 April 1994 from the representative of the\nhostilities and to cooperate fully in efforts to achieve a peaceful Islamic Republic of Iran addressed to the Secretary-\nresolution of the conflict throughout the Republic of Bosnia and General (S/1994/407); letters dated 12 and 15 April\nHerzegovina. 1994, respectively, from the representative of Yugoslavia\n addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1994/418 and\n The Council will remain seized of the matter. S/1994/449); letter dated 14 April 1994 from the\n representative of the Russian Federation addressed to the\n Decision of 22 April 1994 (3367th meeting): Secretary-General (S/1994/443); letter dated 15 April\n resolution 913 (1994) 1994 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n addressed to the President of the Security Council\n At its 3367th meeting, on 21 and 22 April 1994, (S/1994/450); letter 15 April 1994 from the\nthe Council resumed its consideration of the situation representative of Turkey addressed to the President of\nin the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the Security Council (S/1994/453); letter dated 17 April\nthe adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the 1994 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nrepresentatives of Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1994/457); letter\n dated 18 April 1994 from the representative of Croatia\nAustria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,\n addressed to the President of the Security Council\nEgypt, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, the (S/1994/460); letter dated 18 April 1994 from the\nIslamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Secretary-General addressed to the President of the\nNorway, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Security Council (S/1994/466); letter dated 18 April\nSlovenia, the Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey and the 1994 from the representatives of France, Spain and the\nUnited Arab Emirates, at their request, to participate in United Kingdom addressed to the President of the\nthe discussion without the right to vote. The Council Security Council (S/1994/469); letter dated 20 April\n 1994 from the representative of India addressed to the\nalso invited Ambassador Dragomir Djokic, at his\n Secretary-General (S/1994/475); letter dated 20 April\nrequest, to address the Council in the course of its 1994 from the representative of Malaysia addressed to\nconsideration of the item, and extended an invitation to the Secretary-General (S/1994/478); letter dated 21 April\nMr. Engin Ahmet Ansay, Permanent Observer of OIC 1994 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nto the United Nations. addressed to the President of the Security Council\n (S/1994/480); and letter dated 21 April 1994 from the\n__________________\n representative of Brunei Darussalam addressed to the\n 185 S/PRST/1994/19.\n President of the Security Council (S/1994/483).\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 777\n"
[58] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nsteps addressed the following considerations. First, it The representative of Turkey stated that Gorazde\nwas imperative that the Council act immediately to was a “test case” for the United Nations commitments\nrespond to the “slaughter of innocents” in Gorazde. in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the role it would\nThose who had voted for the designation of Gorazde as play in shaping the future of the international system.\na safe area could not avoid the burden they bore for the The lack of decisive action had sent the wrong signals\nlives of the city’s residents. It was that designation and to the aggressors. In order to be viable, the peace\nthe Council’s commitment to it that had been offered in process must be backed by sufficient force to make the\nlieu of Bosnia right to self-defence. Second, the Serbs realize that more war would lead to “more pain\nCouncil could not continue to impede Bosnia right to than gain”. That would only be possible if the\nself-defence unless it was prepared to accept Government and people of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nresponsibility in full for the safety of the citizens of were given the chance to exercise their right to\nBosnia. Third, the precedent of Gorazde posed a self-defence. Arguing that the arms embargo adopted\ndanger to the peace process in Croatia as well as in by the Council in resolution 713 (1991) was in clear\nBosnia and Herzegovina, and must be addressed contradiction of Article 51 of the Charter, the speaker\ndirectly. Lastly, Bosnia and Herzegovina was fully urged the Council to clarify the legal opinion that\nprepared to take part in good faith negotiations. The resolution 713 (1991) should not apply to Bosnia and\nspeaker concluded by reminding Members of the Herzegovina. Turning to the safe areas, the speaker\nUnited Nations that the Security Council and NATO recalled that the concept of safe areas had been based\nalready possessed the necessary authority to provide on the assumption that the resolutions establishing\nclose air-to-ground support for humanitarian workers them would be implemented effectively and\nand did not need new debates or authority.188 immediately. Regrettably, however, those areas had\n been almost abandoned by the United Nations.\n The representative of Croatia stated that, after\n Emphasizing that resolutions 824 (1993) and 836\ntwo years of “unthinkable suffering”, during which\n (1993) provided a clear legal framework for the use of\n150,000 innocent lives had been lost, the time had\n all necessary means, including air strikes against the\ncome to impose peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A\n aggressors for the defence of the safe areas, the speaker\ncredible threat of resolute force combined with equally\n welcomed the letter from the Secretary-General to\nassertive diplomatic efforts should finally bring peace\n NATO and President Clinton’s announcement as “steps\nto the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That was\n in the right direction”. Nevertheless, Turkey wanted to\nwhy Croatia supported President Clinton’s call that the\n see “concrete action”. It also welcomed the preambular\nSarajevo model of a clear ultimatum be extended to\n paragraph of the draft resolution reaffirming the\nGorazde and other safe areas in Bosnia and\n urgency of bringing the perpetrators of crimes against\nHerzegovina. Croatia would also support the use of the\n humanity before the International Tribunal established\nSarajevo ultimatum model in the implementation of the\n by resolution 827 (1993). He emphasized that what was\nSecurity Council’s resolutions and the peace\n needed was a quick prosecution process. Furthermore,\nagreements for the occupied territories in Croatia. It\n Turkey had hoped that the draft resolution would\nwould consider the extension of the exclusion zones\n contain a reference to the need to tighten the\nfor certain safe areas, such as Bihac and Tuzla, into the\n diplomatic isolation and economic embargo imposed\nterritory of Croatia. If the international community was\n on “the aggressor”.190\nnot able to impose peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina by\nthe resolute use of force and assertive diplomacy, then The representative of Tunisia stated that the draft\nthe Security Council would have to consider other resolution should have indicated the Council’s\nways to achieve the desired balance of power in the determination to use any means to put an end to the\nregion, including through allowing Bosnia and systematic violation of its resolutions by the Serb side.\nHerzegovina to exercise its right to defend itself under He argued that Article 51 of the Charter permitted\nArticle 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.189 resort to Article 42 of Chapter VII as the provisions of\n__________________ Article 41, which had been the only provisions invoked\n 188 S/PV.3367, pp. 3-5.\n during the two years since the Council first passed a\n 189 Ibid., pp. 5-7. resolution on the matter, had not achieved the desired\n __________________\n 190 Ibid., pp. 7-9.\n\n\n\n\n778 07-63109\n"
[59] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nresults. If the Council was not prepared, however, to negotiations on the basis of equality, thus implying the\nfollow the sequence of the various provisions in lifting of sanctions.192\nChapter VII, then it should redefine the applicability of\n Mr. Ansay indicated that the Ministers for\nresolution 713 (1991) in respect of the Bosnian side.\n Foreign Affairs of the member countries of the OIC\nReferring to the safe areas, the speaker welcomed the\n Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina would hold\nmovement towards applying the “Sarajevo model” to\n an extraordinary ministerial meeting in New York in\nthe other safe areas. He noted, however, that the\n the following days, aiming to secure all necessary\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not confined\n measures to be taken by the United Nations to protect\nto a few zones defined by the Security Council, and he\n the safe areas. Meanwhile, OIC urged the Council to\nurged the Council to declare the whole of Bosnia and\n take effective steps to enforce the observance of its\nHerzegovina to be a safe area and to clarify that the\n resolutions relating to the protection of the safe areas,\nacquisition of any portion of that territory was “null\n and in particular Gorazde, and to authorize strong\nand void”. Before concluding, the speaker stated that\n retaliatory action, including NATO air strikes, against\nBosnia and Herzegovina was an integral part of the\n the Serbian aggressor, to prevent the continuation of\ninternational community and that the States Member of\n massacres and genocide in Gorazde and the spread of\nthe United Nations had only agreed, in the Charter, to\n conflict to other areas. The Council should also restore\ndelegate a portion of their responsibilities with respect\n without delay the right of individual and collective\nto the maintenance of international peace and security\n self-defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. OIC believed\non the understanding that the Council would be “the\n that any decision precluding Bosnia and Herzegovina\ninstrument of legality and right”. 191\n from exercising that right was unconstitutional. The\n Noting that the international community, the only entity that should be bound by the embargo was\nUnited Nations and the Security Council had exerted the Serbian aggressor. The European Union, NATO and\ngreat efforts over the preceding two years to resolve the international community as a whole must take\nthe crisis, Mr. Djokic contended that those efforts had urgent steps to restore the status quo ante in Bosnia and\nnot sought a comprehensive solution taking account of Herzegovina, and to demonstrate that they were\nthe vital interests of the three constituent peoples on prepared to stand up in defence of international law\nthe basis of equality. Rather, support and legitimacy and morality by all necessary means at their disposal to\nhad effectively been given to one side only — the stop aggression and atrocities. OIC also believed that\nBosnian Muslims. At the same time, only the Bosnian for the sake of international justice and the prevention\nSerbs and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been of more acts of genocide and other crimes against\nconfronted with “harsh sanctions”. The speaker humanity, the International Tribunal should start\ncontended that there would not be and could not be functioning without delay. 193\npeace in Bosnia and Herzegovina if the pressure was\n The representative of Slovenia said that his\nput only on one side — the Serb side — demanding\n delegation joined those who had expressed support for\nthat only it make concessions whereas the Muslim\n the Secretary-General’s recent appeal to NATO to\nsides enjoyed massive political and military support to\n provide the necessary protection of the safe areas. It\nadvance the military option. He stated that calls for\n also supported the approach proposed by President\nlifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslim\n Clinton, agreeing that it was time for vigorous action\nside, and for offensive air strikes to be carried out\n and tightened sanctions. Moreover, Slovenia felt that\nagainst the Bosnian Serbs could only lead to an\n equal resolve should be shown in matters concerning\nescalation of the conflict. The speaker warned that, if\n State succession and other issues resulting from the\nthose calls were acted upon, the United Nations would\n dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. The United\nbecome fully engaged on one side in the civil war.\n Nations should definitively terminate the membership\nWhat was most important was that the Security\n of the former Yugoslavia in order to improve the\nCouncil gave full support to an urgent, unconditional\n conditions for a real and durable peace. Referring to\ncessation of hostilities and to a comprehensive\n the issue of the arms embargo, the speaker stated that it\nceasefire, which could be reached only through __________________\n__________________\n 192 Ibid., pp. 11-13.\n 191 Ibid., pp. 9-11.\n 193 Ibid., pp. 25-26.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 779\n"
[60] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nwas important to recognize that the embargo had been therefore been diluted by that omission. Pakistan was\nextended on the former Yugoslavia and its successor also concerned that the draft resolution did not address\nStates in a specific situation in 1992. It was therefore the issue of an increase in troop levels. Therefore,\ntime for a decision that took into account the new while his delegation would reserve the right to\nrealities and different situations of each of the introduce another draft resolution calling for the lifting\nsuccessor States. There were reasons for keeping the of the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina,\narms embargo as a part of the sanctions against the it would nevertheless support the draft resolution.198\nmain successor State of the former Yugoslavia, against\n The representative of the United States observed\nwhich sanctions were imposed, however, there was a\n that the civilians of Gorazde were being subjected to\nneed to reconsider the merits of applying the embargo\n murderous attacks by the Bosnian Serbs on a daily\nagainst those engaged in legitimate self-defence, which\n basis. These attacks were an outrage to the conscience\nwas an inherent right of all United Nations Members.\n of the Council and an affront to international law.\nFinally, in the case of Slovenia, there was no\n Noting that President Clinton had outlined the position\njustification for maintaining the embargo, as Slovenia\n of her Government in that regard, she indicated that her\nwas not involved in the armed conflicts which had\n delegation was consulting with other members of the\nprompted the adoption of that measure.194\n Council on measures to provide more adequate\n The representative of Bulgaria noted that, as his protection to the safe areas, in keeping with Council\ncountry was in close proximity to the conflict, it had resolutions, and it had proposed the extension of the\nalways insisted on firm judgement and energetic steps approach used around Sarajevo to other safe areas. The\non the part of the United Nations to contain and end the United States would also work with other members of\nwar in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bulgaria had a key the Council to tighten enforcement of the sanctions\nrole to play in implementing the sanctions against against Serbia and Montenegro and it would continue\nSerbia and Montenegro and, being fully aware of its to support UNPROFOR, which genuinely needed\nresponsibilities, it was adhering strictly to the relevant increased manpower. It would also continue to support\nresolutions, at great economic sacrifice. It was fully the International Tribunal. The speaker further\nBulgaria’s expectation that its difficulties would be indicated that the United States Senate had debated a\nkept in mind and taken into account. 195 resolution calling for the United States to lift the arms\n embargo unilaterally. So far, the United States had\n Other speakers also welcomed the request of the\n resisted a unilateral approach, because it believed in\nSecretary-General to NATO to authorize air strikes to\n the sanctity of the sanctions imposed by the United\nprotect Gorazde, 196 while some reiterated their support\n Nations. Nevertheless, Council members should\nfor the lifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia and\n understand that the Government of the United States\nHerzegovina.197\n supported changing resolution 713 (1991) so that the\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of victims of aggression might finally be permitted to\nPakistan stated that his delegation had expected the defend themselves. 199\ndraft resolution to include a reference to the review of\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nthe applicability of resolution 713 (1991). Regrettably,\n adopted unanimously as resolution 913 (1994), which\nits inclusion had not been acceptable to some members\n reads as follows:\nof the Council. His delegation support for the draft had\n__________________ The Security Council,\n 194 Ibid., pp. 35-36.\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the\n 195 Ibid., pp. 38-39.\n conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and\n 196 Ibid., pp. 17-18 (Hungary); pp. 20-21 (Senegal);\n reaffirming in this context its resolution 908 (1994) of 31 March\n pp. 21-22 (Indonesia); pp. 27-28 (United Arab Emirates); 1994,\n pp. 29-31 (Malaysia); p. 31 (Norway); pp. 31-32\n (Austria); and pp. 36-37 (Poland). Recalling also the statement by the President of the\n 197 Ibid., pp. 18-20 (Afghanistan); pp. 20-21 (Senegal); Security Council of 6 April 1994 relating to the situation in the\n pp. 21-22 (Indonesia); pp. 22-24 (Jordan); pp. 27-28 safe area of Gorazde,\n (United Arab Emirates); pp. 29-31 (Malaysia); pp. 33-34 __________________\n (Islamic Republic of Iran); pp. 37-38 (Qatar); and\n 198 Ibid., pp. 43-45.\n pp. 39-41 (Sudan).\n 199 Ibid., pp. 49-50.\n\n\n\n\n780 07-63109\n"
[61] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and Determining that the situation in the Republic of Bosnia\npolitical independence of the Republic of Bosnia and and Herzegovina continues to constitute a threat to international\nHerzegovina and the responsibility of the Security Council in peace and security, reiterating its determination to ensure the\nthis regard, security of the Force and its freedom of movement in all its\n missions, and to these ends acting under Chapter VII of the\n Deeply concerned by the ongoing hostilities in and around\n Charter of the United Nations,\nGorazde, as well as by the consequences for the situation in\nother areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and on A\nthe negotiation process aimed at an overall political settlement,\n 1. Demands the immediate conclusion by the\n Condemning in the strongest possible terms the Bosnian Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\nSerb forces for their continued offensive against the safe area of Bosnian Serb party of a ceasefire agreement, under the auspices\nGorazde, which has resulted in the death of numerous civilians of the United Nations Protection Force, in Gorazde and\nand tremendous human suffering, throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina, leading to an agreement on cessation of hostilities,\n Condemning all attacks against civilian populations and\n and demands that all parties comply strictly with such\nhumanitarian relief workers, and reiterating that any persons\n agreements;\ncommitting violations of international humanitarian law will be\nheld individually responsible, 2. Invites the Secretary-General to take the necessary\n steps to ensure that the Force is able, within the limits of its\n Condemning also the Bosnian Serb party for its failure to\n available resources, to monitor the situation in Gorazde and\nnegotiate in good faith and to uphold its commitments made to\n respect of any ceasefire and disengagement of the military\nthe representatives of the United Nations and the Russian\n forces in Gorazde, including any measure to put heavy weapons\nFederation in respect of ceasefire arrangements in and around\n of the parties under United Nations control;\nGorazde,\n 3. Condemns the shelling and attacks by the Bosnian\n Sharing the concern expressed by the Secretary-General\n Serb forces against the safe area of Gorazde as defined in\nin his reports of 11 March and 16 March 1994, and taking note\n resolution 824 (1993), and demands the withdrawal of these\nof the recommendations of the Secretary-General concerning the\n forces and their weapons to a distance to be agreed by the Force\ndefinition and implementation of the concept of safe areas,\n wherefrom they cease to constitute a threat to the status of\n Determined to contribute to the immediate establishment Gorazde as a safe area;\nof a lasting ceasefire in Gorazde as well as throughout the\n B\nterritory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina through\nnegotiations between the parties, and to ensure its respect, 4. Calls for an end to any provocative action by\n whomsoever committed in and around the safe areas;\n Reaffirming the mandate conferred on the United Nations\nProtection Force by its resolutions 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993, 5. Demands the immediate release of all United\n836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, 844 (1993) of 18 June 1993 and 908 Nations personnel still held by the Bosnian Serb forces;\n(1994), and emphasizing that the Force will continue to make\n 6. Also demands unimpeded freedom of movement for\nfull use of this mandate as and when needed in execution of the\n the Force in the fulfilment of all its tasks and the removal of all\nrelevant resolutions of the Council,\n obstacles to such freedom of movement;\n Praising the untiring and courageous action of the\n 7. Confirms the decision in resolution 908 (1994) to\npersonnel of the Force and of other United Nations agencies in\n take action by 30 April 1994 at the latest on the further troop\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n requirements recommended by the Secretary-General;\n Condemning the harassment and the detention of Force\n C\npersonnel by the Bosnian Serb forces and all obstacles to the\nfreedom of movement of the Force, 8. Underlines the urgent need to intensify the efforts\n towards an overall political settlement agreed by all parties in\n Paying tribute to the enlargement of diplomatic efforts\n the Former Yugoslavia, in particular in the Republic of Bosnia\ntowards the conclusion of an overall political settlement,\n and Herzegovina;\nwelcoming in this context the ongoing international efforts by\nrepresentatives of the United Nations, the European Union, the 9. Calls for the intensification of the efforts to achieve\nUnited States of America and the Russian Federation, and a peaceful settlement with coordination and close consultation\ndetermined to strengthen and coordinate these international between the representatives of the United States of America and\nefforts in order to bring together the current diplomatic the Russian Federation and those of the United Nations and the\ninitiatives with the aim of securing the participation of all the European Union, with the aim of bringing together current\nparties concerned in an overall political settlement, diplomatic initiatives;\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 781\n"
[62] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n D and determined steps were needed. At the same time,\n 10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter, and however, the Russian Federation called for restraint\nstands ready promptly to consider taking further measures as and caution, because the logic of increasing air strikes\nrequired. contained an inherent danger of escalation. It also\n emphasized that the idea of lifting the arms embargo in\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of\n an area of conflict ran counter to the idea of the speedy\nFrance stated that firm pressure on the Bosnian Serbs\n attainment of peace and could only “fan the flames” of\nwas indispensable. The resolution just adopted\n the conflict. Referring to a recent initiative by\nprovided an appropriate response in that respect, by\n President Yeltsin to hold a high-level meeting between\ncalling for the immediate conclusion of a ceasefire\n his country, the United States, the European Union and\nagreement and the withdrawal of Serb forces to a\n the United Nations, the speaker stated that the time was\ndistance that would guarantee the security of Gorazde.\n ripe for those parties to work together towards a\nThese demands would be more rapidly implemented\n political solution to the Bosnian problem, and to put it\nand the protection of the safe areas ensured when there\n before the belligerent parties, so that they were\nwas a credible prospect for military action against\n absolutely clear that it was essential to negotiate. At\nthose responsible for the attacks upon the safe areas.\n the same time, the Serbian side should understand that\nFrance supported the Secretary-General’s request that\n each step towards a complete cessation of hostilities\nNATO authorize air strikes, as well as the proposals by\n would be accompanied by a corresponding lifting of\nthe United States Government to expand the use of air\n the sanctions.201\naction to protect the safe areas in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina. In addition to these initiatives, The representative of Brazil stated that his\ndiplomatic efforts should be resumed in order to delegation was in full agreement with the main\nachieve a political settlement and should revolve objectives of the resolution just adopted. It had been\naround a common position between the various the consistent position of the Government of Brazil\nprotagonists participating in the quest for a settlement — that the use of force must be a last resort, to be\nthe United States, the Russian Federation, the employed only under well-defined circumstances and\nEuropean Union and the United Nations. Such a in strict compliance with relevant Security Council\ncommon position should be based upon the major resolutions. As a corollary to that principle, the\nprinciples of the European Union plan, including, inter Council should direct its actions to facilitating the\nalia, programming the progressive suspension and achievement of an overall negotiated settlement. Brazil\nlifting the sanctions at the appropriate time.200 therefore welcomed endeavours to bring together the\n various existing diplomatic initiatives. Referring to\n The representative of the Russian Federation\n UNPROFOR, the speaker stated that Brazil believed\nstated that the resolution just adopted was an\n that the Force must be provided with the necessary\nimportant, unanimous step in response to the alarming\n means and “humanpower” to carry out its mandate.\nsituation around Gorazde and in Bosnia and\n Nevertheless, should circumstances so require, the\nHerzegovina as a whole. The leadership of the Bosnian\n Council must be prepared to review all aspects of the\nSerbs should comply with its obligations, cease attacks,\n United Nations presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.202\nwithdraw their forces from Gorazde and allow the\nentry of the United Nations into that city. At the same The representative of the United Kingdom stated\ntime, acts of provocation in and around Gorazde should that the resolution just adopted was clear-cut in its\nbe halted. That demand in the resolution was addressed condemnation of the way in which the Bosnian Serbs\nto all sides. In that context, it was important that the had continued to shell Gorazde, while giving\nresolution adopted shared the concern expressed by the undertakings to the United Nations and others about\nSecretary-General in his reports of 10 and 16 March, ceasefires. Noting that UNPROFOR had been given a\nregarding the misuse of the safe areas, and took note of “multiplicity” of roles in Bosnia, the speaker urged that\nhis recommendations concerning the definition and the Force must be given the troops to do its job without\nimplementation of the concept of safe areas. In order to delay. Observing that a negotiated settlement remained\nsteer the conflict towards peaceful settlement, resolute __________________\n__________________ 201 Ibid., pp. 52-53.\n\n 200 Ibid., pp. 50-51. 202 Ibid., pp. 53-54.\n\n\n\n\n782 07-63109\n"
[63] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nthe only path to a lasting peace, he stated that the latest Council invited the representatives of Albania,\nactions of the Serbs had only served to underline the Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina,\ncase for tightening the sanctions against the Federal Canada, Croatia, Egypt, Greece, India, the Islamic\nRepublic of Yugoslavia. As the Council had made Republic of Iran, Malaysia, Norway, Saudi Arabia,\nclear, the road to lifting the sanctions would first Senegal, the Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia and Turkey, at\nrequire the negotiation and implementation of a just their request, to participate in the discussion without\noverall settlement of hostilities in the former the right to vote. The Council also invited Ambassador\nYugoslavia. Referring to the Secretary-General’s Dragomir Djokic, at his request, to address it in the\nrequest to NATO, the speaker noted that his course of the subsequent discussion, and extended an\nGovernment was participating actively in NATO’s invitation to Mr. Hamid Algabid, Secretary-General of\nconsultations regarding the next step. The Serbs would the Islamic Conference.\nbe well advised to withdraw, respect the resolution just\n The representative of Pakistan stated that the\nadopted and seek in good faith a peace settlement\n Council should use its authority to persuade the\nwhich could secure the interests of all communities in\n Bosnian Serbs to accept the agreement signed between\nBosnia and Herzegovina.203\n the Government of Bosnia and the Croats on the\n The representative of China stated that there were creation of a federation. He contended that a new\nno alternatives to settling the conflict through peaceful political process, which should secure the full\nnegotiation. China supported the efforts to strengthen participation of the Islamic countries and enjoy the\nand coordinate the various political and diplomatic support of the Council, could create a momentum\ninitiatives, and had therefore voted in favour of the towards a comprehensive peace agreement. The\nresolution just adopted. The speaker reiterated, speaker further indicated that at a meeting of the\nhowever, that China opposed the use or threat of force, Foreign Ministers of the OIC Contact Group on Bosnia\nas well as any attempt to stop war by expanding its and Herzegovina, held that same day, the Ministers had\nscope. Any escalation of military conflict could only declared, inter alia, that resolution 713 (1991) did not\nlead to further military confrontation and intensified apply to Bosnia and Herzegovina and that the arms\nconflict, thus making more remote any chance of embargo against the Government of Bosnia was\npolitical settlement. China continued to have “unjust, illegal and in direct contradiction of Article 51\nreservations on the invocation of Chapter VII for of the Charter of the United Nations”. The Ministers\nmandatory actions and the implied possible military had also demanded the withdrawal of Serbian heavy\nactions in the resolution.204 weapons from Gorazde, and had called for the\n strengthening of UNPROFOR. Furthermore, OIC\n Deliberations of 27 April 1994 (3370th meeting) Ambassadors in New York had been mandated to\n pursue the objectives of the declaration, in particular\n By a letter dated 22 April 1994 addressed to the\n with respect to the modification of resolution\nPresident of the Security Council,205 the representative\n 713 (1991) to enable the Government of Bosnia to\nof Pakistan, in his capacity as the Chairman of the\n exercise its right to self-defence. Pakistan would\nIslamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, requested\n propose, on behalf of OIC, that the Council adopt a\nthat a formal meeting of the Security Council on the\n resolution declaring that the provisions of resolution\nsituation in Bosnia and Herzegovina be scheduled for\n 713 (1991) did not apply to Bosnia and Herzegovina. If\n27 April 1994. The request was being made to facilitate\n these efforts were to fail, an urgent session of the\na debate on the deteriorating situation in Bosnia and\n General Assembly would be sought, in order to seek\nHerzegovina.\n “peace with justice” in Bosnia and Herzegovina.206\n At its 3370th meeting, held on 27 April 1994 in\n The representative of Turkey noted that his\nresponse to the request contained in the above-\n delegation had tried several times to convince the\nmentioned letter, the Council included the letter in its\n Security Council to set a time limit for the Serbian side\nagenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\n__________________ to comply with its resolutions. It had also underlined\n 203 Ibid., pp. 54-55.\n that the aggressors should be warned very clearly that\n __________________\n 204 Ibid., p. 55.\n 206 S/PV.3370, pp. 2-5.\n 205 S/1994/492.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 783\n"
[64] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nif they failed to comply they would face the put into effect through binding international measures.\nconsequences. It was such convictions that had Finally, the International Tribunal must be provided\nprompted Turkey to actively participate in the with the necessary resources to undertake its\nformulation of the NATO decisions. The speaker responsibilities. The speaker further stated that the\npointed out that the option of air strikes had been Council must take charge and decide on a set of\nfavoured by his Government since 1992. Turkey had measures, including lifting the arms embargo.\nalso defended the view that it should be applicable not Otherwise, the only alternative would be to have\nonly to Sarajevo but to all six United Nations safe recourse to a special emergency session of the General\nareas. The speaker argued that had that proposal been Assembly to take a decision on that important issue.\naccepted on time, it would have spared many lives in Quoting Article 51 of the Charter, he argued that the\nGorazde. He further contended that while the provision implied that no international body or\naccountability of the perpetrators of war crimes authority, including the Council itself, should\nconstituted one of the main pillars of credible undermine the natural or inherent right of all States to\ndeterrence against aggression, nothing was more self-defence. Furthermore, the right to self-defence\nimportant for deterrence, however, than letting the applied and was applied, as provided by Article 51,\nBosnians acquire the means to exercise their inherent “until the Council had taken measures necessary to\nright to defend themselves. Turkey would continue to maintain international peace and security”. Obviously,\ninsist that the Council clarify the legal opinion that its all resolutions adopted by the Council in that regard\nresolution 713 (1991) did not and should not apply to over the past two years were far from adequate to\nBosnia and Herzegovina. Noting that the Council had preserve international security since fighting and acts\nreaffirmed in all relevant resolutions the sovereignty of aggression had continued. Therefore, the Council\nand territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and could not use these resolutions as a pretext for not\nrejected the acquisition of territory through the use of lifting the embargo. Lastly, by placing the aggressor\nforce and the practice of “ethnic cleansing”, the and the victim on an equal footing, the Council had\nspeaker stated that the time had come for the Council contravened the provisions of the Charter. Stressing\nto put these principles into practice. Furthermore, the that the legality of the measures taken by the Council\ndiplomatic isolation and economic embargo imposed depended on the degree to which they conformed to the\non the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should be provisions of the Charter and referring to Article 103\ntightened. Welcoming the calls for the convening of a of the Charter, the speaker contended that Council’s\nhigh-level meeting on Bosnia, Turkey expected the decisions did not prevail over the Charter. The speaker\nStates members of the OIC Contact Group on Bosnia to hoped that the Council would shoulder its\nbe invited to take part to such a meeting.207 responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of\n the Charter, adopt a resolution to support Bosnia and\n The representative of Egypt welcomed the\n Herzegovina, and decide to lift the arms embargo in\ndecision by NATO, as a regional organization under\n order to enable it to exercise its legitimate right to\nChapter VIII of the Charter, to carry out air strikes\n self-defence.208\nagainst Serb military positions from which attacks had\nbeen launched. His delegation was also considering The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nwith interest the idea of holding a new international called for a decisive approach by the United Nations\nconference. If such a conference were to proceed, it towards his country pointing out that the recent\nwould need to address a number of points. First, the ultimatum issued by NATO and the United Nations was\nterms of reference must be in conformity with the an example of what could be achieved when the\nCharter and international law and should include the international community showed resolve and will for\nnon-acquisition of territory by force. Second, any action. The speaker stressed a number of points.\nproposed peace settlement must be in accordance with Firstly, the Serbs should withdraw from the safe areas\nthe Charter and the resolutions of the Council. Third, and their surroundings and their heavy weapons should\nthe conference should concentrate on settling the be removed and returned to Serbia. The arms embargo\nproblem of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Fourth, the should be lifted and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s right to\ninternational community must ensure that the plan was self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter restored.\n__________________ __________________\n 207 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 208 Ibid., pp. 17-20.\n\n\n\n\n784 07-63109\n"
[65] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nSecondly, a process of neutralization of weaponry must settlement. The Russian Federation expected that the\nbe workable. Thirdly, the peace process must be based Bosnian parties and the Russian Federation’s partners\non respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity would join in that process and concentrate their efforts\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina and the return of territories on the following. First, the system of safe areas should\nseized by force. Fourthly, the United Nations had an be strengthened in accordance with Council\nobligation to ensure that resolution 913 (1994), which resolutions. Second, the Serbs and the Muslims should\ncalled for the withdrawal of Serbian forces from the sign an unconditional agreement as soon as possible on\nsafe area of Goradze, was implemented based upon a halt to all hostilities. Third, there should be a\nresolution 824 (1993), by which Goradze was declared comprehensive political settlement in Bosnia and\na safe area. It must also ensure that the boundaries of Herzegovina, taking into account the legitimate\nthe safe area existing prior to the Serbian offensive interests and equal status of all inhabitants of that\nwere restored pending the final outcome of the territory. Lastly, progress in restoring peace to Bosnia\nnegotiations. Lastly, the newly formed Contact Group and Herzegovina should be accompanied by an\non Bosnia and Herzegovina should include a appropriate easing of sanctions against the Federal\nrepresentative of OIC.209 Republic of Yugoslavia. Referring to the arms\n embargo, the speaker argued that the demands for the\n The representative of Greece, speaking on behalf\n embargo to be lifted ran counter to efforts aimed at\nof the European Union, noted that the European Union\n political settlement and could only lead to an escalation\nhad called for an intensified diplomatic effort by the\n of the war. He further noted that his delegation had\ninternational community, involving the United Nations,\n repeatedly drawn attention to the ideas expressed by\nthe European Union, the United States and the Russian\n the Secretary-General with respect to the need for a\nFederation, to ensure the convergence of their\n revision of the concept of safe areas, whose status was\ninitiatives. Particularly at that critical juncture, the goal\n frequently abused. In that connection, his delegation\nwas to establish conditions which would lead to a\n believed that the United Nations forces, together with\ncomprehensive cessation of hostilities and a peace\n the parties concerned, should be entrusted with the task\nsettlement. It was now more important than ever that\n of defining a system and borders for each of the safe\nthe parties engaged in meaningful negotiations. The\n areas. It was important that United Nations forces be\nspeaker further stated that the European Union Action\n deployed in the safe areas. An important condition for\nPlan provided the only appropriate basis for a\n respecting the status of the safe areas was their\nnegotiated settlement and a lasting peace. Referring to\n demilitarization. Heavy weapons must be placed under\nUNPROFOR, he urged that the Force should be\n control and unimpeded humanitarian assistance to the\nprovided with the necessary means to carry out its\n safe areas must be guaranteed. The Russian Federation\nmandate without which any progress in the peace\n felt that it was particularly important for the Council to\nprocess would be meaningless. In that regard, the\n begin work and shoulder its responsibility for\nadoption of resolution 914 (1994) that day on the\n determining the system of safe areas.211\nstrengthening of UNPROFOR was welcomed. 210\n Mr. Djokic stated that in that critical phase, it was\n The representative of the Russian Federation\n imperative that the international community and the\nnoted that the normalization of the situation around\n Council did everything in their power to facilitate a\nGorazde and the fulfilment by the Bosnian Serb party\n negotiated settlement of peace. All efforts must be\nof its obligations were creating positive opportunities\n concerted to establish a comprehensive ceasefire\nfor a swift settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He\n throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only the urgent\nfurther noted that the initiative of his President for\n and unconditional cessation of all hostilities, without\nholding a summit meeting between the Russian\n prejudice to the final political solution, could pave the\nFederation, the United States, the European Union and\n way for the resumption of the peace process. For its\nthe United Nations was aimed at achieving such a\n part, the leadership of the Federal Republic of\nsettlement. The most important point was that military\n Yugoslavia had throughout the conflict invested efforts\nmeasures should not overshadow the political\n__________________ towards finding a peaceful solution and influencing the\n 209 Ibid., pp. 22-23.\n Bosnian Serbs to make compromises. The Federal\n __________________\n 210 Ibid., pp. 23-24.\n 211 Ibid., pp. 25-27.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 785\n"
[66] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nRepublic of Yugoslavia welcomed the recent renewed and the political solution in Croatia might be\nefforts directed towards the resumption of the peace jeopardized to the point of renewed fighting.213\nprocess and the active participation of the United\n The representative of Albania reiterated his\nNations, the European Union, the Russian Federation\n country’s position, that intensive diplomatic action\nand the United States in that regard. The activities of\n combined with other measures, including the use of\nthe newly created Contact Group could be a step in the\n force, would be the most suitable means to bring peace.\nright direction. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,\n He welcomed the initiative to convene a high-level\nhowever, was concerned by the reservations of some\n conference, whilst drawing attention to the serious\ncountries regarding the initiatives for resolving the\n situation in Kosovo and stating that dealing with the\nconflict by peaceful means and the persistence of\n crisis in Kosovo should be an integral element in the\nthreats and punitive measures. The speaker further\n peace process. The Government of Albania reiterated\nargued that the complex nature of the conflict in\n the view that the sanctions against the Federal\nBosnia and Herzegovina made it necessary that no\n Republic of Yugoslavia constituted an important\nformer occupying Power of the territories of the former\n component of the international community’s efforts to\nYugoslavia or any neighbouring States should be\n bring peace to the region and should be maintained\ninvolved in peacekeeping activities. In that regard, the\n despite the fact that Albania was experiencing\ndecision to send Turkish troops to Bosnia and\n “enormous difficulties” as a result of these\nHerzegovina was not only against the interest of easing\n sanctions. 214\nthe situation in the region, but could also have a direct\nbearing on the escalation of the conflict.212 During the debate, a number of speakers called\n for the lifting of the arms embargo in order to enable\n The representative of Croatia noted that the\n Bosnia and Herzegovina to exercise its inherent right\npresence of so many high representatives of the\n to self-defence in accordance with Article 51 of the\nGovernments in the debate indicated on the one hand\n Charter.215 Other speakers opposed the idea, arguing\nthe urgency of the situation in the region and, on the\n that such a step would not facilitate a peaceful\nother hand, gave hope that their commitment would\n resolution of the conflict.216\nbring that crisis to a fair conclusion. In that regard,\nCroatia emphasized the importance of the views of\n Decision of 29 April 1994: letter from the\nOIC in the peace process. That was why it had called\n President to the Secretary-General\nfor the inclusion of a high-ranking representative of\nOIC in the process of finding a political solution to the By a letter dated 29 April 1994, 217 the President\nconflict. International mediation could, however, have of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General\nits limits. The international community had been of the following:\nunable to find the appropriate balance of power to The members of the Security Council, while discussing\nmatch its attempts at political mediation. As long as the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in\nthis imbalance continued, the Government of Croatia the safe areas established by the relevant resolutions of the\nwould support the lifting of the arms embargo. The Council, took note of the recommendations of the Secretary-\nspeaker emphasized in that regard, that the arms General concerning the definition and implementation of the\nembargo would not necessarily promote war. Rather it __________________\n 213 Ibid., pp. 34-36.\nwould create a balance that would promote non-violent\n 214 Ibid., p. 40.\noptions for a fair and sustainable settlement. He argued\n 215 Ibid., pp. 3-5 (Pakistan); pp. 6-7 (Turkey); pp. 8-11\nthat the international community must use all necessary\n (Malaysia); pp. 11-13 (Islamic Republic of Iran);\nmeans to “disengage” the Serbian military capacity, or pp. 13-14 (Senegal); pp. 14-16 (Saudi Arabia); pp. 16-17\nlift the arms embargo, thus enabling Bosnia and (Tunisia); pp. 17-20 (Egypt); pp. 20-22 (OIC); pp. 22-23\nHerzegovina and Croatia to acquire the defence (Bosnia and Herzegovina); pp. 24-25 (Oman); pp. 27-28\ncapacity to compel the Serbian side to accept and (Djibouti); pp. 34-36 (Croatia); pp. 36-37 (Sudan); and\nimplement the results of international mediation and pp. 37-38 (Bangladesh).\n 216 Ibid., pp. 25-27 (Russian Federation); pp. 28-29 (New\nthe relevant Security Council resolutions. Otherwise,\n Zealand); pp. 29-30 (Canada); pp. 31-32 (Sweden);\nthe war in Bosnia and Herzegovina would continue,\n__________________ pp. 32-33 (Yugoslavia); and pp. 33-34 (Norway).\n 217 S/1994/521.\n 212 Ibid., pp. 32-33.\n\n\n\n\n786 07-63109\n"
[67] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nconcept of safe areas, as contained in his reports of 11 March reported that the situation in Gorazde remained one of\nand 16 March 1994. stalemate and tensions continued to be high. He further\n The members of the Council request the Secretary- noted that despite the limitation of its mandate and\nGeneral to submit by 10 May 1994 further specific military resources, UNPROFOR had played a major\nrecommendations on modalities of the implementation of the stabilizing role and contributed to normalizing the\nconcept of safe areas as defined in resolutions 824 (1993) of situation, particularly in and around Sarajevo, along\n6 May 1993 and 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993. the entire confrontation line between Bosnian Croat\n and Bosnian government forces, in Gorazde, and in\n Decision of 4 May 1994 (3374th meeting): Brcko and the Posavina corridor with the deployment\n statement by the President of military observers since 7 May 1994. UNPROFOR\n At its 3374th meeting, on 4 May 1994, the could not, however, be expected indefinitely to\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item. preserve such achievements unless early progress was\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council made towards an agreement on a comprehensive\ninvited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, cessation of hostilities and a halt to the movement of\nat his request, to participate in the discussion without military forces, equipment and supplies. In that regard,\nthe right to vote. The President (Nigeria) then stated the Secretary-General had requested his Special\nthat, after consultations among members of the Representative and UNPROFOR to approach the\nSecurity Council, he had been authorized to make the parties immediately to bring about an early meeting\nfollowing statement on behalf of the Council:218 and an agreement on such issue taking into account the\n separation of forces, the withdrawal of heavy weapons\n The Security Council calls upon the parties to the conflict\nin the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to agree to a\n and the interposition of UNPROFOR troops. He also\ncomplete cessation of hostilities, to comply fully therewith, and welcomed the call by the Troika of the European\nto resume immediately negotiations, without preconditions, for Union, France, the Russian Federation, the United\nthe conclusion of an overall settlement. It demands that the States and the United Kingdom in Geneva, on 13 May\nparties immediately refrain from any offensive military action 1994, for a further reinforcement of UNPROFOR and\nand any action likely to lead to renewed fighting. requested the Council’s support for his proposals.\n The Council is concerned at recent indications of At its 3380th meeting, on 25 May 1994, the\nincreasing tension in a number of areas in the Republic of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, in particular the Posavina “corridor”.\n Council included the report in its agenda. Following\n the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\n The Council welcomes the arrangements reported by the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\nSecretariat to establish a United Nations Protection Force request, to participate in the discussion without the\npresence in the region of the Posavina “corridor”. It encourages\nthe Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the\n right to vote. The President (Nigeria) then stated that,\nFormer Yugoslavia to pursue this rapidly and also to seek after consultations among members of the Security\nenhanced aerial surveillance of this and other areas of tension. Council, he had been authorized to make the following\nThe Council calls on all the parties to cooperate fully with the statement on behalf of the Council:220\nSpecial Representative and the Force in the planned deployment.\n The Security Council has considered the report of the\nIt warns the parties of the serious consequences of any offensive\n Secretary-General pursuant to its resolution 913 (1994).\nmilitary action in or around the Posavina “corridor”.\n The Council reiterates the urgent need to intensify efforts\n The Council is considering further decisions on the matter\n towards an overall political settlement of the conflict in the\nand will remain actively seized of it.\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It calls on the parties to\n resume, without preconditions, serious efforts to reach a\n Decision of 25 May 1994 (3380th meeting): political settlement.\n statement by the President\n The Council reaffirms the urgent need for a\n On 19 May 1994, pursuant to resolution 913 comprehensive cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of\n(1994), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this regard, the\na report on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Council supports the decision of the Secretary-General, in\nparticular in Gorazde.219 The Secretary-General accordance with paragraph 1 of resolution 913 (1994), to entrust\n__________________ his Special Representative and the Force Commander of the\n __________________\n 218 S/PRST/1994/23.\n 220 S/PRST/1994/26.\n 219 S/1994/600.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 787\n"
[68] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nUnited Nations Protection Force with the task of achieving a invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\ncomprehensive cessation of hostilities. In this context it at his request, to participate in the discussion without\nwelcomes the call for such a cessation of hostilities in the the right to vote. The President (Oman) then stated\ncommuniqué dated 13 May 1994 issued at the meeting of\nMinisters for Foreign Affairs at Geneva.\n that, after consultations among members of the\n Security Council, he had been authorized to make the\n The Council demands immediate and full compliance with following statement on behalf of the Council:222\nits resolution 913 (1994) and, in respect of Gorazde, calls upon\nthe parties to cooperate fully with the Force to that end. The Security Council underlines its support for the 8 June\n 1994 agreement of the parties to the conflict, in which they\n Decision of 1 June 1994 (3387th meeting): agreed to observe a ceasefire for a period of one month starting\n from 10 June 1994. The Council expresses its grave concern at\n statement by the President the parties’ failure to comply with the agreement to date.\n At its 3387th meeting, on 1 June 1994, the The Council calls once again on the parties to stop all\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item. offensive military operations and other provocative actions, as\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council well as all ceasefire violations and ethnic cleansing, and to\ninvited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, cooperate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-\nat his request, to participate in the discussion without General for the Former Yugoslavia and the United Nations\nthe right to vote. The President (Oman) then stated Protection Force. It also calls on the parties to resume\n negotiations on a comprehensive cessation of hostilities for the\nthat, after consultations among members of the entire territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with\nSecurity Council, he had been authorized to make the a view to reaching agreement before the expiration of the 8 June\nfollowing statement on behalf of the Council:221 agreement on 10 July 1994, while continuing negotiations to\n achieve a just and comprehensive peace agreement.\n The Security Council recalls its presidential statement of\n25 May 1994. The Council deplores all attacks on United Nations\n personnel and calls on those responsible to ensure that such\n The Council reiterates the urgent need for a\n attacks do not take place. It also condemns the restrictions\ncomprehensive cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of\n imposed on the freedom of movement of the Force, and demands\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and calls upon the\n that these restrictions be immediately lifted, so as to enable the\nparties to resume, without preconditions, serious efforts to reach\n Force to assist in the implementation of the 8 June agreement.\na political settlement. In that regard, it fully supports efforts by\nthe Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the\nFormer Yugoslavia and the Force Commander of the United Decision of 7 July 1994: letter from the\nNations Protection Force to negotiate such a cessation of President to the Secretary-General\nhostilities, and welcomes the decision to convene a meeting with\nthe parties at Geneva on 2 June 1994. It also welcomes the By a letter dated 24 May 1994 addressed to the\nreported decision of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia President of the Security Council, 223 the Secretary-\nand Herzegovina and of the Bosnian Serb party to attend that General transmitted the final report of the Commission\nmeeting. The Council strongly encourages the parties to of Experts established pursuant to resolution 780\nnegotiate in good faith, so that a cessation of hostilities can be (1992). The Commission had been established to\nagreed to as quickly as possible. examine and analyse information gathered with a view\n To that end, the Council strongly demands immediate, full to providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions\nand unconditional compliance with its resolution 913 (1994) of on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva\n22 April 1994, and in this context endorses the efforts made by Conventions and other violations of international\nthe Force to ensure the implementation of that resolution. It calls humanitarian law committed in the territory of the\nupon both parties to cooperate fully with the Force in these\nefforts.\n former Yugoslavia. The Commission had concluded\n that such breaches had been committed on a large\n Decision of 30 June 1994 (3399th meeting): scale. It further had noted that the practice of the\n statement by the President so-called “ethnic cleansing” had been carried out by\n some of the parties so systematically that they strongly\n At its 3399th meeting, on 30 June 1994, the appeared to be the product of a policy. The Secretary-\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item. General indicated that he shared the conclusions of the\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council __________________\n__________________ 222 S/PRST/1994/31.\n 221 S/PRST/1994/29. 223 S/1994/674.\n\n\n\n\n788 07-63109\n"
[69] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nCommission and had instructed that all relevant release of all detainees and, to this end, calls for the delegates of\ninformation gathered by the Commission be forwarded the International Committee of the Red Cross to be granted\nto the Office of the Prosecutor of the International access in particular to all detainees in Lopare and other parts of\n the Bijeljina area.\nTribunal.\n The Council reaffirms the importance it attaches to the\n By a letter dated 7 July 1994,224 the President of right of freedom of movement throughout the Republic of\nthe Security Council informed the Secretary-General of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the United Nations Protection Force.\nthe following: It notes with dismay that the Bosnian Serb party has not allowed\n the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the\n I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 24 May\n Former Yugoslavia to visit Banja Luka, Bijeljina and other areas\n1994 transmitting the final report of the Commission of Experts\n of concern, and strongly urges it to permit such access both to\nestablished pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992)\n the Special Representative and to the Force. It also expresses its\nof 6 October 1992.\n concern about continuing restrictions on access to Sarajevo, in\n The members of the Council are grateful to the particular the closure by the Bosnian Serb party of the routes\nCommission of Experts for the work done in the discharge of its across the airport opened in cooperation with the Force\nmandate. They have noted with appreciation that the database following the 17 March 1994 agreement.\nand all the other information gathered by the Commission in the\ncourse of its work have been forwarded to the office of the Decisions of 23 September 1994 (3428th\nProsecutor of the International Tribunal. meeting): resolutions 941 (1994), 942 (1994)\n and 943 (1994)\n Decision of 2 September 1994 (3421st meeting):\n statement by the President At its 3428th meeting, on 23 September 1994, the\n Council resumed its consideration of the situation in\n At its 3421st meeting, on 2 September 1994, the the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item. the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council representatives of Afghanistan, Albania, Bangladesh,\ninvited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Egypt,\nat his request, to participate in the discussion without Germany, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran,\nthe right to vote. The President (Spain) then drew the Jordan, Malaysia, Senegal, Tunisia and Turkey, at their\nattention of the members of the Council to a letter request, to participate in the discussion without the\ndated 1 September 1994 from the representative of right to vote. The Council also invited Ambassador\nBosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of Dragomir Djokic, at his request, to address the Council\nthe Security Council225 and stated that, after in the course of its consideration of the item. The\nconsultations among members of the Security Council, President (Spain) then drew the attention of the\nhe had been authorized to make the following Council members to the texts of three draft resolutions:\nstatement on behalf of the Council: 226 the first draft resolution had been prepared in the\n The Security Council is deeply disturbed at continuing course of the Council’s prior consultations;227 the\nreports of acts of ethnic cleansing by the Bosnian Serb party in second draft resolution had been submitted by\nthe Bijeljina area. It condemns this practice wherever it occurs Argentina, the Czech Republic, Djibouti, France,\nand by whomsoever it is committed and demands its immediate Germany, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, the Russian\ncessation. It further condemns all violations of international Federation, Rwanda, Spain, the United Kingdom and\nhumanitarian law in the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, for which those who commit them are personally\n the United States;228 and the third draft resolution had\nresponsible. In this context it calls for the full implementation of been submitted by the Czech Republic, France,\nthe agreement on the release of detainees contained in the 8 June Germany, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United\n1994 agreement concluded at Geneva. It calls for the early Kingdom and the United States.229 The President also\n__________________ __________________\n 224 S/1994/800. 227 S/1994/1083.\n 225 S/1994/1023. 228 S/1994/1084.\n 226 S/PRST/1994/50. 229 S/1994/1085.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 789\n"
[70] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\ndrew the attention of the Council members to several such measure in securing the desired objectives,\nother documents.230 especially the reversal of the consequences of\n aggression and ethnic cleansing. Regarding the third\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n draft resolution on easing the sanctions against Serbia\nnoted that his delegation had “mixed views” on the\n and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina was opposed\nthree draft resolutions before the Council. While his\n to it for it sought to reward those who had been\ndelegation supported the first draft resolution\n complicit in crimes and war-making, without assisting\naddressing the crimes of ethnic cleansing being\n the victim to confront ongoing crimes and aggression,\nperpetrated in Serb-occupied areas of Bosnia and\n therefore lacking balance. Furthermore, the draft\nHerzegovina, it wondered why it had taken in excess of\n undermined the necessary improvements in human\nthree months to bring that draft to a vote and why the\n rights standards within Kosovo, Vojvodina and\ntext had been so watered down as to diminish the\n Sandzak, and did not address the ongoing occupation\ncommitment of UNPROFOR to deploy in the places\n of Croatia. It also sought to reward Serbia and\nwhere ethnic cleansing had been executed. Concerning\n Montenegro for a set of “self-designed measures of\nthe second draft resolution on the tightening of\n self-policing”, and Serbia and Montenegro had not\nsanctions against the Bosnia Serbs, his delegation\n been required to endorse the Contact Group peace plan\nsupported its spirit but questioned the effectiveness of\n__________________ by recognizing Bosnia and Herzegovina within its own\n 230 Letters dated 7, 12, 14 and 22 September 1994,\n borders. The speaker also questioned the ability of the\n respectively, from the representative of Bosnia and\n monitoring regime to monitor effectively the closure of\n Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security the border between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia\n Council (S/1994/1037, S/1994/1038, S/1994/1046, and Montenegro. In conclusion, he urged members of\n S/1994/1056 and S/1994/1087); letters dated 9 and the Council not to support the draft resolution.231\n 19 September 1994, respectively, from the representative\n of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security The representative of Croatia expressed his\n Council (S/1994/1040 and S/1994/1072); letters dated Government’s reservations on the draft resolution\n 8 and 21 September 1994, respectively, from the easing sanctions against the Federal Republic of\n representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to Yugoslavia. He argued that the sanctions should only\n the President of the Security Council (S/1994/1044 and be suspended after the Council had received concrete\n S/1994/1079); letters dated 14 and 16 September 1994,\n and undisputed evidence of real progress on the\n respectively, from the representative of Croatia\n addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1994/1052 and\n ground, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also\n S/1994/1062); letter dated 9 September 1994 from the in Croatia. Furthermore, his delegation could not\n representative of Slovenia addressed to the President of overlook the fact that the draft resolution might not\n the Security Council (S/1994/1055); letter dated follow the spirit of resolution 871 (1993), which linked\n 15 September 1994 from the representative of the sanction regime imposed on the Federal Republic\n Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security of Yugoslavia to the implementation of all relevant\n Council (S/1994/1060); letter dated 19 September 1994\n Council resolutions, including those relating to the\n from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of\n the Security Council, transmitting the report of the\n United Nations peacekeeping plan for the Republic of\n Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the Croatia. His Government would therefore support the\n International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on suspension of the sanctions regime against the Federal\n the establishment and commencement of operations of Republic of Yugoslavia only if there was real progress\n an International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the ground in relation to the implementation of\n mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia resolution 871 (1993). An essential first step would be\n and Montenegro) (S/1994/1074); letters dated 19 and\n the recognition by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n 20 September 1994, respectively, from the representative\n of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General\n of the new States on the territory of the former\n (S/1994/1075 and S/1994/1076); letter dated Yugoslavia, within their internationally recognized\n 21 September 1994 from the representatives of France, borders. Should the Council adopt the draft resolution,\n Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom however, the monitoring mission of the International\n and the United States addressed to the Secretary-General Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, which was\n (S/1994/1081); and letter dated 22 September 1994 from operating with meagre resources, would become very\n the representative of Pakistan addressed to the President __________________\n of the Security Council (S/1994/1088). 231 S/PV.3428, pp. 3-5.\n\n\n\n\n790 07-63109\n"
[71] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nimportant. He warned that the mission should not be had appealed to the President of the Security Council\nused to satisfy short-term political goals.232 to postpone consideration of the draft resolution in\n order to allow a comprehensive investigation into that\n The representative of Germany, speaking on\n matter. Regrettably, that request had not been\nbehalf of the European Union, stated that the adoption\n considered favourably. The speaker argued that the\nof the three draft resolutions would constitute an\n easing of sanctions at that time would send the wrong\nimportant step in the international peace effort and\n signal to the aggressor and would undermine the peace\nwould convey an unequivocal message to the Bosnian\n process. Meanwhile, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which\nSerbs. Firstly, the European Union condemned “the\n had accepted the Contact Group peace plan in good\nethnic cleansing” which the Bosnian Serbs had\n faith, was awaiting the fulfilment of the promises made\nsystematically carried out in the areas they occupied\n by the Contact Group, including true and effective\nand reemphasized the importance of the work of the\n border-monitoring, measures in response to the\nInternational Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.\n “strangulation” of Sarajevo, the expansion of exclusion\nSecondly, the Bosnian Serbs must realize that they\n zones, and the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia\nwould remain totally isolated as long as they blocked\n and Herzegovina. Before concluding, the speaker urged\nthe peace process and continue the abhorrent practice\n the Serbian side to stop its genocidal campaign to\nof “ethnic cleansing.” The European Union therefore\n consolidate its territorial gains and to accept the peace\nwelcomed the tightening of sanctions as a means to\n plan. If it failed to do so, then the Government of\nincrease the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept\n Bosnia and Herzegovina should be provided with all\nthe territorial proposal submitted by the Contact\n means necessary to exercise its inherent right to self-\nGroup. Thirdly, concerning the suspension of certain\n defence. 234\nsanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,\nthe European Union was united in the view that the Mr. Djokic noted that the decision to partially\ndecision of President Milosevic to close the border suspend the existing sanctions, while it represented an\ndeserved a positive reaction from the international important shift in attitude towards Yugoslavia, did not\ncommunity. Thus through the adoption of the three constitute an adequate response to the constructive role\ndraft resolutions, the Council would emphasize that played by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the\nthese who choose the course of peace would receive its search for a solution to the crisis in Bosnia and\nsupport and those who persisted in rejecting peace and Herzegovina. What was really needed was the\nembracing war would be isolated and prosecuted. 233 complete lifting of all sanctions and it was unfortunate\n therefore that the conditions were set for the ultimate\n The representative of Turkey noted that his\n and absolute lifting of all sanctions exclusively in the\ndelegation considered both the first draft resolution, on\n function of maintaining political pressure. The Federal\nethnic cleansing, and the second draft resolution, on\n Republic of Yugoslavia expected that, with the\nstrengthening sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, to\n adoption of the draft resolution relaxing the sanctions,\nbe timely steps and believed that they should both be\n the process of lifting all sanctions would gather\nadopted immediately and implemented effectively.\n momentum and the legitimate rights of the Federal\nTurkey had serious doubts, however, about the timing\n Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations and other\nand content of the third draft resolution, relaxing\n international organizations would soon be restored so\nsanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, as it was\n that it could be fully reintegrated into the international\nnecessary to verify Serbia’s claim that it had closed its\n community.235\nborder with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the\nconclusion of the mission of the International During the debate several speakers questioned the\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia was in direct appropriateness of a decision easing sanctions against\ncontradiction with independent reports suggesting that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, raising doubts\nthere had been continuing unauthorized helicopter about the credibility of the claims by the Belgrade\nflights between Serbia and Montenegro and the authorities regarding the closure of their borders with\nSerbian-held areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Turkey the territories occupied by the Bosnian Serbs, in the\n__________________ __________________\n 232 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 234 Ibid., pp. 13-14.\n 233 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 235 Ibid., pp. 14-17.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 791\n"
[72] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nabsence of an effective monitoring mechanism. They questions. He reiterated, however, that his country, in\nargued that before adopting such decision, the Council principle, was not in favour of using sanctions or\nshould ensure that Serbia and Montenegro take a mandatory measures to resolve the conflict in the\nnumber of steps, including its recognition of Bosnia former Yugoslavia. All efforts should be made to\nand Herzegovina within its current borders, its resolve the conflict peacefully. The speaker argued that\ncooperation with the International Tribunal, and its instead of bringing the war to an end, the use of\nacceptance of the designation of 51 per cent of the sanctions or mandatory measures had brought\nterritory of Bosnia and Herzegovina allocated to the enormous suffering to the countries and people of the\nMuslim Croat federation as a safe area, and the lifting region, and had inflicted tremendous losses on the\nof the Sarajevo siege. Instead of easing the sanctions, economies of those third countries that had\nthe Security Council should enforce the implemented the sanctions, in particular the States\nimplementation of its earlier resolutions, and enable neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.\nthe Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to exercise Therefore, on the basis of that principled position,\nits right of self-defence by lifting the arms embargo China would abstain on the draft resolution tightening\nimposed against it. 236 sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs.239\n Other speakers, however, supported the easing of The representative of Pakistan stated that his\nsanctions as a way of acknowledging the positive delegation was not prepared to consider even the\nreaction by the Belgrade authorities to the peace plan partial lifting of sanctions against the Federal Republic\nput forward by the Contact Group and their decision to of Yugoslavia unless and until the consequences of its\nclose their borders, arguing that it was a measure that aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina were reversed\ncould be reversed if Serbia and Montenegro violated its and territories occupied by force surrendered. Easing\ncommitments.237 the sanctions in the current circumstances was\n tantamount to appeasing and rewarding the aggressor\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of\n and would undermine the peace process, sacrificing the\nDjibouti was of the view that some crucial issues ought\n principles of justice and equity enshrined in the Charter\nto have been addressed before embarking on the\n of the United Nations. Furthermore, his delegation\nexercise of easing sanctions such as the military and\n considered the timing for the submission of the draft\nhumanitarian imbalance in the conflict, the recognition\n resolution to be most inopportune, inappropriate and\nby the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of Bosnia within\n premature. Pakistan would therefore vote against the\nits current borders, the cooperation of the Federal\n draft relaxing the sanctions. 240\nRepublic of Yugoslavia with the International Tribunal,\nthe protection of Bosnia’s safe area and the end of the The representative of Rwanda expressed his\nsiege of Sarajevo. His delegation therefore found it delegation’s support for the draft resolutions on ethnic\nvery difficult to support any draft resolution calling for cleansing and on strengthening the sanctions against\nthe partial lifting of sanctions at that moment.238 the Bosnian Serbs. While his delegation had no quarrel\n with the content of the draft resolution relaxing\n The representative of China stated that his\n sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\ndelegation would vote in favour of the draft resolutions\n (Serbia and Montenegro), it believed that its adoption\ncondemning violations of international humanitarian\n would not be opportune, because developments on the\nlaw and suspending aspects of the sanctions against the\n ground clashed with the Rwandan Government policy\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia, as both draft\n with regard to the universal principles of human rights,\nresolutions reflected China’s basic position on those\n__________________ and because previous Council resolutions had not been\n 236 Ibid., pp. 3-5 (Bosnia and Herzegovina); pp. 5-6\n implemented. His delegation would therefore abstain in\n (Croatia); pp. 6-8 (Malaysia); pp. 8-9 (Islamic Republic\n the voting of that draft resolution.241\n of Iran); pp. 9-10 (Senegal); pp. 10-11 (Albania); __________________\n pp. 12-13 (Egypt); pp. 13-14 (Turkey); pp. 18-20 239 Ibid., pp. 23-24.\n (Jordan); pp. 20-21 (Afghanistan); p. 21 (Bangladesh); 240 Ibid., pp. 26-27.\n and p. 22 (Tunisia). 241 Ibid., p. 27.\n 237 Ibid., pp. 11-12 (Germany on behalf of the European\n\n Union); and pp. 17-18 (Canada).\n 238 Ibid., pp. 22-23.\n\n\n\n\n792 07-63109\n"
[73] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n The first draft resolution 242 was then put to the 2. Strongly condemns all violations of international\nvote and was adopted unanimously as resolution 941 humanitarian law, including in particular the unacceptable\n(1994), which reads: practice of ethnic cleansing perpetrated in Banja Luka, Bijeljina\n and other areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n The Security Council, under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, and reaffirms that\n those who have committed or have ordered the commission of\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions,\n such acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such\n Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and acts;\npolitical independence of the Republic of Bosnia and\n 3. Reaffirms its support for the established principles\nHerzegovina,\n that all declarations and actions made under duress, particularly\n Taking note of the information provided by the Office of those regarding land and ownership, are null and void, and that\nthe United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the all displaced persons should be enabled to return in peace to\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross and that contained in their Former homes;\nother relevant reports, particularly regarding grave violations of\n 4. Demands that the Bosnian Serb authorities\ninternational humanitarian law affecting the non-Serb population\n immediately cease their campaign of ethnic cleansing;\nin those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under\nthe control of Bosnian Serb forces, 5. Demands that the Bosnian Serb party accord the\n Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the United\n Gravely concerned at the persistent and systematic\n Nations Protection Force, the Office of the United Nations High\ncampaign of terror perpetrated by the Bosnian Serb forces in\n Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of\nBanja Luka, Bijeljina and other areas of the Republic of Bosnia\n the Red Cross immediate and unimpeded access to Banja Luka,\nand Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, as\n Bijeljina and other areas of concern;\ndescribed in paragraphs 5 to 79 of the above-mentioned report,\n 6. Requests the Secretary-General to arrange, when\n Emphasizing that this practice of ethnic cleansing by the\n conditions permit, the deployment of troops of the Force and\nBosnian Serb forces constitutes a clear violation of international\n United Nations monitors to Banja Luka, Bijeljina and other\nhumanitarian law and poses a serious threat to the peace effort,\n areas of concern and to intensify his efforts in this regard;\n Expressing its deep concern over the continued denial by\n 7. Also requests the Secretary-General to report\nBosnian Serb forces of prompt and unimpeded access to the\n urgently to the Council on the implementation of the present\nSpecial Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former\n resolution;\nYugoslavia and the United Nations Protection Force to Banja\nLuka, Bijeljina and other areas under Bosnian Serb control as 8. Determines to consider any further steps that it may\ndemanded by the Security Council in its presidential statement deem necessary;\nof 2 September 1994,\n 9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n Recognizing that the International Tribunal has\njurisdiction over serious violations of international humanitarian The second draft resolution 243 was then put to the\nlaw committed in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia and that vote and was adopted by 14 votes to none, with\nthe Council remains committed to its previous resolutions on the 1 abstention (China) as resolution 942 (1994), which\nimportance of cooperation with the Tribunal, reads:\n Determined to put an end to the abhorrent and systematic The Security Council,\npractice of ethnic cleansing wherever it occurs and by\nwhomsoever it is committed, Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions,\n\n Determining that the situation in the Republic of Bosnia Affirming its commitment to a negotiated settlement of the\nand Herzegovina continues to constitute a threat to international conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, preserving the territorial\npeace and security, reiterating its determination to ensure the integrity of all the States there within their internationally\nsecurity of the Force and its freedom of movement in all its recognized borders,\nmissions and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the Expressing appreciation for the efforts undertaken by the\nCharter of the United Nations, representatives of the United Nations, the European Union, the\n 1. Reaffirms that all parties to the conflict are bound United States of America and the Russian Federation to assist\nto comply with their obligations under international the parties in reaching a settlement,\nhumanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions of Reaffirming the need for a lasting peace settlement to be\n12 August 1949; signed by all the Bosnian parties and implemented in good faith\n__________________ __________________\n 243 S/1994/1084.\n 242 S/1994/1083.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 793\n"
[74] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nby them, and condemning the decision by the Bosnian Serb (a) Any person in, or resident in, or any entity,\nparty to refuse to accept the proposed territorial settlement, including any commercial, industrial or public\n utility undertaking, in those areas of the Republic\n Viewing the measures imposed by the present resolution\n of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of\nand by its previous relevant resolutions as a means towards the\n Bosnian Serb forces, or\nend of producing a negotiated settlement to the conflict,\n (b) Any entity incorporated in or constituted\n Expressing its support for the continuing efforts of\n under the law of those areas of the Republic of\nMember States, in particular States in the region, to implement\n Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of\nits relevant resolutions,\n Bosnian Serb forces, as well as\n Determining that the situation in the Former Yugoslavia\n (ii) Economic activities carried on, after the date of\ncontinues to constitute a threat to international peace and\n adoption of the present resolution, within their\nsecurity,\n territories, by any person or entity, including those\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United identified by States for the purpose of the present\nNations, resolution, found to be acting for or on behalf of\n and to the benefit of any entity, including any\n A commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking\n 1. Expresses its approval of the proposed territorial in those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and\nsettlement for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb\nhas been put to the Bosnian parties as part of an overall peace forces, or any entity identified in subparagraph (i)\nsettlement; above,\n\n 2. Expresses its satisfaction that the proposed provided that:\nterritorial settlement has now been accepted in full by all except (a) States may authorize such activities to be carried on\nthe Bosnian Serb party; within their territories, having satisfied themselves on a case-by-\n 3. Strongly condemns the Bosnian Serb party for its case basis that the activities do not result in the transfer of\nrefusal to accept the proposed territorial settlement, and property or interests in property to any person or entity\ndemands that that party accept this settlement unconditionally described in subparagraph (i) (a) or (b) above;\nand in full; (b) Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the\n 4. Requires all parties to continue to observe the provision of supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and\nceasefire as agreed on 8 June 1994 and to refrain from all new foodstuffs notified to the Security Council Committee\nacts of hostility; established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning\n Yugoslavia, or commodities and products for essential\n 5. Declares its readiness to take all measures humanitarian needs approved by the Committee;\nnecessary to assist the parties to give effect to the proposed\nsettlement once it has been accepted by all parties, and in this 8. Decides that States shall revoke existing, and issue\nconnection encourages States, acting nationally or through no further, authorization under paragraph 7 above in respect of\nregional agencies or arrangements, to cooperate in an effective any person or entity violating the measures imposed by the\nmanner with the Secretary-General in his efforts to aid the present resolution or violating the measures imposed by earlier\nparties to implement the proposed settlement; relevant resolutions, where those violations have occurred after\n the date of adoption of the present resolution;\n B\n 9. Decides that States shall consider the term\n Resolved to reinforce and extend the measures imposed “economic activities” used in paragraph 7 above to mean:\nby its previous resolutions with regard to those areas of the\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of (a) All activities of an economic nature, including\nBosnian Serb forces, commercial, financial and industrial activities and transactions,\n in particular all activities of an economic nature involving the\n 6. Calls upon States to desist from any political talks use of or dealing in, with or in connection with property or\nwith the leadership of the Bosnian Serb party as long as that interests in property;\nparty has not accepted the proposed settlement in full;\n (b) The exercise of rights relating to property or\n 7. Decides that States shall prevent: interests in property;\n (i) Economic activities carried on, after the date of (c) The establishment of any new entity or change in\n adoption of the present resolution, within their management of an existing entity;\n territories by any entity, wherever incorporated or\n constituted, which is owned or controlled, directly 10. Decides that States shall consider the term\n or indirectly, by: “property or interests in property” used in paragraphs 7 and 9\n\n\n\n\n794 07-63109\n"
[75] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nabove to mean funds, financial, tangible and intangible assets, Bosnian Serb forces shall be prohibited, the only exceptions\nproperty rights and publicly and privately traded securities and being (a) telecommunications, postal services and legal services\ndebt instruments and any other financial and economic consistent with the present resolution and earlier relevant\nresources; resolutions, (b) services whose supply may be necessary for\n humanitarian or other exceptional purposes, as approved on a\n 11. Decides that States in which there are funds or\n case-by-case basis by the Committee established pursuant to\nother financial assets or resources of:\n resolution 724 (1991), and (c) services authorized by the\n (i) Any entity, including any commercial, industrial or Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n public utility undertaking in those areas of the\n 14. Decides that States shall prevent the entry into their\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the\n territories of:\n control of Bosnian Serb forces, or\n (a) The members of the authorities, including\n (ii) Any entity identified in paragraph 7 (i) above or\n legislative authorities, in those areas of the Republic of Bosnia\n any person or entity identified in paragraph 7 (ii)\n and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces and\n above,\n officers of the Bosnian Serb military and paramilitary forces,\nshall require all persons and entities within their territories and those acting on behalf of such authorities or forces;\nholding such funds or other financial assets or resources to\n (b) Persons found, after the adoption of the present\nfreeze them to ensure that neither they nor any other funds or\n resolution, to have provided financial, material, logistical,\nany other financial assets or resources are made available\n military or other tangible support to Bosnian Serb forces in\ndirectly or indirectly to or for the benefit of any of the above-\n violation of relevant resolutions of the Council;\nmentioned persons or entities, except:\n (c) Persons in or resident in those areas of the Republic\n (a) Payments made in connection with activities\n of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb\nauthorized in accordance with paragraph 7 above, or\n forces found to have violated or contributed to the violation of\n (b) Payments made in connection with transactions the measures set out in resolution 820 (1993) of 17 April 1993\nauthorized by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and and in the present resolution,\nHerzegovina with regard to persons or entities within its\n and requests that the Committee established pursuant to\nterritory,\n resolution 724 (1991) establish and maintain an updated list,\nprovided that States are satisfied that payments to persons based on information provided by States and competent regional\noutside their territories will be used for the purpose or in organizations, of the persons falling within this paragraph,\nconnection with the activities and transactions for which provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to\npermission is sought, and that in the case of payments made refuse entry into its territory to its own nationals; and provided\nunder exception (a) above, States may authorize such payments that the entry of a person included in the list into a particular\nonly after they are satisfied on a case-by-case basis that the State on a specified date may be authorized, for purposes\npayments do not result in the transfer of funds or other financial consistent with the pursuit of the peace process and with the\nassets or resources to any person or entity described in present resolution and earlier relevant resolutions, by the\nsubparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph 7 (i) above; Committee or, in the event of disagreement in the Committee, by\n the Council;\n 12. Decides that States shall ensure that all payments of\ndividends, interest or other income on shares, interest, bonds or 15. Decides to prohibit all commercial riverine traffic\ndebt obligations or amounts derived from an interest in, or the from entering ports of those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and\nsale or other disposal of, or any other dealing with, tangible and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces except\nintangible assets and property rights, accruing to: when authorized on a case-by-case basis by the Committee\n established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991), or by the\n (i) Any entity, including any commercial, industrial or Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for its\n public utility undertaking in those areas of the territory, or in case of force majeure;\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the\n control of Bosnian Serb forces, or 16. Decides that States shall require that all shipments\n of commodities and products destined for those areas of the\n (ii) Any entity identified in paragraph 7 (i) or any Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of\n person or entity identified in paragraph 7 (ii) Bosnian Serb forces be properly manifested and either be\n above, physically inspected by the Sanctions Assistance Missions or the\nare made only into frozen accounts; competent national authorities at loading to verify and seal their\n contents or be laden in a manner which permits adequate\n 13. Decides that the provision of services, both physical verification of the contents;\nfinancial and non-financial, to any person or body for the\npurposes of any business carried on in those areas of the 17. Decides that States shall, in notifying or submitting\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of applications to the Committee established pursuant to resolution\n\n\n\n07-63109 795\n"
[76] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n724 (1991) in respect of supplies intended strictly for medical Also welcoming the decision by the authorities of the\npurposes and foodstuffs and essential humanitarian supplies in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to\nrespect of those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and close the international border between the Federal Republic of\nHerzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, report for Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia\ninformation purposes to the Committee on the source of funds and Herzegovina with respect to all goods except foodstuffs,\nfrom which payment is to be made; medical supplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs,\n 18. Decides that States shall, in implementing the Further welcoming the decision by the authorities of the\nmeasures imposed by the present resolution, take steps to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to\nprevent the diversion of benefits to those areas of the Republic invite international assistance with regard to the passage of\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb supplies for essential humanitarian needs through the border\nforces from other places, in particular from the United Nations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nProtected Areas in Croatia; Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n 19. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the Noting in this regard the letter dated 19 September 1994\nnecessary assistance to the Committee established pursuant to from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the\nresolution 724 (1991) and to make the necessary arrangements Security Council, conveying a report from the Co-Chairmen of\nin the Secretariat for that purpose; the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the\n Former Yugoslavia on the establishment and commencement of\n 20. Decides that the provisions set forth in the present\n operations of a mission of the International Conference to the\nresolution do not apply to activities related to the United\n Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),\nNations Protection Force, the International Conference on the\nFormer Yugoslavia or the European Community Monitoring Calling upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of\nMissions; Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to maintain the effective\n closure of the border between the Federal Republic of\n 21. Decides to review the measures imposed by the\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia\npresent resolution whenever appropriate and in any event every\n and Herzegovina with respect to all goods except foodstuffs,\nfour months from the date of adoption of the present resolution,\n medical supplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs,\nand expresses its readiness to reconsider those measures if the\nBosnian Serb party accepts the proposed territorial settlement Noting that paragraph 9 of resolution 757 (1992) of\nunconditionally and in full; 30 May 1992 remains in force,\n 22. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United\nto consider immediately, whenever necessary, further steps to Nations,\nachieve a peaceful solution in conformity with relevant\nresolutions of the Council. 1. Decides that:\n (i) The restrictions imposed by paragraph 7 of\n The third draft resolution244 was then put to the\n resolution 757 (1992), paragraph 24 of resolution\nvote and was adopted by 11 votes in favour to 2 against 820 (1993) with regard to aircraft which are not\n(Djibouti, Pakistan), with 2 abstentions (Nigeria, impounded at the date of adoption of the present\nRwanda), as resolution 943 (1994), which reads: resolution and by other relevant resolutions which\n relate to the provision of goods and services, with\n The Security Council,\n respect to all civilian passenger flights to and from\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, the Belgrade airport carrying only passengers and\n personal effects and no cargo unless authorized\n Affirming its commitment to a negotiated settlement of the under the procedures of the Security Council\nconflict in the Former Yugoslavia, preserving the territorial Committee established pursuant to resolution 724\nintegrity of all the States there within their internationally (1991) concerning Yugoslavia;\nrecognized borders,\n (ii) The restrictions imposed by paragraphs 24 and 28\n Expressing its appreciation for the efforts of the of resolution 820 (1993) and by other relevant\nrepresentatives of the United Nations, the European Union, the resolutions which relate to the provision of goods\nUnited States of America and the Russian Federation to assist and services, with respect to the ferry service\nthe parties in reaching a settlement, between Bar in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n Welcoming the decision by the authorities of the Federal (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bari in Italy carrying\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to support the only passengers and personal effects and no cargo\nproposed territorial settlement for the Republic of Bosnia and unless authorized under the procedures of the\nHerzegovina which has been put to the Bosnian parties, Committee established pursuant to resolution 724\n__________________ (1991);\n 244 S/1994/1085.\n\n\n\n\n796 07-63109\n"
[77] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n (iii) The measures imposed by paragraph 8 (b) and (c) Speaking after the vote, the representative of the\n of resolution 757 (1992) concerning participation in Russian Federation stressed the importance of\n sporting events and cultural exchanges, operative paragraph 5 of resolution 943 (1994), which\nshall be suspended for an initial period of one hundred days provided that the Council would consider further steps\nfrom the day following the receipt by the Security Council of a to ease the sanctions in the light of further progress in\nreport from the Secretary-General that the Co-Chairmen of the the situation. Concerning resolution 942 (1994),\nSteering Committee of the International Conference on the tightening sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, the\nFormer Yugoslavia have certified that the authorities of the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are\n speaker stated that the purpose of that resolution was to\neffectively implementing their decision to close the border make the Bosnian Serbs recognize that there was no\nbetween the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and alternative to a political solution. He further stated that\nMontenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with his country deemed the policy of “ethnic cleansing” to\nrespect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and be repugnant and demanded its immediate cessation.\nclothing for essential humanitarian needs, and that arrangements Accordingly, his delegation had supported the adoption\nare in place pursuant to the decision of the authorities of the of the resolution that condemned the policy conducted\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to\ninvite international assistance with regard to the passage of\n by the Bosnian Serbs and noted, in particular, the\nsupplies for essential humanitarian needs through that border; provision of the resolution that condemned any “ethnic\n cleansing” of whatever origin, and whoever might\n 2. Invites the Committee established pursuant to perpetrate it. The Russian Federation also deemed\nresolution 724 (1991) to adopt appropriate streamlined\nprocedures for expediting its consideration of applications\n important the provisions contained in the resolutions\nconcerning legitimate humanitarian assistance, in particular adopted on the commitment to a settlement of the\napplications from the United Nations High Commissioner for conflict in the former Yugoslavia through negotiation,\nRefugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross; while maintaining the territorial integrity of all States\n 3. Requests that every thirty days the Secretary-\n there within the confines of their internationally\nGeneral submit to the Security Council for its review a report as recognized borders. 245\nto whether the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the The representative of the United States noted that\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia have\ncertified that the authorities of the Federal Republic of\n the resolutions just adopted aimed to pressure the\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are effectively Bosnian Serbs and to demonstrate the Council’s\nimplementing their decision to close the border between the determination to use “both carrots and sticks” to move\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the parties towards a negotiated settlement. In\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all preparing to ease sanctions against the Federal\ngoods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for Republic of Yugoslavia, the Council was\nessential humanitarian needs, and further requests the Secretary- acknowledging that its Government had taken an\nGeneral to report to the Council immediately if he has evidence,\nincluding from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of\n important step to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept\nthe International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, that the negotiated settlement. The United States continued\nthose authorities are not effectively implementing their decision to believe that Belgrade bore primary responsibility for\nto close the border; events in the former Yugoslavia over the preceding\n 4. Decides that if at any time the Secretary-General\n three years. While it welcomed the first indications that\nreports that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia might have\n(Serbia and Montenegro) are not effectively implementing their changed course, it would insist that that country\ndecision to close the border, the suspension of the measures comply with its commitment to keep the border closed.\nreferred to in paragraph 1 above shall terminate on the fifth The suspended sanctions would come into effect,\nworking day following the report of the Secretary-General, without the need for further Council action, if at any\nunless the Security Council decides to the contrary; time the international Mission was no longer able to\n 5. Decides to keep the situation closely under review confirm the border closure. The Government of the\nand to consider further steps with regard to measures applicable Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should not doubt the\nto the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) will of the United States to cancel the suspension of the\nin the light of further progress in the situation; sanctions if it believed that the border had been\n 6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. reopened. The people of Serbia and Montenegro should\n __________________\n 245 S/PV.3428, pp. 30-31.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 797\n"
[78] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nalso understand that further concrete steps towards therefore abstained in the vote on resolution 943\npeace would lead to additional easing of sanctions. The (1994).247\nUnited States urged Belgrade to recognize Croatia and\n The representative of Oman stated that, despite\nBosnia within their internationally recognized borders,\n the positions of both OIC and the Non-Aligned Group\nand to use its influence with the Croatian Serbs to push\n which advocated that submitting resolution 943 (1994)\nthem towards a settlement consistent with Croatia’s\n at that stage was premature, his delegation had voted in\nterritorial integrity. It would also insist that the Federal\n favour of resolution 943 (1994) in deference to the\nRepublic of Yugoslavia not be allowed to rejoin the\n wishes of the majority of members of the Council, and\nfamily of nations until it was in compliance with all\n in the hope that the resolution would help to resolve\nrelevant Council resolutions. Belgrade should\n the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nevertheless,\nunderstand that a decision to choose conflict would\n it stressed that the lifting of the sanctions must be\nstop limited sanctions relief and would lead to the\n subject to a “trial period”, in order to gauge the\nadoption of even tougher measures. Referring to\n peaceful intentions of the Federal Republic of\nresolution 941 (1994), the speaker noted that the\n Yugoslavia. Should there be no concrete progress, then\ncondemnation of ethnic cleansing was an integral part\n the measures in the resolution would become null and\nof efforts to end the conflict.246\n void and the situation would revert to its earlier\n The representative of Nigeria observed that it was status.248\nappropriate that resolution 941 (1994) had been\nadopted under Chapter VII, for the Council could not Decision of 30 September 1994 (3433rd\nbe indifferent to grave violations of international meeting): statement by the President\nhumanitarian law. Referring to resolution 942 (1994),\n At its 3433rd meeting, on 30 September 1994, the\nthe speaker stated that the Bosnian Serb leadership\n Council resumed its consideration of the situation in\nmust be made to realize that the only way to join other\n the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following\nmembers of the international community was to accept\n the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\na negotiated settlement. Nigeria called on the members\n representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\nof the international community, especially\n request, to participate in the discussion without the\nneighbouring States and the Federal Republic of\n right to vote. The President (Spain) then stated that,\nYugoslavia, to discharge their obligations under that\n after consultations among members of the Security\nresolution in order to ensure a complete and total\n Council, he had been authorized to make the following\nisolation of the Bosnian Serb political and military\n statement on behalf of the Council:249\nleadership. Referring to resolution 943 (1994), the\nspeaker noted that his delegation was uneasy with the The Security Council is deeply concerned at the\nloosening of sanctions against the Federal Republic of deteriorating security situation in the safe area of Sarajevo and\nYugoslavia, primarily due to its timing. If the Council elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has included\n increased levels of armed violence, deliberate attacks on United\nhad considered the draft resolution on easing the Nations Protection Force troops and on humanitarian flights,\nsanctions after it had received a report from the severe restrictions on public utilities and continued restriction of\nSecretary-General that the border was being effectively the flow of transport and communications. It notes that normal\nclosed, then some of Nigeria’s concerns would have life has not been fully restored to Sarajevo, as called for in its\nbeen addressed. The Council’s decision to loosen resolution 900 (1994) of 4 March 1994.\nsanctions when nothing had changed on the ground, The Council expresses concern at the deliberate\nhowever, might give the wrong impression. In addition, interruptions of utilities and communications to the civilian\na fundamental condition for the easing of the sanctions population in Sarajevo, as well as the extended period of closure\nshould have been an immediate and explicit of the Sarajevo airport to humanitarian flights and of the route\nrecognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its across that airport opened in cooperation with the Force\ninternationally recognized borders. Nigeria had following the agreement of 17 March 1994, as a result of the\n__________________ actions by the Bosnian Serb party. The Council calls upon the\n Bosnian Serb party not to interfere with the normal functioning\n 246 Ibid., pp. 33-34.\n __________________\n 247 Ibid., pp. 34-36.\n 248 Ibid., pp. 37-39.\n 249 S/PRST/1994/57.\n\n\n\n\n798 07-63109\n"
[79] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nof the Sarajevo airport. It further calls upon the Bosnian Serb At its 3454th meeting, on 8 and 9 November\nparty to cooperate with efforts to restore fully the flow of gas 1994, the Council included that letter in its agenda.\nand electricity to Sarajevo, to reopen all land routes to Sarajevo Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\nand, now and in the future, to refrain from impeding the normal\noperations of these and all other utilities and means of\n invited the representatives of Afghanistan, Albania,\ncommunication and transport. It calls upon all parties not to Algeria, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei\ninterfere with the supply of gas or electricity to the civilian Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Croatia,\npopulation. It reiterates its call to all parties, with the assistance Ecuador, Egypt, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras,\nof the United Nations, to achieve complete freedom of Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Latvia,\nmovement for the civilian population and for humanitarian Malaysia, Morocco, Nicaragua, Norway, the Republic\ngoods to, from and within Sarajevo, to remove any hindrance to of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Slovenia, the Sudan,\nsuch freedom of movement and to help restore normal life to the\ncity.\n Thailand, Tunisia and Turkey, at their request, to\n participate in the discussion without the right to vote.\n The Council condemns in particular the deliberate attack The Council also invited Ambassador Dragomir\non 22 September 1994 on troops of the Force in Sarajevo, just Djokic, at his request, to address the Council in the\none of a number of attacks which clearly suggest a deliberate\npattern. The Council also notes with alarm, and condemns\n course of its consideration of the item, and extended an\nwithout reservation, the reported statements of the Bosnian Serb invitation to Mr. Engin Ahmet Ansay, Permanent\nleadership that the Bosnian Serb party would target activities of Observer of OIC to the United Nations.\nthe Force in retaliation for the passage of a Council resolution\ntightening sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. It warns the\n The representative of Pakistan, speaking also as\nBosnian Serb leadership against any retaliatory action, whether the Chairman of the OIC Contact Group, noted that the\nagainst the Force or any other party and in that context OIC Foreign Ministers at their seventh extraordinary\nwelcomes efforts to support troops of the Force. session, held at Islamabad from 7 to 9 September 1994,\n The Council fully supports the efforts of the Force to\n had reiterated the inapplicability of the arms embargo\nassure compliance with measures designed by the international imposed by resolution 713 (1991) to Bosnia and\ncommunity to improve conditions in Sarajevo. It advises both Herzegovina and Croatia, and had called upon the\nparties, in particular the Bosnian Serbs, to comply with those Security Council to confirm that position. They had\nmeasures. further noted that should the Council not confirm that\n The Council strongly condemns any provocative actions position, then the OIC membership, along with other\nin Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina by States Members of the United Nations, would conclude\nwhomsoever committed, and demands immediate cessation of that members acting individually or collectively could\nsuch actions. provide the means of self-defence to the Government\n The Council encourages the Special Representative of the of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As far as Pakistan was\nSecretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia and the Force to concerned, it had consistently advocated that the\nexplore as a matter of priority proposals for the demilitarization inherent right of the Bosnian people to self-defence\nof Sarajevo. under Article 51 of the Charter should be restored\n The Council affirms its determination to remain seized of without delay. In that context, Pakistan welcomed the\nthe matter. United States recent initiative to lift the arms embargo\n and would extend its support to the early adoption of\n Deliberations of 8 and 9 November 1994 the draft resolution. At the same time, measures should\n (3454th meeting) be adopted by the Council to declare the entire 51 per\n cent of the territory allocated to the Muslim-Croat\n By a letter dated 3 November 1994 addressed to Federation a “safe area”. The Council should also\nthe President of the Security Council,250 the respond effectively to any further violations of its\nrepresentative of Pakistan requested an urgent meeting resolutions, particularly those concerning safe areas, by\nof the Security Council to consider the situation in the use of force and air strikes.251\nBosnia and Herzegovina in the light of resolution\n49/10, which had been adopted by the General The representative of France stated that the\nAssembly on the same date. international community would now be pursuing its\n efforts to overcome the obstinacy of the Bosnian Serbs,\n__________________\n __________________\n 250 S/1994/1248.\n 251 S/PV.3454, pp. 2-4.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 799\n"
[80] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nwho had rejected the peace plan presented by the The representative of the United Kingdom stated\nContact Group, and to encourage those who had that the continued intransigence of the Bosnian Serbs\napproved it to work towards an overall settlement. In represented by far the greatest obstacle on the path to\nthat regard, Belgrade was expected to recognize Bosnia peace in Bosnia. But the new readiness of Belgrade to\nand Herzegovina, to continue its support for the plan of back the Contact’s Group efforts and to isolate the\nthe Contact Group, and to have no political and Bosnian Serbs also offered an opportunity. What was\neconomic relations with the Bosnian Serbs, and to asked from Belgrade was that it took significant steps\napprove the plan of the International Conference on the and recognized Croatia and Bosnia, maintained its\nFormer Yugoslavia. With respect to the Bosnian Serbs, support for the Contact Group plan, continued its\nthere were two ways to bring them to accept the embargo against the Bosnian Serbs and threw its\nContact Group’s plan, through continued strict political weight behind a peace plan for Croatia as well. The\nand economic isolation or by confirming that the speaker further warned that the progress achieved so\nvarious communities would enjoy equal rights with far in the quest for peace would be endangered if the\nregard to the constitution. Addressing the question of arms embargo were to be lifted. The United Kingdom\nlifting the arms embargo against Bosnia and therefore could not support the draft resolution before\nHerzegovina, the speaker cautioned that if the embargo the Council. 254\nwere lifted, diplomatic efforts would be jeopardized. In\n The representative of Senegal argued that the\naddition, UNPROFOR would be exposed to the\n conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina had shown that\nconsequences of offensive military action and reprisals.\n sanctions, however effective, would not be sufficient to\nSuch a measure would lead to withdrawal, which\n stem the hostile inclinations of the aggressor. Senegal,\nwould mean the end of assistance and protection for\n therefore, believed that the adoption of the proposed\nmany peoples. Moreover, a lifting of the arms embargo\n draft resolution, lifting the arms embargo, could make\nwould intensify tensions between the communities of\n a decisive contribution to restoring the balance of\nBosnia and Herzegovina and the successor countries of\n power. Referring to General Assembly resolution\nthe former Yugoslavia.252\n 49/10, the speaker noted that the General Assembly\n The representative of the Russian Federation had urged the Council to fulfil its responsibility under\nexpressed concern at reports that the present military Article 24 of the Charter and to take appropriate steps\nescalation in Bosnia had resulted from continued to restore the sovereignty, political independence,\ndeliveries of arms to the Bosnian Government troops, territorial integrity and unity of Bosnia and\nin violation of resolution 713 (1993). Particularly Herzegovina. He noted that the measures proposed in\nalarming had been the use of the safe areas by those the draft resolution before the Council came in\nsame troops to carry out attacks. The Russian response to a renewed appeal by the General Assembly,\nFederation called on the Government of Bosnia and all most of whose members were of the view that the\nparties to reject attempts to solve the problem by non-application to the Bosnian and Croat parties of\nmilitary means. In addition, it was necessary to resolution 713 (1991) constituted not a potential threat\nintroduce certain changes into the concept and regime of wider conflict, but an easing of a burden which had\nof the safe areas, taking into account the Secretary- seriously hampered the ability of a Member of the\nGeneral’s recommendations contained in his report of United Nations to exercise its inherent right to\n9 May 1994. Referring to the question of lifting the individual and collective self-defence under Article 51\nembargo, the speaker expressed the belief that such a of the Charter. In conclusion, his delegation fully\nstep would be an extreme measure and should be supported the draft resolution before the Council. 255\nconsidered only after all political means had been\n The representative of Germany, speaking on\nexhausted. He argued that lifting the embargo would\n behalf of the European Union, stated that Belgrade\nhave negative consequences for the political process,\n could significantly improve the prospects for a\nfor the continued provision of humanitarian assistance,\n peaceful settlement by taking a number of steps,\nand for the activities of UNPROFOR.253\n including recognizing Bosnia and Croatia within their\n__________________ __________________\n 252 Ibid., pp. 4-6. 254 Ibid., pp. 7-9.\n 253 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 255 Ibid., pp. 16-17.\n\n\n\n\n800 07-63109\n"
[81] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\ninternationally recognized borders, continuing to international community had failed to secure peace in\nendorse the Contact Group plan, endorsing the plan for the region, it had a moral and political obligation to\nCroatia of the International Conference on the Former respond to the legitimate concern of the Bosnian\nYugoslavia, and continuing to implement the sanctions people for their very existence. His delegation noted\nagainst the Bosnian Serbs. Referring to the question of that the draft resolution provided for the deferral of\nlifting the arms embargo, the speaker stated that such a such lifting for a period of six months, which it\nstep must remain a last resort, to be used only once all believed to be a “judicious step”. It emphasized that\navenues for a political settlement had been the draft was not meant to lead to an intensified arms\nexhausted.256 struggle in Bosnia, but to bring armed hostilities to an\n end. The international community must exert more\n The representative of Slovenia recalled that the\n pressure on the Bosnian Serbs, and the Republic of\nembargo was imposed on the former Yugoslavia back\n Korea believed that the prospect of lifting the arms\nin 1991, when that former State still existed and had\n embargo was the most persuasive weapon against\nbeen extended to the successor States of the former\n “Serbian intransigence”.258\nYugoslavia in a specific situation in 1992. Since that\ntime almost everything had changed for each of the The representative of Croatia noted that the\nsuccessor States and a debate which would take into balance of power which was a prerequisite for a\naccount the new realities was long overdue. The political settlement and for a just and lasting peace in\nspeaker noted that while there were many reasons for Bosnia and Herzegovina, had not been achieved\nkeeping the arms embargo as a part of sanctions through the measures thus far taken by the\nimposed by the Council, until the conditions for lifting international community. The Council must now plan\nthese sanctions were fulfilled, there was a need to for new mechanisms that would impose peace such as\nrecognize the inapplicability of an arms embargo to the lifting of arms embargo against the Federation of\nthose engaged in legitimate self-defence. The entire Bosnia and Herzegovina. The lifting of the arms\nconcept of collective security was based upon embargo would be not a step towards war but a “leap\ncomplementarity of self-defence and international towards peace”, moving the region towards a new,\naction so as to provide effective protection of States’ desirable balance. Referring to the situation in Croatia,\nexistence and their territorial integrity and political the speaker welcomed the inclusion of a paragraph in\nindependence. He further contended that in the case of the preamble of the draft resolution before the Council\nhis country, there was no justification for continuing which called into question the continued application of\nthe arms embargo. Slovenia was not, and had never the arms embargo against Croatia. The speaker argued\nbeen, involved in an armed conflict that prompted the that since the draft resolution deferred the lifting of the\nimposition of that arms embargo. Therefore, it would arms embargo for six months, it was only logical to\nbe not only appropriate, but necessary for the Council make his Government, too, eligible for a lifting of the\nto declare that relevant paragraphs of resolutions 713 arms embargo in six months. 259\n(1991), 724 (1991), 727 (1992) and 762 (1992) no\n Mr. Djokic argued that calls for lifting the arms\nlonger applied.257\n embargo against the Bosnian Muslims and carrying out\n Referring to the question of lifting the arms air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs could only lead to\nembargo, the representative of the Republic of Korea an escalation of the conflict. Noting that the effort to\nstated that his delegation shared the apprehensions of resolve the crisis had been ineffective so far, he\nthose States who were concerned that lifting the contended that the urgent and unconditional lifting of\nembargo would aggravate the situation. For that all sanctions against the Federal Republic of\nreason, the Republic of Korea had abstained in the Yugoslavia would create the conditions for the\nvoting the previous year on General Assembly establishment of an early, just and lasting peace.\nresolution 48/88. In the most recent vote, however, on Yugoslavia was ready to accept any solution agreed to\nresolution 49/10, the Republic of Korea had registered by the warring parties, on the basis of full equality and\nan affirmative vote, with the view that as the respect for the legitimate rights of all three Bosnian\n__________________ __________________\n 256 Ibid., pp. 19-20. 258 Ibid., pp. 24-25.\n 257 Ibid., pp. 22-24. 259 Ibid., pp. 26-27.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 801\n"
[82] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\npeoples and it stood ready to recognize the former lifted if the Bosnian Serbs continued to reject the peace\nYugoslav republics once all outstanding issues had process should give them a “weighty” reason to accept\nbeen resolved. It was convinced that the Contact Group the Contact Group’s proposed territorial arrangements.\nplan was the only viable way to end the crisis and The United States was determined to proceed on a firm\nestablish a just and lasting solution and it called on all course. Debates in the Council and the General\nsides to cease immediately and unconditionally all Assembly had indicated that a strong majority of the\nmilitary activities and to abide strictly by the ceasefire United Nations membership supported lifting the arms\nagreement. 260 embargo against Bosnia.262\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina While several speakers expressed support to the\nquestioned what option was left to his country. If the United States draft resolution on the lifting of the arms\nchoice were between retaining UNPROFOR and the embargo 263 and a number of them called for the\nlifting of arms embargo, then his country would choose strengthening of UNPROFOR mandate, 264 others\nthe latter. The choice, however, might not be between opposed the lifting or expressed doubts about it, 265\none and the other. Rather, both options might be arguing that it would lead to the disintegration of\npossible. His Government believed that UNPROFOR UNPROFOR and that efforts should focused on a\nefforts could be supplemented by measures that political solution.\neffectively allowed the Bosnians to defend themselves\nby the lifting of the arms embargo or, through an Decision of 13 November 1994 (3456th\noverall peacemaking process. Noting that his country meeting): statement by the President\nhad made many concessions in the past, the\n By a letter dated 11 November 1994 addressed to\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina believed that\n the President of the Security Council,266 the\none more compromise had been made by asking the\n representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina transmitted a\nCouncil to lift the arms embargo and to defer the\n letter of the same date from the President of Bosnia\napplication of that decision for six months, to give the\n and Herzegovina. In that letter, the President reported\ninternational community and the Contact Group a last __________________\nopportunity to compel the Bosnian Serbs to accept the 262 S/PV.3454 (Resumption 2), pp. 68-70.\npeace plan.261 263 S/PV.3454, pp. 2-4 (Pakistan); p. 12 (Oman); p. 16\n\n The President, speaking in her capacity as the (Senegal); pp. 17-18 (Malaysia); pp. 18-19 (Turkey);\n pp. 20-21 (Brunei Darussalam); pp. 21-22 (Afghanistan);\nrepresentative of the United States, stated that her\n pp. 24-25 (Republic of Korea); pp. 25-27 (Croatia);\nGovernment had presented a draft resolution that pp. 27-28 (Bangladesh); pp. 28-30 (Islamic Republic of\nwould lift the arms embargo after six months if the Iran); pp. 30-31 (Algeria); S/PV.3454 (Resumption 1),\nBosnian Serbs had not yet agreed to a settlement. She pp. 36-43 (Bosnia and Herzegovina); pp. 44-46 (Jordan);\nargued that there were no grounds in justice or law for pp. 46-48 (Morocco); pp. 48-50 (Egypt); pp. 51-52\ndenying the Government of Bosnia the right to defend (Cambodia); pp. 52-53 (Nicaragua); pp. 53-54 (Albania);\nitself. Bosnia and Herzegovina had not attacked its and pp. 54-55 (Indonesia); and S/PV.3454\n (Resumption 2), pp. 58-59 (Sudan); pp. 59-60 (Tunisia);\nneighbours, supported international terrorism or\n pp. 63-64 (Guinea-Bissau); pp. 64-66 (OIC); p. 66\notherwise abused its responsibilities as a sovereign (Thailand); pp. 67-68 (Djibouti); and pp. 68-70 (United\nPower. The real question before the Council was States).\nwhether it would at long last translate words into 264 S/PV.3454, pp. 17-18 (Malaysia); pp. 18-19 (Turkey);\n\nactions, for it was only bold action that could provide and pp. 27-28 (Bangladesh); and S/PV.3454\nthe pressure necessary to end the war. The speaker (Resumption 2), pp. 64-66 (OIC).\n 265 S/PV.3454, pp. 4-6 (France); pp. 6-7 (Russian\nargued that, under the draft resolution, arms would not\n Federation); pp. 7-9 (United Kingdom); pp. 9-10 (Czech\nbegin to flow into Bosnia for a period of six months.\n Republic); pp. 10-12 (New Zealand); pp. 13-14 (Brazil);\nDuring that time, the capacity of the Bosnian Serbs to pp. 14-15 (Spain); pp. 19-20 (Germany on behalf of the\nwage war could be limited through tighter sanctions. European Union); pp. 31-34 (Yugoslavia); S/PV.3454\nMoreover, the prospect that the embargo would be (Resumption 1), pp. 43-44 (Norway, on behalf of the\n__________________ Nordic countries); p. 50 (Ecuador); and p. 56\n 260 Ibid., pp. 31-34. (Honduras); and S/PV.3454 (Resumption 2), pp. 61-62\n 261 S/PV.3454 (Resumption 1), pp. 36-43. (Canada); and pp. 62-63 (Bulgaria).\n 266 S/1994/1283.\n\n\n\n\n802 07-63109\n"
[83] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nthat the situation in and around the Bihac “safe area” among members of the Security Council, she had been\ncontinued to deteriorate, and that numerous attacks had authorized to make the following statement on behalf\nbeen launched by rebel Serbs from the United Nations of the Council:270\nProtected Areas, inflicting heavy casualties upon the The Security Council views with alarm the escalation in\ncivilian population. In view of the situation, he recent fighting in the Bihac area and the flow of refugees and\nrequested an emergency meeting of the Security displaced persons resulting from it. It strongly urges all parties\nCouncil. and others concerned to refrain from all hostile actions and to\n exercise the utmost restraint.\n By a letter dated 12 November 1994 addressed to\nthe President of the Security Council,267 the The Council condemns any violation of the international\nrepresentative of Croatia transmitted a letter of the border between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina. It demands that all parties and others\nsame date from the Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia. concerned, in particular the so called Krajina Serb forces, fully\nIn that letter, the Deputy Prime Minister reported that respect that border and refrain from hostile acts across it.\nthe situation in the United Nations Protected Areas and\nin Bosnia and Herzegovina had deteriorated to such an The Council calls upon all parties and others concerned to\n abstain from any action that could cause a further escalation in\nextent that it warranted decisive and immediate action the fighting.\nby the Security Council, UNPROFOR and NATO, and\nrequested that the Council, at an emergency meeting, The Council demands that all parties and others\nreview the overall situation in the area and consider the concerned immediately ensure, in cooperation with the United\n Nations Protection Force, unimpeded access for humanitarian\ndemands that had been elaborated in a letter dated supplies.\n11 November 1994 from the representative of Croatia\naddressed to the President of the Security Council.268 The Council expresses full support for the efforts of the\nThose demands included (a) the extension of the Force and calls on the parties to respect the safety and security\n of the Force, its unimpeded access to supplies and its freedom of\nexclusion zone regime in the occupied parts of movement.\nCroatian territory; and (b) the engagement of NATO\nforces in the occupied territories and the airspace of The Council emphasizes the significance of its resolutions\nCroatia, whenever Security Council and General on safe areas and demands that all concerned facilitate\n implementation of these resolutions, and in this connection\nAssembly resolutions were being violated. requests the Secretary-General to report as soon as possible on\n At its 3456th meeting, held on 13 November any further measures to stabilize the situation in and around the\n1994 in response to the requests contained in the safe area of Bihac, drawing on the experience of the Force in\n Bihac and the other safe areas.\nabove-mentioned letters, the Council included the\nletters in its agenda. Following the adoption of the\n Decision of 18 November 1994 (3460th\nagenda, the Council invited the representatives of\n meeting): statement by the President\nBosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request,\nto participate in the discussion without the right to At its 3460th meeting, on 18 November 1994, the\nvote. The President (United States) then drew the Council resumed its consideration of the item.\nattention of the members of the Council to several Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\ndocuments 269 and stated that, after consultations invited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n__________________ and Croatia, at their request, to participate in the\n 267 S/1994/1286. discussion without the right to vote. The President\n 268 S/1994/1285.\n (United States) drew the attention of the members of\n 269 Letter dated 9 November 1994 from the representative of\n the Council to several documents 271 and stated that,\n Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of __________________\n the Security Council (S/1994/1271); letter dated 270 S/PRST/1994/66.\n 11 November 1994 from the representative of Croatia 271 Letters dated 14, 14, 15 and 16 November 1994,\n addressed to the President of the Security Council\n respectively, from the representative of Bosnia and\n (S/1994/1285); and letter dated 12 November from the\n Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security\n representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to\n Council (S/1994/1289, S/1994/1292, S/1994/1294 and\n the President of the Security Council, transmitting a\n S/1994/1300); and letter dated 15 November 1994 from\n letter dated 11 November 1994 from the Minister for\n the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran\n Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to\n addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1994/1295).\n the President of the Security Council (S/1994/1287).\n\n\n\n07-63109 803\n"
[84] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nafter consultations among members of the Security mandate. Bosnia and Herzegovina supported all such\nCouncil, she had been authorized to make the efforts in keeping with its territorial integrity and\nfollowing statement on behalf of the Council:272 sovereignty and the interests of its citizens. Until the\n The Security Council condemns in the strongest possible\n Bosnian Serbs accepted the Contact Group plan and\nterms the attack on the safe area of Bihac by aircraft belonging until there was a comprehensive effort at peacemaking,\nto the so-called Krajina Serb forces, which involved the the safe areas concept would only be a secondary tool\ndropping of napalm and cluster bombs in south-west Bihac, in to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s responsibilities and\nclear violation of the status of Bihac as a safe area. This efforts at defence and peacemaking. Referring to the\nviolation is all the more grave because of the threat it poses to issue of Sarajevo, the speaker noted that his delegation\nthe United Nations Protection Force troops deployed in the safe favoured the demilitarization of that city, consistent\narea of Bihac.\n with the Contact Group plan. Bosnia and Herzegovina\n The Council also condemns the shelling by the so-called was prepared to evaluate options for other safe areas\nKrajina Serb forces from the United Nations Protected Areas as that would not undermine its territorial integrity or\na flagrant violation of the territorial integrity of the Republic of sovereignty.274\nBosnia and Herzegovina and relevant Council resolutions. It\ndemands that all parties and others concerned, in particular the The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nso-called Krajina Serb forces, cease immediately all hostile was adopted unanimously as resolution 959 (1994),\nactions across the international border between the Republic of which reads:\nCroatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n The Security Council,\n The Council further demands an immediate end to all\nmilitary activity which endangers the lives of the Force Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the\npersonnel deployed in the Bihac area and demands that all conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular\nparties and others concerned, in particular the so-called Krajina its resolutions 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993 and 836 (1993) of\nSerb forces, restore the freedom of movement of Force 4 June 1993,\npersonnel in and around the Bihac area, including their\n Reaffirming the need for a lasting peace settlement to be\nunimpeded access to supplies.\n signed by all the Bosnian parties and implemented in good faith\n The Council calls on all parties and others concerned to by them, and condemning the decision by the Bosnian Serb\nrefrain from any hostile action that could cause further party to refuse to accept the proposed territorial settlement,\nescalation in the fighting, and also calls on them to achieve\n Reaffirming also the independence, sovereignty and\nurgently a ceasefire in the Bihac area.\n territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n\n Decision of 19 November 1994 (3462nd Expressing special concern about the escalation in recent\n meeting): resolution 959 (1994) fighting in the Bihac pocket, including in, from and around the\n safe areas, and the flow of refugees and displaced persons\n At its 3462nd meeting, on 19 November 1994, resulting from it,\nthe Council resumed its consideration of the situation Bearing in mind the importance of facilitating the return\nin the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following of refugees and displaced persons to their homes,\nthe adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia Taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General of\n 11 March and 16 March 1994 and of his recommendations\nand Germany, at their request, to participate in the concerning the definition and implementation of the concept of\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The President safe areas in his report of 9 May 1994,\n(United States) then drew the attention of the Council\nmembers to the text of a draft resolution submitted by Recalling the statements by the President of the Security\n Council of 6 April, 30 June, 13 November and 18 November\nFrance, Germany, the Russian Federation, Spain, the 1994,\nUnited Kingdom and the United States. 273\n Reaffirming its previous calls on all parties and others\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina concerned to refrain from any hostile action that could cause\nstated that it was his delegation’s understanding that further escalation in the fighting and to achieve urgently a\nthe draft resolution was designed to facilitate the ceasefire in the Bihac area,\nefforts of UNPROFOR under its peacekeeping Reiterating the importance of maintaining Sarajevo, the\n__________________\n capital of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a united\n 272 S/PRST/1994/69. __________________\n 273 S/1994/1317.\n 274 S/PV.3462, pp. 2-3.\n\n\n\n\n804 07-63109\n"
[85] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\ncity and a multicultural, multi-ethnic and plurireligious centre, 8. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\nand noting in this context the positive contribution that\nagreement between the parties on the demilitarization of Speaking after the vote, the representative of\nSarajevo could make to this end, to the restoration of normal life New Zealand noted that, while his delegation had\nin Sarajevo and to achieving an overall settlement, consistent voted in favour of the resolution just adopted, it\nwith the peace plan of the Contact Group, nevertheless retained some reservations. Those\n Taking note of the communiqué on Bosnia and reservations stemmed from the belief that the safe\nHerzegovina issued on 30 July 1994 by the Troika of the areas had been restrictively implemented on a number\nEuropean Union and the foreign ministers of the Russian of occasions, contrary to the spirit and intention of\nFederation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993). Moreover, his\nIreland and the United States of America and, in particular, of delegation had reservations about many of the\ntheir commitment to strengthen the regime of safe areas, conclusions of the Secretary-General’s reports. New\n 1. Expresses its grave concern over the recent Zealand believed that any updating, as called for in\nhostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina; operative paragraph 5 of the resolution would, require\n 2. Condemns any violation of the international border some radical new thinking rather than simple updating.\nbetween the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and It further believed that the Contact Group plan had\nHerzegovina, and demands that all parties and others concerned, significantly changed the underlying parameters\nin particular the so-called Krajina Serb forces, fully respect the against which the concept of safe areas should be\nborder and refrain from hostile acts across it; reviewed. The Security Council had approved and\n 3. Expresses its full support for the efforts by the endorsed the Contact Group plan, but any proposals for\nUnited Nations Protection Force to ensure implementation of the defining the geographical scope of future demilitarized\nSecurity Council resolutions on safe areas; safe areas, if they were to meet with consensus in the\n 4. Calls upon all the Bosnian parties to respect fully Council, should envisage sufficiently large areas for\nthe status and functions of the Force and to cooperate with it in the population to lead a normal life. Moreover, the\nits efforts to ensure implementation of the Security Council overall framework for such future demilitarized safe\nresolutions on safe areas, and demands that all parties and others areas should reinforce, not undermine, the areas\nconcerned show maximum restraint and put an end to all hostile envisaged in the Contact Group plan. 275\nactions in and around the safe areas in order to ensure that the\nForce can carry out its mandate in this regard effectively and\nsafely;\n Decision of 26 November 1994 (3466th\n meeting): statement by the President\n 5. Requests the Secretary-General to update his\nrecommendations on modalities of the implementation of the By a letter dated 25 November 1994 addressed to\nconcept of safe areas and to encourage the Force, in cooperation the President of the Security Council,276 the\nwith the Bosnian parties, to continue the efforts to achieve representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina requested an\nagreements on strengthening the regimes of safe areas taking emergency meeting of the Council, in view of the\ninto account the specific situation in each case, and recalls its continuing attacks on, and occupation of, the Bihac\nrequest to the Secretary-General made in the statement by the\nPresident of the Security Council of 13 November 1994 to report\n safe area, by the so-called Bosnian/Croatian Serb\nas soon as possible on any further measures to stabilize the forces.\nsituation in and around the safe area of Bihac; At its 3466th meeting, held on 26 November\n 6. Further requests the Secretary-General and the 1994 in response to the request contained in the above-\nForce to intensify efforts aimed at reaching agreement with the mentioned letter, the Council included that letter in its\nBosnian parties on the modalities of demilitarization of agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\nSarajevo, bearing in mind the need for the restoration of normal Council invited the representatives of Bosnia and\nlife to the city and for free access to and from the city by land\nand air and the free and unimpeded movement of people, goods\n Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate\nand services in and around the city in line with its resolution 900 in the discussion without the right to vote. The\n(1994), particularly paragraph 2 thereof; President (United States) drew the attention of the\n __________________\n 7. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the 275 Ibid., pp. 5-6.\nimplementation of the present resolution by 1 December 1994; 276 S/1994/1342.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 805\n"
[86] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nmembers of the Council to a number of documents 277 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of\nand stated that, after consultations among members of Croatia.\nthe Security Council, she had been authorized to make The Council condemns violations of the international\nthe following statement on behalf of the Council:278 border between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina by the so-called Krajina Serb forces\n The Security Council reiterates its deep concern over the\n and others concerned in the Bihac region. It demands that all\ndeteriorating situation in the Republic of Bosnia and\n hostile acts across that international border cease immediately,\nHerzegovina, particularly the Bihac region and especially in the\n and also demands that all so-called Krajina Serb forces\nsafe area of Bihac. It condemns in the strongest possible terms\n withdraw immediately from the territory of the Republic of\nall the violations of the safe area of Bihac by whomsoever\n Bosnia and Herzegovina.\ncommitted, in particular the flagrant and blatant entry into the\nsafe area by the Bosnian Serb forces. It also notes with concern The Council reiterates its full support for the proposed\nthe hostilities around Velika Kladusa. It demands that all parties territorial settlement for the Republic of Bosnia and\nand others concerned agree to and implement an immediate and Herzegovina which has been put by the Contact Group to the\nunconditional ceasefire in the Bihac region, in particular in and parties as part of an overall peace settlement. The Council\naround the safe area of Bihac. It calls on all parties to intensify reiterates its condemnation of the Bosnian Serb party’s refusal to\nnegotiations for a ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities accept the proposed territorial settlement and demands that that\nthroughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and party accept it unconditionally and in full.\nHerzegovina in pursuit of the territorial settlement for the\n The Council will monitor compliance with the terms of\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina proposed by the Contact\n the present statement and react appropriately.\nGroup as part of an overall peace settlement.\n The Council expresses its full support for the continued Decision of 29 November 1994 (3471st meeting):\nefforts by United Nations personnel to achieve a ceasefire in the statement by the President\nBihac area, as well as for the efforts of the United Nations\nProtection Force to implement its mandate to deter attacks At its 3471st meeting, on 29 November 1994, the\nagainst the safe areas. The Council insists on the withdrawal of Council resumed its consideration of the item.\nall Bosnian Serb military forces from the Bihac safe area and on Following the adoption of the agenda, the President\nthe need to ensure full respect by all parties of the safe areas,\nparticularly for the benefit of the civilian population. The\n (United States) drew the attention of the members of\nCouncil calls on all parties and others concerned fully to the Council to several documents 279 and stated that,\ncooperate with these efforts. The Council underlines the terms of after consultations among members of the Security\nresolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, which enable the Force to Council, she had been authorized to make the\ncarry out its mandate in relation to safe areas. following statement on behalf of the Council:280\n The Council commends the Force, including those of its The Security Council reiterates its concern over the\npersonnel serving in the Bihac region, in particular the continuing conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nBangladeshi troops, for the important contributions they are including in the Bihac region and in particular in and around the\nmaking under the most difficult conditions. It calls on the parties safe area of Bihac. It remains concerned over the blatant\nand all others concerned to ensure freedom of movement for violation of the Bihac safe area. The Council remains\npersonnel of the Force and the Office of the United Nations determined fully to support efforts to negotiate a peaceful\nHigh Commissioner for Refugees and access to necessary resolution of that conflict consistent with its previous\nsupplies for the Force and the civilian population throughout the resolutions and the proposals of the Contact Group.\n__________________\n 277 Letters dated 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 26 and 26 November\n The Council expresses its full support for the efforts of\n United Nations officials to stabilize the situation in and around\n 1994, respectively, from the representative of Bosnia and\n the safe area of Bihac. It takes note with satisfaction of the\n Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security\n proposal put to the parties by United Nations officials for an\n Council (S/1994/1319, S/1994/1325, S/1994/1328,\n immediate and unconditional ceasefire in the Bihac region to be\n S/1994/1343, S/1994/1346, S/1994/1347 and\n followed by a ceasefire throughout the territory of the Republic\n S/1994/1348); letter dated 22 November 1994 from the\n of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the interposition of the United\n representative of Croatia addressed to the President of\n Nations Protection Force in the Bihac safe area, a complete\n the Security Council (S/1994/1327); letter dated __________________\n 22 November 1994 from the representative of Yugoslavia\n 279 Letters dated 26 and 28 November 1994 from the\n addressed to the President of the Security Council\n (S/1994/1329); and letter dated 25 November 1994 from representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to\n the representative of the Russian Federation addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/1348 and\n the Secretary-General (S/1994/1345). S/1994/1351).\n 280 S/PRST/1994/74.\n 278 S/PRST/1994/71.\n\n\n\n\n806 07-63109\n"
[87] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\ndemilitarization of the safe area involving the withdrawal from Under the draft resolution, in its preambular part,\nit by all military forces and opening corridors for humanitarian the Council, inter alia, would have: expressed concern\nrelief. The Council welcomes the acceptance by the Bosnian about the continuing threat to international peace and\nGovernment of this proposal and calls on the Bosnian Serb party\nalso to accept it.\n security posed by the conflict in Bosnia and\n Herzegovina and the situation in the United Nations\n The Council welcomes the impending visit of the Protected Areas in Croatia, and at the military activities\nSecretary-General to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It by the local Serb paramilitary forces within the United\ndemands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully\nwith the Secretary-General’s efforts to stabilize the situation in\n Nations Protected Areas in Croatia against Bosnia and\nand around the safe area of Bihac and throughout the territory of Herzegovina and the Bihac safe area. In the operative\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and ensure the security part of the draft resolution, the Council, inter alia,\nof the Force as it implements its mandate. would have (i) reconfirmed that the requirements of all\n relevant Security Council resolutions, including in\n Decision of 2 December 1994 (3475th meeting): particular paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993) and\n rejection of a draft resolution resolution 943 (1994), should be strictly applied in\n respect of all goods crossing the border between the\n At its 3475th meeting, on 2 December 1994, the\n Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the situation in\n Herzegovina, including goods destined for the United\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following\n Nations Protected Areas in Croatia; and (ii) demanded\nthe adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\n that the provisions of paragraph 12 of resolution 820\nrepresentatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,\n (1993) be applied strictly and in full on the\nEgypt and Turkey, at their request, to participate in the\n international border between Croatia and the Federal\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The President\n Republic of Yugoslavia, and on the international border\n(Rwanda) then drew the attention of the Council\n between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in\nmembers to the text of a draft resolution submitted by\n regard to the import, export, and trans-shipment of all\nBosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Djibouti, Egypt,\n commodities with the exception of essential\nNigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Rwanda and Turkey, 281 and\n humanitarian supplies, including medical supplies and\nto a number of other documents. 282\n foodstuffs distributed by international humanitarian\n__________________ agencies.\n 281 S/1994/1358.\n 282 Letters dated 2 November and 1 December 1994 from The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the contended that the need for the draft resolution had\n Security Council, transmitting the reports of the been brought about not only because resolution 820\n Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the (1993), and specifically paragraph 12 of that\n International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, resolution, had not been implemented, but also because\n concerning the operations of the International the monitoring Mission of the International Conference\n Conference’s mission to the Federal Republic of\n on the Former Yugoslavia itself had facilitated the\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (S/1994/1246 and\n S/1994/1372); letter dated 2 December 1994 from the\n violation of that paragraph, as indicated in the\n Secretary-General addressed to the President of the 2 November report of the International Conference’s\n Security Council, transmitting the report of the Co-Chairmen. It was unfortunate that because of an\n Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the absence of will on the part of UNPROFOR command\n International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on to implement Council resolutions, the Council had, for\n the conclusion of an Economic Agreement between the the second time in as many weeks, to consider\n Croatian Government and the Serb local authorities\n mandates already in existence. Nevertheless, the\n (S/1994/1375); letter dated 25 November 1994 from the\n representative of Pakistan addressed to the President of\n Bosnian delegation would welcome the draft\n the Security Council (S/1994/1355); letter dated resolution, as it sent a message that strategic resources\n 28 November 1994 from the representative of Yugoslavia such as fuel could not be used for the pursuit of war,\n addressed to the President of the Security Council violations of international law, nor for the benefit of\n (S/1994/1361); and letters dated 30 November 1994 the Bosnian Serbs. The draft resolution would also help\n from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to reinforce the importance of the delivery of\n addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1994/1364) and\n the President of the Security Council (S/1994/1366).\n\n\n\n07-63109 807\n"
[88] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nhumanitarian aid. Failure to adopt the draft resolution, incentives nor disincentives. It was Nigeria’s view that\nhowever, would signify an evasion of responsibility. 283 the draft would not negatively affect the economic\n agreement, but would facilitate efforts on the ground,\n The representative of Croatia stated that his\n such as the attempts of the Contact Group to gain the\ndelegation believed that the draft resolution would send\n acceptance of the peace plan by the Bosnian Serbs. 285\nthe message that the international community was\nwilling to take steps to minimize the suffering of the The representative of China, while noting that his\ncivilian population in the region. Contending that the delegation understood the concern of the sponsors of\nSecurity Council had not been addressing adequately the draft resolution over the worsening situation in\nthe violation of the border between Croatia and Bosnia Bosnia and Herzegovina, stated that it could not agree\nand Herzegovina, the speaker stated that the result was to invoking Chapter VII of the Charter for sanctions in\nthe promotion of a de facto unification of the local the region of the former Yugoslavia. China believed\nCroatian Serb and Bosnian Serb parties, into a single that such a step would only further aggravate the\nmilitary and territorial entity. The draft resolution confrontation and would not be conducive to a final,\nwould dispel any possibility of such unification by comprehensive political solution to the problems in the\nreinforcing principles already established in resolution region of the former Yugoslavia. Based on its stated\n820 (1993). Moreover, the draft would send a message position on resolution 820 (1993), China would have\nthat strategic resources, such as fuel, directed to the difficulties with regard to the portion of the draft\nlocal Croatian Serb party, could not be used for the resolution that sought to reaffirm the relevant elements\nbenefit of the Bosnian Serbs, nor by the local Croatian of resolution 820 (1993). The Chinese delegation\nSerb party to violate the territorial integrity of Bosnia would therefore abstain in the voting on the draft\nand Herzegovina, and that arrangements to supply the resolution.286\nCroatian Serb party must cease unless there had been\n The representative of the Russian Federation\napproval by the Government of Croatia. Noting that\n expressed regret that the draft resolution had been\nsome delegations had expressed the view in prior\n brought to the vote. It was his delegation’s view that\nconsultations that the draft resolution would negatively\n tightening restrictions against the Krajina and Bosnian\naffect the economic reintegration agreement between\n Serbs would in fact lead to a “tightening of screws” in\nthe Government of Croatia and the local Croatian Serb\n the implementation of resolution 820 (1993), whose\nparty, the speaker argued that, on the contrary, the draft\n basic purpose had been to strengthen the sanctions\nresolution would promote the implementation of the\n against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The\nagreement. The implementation of the agreement\n speaker argued that there could hardly have been a\nwould only be possible when the borders were sealed\n more untimely moment for the submission of the draft\nand the local Croatian Serb party had decided to\n resolution, given that the Government of the Federal\ncooperate with the Government of Croatia to satisfy its\n Republic of Yugoslavia had begun to cooperate with\neconomic and humanitarian needs. Thus, the adoption\n international efforts, such as those of the Contact\nof the draft resolution would give political support to\n Group, had unconditionally supported the territorial\nthe implementation of the agreement.284\n settlement plan, had closed its border to all prohibited\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of deliveries of goods to the Bosnian Serbs, and was\nNigeria noted that the primary objective of the draft cooperating with the mission of the International\nresolution was to reaffirm and clarify the provisions of Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. The Russian\nprevious resolutions on the movement of Federation was therefore of the opinion that the\nnon-humanitarian goods across the international positive approach of the Federal Republic of\nborders in the areas of conflict in the former Yugoslavia deserved further encouragement, inter alia\nYugoslavia. The draft would not create new measures. by suspending the applicability of resolution 820\nRather, it would strengthen the implementation of the (1993). Accordingly, it had no choice but to vote\nrelevant resolutions already adopted. Nigeria also against the draft resolution.287\nbelieved that the draft would create neither new __________________\n__________________\n 285 Ibid., p. 7.\n 283 S/PV.3475, pp. 2-4.\n 286 Ibid., pp. 9-10.\n 284 Ibid., pp. 4-5.\n 287 Ibid., pp. 10-11.\n\n\n\n\n808 07-63109\n"
[89] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and resulting in one death and injuries to four other Bangladeshi\nreceived 13 votes in favour to 1 against (Russian personnel.\nFederation), with 1 abstention (China), and was not The Council expresses profound regret at the casualties\nadopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent suffered by the United Nations peacekeepers as a result of this\nmember of the Council. unprovoked and dastardly attack. It wishes to convey its deep\n condolences to the Government of Bangladesh as well as to the\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the families of the affected soldiers.\nUnited States stated that the draft resolution would\n The Council endorses the protest that the Force has made\nhave reaffirmed decisions already taken by the to the Abdic forces and to the local Serb authorities in Knin, and\nCouncil. It would have addressed a serious discrepancy its warning to the authorities in Pale.\nbetween the requirements of resolution 943 (1994) and\nactual practice, and more specifically the The Council is outraged at this incident of direct attack on\n the Force personnel and demands that such attacks do not recur.\ntrans-shipment of prohibited goods from the Federal It warns the perpetrators of the attack that their heinous act of\nRepublic of Yugoslavia through Bosnia to the United violence carries corresponding individual responsibility.\nNations Protected Areas in Croatia. The draft’s failure\nto pass was regrettable, but that did not change the fact Decision of 6 January 1995 (3486th meeting):\nthat a strict regime of economic measures against the statement by the President\nBosnian Serbs was already embodied in binding\nCouncil resolutions. The United States would continue At its 3486th meeting, on 6 January 1995, the\nits efforts to ensure the firm application of those Council resumed its consideration of the item.\nmeasures, in order to persuade the Bosnian Serbs that Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\nacceptance of the Contact Group plan was in their best invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\ninterests and rejection was not.288 at his request, to participate in the discussion without\n the right to vote. The President (Argentina) drew the\n Decision of 11 December 1994 (3478th meeting): attention of the members of the Council to several\n statement by the President documents 291 and stated that, after consultations\n among members of the Security Council, he had been\n At its 3478th meeting, on 11 December 1994, the authorized to make the following statement on behalf\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item. of the Council:292\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council\ninvited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina The Security Council welcomes the agreements between\n the Bosnian parties on a ceasefire and on a complete cessation of\nand Croatia, at their request, to participate in the hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The President on 23 and 31 December 1994. It commends the efforts of all\n(Rwanda) then drew the attention of the members of who worked to achieve them.\nthe Council to a letter dated 12 December 1994 from\n The Council stresses the importance it attaches to\nthe representative of Bangladesh addressed to the immediate and full compliance with the agreements. It attaches\nPresident of the Security Council289 and stated that, the highest priority at this juncture to the timely completion of\nafter consultations among members of the Security the various steps envisaged in the agreement on a complete\nCouncil, he had been authorized to make the following cessation of hostilities. It looks to the parties and others\nstatement on behalf of the Council:290 concerned to cooperate fully with the United Nations Protection\n Force in their implementation. The Council calls upon all forces\n The Security Council strongly condemns the deliberate __________________\nattack on Bangladeshi United Nations peacekeepers on 291 Letter dated 6 January 1995 from the Secretary-General\n12 December 1994 in Velika Kladusa, in the region of Bihac in\n addressed to the President of the Council, transmitting\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The attacked personnel\n the text of the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement,\nof the United Nations Protection Force were travelling in an\n signed on 23 December 1994, and the Agreement on\narmoured personnel carrier, unmistakably carrying clear United\n Complete Cessation of Hostilities, signed on\nNations markings. It was hit by a wire guided anti tank missile\n__________________ 31 December 1994 (S/1995/8); report of the Secretary-\n General pursuant to resolution 959 (1994)\n 288 Ibid., p. 11.\n (S/1994/1389); and letter dated 27 December 1994 from\n 289 S/1994/1414.\n the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed\n 290 S/PRST/1994/79.\n to the President of the Security Council (S/1994/1452).\n 292 S/PRST/1995/1.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 809\n"
[90] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nto cease fighting around Bihac. It supports efforts in train to transmitting a note by the OIC Contact Group\nstrengthen the Force, and encourages Member States to make concerning the report of the Co-Chairmen.\navailable the personnel and equipment needed for the Force to\nsupervise and monitor the agreements. The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n The Council will continue its consideration of all aspects\n noting that the draft resolution before the Council\nof the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the report of the would extend, for a further 100 days, the suspension of\nSecretary-General of 1 December 1994. certain aspects of the sanctions against the Federal\n Republic of Yugoslavia contained in resolution 943\n The Council deems it imperative to intensify efforts under\nthe auspices of the Contact Group to achieve an overall\n (1994), pointed out that none of the objectives sought\nsettlement on the basis of the acceptance of the Contact Group by that resolution had been realized. Moreover, there\npeace plan as a starting point. It will give its full support to such had been counter-productive consequences due to the\nefforts. fact that mechanisms established to monitor the border\n and implement resolution 943 (1994) had been flawed,\n Decision of 12 January 1995 (3487th meeting): enabling the transport of fuel that allowed the Croatian\n resolution 970 (1995) and Bosnian Serbs to carry out aggression against the\n Bihac region and to pose a threat to UNPROFOR\n By a letter dated 4 January 1995 addressed to the\n personnel. Nevertheless, Bosnia and Herzegovina\nPresident of the Security Council, 293 the Secretary-\n welcomed the elements of the draft resolution that\nGeneral transmitted the report of the Co-Chairmen of\n were designed to strengthen the effectiveness of the\nthe Steering Committee of the International Conference\n border monitoring mission. It also welcomed the\non the Former Yugoslavia, concerning the operations of\n clarification requiring that the trans-shipment of goods\nthe Conference’s mission to the Federal Republic of\n or personnel through or to Bosnia and Herzegovina and\nYugoslavia. The report contained the certification\n Croatia be approved by the respective Government.\nreferred to in paragraph 3 of resolution 943 (1994). 294\n Bosnia and Herzegovina’s endorsement of the draft\n At its 3487th meeting, on 12 January 1995, the was, however, tempered by the following. First, the\nCouncil included that letter in its agenda. Following monitoring border mission should be provided with\nthe adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the adequate resources and a command structure that\nrepresentatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, would genuinely seal and monitor the border. Second,\nEgypt, Malaysia, Pakistan and Turkey, at their request, the Council should not reward Belgrade with a further\nto participate in the discussion without the right to suspension of aspects of the sanctions regime unless it\nvote. The Council also invited Ambassador Dragomir had recognized the sovereignty and territorial integrity\nDjokic, at his request, to address the Council in the of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the other former\ncourse of the subsequent discussion. The President Yugoslav Republics. Third, the cross-border aggression\n(Argentina) then drew the attention of the Council being carried out by Croatian Serbs must stop.297\nmembers to the text of a draft resolution submitted by\n The representative of Croatia stated that the draft\nthe Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy and the\n resolution before the Council contained elements that\nUnited Kingdom295 as well as to a letter dated\n would be of great benefit to the peace process in\n11 January 1995 from the representative of Morocco\n Croatia and in the region in general. He noted that\naddressed to the President of the Security Council,296\n__________________ paragraph 3 of the draft extended the Yugoslav-\n 293 S/1995/6.\n Bosnian border blockade so that it would affect\n 294 In paragraph 3 of resolution 943 (1994), the Council Croatia, meaning that Belgrade would not be able to\n requested that every 30 days the Secretary-General send non-humanitarian assistance to the occupied\n submit to the Council a report on whether the territories of Croatia via the Bosnia and Herzegovina\n Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee had certified border, without consequences. Furthermore, should the\n that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was effectively Belgrade authorities choose to violate paragraph 12 of\n implementing its decision to close the border between resolution 820 (1993), in that way, the Council would\n the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and\n be left with no alternative but to reinstate the sanctions\n Herzegovina with respect to all goods except for\n humanitarian needs.\n suspended by resolution 943 (1994). The speaker,\n 295 S/1995/21.\n __________________\n 296 S/1995/30. 297 S/PV.3487, pp. 2-4.\n\n\n\n\n810 07-63109\n"
[91] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nhowever, pointed out that the extension of the border had tried different means of exerting pressure on the\nblockade was incomplete, because the border between “aggressor responsible for the outbreak and\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Sector East in continuation of the military confrontation in Bosnia\nthe United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia could and Herzegovina”. But the Serbian party remained\nstill be used by Belgrade without consequences. He intransigent. It was therefore necessary for the\ncontended that a complete blockade of the border international community to continue to exert pressure,\nbetween Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia would including through the application of sanctions, until the\nfurther the peace process in Croatia. Noting that a Bosnian Serb party engaged with the peace plan. Egypt\npolitical solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina did not called upon the Council to adopt a draft resolution,\nappear likely in the near future, he argued that by under which international military observer forces\naddressing the situation in Croatia first, the would be deployed along the borders between Bosnia\ninternational community could help Bosnia and and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of\nHerzegovina, in the short term, by reallocating the Yugoslavia, in order to ensure effective monitoring and\nnecessary additional UNPROFOR resources into that the cutting of the supply line between Serbia and\ncountry, and, in the long term, by creating conditions Montenegro and the Bosnian Serbs. 300\nof balance favourable to continuing with the Contact\n The representative of Pakistan expressed the\nGroup Plan. The draft resolution was a small but\n belief that it was essential that the resolutions of the\nimportant step in that direction. 298\n Security Council be effectively enforced, in particular\n The representative of Turkey said that his those authorizing the use of force and air strikes. The\ndelegation had serious reservations about the draft lack of resolve to implement those resolutions had\nresolution. It believed that the monitoring mechanism emboldened the Serbs in their “intransigence” and had\nestablished under resolution 943 (1994) was not enabled them to continue to assault the sovereignty and\neffective. Despite the certification provided by the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Pakistan reiterated the decision of the Seventh Islamic\nmission monitoring the border, independent Summit Conference, held in Casablanca from 11 to\ninternational sources acknowledged that the border 15 December 1994, which had expressed opposition to\ncontinued to be violated, with the transport of strategic the lifting or easing of sanctions against Serbia and\nmaterial and personnel. It was therefore extremely Montenegro until it had satisfied the following\nimportant that the monitoring mechanisms be conditions: first, the recognition of Bosnia and\nstrengthened and the number of monitors increased. Herzegovina within its internationally recognized\nNoting that the mission had approved fuel shipments to borders; second, the acceptance of United Nations\nthe Croatian Serbs, the speaker contended that such a forces on the border to undertake effective monitoring;\nmeasure violated the territorial integrity and and third, the implementation of the Contact Group\nsovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, as peace plan, including the full withdrawal from all\nwell as resolution 820 (1993). He further argued that occupied territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina.301\nthe fuel shipments had enabled the Croatian Serbs to\n Mr. Djokic contended that his Government had\nundertake aggression against the safe area of Bihac.\n fulfilled all the obligations and met all the conditions\nTurkey hoped that the adoption of the draft resolution\n set by the relevant Security Council resolutions.\nwould contribute to the termination of such shipments\n Therefore the decision by the Council to extend the\nand it looked forward to the strengthening of\n partial suspension of sanctions for another 100 days\nmechanisms for deterring and reporting violations. 299\n and to put forward new conditionalities and restrictions\n The representative of Egypt was of the view that was very disappointing. References in the draft\nthe Council should look into taking immediate, firm resolution to the export of products from the Federal\nand effective measures to implement earlier resolutions Republic of Yugoslavia to the Krajina Serbs had\non Bosnia and Herzegovina before adopting new ones nothing to do with the primary objective of the closure\non the subject. He recalled that for years the Council of the border, which was to influence the Bosnian\n__________________ __________________\n 298 Ibid., pp. 4-6. 300 Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n 299 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 301 Ibid., pp. 8-9.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 811\n"
[92] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nSerbs to accept the Contact Group’s plan. Rather, it negotiated solution. In addition, mutual recognition\nrepresented an attempt to impose new conditions on the between all the States of the former Yugoslavia was an\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia. The draft resolution urgent political necessity.303\nwas not a mere extension of the partial suspension of\n The representative of the Czech Republic was of\nthe sanctions but rather called for the cessation of\n the view that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was\npractically all economic relations between the Federal\n cooperating with the International Conference on the\nRepublic of Yugoslavia and the Krajina Serbs.\n Former Yugoslavia mission. His delegation had seen no\nMoreover, it sought to exact an indirect recognition of\n evidence that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nCroatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was\n would have condoned, let alone participated in, the\nunacceptable before a political solution had been\n violations of the border regime that the mission had\naccepted by all parties to the conflict. The speaker\n detected. The situation on the border was far more\nfurther argued that, during the preceding 100 days, the\n favourable now than it had been when resolution 943\nlimited suspension of sanctions had not been entirely\n (1994) was adopted. That was why his delegation saw\nfulfilled. Despite a call by resolution 943 (1994) to the\n no reason to change the regime that resolution had\nsanctions Committee to adopt streamlined procedures\n introduced. His delegation would have agreed to an\nfor expediting its consideration of applications for\n extension even longer than 100 days, but had no\nexemptions for legitimate humanitarian assistance, the\n problem with the proposal at hand. As for the future of\nCommittee had in fact resorted to stricter\n sanctions themselves, that was not the time even to\nimplementation of the sanctions.302\n consider their further abatement. 304\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of\n The representative of China stated that the\nGermany stated that, in order to extend the provisions\n international community should encourage the Federal\nof resolution 943 (1994), the Council must decide\n Republic of Yugoslavia to make further efforts to bring\nwhether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had closed\n peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina. He reiterated that\nthe border effectively and whether it had sustained its\n China was not in favour of settling the dispute through\ncourse with regard to accepting the Contact Group plan\n sanctions or mandatory measures, for such steps would\nand isolating the Bosnian Serbs. The answer to both of\n aggravate the situation, bringing suffering to the people\nthose questions was “a sober yes”. Since the adoption\n and causing serious damage to the economy of third\nof resolution 943 (1994), however, the provision of\n countries. Based on that position, China supported the\nfuel originating from the Federal Republic of\n extension of the provisions of resolution 943 (1994)\nYugoslavia had facilitated the military activities of the\n and would vote in favour of the draft. The speaker\nKrajina Serb forces, who continued to be active in\n pointed out, however, that China’s position had not\ncross-border attacks on the Bihac area. That situation\n changed in relation to certain elements of the draft\nwas unacceptable and Germany demanded that all\n resolution that were related to resolutions 757 (1992)\nKrajina Serb forces withdraw from Bosnian territory.\n and 820 (1993).305\nGermany had supported the inclusion in the draft of\nnew provisions to cut off the shipment of fuel and The representative of the Russian Federation\nother non-humanitarian supplies via Bosnia to the stated that his country was convinced that there were\nUnited Nations Protected Areas. It therefore welcomed more than adequate grounds for agreeing on new\nthe fact that the International Conference on the measures to encourage Belgrade and that the Council\nFormer Yugoslavia mission would now be reporting on could, as a minimum, decide on the indefinite\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s compliance with extension of the measures provided for in resolution\nthat requirement. The speaker further stated that the 943 (1994) and consider a further easing of sanctions.\nmessage of the draft resolution was clear: the Federal The Council had received four reports from the\nRepublic of Yugoslavia must withhold all support for International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia\nthe Bosnian Serb military and block all border mission corroborating the effective closure of the\ncrossings that the mission could not monitor. Germany border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and\nalso expected Belgrade to use its influence with the __________________\nvarious Serb parties to bring them closer to a 303 Ibid., pp. 14-15.\n\n__________________ 304 Ibid., pp. 16-17.\n 305 Ibid., pp. 19-20.\n 302 Ibid., pp. 10-12.\n\n\n\n\n812 07-63109\n"
[93] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nBosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, Belgrade’s Expressing its appreciation for the work of the\nconstructive attitude was yielding practical results, Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International\nincluding the economic agreements between the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and of the Mission of the\n International Conference to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nCroatian Government and the local Serbian authorities (Serbia and Montenegro), and stressing the importance it\nin the United Nations Protected Areas, an agreement on attaches to the availability of all resources necessary for the\nthe complete cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and work of the Mission,\nHerzegovina, and changes in the Bosnian Serb\n Noting that paragraph 9 of resolution 757 (1992) of\nleadership. Russia, therefore, regretted that the Council 30 May 1992 remains in force,\nhad not been able to agree on a draft that would have\nprovided for further measures of encouragement, and it Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United\nfelt that certain aspects of the draft before the Council Nations,\nwere “completely unwarranted”, running counter to the 1. Decides that the restrictions and other measures\nrecommendations of the Co-Chairmen of the referred to in paragraph 1 of resolution 943 (1994) shall be\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. In suspended for a further period of one hundred days from the\nunreservedly favouring the extension of the partial adoption of the present resolution;\nextension of sanctions, Russia could not share 2. Calls upon all States and others concerned to\nresponsibility for the potential negative consequences respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and international\nof the adoption of the draft resolution, and thus could borders of all States in the region;\nnot support it. It hoped that the principle that a 3. Reaffirms that the requirements in paragraph 12 of\ndeserving party should be encouraged would be resolution 820 (1993) that import to, export from and\nimplemented more consistently in the future.306 trans-shipment through the United Nations Protected Areas in\n the Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb\nwas adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention forces, with the exception of essential humanitarian supplies\n(Russian Federation), as resolution 970 (1995), which including medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by\nreads: international humanitarian agencies, shall be permitted only\n with proper authorization from the Government of the Republic\n The Security Council, of Croatia or the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina respectively, apply to all shipments across the\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, in particular\n international border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nresolution 943 (1994) of 23 September 1994,\n (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and\n Welcoming the measures taken by the authorities of the Herzegovina;\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in\n 4. Requests the Security Council Committee\nparticular those detailed in the report transmitted by the letter\n established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) urgently to\ndated 4 January 1995 from the Secretary-General to the\n expedite its elaboration of appropriate streamlined procedures as\nPresident of the Security Council, to maintain the effective\n referred to in paragraph 2 of resolution 943 (1993), and to give\nclosure of the international border between the Federal Republic\n priority to its consideration of applications concerning\nof Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of\n legitimate humanitarian assistance, in particular applications\nBosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all goods except\n from the International Committee of the Red Cross and from the\nfoodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential\n Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees\nhumanitarian needs, and noting that those measures were a\n and other organizations in the United Nations system;\nnecessary condition for the adoption of the present resolution,\n 5. Requests that every thirty days the Secretary-\n Stressing the importance of the maintenance by the\n General submit to the Security Council for its review a report as\nauthorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n to whether the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\nMontenegro) of the effective closure of that border, and of\n International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia have\nfurther efforts by them to enhance the effectiveness of that\n certified that the authorities of the Federal Republic of\nclosure, including by the prosecution of persons suspected of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are effectively\nviolating measures to that end and by sealing border crossing\n implementing their decision to close the international border\npoints as requested by the Mission of the International\n between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia,\n Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with\n__________________ respect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and\n 306 Ibid., pp. 20-21. clothing for essential humanitarian needs and are complying\n with the requirements of paragraph 3 above in respect of all\n shipments across the international border between the Federal\n\n\n07-63109 813\n"
[94] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the objective of achieving a lasting political settlement in\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and further requests the the former Yugoslavia.307\nSecretary-General to report to the Council immediately if he has\nevidence, including from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering The representative of Indonesia reiterated his\nCommittee, that those authorities are not effectively country’s position that the suspension of certain\nimplementing their decision to close that border; aspects of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of\n 6. Decides that, if at any time the Secretary-General Yugoslavia, contained in resolution 943 (1994), had\nreports that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia been premature. Equally important, resolutions adopted\n(Serbia and Montenegro) are not effectively implementing their by the Council had explicitly stipulated the steps that\ndecision to close that border, the suspension of the measures the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should take if\nreferred to in paragraph 1 above shall terminate on the fifth sanctions were to be eased. These clearly went beyond\nworking day following the report of the Secretary-General,\nunless the Security Council decides to the contrary;\n the mere promise to close the border with Bosnia and\n Herzegovina. Indonesia therefore had serious\n 7. Decides to keep the situation closely under review reservations regarding the provision for an extension of\nand to consider further steps with regard to measures applicable the suspension of sanctions as contained in the\nto the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)\nin the light of further progress in the situation;\n resolution just adopted. Despite its misgivings,\n however, Indonesia was cognizant of the positive\n 8. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. elements contained in the resolution, such as the call\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the upon all States to respect the sovereignty, territorial\nUnited Kingdom stated that the economic sanctions integrity and international borders of all States in the\nagainst the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the region and the provision reaffirming the requirement\nBosnian Serbs had undoubtedly been a major factor in contained in paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993) that\nrecent progress. The impact of the sanctions upon the imports to, exports from and trans-shipment through\neconomy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia and\nbeen largely responsible for Belgrade’s decision to those areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the\ncease assisting the Bosnian Serbs, and to support the control of the Bosnian Serbs should be permitted only\nContact Group plan. The Federal Republic of with the authorization of the Government of Croatia or\nYugoslavia’s cooperation with the International Bosnia and Herzegovina. Against that background,\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia mission must Indonesia had voted in favour of the resolution just\ncontinue if the sanctions were to continue to be adopted. Its position was based on the understanding\nsuspended. The resolution just adopted represented a that Belgrade would scrupulously uphold its\nbalanced response to the cooperation provided by commitments and that, should the Secretary-General\nBelgrade over the preceding hundred days. The report a wilful violation, then the suspension of the\nresolution allowed for the continued suspension of sanctions would be terminated forthwith. 308\naspects of the sanctions for a further 100 days. It also The representative of the United States observed\nsought to remove any ambiguity about the application that the sanctions regime had been vital to the effort to\nof resolution 820 (1993) concerning trans-shipments persuade the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the\nacross the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia-Bosnian Bosnian Serbs that a peaceful resolution of the conflict\nborder, and to give clear priority to applications for was in their best interests. The resolution just adopted\nhumanitarian assistance. The speaker further noted that was an indication that the effort to persuade Belgrade\nsanctions were being imposed to achieve changes in to pressure the Bosnian Serbs had begun to show\npolicy, rather than to punish. Sanctions reinforced the results. There should be no doubt that the willingness\nContact Group’s strategy of increasing the pressure on of the United States Government to support the\nthe Bosnian Serbs to return to the negotiating table. It resolution had been a direct result of the conclusion\nwas essential that Belgrade continued to support the that Belgrade had moved to implement its decision to\nContact Group approach, maintained the embargo on close the border. Nevertheless, further efforts must be\nthe Bosnian Serbs and kept up the pressure on the made to ensure that the border was effectively closed.\nKrajina Serbs to cease violating the Croatian-Bosnian __________________\nborder, and to implement the economic agreement in 307 Ibid., pp. 22-23.\n\nCroatia. Further sanctions relief might be possible, but 308 Ibid., pp. 23-25.\n\nonly if there was substantial progress towards the\n\n\n814 07-63109\n"
[95] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nThe United States was therefore gratified that the others concerned henceforth to facilitate the unhindered flow of\nCouncil had reaffirmed its prohibition of trans-shipments humanitarian assistance and complete freedom of movement for\nthrough Bosnian territory controlled by the Bosnian the United Nations Protection Force.\nSerbs. Such trans-shipments without the permission of\nthe relevant Governments had been, and continued to be, Decision of 14 April 1995 (3520th meeting):\nviolations of paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993). The statement by the President\nspeaker further stated that the effectiveness of the border At its 3520th meeting, on 14 April 1995, the\nclosure would require continued vigilance on the part of Council resumed its consideration of the item.\nthe international community, the International Following the adoption of the agenda, the President\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia mission and (Czech Republic) stated that, after consultations among\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia officials. The United members of the Security Council, he had been\nStates expected that a number of measures would be authorized to make the following statement on behalf\ntaken to ensure effective closure.309 of the Council:311\n The Security Council is gravely concerned at the recent\n Decision of 17 February 1995 (3501st meeting): attacks on the United Nations Protection Force personnel in the\n statement by the President Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in this regard, has\n At its 3501st meeting, on 17 February 1995, the learnt with particular indignation that once again a soldier of the\n Force, this time a soldier of the French contingent, was\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item. deliberately targeted and shot to death by an unidentified sniper\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council in Sarajevo today. The Council notes with similar concern that\ninvited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, several other soldiers of the United Nations have been killed\nat his request, to participate in the discussion without recently in similar circumstances.\nthe right to vote. The President (Botswana) then stated The Council condemns in the strongest terms such acts\nthat, after consultations among members of the directed at peacekeepers who are serving the cause of peace in\nSecurity Council, he had been authorized to make the the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Deliberate targeting of\nfollowing statement on behalf of the Council:310 the United Nations Protection Force personnel reflects the\n overall deterioration of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia\n The Security Council is deeply concerned at the continued\n and Herzegovina. The Council wishes to state once again that\nfighting around Bihac and deplores the serious humanitarian\n this is totally unacceptable. It reiterates that the cooperation of\nsituation in the Bihac area. It reaffirms its support for the\n all parties and others concerned is indispensable for the missions\nSpecial Representative of the Secretary-General and the United\n of the Force to be carried out and demands that they respect\nNations Protection Force.\n fully the status of United Nations personnel.\n The Council recalls the statement of the President of the\n The Council invites the Secretary-General to investigate\nSecurity Council of 6 January 1995. It reiterates the importance\n the circumstances of these acts and to report to the Council,\nit attaches to full compliance with the agreements between the\n taking into consideration the views of troop-contributing\nBosnian parties on a ceasefire and on a complete cessation of\n countries, on any measures which might be necessary to prevent\nhostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded\n further similar attacks, which should not remain unpunished.\non 23 and 31 December 1994. All involved must now make a\nconcerted effort to consolidate what has been achieved so far to\navoid the risk of a renewed outbreak of hostilities. Decision of 19 April 1995 (3521st meeting):\n resolution 987 (1995)\n The Council demands that all forces in the Bihac area\ncease fighting immediately and cooperate fully with the United At its 3521st meeting, on 19 April 1995, the\nNations Protection Force in achieving an effective ceasefire. The Council resumed its consideration of the item.\nCouncil reiterates its condemnation of the continued violations Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\nof the international border between the Republic of Croatia and invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n at his request, to participate in the discussion without\n The Council condemns the recent obstruction of the right to vote. The President (Czech Republic) then\nhumanitarian convoys destined for the Bihac area by the drew the attention of the Council members to the text\nCroatian Serb and Abdic forces. It welcomes the fact that of a draft resolution submitted by France.312\nconvoys are now getting through and calls upon all parties and\n__________________ __________________\n 309 Ibid., pp. 25-26. 311 S/PRST/1995/19.\n 310 S/PRST/1995/8. 312 S/1995/311.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 815\n"
[96] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina Herzegovina for the security and safety of the United Nations\nstated that the deaths of two UNPROFOR soldiers in Protection Force, and in this context demands again that all\nSarajevo testified to the continuing terrorization of that parties and others concerned refrain from any act of intimidation\n or violence against the Force and its personnel;\ncity; and to the fact that resolutions on safe areas\ncontinued to be violated. He argued that the soldiers’ 2. Recalls its invitation to the Secretary-General, in\ndeaths would not be in vain if they contributed to a this context, to submit proposals on any measures which could\nchange in the situation. The draft resolution before the be taken to prevent attacks against the United Nations Protection\n Force and its personnel and allow it to perform effectively its\nCouncil was a first step in that direction. His mission, and invites him to submit such proposals on an urgent\ndelegation supported the establishment of new basis;\nmeasures to prevent further attacks against\nUNPROFOR troops and improve their security. It 3. Calls upon the Bosnian parties to agree to an\n extension of the agreements on a ceasefire and on a complete\nhoped that the Council would also review the cessation of hostilities concluded on 23 and 31 December 1994\nUNPROFOR mandate. 313 beyond 30 April 1995, and looks to all parties and all others\n The draft resolution was put to the vote and concerned to cooperate fully with the United Nations Protection\n Force in their implementation;\nadopted unanimously as resolution 987 (1995), which\nreads: 4. Urges all parties and others concerned to resume\n forthwith negotiations towards an overall peaceful settlement on\n The Security Council, the basis of the acceptance of the Contact Group peace plan as a\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the starting-point;\nconflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and 5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\nreaffirming in this context its resolution 982 (1995) of 31 March\n1995, in particular paragraphs 6 and 7 thereof, Speaking after the vote, the representative of\n Expressing its grave concern at the continued fighting in\n France stated that it had been a matter of urgency for\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina despite the agreements the Council to react to the murders of UNPROFOR\non a ceasefire and on a complete cessation of hostilities personnel by condemning those unacceptable acts and\nconcluded on 23 and 31 December 1994, and deploring the by giving a sign of its determination that the status of\nviolations of these agreements and of the ban imposed by its United Nations personnel be respected. It had also been\nresolutions 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992 and 816 (1993) of essential to remind the Bosnian parties of the need to\n31 March 1993 by whomsoever committed, extend the ceasefire and cessation-of-hostilities\n Stressing the unacceptability of all attempts to resolve the agreements beyond 30 April and to recommence\nconflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by military immediately negotiations towards an overall settlement,\nmeans, by accepting the Contact Group peace plan as a starting\n Noting once again the need for resumed negotiations point.314\naimed at an overall peaceful settlement of the situation in the\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of the Decision of 21 April 1995 (3522nd meeting):\nacceptance of the Contact Group peace plan as a starting-point, resolution 988 (1995)\n Gravely preoccupied at the recent attacks on the United By a letter dated 13 April 1995 addressed to the\nNations Protection Force personnel in the Republic of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina and at the fatalities resulting therefrom,\n President of the Security Council, 315 the Secretary-\ncondemning in the strongest terms such unacceptable acts General transmitted a report of the Co-Chairmen of the\ndirected at members of peacekeeping forces, and determined to Steering Committee of the International Conference on\nobtain a strict respect of the status of United Nations personnel the Former Yugoslavia, concerning the operations of\nin the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Conference’s mission. The report contained the\n Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security of the certification referred to in resolution 970 (1995).\nUnited Nations Protection Force and freedom of movement for At its 3522nd meeting, on 21 April 1995, the\nall its missions, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of\nthe Charter of the United Nations,\n Council resumed its consideration of the item and\n included the above-mentioned letter in its agenda.\n 1. Emphasizes once again the responsibility of the Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\nparties and others concerned in the Republic of Bosnia and __________________\n__________________\n 314 Ibid., p. 5.\n 313 S/PV.3521, pp. 2-3.\n 315 S/1995/302.\n\n\n\n\n816 07-63109\n"
[97] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\ninvited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Yugoslavia, however, then Belgrade might\nat his request, to participate in the discussion without begin to question the activities of the mission.318\nthe right to vote. The Council also invited Ambassador\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nDragomir Djokic, at his request, to address it in the\n expressed appreciation for the Council’s efforts to\ncourse of the subsequent discussion. The President\n improve the effectiveness of the border-sealing regime.\n(Czech Republic) then drew the attention of the\n While he noted that the new mechanism and reporting\nCouncil members to the text of a draft resolution\n system contained in the draft resolution before the\nsubmitted by the Czech Republic, France, Germany,\n Council should help advance towards the desired\nItaly, the United Kingdom and the United States, 316 as\n results, he also stressed that Member States must\nwell as to several other documents. 317\n provide all the necessary resources for the new system\n Mr. Djokic noted with regret that, despite to be effective. That included the provision of\nconsistently positive reports by the International independent evidence of violations and more experts\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia mission that the and troops deployed along the border. In that context,\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia was adhering to its Bosnia and Herzegovina welcomed the provision in\ncommitment to close its border with the Bosnian Serbs, paragraph 16 of the draft resolution, calling upon the\nand despite the fact that it had fulfilled the provisions mission to provide the relevant Government with its\nof relevant resolutions by which the sanctions had been observations and findings. It also took note of the\nintroduced, the Council was not able to lift the expiration date of the provision easing the sanctions\nsanctions altogether. He argued that, by opting to against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, stating that\nmaintain the greatest part of the most comprehensive it was long enough to test the efficacy of both the\nsanctions regime adopted against any State Member of border closure and monitoring mechanism and of the\nthe United Nations, the Council was continuing to Belgrade regime’s authority. The speaker concluded by\npursue a policy of punishing the Federal Republic of saying that the most critical variable in the search for\nYugoslavia and the Serbian and Montenegrin people peace was the acceptance and implementation of the\nfor matters for which they bore no responsibility. The peace plan by the Bosnian Serbs. Until that occurred,\nspeaker further argued that the new conditions being the international community should maintain its\nset by some members of the Contact Group, including commitment to the United Nations mandate in Bosnia\nin particular the calls for the recognition by the Federal and Herzegovina, Croatia and elsewhere. Bosnia and\nRepublic of Yugoslavia of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herzegovina would continue to use its capacity,\nCroatia as a prerequisite for the further suspension of including the right and means to defend its population,\nsanctions, lacked a basis in Security Council territorial integrity and sovereignty. In that connection,\nresolutions and represented a counterproductive form it reasserted its “unabridgable right” to defend itself. 319\nof pressure. Recalling that the decision by the Federal\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of\nRepublic of Yugoslavia to cut political and economic\n Argentina noted that whilst his delegation was in\nlinks with the Bosnian Serbs had been unilateral, the\n favour of continuing the suspension of the sanctions, it\nspeaker noted that that step had been taken in order to\n wished to place on record its interpretation of certain\npressure the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group\n provisions of the draft resolution. His delegation\nplan. Yugoslavia had therefore accepted the\n interpreted the date mentioned in operative paragraph 1\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia\n not as curtailing the deadline set by resolution 970\nmission in order to facilitate that unilateral decision. If\n (1995), but rather as establishing a new and more clear-\nfurther pressure were brought to bear on the Federal\n__________________ cut policy. The reason was that it would not be\n 316 S/1995/319.\n particularly meaningful to interpret it as a setting of a\n 317 Letter dated 13 April 1995 from the representative of shorter deadline for the suspension of sanctions, when\n Croatia addressed to the President of the Security it was acknowledged that there had been no substantive\n Council (S/1995/301); and letter dated 15 April 1995 changes warranting that suspension. His delegation\n from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina also understood the authorization for the Federal\n addressed to the President of the Security Council __________________\n (S/1995/309). 318 S/PV.3522, pp. 2-4.\n 319 Ibid., pp. 4-7.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 817\n"
[98] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nRepublic of Yugoslavia to operate commercial flights “unwarranted micromanagement” whereas in other\nin operative paragraph 2 to mean that it should be able instances it closed its eyes to flagrant violations of its\nto obtain the necessary quantities of fuel, lubricants, own decisions, as had long happening with respect to\nequipment and spare parts to ensure that the flights the arms embargo on all successor States of the former\nwere safe.320 Yugoslavia.321\n The representative of the Russian Federation The representative of China reiterated that his\nstated that his delegation would not be able to support delegation was against the introduction of sanctions or\nthe draft resolution, because it did not consider it to be mandatory measures in relation to the conflict in the\nconsistent with the principle of positive and negative former Yugoslavia, contending that events had proved\nincentives previously agreed upon in the Contact that sanctions or pressure would further complicate the\nGroup and the Security Council, according to which issue. Stating that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nthose that supported the peace plan would be was an important factor for restoring peace and\nencouraged while pressure would be exerted on those stability in the region, and that his Government had\nthat rejected it. Recalling that it was the Federal supported the mission in the discharge of its duties, and\nRepublic of Yugoslavia’s own decision to close its had taken measures to effectively close its border with\nborder with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the speaker Bosnia and Herzegovina, the speaker contended that\nstated that the Government of the Federal Republic of the international community should continue to\nYugoslavia had stuck strictly to its decision to close its encourage rather than discourage the Federal Republic\nborder with Bosnia and Herzegovina to all except of Yugoslavia for fulfilling its commitment to close the\nhumanitarian goods, as corroborated by numerous border. Regrettably, although the draft resolution\nreports of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee further extended the provisions for easing the\nof the International Conference on the Former sanctions, it had shortened the period of extension and\nYugoslavia. In addition, its cooperation with the attached more restrictive conditions to the extension,\nConference’s mission remained very good. Under these which was a step backward from resolutions 943\ncircumstances, the Council would have been justified (1994) and 970 (1995). China would therefore abstain\nin adopting further positive stimuli, such as making the from the vote on the draft resolution.322\npartial suspension of sanctions indefinite.\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nUnfortunately, with each extension of the partial\n adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (China,\nsuspension, the Council had been inclined to make\n Russian Federation) as resolution 988 (1995), which\nfresh demands on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.\n reads:\nAn example of that approach was that the draft\nresolution attempted to link the voluntary decision by The Security Council,\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to close its border Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, in particular\nwith Bosnia and Herzegovina to the situation on its resolutions 943 (1994) of 23 September 1994 and resolution 970\nborder with Croatia, thus constituting a serious step (1995) of 12 January 1995,\ntowards changing the mandate of the International Noting the measures taken by the authorities of the\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia mission without Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), as\nconsulting Belgrade. It was beyond the understanding described in the reports transmitted by the letters dated\nof the Russian Federation why it had been necessary to 31 March 1995 and 13 April 1995 from the Secretary-General to\ncut back the draft resolution’s duration to 75 days when the President of the Security Council, to maintain the closure of\na mechanism, which was still operational, was agreed the international border between the Federal Republic of\nupon in September last year that provided for the Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia\n and Herzegovina with respect to all goods except foodstuffs,\nimmediate reimposition of full sanctions should the medical supplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs,\nGovernment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia fail and noting that those measures were a necessary condition for\nto implement its decision to close the border. The the adoption of the present resolution,\nRussian Federation also considered a number of\n Concerned, however, about reports suggesting that\nprovisions of the draft resolution to be “puzzling”. The helicopter flights may have crossed the border between the\nspeaker contended that the Council was engaging in __________________\n__________________\n 321 Ibid., pp. 13-15.\n 320 Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n 322 Ibid., pp. 15-16.\n\n\n\n\n818 07-63109\n"
[99] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic 5. Underlines the importance it attaches to the work\nof Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and noting that an of the Mission of the International Conference on the Former\ninvestigation of those reports is being undertaken by the Mission Yugoslavia, expresses its concern that a shortage of resources\nof the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, hampers the effectiveness of that work, and requests the\n Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within thirty\n Noting with satisfaction that the cooperation of the\n days of the adoption of the present resolution on measures to\nMission of the International Conference with the authorities of\n increase the effectiveness of the work of the Mission, including\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)\n on the question of helicopter flights;\ncontinues to be good, and stressing the importance of effective\nclosure by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 6. Requests Member States to make available the\n(Serbia and Montenegro) of the international border between the necessary resources to strengthen the capacity of the Mission of\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the International Conference to carry out its tasks, and\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and of further efforts encourages the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nby them to enhance the effectiveness of that closure, including (Serbia and Montenegro) to give additional support for the\nby the prosecution of persons suspected of violating measures to operation of the Mission;\nthat end and by sealing border crossing points as requested by\n 7. Calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic\nthe Mission,\n of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to cooperate fully with\n Expressing its appreciation for the work of the the Mission of the International Conference, in particular in\nCo-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International investigating alleged breaches of the closure of the border,\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia and of the Mission of the whether by land or by air, between the Federal Republic of\nInternational Conference to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia\n(Serbia and Montenegro), and Herzegovina and ensuring the continued closure of that\n border;\n Noting that paragraph 9 of resolution 757 (1992) of\n30 May 1992 remains in force, 8. Stresses the importance it attaches to a thorough\n investigation of reports that helicopter flights may have crossed\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United\n the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia\nNations,\n and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n 1. Decides that the restrictions and other measures calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nreferred to in paragraph 1 of resolution 943 (1994) shall be (Serbia and Montenegro) to comply with their commitment to\nsuspended until 5 July 1995; cooperate fully in that investigation, and requests the Secretary-\n General to report to the Security Council on the outcome of the\n 2. Confirms that commodities and products, including investigation;\nfuel beyond immediate needs for a flight or ferry voyage, taking\ninto account internationally recognized safety requirements, 9. Reaffirms its decision that import to, export from\nshall not be carried on flights and ferry services permitted in and trans-shipment through the United Nations Protected Areas\naccordance with paragraph 1 above, except in accordance with in the Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of\nthe provisions of relevant resolutions and in conformity with the Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb\nprocedures of the Security Council Committee established forces, with the exception of essential humanitarian supplies\npursuant to resolution 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991, and including medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by\nthat, if a need is established for the supply of additional fuel for international humanitarian agencies, shall be permitted only\nthe operation of flights permitted in accordance with paragraph 1 with proper authorization from the Government of the Republic\nabove, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 of Croatia or the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and\n(1991) shall consider such applications on a case-by-case basis; Herzegovina;\n\n 3. Reminds States of the importance of strict 10. Encourages the authorities of the Federal Republic\nenforcement of measures imposed under Chapter VII of the of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to reinstate the\nCharter, and calls upon all States which allow flights or ferry severance of international telecommunication links between the\nservices permitted in accordance with paragraph 1 above from Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and\ntheir territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft to report to the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the\nthe Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) on control of Bosnian Serb forces which they instituted in August\nthe controls adopted by them to implement such measures in 1994;\nearlier relevant resolutions;\n 11. Requests the Committee established pursuant to\n 4. Calls upon all States and others concerned to resolution 724 (1991) to conclude urgently its elaboration of\nrespect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and international appropriate streamlined procedures, and invites the Chairman of\nborders of all States in the region; that Committee to report to the Security Council as soon as\n possible on the matter;\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 819\n"
[100] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n 12. Also requests the Committee established pursuant violation of earlier relevant resolutions, the suspension of the\nto resolution 724 (1991) to continue to give priority to its measures referred to in paragraph 1 above shall terminate on the\nconsideration of applications concerning legitimate humanitarian fifth working day following the report of the Secretary-General,\nassistance, in particular applications from the International unless the Security Council decides to the contrary;\nCommittee of the Red Cross and from the Office of the United\n 16. Encourages the Co-Chairmen of the Steering\nNations High Commissioner for Refugees and other\n Committee of the International Conference to ensure that the\norganizations in the United Nations system;\n Mission of the International Conference keeps the Government\n 13. Requests that, every thirty days and no fewer than of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Government of\nten days before the expiration of the period referred to in the Republic of Croatia and the authorities of the Federal\nparagraph 1 above, the Secretary-General submit to the Security Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) fully informed\nCouncil for its review a report as to whether the Co-Chairmen of about the findings of the Mission;\nthe Steering Committee of the International Conference on the\n 17. Decides to keep the situation closely under review\nFormer Yugoslavia, on the basis of information made available\n and to consider further steps with regard to measures applicable\nto them from the Mission of the International Conference and all\n to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)\nother available sources deemed relevant by the Mission, have\n in the light of further progress in the situation;\ncertified that the authorities of the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are implementing their 18. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\ndecision to close the international border, on land and in the air,\nbetween the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Speaking after the vote, the representative of the\nMontenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with United States expressed her delegation’s belief that\nrespect to all goods, except foodstuffs, medical supplies and Belgrade had not done enough to comply with its\nclothing for essential humanitarian needs and are complying commitment to isolate the Bosnian Serbs. The United\nwith the requirements of paragraph 3 of resolution 970 (1995) in States could not, therefore, have supported a resolution\nrespect of all shipments across the international border between\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)\n that represented “business as usual”. The resolution\nand the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and requests that just adopted was designed to acknowledge progress,\nthe Secretary-General inform the Council in his report if the but also to close remaining loopholes. Belgrade must\nCo-Chairmen of the Steering Committee have received close the land and air border with Bosnia, and must not\nsubstantiated evidence, from sources deemed relevant by the seek to circumvent the closure of the border by\nMission, of substantial trans-shipments of goods, except illegally shipping goods through Serb-controlled\nfoodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential Croatia. The United States had been prepared to block\nhumanitarian needs, from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n(Serbia and Montenegro) through the Republic of Croatia to the\n the resolution just adopted if those steps to tighten the\nareas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the border closure had not been included. During the\ncontrol of Bosnian Serb forces in violation of earlier relevant subsequent 75 days, the United States would be\nresolutions; watching closely to see if Belgrade was improving its\n 14. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the\n compliance with its commitment to close the border.\nSecurity Council immediately if he has evidence, including from The speaker urged the International Conference on the\nthe Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Former Yugoslavia mission, the Co-Chairmen of the\nConference, that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Steering Committee and the Secretary-General to\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are not implementing their implement fully paragraphs 13 and 15 of the\ndecision to close the border between the Federal Republic of resolution, stressing that it was up to them to make\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia sure that the Council’s decisions were more than words\nand Herzegovina;\n on pieces of paper. He noted that border closure was\n 15. Decides that if at any time the Secretary-General not an end in itself and that the objective remained\nreports that, from sources deemed relevant by the Mission of the obtaining the agreement of the Bosnian Serbs to the\nInternational Conference, the authorities of the Federal Republic Contact Group plan. Thus it was necessary to maintain\nof Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are not implementing\ntheir decision to close the border between the Federal Republic\n the pressure upon the Bosnian Serbs. The authorities in\nof Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Belgrade also needed to understand that the suspension\nBosnia and Herzegovina or that they are permitting substantial of additional sanctions would depend on their\ndiversion of goods, except foodstuffs, medical supplies and willingness to take further steps towards peace, most\nclothing for essential humanitarian needs, from the Federal notably by recognizing Croatia and Bosnia and\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) through the\nRepublic of Croatia to the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces in\n\n\n\n820 07-63109\n"
[101] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nHerzegovina within their internationally recognized however, if Belgrade were to make further\nborders.323 commitments to advancing the peace process. 325\n The representative of France noted that his The President, speaking in his capacity as the\ncountry had been called upon to make a difficult representative of the Czech Republic, stated that\nchoice, which it did on the basis of a number of keeping up the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and\nconsiderations. Firstly, France was convinced that the maintaining the regime of abated sanctions was the\nmechanisms now in place to monitor the border closure best way forward. In fact, the Czech Republic would\nwere, overall, achieving their objectives. It reaffirmed have preferred that the suspension had been extended\nthat the best way of improving the Mission’s operation significantly beyond the 5 July deadline because it felt\nwas by increasing the resources allocated to it. At the that Belgrade was substantively cooperating.326\nsame time, France recognized that the Federal Republic\nof Yugoslavia had demonstrated that it was cooperating Decisions of 3 May 1995 (3530th meeting):\nwith the Mission. That was essentially why the French statements by the President\ndelegation wished to extend the suspension of\n At its 3530th meeting, on 3 May 1995, the\nsanctions. Secondly, a number of steps had proved\n Council resumed its consideration of the item.\nuseful in plugging the gaps resulting from the\n Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\nshortfalls, the most striking examples of which were\n invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nthe helicopter flights and the sidestepping of the\n at his request, to participate in the discussion without\nfrontier closure by passing goods for Bosnia and\n the right to vote. The President (France) then stated\nHerzegovina by way of Croatian territory, which was\n that, after consultations among members of the\nwhy a part of the resolution included a strengthening of\n Security Council, he had been authorized to make two\nthe existing measures. That strengthening in France\n statements on behalf of the Council. The first\nview, was not such as to cast doubt on the degree of\n statement 327 reads:\ncooperation being afforded by the Belgrade authorities,\nbut did respond to the loopholes that had shown up by The Security Council is deeply concerned about the\nexperience. The speaker further stressed that, even failure of the Bosnian parties to agree to an extension of the\nthough the length of the extension of the suspension of agreements on a ceasefire and on a complete cessation of\n hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\nsanctions had been shortened, it had only been recent deterioration of the situation there. It stresses once again\nshortened slightly. France would have agreed with the the unacceptability of all attempts to resolve the conflict in the\nperiod provided in previous resolutions, but had Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by military means.\naccepted the time frame in the resolution in a spirit of\n The Council calls upon the Bosnian parties to agree\ncompromise.324 without further delay to a further ceasefire and a complete\n The representative of the United Kingdom stated cessation of hostilities and, in this regard, fully supports the\nthat the Bosnian Serb leadership must understand that negotiating efforts of the United Nations Protection Force and\n other international efforts aimed at persuading the Bosnian\nthere was no alternative to resuming peace parties to agree to such a ceasefire and complete cessation of\nnegotiations, with the Contact Group plan as the hostilities. The Council urges the Bosnian parties to abstain\nstarting point. In relation to the suspended sanctions from any steps which may lead to further escalation of the\nagainst the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, two conflict and reaffirms the need for a political settlement on the\nimportant issues should be addressed without delay. basis of the acceptance of the Contact Group peace plan as a\nThe first was to ensure that the border closure was starting point.\neffective, and the second was to reinforce the The second statement 328 reads:\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia\nmission so that it was able to carry out its tasks The Security Council is deeply concerned about the\n obstruction of the normal operation of Sarajevo airport,\neffectively. A limited suspension of the sanctions was including the suspension of the humanitarian relief airlift,\nthe appropriate response to Belgrade’s cooperation. __________________\nAdditional sanctions relief would only be justified, 325 Ibid., pp. 20-21.\n__________________ 326 Ibid., p. 21.\n 323 Ibid., pp. 16-17. 327 S/PRST/1995/24.\n 324 Ibid., pp. 17-18. 328 S/PRST/1995/25.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 821\n"
[102] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\ncaused by Bosnian Serb threats against United Nations aircraft enable the Force to carry out its mandate in accordance with the\nand humanitarian relief flights, and by their attempts to impose resolutions of the Council.\nrestrictions on the use of Sarajevo airport by official missions as\n The Council calls upon the parties to enter into\nforeseen in the 5 June 1992 agreement (S/24075). Such\n negotiations as provided for in its resolution 998 (1995) of\nobstruction is in breach of the agreement of 5 June 1992 and of\n 16 June 1995 and to agree without further delay to a ceasefire\nthe Council’s previous resolutions, in particular resolution 761\n and a complete cessation of hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia\n(1992), and is unacceptable. Obstruction of the humanitarian\n and Herzegovina. The Council emphasizes that there can be no\nrelief also constitutes a violation of international humanitarian\n military solution to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and\nlaw.\n Herzegovina. It stresses the importance it attaches to the\n In that context, the Council demands that all parties and vigorous pursuit of a political settlement and reiterates its\nothers concerned comply fully with the agreement of 5 June demand that the Bosnian Serb party accept the Contact Group\n1992 and create immediately the necessary conditions for peace plan as a starting point.\nunimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and\nother destinations in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It Decision of 5 July 1995 (3551st meeting):\ncalls upon the Bosnian Serb party to guarantee the safety of all resolution 1003 (1995)\nflights to Sarajevo supervised by the United Nations Protection\nForce, including humanitarian relief flights. By a letter dated 25 June 1995 addressed to the\n The Council requests the Secretary-General to keep it President of the Security Council, 330 the Secretary-\ninformed of discussions with the Bosnian Serb party on the General transmitted a report of the Co-Chairmen of the\nrestoration of the normal functioning of the Sarajevo airport so Steering Committee of the International Conference on\nthat it might take further action as necessary. the Former Yugoslavia, concerning the operations of\n the Conference’s mission. The report contained the\n Decision of 23 June 1995 (3548th meeting): certification referred to in resolution 988 (1995).\n statement by the President\n At its 3551st meeting, on 5 July 1995, the\n At its 3548th meeting, on 23 June 1995, the Council included the above-mentioned letter in its\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item. agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council Council invited the representatives of Bosnia and\ninvited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate\nat his request, to participate in the discussion without in the discussion without the right to vote. The Council\nthe right to vote. The President (Germany) then stated also invited Ambassador Dragomir Djokic, at his\nthat, after consultations among members of the request, to address the Council in the course of the\nSecurity Council, he had been authorized to make the subsequent discussion. The President (Honduras) then\nfollowing statement on behalf of the Council:329 drew the attention of the Council members to the text\n The Security Council reiterates its condemnation of of a draft resolution submitted by the Czech Republic,\ninterference with humanitarian supplies and the freedom of France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United\nmovement of the United Nations Protection Force by all parties States, 331 as well as to a letter dated 5 July 1995 from\nwithin the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and\nIn this context, it is deeply concerned by the blockading by Croatia addressed to the President of the Security\nBosnian Government forces of the United Nations Protection Council. 332\nForce personnel in the Visoko, Gorazde, Gorni Vakuf and\nKladanj areas, which included placing mines outside the United The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nNations Protection Force camp in Visoko on 20 June 1995. The said that if Belgrade wished to secure further sanctions\nCouncil is also deeply concerned at the deterioration in the relief or even to maintain the easing of sanctions, it\nsituation in and around Sarajevo, the obstruction by the Bosnian\nSerb party of freedom of movement and utilities to the city and\n must understand that the border closure should be real,\nthe continued obstruction of the normal operation of Sarajevo that the recognition of its neighbours must be\nairport. unambiguous, and that its support for the peace process\n needed to be sincere and not just tactical. Instead,\n The Council stresses that all such actions are\nunacceptable and demands that all parties fully respect the\n Belgrade was continuing to provide strategic support\n __________________\nsafety and security of the United Nations Protection Force\n 330 S/1995/510.\npersonnel and ensure their complete freedom of movement to\n__________________ 331 S/1995/537.\n 332 S/1995/538.\n 329 S/PRST/1995/31.\n\n\n\n\n822 07-63109\n"
[103] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nfor the so-called Krajina and Bosnian Serb armies. major efforts to contribute to the search for a just and\nBosnia and Herzegovina did not ask anything more peaceful settlement. Only negotiations could be\nthan the legal recognition by Belgrade of its conducive to such an outcome, not the use of force, the\nsovereignty and territorial integrity, which the United lifting of the arms embargo or the deployment of new\nNations had already recognized in the context of its troops. If the Council truly wished to open the road\nmembership in the United Nations.333 towards peace, it must have the courage to lift the\n sanctions altogether. The sanctions only fostered\n The representative of Croatia reiterated his\n resistance and established limits within the Federal\nGovernment’s position that the only way out of the\n Republic of Yugoslavia on greater cooperation.335\nexisting impasse was for the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia to recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina and Speaking before the vote, the representative of\nCroatia, and for the international community to ensure the Russian Federation said that his delegation would\nthe effective closure of the relevant borders between abstain in the vote on the draft resolution, for it\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and believed that the draft did not encourage a constructive\nHerzegovina and Croatia. He contended that the peace policy on the part of the Federal Republic of\nprocess had been derailed by the devaluation of the Yugoslavia. He argued that since the adoption of\nSecurity Council mandate for the International resolution 943 (1994), the Federal Republic of\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia mission. Clearly, Yugoslavia had been playing a positive role. In the\nthe Conference had reinterpreted its mandate to mean Russian Federation’s view, that merited appropriate\npartial closing of the border, and not effective closing, encouragement in the form of a further easing of the\nas was originally envisaged by the Council. The sanctions. At the very least, the Council should have\nGovernment of Croatia had given ample evidence that made the partial suspension of the sanctions indefinite,\nthe relevant border was not effectively closed. It as the Russian Federation itself had proposed. Instead,\ntherefore considered the International Conference on the draft resolution was extending the suspension of\nthe Former Yugoslavia certification of the border the sanctions for a reduced period of only 75 days, as\nclosure to be “null and void” and called on the Council was the case in the previous resolution. Moreover, a\nto review the work of the mission, and to clarify new preambular paragraph had appeared that referred\nwhether its mandate was to certify a partial or an to the importance of the cessation of military assistance\neffective closure of the border. If the Council were to to the Bosnian Serbs. In addition to the fact that that\ndecide that the mandate was indeed for a partial provision went beyond resolution 713 (1991), which\nclosure, then Croatia would have to re-evaluate its established a general and complete embargo on all\nposition in the peace process and on the likelihood of deliveries of weapons and military equipment, it was\nthe successful implementation of the mandate of the also particularly untenable with respect to assertions\nUnited Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in concerning the financing and coordination of air\nCroatia (UNCRO), calling for border control between defence, and was in no way confirmed by the reports of\nCroatia and Serbia and Montenegro, and Croatia and the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.\nBosnia and Herzegovina.334 Most important, that provision was directed at one of\n the parties to the conflict, while the responsibility for\n Mr. Djokic stated that his country was prepared to\n the recent drastic deterioration of the situation there\nrecognize the border of Bosnia and Herzegovina once\n was borne not only and not so much by the Bosnian\nthe political problems affecting its nations were closer\n Serbs. His delegation could not agree with operative\nto being resolved. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n paragraph 3 which contained a call for mutual\nalso insisted that the sanctions be lifted before there\n recognition between the successor States of the former\nwas any such recognition. The speaker argued that the\n Yugoslavia. That provision did not fit within the\nperpetuation of the sanctions and the setting of\n context of a generally technical and limited extension\nadditional conditions for their lifting were absurd and\n of the suspension of a minimal set of sanctions for a\nthat their maintenance was untenable now, especially\n short period of time. 336\nas the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was investing\n__________________ __________________\n 333 S/PV.3551, pp. 2-4. 335 Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n 334 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 336 Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 823\n"
[104] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and 1. Decides that the restrictions and other measures\nadopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention referred to in paragraph 1 of resolution 943 (1994) shall be\n(Russian Federation) as resolution 1003 (1995), which suspended until 18 September 1995;\nreads: 2. Decides also that the arrangements referred to in\n paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 988 (1995) shall continue\n The Security Council,\n to apply;\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, in particular\n 3. Renews its call for early mutual recognition\nresolutions 943 (1994) of 23 September 1994, 970 (1995) of\n between the States of the former Yugoslavia within their\n12 January 1995 and 988 (1995) of 21 April 1995,\n internationally recognized borders, recognition between the\n Calling upon all States and others concerned to respect Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic\nthe sovereignty, territorial integrity and international borders of of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) being an important first\nall States in the region, step, and urges the authorities of the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to take that step;\n Noting the measures taken by the authorities of the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in 4. Reaffirms its decision to keep the situation closely\nparticular those detailed in the report transmitted by the letter under review and to consider further steps with regard to\ndated 25 June 1995 from the Secretary-General to the President measures applicable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nof the Security Council, to maintain the effective closure of the (Serbia and Montenegro) in the light of further progress in the\ninternational border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia situation;\n(Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and\n 5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\nHerzegovina with respect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical\nsupplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs, and Speaking after the vote, the representative of the\nnoting with satisfaction that the cooperation of the Mission of United States observed that, while the Co-Chairmen of\nthe International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia with the the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia\nauthorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) continues to be good,\n had reported some improvement in the effectiveness of\n the border closure, they had also pointed out some\n Reaffirming the importance of further efforts by the shortcomings in Belgrade’s willingness to implement\nauthorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and its decision to isolate the Bosnian Serbs. It was those\nMontenegro) to enhance the effectiveness of the closure of the\ninternational border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n shortcomings that made the United States Government\n(Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and unwilling to accept an extension of 100 days and to\nHerzegovina with respect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical insist on 75 days. She recalled that the goal of\nsupplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs, extending limited sanctions relief to Belgrade was to\n Underlining the particular importance it attaches to there\n increase the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept a\nbeing no provision of military assistance, in terms of finance, settlement based on the Contact Group plan. The\nequipment, coordination of air defences or recruitment of troops, United States continued to believe that an effectively\nto the Bosnian Serb forces, enforced border closure would help to achieve that\n Expressing its appreciation for the work of the\n goal. It was therefore disturbed by indications of\nCo-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International increasing military cooperation between Belgrade and\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia and of the Mission of the the Bosnian Serbs, including reports that the authorities\nInternational Conference to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were providing\n(Serbia and Montenegro), and underlining the importance of the financial assistance and equipment to the Bosnian Serb\nnecessary resources being made available so as to strengthen the army, cooperating with Bosnian Serb air defence\ncapacity of the Mission to carry out its tasks, systems, and returning draft-age Bosnian Serb males to\n Noting with satisfaction that the Security Council Bosnia. If those reports were accurate, they would\nCommittee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) of weaken the case for continuing the limited suspension\n15 December 1991 has adopted streamlined procedures for of sanctions. Such violations would undermine the\nexpediting its consideration of applications concerning Council’s key objective of persuading the Bosnian\nlegitimate humanitarian assistance, as well as a number of\nmeasures facilitating legitimate trans-shipments via the Danube\n Serbs that there was no alternative to a negotiated\nriver, solution. The speaker also expressed concern over\n reports of increased military support by Belgrade for\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United the Croatian Serbs, and noted that her Government\nNations,\n\n\n\n\n824 07-63109\n"
[105] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nwould pay close attention to the manner in which had been used as a basis for the argument in favour of\nBelgrade continued to implement the border closure.337 the maintenance of the arms embargo against Bosnia\n and Herzegovina. The establishment and activation of\n The representative of China reiterated that his\n the rapid reaction force also could make a crucial\ndelegation opposed resorting to sanctions or mandatory\n contribution to the rehabilitation of the UNPROFOR\nactions in relation to the conflict in the former\n mandate and UNPROFOR capabilities in Bosnia and\nYugoslavia, as facts had proven that sanctions or\n Herzegovina. That, combined with NATO activities,\npressure would only further complicate the situation.\n could help to reverse the situation in the country. 340\nThe international community should encourage the\nefforts made by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by The representative of Croatia expressed the\ngradually removing the sanctions. China regretted that concern of his Government at recent developments in\nthe views of all delegations had not been taken into the six safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He noted\naccount during the negotiating process on the draft that both the decision by the Bosnian Serb leadership\nresolution. As the main purpose of the draft, however, to renew its advances in the safe areas and the lack of\nhad been to continue the partial suspension of the an appropriate response by the international\nsanctions, China had voted in favour of the resolution community posed serious risks to Croatia and the\njust adopted.338 Bosnian Croat federation. Croatia was especially\n concerned about the situation in the safe area of Bihac.\n Decision of 12 July 1995 (3553rd meeting): It would consider the displacement of the population to\n resolution 1004 (1995) be a serious threat to its internal security and may be\n compelled to undertake measures to secure the status\n At its 3553rd meeting, on 12 July 1995, the\n of Bihac as a safe area if that status ever became\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item.\n threatened. Croatia also would have to draw\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council\n conclusions from the international community’s lack of\ninvited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n an appropriate response to the situation in Srebrenica,\nand Croatia, at their request, to participate in the\n in respect of the mandate of the United Nations in\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The President\n Croatia and the ability and willingness of UNCRO to\n(Honduras) then drew the attention of the Council\n achieve its objectives and to control Croatia’s relevant\nmembers to the text of a draft resolution submitted by\n international borders. It took the view that\nFrance, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the\n developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina were a\nUnited States339 and read out a revision that had been\n consequence of the international community having\nmade to the draft.\n ignored a serious increase in Serbia’s interference in\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina the occupied territories of Croatia and Bosnia and\nstated that by attacking Srebrenica and threatening Herzegovina.341\nZepa, the Bosnian Serbs continued to realize their main\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of\ngoal: the elimination of the Contact Group plan and the\n France noted that the action undertaken by the Bosnian\nstrengthening of their own position with the goal of the\n Serbs against Srebrenica was of a different nature since\nlegalization of the fait accompli. He recalled the\n it represented a deliberate intention on the part of the\nstatement made by his President, on 12 July 1995, in\n Bosnian Serbs to use force to occupy a safe area. He\nwhich he urged the United Nations and NATO to\n stated that the international community could not\nre-establish by force the violated safe zone of\n accept any questioning of the status of the safe areas.\nSrebrenica, and that tents, food and medicine be\n The draft resolution therefore called on the Secretary-\nprovided to the population expelled from that safe area.\n General to take the necessary steps to bring about the\nThe speaker further noted that his Government\n withdrawal of Bosnian Serb forces from Srebrenica. In\npreferred the full rehabilitation of the mandate of\n supporting that request, France did not wish to impose\nUNPROFOR and its strengthening. UNPROFOR had\n the use of any particular means. It was simply\nan obligation to defend safe areas since that defence\n__________________ signifying its preparedness to make troops available for\n __________________\n 337 Ibid., pp. 11-12.\n 340 S/PV.3553, pp. 2-4.\n 338 Ibid., pp. 13-14.\n 341 Ibid., pp. 4-5.\n 339 S/1995/560.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 825\n"
[106] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nany operations the civilian and military authorities and Gravely concerned also at the very serious situation\nthe United Nations force might consider realistic and which confronts personnel of the United Nations Protection\nrealizable.342 Force and a great number of displaced persons within the safe\n area at Potocari, especially the lack of essential food supplies\n The representative of the Russian Federation and medical care,\ncondemned the actions of the Bosnian Serb army in Paying tribute to the United Nations Protection Force\nviolation of Security Council decisions on the safe personnel deployed in the safe area of Srebrenica,\nareas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His delegation\n Condemning the offensive by the Bosnian Serb forces\nconcurred with the view that it was necessary to restore against the safe area of Srebrenica and, in particular, the\nthe demilitarized status of the safe area of Srebrenica. detention by the Bosnian Serb forces of United Nations\nThat task was complex, but in the Russian Federation’s Protection Force personnel,\nview, the solution would not be reached through the\n Condemning also all attacks on United Nations Protection\nuse of air power or through the withdrawal of United Force personnel,\nNations forces from Bosnia. Rather, the secure and\neffective functioning of UNPROFOR should be Recalling the agreement of 18 April 1993 by the\nensured. Noting that the draft resolution mandated the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\n Bosnian Serb party for the demilitarization of Srebrenica, and\nSecretary-General to use all resources available to regretting that it has not been implemented in full by either\nrestore the status of the safe area, the speaker party,\nexpressed the view that that provision precluded the\noption of using force, as that would exceed the existing Stressing the importance of renewed efforts to achieve an\n overall peaceful settlement, and the unacceptability of any\nmandate of the peacekeeping operation. It was also attempt to resolve the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and\nextremely important that efforts to restore the safe area Herzegovina by military means,\nstatus did not violate the impartiality of UNPROFOR.\nUnited Nations forces could not and should not Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United\n Nations,\nundertake actions that would convert them into a party\nto the conflict. The Russian Federation fully concurred 1. Demands that the Bosnian Serb forces cease their\nwith the Secretary-General’s view that attacks launched offensive and withdraw from the safe area of Srebrenica\nfrom safe areas were inconsistent with the safe area immediately;\nconcept and precipitated a disproportionate response 2. Demands also that the parties respect fully the\nfrom the Bosnian Serbs. The Russian Federation also status of the safe area of Srebrenica in accordance with the\nagreed with the Secretary-General that the only way to agreement of 18 April 1993;\nmake safe areas truly safe was to define a regime 3. Demands further that the parties respect fully the\nacceptable to both parties and to promote mutual safety of United Nations Protection Force personnel and ensure\nrespect for that regime.343 their complete freedom of movement, including resupply;\n\n The draft resolution, as orally revised in its 4. Demands that the Bosnian Serb forces immediately\nprovisional form, was then put to the vote and adopted and unconditionally release unharmed all detained United\n Nations Protection Force personnel;\nunanimously as resolution 1004 (1995), which reads:\n 5. Demands also that all parties allow unimpeded\n The Security Council,\n access for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, for Refugees and other international humanitarian agencies to\n the safe area of Srebrenica in order to alleviate the plight of the\n Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial civilian population and, in particular, that they cooperate on the\nintegrity and political independence of the Republic of Bosnia restoration of utilities;\nand Herzegovina,\n 6. Requests the Secretary-General to use all resources\n Gravely concerned at the deterioration in the situation in available to him to restore the status, as defined by the\nand around the safe area of Srebrenica, Republic of Bosnia and agreement of 18 April 1993, of the safe area of Srebrenica in\nHerzegovina, and at the plight of the civilian population there, accordance with the mandate of the United Nations Protection\n__________________ Force, and calls upon the parties to cooperate to that end;\n 342 Ibid., p. 5 7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n 343 Ibid., pp. 9-10.\n\n\n\n\n826 07-63109\n"
[107] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the documents 346 and stated that, after consultations\nUnited States stated that the resolution just adopted among members of the Security Council, he had been\nmust be the beginning of “credible resolve”. She authorized to make the following statement on behalf\nfurther stated that, peaceful means were to be of the Council:347\npreferred, but when “brutal force” was used the The Security Council recalls its resolution 1004 (1995).\nSecretary-General must have the right to use the The Council is deeply concerned about the ongoing forced\nresources available, in consultation with the relevant relocation of tens of thousands of civilians from the Srebrenica\ntroop contributors, to meet the humanitarian needs of safe area to the Tuzla region by the Bosnian Serb party. Such\nthe civilian population and to achieve lasting peace. forced relocation is a clear violation of the human rights of the\nThe United States therefore believed that UNPROFOR civilian population. It is especially concerned about reports of\nmust remain in Bosnia, supported by the rapid reaction grave mistreatment and killing of innocent civilians. It is equally\n concerned about reports that up to 4,000 men and boys have\nforce. The leadership of UNPROFOR would have to been forcibly removed by the Bosnian Serb party from the\nmake tough decisions in the days ahead. The United Srebrenica safe area. It demands that in conformity with\nStates further believed that the role of NATO would be internationally recognized standards of conduct and\nvital to decisions in support of UNPROFOR. It international law the Bosnian Serb party release them\nsupported the full and speedy deployment of the rapid immediately, respect fully the rights of the civilian population of\nreaction force and was prepared to provide the the Srebrenica safe area and other persons protected under\nnecessary air and logistical resources for the international humanitarian law and permit access by the\n International Committee of the Red Cross.\npurpose.344\n The Council again condemns the unacceptable practice of\n The representative of China stated that his ethnic cleansing and reaffirms that those who have committed or\ndelegation had voted in favour of the resolution just have ordered the commission of such acts will be held\nadopted because it was aimed at protecting the individually responsible in respect of such acts.\nSrebrenica safe area, stopping offensives against The Council demands that the Bosnian Serb party\nUNPROFOR, and preventing the further deterioration immediately allow unimpeded access to the civilian population\nof the humanitarian situation. China nevertheless had of the Srebrenica safe area by international humanitarian\nreservations about taking enforcement action by organizations and cooperate with any procedure established by\ninvoking Chapter VII of the Charter, as set forth in the those organizations to determine which civilians wish to depart\nresolution. It was also concerned at the serious political from the area of Srebrenica. It further demands that the Bosnian\nand military consequences that might result from the Serb party respect fully the rights of those civilians who wish to\n remain in the safe area and cooperate with efforts to ensure that\nactions authorized by the resolution, including the civilians who wish to depart are allowed to do so with their\npossibility that the peacekeeping force could become a families in an orderly, safe way in conformity with international\nparty to the conflict and thus lose the basis of its law.\ncontinued existence. 345\n The Council demands that both sides allow the\n unhindered movement of humanitarian relief and cooperate with\n Decision of 14 July 1995 (3554th meeting): __________________\n statement by the President 346 Letter dated 12 July 1995 from the representative of\n\n At its 3554th meeting, on 14 July 1995, the Morocco addressed to the President of the Security\n Council, transmitting a statement adopted on 11 July\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item.\n 1995 by the OIC Contact Group at its meeting on the\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (S/1995/563); letter\ninvited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, dated 13 July 1995 from the representative of Bosnia and\nat his request, to participate in the discussion without Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security\nthe right to vote. The President (Honduras) drew the Council (S/1995/571); letters dated 13 July 1995 from\nattention of the members of the Council to several the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed\n__________________ to the Secretary-General (S/1995/572 and S/1995/573);\n 344 Ibid., pp. 10-11. and letter dated 12 July 1995 from the representative of\n 345 Ibid., pp. 12-13. Spain addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting\n the text of a communiqué of the same date, issued by the\n Presidency of the European Union, concerning\n Srebrenica (S/1995/574).\n 347 S/PRST/1995/32.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 827\n"
[108] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nefforts by international organizations and agencies and after consultations among members of the Security\nconcerned Governments to provide food, medicine, facilities and Council, he had been authorized to make the following\nhousing to the displaced. statement on behalf of the Council:350\n The Council reiterates its demand that the Bosnian Serb\n The Security Council, recalling its previous resolutions, is\nforces immediately and unconditionally release unharmed all\n deeply concerned by the situation in and around the safe area of\ndetained personnel of the United Nations Protection Force and\n Zepa. It condemns in the strongest possible terms the offensive\nthat the parties respect fully the safety of all Force personnel\n by the Bosnian Serb forces against the safe area. The Council is\nand ensure their complete freedom of movement.\n also concerned in particular at the plight of the civilian\n The Council pays tribute to all the personnel of the United population there.\nNations Protection Force and of the Office of the United Nations\n The Council attaches the utmost importance to the safety\nHigh Commissioner for Refugees, especially those deployed in\n and well-being of the civilian population in Zepa. It demands\nthe area of Srebrenica. It notes that the presence and bravery of\n that the Bosnian Serb forces refrain from any further action that\nthe troops has undoubtedly saved the lives of many civilians in\n threatens the safety of that population and that they respect fully\nthe Srebrenica area.\n the rights of the civilian population and other persons protected\n under international humanitarian law. The Council reaffirms its\n Decision of 20 July 1995 (3556th meeting): condemnation of all violations of international humanitarian\n statement by the President law, and reiterates to all concerned that those who have\n committed or ordered the commission of such acts will be held\n By a letter dated 17 July 1995 addressed to the individually responsible in respect of such acts. It reminds the\nPresident of the Security Council,348 the representative military and political leaders of the Bosnian Serb party that this\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina transmitted a letter of the responsibility extends to any such acts committed by forces\nsame date from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of under their command.\nBosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of The Council underlines the importance it attaches to the\nthe Security Council. In that letter, the Foreign fullest cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High\nMinister reported that attacks against the safe area of Commissioner for Refugees and other international humanitarian\nZepa were continuing and requested an emergency organizations and demands that they be given unhindered\nmeeting of the Security Council to consider security freedom of movement and access to that area. It further demands\nmeasures and the safe evacuation of the civilian that the Bosnian Serb authorities cooperate with all efforts,\n including those of the United Nations Protection Force, to\npopulation from Zepa. ensure the safety of the civilian population and, in particular, its\n At its 3556th meeting, held on 20 July 1995 in most vulnerable members, including evacuation as requested by\nresponse to the request contained in the above- the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina in his letter of 17 July 1995.\nmentioned letter, the Council included the letter in its\nagenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the The Council strongly condemns the recent acts of\nCouncil invited the representative of Bosnia and violence and intimidation which have occurred against United\nHerzegovina, at his request, to participate in the Nations Protection Force personnel. It demands that both parties\n ensure the safety and freedom of movement of Force personnel\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The President at all times.\n(Honduras) drew the attention of the members of the\nCouncil to a number of documents 349 and stated that, __________________\n__________________\n transmitting the text of a statement by the Chairman-in-\n 348 S/1995/582.\n Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation\n 349 Letter dated 14 July 1995 from the representative of\n in Europe concerning the situation in Bosnia and\n Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the Secretary- Herzegovina (S/1995/583); letter dated 17 July 1995\n General (S/1995/576); letter dated 14 July 1995 from the from the representative of Malaysia addressed to the\n representative of Ukraine addressed to the Secretary- Secretary-General (S/1995/584); letter dated 18 July\n General (S/1995/577); letter dated 14 July 1995 from the 1995 from the representative of Egypt addressed to the\n representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to President of the Security Council (S/1995/589); letter\n the President of the Security Council (S/1995/579); letter dated 17 July 1995 from the representative of Ukraine\n dated 14 July 1995 from the representative of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1995/590); and\n addressed to the President of the Security Council, letter dated 19 July 1995 from the representative of\n transmitting the declaration issued by the Group of Arab Jordan addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1995/598).\n States at its meeting of the same date (S/1995/581); 350 S/PRST/1995/33.\n letter dated 17 July 1995 from the representative of\n Hungary addressed to the Secretary-General,\n\n\n\n828 07-63109\n"
[109] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n Decision of 25 July 1995 (3557th meeting): The Council remains particularly concerned at the plight\n statement by the President of the civilian population and other persons protected under\n international humanitarian law in the Zepa area. It welcomes and\n By a letter dated 24 July 1995 addressed to the supports the efforts being made by the United Nations\nPresident of the Security Council,351 the representative Protection Force and the international humanitarian agencies, as\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the light of the requested by the President of the Republic of Bosnia and\ndeteriorating situation in the safe area of Zepa and the Herzegovina, to achieve a safe evacuation of those civilians who\n wish to leave and stresses the importance it attaches to the\nimminent threat to its civilian population, requested an success of these efforts. It requests the Secretary-General to use\nemergency meeting of the Security Council, to address all resources available to him to that end and calls upon the\nthe immediate and urgent need for all measures to be parties to cooperate.\ntaken to ensure a safe and UNPROFOR-escorted\n The Council demands that the United Nations Protection\nevacuation of the civilian population of Zepa. Force and the international humanitarian agencies be provided\n At its 3557th meeting, held on 25 July 1995 in with immediate and unhindered access to the population of the\nresponse to the request contained in the above- area and, in particular, that the Bosnian Serb party provide\n access for representatives of the International Committee of the\nmentioned letter, the Council included the letter in its Red Cross to all civilians who decide to remain and permit the\nagenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the International Committee of the Red Cross to register any\nCouncil invited the representative of Bosnia and persons detained against their will and visit them immediately.\nHerzegovina, at his request, to participate in the\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The President Decision of 10 August 1995 (3564th meeting):\n(Honduras) drew the attention of the members of the resolution 1010 (1995)\nCouncil to several documents352 and stated that, after\nconsultations among members of the Security Council, At its 3564th meeting, on 10 August 1995, the\nhe had been authorized to make the following Council resumed its consideration of the item.\nstatement on behalf of the Council:353 Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\n invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n The Security Council is deeply concerned about the at his request, to participate in the discussion without\nsituation in and around the safe area of Zepa in the Republic of the right to vote. The President (Indonesia) then drew\nBosnia and Herzegovina. The Council notes the letter of 25 July\n1995 from the President of the Republic of Bosnia and\n the attention of the Council members to the text of a\nHerzegovina to the President of the Security Council. draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council’s\n prior consultations 354 and to two other documents. 355\n The Council reaffirms its previous relevant resolutions\nand the statement by its President of 20 July 1995. It reiterates The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nin the strongest possible terms its condemnation of the Bosnian stated that the draft resolution was a small step\nSerb offensive against the safe area and demands that the forward. Nevertheless, it was a resolution that more\nBosnian Serbs comply fully with the requirements set out in that clearly articulated care, even though it might be\nstatement as well as its earlier resolutions. The Council further\ndemands that Bosnian Serb forces withdraw from the safe areas\n irreparably late for many. The draft did not mention the\nof Srebrenica and Zepa. destiny of those refugees from Zepa who had fled to\n__________________ Serbia. Bosnia and Herzegovina requested international\n 351 S/1995/610.\n humanitarian organizations to register those refugees\n 352 Letter dated 25 July 1995 from the representative of and to prevent their disappearance or further abuse in\n Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of violation of the Geneva Conventions and humanitarian\n the Security Council, transmitting a letter of the same law. The Bosnian delegation also looked forward to the\n date from the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina __________________\n addressed to the President of the Security Council 354 S/1995/677.\n (S/1995/611); letter dated 25 July 1995 from the 355 Letter dated 8 August 1995 from the representative of\n representative of Morocco addressed to the President of Kazakhstan addressed to the Secretary-General\n the Security Council (S/1995/612); letter dated 24 July (S/1995/674); and letter dated 9 August 1995 from the\n 1995 from the representative of Yugoslavia addressed to representative of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary-\n the President of the Security Council (S/1995/613); and General (S/1995/679).\n letter dated 25 July 1995 from the representative of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of\n the Security Council (S/1995/617).\n 353 S/PRST/1995/34.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 829\n"
[110] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nreport by the Secretary-General on these issues, as events in and around Zepa and Srebrenica might have\nrequested by the Council in the draft resolution.356 been avoided.358\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of The representative of the United States stated that\nGermany stated that his country had taken the initiative Srebrenica and Zepa should not be forgotten because\nwhich had led to the draft resolution because it was they were areas for which the Council had assumed a\nappalled and alarmed. Several weeks after the fall of special responsibility. They were United Nations\nSrebrenica and Zepa, the whereabouts of about 7,000 protected safe areas, where the Council hoped its\nto 8,000 male Bosnians who were taken prisoners by authority and legitimacy would offer protection from\nSerbian Serbs were still unknown. According to the violence and attack. Tragically, the authority of the\nlatest update by the International Committee of the Red Council and the good opinion of the world appeared to\nCross (ICRC), only 164 detainees from Srebrenica and mean little to the Bosnian Serb leadership. The Council\n44 from Zepa had been registered. Germany insisted had a responsibility to investigate what had happened\nthat immediate access be granted to international and to ensure that those responsible were brought to\nhumanitarian organizations to all detainees from justice. Turning to the resolution, the speaker noted the\nSrebrenica and Zepa and that the civilian Bosnians demand that the Bosnian Serbs give immediate access\ntaken prisoner be released immediately. It condemned to persons displaced from Srebrenica and Zepa, as well\nthe persistent refusal by the Bosnian Serbs to allow as the demand that access be granted to detained\nsuch access to ICRC representatives. That practice persons and that the rights of those persons be\nconstituted a violation of international humanitarian respected. He also noted the resolution’s reiteration\nlaw. The speaker also urged United Nations that those who had violated international humanitarian\nrepresentatives to continue their efforts to obtain law would be held accountable as individuals for their\ninformation on the missing men.357 acts. Establishing the truth about what had happened in\n Srebrenica was essential not only to justice, but to\n The representative of the Russian Federation\n peace. Responsibility for the atrocities lay with the\nexpressed concern at reports of flagrant violations of the\n individuals who had ordered and committed the crimes\nnorms of international humanitarian law in Srebrenica,\n and true reconciliation would not be possible until the\nwhich should be duly investigated, as well as at the\n perception of collective guilt had been expunged and\nunavailability of information on the whereabouts of\n personal responsibility assigned. 359\nmany former inhabitants of Srebrenica. The Russian\nFederation supported the demand in the draft resolution The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nthat the Bosnian Serbs grant representatives of UNHCR, adopted unanimously as resolution 1010 (1995), which\nICRC and other international humanitarian agencies reads:\naccess to those who had been displaced from Srebrenica The Security Council,\nand Zepa. It also expected all prisoners of war to be\ntreated in accordance with international norms and noted Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, and\nthat, if the Secretary-General were to confirm that reaffirming its resolution 1004 (1995) of 12 July 1995,\nviolations of international humanitarian law had indeed Reaffirming the statements by its President of 20 and\ntaken place, then the Council would have to respond 25 July 1995, and deeply concerned that the demands set out\nappropriately. The speaker noted that the lesson to be therein have not been fully complied with by the Bosnian Serb\ndrawn from events in Srebrenica and Zepa was that there party,\nwas a need to address the concept of safe areas and the Reiterating the unacceptability of the violation of the safe\nmodalities for its implementation. It was important to areas of Srebrenica and Zepa by Bosnian Serb forces,\ndetermine what kind of safe area was acceptable to both Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial\nsides. In addition, the relevant agreements should include integrity and independence of the Republic of Bosnia and\nprovision for the demilitarization of all territories. He Herzegovina,\ncontended that if that had been done earlier, the tragic Affirming its commitment to the search for an overall\n__________________\n negotiated settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia\n 356 S/PV.3564, pp. 2-3. __________________\n 357 Ibid., pp. 3-4.\n 358 Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n 359 Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n\n\n\n\n830 07-63109\n"
[111] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States Decision of 7 September 1995 (3572nd meeting):\nthere within their internationally recognized borders, and stressing statement by the President\nthe importance it attaches to the mutual recognition thereof,\n On 30 August 1995, pursuant to resolution 1010\n Deeply concerned at reports of grave violations of\ninternational humanitarian law in and around Srebrenica and at\n (1995), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a\nthe fact that many of the former inhabitants of Srebrenica cannot report concerning events in Srebrenica and Zepa.361 The\nbe accounted for, Secretary-General reported that, despite repeated\n requests by his Special Representative, the Bosnian Serb\n Concerned also at the plight of the civilian population and\nother persons protected under international humanitarian law,\n authorities had refused access to persons displaced from\noriginating in the Zepa area, Srebrenica and Zepa, making it impossible to collect\n direct, first-hand evidence of the extent to which the\n Expressing its strong support for the efforts of the Bosnian Serbs had respected the rights of displaced\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross in seeking access to\ndisplaced persons, and condemning the failure of the Bosnian Serb\n persons. There was significant prima facie evidence,\nparty to comply with their commitments to the International however, that violations of international humanitarian\nCommittee of the Red Cross in respect of such access, law had occurred during and after the Bosnian Serb\n offensive on Srebrenica. The Secretary-General thus\n 1. Demands that the Bosnian Serb party give\nrepresentatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for\n recommended that the Council reiterate its urgent call to\nRefugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Bosnian Serb leadership to authorize immediate and\nother international agencies immediate access to persons full access to displaced persons. Such access should\ndisplaced from Srebrenica and Zepa who are within the areas of include the possibility for an impartial international\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of investigation to take place and remained a crucial step in\nBosnian Serb forces, and that the Bosnian Serb party permit ascertaining the full extent of violations of international\nrepresentatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross humanitarian law and human rights and in addressing\nto visit and register any persons detained against their will,\nincluding any members of the forces of the Republic of Bosnia\n any persisting abuses.\nand Herzegovina; At its 3572nd meeting, on 7 September 1995, the\n 2. Also demands that the Bosnian Serb party respect Council included that report in its agenda. Following\nfully the rights of all such persons and ensure their safety, and the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nurges that any persons detained be released; representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\n 3. Reiterates that all those who commit violations of request, to participate in the discussion without the\ninternational humanitarian law will be held individually right to vote. The President (Italy) then stated that,\nresponsible in respect of such acts; after consultations among members of the Council, he\n 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the\n had been authorized to make the following statement\nCouncil as soon as possible, and no later than 1 September 1995, on behalf of the Council: 362\nwith any information available to United Nations personnel The Security Council has considered the report of the\nregarding compliance with the present resolution and concerning Secretary-General of 30 August 1995 submitted pursuant to\nviolations of international humanitarian law; Council resolution 1010 (1995) of 10 August 1995.\n 5. Decides to remain seized of the matter. The Council strongly condemns the failure of the Bosnian\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of Serb party to comply with the demands contained in resolution\n 1010 (1995). The Bosnian Serb party’s refusal to cooperate with\nFrance noted that the Council requested the Secretary- the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the\nGeneral to report to the Council before the end of the International Committee of the Red Cross cannot but reinforce\nmonth on the implementation of the resolution just the deep concern expressed in that resolution and in previous\nadopted, and on the measures taken to end violations of resolutions and statements.\nhumanitarian law. He, however, warned that the The Council stresses its determination that the fate of\nCouncil might have to take action before that date persons displaced from Srebrenica and Zepa be established. It\narguing that it owed it to itself to remain vigilant on a reaffirms its demands to the Bosnian Serb party to give\nquestion which involved the fate of thousands of representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for\ncivilians subjected to vile and barbaric treatment.360 Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross and\n __________________\n__________________ 361 S/1995/755.\n 362 S/PRST/1995/43.\n 360 Ibid., p. 7.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 831\n"
[112] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nother international agencies immediate access to such persons The representative of the Russian Federation\nwho are within the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and noted that his country had requested an urgent meeting\nHerzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces and to of the Security Council, to consider the situation that\npermit representatives of the International Committee of the Red\nCross to visit and register any persons detained against their\n had arisen in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of the\nwill. bombing of Bosnian Serb positions by NATO aircraft.\n The Russian Federation was convinced that the NATO\n The Council also reaffirms its demands to the Bosnian air strikes and the shelling of the Bosnian Serbs by the\nSerb party to respect fully the rights of all such persons, to\nensure their safety and to release them.\n Rapid Reaction Force were undermining, rather than\n strengthening, efforts to reach a political settlement.\n The Council reiterates that all those who commit Such steps were beyond the decisions of the Security\nviolations of international humanitarian law will be held Council, changing the peacekeeping character of the\nindividually responsible in respect of such acts.\n United Nations operation in Bosnia and involving the\n The Council takes note of the investigations that are being international community in a conflict against one of the\ncarried out by the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of parties. The speaker also raised a number of objections\nPersons Responsible for Serious Violations of International to the manner in which the air strikes had proceeded.\nHumanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former\nYugoslavia since 1991, established pursuant to its resolution 827\n Firstly, the agreed procedures for the use of force in\n(1993). The Council reiterates in this context that all States shall Bosnia and Herzegovina had been seriously violated.\ncooperate fully with the Tribunal and its organs, including by Consultations had not been held with members of the\nproviding access to sites the Tribunal deems important for its Council, despite the stipulation in resolution 844\ninvestigations. (1993) that they should take place, and the members of\n The Council requests the Secretary-General to continue the Council had not been informed in a timely fashion\nhis efforts and to report to the Council no later than 6 October of the actions taken. Those oversights were particularly\n1995 regarding compliance with resolution 1010 (1995) and any inadmissible because the actions represented a\nfurther relevant information that may become available. qualitative change in the nature of the use of force.\n The Security Council will remain actively seized of the Secondly, the bombing and shelling had been\nmatter. “disproportionate and excessive”. Thirdly, there had\n been a qualitative change in the “dual key” procedure,\n Deliberations of 8 September 1995 meaning that the United Nations had no authority to\n (3575th meeting) end the use of force without the agreement of NATO.\n Fourthly, apparently a memorandum of understanding\n At its 3575th meeting, on 8 September 1995, the had been drawn up between NATO and the United\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item. Nations concerning the use of air power under the new\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council conditions, according to which force would be applied\ninvited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to areas outside the boundaries of Bosnia and\nCroatia, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey and Ukraine, at their Herzegovina. Such a use of air power would be in\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the direct violation of the resolutions of the Council.\nright to vote. The Council also invited Ambassador Lastly, the active participation of the Rapid Reaction\nDragomir Djokic, at his request, to address it in the Force exceeded its mandate, as set out in resolution\ncourse of the subsequent discussion. The President 988 (1995). The recent actions had not been taken to\n(Italy) then drew the attention of the Council members protect United Nations personnel and humanitarian\nto several documents.363 convoys. Rather, they amounted to virtual participation\n__________________ in military action against one side. Thus, the Rapid\n 363 Letter dated 7 September 1995 from the representative Reaction Force no longer remained impartial, even\n of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary- though it remained an integral part of the United\n General (S/1995/776); letter dated 7 September 1995 Nations peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.364\n from the representative of Yugoslavia addressed to the\n President of the Security Council (S/1995/778); and The representative of the United Kingdom stated\n letter dated 8 September 1995 from the representatives that his delegation was confident that the recent United\n of France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Nations/NATO action in Bosnia had been appropriate\n Kingdom and the United States addressed to the __________________\n Secretary-General (S/1995/780). 364 S/PV.3575, pp. 2-4.\n\n\n\n\n832 07-63109\n"
[113] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nand justified. The action had had clear and specific however, Nigeria regretted that it had become\nobjectives, designed to protect the safe areas in line necessary to employ such force. Nigeria hoped that the\nwith Security Council resolutions. If the Bosnian Serbs air strikes had not done irreparable harm to the\nwere to comply with the requirements explained to neutrality of the United Nations. It was not too late to\nthem by the United Nations commanders, then the make a reassessment of strategy. 368\naction would end.365\n The representative of China welcomed the\n The representative of France emphasized that the progress achieved in Geneva. He noted, however, that\nmilitary action taken by the United Nations and NATO his country was not in favour of using air strikes to\nhad been the outcome of decisions taken at the London exert pressure. Taking such action would further\nConference of July 1994, as part of a plan to protect complicate the situation and create obstacles to a\nthe safe areas. Those operations had been triggered by political settlement. In the light of the progress\nthe shelling of the Sarajevo market and had been based achieved, it was necessary to cease the air strikes\nupon the “dual key” mechanism, whose legitimacy was immediately, in order to create an environment\nbeyond reproach, and on respect for the prerogatives of conducive to a political settlement.369\nthe Council and the responsibilities of the United\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nNations. He further stated that military firmness was an\n stated that her Government fully supported the United\nessential condition for the success of diplomatic action.\n Nations and NATO action against military targets of\nIt was essential that the siege of Sarajevo be lifted, that\n the Bosnian Serbs and considered the legitimacy of\nheavy weapons be withdrawn beyond the exclusion\n such actions to be beyond doubt, as they were being\nzone, and that all attacks against the safe areas\n taken in accordance with resolution 836 (1993). 370\ncease.366\n The representative of Croatia stated that his\n The representative of the United States stated\n country supported the operation of NATO in Bosnia.\nthat, in order to defend the possibility of a diplomatic\n Croatia believed that it was necessary to continue\nsolution, the international community had had no\n exerting pressure on the Bosnian Serb party, and that\nchoice but to respond forcefully to the Bosnian Serb\n NATO’s course of action would decisively assist to\nattack on the Sarajevo marketplace. The Bosnian Serbs\n bring about an overall lasting peaceful settlement in the\nhad been warned that continued attacks on the safe\n region. It was assisting in that effort by allowing the\nareas would lead to a strong response. They had chosen\n use of its airspace by NATO air forces, and providing\nto ignore that warning and must accept the\n the use of its ports for the rapid reaction capacity of\nconsequences of their actions. The United Nations and\n UNPROFOR. While supporting the newest peace\nNATO had made it clear that they were not at war with\n initiative, the speaker emphasized the importance of\nthe Bosnian Serbs. The air strikes would end as soon as\n mutual recognition of the countries in the former\nthe Bosnian Serb leadership complied with certain\n Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was\nconditions, which called for nothing more than the\n essential to protect and unconditionally respect all\nimplementation of Security Council resolutions. The\n international borders and territorial integrity of all the\nspeaker further noted that these actions were fully\n successor States of the former Socialist Federal\nauthorized by Security Council resolutions. The\n Republic of Yugoslavia. His delegation also stated that\nSecurity Council had created the safe areas and had\n Croatia did not find encouragement in the reluctance of\ngiven UNPROFOR the mandate to deter attacks and it\n the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to subscribe to the\nshould support the efforts of UNPROFOR to\n basic principle of the peaceful reintegration of Eastern\nimplement that mandate.367\n Slavonia into the rest of Croatia.371\n The representative of Nigeria stated that the\n Mr. Djokic demanded that the Security Council\nNATO air strikes had been an appropriate and\n take urgent measures to end the NATO air strikes and\nmeasured response to the recent attack by the Bosnian\n attacks by the Rapid Reaction Force against Bosnian\nSerb forces against a civilian centre. At the same time, __________________\n__________________\n 368 Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n 365 Ibid., p. 4.\n 369 Ibid., p. 8.\n 366 Ibid., pp. 4-5.\n 370 Ibid., pp. 10-11.\n 367 Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n 371 Ibid., p. 12.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 833\n"
[114] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nSerb military and civilian targets. Noting that NATO Decision of 8 September 1995 (3576th meeting):\nair strikes had commenced as a retaliation for the statement by the President\nshelling of Sarajevo, the speaker contended, however,\n At its 3576th meeting, on 8 September 1995, the\nthat the scale, intensity and duration of the strikes went\n Council resumed its consideration of the item.\nfar beyond retaliatory measures, and their clear aim\n Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\nwas to inflict serious injury on the Bosnian Serb\n invited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nmilitary capability, economic infrastructure and even\n and Croatia, at their request, to participate in the\ncivilian facilities. Moreover, the scope and intensity of\n discussion without the right to vote. The President\nthe bombing had greatly exceeded the mandate given\n (Italy) drew the attention of the members of the\nto the Secretary-General and NATO by relevant\n Council to a letter dated 8 September 1995 from the\nSecurity Council resolutions with the aim of protecting\n representatives of France, Germany, the Russian\nthe safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. By departing\n Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States\nfrom the traditional principles of peacekeeping,\n addressed to the Secretary-General,376 transmitting the\nneutrality and impartiality, the United Nations and\n text of the Joint Statement and Agreed Basic Principles\nNATO had set out on a “slippery slope”, which could\n signed on 8 September 1995, in Geneva, by the\nlead to further involvement on the side of the Bosnian\n Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and\nMuslims and full-scale war against the Bosnian Serbs.\n Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of\nAt a time when a just and lasting peace was at last\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). He then stated\nwithin reach, it was essential that that opportunity\n that, after consultations among members of the\nshould not be missed, and that NATO air strikes be\n Security Council, he had been authorized to make the\nstopped.372\n following statement on behalf of the Council:377\n The representative of Ukraine stated that in view The Security Council welcomes the meeting of the\nof the very encouraging progress which had been Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and\nachieved in the process of securing a peace settlement Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic\nin the Balkans, it would be desirable to review the of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) held under the auspices\nquestion of putting an end to any further bombing of of the Contact Group at Geneva on 8 September 1995. It\nmilitary targets belonging to the Bosnian Serbs by welcomes the joint statement issued at the conclusion of that\nNATO. Such a step would help create a favourable meeting and in particular the agreement by the parties on the\n Agreed Basic Principles. It strongly urges the parties to\natmosphere at the talks and help to strengthen trust negotiate in good faith and expeditiously on the basis of those\nbetween the parties. A second matter, of even greater Principles with the aim of achieving a lasting peace throughout\nimmediacy, was the question of lifting economic the region.\nsanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.373\n During the debate, other speakers supported the Decision of 15 September 1995 (3578th meeting):\nair operation conducted by NATO which was consistent resolution 1015 (1995)\nwith Security Council resolutions, in particular By a letter dated 6 September 1995 addressed to\nresolution 836 (1993).374 Some were of the view that the President of the Security Council,378 the Secretary-\nthe operation should continue until its objectives were General transmitted the report of the Co-Chairmen of\nfully met.375 the Steering Committee of the International Conference\n on the Former Yugoslavia, concerning the operations of\n__________________ the Conference’s mission to the Federal Republic of\n 372 Ibid., pp. 12-13.\n Yugoslavia. The report contained the certification\n 373 Ibid., pp. 13-14.\n referred to in resolution 1003 (1993).379\n 374 Ibid., pp. 6-7 (Germany); p. 7 (Czech Republic); pp. 8-9\n\n (Indonesia); p. 9 (Argentina); pp. 14-15 (Egypt); p. 16 At its 3578th meeting, on 15 September 1995, the\n (Turkey); and pp. 16-17 (Pakistan). Council included the above-mentioned letter in its\n 375 Ibid., pp. 14-15 (Egypt); and p. 16 (Turkey).\n __________________\n 376 S/1995/780.\n 377 S/PRST/1995/45.\n 378 S/1995/768.\n 379 See footnote 294.\n\n\n\n\n834 07-63109\n"
[115] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nagenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the The representative of Bulgaria, referring to the\nCouncil invited the representatives of Bosnia and continuing sanctions against the Federal Republic of\nHerzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia and Ukraine, at their Yugoslavia, noted that Bulgaria, as a State Member of\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the the United Nations that was strictly observing the\nright to vote. The President (Italy) then drew the sanctions regardless of their devastating effect on its\nattention of the Council members to the text of a draft economy, hoped that the peace process might lead to a\nresolution submitted by the Czech Republic, France, discussion about the suspension and gradual lifting of\nGermany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United the sanctions. Recalling the statement of 18 May by the\nKingdom and the United States. 380 Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria, Greece, Moldova,\n Romania and Ukraine, which had expressed concern at\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n the overall situation in the region aggravated by the\nstated that the findings of his Government differed\n sanctions, the speaker reiterated his Government’s\ndrastically from those of the International Conference\n support for the concrete proposals made by the Foreign\non the Former Yugoslavia mission. According to the\n Ministers to mitigate the impact of the sanctions. He\nGovernment of Bosnia, deliveries of military assistance\n further emphasized that one of the major challenges\nfrom the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the\n facing the United Nations was the extent to which it\nBosnian Serbs had doubled between January and July.\n would be able to resolve the special economic\nHis delegation was surprised that the draft resolution\n problems of non-target countries affected by the\nbefore the Council supported the suspension of\n implementation of sanctions.383\nsanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nfor 180 days. At the same time it believed that the time The representative of Croatia noted that his\n“when the international community was willing to be delegation believed that the sanctions were still one of\ndeceived by the regime in Belgrade was irretrievably the most effective instruments of the international\ngone”. Bosnia hoped that the latest peace initiative community for bringing an end to the conflict.\nwould mean that the draft resolution would be the last Eliminating that instrument would undermine the\nin a series of sanctions resolutions.381 established balance and the international community’s\n leverage. His delegation also believed that the gradual\n The representative of Ukraine considered the\n lifting of the sanctions against Belgrade must be\ndraft resolution to constitute a recognition by the\n related to deeds and not promises. It also reminded the\ninternational community of the desire of the Federal\n Council that resolution 871 (1993) had clearly\nRepublic of Yugoslavia to cooperate for a peaceful\n established the linkage between ending Belgrade’s\nsettlement. Ukraine believed, however, that the\n economic and political isolation, and its cooperation in\ncontinuation of the suspension of sanctions for a\n ending the occupation of parts of Croatia. It warned\nfurther 180 days was an inadequate step. Rather, the\n that any exclusion of the question of the remaining\nCouncil should be considering lifting the sanctions\n occupied territories of Croatia from the comprehensive\naltogether. A first step in that direction could be\n peace plan, including delinking them from the\nrenewing transit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n sanctions against Belgrade, would inevitably force the\nof a list of individual products, together with a lifting\n Government of Croatia to consider other legitimate\nof the ban on trade in products not regarded as\n means of restoring its sovereignty. 384\nstrategic. In that connection, Ukraine welcomed\nparagraph 3 of the draft resolution, which made it Speaking before the vote, the representative of\npossible for the Council to consider adjustments to the Indonesia took note of the certification issued by the\nsanctions regime. Before concluding, the speaker International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia\nstated that the process for lifting the sanctions could mission. At the same time, Indonesia was concerned by\ntake place at the same time as the process of mutual the continued shortcomings experienced in the border\nrecognition of the successor States of the former closure and, in particular, by the fact that uniformed\nYugoslavia.382 personnel were continuing to cross the border between\n__________________ the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and\n __________________\n 380 S/1995/789.\n 383 Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n 381 S/PV.3578, pp. 2-3.\n 384 Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n 382 Ibid., pp. 3-5.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 835\n"
[116] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nHerzegovina. Clearly, it was possible to improve the applicable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the\nclosure of the border. Indonesia would vote in favour light of further progress. Such steps towards a further\nof the draft resolution, however, for it believed that the easing of sanctions might be adopted at any time,\nclosure of the border remained an instrumental pillar without waiting for the resolution’s deadline to\nfor the achievement of a negotiated settlement. 385 expire. 387\n The representative of China noted that the The representative of Honduras stated that\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia had made many efforts maintaining sanctions indefinitely would not help to\nto implement the relevant resolutions of the Council, resolve the conflict. Honduras hoped that lifting the\nincluding continuing to meet its commitment to close sanctions would lighten the burden upon the economic\nthe border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. China was of and social development of the Federal Republic of\nthe view that Belgrade’s efforts to meet its Yugoslavia and neighbouring countries. It further\ncommitments should be recognized and encouraged by hoped that the draft resolution would motivate the\nthe Council, through concrete action. China would vote Belgrade authorities to continue cooperating with the\nin favour of the draft resolution extending the partial international community, so that the Council might\nsuspension of sanctions against the Federal Republic of consider revoking the sanctions regime. 388\nYugoslavia to 180 days. In keeping with its position on\n The representative of Botswana stated that the\nsanctions, however, China was not in favour of using\n proposed length of the suspension of aspects of the\npressure tactics such as mandatory sanctions in the\n sanctions was a clear recognition of the positive role\nregion of the former Yugoslavia, for such steps would\n played by Belgrade in the peace process in recent\nonly complicate the issue and hurt innocent civilians.\n weeks. Botswana welcomed the agreement signed the\nChina therefore believed that the Council should lift\n previous day for the withdrawal of the Bosnian Serb\nthe sanctions against the Federal Republic of\n heavy weapons from Sarajevo. Turning to the question\nYugoslavia and ease the remaining economic sanctions.\n of the air strikes, the speaker cautioned against the\nSuch a step would alleviate the suffering of the people\n appearance of partiality by the United Nations in the\nin the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, facilitate the\n Balkan conflict. The shelling of the Sarajevo\neconomic development of all the countries of the region,\n marketplace in Sarajevo had constituted a cynical\nand contribute to restoring peace and stability. 386\n provocation against the authority of the United Nations\n The representative of the Russian Federation and deserved a strong response. The United Nations\nstated that, in his delegation’s view, the draft resolution should, however, avoid the appearance of taking sides.\nwas a significant improvement over previous It could not wage war in Bosnia and hope to make\nresolutions on the subject, in particular because it did peace at the same time, without compromising the\nnot contain provisions pertaining to Belgrade’s execution of one of those aims. Furthermore, it was\ndecision to close the border to all but humanitarian critical that the Council guard against losing control of\ndeliveries. Another step in the right direction was the the transfer of authority of the United Nations to\nsubstantial increase in the timeframe for the next regional arrangements. In such situations, the United\nsuspension of some sanctions. In light of those factors, Nations should never assume the position of a\nthe Russian Federation would support the draft. In a bystander in an operation that was supposed to be\nbroader context, it believed that the constructive policy under the command and control of the Council.389\nof the Yugoslav leadership should meet with an\n The representative of Nigeria noted with\nappropriate response from the international community.\n satisfaction Belgrade’s continuing political commitment\nThe sanctions should be lifted without delay, as their\n to the closure of the border. Nigeria was concerned,\nretention was hindering efforts to reach a political\n however, at reports of continuing violations of that\nsettlement. Given the Russian Federation’s position in\n border. It therefore called on Belgrade to take adequate\nfavour of an immediate lifting of the sanctions, it took\n steps to put a stop to all illegal activities and border\nnote of paragraph 3, reaffirming the Council’s decision\n violations. It would support the draft resolution,\nto consider further steps with regard to measures __________________\n__________________\n 387 Ibid., pp. 8-9.\n 385 Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n 388 Ibid., p. 9.\n 386 Ibid., p. 8.\n 389 Ibid., pp. 9-10.\n\n\n\n\n836 07-63109\n"
[117] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nhowever, because it had seen signs that the Council’s 3. Reaffirms its decision to keep the situation closely\n“carrot-and-stick policy” was modifying the behaviour under review and to consider further steps with regard to\nof the authorities in Belgrade.390 measures applicable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro) in the light of further progress in the\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and situation;\nadopted unanimously as resolution 1015 (1995), which 4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\nreads:\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the\n The Security Council, United States underlined some fundamental points\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, in particular about the resolution just adopted. First, the suspended\nresolutions 943 (1994) of 23 September 1994, 970 (1995) of sanctions were limited strictly to cultural and sports\n12 January 1995, 988 (1995) of 21 April 1995 and 1003 (1995) exchanges, the restoration of passenger air transport to\nof 5 July 1995, and from Belgrade, and ferry service to the port of Bar.\n Calling upon all States and others concerned to respect There was no suspension of economic sanctions,\nthe sovereignty, territorial integrity and international borders of meaning that there had been no increase of sanctions\nall States in the region, relief. Rather, the existing relief had been extended for\n Noting the measures taken by the Federal Republic of six months. The United States continued to believe that\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in particular those detailed further sanctions relief must follow real steps towards\nin the report transmitted by the letter dated 6 September 1995 peace, such as mutual recognition among the successor\nfrom the Secretary-General to the President of the Security States to the former Yugoslavia. Secondly, the\nCouncil, to maintain the effective closure of the international requirements of resolution 988 (1995) remained in full\nborder between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with\n force, including the requirement in paragraphs 14 and\nrespect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and 15 that the Secretary-General report to the Council\nclothing for essential humanitarian needs, and noting with immediately if he had evidence of non-compliance by\nsatisfaction that the cooperation of the Mission of the the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro with the\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia with the border closure. If such a report were to be submitted,\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) the suspension of the sanctions would terminate. In that\ncontinues to be generally good, connection, there had been indications of shortcomings\n Reaffirming the importance of further efforts by the in the implementation of Serbia and Montenegro’s\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to commitment to close its border. In particular, efforts by\nenhance the effectiveness of the closure of the international Serbia and Montenegro to assist the Bosnian Serbs in\nborder between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and restoring their military communications and air defence\nMontenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with\nrespect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and\n networks and providing other military assistance would\nclothing for essential humanitarian needs, violate the commitment to close the border.391\n Expressing its appreciation for the work of the The representative of France stated that while the\nCo-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International resolution just adopted was technical in nature, the\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia and of the Mission of the improvement made to it — the extension of the\nInternational Conference to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia suspension period to 180 days — reflected his\n(Serbia and Montenegro), and underlining the importance of the delegation’s conviction that a dynamic of negotiation\nnecessary resources being made available so as to strengthen the\ncapacity of the Mission to carry out its tasks,\n seemed to have begun and must be encouraged. France\n hoped that the Council would have the opportunity to\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United decide, on the basis of the evolving situation, on the\nNations, further alleviation of sanctions.392\n 1. Decides that the restrictions and other measures\nreferred to in paragraph 1 of resolution 943 (1994) shall be __________________\nsuspended until 18 March 1996; 391 Ibid., pp. 11-12.\n 392 Ibid., pp. 12-13.\n 2. Decides also that the arrangements referred to in\nparagraphs 13, 14 and 15 of resolution 988 (1995) shall continue\nto apply;\n__________________\n 390 Ibid., p. 10.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 837\n"
[118] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n Decision of 18 September 1995 (3580th meeting): of the Council’s prior consultations 394 and to several\n statement by the President other documents.395\n At its 3580th meeting, on 18 September 1995, the The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item. adopted unanimously as resolution 1016 (1995), which\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council reads:\ninvited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Security Council,\nat his request, to participate in the discussion without\nthe right to vote. The President (Italy) then stated that, Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions and the\nafter consultations among members of the Security statement by its President of 18 September 1995,\nCouncil, he had been authorized to make the following Deeply concerned by the military situation on the ground\nstatement on behalf of the Council: 393 in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and by the plight of\n the civilian population there, which constitutes a humanitarian\n The Security Council deplores the rapidly escalating crisis of significant proportions,\nmilitary situation on the ground in the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, and expresses its deep concern about the plight of Especially concerned by the humanitarian consequences,\nthe civilian population resulting therefrom. as a result of the recent fighting, including loss of life and\n suffering among the civilian population, and a new flow of tens\n The Council demands that all the parties involved in of thousands of refugees and displaced persons,\noffensive military activities and hostile acts in western Bosnia\ncease them immediately and respect fully the rights of the local Reiterating its full support for the Agreed Basic Principles\npopulation. It stresses the importance it attaches to intensified signed at Geneva on 8 September 1995,\nefforts to alleviate the plight of refugees and displaced persons\n Gravely concerned about all offensives and hostile acts in\nand to the fullest cooperation in this regard by the parties with\n the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the parties\nthe United Nations Protection Force and the international\n concerned, including those most recently undertaken,\nhumanitarian agencies. The Council reiterates that there can be\nno military solution to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and 1. Notes the assurances given by the Governments of\nHerzegovina and urges all parties not to take military advantage the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of\nof the present situation. It once again expresses its full support Croatia regarding offensive actions in western Bosnia and, while\nfor the Agreed Basic Principles signed at Geneva on taking note of the reports that the offensive actions have slowed\n8 September 1995, which provide a basis for negotiations with down, affirms the need for full compliance with the demands set\nthe aim of achieving a lasting peace throughout the region. out in the statement by its President of 18 September 1995;\n The Council furthermore deplores the death of one Danish 2. Deplores the casualties suffered by the Danish\npeacekeeper and injury to nine others and expresses its peacekeepers, expresses its condolences to the Government of\ncondolences to the Government of Denmark and to the family of Denmark and to the families of the peacekeepers who lost their\nthe peacekeeper who lost his life. lives, and demands that all parties fully respect the safety of\n United Nations personnel;\n Decision of 21 September 1995 3. Calls upon all parties and others concerned to\n (3581st meeting): resolution 1016 (1995) refrain from violence and hostile acts and to reach immediately\n a ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities throughout the territory\n At its 3581st meeting, on 21 September 1995, the of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item.\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council 4. Calls upon Member States involved in promoting\ninvited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina an overall peaceful settlement in the region to intensify their\n efforts to this end with the parties to ensure that they take no\nand Croatia, at their request, to participate in the advantage from the current situation and show utmost restraint;\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The President\n(Italy) then drew the attention of the Council members 5. Demands that the parties negotiate in good faith on\nto the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course the basis of the Agreed Basic Principles signed at Geneva on\n __________________\n__________________\n 394 S/1995/810.\n 393 S/PRST/1995/47.\n 395 Letter dated 19 September 1995 from the representative\n\n of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of\n the Security Council (S/1995/808); and letter dated\n 20 September 1995 from the representative of Croatia\n addressed to the President of the Security Council\n (S/1995/812).\n\n\n\n838 07-63109\n"
[119] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n8 September 1995 with the aim of achieving lasting peace the rights of all communities, including their right to remain\nthroughout the region; where they are or to return to their homes in safety.\n 6. Reiterates that there can be no military solution to The Council is, in particular, deeply concerned about new\nthe conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; reports concerning acts of ethnic cleansing committed in the\n Banja Luka and Prijedor areas, especially about reports,\n 7. Urges all States and international humanitarian\n including those by international humanitarian organizations, that\norganizations to intensify their efforts to help to alleviate the\n non-Serb men and boys of draft age are being taken away by\nplight of refugees and displaced persons;\n Bosnian Serb and other paramilitary forces. The Council\n 8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide to the demands that those persons be immediately released.\nCouncil as soon as possible information on the humanitarian\n The Council demands that the Bosnian Serb party grant\nsituation, including information available through the United\n United Nations personnel and the representatives of the\nNations High Commissioner for Refugees and other sources;\n International Committee of the Red Cross immediate and\n 9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. unimpeded access to all the areas of concern. It also demands\n that representatives of the International Committee of the Red\n Decision of 12 October 1995 (3587th meeting): Cross be allowed to visit and register any persons detained\n against their will. The Council reiterates in this context the\n statement by the President demands set out in resolution 1010 (1995) and in the statement\n At its 3587th meeting, on 12 October 1995, the by its President of 7 September 1995 on Srebrenica and Zepa.\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item. The Council reaffirms that those who have committed or\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council have ordered the commission of violations of international\ninvited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, humanitarian law will be held individually responsible for them.\nat his request, to participate in the discussion without The Council recalls in this context the establishment of the\nthe right to vote. The President (Nigeria) then stated International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons\n Responsible for Serious Violations of International\nthat, after consultations among members of the Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former\nSecurity Council, he had been authorized to make the Yugoslavia since 1991, pursuant to its resolution 827 (1993) and\nfollowing statement on behalf of the Council:396 reiterates that all States shall cooperate fully with the Tribunal\n and its organs.\n The Security Council welcomes the entry into force of the\nceasefire agreement of 5 October 1995 between the Bosnian The Council will remain actively seized of the matter.\nparties.\n The Council takes this opportunity to express its gratitude Decision of 30 November 1995 (3601st meeting):\nto all those who negotiated the ceasefire agreement and to the resolution 1026 (1995)\nUnited Nations Protection Force and others who, often at risk to\ntheir own lives, have made possible, with the cooperation of all On 23 November 1995, pursuant to resolutions\nthe parties, the restoration of gas and electricity supplies to the 981 (1995), 982 (1995) and 983 (1995), the Secretary-\ninhabitants of Sarajevo, enabling them to live in more decent General submitted to the Council a report on the three\nconditions. peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia.397\n The Council demands that all parties fully comply with The report was intended to assist the Council in its\nthe provisions of the ceasefire agreement and refrain from any deliberations on the future of those missions.\nmilitary activity that could jeopardize the peace process. It\nexpresses its deepest concern at any operation that provokes\n In his report, the Secretary-General noted that the\nlarge-scale movements of population detrimental to the peace general framework agreement, which had been\nprocess and a final and fair settlement. The Council is initialled by the Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nparticularly concerned about new reports related to the Croatia and Serbia on 21 November 1995 in Dayton,\nmovements of the displaced population in the areas of Sanski provided the basis for peace to become reality. The\nMost and Mrkonjic Grad. framework agreement contained many aspects with far-\n The Council reiterates its strong condemnation of all reaching implications not only for the United Nations\npractices of ethnic cleansing wherever they occur and by peacekeeping forces deployed in the former\nwhomsoever committed. It demands their immediate cessation Yugoslavia, but also for the future role of the\nand underlines the need to alleviate the sufferings caused by __________________\nthese acts. The Council urges all Bosnian parties to respect fully 397 S/1995/987. The report was considered by the Council\n__________________\n also at its 3600th meeting, under the item “The situation\n 396 S/PRST/1995/52.\n in Croatia” (see sect. 21.K of the present chapter).\n\n\n\n07-63109 839\n"
[120] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nOrganization in that region, which had yet to be fully Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia\nassessed and analysed. In connection with and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other parties\nUNPROFOR, the Secretary-General noted that since thereto on 21 November 1995 at Dayton, Ohio, signifying\n agreement between the parties to sign formally the Peace\nthe agreement envisaged the implementation of the Agreement,\nmilitary and regional stabilization aspects to be the\nresponsibility of a new Implementation Force (IFOR), Stressing the need for all parties to comply fully with all\nto be authorized by the Security Council, a primary provisions of the Peace Agreement and, prior to the entry into\n force of that agreement, the need for all parties to cooperate\ntask for UNPROFOR was to arrange for the transfer of fully with the United Nations Protection Force and to maintain\nresponsibility to IFOR. Pending finalization of the the current ceasefire agreement,\narrangements for the transfer of responsibility to IFOR,\nthe Secretary-General recommended that the existing Welcoming the positive role played by the United Nations\n Protection Force, and paying tribute to the personnel of the\nmandate of UNPROFOR be extended for two months, Force in the performance of their mandate,\nor until the appropriate transfer of authority had been\nexecuted between UNPROFOR and the incoming Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of\nImplementation Force, subject to authorization of the 23 November 1995,\nSecurity Council. Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security and\n freedom of movement of the personnel of United Nations\n At its 3601st meeting, on 30 November 1995, the peacekeeping operations in the territory of the former\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the situation in Yugoslavia, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and included Charter of the United Nations,\nthe above-mentioned report in its agenda. Following 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of\nthe adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the 23 November 1995;\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the 2. Decides to extend the mandate of the United\n Nations Protection Force for a period terminating on 31 January\nright to vote. The President (Oman) then drew the 1996, pending further action by the Council with regard to the\nattention of the Council members to the text of a draft implementation of the Peace Agreement;\nresolution submitted by Argentina, the Czech Republic,\nFrance, Germany, Honduras, Italy, the Russian 3. Invites the Secretary-General to keep the Council\n informed of developments in the peace process and to submit as\nFederation, the United Kingdom and the United soon as possible to the Council reports, containing the necessary\nStates, 398 as well as to a letter dated 29 November information and recommendations, on aspects of the\n1995 from the representative of the United States implementation of the Peace Agreement as they affect the\naddressed to the Secretary-General,399 transmitting the United Nations in order to enable the Council to take a decision\ntext of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in ensuring an orderly transfer of authority as envisaged in the\nBosnia and Herzegovina. Peace Agreement;\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and 4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\nadopted unanimously as resolution 1026 (1995), which\nreads: Decision of 7 December 1995 (3603rd meeting):\n statement by the President\n The Security Council,\n At its 3603rd meeting, on 7 December 1995, the\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in Council resumed its consideration of the item.\nparticular its resolutions 982 (1995) of 31 March 1995 and 998\n(1995) of 16 June 1995,\n Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\n invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Reaffirming its commitment to the independence, at his request, to participate in the discussion without\nsovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia the right to vote. The President (Russian Federation)\nand Herzegovina,\n then stated that, after consultations among members of\n Welcoming again the initialling of the General Framework the Security Council, he had been authorized to make\nAgreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the the following statement on behalf of the Council:400\nannexes thereto (collectively the “Peace Agreement”) by the\n__________________ __________________\n 398 S/1995/995. 400 S/PRST/1995/60.\n\n 399 S/1995/999.\n\n\n\n\n840 07-63109\n"
[121] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n The Security Council expresses deep concern over the to that common effort, he stated that the most\nlooting and burning of houses by the forces of the Croatian important of them were in the fields of humanitarian\nDefence Council in the area of Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo, relief and return of refugees, and civilian police, where\nwhich have continued for some time, and it also notes with\nconcern that similar acts have been committed by Bosnian Serb\n the parties had asked the Organization to deploy a\nforces in other areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council is United Nations civilian police greater than any\nalso deeply concerned by reports that the Croatian Defence previously seen. Other areas, where the United Nations\nCouncil is moving mine-laying equipment into the Mrkonjic could make a contribution, included human rights.\nGrad and Sipovo areas.\n At its 3607th meeting, on 15 December 1995, the\n The Council considers that such actions are dangerous Council resumed its consideration of the situation in\nand detrimental to the spirit of confidence essential for the the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and included\nimplementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and\nHerzegovina.\n the report of the Secretary-General in its agenda.\n Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\n The Council demands that all such actions be stopped invited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nimmediately and stresses the need for all parties to exercise Brazil, Canada, Croatia, Egypt, Japan, Malaysia,\nmaximum restraint and to demonstrate the cooperation essential\nfor the successful implementation of the Peace Agreement.\n Norway, Spain, Turkey and Ukraine, at their request, to\n participate in the discussion without the right to vote.\n Decision of 15 December 1995 (3607th meeting): The Council also invited Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, at\n resolution 1031 (1995) his request, to address it in the course of the\n subsequent discussion. The President (Russian\n On 13 December 1995, pursuant to resolution Federation) then drew the attention of the Council\n1026 (1995), the Secretary-General submitted to the members to the text of a draft resolution submitted by\nCouncil a report on developments in the peace process Argentina, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy,\nin Bosnia and Herzegovina.401 The report noted that the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the\nthe most important development since the adoption of United States,402 as well as to several other\nresolution 1026 (1995) was the Peace Implementation documents.403\nConference convened in London on 8 and 9 December\nwhich had resulted in the adoption of a document The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nknown as “the London conclusions”. The Conference noted that the Council would be deciding upon a\nhad also approved the designation of Mr. Carl Bildt as comprehensive resolution on the various aspects of the\nHigh Representative and had invited the Security implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. As a\nCouncil to agree to it. The report also addressed host country to the Implementation Force, Bosnia and\naspects of implementation of the peace agreement that Herzegovina pledged partnership in the implementation\naffected the United Nations and dealt with the future of of the agreement. Bosnia and Herzegovina was\ncertain existing United Nations activities which would committed to furthering existing democratic\neither be discontinued or transferred to other agencies. institutions and establishing new ones to restore the\nThe Secretary-General observed that the Peace rule of law and order in every part of the country, thus\nAgreement offered real hope of bringing an end to the guaranteeing safety, justice and respect for all citizens\nconflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He welcomed the of Bosnia and Herzegovina, regardless of ethnic or\nfact that Member States had decided that the task of religious background. The speaker argued that\nhelping to implement the Peace Agreement in Bosnia restoration of mutual confidence would be possible if\n __________________\nand Herzegovina should not be entrusted to the United\n 402 S/1995/1033.\nNations alone. He noted, in that regard, that only a 403 Letter dated 29 November 1995 from the representative\ncooperative effort between many international of the United States addressed to the Secretary-General\norganizations and Member States could generate the (S/1995/999); letter dated 7 December 1995 from the\nskills and resources, and above all, the political will representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia\nrequired to end the fighting and start building the peace addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1995/1021); letter\nin Bosnia and Herzegovina. Referring to the ways in dated 11 December 1995 from the representative of the\nwhich the United Nations could make its contribution United Kingdom addressed to the Secretary-General\n__________________ (S/1995/1029); and letter dated 14 December 1995 from\n 401 S/1995/1031.\n the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the\n Security Council (S/1995/1034).\n\n\n07-63109 841\n"
[122] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nthe Bosnian Serb authorities were to do the same in the further noted any delay in addressing the\nterritories under their control, including by bringing to implementation of the Basic Agreement would\njustice those who had committed war crimes and by minimize the possibility of its success. The momentum\npreventing them from playing any future political role. for peace that was evident in implementing the Peace\nFinally, Sarajevo should again be not only a symbol of Agreement in Bosnia should be emulated and utilized\nthe ethnic, religious and cultural diversity and richness to secure peace in Croatia as well.407\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also the birthplace of\n Mr. Jovanovic noted that it had not been an easy\nnew international hope and solidarity.404\n task to achieve the Peace Agreement, but the essential\n The representative of Croatia noted that no matter thing was that peace had finally prevailed and that the\nhow difficult and tragic the past four years had been, implementation of the Agreement would strengthen\nthe peace agreement would move Bosnia and the whole stability, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also\nregion forwards and the timely deployment of IFOR, to in the Balkans and Europe. The basic task ahead was\nbe authorized by the draft resolution, would continue full implementation of the Peace Agreement. The\nthe momentum for peace. It would also be necessary, responsibility for such implementation lay not only\nhowever, to implement the economic and electoral with the Republika of Srpska and the Muslim-Croat\naspects of the Agreement with the same commitment Federation and other interested parties, but also with\nand vigour. IFOR alone could not secure a lasting and international entities assigned major implementation\njust peace in Bosnia. Croatia regretted that the tasks. For its part, Yugoslavia stood ready to implement\nagreement on the normalization of relations between it fully the commitments it had undertaken under the\nand Bosnia and Herzegovina, including mutual Agreement. The speaker further stated that it was\nrecognition, had not been signed in Paris. Croatia’s imperative that the military and civilian components of\nposition remained that unconditional recognition was a the international presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina\nprerequisite for the equitable resolution of all took an impartial and objective position towards all\noutstanding issues between two sovereign States. parties. It was also imperative that the Serbs of\nTurning to the draft resolution, the speaker emphasized Sarajevo receive concrete guarantees that their\nparagraph 8, which recognized the right of all Bosnian freedom, security, equality and human rights would be\nrefugees and displaced persons to return to their homes fairly and unconditionally respected. Referring to the\nof origin in safety and called on the United Nations to question of sanctions, the speaker stated that his\nplay a leading role in their repatriation. Those refugees delegation expected that, in accordance with the Peace\nand displaced persons must be given the opportunity to Agreement, the Council would soon lift all sanctions\nreturn home or they must be compensated for their against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Having\nproperty fairly and in a timely manner. The speaker been “crippled” by international sanctions and isolated\nconcluded by presenting the position of his from the international community, the Federal\nGovernment on the report of 13 December of the Republic of Yugoslavia was eagerly seeking to restore\nSecretary-General405 on the implementation of the its place in the family of nations. It believed that, by\nBasic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, pursuing a constructive policy for peace in the former\nBaranja and Western Sirmium. 406 Croatia expressed Yugoslavia, it had earned the right to normalize its\nconcern that that report placed emphasis on external status in all international organizations, and to\nrisks and not enough emphasis on the most important normalize relations with the European Union. As a\nelement of the agreement which was demilitarization. founding Member, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nIt could not accept an attempt to build a new and requested that the Council allow it to resume its\nimproved safe area in the occupied Vukovar region. rightful place in the United Nations without delay, in\nTherefore, the deployment of a large international force accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and\nto Croatia was unacceptable. Rather, the military international law. It was particularly unacceptable that\naspects of the implementation force should be reduced additional conditions were being set for the\nand the civilian aspects strengthened. The speaker normalization of the status of the Federal Republic of\n__________________ Yugoslavia in the United Nations. With the signing of\n 404 S/PV.3607, pp. 3-4. __________________\n 405 S/1995/1028. 407 S/PV.3607, pp. 4-6.\n 406 S/1995/951, annex.\n\n\n\n\n842 07-63109\n"
[123] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nthe Peace Agreement, it was only logical that of peace would be a civilian task. It was therefore\nYugoslavia’s rights be fully restored.408 necessary to strengthen the political consensus\n achieved so far by holding free and fair elections. It\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of\n was also necessary to assist the local security forces, to\nthe United Kingdom stated that the conclusion of the\n monitor human and minority rights, to undertake\nPeace Agreement and the draft resolution before the\n important humanitarian tasks, and to reconstruct and\nCouncil sounded the call for the most comprehensive\n develop a devastated country and its economy. In that\noperation to reconstruct a European country since the\n effort, the United Nations would continue to have an\nMarshall Plan half a century earlier. Sustaining that\n important peacekeeping role, and Germany fully\nprocess would be vital, if the promise of peace were to\n supported the concept of a strong International Police\nbecome a reality. One important task was military in\n Task Force and of a United Nations civilian mission.\nnature. The role of IFOR would be even-handed and\n Referring to the question of the admission of the\nlimited in scope and duration. The force would not be\n Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the General\nimposing the peace settlement, but it would take\n Assembly, the speaker noted that his delegation would\nnecessary action to ensure compliance. Furthermore,\n welcome such a development under the conditions\nshould it be decided that IFOR would detain and\n determined by the respective organs of the United\ntransfer to the appropriate authorities any persons\n Nations. Turning to the question of coordination of the\nindicted by the Tribunal with whom it came into\n civilian tasks to be carried out in the implementation of\ncontact, then the authority to do so was provided by the\n the Peace Agreement, the speaker stated that the many\ndraft resolution, when read in conjunction with the\n international organizations involved must work in the\nPeace Agreement. The implementation of the Peace\n same direction. It was important that there be no\nAgreement, however, was simply not a military task.\n duplication of effort. In that respect, the draft\nIFOR was necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for\n resolution spelled out clearly the responsibilities of the\nrebuilding the civil, political and economic institutions\n High Representative, as the final authority in theatre\nand structures that would form the basis of a unified,\n regarding civilian implementation and as coordinator\nprosperous and stable society. The international\n of the civilian operations with the authority to give\ncommunity faced a huge commitment in implementing\n guidance as appropriate. In conclusion, the speaker\nthe Peace Agreement. That commitment needed to be\n stated that those responsible for war crimes and\nmatched by a similar determination on the part of the\n violations of international humanitarian law must be\nBosnian people, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n brought to justice. Without uncovering the truth and\nand Croatia. Before concluding, the speaker warned\n without justice, national reconciliation could not be\nthat failure by the Bosnian Serbs to cooperate would\n achieved. The draft rightly stressed the importance of\nlead to the continuation of economic sanctions.409\n full cooperation with the International Tribunal and\n The representative of Germany stated that the made it clear that IFOR had a role to play in that\ndraft resolution conferred a challenging responsibility respect.410\nupon the members of the Council. By an affirmative\n The representative of Argentina stated that, as\nvote, the Council would set in motion an enormous\n clearly set out in one of the preambular paragraphs of\ninternational military and civilian operation. Noting\n the draft resolution, the conflict in the former\nthat all parties had consented to the deployment of\n Yugoslavia remained a threat to international peace and\nIFOR, including the use of force if necessary, the\n security. That factor explained the widespread concern\nspeaker stated that it was essential that the parties\n that the principal role for the United Nations, through\ncomply with their commitment to refrain from the use\n the Council, would be to keep the implementation of\nof force, and that they cooperate fully with IFOR in the\n the Peace Agreement under permanent review. With the\nmilitary side of the implementation of the Peace\n draft resolution, work of great importance to the United\nAgreement. However, while the military component of\n Nations would begin in such areas as the protection of\nthe implementation of the Dayton Agreement\n human rights, humanitarian assistance, civil policing\nrepresented the foundation of peace, the construction\n__________________ and the removal of mines. Argentina was struck,\n 408 Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n however, by the fact that the supervision of electoral\n __________________\n 409 Ibid., pp. 8-9.\n 410 Ibid., pp. 9-11.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 843\n"
[124] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nprocesses, which was an area where the United Nations Member States that was preventing the Organization\nhad unparalleled experience and aptitude — had been from undertaking directly the enforcement operations\nassigned to the Organization for Security and envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter. Nigeria also\nCooperation in Europe (OSCE). It therefore supported believed that the Council should not continue to\nthe Secretary-General’s offer to OSCE that the contract out what would normally be a United Nations\ninvaluable experience of the United Nations might be responsibility to a group of powerful States. Questions\nput to use in Bosnia. Argentina also emphasized the about the timeframe and concept of operations were\nimportance of the International Tribunal. Peace would not quite clear, nor could one say exactly whence the\nonly be lasting if those responsible for atrocities were post of High Representative derived its legitimacy and\nmade to face the consequences of their actions. 411 authority. As States Members of the United Nations,\n the members of the Council should not support\n The representative of China welcomed the\n decisions that had the effect of subordinating the\npositive developments in relation to the situation in\n Organization or its Secretary-General to another\nBosnia and Herzegovina. Observing that the Federal\n organization. The United Nations was still the most\nRepublic of Yugoslavia had made unremitting efforts in\n universal expression of the will of the international\nthe peace process and should be acknowledged and\n community. However, in view of its policy of\nencouraged by the international community, he stated\n supporting all peace initiatives and of the primary\nthat the Council should resolve soon the question of the\n objective of helping to resolve the Balkan conflict,\nstatus of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the\n Nigeria would support the draft resolution. 413\nUnited Nations. On the basis of China’s position in\nsupport of the peace process in the former Yugoslavia, The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nand the fact that the draft resolution called for adopted unanimously as resolution 1031 (1995), which\nextraordinary action in extraordinary circumstances, reads:\nthe Chinese delegation would vote in favour of the The Security Council,\ndraft resolution. That did not represent, however, a\nchange in China’s position. China had long Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions concerning\ndisapproved of operations authorized by the Council the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia,\nwhen Chapter VII was invoked and mandatory Reaffirming its commitment to a negotiated political\nmeasures adopted, and it could not approve the settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia preserving\nCouncil’s authorization of the unlimited use of force. It the territorial integrity of all States there within their\ntherefore believed that IFOR must maintain neutrality internationally recognized borders,\nand impartiality and avoid the wanton use of force, in Welcoming the signing on 14 December 1995 at the Paris\norder not to damage the image of the United Nations. Peace Conference of the General Framework Agreement for\nIFOR should thus provide the Council with timely and Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the annexes thereto\nfull reports on the implementation of its tasks and (collectively the “Peace Agreement”) by the Republic of Bosnia\n and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal\nshould accept the necessary control of and guidance Republic of Yugoslavia and the other parties thereto,\nfrom the Council.412\n Welcoming also the Dayton Agreement on implementing\n The representative of Nigeria noted that his the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina of 10 November\ndelegation would have preferred a United Nations 1995,\noperation under the policy control of the Council and Welcoming further the conclusions of the Peace\nthe managerial supervision of the Secretary-General, in Implementation Conference held in London on 8 and\nspite of the fact that the parties to the agreement had 9 December 1995 (the London Conference), and in particular its\nrequested a multinational force. While mindful of the decision to establish a Peace Implementation Council and its\nSecretary-General’s observations about the inability of Steering Board as referred to in those conclusions,\nthe United Nations to undertake such an operation at Paying tribute to the International Conference on the\nthat time, Nigeria believed that it was a lack of Former Yugoslavia for its efforts aimed at achieving a peace\npolitical backing and of the resource support of settlement, and taking note of the decision of the London\n__________________ Conference that the Peace Implementation Council will subsume\n 411 Ibid., pp. 11-12. the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,\n 412 Ibid., pp. 13-14. __________________\n 413 Ibid., pp. 14-15.\n\n\n\n\n844 07-63109\n"
[125] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United\n13 December 1995, Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and other\n intergovernmental or regional human rights missions or\n Determining that the situation in the region continues to\n organizations to monitor closely the human rights situation in\nconstitute a threat to international peace and security,\n Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n Determined to promote the peaceful resolution of the\n 8. Welcomes further the parties’ commitment to the\nconflicts in accordance with the purposes and principles of the\n right of all refugees and displaced persons freely to return to\nCharter of the United Nations,\n their homes of origin in safety, notes the leading humanitarian\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United role which has been given by the Peace Agreement to the United\nNations, Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, in coordination with\n other agencies involved and under the authority of the Secretary-\n I General, in assisting with the repatriation and relief of refugees\n 1. Welcomes and supports the Peace Agreement, and and displaced persons, and stresses the importance of\ncalls upon the parties to fulfil in good faith the commitments repatriation being phased, gradual and orderly;\nentered into in that Agreement; 9. Emphasizes the importance of the creation of\n 2. Expresses its intention to keep the implementation conditions conducive to the reconstruction and development of\nof the Peace Agreement under review; Bosnia and Herzegovina, and encourages Member States to\n provide assistance for the programme of reconstruction in that\n 3. Welcomes the progress made towards mutual country;\nrecognition among the successor States to the former Socialist\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia, within their internationally 10. Underlines the relationship, as described in the\nrecognized borders; conclusions of the London Conference, between the fulfilment\n by the parties of their commitments in the Peace Agreement and\n 4. Reaffirms its resolutions concerning compliance the readiness of the international community to commit financial\nwith international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, resources for reconstruction and development;\nreaffirms also that all States shall cooperate fully with the\nInternational Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 11. Welcomes the agreement of the parties to annex 1-B\nResponsible for Serious Violations of International of the Peace Agreement that the establishment of progressive\nHumanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former measures for regional stability and arms control is essential to\nsince 1991 and its organs in accordance with the provisions of creating a stable peace in the region, emphasizes the importance\nresolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 and the statute of the of all Member States supporting their efforts to this end, and\nInternational Tribunal, and shall comply with requests for supports the commitment of the Organization for Security and\nassistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under article 29 Cooperation in Europe to assist the parties with the negotiation\nof the statute, and calls upon them to allow the establishment of and implementation of such measures;\noffices of the Tribunal; II\n 5. Recognizes that the parties shall cooperate fully 12. Welcomes the willingness of the Member States\nwith all entities involved in the implementation of the peace acting through or in cooperation with the organization referred\nsettlement, as described in the Peace Agreement, or which are to in annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to assist the parties to\notherwise authorized by the Security Council, including the the Peace Agreement by deploying a multinational\nInternational Tribunal, and that the parties have in particular implementation force;\nauthorized the multinational force referred to in paragraph 14\nbelow to take such actions as required, including the use of 13. Notes the invitation of the parties to the\nnecessary force, to ensure compliance with annex 1-A of the international community to send to the region for a period of\nPeace Agreement; approximately one year a multinational implementation force to\n assist in implementation of the territorial and other militarily\n 6. Welcomes the agreement by the Organization for related provisions of annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement;\nSecurity and Cooperation in Europe to adopt and put in place a\nprogramme of elections for Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the 14. Authorizes the Member States acting through or in\nrequest of the parties to annex 3 of the Peace Agreement; cooperation with the organization referred to in annex 1-A of the\n Peace Agreement to establish a multinational Implementation\n 7. Welcomes also the parties’ commitment, as Force under unified command and control in order to fulfil the\nspecified in the Peace Agreement, to securing for all persons role specified in annexes 1-A and 2 of the Peace Agreement;\nwithin their jurisdiction the highest level of internationally\nrecognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, stresses 15. Authorizes the Member States acting under\nthat compliance with this commitment is of vital importance in paragraph 14 above to take all necessary measures to effect the\nachieving a lasting peace, and welcomes the invitation by the implementation of and to ensure compliance with annex 1-A of\nparties to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the the Peace Agreement, stresses that the parties shall be held\n\n\n\n07-63109 845\n"
[126] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nequally responsible for compliance with that annex and shall be 23. Invites all States, in particular those in the region,\nequally subject to such enforcement action by the to provide appropriate support and facilities, including transit\nImplementation Force as may be necessary to ensure facilities, for the Member States acting under paragraph 14\nimplementation of that annex and the protection of the Force, above;\nand takes note that the parties have consented to the taking of\n 24. Welcomes the conclusion of the agreements\nsuch measures by the Implementation Force;\n concerning the status of forces as referred to in appendix B to\n 16. Authorizes the Member States acting under annex 1 A of the Peace Agreement, and demands that the parties\nparagraph 14 above, in accordance with annex 1-A of the Peace comply fully with those agreements;\nAgreement, to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance\n 25. Requests the Member States acting through or in\nwith the rules and procedures, to be established by the\n cooperation with the organization referred to in annex 1 A of the\nCommander of the Implementation Force, governing command\n Peace Agreement to report to the Council, through the\nand control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina with\n appropriate channels and at least at monthly intervals, the first\nrespect to all civilian and military air traffic;\n such report be made not later than ten days following the\n 17. Authorizes Member States to take all necessary adoption of the present resolution;\nmeasures, at the request of the Implementation Force, either in\n 26. Endorses the establishment of a High\ndefence of the Force or to assist the Force in carrying out its\n Representative, following the request of the parties, who, in\nmission, and recognizes the right of the Force to take all\n accordance with annex 10 on civilian implementation, will\nnecessary measures to defend itself from attack or threat of\n monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement and\nattack;\n mobilize and, as appropriate, give guidance to and coordinate\n 18. Demands that the parties respect the security and the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies involved,\nfreedom of movement of the Implementation Force and other and agrees to the designation of Mr. Carl Bildt as High\ninternational personnel; Representative;\n 19. Decides that, with effect from the day on which the 27. Confirms that the High Representative is the final\nSecretary-General reports to the Council that the transfer of authority in theatre regarding interpretation of annex 10 of the\nauthority from the United Nations Protection Force to the Peace Agreement on civilian implementation;\nImplementation Force has taken place, the authority to take\n 28. Decides that all States concerned, and in particular\ncertain measures conferred upon States by resolutions 770\n those where the High Representative establishes offices, shall\n(1992) of 13 August 1992, 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992, 816\n ensure that the High Representative enjoys such legal capacity\n(1993) of 31 March 1993, 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, 844\n as may be necessary for the exercise of his functions, including\n(1993) of 18 June 1993 and 958 (1994) of 19 November 1994\n the capacity to contract and to acquire and dispose of real and\nshall be terminated, and that the provisions of resolution 824\n personal property;\n(1993) of 6 May 1993 and subsequent resolutions regarding safe\nareas shall also be terminated from the same date; 29. Notes that close cooperation between the\n Implementation Force, the High Representative and the agencies\n 20. Requests the Government of Bosnia and\n will be vital to ensure successful implementation;\nHerzegovina to cooperate with the Commander of the\nImplementation Force to ensure the effective management of the 30. Affirms the need for the implementation of the\nairports in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the light of the Peace Agreement in its entirety, and in this context stresses the\nresponsibilities conferred on the Force by annex 1 A of the importance it attaches to the urgent implementation of annex 11\nPeace Agreement with regard to the airspace of Bosnia and of the Peace Agreement, decides to act expeditiously on the\nHerzegovina; report of the Secretary-General recommending the establishment\n of a United Nations civilian police force with the tasks set out in\n 21. Decides, with a view to terminating the\n that annex, together with a civilian office with the\nauthorization granted in paragraphs 14 to 17 above one year\n responsibilities described in the report of the Secretary-General,\nafter the transfer of authority from the United Nations Protection\n and further decides that in the interim civilian police, demining,\nForce to the Implementation Force, to review by that date and to\n civil affairs and other personnel that might be required to carry\ntake a decision whether that authorization should continue,\n out the tasks described in that report shall continue in theatre,\nbased upon the recommendations from the States participating in\n notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 33 and 34 below;\nthe Implementation Force and from the High Representative\nthrough the Secretary-General; 31. Stresses the need for early action in Sarajevo to\n create confidence between the communities, and, to this end,\n 22. Decides also that the embargo imposed by\n requests the Secretary-General to ensure the early redeployment\nresolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 shall not apply to\n of elements of United Nations civilian police from the Republic\nweapons and military equipment destined for the sole use of the\n of Croatia to Sarajevo;\nMember States acting under paragraph 14 above, or of\ninternational police forces;\n\n\n\n\n846 07-63109\n"
[127] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n 32. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the of IFOR was to make peace work, not to fight a war or\nCouncil reports from the High Representative, in accordance to occupy, the speaker warned nevertheless that, if\nwith annex 10 of the Peace Agreement and the conclusions of anyone were foolish enough to attack or threaten\nthe London Conference, on the implementation of the Peace\nAgreement;\n IFOR, then they would regret having done so. The\n speaker noted that the resolution just adopted\n III recognized that the parties must cooperate fully with\n 33. Decides that the mandate of the United Nations the International Tribunal and that IFOR had authority\nProtection Force shall terminate on the date on which the to take actions, including the use of necessary force, to\nSecretary-General reports to the Council that the transfer of ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of the\nauthority from the United Nations Protection Force to the Peace Agreement. That was a welcome supplement to\nImplementation Force has taken place; the duties and authorities stemming from resolution\n 34. Approves the arrangements set out in the report of 827 (1993). The NATO Council could now underscore\nthe Secretary-General on the withdrawal of the United Nations the obligation of the parties to cooperate fully with the\nProtection Force and headquarters elements from the United Tribunal by explicitly authorizing IFOR to transfer\nNations Peace Force, including the arrangements for the indicted persons to the Tribunal and to detain such\ncommand and control of the United Nations Protection Force\nfollowing the transfer of authority from it to the Implementation\n persons for that purpose. The United States also\nForce; stressed the importance of every country’s obligation to\n cooperate with the Tribunal and to comply with its\n 35. Expresses its warmest appreciation to all United orders. Unless they complied with their obligations, the\nNations Protection Force personnel who have served the cause\nof peace in the former Yugoslavia, and pays tribute to those who\n parties to the conflict could not expect to reap the\nhave given their lives and those who have suffered serious benefits of peace, ensure the permanent easing of\ninjuries in that service; economic sanctions, or hope to rejoin fully the\n community of civilized nations, including as a Member\n 36. Authorizes the Member States, acting under\nparagraph 14 above, to use all necessary means to assist in the\n of the United Nations. The speaker further stated that\nwithdrawal of the United Nations Protection Force; special attention must be given to holding democratic\n elections, ensuring respect for human rights, planning\n 37. Calls upon the parties to ensure the safety and for the safe return of refugees and displaced persons,\nsecurity of the United Nations Protection Force and confirms\nthat the Force will continue to enjoy all existing privileges and\n creating a professional police force, and initiating a\nimmunities, including during the period of withdrawal; comprehensive programme of economic\n reconstruction.414\n 38. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the\nCouncil when the withdrawal of the United Nations Protection The representative of France expressed his\nForce is complete; country’s view that the Council must assume three\n IV tasks. First, it must finalize the necessary arrangements\n to implement the civilian and military aspects integral\n 39. Recognizes the unique, extraordinary and complex to the Peace Agreement. Second, it must maintain the\ncharacter of the present situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nrequiring an exceptional response;\n United Nations presence whenever that presence was\n indispensable. Third, the authority of the Council must\n 40. Decides to remain seized of the matter. be affirmed. It was the Council, and the Council alone,\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the that under the Charter could give legitimacy to the\nUnited States stated that, while much of the Council’s military means to be used. It must also ensure the\nwork had borne fruit, often its resolutions and overall coherence of the operation by regularly\nstatements had promised much but accomplished little. assessing both the civilian and military aspects of its\nOften the Council’s message to the people of Bosnia implementation. The speaker noted that the resolution\nhad been a tragic one: “We cannot defend you and we just adopted met those objectives.415\nwill not let you defend yourselves”. Now, however, the The President, speaking in his capacity as the\nCouncil’s message was different. It had helped Bosnia representative of the Russian Federation, emphasized\nto negotiate a peace agreement, it was authorizing a __________________\npowerful military force to implement that peace, and it 414 Ibid., pp. 19-21.\n\nwould enable Bosnia to ensure that peace once the 415 Ibid., pp. 21-22.\n\ninternational presence had left. Noting that the purpose\n\n\n07-63109 847\n"
[128] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nwhat he considered as the most important feature of the The representative of Ukraine stressed that the\nresolution that the Member States providing forces to ultimate responsibility for the implementation of the\nIFOR were authorized by the resolution to do only Peace Agreement lay with the conflicting parties. In\nwhat the Bosnian parties themselves had agreed to. that context, Ukraine fully supported paragraph 10 of\nThus, should force be used against violators of the the resolution just adopted, underlining the relationship\nAgreement, the resolution clearly made those sides’ between the fulfilment by the parties of their\nagreement conditional on an equal, impartial approach commitments in the Peace Agreement and the readiness\nto all sides to the Bosnian conflict. The Russian of the international community to commit financial\nFederation would consistently defend the need to avoid resources for reconstruction and development.\nunjustified use of force in the course of the operation. Referring to the military aspects of the resolution just\nIt was important that, under the resolution, the Security adopted, the speaker noted that his Government\nCouncil must take a decision a year later regarding the supported the authorization by the Council of IFOR,\nneed to extend the military component of the operation. which would provide monthly reports to the Council on\nThat provision, together with regular reporting to the its activities, thus enabling an appropriate means of\nCouncil on the conduct of the entire operation, ensured political monitoring by the Council. The establishment\nreliable political control by the Security Council and of IFOR was a decisive step towards a comprehensive\nindicated that the massive military operation in no way settlement of the conflict. IFOR would be deployed as\nrepresented a replacement of the United Nations by a neutral and impartial force, capable of ensuring\nindividual or regional organizations. The speaker implementation of the Peace Agreement and of\nfurther noted that the resolution defined the need to protecting itself. At the same time, Ukraine hoped that\nstrengthen regional stability and control over IFOR commanders would take all necessary steps to\narmaments, which meant that all sides must ensure that ensure that the right to take all necessary measures to\nthe arms reserves of the Bosnian side should be defend against the threat of attack was not abused. The\nreduced rather than increased. The Council had also speaker, finally, suggested that the establishment of a\nconfirmed that the achievement of a just and lasting “special regime” of participation in the rehabilitation\npeace was impossible without securing internationally and development of Bosnia might be appropriate for\nrecognized human rights, including the right of the States that had been most affected economically by\nrefugees and displaced persons freely to return. their strict observance of the sanctions against the\nAnother necessity was the cooperation of all parties Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Such an initiative\nwith the International Tribunal, in accordance with could be regarded as partial compensation for the\nCouncil decisions and commitments entered into by the billions of dollars in losses suffered by the States\nparties themselves in Dayton. Of primary importance neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.417\nin creating an appropriate climate between the parties\n The representative of Egypt welcomed the Peace\nwere immediate measures to strengthen and build\n Agreement and the resolution just adopted. Egypt\nconfidence, particularly in areas where ethnic groups\n hoped that a negotiated settlement would be reached by\nwere living side by side. The most complex situation\n all concerned parties on outstanding issues related to\narose in Sarajevo, where there was an urgent need to\n the succession of States within the former Yugoslavia,\nprevent a massive exodus of the Serbian population.\n so that the successor States might resume the\nThe Russian Federation expected the immediate\n international role that the Federated Republic of\nimplementation of tasks entrusted to the Secretary-\n Yugoslavia had played in the past. It also hoped that\nGeneral by the resolution for ensuring a speedy\n the peoples of the successor States would be able to\nredeployment to Sarajevo of additional contingents of\n live in safety, security and dignity in the context of\nthe United Nations civilian police. The Russian\n mutual friendly relations amongst all successor States.\nFederation was also in favour of deciding on an\n Egypt considered it important that there be a guarantee\nimmediate repeal of sanctions against Belgrade and\n of the voluntary return of all refugees and displaced\nagainst the Serb Republic, in order to foster the\n persons, that there be cooperation with the\nsuccessful implementation of the Agreements.416\n International Tribunal, and that IFOR would be\n__________________ deployed and would act in the context of a Security\n 416 Ibid., pp. 24-26. __________________\n 417 Ibid., pp. 28-30.\n\n\n\n\n848 07-63109\n"
[129] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nCouncil resolution, thus meaning that the force would as possible. He therefore recommended that the\nbe acting on behalf of the international community. 418 Council authorize the establishment of the transitional\n council and local implementation committees. He\n Decision of 21 December 1995: letter from the would soon nominate a suitable official to serve as the\n President of the Secretary-General transitional administrator.\n On 13 December 1995, pursuant to resolution By a letter dated 21 December 1995,421 the\n1025 (1995), the Secretary-General submitted to the President of the Security Council informed the\nCouncil a report419 on aspects of the establishment by Secretary-General of the following:\nthe Council of an operation consisting of a transitional The members of the Security Council have reviewed your\nadministration and a transitional peacekeeping force to report of 13 December 1995 on the implementation of the Basic\nimplement the relevant provisions of the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and\nAgreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja Western Sirmium. The members of the Council agree with you\nand Western Sirmium, 420 which had been signed on that the agreement merits full international support for its\n12 November 1995. effective and timely implementation.\n\n The Secretary-General observed that, although In the agreement it is requested that the Council establish\n a transitional administration and authorize the deployment of an\nthe conclusion of the Framework Agreement for peace international force. The members of the Security Council,\nin the neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina should reaffirming resolution 1025 (1995) of 30 November 1995, stand\ncontribute to a vastly improved climate in the region as ready to consider the option that both be components of a United\na whole, the past record of the parties to the Basic Nations operation and, if the Council decides to establish such\nAgreement in honouring their undertakings was not an operation, they stress the need for the necessary financial\nencouraging and the imprecise nature of the agreement resources to be made available in a timely fashion.\nmade it unwise to assume that compliance would be The members of the Council agree that the force should\nreadily forthcoming. The force deployed must therefore operate under an appropriate mandate and be provided with the\nhave a mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter, as necessary protection. They encourage you to accelerate\nwell as the capacity to take the necessary action to discussions with possible troop contributors so that the force can\nmaintain peace and security, deter attack from any side, be deployed at the earliest possible date.\nand defend itself. A Chapter VII mandate would also be The members of the Council agree with your observation\nnecessary to give the transitional administrator the that implementation of the Agreement of 12 November will be\npower to “govern”, as stipulated in the Agreement. The complex and difficult. They recognize the danger that the two\nSecretary-General remained of the view that the sides might have different interpretations of some of its\n provisions. They therefore welcome your decision to send an\ndeployment and command of the force required would envoy to the region as soon as is convenient to discuss the\nbest be entrusted to a coalition of Member States, implementation of the Agreement with the Government of\nrather than to the United Nations. One option was Croatia and representatives of the local Serbs, and practical\ntherefore for the Council to authorize Member States to aspects of the establishment of a United Nations operation,\nestablish a multinational force to conduct the including the possibilities for assistance from the host country in\noperation. However, in consultations with the offsetting its cost.\nSecretariat, some Member States had expressed a\npreference for the Basic Agreement to be implemented Decision of 21 December 1995 (3612th meeting):\nby a United Nations force. If that point of view were to resolution 1034 (1995)\nbe accepted by the Council, then the arguments in On 27 November 1995, pursuant to resolution\nfavour of giving the force a Chapter VII mandate 1019 (1995), the Secretary-General submitted to the\nwould remain no less compelling. The Secretary- Council a report on violations of international\nGeneral further noted that, while effective humanitarian law and human rights in the areas of\ndemilitarization at the outset of the operation would be Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sanski Most. 422 The\na major key to success, it would be important for the Secretary-General noted that United Nations personnel\nimplementation of the civilian aspects to begin as soon had had very limited access to the areas mentioned and\n__________________ __________________\n 418 Ibid., pp. 33-34.\n 421 S/1995/1053.\n 419 S/1995/1028.\n 422 S/1995/988.\n 420 S/1995/951, annex.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 849\n"
[130] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nthat most of the information had been gathered from initiative for the draft resolution, because it had felt\nrefugees and displaced persons. He reported that the that the Council could not shy away from a specific,\nlast few months had seen further despicable acts of clear and unequivocal reaction to the specific crimes\ncruelty and violence. There were reports of a consistent and violations of international law described in the\npattern of summary executions, rape, mass expulsions, report. The speaker reiterated his country position with\narbitrary detentions, forced labour and large-scale regard to two fundamental principles. First, it was of\ndisappearances, which had yet to be properly the utmost importance that the same legal standards,\ninvestigated. Access to the areas in question was the same norms of law and the same critical objectivity\ncrucial and the international community should insist be applied. There must be no selectivity, no attempts to\nthat the Bosnian Serb leadership provide full “diminish” or “enlarge”, for partisan reasons, the\ncooperation to all relevant international mechanisms, in violations of international humanitarian law committed\norder to enable events to be thoroughly investigated by one side. In the same manner, Germany opposed\nand the truth to be established. The Secretary-General attempts to “balance” the crimes committed by one\nalso noted that, on 16 November 1995, the side with human rights violations committed by\nInternational Tribunal had issued further indictments another or to equate behaviours that cannot be equated.\nagainst the Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic Second, it was equally important that the Council\nand Ratko Mladic, for their direct and individual honour the general principle of the separation of\nresponsibilities in the atrocities committed against the powers, by seeing to it that the judicial prerogatives\nBosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica in July 1995, and competences of the International Tribunal were\nafter the fall of the enclave to Bosnian Serb forces. fully respected. In order to establish the full truth about\nThey were charged with genocide, crimes against the crimes and human rights violations in question,\nhumanity and violations of the laws or customs of war. three aspects were of particular importance: there must\nIt was imperative that the Prosecutor of the be a full investigation of the violations in question;\nInternational Tribunal be provided with the ability and there must be access to the area; and the international\npowers to gather the necessary evidence swiftly. community must be firm in its support of the efforts of\nMoreover, States had an obligation to take the actions the International Tribunal. 424\nneeded to create the conditions for the Tribunal to\n The representative of Oman stated that\nperform its task.\n substantial evidence supported the conclusion that\n At its 3612th meeting, on 21 December 1995, the Bosnian Serb soldiers were responsible for the crime of\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item and genocide. Justice should prevail and those who had\nincluded the report of the Secretary-General in its committed crimes against humanity must be brought to\nagenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the justice. Oman hoped that IFOR would act according to\nCouncil invited the representatives of Bosnia and its mandate, including by apprehending those indicted\nHerzegovina and Turkey, at their request, to participate by the International Tribunal.425\nin the discussion without the right to vote. The\n The representative of the United Kingdom stated\nPresident (Russian Federation) then drew the attention\n that the adoption of the draft resolution would be the\nof the Council members to the text of a draft resolution\n clearest signal that the Council had not forgotten what\nsubmitted by Argentina, France, Germany, Italy, the\n had happened in Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and\nUnited Kingdom and the United States,423 and read out\n Sanski Most. The report of the Secretary-General\nsome changes that had been made to the draft.\n provided irrefutable evidence of atrocities in those\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of places and elsewhere. Given the scale of the human\nGermany noted that the report of the Secretary-General rights abuses, it was right that the Council should focus\nwas a particularly worrying summary of the state of on those events in particular. There should be no\ninformation on the missing persons, executions and the misunderstanding, however: the Council’s commitment\ninvolvement of Bosnian Serb leaders and of Serbian was to human rights, irrespective of ethnic background,\nparamilitary forces in those crimes. His delegation, nationality or religion. By focusing on crimes against\ntogether with the French delegation, had taken the __________________\n__________________ 424 S/PV.3612, pp. 5-6.\n\n 423 S/1995/1047. 425 Ibid., p. 7.\n\n\n\n\n850 07-63109\n"
[131] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nnon-Serbs, the Council did not in any way condone or States deplored them and joined the Council in urging\nignore human rights violations committed against an end to all such practices. 428\nmembers of the Serb population. Nor did the draft seek\n The draft resolution, as orally revised in its\nto condemn the Bosnian Serb people. The crimes in\n provisional form, was then put to the vote and adopted\nquestion had been committed by individuals and those\n unanimously as resolution 1034 (1995), which reads:\ninvolved would be held responsible as individuals.\nNoting that the Peace Agreement set out a road map The Security Council,\ndesigned to re-establish the rule of law throughout all Reaffirming all its earlier relevant resolutions on the\nthe communities in Bosnia, the speaker observed that situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including resolution 1019\nimplementation would be hindered if those responsible (1995) of 9 November 1995, and condemning the Bosnian Serb\nfor the acts contained in the report of the Secretary- party’s failure, despite repeated calls that it should do so, to\nGeneral were not brought to justice. Thus, all should comply with the demands contained therein,\nsupport the work of the International Tribunal. It was Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of\nalso essential that UNHCR and ICRC be given full 27 November 1995 pursuant to resolution 1019 (1995) on\naccess to those displaced or detained or missing from violations of international humanitarian law in the areas of\nSrebrenica and elsewhere. If there were to be a durable Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sanski Most,\npeace in Bosnia, then it must be based upon Gravely concerned at the information contained in the\nreconciliation between communities. That above-mentioned report that there is overwhelming evidence of\nreconciliation would only be complete if accomplished a consistent pattern of summary executions, rape, mass\nby justice.426 expulsion, arbitrary detentions, forced labour and large-scale\n disappearances,\n The representative of China said that his\n Reiterating its strong support for the work of the\ndelegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution, International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons\nhowever it believed that, in dealing with violations of Responsible for Serious Violations of International\ninternational humanitarian law, the Council should Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former\ndistinguish its purview from those of other bodies, and Yugoslavia since 1991, established pursuant to its resolution 827\nrefrain from intervening in matters falling in the (1993) of 25 May 1993,\npurview of others. China therefore expressed Noting that the General Framework Agreement for Peace\nreservations relating to elements of the draft resolution in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the annexes thereto (collectively\nthat should have been dealt with by the International the “Peace Agreement”), initialled at Dayton, Ohio, on\nTribunal or other related United Nations bodies.427 21 November 1995, provides that no person who is serving a\n sentence imposed by the International Tribunal and no person\n The representative of the United States stated that who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who has failed to\nthe responsibility for the atrocities committed in comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal may stand as\neastern Bosnia was not in doubt; it rested with the a candidate or hold any appointive, elective, or other public\nBosnian Serbs, as it was made clear by the Secretary- office in Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nGeneral’s report. The Secretary-General’s report Condemning the failure of the Bosnian Serb party to\nunderlined the importance of support for the work of comply with its commitments in respect of giving access to\nthe Tribunal and the necessity for the parties to displaced persons and to persons detained or reported missing,\ncooperate with the Tribunal in every way. The draft Reiterating its concern expressed in the statement by its\nresolution also condemned the burning and looting of President of 7 December 1995,\nhouses and territory which, under the Dayton\n Deeply concerned by the plight of hundreds of thousands\nAgreement, were to be returned to Bosnian Serb of refugees and displaced persons as a result of hostilities in the\ncontrol. Although the nature and extent of those former Yugoslavia,\nviolations of human rights could not be equated to\nthose committed by the Bosnian Serbs, the United 1. Strongly condemns all violations of international\n__________________ humanitarian law and of human rights in the territory of the\n former Yugoslavia, demands that all concerned comply fully\n 426 Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n with their obligations in this regard, and reiterates that all those\n 427 Ibid., p. 10.\n __________________\n 428 Ibid., pp. 12-13.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 851\n"
[132] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nwho commit violations of international humanitarian law will be immediate and unrestricted access to the areas in question,\nheld individually responsible in respect of such acts; including for the purpose of the investigation of the atrocities;\n 2. Condemns in particular in the strongest possible 9. Underlines in particular the urgent necessity for all\nterms the violations of international humanitarian law and of the parties to enable the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal\nhuman rights by Bosnian Serb and paramilitary forces in the to gather effectively and swiftly the evidence necessary for the\nareas of Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sanski Most as Tribunal to perform its task;\ndescribed in the report of the Secretary-General of 27 November\n 10. Stresses the obligations of all the parties to\n1995 and showing a consistent pattern of summary executions,\n cooperate with and provide unrestricted access to the relevant\nrape, mass expulsions, arbitrary detentions, forced labour and\n United Nations and other international organizations and\nlarge-scale disappearances;\n institutions so as to facilitate their investigations, and notes their\n 3. Notes with the utmost concern the substantial commitment under the Peace Agreement in this regard;\nevidence referred to in the report of the Secretary-General that\n 11. Reiterates its demand that all parties, and in\nan unknown but large number of men in the area of Srebrenica,\n particular the Bosnian Serb party, refrain from any action\nnamely in Nova Kasaba-Konjevic Polje (Kaldrumica), Kravice,\n intended to destroy, alter, conceal or damage any evidence of\nRasica Gai, Zabrde and two sites in Karakaj, and possibly also\n violations of international humanitarian law and that they\nin Bratunac and Potocari, have been summarily executed by\n preserve such evidence;\nBosnian Serb and paramilitary forces, and condemns in the\nstrongest terms the commission of such acts; 12. Also reiterates its demand that all States, in\n particular those in the region of the former Yugoslavia, and all\n 4. Reiterates its strong support for the efforts of the\n parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, comply fully and\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross in seeking access to\n in good faith with the obligations contained in paragraph 4 of\ndisplaced persons and to persons detained or reported missing,\n resolution 827 (1993) to cooperate fully with the International\nand calls upon all parties to comply with their commitments in\n Tribunal, and calls upon them to create the conditions essential\nrespect of such access;\n for the Tribunal to perform the task for which it has been\n 5. Reaffirms its demand that the Bosnian Serb party created, including the establishment of offices of the Tribunal\ngive representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner when the latter deems it necessary;\nfor Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross and\n 13. Further reiterates its demand that all detention\nother international agencies immediate and unimpeded access to\n camps throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina\npersons displaced and to persons detained or reported missing\n should be immediately closed;\nfrom Srebrenica, Zepa and the regions of Banja Luka and Sanski\nMost who are within the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under 14. Urges the parties to ensure full respect for the\nthe control of Bosnian Serb forces and that the Bosnian Serb norms of international humanitarian law and of human rights of\nparty permit representatives of the International Committee of the civilian population living in the areas in Bosnia and\nthe Red Cross (a) to visit and register any persons detained Herzegovina now under their control which under the Peace\nagainst their will, whether civilians or members of the forces of Agreement will be transferred to another party;\nBosnia and Herzegovina, and (b) to have access to any site it\nmay deem important; 15. Condemns the widespread looting and destruction\n of houses and other property, in particular by the Croatian\n 6. Affirms that the violations of humanitarian law and Defence Council forces in the area of Mrkonjic Grad and\nhuman rights in the areas of Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sipovo, and demands that all sides immediately stop such\nSanski Most from July to October 1995 must be fully and action, investigate them and make sure that those who violated\nproperly investigated by the relevant United Nations and other the law be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;\ninternational organizations and institutions;\n 16. Demands that all sides refrain from laying mines,\n 7. Notes that the International Tribunal for the in particular in those areas now under their control which under\nProsecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of the Peace Agreement will be transferred to another party;\nInternational Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of\nthe Former Yugoslavia since 1991, established pursuant to 17. Urges Member States to continue to assist the\nresolution 827 (1993), issued on 16 November 1995 indictments efforts of the United Nations, humanitarian agencies and\nagainst the Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko non-governmental organizations under way in the former\nMladic for their direct and individual responsibilities for the Yugoslavia to alleviate the plight of hundreds of thousands of\natrocities committed against the Bosnian Muslim population of refugees and displaced persons;\nSrebrenica in July 1995; 18. Also urges all the parties to the conflicts in the\n 8. Reaffirms its demand that the Bosnian Serb party territory of the former Yugoslavia to cooperate fully with these\ngive representatives of the relevant United Nations and other efforts with a view to creating conditions conducive to the\ninternational organizations and institutions, including the repatriation and return of refugees and displaced persons in\nSpecial Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, safety and dignity;\n\n\n\n852 07-63109\n"
[133] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n 19. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council Having further considered the report of the Secretary-\nregularly informed on progress reached in the investigation of General of 13 December 1995,\nthe violations of international humanitarian law referred to in\n 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General and\nthe report mentioned above;\n the proposals for involvement by the United Nations in the\n 20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. implementation of the Peace Agreement contained therein;\n\n After the vote, the President, speaking in his 2. Decides to establish, for a period of one year from\ncapacity as the representative of the Russian the transfer of authority from the United Nations Protection\nFederation, noted that the Council had again returned Force to the multinational Implementation Force, a United\n Nations civilian police force to be known as the International\nto the subject of violations of the norms of Police Task Force, to be entrusted with the tasks set out in\ninternational humanitarian law in the former annex 11 of the Peace Agreement, and a United Nations civilian\nYugoslavia. He stated that his Government’s principled office with the responsibilities set out in the report of the\nposition remained unchanged. The Russian Federation Secretary-General, and to that end endorses the arrangements set\nfirmly condemned any violations of international out in the report of the Secretary-General;\nhumanitarian law and human rights on the territory of 3. Notes with satisfaction that the International Police\nthe former Yugoslavia, no matter by whom or where Task Force and the United Nations civilian office will be under\nthey were perpetrated. The Russian Federation believed the authority of the Secretary-General and subject to\nthat the Council’s reaction to such violations could not coordination and guidance as appropriate by the High\nbe selective or one-sided. It was satisfied therefore that Representative, welcomes the Secretary-General’s intention to\nthe one-sided nature of the initial draft resolution had appoint a United Nations Coordinator, and requests the\n Secretary-General to submit to the Council, at least every three\nbeen corrected in the final text.429 months, reports about the work of the International Police Task\n Force and of the civilian office accordingly;\n Decision of 21 December 1995 (3613th meeting):\n resolution 1035 (1995) 4. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n At its 3613th meeting, on 21 December 1995, the\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item and B. The situation prevailing in and\nincluded the report of the Secretary-General of adjacent to the United Nations\n13 December 1995 in its agenda. 430 Following the Protected Areas in Croatia\nadoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his Initial proceedings\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the\nright to vote. The President (Russian Federation) then Decision of 25 January 1993 (3163rd meeting):\ndrew the attention of the Council members to the text resolution 802 (1993)\nof a draft resolution prepared in the course of the\nCouncil’s prior consultations.431 By a letter dated 25 January 1993 addressed to\n the President of the Security Council,432 the\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and representative of France requested the immediate\nadopted unanimously as resolution 1035 (1995), which convening of a Security Council meeting to consider\nreads: the grave situation existing in the United Nations\n The Security Council, Protected Areas in Croatia, and especially the attacks\n to which the personnel of the United Nations\n Recalling its resolution 1031 (1995) of 15 December Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in those areas had\n1995,\n been subjected.\n Recalling also the General Framework Agreement for\nPeace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the annexes thereto At its 3163rd meeting, held on 25 January 1993\n(collectively the “Peace Agreement”), in response to the request contained in that letter, the\n Council began consideration of the item and included\n__________________\n that letter in its agenda. Following the adoption of the\n 429 Ibid., pp. 15-16.\n 430 S/1995/1031 and Add.1.\n agenda, the President (Japan) drew the attention of the\n __________________\n 431 S/1995/1049.\n 432 S/25156.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 853\n"
[134] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nCouncil members to the text of a draft resolution that General to take all necessary steps to ensure their\nhad been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior safety. The fundamental obligation to ensure the safety\nconsultations 433 and to a revision that had been made of United Nations personnel was too often disregarded\nto the draft. He also drew the attention of the Council by parties involved in conflicts, but it was an\nmembers to two letters dated respectively 24 and obligation to which the United Nations should\n25 January from the representatives of the Federal scrupulously attend. The speaker also noted that it was\nRepublic of Yugoslavia and Croatia addressed to the no less important that the Council was calling upon the\nPresident of the Security Council.434 In his letter, the parties to cooperate with UNPROFOR to resolve\nrepresentative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia questions related to the implementation of the United\ntransmitted a letter of the same day from the Vice- Nations peace plan and to refrain from any action or\nPresident in which the latter denounced the Croatian threat that might undermine the efforts for peace that\n“aggression” against the Republic of Serbian Krajina were being made in Geneva. 435\nand requested an urgent meeting of the Security\n The draft resolution, as orally revised in its\nCouncil “to condemn that aggression and order the\n provisional form, was then put to the vote and adopted\nCroatian troops to immediately stop all military\n unanimously as resolution 802 (1993), which reads:\noperations and withdraw to their original positions”. In\nhis letter, the representative of Croatia informed the The Security Council,\nCouncil that “the limited action of the Croatian Police Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September\nforces and Croatian Army units on the territory of 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,\nCroatia —within the so-called “pink zones” — aimed\n Reaffirming in particular its commitment to the United\nat securing the perimeter of the Maslenica-bridge Nations peacekeeping plan,\nrebuilding site, had been terminated upon completion\nof its goal”. His Government deplored the loss of life Deeply concerned by the information provided by the\nof members of UNPROFOR who were caught in the Secretary-General to the Security Council on 25 January 1993\n on the rapid and violent deterioration of the situation in Croatia\ncross-fire during the said conflict and reiterated its as a result of military attacks by Croatian armed forces on the\nview that “the legitimate authorities of one country areas under the protection of the United Nations Protection\ncould not be regarded as aggressors on their own Force,\nterritory”.\n Strongly condemning those attacks which have led to\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of casualties and loss of life in the Force, as well as among the\nFrance noted that his Government had requested that civilian population,\nthe Security Council meet immediately to consider the Deeply concerned also by the lack of cooperation in\nsituation created by the attack by the Croatian Army in recent months by the Serb local authorities in the areas under the\nthe region of Maslenica. He contended that the protection of the Force, by the recent seizure by them of heavy\noffensive, which had taken place at a particularly weapons under control of the Force, and by threats to widen the\nimportant point in the ongoing peace process in conflict,\nGeneva and had cost the lives of two French soldiers 1. Demands the immediate cessation of hostile\nserving in UNPROFOR, could only further jeopardize activities by Croatian armed forces within or adjacent to the\nthe implementation of the United Nations peace plan in United Nations Protected Areas and the withdrawal of the\nthe region. It was very important that the Security Croatian armed forces from these areas;\nCouncil reacted to these events, condemned these 2. Strongly condemns the attacks by these forces\ndeliberate attacks against UNPROFOR and demanded against the United Nations Protection Force in the conduct of its\nthe cessation of military activities by the Croatian duty of protecting civilians in the Protected Areas and demands\nArmy directed against UNPROFOR in the United their immediate cessation;\nNations Protected Areas. The Government of France 3. Demands also that the heavy weapons seized from\nalso was pleased that the Council was demanding that the storage areas controlled by the Force be returned\nthe parties respect the safety of United Nations immediately to the Force;\npersonnel and that it was inviting the Secretary- 4. Demands further that all parties and others\n__________________ concerned comply strictly with the ceasefire arrangements\n 433 S/25160. __________________\n 434 S/25154 and S/25159. 435 S/PV.3163, pp. 3-4.\n\n\n\n\n854 07-63109\n"
[135] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nalready agreed and cooperate fully and unconditionally in the a gross violation of Security Council resolutions, but\nimplementation of the United Nations peacekeeping plan, was also endangering the Geneva negotiations for a\nincluding the disbanding and demobilization of the Serb peaceful settlement in the former Yugoslavia, which\nterritorial defence units or other units of similar functions;\n were at a crucial and sensitive stage. Having taken all\n 5. Expresses its condolences to the families of the those factors into account, the delegation of the\npersonnel of the Force who have lost their lives; Russian Federation had voted in favour of the\n 6. Demands that all parties and others concerned resolution just adopted. He warned, however, that if the\nrespect fully the safety of United Nations personnel; Croatian side were to fail to meet the demands of that\n 7. Invites the Secretary-General to take all necessary\n and other relevant resolutions of the Security Council,\nsteps to ensure the safety of the Force personnel concerned; then sanctions would have to be imposed on Croatia to\n the same extent as those imposed against the Federal\n 8. Calls upon all parties and others concerned to Republic of Yugoslavia.436\ncooperate with the Force in resolving all remaining issues\nconnected with the implementation of the peace keeping plan,\nincluding allowing civilian traffic freely to use the Maslenica Decision of 27 January 1993 (3165th meeting):\ncrossing; statement by the President\n 9. Calls again upon all parties and others concerned At its 3165th meeting, on 27 January 1993, the\nto cooperate fully with the International Conference on the Council included the letter dated 25 January from the\nFormer Yugoslavia and to refrain from any actions or threats representative of France addressed to the President of\nwhich might undermine the current efforts aimed at reaching a the Security Council in its agenda. Following the\npolitical settlement;\n adoption of the agenda, the President (Japan) stated\n 10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. that, after consultations among members of the\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make the\nRussian Federation argued that the military operations following statement on behalf of the Council:437\nof the Croatian Army in the Serbian Krajina region The Security Council is deeply concerned to learn from\nrepresented another link in the chain of violations by the Secretary-General that the offensive by the Croatian armed\nZagreb of the demands of the Security Council. He forces continues unabated in flagrant violation of resolution 802\nstated that the Croatian side had been ignoring for a (1993) of 25 January 1993, at a crucial time in the peace\n process.\nlong time the ban on flights over the air space of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, that it had been shipping The Council demands that military action by all parties\narms into that Republic, and that it was also conducting and others concerned cease immediately. It further demands that\nmilitary operations against the Muslims in Bosnia. He all parties and others concerned comply fully and immediately\n with all the provisions of resolution 802 (1993) and with other\ncontended that the attack being mounted by Croatian relevant Council resolutions.\narmed forces in areas under United Nations protection\nconstituted a direct challenge to the peacekeeping The Council once again demands that all parties and\nmission of the United Nations in the former others concerned respect fully the safety of United Nations\n personnel and guarantee their freedom of movement. The\nYugoslavia. The attempt to resolve the problem of Council reiterates that it will hold the political and military\nKrajina by military means was all the more regrettable leaders involved in the conflict responsible and accountable for\nbecause the leaders of the Federal Republic of the safety of the United Nations peacekeeping personnel in the\nYugoslavia and Croatia had seemed to be close to area.\nachieving a mutually acceptable agreement. The The Council will remain actively seized of the matter, in\nRussian Federation was particularly concerned that particular with a view to considering what further steps might be\nCroatia was ignoring the demands of the Security necessary to ensure that resolution 802 (1993) and other relevant\nCouncil and that the Croatian army was continuing its Council resolutions are fully implemented.\noffensive actions in Serb-populated areas of Croatia.\nHe contended that Zagreb was not only refusing to __________________\nrestore the status quo and withdraw from the territories 436 Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n 437 S/25178.\nit had seized through invasion, but was also seeking to\nextend the area in which it was carrying out military\naction. He argued that the Croatian attack was not only\n\n\n\n07-63109 855\n"
[136] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n Decision of 8 June 1993 (3231st meeting): 13 July 1993, the Croatian authorities had conveyed to\n statement by the President UNPROFOR their intention to reopen the Maslenica\n bridge and the Zemunik airport on 18 July 1993. They\n At its 3231st meeting, on 8 June 1993, the\n had also requested UNPROFOR to take all necessary\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item.\n measures to “ensure that the event will pass without\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council\n incident”. He further informed the Council that the\ninvited the representative of Croatia, at his request, to\n local Serb authorities and the authorities of the Federal\nparticipate in the discussion without the right to vote.\n Republic of Yugoslavia did not consider the planned\nThe President (Spain) then stated that, after\n event to be in conformity with Security Council\nconsultations among members of the Security Council,\n resolutions 802 (1993) and 847 (1993) and that they\nhe had been authorized to make the following\n perceived the planned events as a provocation. The\nstatement on behalf of the Council: 438\n Secretary-General had come to the conclusion that\n Having examined the situation in the United Nations developments at the Maslenica bridge and the Zemunik\nProtected Areas (UNPAs) in the Republic of Croatia, the airport in Croatia deserved the urgent attention of the\nSecurity Council is deeply concerned by the failure of the Council, which might wish to consider the danger\nKrajina Serbs to participate in talks on the implementation of its\nresolution 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993 which were to be held\n posed by that situation and decide upon appropriate\nin Zagreb on 26 May 1993. It deplores the interruption of the action.\ndialogue between the parties, which had recently produced Following the adoption of the agenda, the\nencouraging signs of progress.\n President (United Kingdom) drew the attention of the\n The Council stresses its support for the peace process members of the Council to a letter dated 12 July 1993\nunder the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the International from the representative of Croatia addressed to the\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia and urges the parties to President of the Security Council in which he stated\nsolve all problems which might arise by peaceful means and\nresume the talks immediately with a view to the rapid\n that his Government expected the Council and\nimplementation of resolution 802 (1993) and all other relevant UNPROFOR to take the steps necessary to ensure that\nresolutions. The Council expresses its willingness to help ensure the reopening of the Maslenica bridge would not be\nthe implementation of an agreement on this basis reached by the interrupted. 440\nparties, including respect for the rights of the local Serb\npopulation. The President then stated that, after consultations\n among members of the Security Council, he had been\n The Council reminds the parties that the UNPAs are authorized to make the following statement on behalf\nintegral parts of the territory of Croatia, and that no action\ninconsistent with this would be acceptable.\n of the Council:441\n The Security Council is deeply concerned at the\n The Council reiterates its demand that international\n information contained in the letter of the Secretary-General\nhumanitarian law be fully respected in the UNPAs.\n dated 14 July 1993 on the situation in and around the United\n The Council urges the Government of the Republic of Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in the Republic of Croatia. It\nCroatia, in cooperation with other interested parties, to take all recalls its resolutions 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993 and 847\nnecessary measures to ensure the full protection of the rights of (1993) of 30 June 1993 and in particular the demand in the\nall residents of the UNPAs when Croatia exercises fully its former that all parties and others concerned comply strictly with\nauthority in these Areas. the ceasefire arrangements already agreed and the call on them\n in the latter to reach an agreement on confidence building\n Decision of 15 July 1993 (3255th meeting): measures.\n statement by the President The Council expresses its deep concern at the latest report\n on hostilities in the UNPAs, including in particular by the\n At its 3255th meeting, on 15 July 1993, the Krajina Serbs, and demands that these hostilities cease\nCouncil included a letter dated 14 July 1993 from the immediately.\nSecretary-General addressed to the President of the\nSecurity Council in its agenda.439 The Secretary- The Council continues to attach the highest importance to\n securing the reopening of the Maslenica crossing to civilian\nGeneral informed the Council that, in a letter dated traffic. In this context it reaffirms its support for the sovereignty\n__________________\n __________________\n 438 S/25897.\n 440 S/26074.\n 439 S/26082.\n 441 S/26084.\n\n\n\n\n856 07-63109\n"
[137] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nand territorial integrity of Croatia. It recognizes the real and The Council demands that the Croatian forces withdraw\nlegitimate concern of the Government of Croatia in such forthwith in conformity with the above-mentioned agreement\nreopening, as set out in the letter dated 12 July 1993 from the and that they permit the immediate deployment of UNPROFOR.\nPermanent Representative of Croatia. It also recalls the demand The Council also demands that the Krajina Serb forces refrain\nin its resolution 802 (1993) that the Croatian armed forces from entering the area. The Council calls for maximum restraint\nwithdraw from the areas in question. from all the parties, including the observance of a ceasefire.\n The Council considers that the planned unilateral The Council warns of the serious consequences of any\nreopening of the Maslenica bridge and of Zemunik airport on failure to implement the above-mentioned agreement.\n18 July 1993, in the absence of agreement between the parties\n The Council will remain actively seized of the matter.\nand others concerned in cooperation with the United Nations\nProtection Force (UNPROFOR), would jeopardize the objectives\nof the Council’s resolutions and in particular the call in its Decision of 27 August 1993: letter from the\nresolution 847 1993) for agreement on confidence building President to the Secretary-General\nmeasures and the efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the International\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia and UNPROFOR to By a letter dated 20 August 1993 addressed to the\nachieve a negotiated settlement to the problem. It urges the President of the Security Council, 443 the Secretary-\nGovernment of Croatia to refrain from this action. General, recalling resolutions 771 (1992) of 15 August\n The Council expresses its support for the efforts of the\n 1992 and 780 (1992) of 6 October 1992, stated that the\nCo-Chairmen and UNPROFOR and calls on the parties and Commission of Experts established pursuant to\nothers concerned to cooperate fully with them in this regard and resolution 780 (1992) had been attempting to examine\nto conclude rapidly the agreement on confidence building and analyse information relating to grave breaches of\nmeasures called for in its resolution 847 1993). It joins the the Geneva Conventions and other violations of\nSecretary-General in his call to the parties and others concerned humanitarian law committed in the territory of the\nto act in a manner conducive to the maintenance of peace and to former Yugoslavia, and to uncover and establish\nrefrain from any action which would undermine these efforts,\nand calls upon the parties to assure UNPROFOR’s freedom of\n evidence at mass grave sites in the United Nations\naccess in particular to the area surrounding the Maslenica Protected Areas in Croatia. The Government of the\ncrossing. Netherlands had offered to provide free of cost an\n armed military engineer unit of up to 50 personnel to\n Decision of 30 July 1993 (3260th meeting): assist in the excavation of a mass grave site at Ovcara\n statement by the President near Vukovar. The Secretary-General believed that this\n task could best be carried out by including the unit, on\n At its 3260th meeting, on 30 July 1993, the a temporary basis, UNPROFOR. The additional\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item. elements of the Force would be deployed in the area\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the President for a period of 10 weeks starting 1 September 1993,\n(United Kingdom) stated that, after consultations subject to the extension of the mandate of UNPROFOR\namong members of the Security Council, he had been which would expire on 30 September 1993. The\nauthorized to make the following statement on behalf Secretary-General stated that he would proceed on that\nof the Council:442 basis, subject to the concurrence of the members of the\n The Security Council has heard with deep concern the Council.\nreport from the Special Representative of the Secretary-General\nfor the Former Yugoslavia on the situation in and around the By a letter dated 27 August 1993, 444 the President\nUnited Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in the Republic of of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General\nCroatia and in particular in respect of the Maslenica crossing. of the following:\n The Council reaffirms the presidential statement of The members of the Security Council have considered\n15 July 1993. Following this statement the parties reached an your letter of 20 August 1993 referring to Council resolutions\nagreement on 15/16 July 1993 at Erdut which requires the 771 (1992) and 780 (1992). The members agree with your\nwithdrawal of Croatian armed forces and police from the area of suggestion to accept the offer of the Government of the\nthe Maslenica bridge by 31 July 1993 and the placing of the Netherlands to provide free of cost to the United Nations a\nbridge under the exclusive control of the United Nations 50-person engineering unit to assist in the excavation of a mass\nProtection Force (UNPROFOR). grave site at Ovcara near Vukovar, in the United Nations\n __________________\n__________________\n 443 S/26373.\n 442 S/26199.\n 444 S/26374.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 857\n"
[138] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nProtected Areas in Croatia, in the context of the work of the The Security Council, which has begun its consideration\nCommission of Experts established pursuant to resolution 780 of the report of the Secretary-General of 14 January 1995\n(1992). They note the information contained in the letter, and submitted pursuant to resolution 947(1994), has learned with\nagree with the proposal contained therein. concern of the position adopted by the Republic of Croatia on\n the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Protection\n The members understand that the connection of the\n Force in Croatia beyond 31 March 1995, as set out in the letter\nUnited Nations Protection Force with the engineering unit will\n dated 12 January 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the\nbe the provision of administrative and logistic support and\n Republic of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the\nprotection.\n Secretary-General. It is particularly concerned about the wider\n implications of this development for the peace process\n Decision of 17 January 1995 (3491st meeting): throughout the former Yugoslavia. The Council reiterates its\n statement by the President commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the\n Republic of Croatia within its internationally recognized\n At its 3491st meeting, on 17 January 1995, the borders. It understands the concerns of the Croatian Government\nCouncil included a letter dated 12 January 1995 from about the lack of implementation of major provisions of the\nthe representative of Croatia addressed to the United Nations peacekeeping plan for Croatia. It will not accept\nSecretary-General in its agenda.445 By that letter, the the status quo becoming an indefinite situation. It believes,\nrepresentative of Croatia transmitted a letter of the however, that the continued presence of the United Nations\nsame date from the President of Croatia to the Protection Force in the Republic of Croatia is of vital\n importance for regional peace and security and that the United\nSecretary-General in which he stated that, despite its Nations, in general, and the Force, in particular, have a positive\nendeavours, UNPROFOR had been unable to role to play in achieving the further implementation of the\nimplement the most important provisions of the Vance peacekeeping plan and bringing about a settlement which\nPlan and subsequent Security Council resolutions. ensures full respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty\nMoreover, Croatia found the continued presence of of Croatia. It recalls the important role the United Nations\nUNPROFOR in the occupied territories to be largely Protection Force plays in helping to sustain the ceasefire in\ncounterproductive to the peace process. He further Croatia, facilitating humanitarian activities and international\n relief work and supporting implementation of the economic\ncontented that the Serb intransigence and agreement of 2 December 1994. It is in that perspective that the\nUNPROFOR’s reserve were de facto allowing and Council hopes that discussions over the weeks ahead will lead to\npromoting the occupation of parts of Croatia’s territory. a re-examination of the position now taken in relation to the\nThe “freezing” of a negative status quo was continuing role of the United Nations Protection Force in the\nunacceptable. The President concluded that, although Republic of Croatia. Meanwhile, the Council calls upon all\nUNPROFOR had played an important role in stopping parties and others concerned to avoid any action or statement\nviolence and major conflicts in Croatia, it was an which might lead to an increase in tension. It welcomes the\n conclusion, under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the\nindisputable fact that the present character of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the\nUNPROFOR mission did not provide conditions Former Yugoslavia, of the economic agreement of 2 December\nnecessary for establishing lasting peace and order in 1994 and urges the parties to continue, and accelerate, its\nCroatia. Croatia was therefore terminating the implementation; it notes the need for adequate international\nUNPROFOR mandate, effective 31 March 1995, in financial support and encourages the international community to\naccordance with Security Council resolution 947 respond to this need. It calls for the intensification in the coming\n(1994). weeks of all these efforts to consolidate this achievement and to\n bring about a political settlement in Croatia and it calls upon the\n Following the adoption of the agenda, the parties to cooperate with these efforts and to negotiate in earnest\nCouncil invited the representative of Croatia, at his to that end.\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the The Council affirms its commitment to the search for an\nright to vote. overall negotiated settlement of the conflicts in the former\n Yugoslavia ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of\n The President (Argentina) then stated that, after all the States there within their internationally recognized\nconsultations among members of the Security Council, borders and stresses the importance it attaches to the mutual\nhe had been authorized to make the following recognition thereof.\nstatement on behalf of the Council: 446\n__________________\n 445 S/1995/28.\n 446 S/PRST/1995/2.\n\n\n\n\n858 07-63109\n"
[139] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n C. Navigation on the Danube river447 following statement to the media on behalf of the\n members of the Council:450\n Initial proceedings In connection with letters dated 27 January from the\n representative of Romania and 28 January 1993 from the\n Decision of 28 January 1993: statement by representative of Bulgaria to the President of the Security\n the President Council, the members of the Council heard a report from the\n Chairman of the Committee established by resolution 724\n By a letter dated 27 January 1993 addressed to (1991) about Yugoslav vessels carrying oil from Ukraine to\nthe President of the Security Council, the Serbia by way of the Danube, a flagrant violation of mandatory\nrepresentative of Romania transmitted the declaration Security Council resolutions.\nissued by his Government on 27 January 1993, The members of the Council are concerned that these\nconcerning the situation created on the Danube river as shipments are reported to have left Ukrainian territory after the\na result of the flagrant violation of Security Council adoption of resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992 and indeed\nresolutions 757 (1992) and 787 (1992) by Yugoslav may have left after the adoption of resolution 787 (1992) of\nvessels transporting petroleum products.448 The 16 November 1992. They call on the Government of Ukraine to\n ensure that no further such shipments are permitted.\nrepresentative of Romania underlined that cooperation\nbetween riparian States as well as international The members of the Council are also extremely concerned\ncooperation, including appropriate consideration and that some of the vessels have already reached Serbia. In this\naction by the Security Council, was necessary in order regard, they demand that the authorities of the Federal Republic\n of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) comply fully with the\nto compel the Yugoslav authorities to take immediate\n relevant resolutions. They have asked the President of the\nmeasures to stop the violation of the embargo by the Council to convey their concern to the representatives of\nYugoslav vessels. Romania and Bulgaria, to remind them of their clear obligations\n under the relevant resolutions and to seek an explanation of their\n By a letter dated 28 January 1993 addressed to\n failure to fulfil them. They have asked the President to draw\nthe President of the Security Council,449 the particular attention to the relevant resolutions, which make clear\nrepresentative of Bulgaria transmitted the text of a the responsibility of all riparian States to take necessary\npress release of 27 January 1993 by his Ministry of measures to ensure that shipping on the Danube is in accordance\nForeign Affairs regarding the recent incident involving with Council resolutions, including such enforcement measures\nthe unauthorized passage of the Serbian convoy towed commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be\nby the tugship Bihac through the Bulgarian-Romanian necessary to halt such shipping. The members of the Council\n reaffirm their support for vigorous enforcement of the relevant\nsector of the Danube. The Ministry stated that\n resolutions, and they are clear that the riparian States have the\nestablishing close cooperation between Bulgarian and means to fulfil this obligation and that they must do so\nRomanian authorities was of decisive significance to forthwith.\nprevent such incident in the future. He reiterated his\nappeal for the deployment of international sanctions Decision of 10 February 1993: statement by\nmonitoring missions at all ports along the Danube and the President\nstressed the urgent need for substantial technical\nsupport to assist his country and Romania in the On 10 February 1993, after consultations with the\nimplementation of the sanctions. members of the Council, the President made the\n following statement to the media on behalf of the\n On 28 January 1993, after consultations with the members of the Council:451\nmembers of the Council, the President made the\n__________________ The members of the Security Council have heard a report\n 447 This item was initially considered under the title\n from the Chairman of the Committee established by resolution\n 724 (1991) about the detention of Romanian vessels on the\n “Navigation on the Danube river in the Federal Republic\n Danube by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)”. It was\n (Serbia and Montenegro).\n reformulated to read “Navigation on the Danube river”\n as from the 3533rd meeting, held on 11 May 1995. They have learned that the Minister of Transport of the\n 448 S/25189. Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has\n 449 S/25182. threatened to detain more Romanian vessels if Romania does not\n __________________\n 450 S/25190.\n 451 S/25270.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 859\n"
[140] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nallow the passage of Yugoslav vessels on the Danube. They have regime and lacking proper authorization or carrying\nalso learned that that Minister has addressed a letter to the falsified documents. The letter noted that those\nChairman of the Committee established by resolution 724 shipments had, in many instances, crossed several\n(1991) informing him that the Romanian vessels would be\nreleased without further delay, which according to information\n international borders before reaching Hungary and it\nprovided by the Chargé d’affaires of the Permanent Mission of contended that Hungary’s commitment to implementing\nRomania to the United Nations has not yet happened. the sanctions could be efficient only if it was sustained\n by the cooperation of all the States Members of the\n The members of the Council recall their statement of\n28 January 1993 about the responsibility of States to enforce\n United Nations, in observance of the relevant Security\nmandatory Security Council resolutions, with particular Council resolutions.\nreference to Yugoslav vessels attempting to violate those At its 3290th meeting, on 13 October 1993, the\nresolutions by way of the Danube. They commend the Romanian\nGovernment for the action it has since taken in this regard and\n Council included the above-mentioned letter in its\nreaffirm once again their full support for vigorous enforcement agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\nof the relevant resolutions. President (Brazil) stated that, after consultations\n among members of the Security Council, he had been\n They also recall that under Article 103 of the Charter, the\nobligations of the Members of the United Nations under the\n authorized to make the following statement on behalf\nCharter prevail over their obligations under any other of the Council:453\ninternational agreement. The Security Council has learned with deep concern that\n The members of the Council condemn any such the blocking of the Danube by two Serbian non-governmental\nretaliatory action and threats of such action by the authorities of organizations is still continuing and deplores the acquiescence\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia\nis wholly unacceptable for those authorities to take retaliatory and Montenegro), which is reflected in the fact that they have\nmeasures in response to action by a State in fulfilment of its failed to take any action to prevent these acts. It condemns these\nobligations under the Charter of the United Nations. They deliberate and unjustified acts of interference with the river\ndemand that those authorities release forthwith the Romanian traffic of several Member States of the United Nations. It\nvessels they have unjustifiably detained, and that they desist emphasizes the importance it attaches to the free and unhindered\nfrom further unlawful detention. navigation on the Danube, which is essential for legitimate trade\n in the region. It reminds the authorities of the Federal Republic\n of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of their previous written\n Decision of 13 October 1993 (3290th meeting): commitment to secure free and safe navigation on this vital\n statement by the President international waterway.\n By a letter dated 11 October 1993 addressed to the The Council is also concerned that the authorities of the\nPresident of the Security Council, the representative of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)\nHungary reported that the blockade on the Danube at continue to impose tolls on foreign vessels transiting the section\nBelgrade, which had been initiated in mid-July by two of the Danube which passes through the territory of the Federal\nSerbian non-governmental organizations, was continuing Republic. By extracting these payments, the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) violates its international\nunabated.452 Despite recent promises made by the obligations. The Council rejects any attempt to justify, on\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia to eliminate the whatever ground, the imposition of tolls on the Danube. It\nblockade, Belgrade had taken no measures to remedy the demands that the authorities of the Federal Republic of\nsituation. Moreover, the authorities of the Federal Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and any others imposing\nRepublic of Yugoslavia continued to impose tolls on similar tolls cease such action immediately.\nvessels wishing to transit the Yugoslav section of the The Council condemns these illegal actions and reaffirms\nDanube, in violation of the Danube Convention and that it is wholly unacceptable for the Federal Republic of\ndespite the call made on 3 September 1993 by the Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to take retaliatory\nSecurity Council Committee established pursuant to measures in response to action by a State in fulfilment of its\nresolution 724 (1991) to cease their illegal action. obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. It reminds\nHungary, while firm in its commitment to the full the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of\n its own international obligations and demands that its authorities\nimplementation of its obligations arising in connection ensure free movement of international traffic on the Danube.\nwith the sanctions regime, was facing an increasingly\ncomplex task of stopping shipments falling under that The Council remains seized of the matter.\n__________________ __________________\n 452 S/26562.\n 453 S/26572.\n\n\n\n\n860 07-63109\n"
[141] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n Decision of 14 March 1994 (3348th meeting): that had been prepared in the course of the Council’s\n statement by the President prior consultations455 and to a letter dated 8 May 1995\n from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee\n At its 3348th meeting, on 14 March 1994, the\n established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991)\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item.\n concerning Yugoslavia addressed to the President of\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the President\n the Security Council.456 The Chairman informed the\n(France) stated that, after consultations among\n Council that the Government of Romania, supported by\nmembers of the Security Council, he had been\n other Danube riparian States, the Danube Commission\nauthorized to make the following statement on behalf\n and the European Union/Organization for Security and\nof the Council:454\n Cooperation in Europe Sanctions Coordinator, had\n The Security Council has taken note of the letters dated requested authorization for vessels of the Federal\n10 and 14 March 1994 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Republic of Yugoslavia to be allowed to use the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In Romanian locks of the Iron Gates I system, on the left\nthese documents, his Government acknowledges that the\nBulgarian convoy, the Han Kubrat, composed of 6 barges\n bank of the Danube, while repairs were carried out to\ntransporting 6,000 tons of diesel oil on the Danube, entered the the locks on the right bank. The riparian States and\nterritory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and international organizations concerned had asked for the\nMontenegro) on the morning of 6 March 1994 at the port of Committee’s assistance, stressing the importance for\nPrahovo. The Government also recognizes that the cargo was safe international navigation on the Danube of the Iron\nunloaded and that the convoy returned to Bulgaria without it. Gates I system being properly maintained and repaired.\n The Council most strongly condemns this flagrant In considering the matter, the Committee had taken\nviolation by the authorities of the Federal Republic of into account the need and readiness of Romania to\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of the relevant resolutions ensure that vessels of the Federal Republic of\nof the Council prohibiting the shipment of commodities and Yugoslavia, if allowed to use the Romanian locks of\nproducts to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and the system, would not engage in any activities\nMontenegro). It holds the authorities of the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) fully accountable for the\n contravening the relevant Security Council resolutions.\nnon-return of the cargo of the Han Kubrat. The Committee had therefore recommended, in view of\n the exceptional circumstances as well as the provisions\n The Council welcomes the cooperative attitude of the contained in paragraph 16 of resolution 820 (1993),\nBulgarian Government. It calls upon the authorities of Bulgaria\nto assess the precise circumstances of this act and to prosecute\n that the Security Council consider the adoption of a\nthose responsible for it. technical resolution on the matter.\n The Council reaffirms the importance it attaches to free The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nand unimpeded navigation on the Danube, which is essential to was adopted unanimously as resolution 992 (1995),\nlegitimate commerce in the region. It again stresses that the which reads:\nauthorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) have undertaken in writing to guarantee the The Security Council,\nfreedom and security of navigation on this crucial international Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the\nwaterway. It invites them to respect scrupulously their former Yugoslavia, in particular its resolution 820 (1993) of\ncommitments in this regard. 17 April 1993,\n The Council stands ready to address the issue again in the Desiring to promote free and unhindered navigation on\nfuture. the Danube in accordance with those resolutions,\n\n Decision of 11 May 1995 (3533rd meeting): Recalling statements made by the President of the\n Security Council on freedom of navigation on the Danube, in\n resolution 992 (1995) particular that made on 13 October 1993 expressing concern\n At its 3533rd meeting, on 11 May 1995, the about the imposition of illegal tolls on foreign vessels transiting\nCouncil included the item entitled “Navigation on the the section of the Danube which passes through the territory of\n the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),\nDanube river” in its agenda. Following the adoption of\nthe agenda, the President (France) drew the attention of __________________\nthe Council members to the text of a draft resolution 455 S/1995/373.\n\n__________________ 456 S/1995/372.\n\n 454 S/PRST/1994/10.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 861\n"
[142] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n Reminding States of their obligations under paragraph 5 monitor this use, including, if necessary, by inspections of the\nof resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992 not to make available vessels and their cargo, to ensure that no goods are loaded or\nto the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia unloaded during the passage by the vessels through the locks of\nand Montenegro) or to any commercial, industrial or public the Iron Gates I system;\nutility undertaking in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia\n 4. Also requests the Government of Romania to deny\nand Montenegro) any funds or any other financial or economic\n passage through the locks of the Iron Gates I system on the left\nresources and to prevent their nationals from making available\n bank of the Danube to any vessel using the locks of the Iron\nto those authorities or to any such undertaking any such funds or\n Gates I system under the authority of paragraph 1 above which\nresources, and noting that flag States may submit claims to the\n is identified as being a party to any suspected or substantiated\nauthorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n violation of the relevant Council resolutions;\nMontenegro) for reimbursement of tolls illegally imposed on\ntheir vessels transiting the section of the Danube which passes 5. Requests the Sanctions Assistance Missions\nthrough the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Communications Centre to report to the Committee established\n(Serbia and Montenegro), pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) and to the Romanian\n authorities operating the locks of the Iron Gates I system on the\n Taking note of the letter dated 8 May 1995 from the\n left bank of the Danube any suspected violation of any of the\nChairman of the Security Council Committee established\n relevant Council resolutions by vessels using the locks of the\npursuant to resolution 724 (1991) regarding the use by vessels\n Iron Gates I system under the authority of paragraph 1 above\nregistered in, or owned or controlled by persons in, the Federal\n and to transmit to the Committee and to the Romanian\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of the locks of\n authorities evidence that any such violation has in fact occurred;\nthe Iron Gates I system on the left bank of the Danube while\n and decides that the Chairman of the Committee shall, after\nrepairs are carried out to the locks on the right bank,\n consulting members of the Committee, transmit to the Council\n Recognizing that the use by vessels registered in, or any substantiated evidence of such a violation forthwith;\nowned or controlled by persons in, the Federal Republic of\n 6. Decides that the exemption provided for in\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of the locks will require an\n paragraph 1 above shall terminate on the third working day after\nexemption from the provisions of paragraph 16 of resolution 820\n the Council receives substantiated evidence from the Chairman\n(1993) and acting, in this respect, under Chapter VII of the\n of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991)\nCharter of the United Nations,\n of a violation of any of the relevant resolutions of the Council\n 1. Decides that the use of the locks of the Iron Gates I by a vessel using the locks of the Iron Gates I system under the\nsystem on the left bank of the Danube by vessels (a) registered authority of paragraph 1 above, unless the Council decides to the\nin the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) contrary, and that the Government of Romania shall be so\nor (b) in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a informed immediately;\nperson or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic\n 7. Requests the Executive Director of the Danube\nof Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall be permitted in\n Commission to inform the Chairman of the Committee\naccordance with this resolution;\n established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) of the date of\n 2. Also decides that the present resolution shall come completion of the repairs, or, if the repairs have not been\ninto force on the day following the receipt by the Council from completed within sixty days of the entry into force of the present\nthe Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution, or within the subsequent periods of up to sixty days\nresolution 724 (1991) of a report by the Danube Commission for which the provisions of the present resolution may be\nthat it is satisfied that preparations for the repairs to the locks of extended, to provide the Chairman with a report on the state of\nthe Iron Gates I system on the right bank of the Danube have the repairs ten days before the expiry of any such period;\nbeen completed, and that the present resolution shall remain in\n 8. Confirms that, in accordance with the provisions of\nforce, subject to paragraph 6 below, for a period of sixty days\n resolution 760 (1992), the importation into the Federal Republic\nfrom the date on which it comes into force, and, unless the\n of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of supplies essential to\nCouncil decides otherwise, for further periods of up to sixty\n the repair of the locks on the right bank of the Danube may be\ndays if the Council is notified by the Committee established\n approved in accordance with the procedures of the Committee\npursuant to resolution 724 (1991) that each such further period\n established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) at a meeting or\nis required for completion of the necessary repairs;\n meetings of the Committee;\n 3. Requests the Government of Romania, with the\n 9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\nassistance of the European Union/Organization for Security and\nCooperation in Europe Sanctions Assistance Missions, strictly to\n\n\n\n\n862 07-63109\n"
[143] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n D. United Nations Protection Force457 consider those territories to be part of Croatia and\n rejected talks on that basis. It further argued that the\n Decision of 19 February 1993 (3174th meeting): two parties to the original plan no longer have any\n resolution 807 (1993) locus standi in the area where UNPROFOR was\n deployed. The mandate and deployment of\n On 10 February 1993, pursuant to resolution 743\n UNPROFOR must now be discussed with them as the\n(1992), the Secretary-General submitted to the Security\n sovereign “Republic of Serb Krajina”.\nCouncil a further report on the United Nations\nProtection Force (UNPROFOR).458 The report was Noting that these positions appeared to be\nintended to provide a basis for the Security Council to irreconcilable, the Secretary-General proposed the\ntake appropriate action on the future of the Force following options with regard to the UNPROFOR\nbefore its mandate expired on 21 February 1993. It mandate: (a) to renew the mandate entrusted to\nfocused primarily on the options available to the UNPROFOR by resolution 743 (1992); (b) to modify\nCouncil in relation to the UNPROFOR mandate in that mandate; or (c) to give UNPROFOR no mandate\nCroatia. in Croatia. Analysis of these options, however, did not\n indicate any clear way forward in a difficult situation\n The Secretary-General observed that while the\n not foreseen when the Security Council had decided to\nnon-cooperation of the local Serb authorities had\n establish UNPROFOR. Two factors needed to be\nseriously retarded the implementation of the United\n addressed before taking any decision regarding\nNations peace-keeping plan, the Croatian offensive on\n UNPROFOR. The first was the failure to implement\nand after 22 January 1993 had significantly altered the\n the peacekeeping plan. The second was that it had not\nrealities on the ground. Following the offensive, the\n been possible to negotiate an agreed settlement to the\nPresident of Croatia had indicated publicly that his\n conflict between Croatia and the Serbs populations\nGovernment was also prepared to invade the United\n living in the United Nations Protected Areas and the\nNations Protected Areas if UNPROFOR was unable to\n pink zones. He had therefore asked the Co-Chairmen of\nfulfil its mandate there. For its part, the Serb leadership\n the Steering Committee of the International Conference\nin the United Nations Protected Areas had rearmed and\n on the former Yugoslavia to address those questions\nremobilized its force in response to the Croatian\n urgently, so that he could make a substantive\noffensive. In addition, the circumstances in which the\n recommendation for an extension of the UNPROFOR\npeacekeeping plan had been drafted and agreed had\n mandate. As it was unlikely that those results could be\nthemselves changed. The plan had been envisaged as\n achieved by 21 February 1993, when the existing\nan interim arrangement pending an overall political\n UNPROFOR mandate was due to expire, the Secretary-\nsolution to the Yugoslav crisis. The Government of\n General recommended that the Security Council extend\nCroatia claimed there was no longer any “overall\n the mandate of the Force for an interim period, until\npolitical solution” to negotiate. The only issue, in its\n 31 March 1993.\nview, was the return of the Protected Areas and the\n“pink zones” to Croatian control, with the Serb At its 3174th meeting, on 19 February 1993, the\nminority enjoying the rights granted by the Croatian Council included the further report of the Secretary-\nConstitution and other legal instruments. The Serb General in its agenda. Following the adoption of the\nleadership in the Protected Areas, however, refused to agenda, the Council invited the representative of\n__________________ Croatia, at his request, to participate in the discussion\n 457 This item was initially considered under the title “Report without the right to vote. The Council also invited\n of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 743 Ambassador Dragomir Djokic, at his request, to\n (1992)”. It was reformulated to read “United Nations address the Council in the course of the discussion.\n Protection Force (UNPROFOR)” as from the 3248th The President (Morocco) then drew the attention of the\n meeting, held on 30 June 1993.\n 458 S/25264 and Corr.1. Council members to the text of a draft resolution that\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 863\n"
[144] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nhad been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior Protected Areas, UNPROFOR and the Serb civilian\nconsultations 459 and to several other documents. 460 population, represented a flagrant violation of the\n Vance peace plan and of relevant Security Council\n The representative of Croatia stated that his\n resolutions, including resolutions 724 (1991) and 762\nGovernment supported the Secretary-General’s\n (1992). He argued that Croatia had ignored recent\nproposal for the provisional extension of the\n decisions of the Council, such as resolution 802 (1993)\nUNPROFOR mandate, as it would provide enough time\n and the presidential statement of 27 January 1993, and\nfor negotiations concerning all aspects of the\n that the Council had an obligation to take all\nUNPROFOR operation and for full implementation of\n appropriate measures, including those envisaged in\nthe Vance plan. Referring to his letter dated\n Chapter VII, to make Croatia honour the Charter of the\n12 February 1993, he stressed that future United\n United Nations and all relevant Security Council\nNations operations in Croatia must be based on the\n resolutions. For its part, the Federal Republic of\nfollowing basic elements: complete demilitarization of\n Yugoslavia had fulfilled all obligations undertaken\nthe United Nations Protected Areas and pink zones;\n under the Vance plan and supported further\nvoluntary return of the refugees; control of Croatian\n engagement of UNPROFOR and full implementation\ninternational borders; confidence-building measures as\n of resolution 802 (1993). The speaker further argued\na part of the process of reintegration of the Protected\n that UNPROFOR had proved to be justified, thus\nAreas and the pink zones into the Croatian State; and\n creating the basic prerequisites for all open questions\nprotection of national minorities and other human\n to be resolved. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had\nrights. Croatia was prepared to implement Security\n expected the UNPROFOR mandate to be extended for\nCouncil resolution 802 (1993) as a first step in the\n a year, however it supported the proposal contained in\ndemilitarization process that would be fully established\n the draft resolution. It hoped that in the meantime the\nthrough the implementation of resolutions 762 (1992)\n necessary conditions would be created so that the\nand 769 (1992) and that would enable a comprehensive\n mandate could be further extended, as envisioned by\npolitical solution under the auspices of the Conference\n the plan, until a comprehensive and peaceful solution\non the Former Yugoslavia. Before concluding, the\n was reached.462\nspeaker expressed confidence that future decisions of\nthe Council would give added credibility to the Speaking before the vote, the representative of\nUNPROFOR operation, and would provide it with France stated that the security of UNPROFOR\neffective mechanisms to attain the goals foreseen in the personnel was a priority for his Government, in\nVance plan. 461 considering the question of renewing the UNPROFOR\n mandate. Recent events in Croatia had demonstrated\n Mr. Djokic contended that the recent aggression\n that there was an overriding need to endow the Force\nof the Croatian Army against the United Nations\n__________________ with both the legal basis and the military means to\n 459 S/25306.\n ensure its self-defence. In the circumstances, the\n 460 Letters dated 5 January and 12 February 1993, Council’s only option was to extend the mandate for an\n respectively, from the representative of Croatia interim period of six weeks, but even for that brief\n addressed to the Secretary-General (S/25062 and period it had been “unthinkable” to extend the mandate\n S/25288); letter dated 29 January 1993 from the in its current form. The French delegation had\n representative of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary- therefore proposed a draft resolution placing\n General (S/25193); letters dated 1 and 3 February 1993, UNPROFOR within the framework of Chapter VII of\n respectively, from the representative of Yugoslavia\n the Charter, and it had suggested a series of concrete\n addressed to the President of the Security Council\n (S/25218 and S/25237); letter dated 26 January 1993\n measures to ensure greater stability in the areas where\n from the representatives of France, Spain and the United UNPROFOR was deployed. The reference to Chapter\n Kingdom addressed to the President of the Security VII was not designed to change the nature of the Force\n Council, transmitting the text of the statement on the from peacekeeping to peacemaking. Rather, the sole\n former Yugoslavia adopted by the European Community __________________\n on 25 January 1993 (S/25222); and letter dated 462 Ibid., pp. 6-13.\n 5 February 1993 from the representative of Turkey\n addressed to the Secretary-General (S/25246).\n 461 S/PV.3174, pp. 3-6.\n\n\n\n\n864 07-63109\n"
[145] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nconsideration was “preventive security”, which was The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nreflected in the text of the draft resolution.463 adopted unanimously as resolution 807 (1993), which\n reads:\n The representative of China said that the\nUNPROFOR mandate should be extended for an The Security Council,\ninterim period. His delegation shared the concern of Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992\nother delegations relating to the threat posed to the and all subsequent resolutions relating to the United Nations\nsecurity of Force personnel and it supported the Protection Force,\nSecretary-General’s taking appropriate measures to Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of\nstrengthen the security of UNPROFOR personnel. In 10 February 1993,\nthe light of that consideration, and of the fact that it\nhad been repeatedly stated that the purpose of invoking Deeply concerned by the lack of cooperation of the\n parties and others concerned in implementing the United\nChapter VII of the Charter in the draft resolution was Nations peacekeeping plan in Croatia,\nto take measures to increase appropriately the\nUNPROFOR self-defence capability, his delegation Deeply concerned also by the recent and repeated\nwould vote in favour of the draft resolution. The violations by the parties and others concerned of their ceasefire\n obligations,\nspeaker, however, pointed out that UNPROFOR was a\npeacekeeping operation and that Chapter VII had not Determining that the situation thus created constitutes a\nbeen invoked either in resolution 743 (1992) or in threat to peace and security in the region,\nsubsequent resolutions relating to the matter, nor did Noting in that context the request of the Secretary-\nthe Secretary-General’s report contained such request. General to the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\nThe question could have been settled through the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, mentioned\nexpanded concept of self-defence and rules of in his report, to establish as soon as possible, through\nengagement, and by taking appropriate measures discussions with the parties, a basis on which the mandate of the\n Force could be renewed,\nwithout invoking Chapter VII. China wished to place\non record its understanding that the practice of Determined to ensure the security of the Force, and to this\ninvoking Chapter VII was exceptional and did not end acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United\nconstitute a precedent for future peacekeeping Nations,\noperations.464 1. Demands that the parties and others concerned\n comply fully with the United Nations peacekeeping plan in\n The representative of the Russian Federation Croatia and with the other commitments they have undertaken\nstated that his delegation considered the demand and in particular with their ceasefire obligations;\ncontained in the draft resolution for the rapid\n 2. Demands also that the parties and others concerned\nimplementation of resolution 802 (1993) and other refrain from positioning their forces in the proximity of units of\nresolutions to be extremely important. It was important the United Nations Protection Force in the United Nations\nto exert a “balanced influence” over those involved in Protected Areas and in the pink zones;\nthe Yugoslav crisis, in the interest of prompt\n 3. Demands the full and strict observance of all\nsettlement. The Russian Federation believed that, relevant Security Council resolutions relating to the mandate\nshould Croatia fail to meet the demands contained in and operations of the Force in the Republic of Bosnia and\nresolution 802 (1993) and other Security Council Herzegovina;\nresolutions, sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter\n 4. Demands further that the parties and others\nshould also be applied to Croatia. The Russian concerned respect fully unimpeded freedom of movement of the\nFederation also supported the provisions in the draft Force, enabling it, inter alia, to carry out all necessary\nresolution that sought to strengthen the security of concentrations and deployments, all movements of equipment\nUNPROFOR personnel.465 and weapons and all humanitarian and logistical activities;\n__________________ 5. Decides, in the context of these demands, to extend\n 463 Ibid., pp. 13-15. the mandate of the Force for an interim period terminating on\n 464 Ibid., pp. 19-21. 31 March 1993;\n 465 Ibid., pp. 21-23.\n 6. Urges the parties and others concerned fully to\n cooperate with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of\n the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in the\n\n\n\n07-63109 865\n"
[146] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\ndiscussions under their auspices in order to ensure full the United Nations peacekeeping plan and to the\nimplementation of the United Nations peacekeeping mandate in implementation of resolution 802 (1993) and other\nCroatia, including, inter alia, through the collection and relevant resolutions.\nsupervision of heavy weapons by the Force and the appropriate\nwithdrawal of forces; At its 3189th meeting, held on 30 March 1993,\n 7. Invites the Secretary-General to work to achieve the Council continued its discussion under the item\nthe rapid implementation of the United Nations peacekeeping entitled “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to\nmandate and of relevant Security Council resolutions, including Security Council resolution 807 (1993)”. Following the\nresolution 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993, thus to ensure adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nsecurity and stability throughout the Protected Areas and the representative of Croatia, at his request, to participate\npink zones; in the discussion without the right to vote. The\n 8. Also invites the Secretary-General, during the President (New Zealand) then drew the attention of the\ninterim period and in consultation with the force contributing Council members to the text of a draft resolution that\nStates, to take, in accordance with paragraph 17 of his report, all had been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior\nappropriate measures to strengthen the security of the Force, in consultations,467 to the report of the Secretary-General\nparticular by providing it with the necessary defensive means,\nand to study the possibility of carrying out such local\n and to several other documents.468\nredeployment of military units as is required to ensure their Speaking before the vote, the representative of\nprotection; France stated that his delegation welcomed the draft\n 9. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report resolution, which strengthened the recourse to\non the further extension of the mandate of the Force, including Chapter VII by extending it to the question of the\nfinancial estimates for all its activities as proposed in his report freedom of movement of UNPROFOR. The draft\nof 10 February 1993; resolution also extended the Force’s mandate for an\n 10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. interim period and provided that the Council would\n reconsider the situation of UNPROFOR within one\n Decision of 30 March 1993 (3189th meeting): month and, if necessary, would draw the appropriate\n resolution 815 (1993) conclusions. He warned that, should the fighting\n continue, a series of firm measures would have to be\n On 25 March 1993, pursuant to resolution 807\n considered and implemented. These measures could\n(1993), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council\n include: the use of all necessary measures to strengthen\na report on the further extension of the UNPROFOR\n the monitoring of the embargo, or the adoption of new\nmandate. 466 The Secretary-General informed the\n measures; the deployment or reinforcement of\nCouncil that in accordance with resolution 807 (1993),\n observers on the Bosnian-Croatian border; the\nthe Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\n broadening of the application of Chapter VII when the\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia had\n mandate of the Force was next renewed; or, if the\nheld several rounds of talks, in New York and Geneva,\n situation called for it, the partial or total withdrawal of\nwith representatives of the Government of Croatia and\n the Force. The speaker concluded by stating that the\nthe Serb population living in the United Nations __________________\nProtected Areas and the pink zones. While some 467 S/25481.\nprogress had been made in the talks, fundamental 468 Letter dated 1 March 1993 from the representative of\ndifferences remained. It appeared, therefore, that more Croatia addressed to the President of the Security\ntime would be needed to bring the negotiations to a Council (S/25350); letters dated 22 and 26 March 1993,\nmeaningful conclusion. However, as any termination of respectively, from the representative of Croatia\nthe UNPROFOR presence in Croatia would entail the addressed to the President of the Security Council\nstrong likelihood of an outbreak of renewed hostilities, (S/25454 and S/25477); letter dated 19 March 1993 from\n the representative of Croatia addressed to the Secretary-\nthe Secretary-General recommended that the Force’s\n General (S/25447); letters dated 8 March 1993 from the\nmandate be extended for a further interim period of representative of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-\nthree months. In the meantime, the Secretary-General General (S/25381 and S/25382); and letter dated\nhad requested the Co-Chairmen to continue their 22 March 1993 from the representative of Yugoslavia\nefforts to obtain renewed commitment by the parties to addressed to the President of the Security Council\n__________________ (S/25449).\n 466 S/25470 and Add.1.\n\n\n\n\n866 07-63109\n"
[147] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nprinciple of respect for Croatia’s territorial integrity Speaking after the vote, the representative of\nmust be solemnly established.469 Hungary stated that his country had voted in favour of\n resolution 815 (1993), even though it could not yet\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\n indicate the tasks that the United Nations would have\nadopted unanimously as resolution 815 (1993), which\n to bear in the future in the settlement of the crisis of\nreads:\n the former Yugoslavia. He further noted that his\n The Security Council, delegation did not regard the resolution just adopted as\n Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992 merely a technical extension of the UNPROFOR\nand all subsequent resolutions relating to the United Nations mandate for another three months. The resolution again\nProtection Force, reaffirmed that any future mandate must be based on\n Reaffirming in particular its commitment to ensure\n respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of\nrespect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia Croatia, and that the United Nations Protected Areas\nand of the other Republics where the Force is deployed, were an integral part of the territory of the Republic of\n Croatia. The Security Council was therefore clearly\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of\n25 and 26 March 1993,\n establishing the framework within which the parties in\n Croatia would continue political negotiations. 470\n Deeply concerned at the continuing violations by the\nparties and others concerned of their ceasefire obligations, The representative of the United States welcomed\n the resolution just adopted, which recognized that\n Determining that the situation thus created continues to\nconstitute a threat to peace and security in the region,\n UNPROFOR was doing its best to contain the fighting\n and to create conditions for the peaceful resolution of\n Determined to ensure the security of the Force and its the conflict. Unfortunately, United Nations efforts had\nfreedom of movement for all its missions, and to these ends not been totally successful. In Croatia, for example, the\nacting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n inability of UNPROFOR to implement the United\n 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General, in Nations peacekeeping plan had been partially\nparticular its paragraph 5; responsible for the renewal of fighting. That was why\n 2. Reaffirms all the provisions of its resolutions 802 the Council was acting to create conditions for the\n(1993) of 25 January 1993 and 807 (1993) of 19 February 1993; complete implementation of that plan. The United\n 3. Decides to reconsider one month after the date of\n States also believed it important to stress that the\nthe adoption of the present resolution, or at any time at the United Nations Protected Areas were integral parts of\nrequest of the Secretary-General, the mandate of the United Croatia.471\nNations Protection Force in the light of developments of the\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and the\n The representative of China noted that his\nsituation on the ground; delegation supported the principles contained in the\n resolution just adopted, particularly that of ensuring\n 4. Decides, in this context, further to extend the the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia. He\nmandate of the Force for an additional interim period\nterminating on 30 June 1993;\n also reiterated his country’s position that the\n application of Chapter VII of the Charter was due to\n 5. Supports the Co-Chairmen of the Steering the special and specific needs of Croatia and that it\nCommittee of the International Conference on the Former should not constitute a precedent for the peacekeeping\nYugoslavia in their efforts to help to define the future status of\nthose territories comprising the United Nations Protected Areas,\n operations of the United Nations.472\nwhich are integral parts of the territory of the Republic of\nCroatia, and demands full respect for international humanitarian Decision of 30 June 1993 (3248th meeting):\nlaw, and in particular the Geneva Conventions, in these Areas; resolution 847 (1993)\n 6. Requests the Secretary-General to report urgently On 15 May 1993, pursuant to resolution 815\nto the Security Council on how the United Nations peace plan (1993), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council\nfor Croatia can be effectively implemented; a report containing an interim assessment of\n 7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. __________________\n 470 Ibid., pp. 8-12.\n__________________\n 471 Ibid., p. 12.\n 469 S/PV.3189, pp. 3-6.\n 472 Ibid., pp. 14-16.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 867\n"
[148] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\ndevelopments relating to the UNPROFOR mandate in addition, he proposed certain enhancements to the\nCroatia.473 strength of UNPROFOR.474\n The Secretary-General noted that developments The Secretary-General, however, decided to await\nsince the establishment of UNPROFOR had done little a report from the Co-Chairman of the Steering\nto alleviate his original apprehension that there Committee of the International Conference on the\nremained a number of unanswered questions about the Former Yugoslavia and Special Representative in the\nextent to which the Force would receive the necessary former Yugoslavia before making any\ncooperation. The Serb side had taken the presence of recommendations to the Council. The Secretary-\nUNPROFOR as a licence to freeze the status quo in General also underscored the importance of pursuing,\nplace, under UNPROFOR “protection” while as soon as possible and parallel to the work of the\nestablishing a “state” of the “Republic of Serb Krajina” peacekeeping force, a process of active negotiation\nin the UNPROFOR area of responsibility. The Croatian under the auspices of the Conference, in order to find\nside, meanwhile, had insisted that since the plan was long-term political solutions to the question of the\ndrafted, the “overall political solution” that was sought United Nations Protected Areas and the relationship\nat the time had been found with the recognition of between Croats and Serbs in Croatia.\nCroatia and its admission to the United Nations; the\n On 24 June 1993, pursuant to resolution 815\nSerbs must therefore accept the authority of Zagreb,\n (1993), the Secretary-General submitted a further\nwhich they had rebelled against in the first place.\n report on UNPROFOR.475 The report focused primarily\n The Secretary-General further noted that while on the activities of UNPROFOR in Croatia, as\nUNPROFOR had succeeded in ensuring the complete developments in the former Yugoslav Republic of\nwithdrawal from the United Nations Protected Areas, it Macedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina appeared to\nhad not been able to fulfil other aspects of the original warrant an extension of the Force’s mandate in those\npeacekeeping plan. The Serbs had failed to demilitarize areas.\nthe Protected Areas and as a result, little progress had\n The Secretary-General reported that, although\nbeen made towards the return of refugees and displaced\n intensive efforts had been made by the Co-Chairmen of\npersons to their homes in the Protected Areas. They\n the Steering Committee of the International Conference\nhad also refused to cooperate with UNPROFOR in the\n on the Former Yugoslavia and by UNPROFOR, no\nimplementation of resolutions 762 (1992) and 769\n significant progress had occurred. At the same time,\n(1992). They had imposed restrictions on the\n the presence of UNPROFOR was indispensable to\nUNPROFOR monitoring function. The Croatian side,\n control the conflict and to foster a climate in which\nin turn, had manifested its impatience with the United\n negotiations between parties could be promoted. The\nNations, launching military offensives across the line\n continued presence of UNPROFOR could be justified\nof confrontation. The view of the Government of\n by the fact that it was playing a role in preventing the\nCroatia was that UNPROFOR should be given\n resumption or escalation of conflict, by providing a\nenforcement powers to oblige the Serbs to comply with\n “breathing space” for the continued efforts of the\nSecurity Council resolutions, and to do so with specific\n Co-Chairmen, and by supporting the provision of\nobjectives against a set timetable, failing which the\n essential humanitarian assistance to the victims of the\nGovernment had made it clear it would not agree to\n conflict. According to the Co-Chairmen, the\nfurther extensions of the UNPROFOR mandate. In the\n termination of the mandate would risk the resumption\nlight of the virtually irreconcilable differences between\n of a major conflict in the region and cause severe\nthe parties, the Secretary-General proposed the\n adverse consequences for humanitarian relief\nfollowing options: (a) to declare the mandate\n operations. In view of those considerations, the\nunworkable and to withdraw the Force; (b) to accept\n Secretary-General recommended that UNPROFOR be\nthe Croatian view and approve enforcement action to __________________\nexact compliance from the Serbs; and (c) to leave 474 The enhancements (see S/25777, paras. 22, 24 and 25)\nUNPROFOR in place, with no change in mandate but were subsequently referred to by the Council in\nwith limited enhancements of its military capacity. In resolution 847 (1993), para. 1. For details relating to the\n__________________ enhancements, see chapter V.\n 473 S/25777 and Corr.1 and Add.1. 475 S/25993.\n\n\n\n\n868 07-63109\n"
[149] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nmaintained with its existing mandate, and its mandate The Security Council,\nbe extended for a further period of three months, until Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992\n30 September 1993. He noted, however, that significant and all subsequent resolutions relating to the United Nations\nprogress would be required in the “peacemaking” Protection Force,\nefforts of the Co-Chairmen if a further renewal were to Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of\nbe contemplated. He also warned that, should the 15 and 25 May 1993 and of 24 June 1993,\nthreats to the safety of security of United Nations\npersonnel become even more serious, he would have to Having considered also the letter dated 26 June 1993\n from the President of the Republic of Croatia addressed to the\ninform the Council that a viable basis for the Secretary-General,\ncontinuation of the Force no longer existed.\n Recalling the overwhelming importance of seeking, on\n At its 3248th meeting, on 30 June 1993, the the basis of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council,\nCouncil included in its agenda the item entitled comprehensive political solutions to the conflicts in the territory\n“United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)”, as of the former Yugoslavia, and of sustaining confidence and\nwell as the above-mentioned reports. Following the stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,\nadoption of the agenda, the Council invited the Strongly condemning continuing military attacks within\nrepresentative of Croatia, at his request, to participate the territory of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of\nin the discussion without the right to vote. The Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reaffirming its commitment to\nPresident (Spain) then drew the attention of the ensure respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of\nCouncil members to the text of a draft resolution 476 Croatia and of the other Member States where the Force is\n deployed,\nthat had been prepared in the course of the Council’s\nprior consultations and to several other documents, 477 Calling on the parties and others concerned to reach an\nincluding a letter dated 25 June from the representative agreement on confidence-building measures in the territory of\nof Croatia to the Secretary-General. The letter Croatia, including the opening of the railroad between Zagreb\n and Split, the highway between Zagreb and Zupanja, and the\ntransmitted a letter of the same date from the President Adriatic oil pipeline, securing the uninterrupted traffic across\nof Croatia in which he stated that a limited extension of the Maslenica straits, and restoring the supply of electricity and\nthe UNPROFOR mandate was only partially water to all regions of Croatia, including the United Nations\nacceptable, namely, for a period of one month. Protected Areas,\nHowever, if progress was made during that one-month Determined to ensure the security of the Force and its\nperiod, Croatia would be willing to accept the freedom of movement for all its missions, and to these ends, as\nprolongation of the role of UNPROFOR in Croatia regards the Force in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nunder a new mandate. The new mandate must give acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\nUNPROFOR the authority and instructions to enforce 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General of\nand implement all the relevant resolutions of the 24 June 1993 and the request for additional resources contained\nCouncil in accordance with a specific timetable. in paragraphs 22, 24 and 25 of his report of 15 May 1993;\nMoreover, any agreement on the new mandate could be\n 2. Requests the Secretary-General to report one month\nconcluded only between Croatia and the United after the adoption of the present resolution on progress towards\nNations and be separated from the UNPROFOR implementation of the United Nations peacekeeping plan for\nmandates in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Croatia and all relevant Security Council resolutions, taking into\n account the position of the Government of Croatia, and decides\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and to reconsider, in the light of that report, the mandate of the\nadopted unanimously as resolution 847 (1993), which United Nations Protection Force in the territory of the Republic\nreads: of Croatia;\n__________________ 3. Decides, in this context, to extend the mandate of\n 476 S/26014. the Force for an additional interim period terminating on\n 477 Letters dated 18 and 25 June 1993, respectively, from the 30 September 1993;\n representative of Croatia addressed to the Secretary-\n 4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security\n General (S/25973 and S/26002); and letter dated 30 June\n Council regularly informed on developments in regard to the\n 1993 from the representative of Hungary addressed to\n implementation of the mandate of the Force;\n the President of the Security Council (S/26017).\n 5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 869\n"
[150] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n Decision of 20 August 1993: letter from the Turning to the question of the UNPROFOR\n President to the Secretary-General mandate, the Secretary-General reiterated that the\n fundamental solution to the conflict needed to be\n By a letter dated 18 August 1993 addressed to the\n sought through political dialogue. The parties bore the\nPresident of the Security Council, 478 the Secretary-\n primary responsibility for achieving such a solution\nGeneral reported that, following the necessary training\n and they needed to take steps towards reconciliation. In\nexercises in coordination with the North Atlantic\n that process, the principal objective of UNPROFOR\nTreaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations now\n could only be to keep the peace, thus permitting\nhad the initial operational capability for the use of air\n negotiations to take place on an overall political\npower in support of the United Nations Protection\n settlement. Despite the fact that conditions on the\nForce in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n ground had prevented UNPROFOR from carrying out\n By a letter dated 20 August 1993, 479 the President essential elements of its mandate, its presence in\nof the Security Council informed the Secretary-General Croatia had nevertheless helped to contain a volatile\nof the following: situation. The Secretary-General therefore\n I have the honour to inform you that I have shared the\n recommended that the Security Council renew the\ncontents of your letter to me of 18 August 1993, in which you UNPROFOR mandate for a period of six months;\ninformed me that the United Nations now has the initial demand that the parties in Croatia conclude an\noperational capability for the use of air power in support of the immediate ceasefire and cooperate with UNPROFOR,\nUnited Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, so that it might fulfil the peacekeeping aspects of its\nwith all members of the Security Council. mandate; and direct the parties to cooperate with\n UNPROFOR in restoring water, power,\n Decision of 30 September 1993 (3284th communications and other economic necessities. To\n meeting): resolution 869 (1993) enhance the security force, he had requested the\n On 20 September 1993, pursuant to resolution extension of close air support to the territory of\n743 (1992), the Secretary-General submitted to the Croatia. He would report to the Council by\nCouncil a further report on UNPROFOR 480 to assist 30 November 1993 on the progress achieved by the\nthe Council in its deliberations on the renewal of the Co-Chairmen and UNPROFOR and make further\nmandate of UNPROFOR. recommendations.481\n\n The Secretary-General reported that the President At its 3284th meeting, on 30 September 1993, the\nof Croatia, in a letter to him dated 13 September 1993, Council included the above-mentioned report of the\nhad advanced a number of considerations which he Secretary-General in its agenda. Following the\nwished to be taken into account. One of his suggestions adoption of the agenda, the President (Venezuela) drew\nwas that UNPROFOR be divided into three parts — the attention of the Council members to the text of a\nUNPROFOR (Croatia), UNPROFOR (Bosnia and draft resolution that had been prepared in the course of\nHerzegovina) and UNPROFOR (the former Yugoslav the Council’s prior consultations,482 and to other\nRepublic of Macedonia) — while retaining its documents.483\nintegrated military, logistical and administrative The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nstructure under the command of one Special adopted unanimously as resolution 869 (1993), which\nRepresentative of the Secretary-General and one reads:\ntheatre Force Commander. In view of the importance\n __________________\nattached by the Croatian authorities to such a division,\n 481 The Secretary-General’s recommendations (S/26470,\nand taking into account the circumstances prevailing\n para. 16) were subsequently referred to by the Council in\non the ground at that time, the Secretary-General had\n resolution 871 (1993), para. 1.\ndecided to grant this suggestion favourable 482 S/26513.\nconsideration. 483 Letter dated 17 September 1993 from the representative\n\n__________________ of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General\n 478 S/26335.\n (S/26464); and letter dated 24 September 1993 from the\n 479 S/26336.\n representative of Croatia addressed to the President of\n 480 S/26470 and Add.1.\n the Security Council (S/26491).\n\n\n\n\n870 07-63109\n"
[151] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n The Security Council, invited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992 and Croatia, at their request, to participate in the\nand all subsequent resolutions relating to the United Nations discussion without the right to vote. The President\nProtection Force, (Brazil) then drew the attention of the Council\n Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of the\n members to the text of a draft resolution that had been\nForce and its freedom of movement for all its missions, and to prepared in the course of the Council’s prior\nthese ends, as regards the Force in the Republic of Croatia and consultations,485 and to several other documents, 486\nin the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under including a letter dated 24 September 1993 from the\nChapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, representative of Croatia addressed to the President of\n 1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United the Security Council, transmitting a letter of the same\nNations Protection Force for an additional period terminating on date from the Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to\n1 October 1993; the President of the Security Council. In that letter, the\n 2. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n Minister outlined certain measures which his\n Government insisted should be an essential part of the\n Decision of 1 October 1993 (3285th meeting): future of the UNPROFOR presence on the territory of\n resolution 870 (1993) Croatia. If such measures were not incorporated in the\n Council’s resolution concerning the extension of the\n At its 3285th meeting, on 1 October 1993, the UNPROFOR mandate, Croatia would consider the\nCouncil continued its consideration of the item. mandate terminated and would request the withdrawal\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the President of all UNPROFOR contingents by 30 November 1993.\n(Brazil) drew the attention of the Council members to\nthe text of a draft resolution that had been prepared in The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nthe course of the Council’s prior consultations 484 and adopted unanimously as resolution 871 (1993), which\nto a revision that had been made to the draft in its reads:\nprovisional form. The Security Council,\n\n The draft resolution, as orally revised, was then Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992\nput to the vote and adopted unanimously as resolution and all subsequent resolutions relating to the United Nations\n870 (1993), which reads: Protection Force,\n Reaffirming also its resolution 713 (1991) of\n The Security Council,\n 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,\n Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of\nand all subsequent resolutions relating to the United Nations\n 20 September 1993,\nProtection Force,\n Having also considered the letter of the Minister for\n Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of the\n Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia dated 24 September\nForce and its freedom of movement for all its missions, and to\n 1993,\nthese ends, as regards the Force in the Republic of Croatia and\n __________________\nin the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under\nChapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 485 S/26518.\n 486 Letter dated 17 September 1993 from the representative\n 1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General\nNations Protection Force for an additional period terminating on (S/26464); letter dated 19 September 1993 from the\n5 October 1993; Secretary-General addressed to the President of the\n 2. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. Security Council (S/26468); letter dated 24 September\n 1993 from the representative of Croatia addressed to the\n President of the Security Council (S/26491); and letter\n Decision of 4 October 1993 (3286th meeting):\n dated 30 September 1993 from the representatives of\n resolution 871 (1993) China, France, the Russian Federation, the United\n At its 3286th meeting, on 4 October 1993, the Kingdom and the United States addressed to the\n Secretary-General, transmitting the text of the statement\nCouncil continued its consideration of the item.\n issued on 30 September 1993 by the Ministers for\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council Foreign Affairs of the five permanent members of the\n__________________\n Security Council following a meeting with the Secretary-\n 484 S/26525.\n General (S/26517).\n\n\n07-63109 871\n"
[152] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n Deeply concerned that the United Nations peacekeeping the authority of the Republic of Croatia in the pink zones, and in\nplan for the Republic of Croatia, and all relevant Council this context calls for the revival of the Joint Commission\nresolutions, in particular resolution 769 (1992) of 7 August established under the chairmanship of the United Nations\n1992, have not yet been fully implemented, Protection Force;\n Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of the 8. Urges all the parties and others concerned to\nForce and its freedom of movement for all its missions, and to cooperate with the Force in reaching and implementing an\nthese ends, as regards the Force in the Republic of Croatia and agreement on confidence-building measures including the\nin the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under restoration of electricity, water and communications in all\nChapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, regions of Croatia, and stresses in this context the importance it\n attaches to the opening of the railroad between Zagreb and Split,\n 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of\n the highway between Zagreb and Zupanja, and the Adriatic oil\n20 September 1993, in particular paragraph 16 thereof;\n pipeline, securing the uninterrupted traffic across the Maslenica\n 2. Notes the intention of the Secretary-General to strait, and restoring the supply of electricity and water to all\nestablish, as described in his report, three subordinate regions of Croatia including the Protected Areas;\ncommands within the United Nations Protection Force —\n 9. Authorizes the Force, in carrying out its mandate in\nUNPROFOR (Croatia), UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina)\n Croatia, acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures,\nand UNPROFOR (the former Yugoslav Republic of\n including the use of force, to ensure its security and its freedom\nMacedonia) — while retaining the existing dispositions in all\n of movement;\nother respects for the direction and conduct of the United\nNations operation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia; 10. Decides to continue to review urgently the\n extension of close air support to the Force in the territory of\n 3. Condemns once again continuing military attacks\n Croatia as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report\nwithin the territory of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic\n of 20 September 1993;\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reaffirms its commitment to\nensure respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 11. Decides in this context to extend the mandate of the\nCroatia, of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the former Yugoslav Force for an additional period terminating on 31 March 1994;\nRepublic of Macedonia, where the Force is deployed;\n 12. Requests the Secretary-General to report two\n 4. Reaffirms the crucial importance of the full and months after the adoption of the present resolution on progress\nprompt implementation of the United Nations peacekeeping plan towards implementation of the United Nations peacekeeping\nfor the Republic of Croatia, including the provisions of the plan plan for the Republic of Croatia and all relevant Security\nconcerning the demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Council resolutions, taking into account the position of the\nAreas, and calls upon the signatories of that plan and all others Croatian Government, as well as on the outcome of the\nconcerned, in particular the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia negotiations within the International Conference on the Former\n(Serbia and Montenegro), to cooperate in its full Yugoslavia, and decides to reconsider the mandate of the Force\nimplementation; in the light of that report;\n 5. Declares that continued non-cooperation in the 13. Also requests the Secretary-General to keep the\nimplementation of the relevant resolutions of the Security Council regularly informed on developments in regard to the\nCouncil or external interference, in respect of the full implementation of the Force’s mandate;\nimplementation of the United Nations peacekeeping plan for the\n 14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\nRepublic of Croatia, would have serious consequences, and in\nthis connection affirms that full normalization of the Speaking after the vote, the representative of\ninternational community’s position towards those concerned will France noted that it had not been easy to negotiate the\ntake into account their actions in implementing all relevant\nCouncil resolutions, including those relating to the peacekeeping\n resolution just adopted, for it had not been a “routine”\nplan for Croatia; extension of the mandate of UNPROFOR. The Council\n had had to take into account the concerns of the\n 6. Calls for an immediate ceasefire agreement parties, as well as new operational needs. It had\nbetween the Government of Croatia and the local Serb\nauthorities in the Protected Areas, mediated under the auspices\n attempted to respond to Croatia’s requests, without\nof the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and running the risk of promising more than it could\nurges them to cooperate fully and unconditionally in its deliver. He contended that the resolution established a\nimplementation, as well as in the implementation of all the balance between the legitimate concerns of the\nrelevant Council resolutions; Croatian Government and the means available to the\n 7. Stresses the importance it attaches, as a first step Council and UNPROFOR. His delegation understood\ntowards the implementation of the United Nations peacekeeping that the Council would be able to take action the\nplan for the Republic of Croatia, to the process of restoration of following week on the Secretary-General’s proposal to\n\n\n872 07-63109\n"
[153] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nextend close air support in Bosnia and Herzegovina to everything possible to prevent a resurgence of armed\nUNPROFOR operations in Croatia.487 hostilities along its southern borders. Hungary gave its\n full support to the resolution because it reflected the\n The representative of the United States stated that\n special problems facing Croatia and the region. It\nher delegation considered the extension of the\n hoped that the resolution might help to create the\nUNPROFOR mandate essential to the international\n necessary conditions for a peaceful settlement of all\ncommunity’s efforts to minimize the conflict in the\n disputes on the basis of respect for the principles of\nformer Yugoslavia, prevent it from spreading, provide\n territorial integrity and the rights of ethnic\nhumanitarian relief and, most important, facilitate\n communities.490\nnegotiated solutions to all aspects of the conflict. She\nalso observed that, although much attention had been The representative of the Russian Federation\nfocused on the operations of UNPROFOR in Croatia, it stated that UNPROFOR was playing a particularly\nwas important to emphasize that the UNPROFOR important role in stabilizing the situation and creating\nmandate and the effects of its extension applied with conditions for the implementation of agreements that\nequal importance to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the remained to be signed. He cautioned that withdrawing\nformer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. What was United Nations forces from Croatia, could have\nimportant also was to look to the future and begin the “catastrophic consequences”, leading to an escalation\ndifficult work of implementing the Vance plan in good of the entire conflict in the former Yugoslavia. He also\nfaith. Before concluding, she observed that, while noted that, pursuant to the resolution just adopted, the\nUNPROFOR (Croatia) would become one of the Council would continue to review urgently the question\nsubordinate commands within the integrated command of extending close air support to UNPROFOR in\nstructure of UNPROFOR as a whole, the resolution just Croatia. The Russian delegation understood that the\nadopted established no precedent for the command and mechanism for such an extension would be the same as\ncontrol arrangements for any peacekeeping force that that provided for in resolution 836 (1993). It was also\nmight be led by NATO in order to implement a peace important that an agreement be reached on confidence-\nagreement in Bosnia.488 building measures, which could be promoted by\n restoring water and electricity supplies and\n The representative of China noted that the\n communications, and by satisfying other economic\nconsent of the parties was a precondition to the\n needs of the people. 491\ndeployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations\nand the extension of their mandates. Since the Croatian\n Decision of 17 December 1993: letter from the\nGovernment had agreed to the extension of the\n President to the Secretary-General\nmandate, the Chinese delegation had voted in favour of\nthe resolution just adopted. The speaker further stated On 1 December 1993, pursuant to resolution 871\nthat China was not in favour of invoking Chapter VII (1993), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council\nof the Charter in peacekeeping operations, nor was it in a report on progress towards implementation of the\nfavour of using sanctions as a means to resolve United Nations peacekeeping plan for Croatia and all\nconflicts. His delegation therefore had reservations on relevant Security Council resolutions, as well as on the\ncertain elements in the resolution. In addition, outcome of talks within the framework the of\nprudence should be exercised with regard to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.492\nextension of air support to UNPROFOR in Croatia, so\n The Secretary-General reported that a series of\nas to avoid further complicating the matter and\n talks, chaired by the International Conference on the\nadversely affecting the political settlement process. 489\n Former Yugoslavia, had been held between the parties\n The representative of Hungary stated that his during November 1993. The aims of the talks had been\ndelegation had voted in favour of the resolution just to discuss a ceasefire, economic reconstruction and\nadopted because it wished to maintain UNPROFOR political questions. While some progress had been\noperations on the territory of Croatia and to do made towards a ceasefire and in identifying economic\n__________________ __________________\n 487 S/PV.3286, pp. 5-6. 490 Ibid., pp. 10-11.\n 488 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 491 Ibid., pp. 22-25.\n 489 Ibid., pp. 7-9. 492 S/26828.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 873\n"
[154] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nmatters of mutual interest, both sides had requested peaceful settlement. The significant developments that\nmodifications to the proposed ceasefire agreement. In had taken place during the reporting period included\nthe meantime, they had agreed to establish a military the active and direct involvement of major powers in\nJoint Commission to work on outstanding areas of the negotiation process and the signature of a ceasefire\ndispute in relation to the lines of separation that would agreement, on 23 February in Zagreb, between the\nbe used once the ceasefire was implemented. The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian\nSecretary-General observed that the various initiatives Defence Council. In addition, the signing on 1 March\nthat were under way could pave the way for 1994 of the Framework Agreement establishing a\nimplementation of the peacekeeping plan.493 Progress Federation in the Areas of the Republic of Bosnia and\nwas slow and was quickly halted if one side attacked Herzegovina with a Majority Bosniac and Croatian\nterritory held by the other. He did not recommend Population, and the Outline of a Preliminary\nreconsideration by the Council of the UNPROFOR Agreement for a Confederation between the Republic\nmandate. However, it was essential that the two sides of Croatia and that Federation had opened new avenues\nintensify their efforts for the achievement of a ceasefire for a political settlement.\nagreement, for the institution of practical measures of\n Given that fluid situation, the Secretary-General\neconomic cooperation and for the negotiation of a\n could only provide an outline of the major concepts\nlasting political settlement.494\n and requirements of UNPROFOR. 497 The Secretary-\n By a letter dated 17 December 1993,495 the General also commented on the utility of extending the\nPresident of the Security Council informed the concept of safe areas to Mostar, Vitez and Maglaj.\nSecretary-General of the following: While he did not believe there was a need to apply the\n The members of the Security Council have taken note of\n protection defined in resolutions 824 (1993) and 836\nyour report of 1 December 1993 submitted pursuant to Security (1993) to Mostar and Vitez where the ceasefire\nCouncil resolution 871 (1993), in the light of which they have prevailed, he was of the opinion that, in view of the\ncompleted the review provided for in paragraph 12 of that continuing hostilities in and around Maglaj, there may\nresolution. be a merit in extending the safe area concept to this\n They share the observations contained in paragraph 16 of city.\nthis report regarding the mandate of the United Nations The Secretary-General further observed that the\nProtection Force.\n recent developments in Bosnia had created a new\n situation, which should provide numerous\n Decision of 31 March 1994 (3356th meeting):\n opportunities for UNPROFOR to make substantial\n resolution 908 (1994)\n progress in the implementation of the mandates\n On 11 March 1994, pursuant to resolution 900 entrusted to it. At that critical juncture, however, the\n(1994), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council ability of UNPROFOR was severely limited by the\na report on UNPROFOR.496 lack of military resources. He therefore recommended\n that the Council consider increasing the authorized\n The Secretary-General noted that the situation in\n strength of UNPROFOR to 8,250 additional troops.\nBosnia and Herzegovina was undergoing rapid\n Should the Council decide to extend the safe area\nchanges, which had provided a multitude of new\n concept to Maglaj, an additional 1,500 troops would be\nopportunities to make significant progress towards a\n__________________ required.\n 493 The report mentioned the peace initiative of the On 16 March 1994, pursuant to resolution 871\n President of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman (S/26681, (1993), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council\n appendix), which addressed the situations in the United a report containing a comprehensive review of the role\n Nations Protected Areas and in Bosnia, and future\n and functioning of UNPROFOR.498\n cooperation in the area of the former Yugoslavia.\n 494 The Secretary-General’s observations (S/26828, __________________\n para. 16), were referred to in the letter subsequently 497 For details see section II of the report of the Secretary-\n addressed to him by the President of the Security General. The proposals in section II were subsequently\n Council. endorsed by the Council in resolution 908 (1994),\n 495 S/26890.\n para. 11.\n 496 S/1994/291 and Corr.1 and Add.1.\n 498 S/1994/300.\n\n\n\n\n874 07-63109\n"
[155] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n The Secretary-General observed that the dilemma The Secretary-General noted that the opening of\nconfronting the international community as the expiry Tuzla airport had been repeatedly requested by the\nof the Force’s current mandate approached, was Tuzla authorities since the spring of 1993. While the\nwhether to consider that the limited successes of Bosnian Serb authorities on the ground had not\nUNPROFOR continued to justify the United Nations previously raised objections to the opening of the\nenormous expenditure of resources and lives or airport under United Nations control, Mr. Karadzic, at\nwhether the Force’s ability to implement all the tasks a meeting on 18 November 1993, with the United\nassigned to it warrant an end to, or reduction of, its Nations, had refused to permit its opening prior to the\nefforts. Another option would be to redefine its conclusion of an overall settlement, stating his strong\nmandates commensurate with the resources the fear of possible misuse of the airport for military\ninternational community was prepared to make purposes. That same position was repeated on several\navailable to UNPROFOR. However, he did not believe other occasions. Given the increasing humanitarian\nthat at that stage extensive redefinition was advisable. need, the Secretary-General had requested\nAs he had previously pointed out to the Council, the UNPROFOR to draw up a detailed plan for the opening\nchoice in Croatia was between continuing a mission of Tuzla airport. That plan described three scenarios\nthat was clearly unable to fulfil its original mandate in based on varying degrees of consent of the parties. The\nfull or withdrawing and risking a renewed war that Special Representative of the Secretary-General had\nwould probably result in appeals for UNPROFOR to been liaising with the parties to open the airport with\nreturn to restore peace. Given such a choice, soldiering their consent. On 6 March, Mr. Karadzic had agreed to\non in hope seemed preferable to withdrawing in the opening of the airport in Tuzla for humanitarian\nabdication. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the continued purposes under United Nations control, on certain\ndeployment of UNPROFOR would serve a three- conditions which were rejected by the other party. The\npronged strategy: (a) to use military means for Secretary-General, however, believed that the opening\nhumanitarian purposes; (b) to seek to end the conflict of Tuzla airport for UNPROFOR purposes was now\nitself by creating conditions favourable to diplomatic feasible, and that humanitarian flights would be\nnegotiations on a political settlement; and (c) to possible before long. His Special Representative was\nprovide a capacity to help the parties to implement therefore continuing intensive negotiations with the\nagreements resulting from the diplomatic negotiations. parties in order to achieve an agreement which would\nSince the demilitarization of Sarajevo in February govern the modalities of the full-fledged reopening of\n1994, the military means of the international the airport. He also outlined the additional resources\ncommunity were being used more directly to serve its that would be required in order to support UNPROFOR\ndiplomatic objectives. That offered new grounds for activities at Tuzla airport.500 He further noted that, as\nhope for an overall solution. the opening of Tuzla airport was being pursued for the\n purpose of improving the capability to deliver\n The Secretary-General therefore recommended the\n humanitarian assistance, the activity would fall within\nrenewal of the UNPROFOR mandate for a further 12\n the existing mandate given by Council resolutions 836\nmonths beyond 31 March 1994. That period was\n (1993) and 844 (1993). However, in the light of the\nproposed in the interest of efficiency, although he would\n political importance of such an action and of the need\nbe prepared, should the situation on the ground improve,\n for additional resources to ensure the safe operation of\nto recommend reducing the duration of the Force’s\n the airport, he believed that the explicit approval and\nmandate. He also recommended that authority for close\n support of the Security Council was required. He\nair support be extended to the territory of Croatia.\n therefore recommended that the Council approve the\n On 24 March 1994, pursuant to resolutions 844 UNPROFOR plans for the opening of Tuzla airport for\n(1993), 836 (1993) and 776 (1992), the Secretary- __________________\nGeneral submitted to the Council a report containing 500 The Secretary-General’s observations relating to the\n\nhis plans to direct UNPROFOR to reopen Tuzla airport additional resource requirements (S/1994/333, para. 14)\nfor the delivery of humanitarian supplies and related were subsequently approved by the Council in resolution\n 908 (1994), para. 5. An estimate of the costs for the\npurposes. 499\n additional requirements was submitted as an addendum\n__________________ to the report.\n 499 S/1994/333 and Add.1.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 875\n"
[156] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nhumanitarian purposes, as well as the additional addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a\nresources requested for that purpose. letter of the same date from the President of Croatia to\n the Secretary-General, in which he agreed to the\n By a letter dated 30 March 1994 addressed to the\n extension of the UNPROFOR mandate and enclosed a\nPresident of the Security Council, 501 the Secretary-\n series of goals and actions which he considered to be\nGeneral informed the Council of the conclusion on\n necessary for the success of the renewed mandate.\n29 March 1994 in Zagreb of a ceasefire agreement\nbetween the Government of Croatia and the local Serb Speaking before the vote, the representative of\nauthorities in the United Nations Protected Areas, Pakistan stated that his delegation, along with other\nwhich copy of it was attached to the letter as an annex. members of the Non-Aligned Movement in the\nHe noted that the implementation of the ceasefire Council, had favoured the designation of Maglaj as a\nagreement would involve, inter alia, interpositioning safe area, and regretted that it had not found the\nUNPROFOR forces in a zone of separation; support of all members in the Council. His delegation,\nestablishing additional control points, observation however, would support the draft resolution before the\nposts and patrols; and monitoring the withdrawal of Council. He added that the international community\nheavy weapons out of range of the contact line. He must demonstrate its resolve to arrive at a just and\nsuggested that the Council might wish to welcome that lasting solution to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina\ndevelopment and to authorize UNPROFOR to perform by taking all appropriate measures to reverse the\nthe functions called for in the agreement. He also noted consequences of aggression against that country. The\nthat UNPROFOR would require additional military lands seized by the use of force and “ethnic cleansing”\nresources in order to undertake those tasks, and he must be returned. The sovereignty, territorial integrity\nrecommended that the Council authorize the provision and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nof those additional resources. must be restored and respected. 504\n At its 3356th meeting, on 31 March 1994, the The representative of the Czech Republic\nCouncil included the three above-mentioned reports questioned the Secretary-General’s suggestion that\nand the letter in its agenda. Following the adoption of 1,500 additional troops would be required to turn\nthe agenda, the Council invited the representatives of Maglaj into a safe area, when Srebrenica and Zepa had\nBosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, been granted the status of safe areas with far fewer\nto participate in the discussion without the right to troops than that. He contended that experience had\nvote. The President (France) then drew the attention of shown that declaring an area safe contributed, in and of\nthe Council members to the text of a draft resolution itself, to the safety of the area, whether or not it was\nthat had been prepared in the course of the Council’s truly safe from the military point of view. His\nprior consultations,502 and to several other delegation could not but regret that some of the energy\ndocuments,503 including a letter dated 16 March the Council devoted to the almost moot issue of Maglaj\n__________________ had not been spent on what appeared to be an even\n 501 S/1994/367. worse situation in Banjaluka. The city had been in the\n 502 S/1994/359.\n hands of ethnic Serbs for some time now and “ethnic\n 503 Letters dated 15 and 23 March 1994, respectively, from\n cleansing” continued unabated there. 505\n the representative of Bulgaria addressed to the President\n of the Security Council (S/1994/302 and S/1994/336); The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\n letter dated 16 March 1994 from the representative of adopted unanimously as resolution 908 (1994), which\n Croatia addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1994/305 reads:\n and Corr.1); letter dated 22 March 1994 from the\n representative of Greece addressed to the President of The Security Council,\n the Security Council (S/1994/328); letter dated 22 March\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the\n 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the\n conflicts in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia, and\n President of the Security Council (S/1994/330); letter\n reaffirming in this context its resolution 871 (1993) of 4 October\n dated 23 March 1994 from the President of the Security\n 1993 on the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force,\n Council addressed to the Secretary-General\n (S/1994/331); and letter dated 25 March 1994 from the __________________\n representative of Yugoslavia addressed to the President 504 S/PV.3356, pp. 3-5.\n of the Security Council (S/1994/350). 505 Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n\n\n\n\n876 07-63109\n"
[157] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of living conditions in that city and contributing to the\n11 March, 16 March and 24 March 1994 and his letter dated implementation of the agreements between the parties on it,\n30 March 1994,\n Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of the\n Having considered also the letter dated 16 March 1994 Force and its freedom of movement in all its missions, and to\nfrom the President of the Republic of Croatia addressed to the these ends, as regards the Force in the Republic of Croatia and\nSecretary-General, in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under\n Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n Emphasizing the need for a negotiated settlement accepted\nby all parties, and welcoming the continuing efforts of the A\nCo-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia, 1. Welcomes the reports of the Secretary-General of\n 11 March, 16 March and 24 March, and his letter dated\n Welcoming also the ceasefire agreement between the 30 March 1994;\nGovernment of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\nBosnian Croat party and the signature of the Washington 2. Reaffirms its commitment to ensure respect for the\nFramework Agreement of 1 March 1994 between the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia,\nGovernment of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former\nGovernment of the Republic of Croatia and the Bosnian Croat Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where the United Nations\nparty, as steps towards an overall settlement, Protection Force is deployed;\n\n Underlining the importance of involving the Bosnian Serb 3. Decides to extend the mandate of the Force for an\nparty in further efforts to achieve an overall negotiated additional period terminating on 30 September 1994;\nsettlement, 4. Recognizes the need, following recent progress, for\n Welcoming the ceasefire agreement signed on 29 March increased resources for the Force, described in the reports of the\n1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb Secretary-General of 11 and 16 March 1994 and his letter dated\nauthorities in the United Nations Protected Areas, which was 30 March 1994, decides, as an initial step, to authorize an\nfacilitated by the Russian Federation, the United States of increase of Force personnel by up to 3,500 additional troops,\nAmerica, the European Union and the International Conference and also decides to take action by 30 April 1994 at the latest on\non the Former Yugoslavia, the further troop requirements recommended by the Secretary-\n General in the above-mentioned documents, with a view to\n Welcoming also the discussions between the Republic of providing the Force with the means necessary for the\nCroatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and implementation of its mandate;\nMontenegro), pursuant to the joint statement of 19 January\n1994, 5. Approves the Force’s plans, described in the report\n of the Secretary-General of 24 March 1994, for the reopening of\n Welcoming further the recent significant progress the Tuzla airport for humanitarian purposes, and authorizes\nachieved in and around Sarajevo, and stressing that a strong and additional resources requested in paragraph 14 of that report for\nvisible presence of the Force in this area, as well as in other these purposes;\nareas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\nRepublic of Croatia, within the framework of its mandate, is 6. Calls upon Member States to assist the Secretary-\nessential to consolidate such progress, General to implement paragraphs 4 and 5 above by contributing\n personnel, equipment and training;\n Recalling the statement by the President of the Security\nCouncil of 14 March 1994 and the joint letter of Bosnia and 7. Urges that necessary arrangements be concluded,\nHerzegovina and Croatia dated 17 March 1994, and in this including, where appropriate, agreements on the status of forces\ncontext taking note of the recent developments in Maglaj, and other personnel with the Republic of Croatia, the Former\n Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of\n Determined to put an end to the suffering of the civilian Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);\npopulation in and around Maglaj,\n 8. Decides that Member States, acting nationally or\n Welcoming the ongoing efforts aimed at the reopening of through regional organizations or arrangements, may take, under\nthe Tuzla airport for humanitarian purposes, the authority of the Security Council and subject to close\n coordination with the Secretary-General and the Force, all\n Welcoming also the work undertaken by the joint civil\n necessary measures to extend close air support to the territory of\nmission to Sarajevo of the Governments of the United Kingdom\n the Republic of Croatia, in defence of Force personnel in the\nof Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of\n performance of the Force’s mandate, as recommended by the\nAmerica,\n Secretary-General in paragraph 12 of his report of 16 March\n Welcoming further the dispatch of the European Union 1994;\nfact-finding mission to Mostar with a view to helping improve\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 877\n"
[158] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n 9. Urges the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb 16. Commends in this context the setting up of the\nauthorities in the United Nations Protected Areas to comply with Interim Coordination Board to assess the situation in Sarajevo in\nthe ceasefire agreement signed on 29 March 1994, and order to facilitate the task of this senior official;\nwelcomes the efforts undertaken by the Force towards\n 17. Welcomes the establishment by the Secretary-\nimplementing this agreement;\n General on 21 March 1994 of a voluntary trust fund for the\n 10. Also urges all the parties and others concerned to restoration of essential public services in and around Sarajevo,\ncooperate with the Force in reaching and implementing an in accordance with the provisions of resolution 900 (1994), and\nagreement on confidence-building measures in all regions of the strongly appeals to the international community to make\nRepublic of Croatia including the United Nations Protected voluntary financial contributions to this trust fund;\nAreas, further urges the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb\n 18. Notes with appreciation the steps being taken by\nauthorities in the United Nations Protected Areas, inter alia, to\n the Secretary-General, the Force and other United Nations\nrevive the Joint Commission process with regard to\n agencies and humanitarian organizations to restore normal life\ncommunication links and economic issues, and recognizes in\n to all areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nthis context the importance of the immediate reopening of the\n encourages them to continue their efforts, and in this context\nAdriatic oil pipeline for the economies of the Republic of\n requests the Secretary-General to consider ways and means of\nCroatia and of the other countries in the region;\n further enhancing the work of the civilian component of the\n 11. Endorses the proposals in section II of the report of Force;\nthe Secretary-General of 11 March 1994, on arrangements\n 19. Calls on the parties to honour their commitments to\nrelating to the ceasefire and ensuring the freedom of movement\n ensure the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for\nin and around Sarajevo, including the additional tasks set out in\n Refugees and the Force unimpeded access throughout the\nparagraph 14 thereof, emphasizes the need for the Force to\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in performance of their\ndeploy its resources in a flexible manner, in particular in and\n mandate, and in particular calls upon the Bosnian Croat party to\naround the safe areas, and authorizes the Force to carry out these\n release infrastructure equipment and material urgently needed\ntasks in relation to the ceasefire entered into by the Government\n for humanitarian relief;\nof the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian\nCroat party and, following a report by the Secretary-General and C\nwithin existing resources, in relation to any further ceasefire\nagreed between the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina in pursuit 20. Welcomes the presence of Force personnel and the\nof the peace process; arrival of humanitarian convoys in Maglaj, but expresses once\n again its deep concern at the situation there;\n 12. Encourages the Special Representative of the\nSecretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia, in cooperation 21. Welcomes also the contribution of the Force, within\nwith the authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic of its available resources, to the restoration of safety and security\nMacedonia, to use his good offices, as appropriate, to contribute to the area in and around Maglaj in order to promote the well-\nto the maintenance of peace and stability in that Republic; being of its inhabitants;\n\n 13. Urges the parties to seize the opportunity provided 22. Demands that the Bosnian Serb party cease\nby the Force’s continuation to bring the peace process to a forthwith all military operations against the town of Maglaj and\nsuccessful conclusion; remove all obstacles to free access to it, condemns all such\n obstacles, and calls upon all parties to show restraint;\n 14. Requests the Secretary-General to keep it regularly\ninformed on progress towards implementation of the United 23. Takes note of the assessment by the Secretary-\nNations peacekeeping plan for the Republic of Croatia and all General of the feasibility of extending the safe area concept to\nrelevant Security Council resolutions, taking into account the Maglaj, and requests him to keep the situation under review and\nposition of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, as well to report to the Council as appropriate;\nas on the outcome of the negotiations within the International\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia, and decides to reconsider\n D\nthe mandate of the Force at any time according to the 24. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council\ndevelopments on the ground and in the negotiations; regularly informed on developments in regard to the\n implementation of the Force’s mandate;\n B\n 25. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n 15. Welcomes the appointment by the Secretary-\nGeneral of a senior civilian official for the restoration of Speaking after the vote, the representative of the\nessential public services in and around Sarajevo in accordance United Kingdom stated that the implementation of\nwith the provisions of resolution 900 (1994) of 4 March 1994; confidence-building measures in the United Nations\n Protected Areas referred to in the resolution and the\n revival of the joint-commission process were steps\n\n\n878 07-63109\n"
[159] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nwhich should be taken quickly, paving the way for a Council, which he was confident would be\nfinal settlement involving autonomy for the Serbs forthcoming. 507\nwithin the existing borders of Croatia. His delegation\n The representative of China noted that the\nwelcomed the increase in the strength of UNPROFOR\n Council’s approval of a further enlargement of\nprovided for in the resolution just adopted, which\n UNPROFOR and an extension of its mandate reflected\nwould allow those additional personnel already\n the hope that the presence of UNPROFOR would\navailable from Member States to be deployed\n create favourable conditions for an early and\nimmediately. It also welcomed the resolution’s\n comprehensive political settlement. He reiterated the\nauthorization of additional personnel for the reopening\n position of his country on questions related to\nof Tuzla airport. The speaker cautioned, however, that\n UNPROFOR. First, the sovereignty of Croatia and\nfurther reinforcement of UNPROFOR would be needed\n Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as other countries in\nif the ceasefires in central Bosnia and Croatia were to\n the region, should be fully respected. Secondly, China\nbe implemented fully. He also argued that tasks could\n was not in favour of the use or threat of force, nor the\nnot be added indefinitely if the necessary resources\n invocation of Chapter VII in the peacekeeping\nwere not available. His Government would have been\n operations of UNPROFOR. It therefore retained\nprepared to join in authorizing all the additional\n reservations on the invocations of Chapter VII in the\npersonnel requested by the Secretary-General. In the\n resolution just adopted. At the same time, however, it\nfollowing month the Council would need to act on the\n had noted that the resolution specified certain\nbalance of those requests, for delay would put at risk\n limitations concerning that issue. Thirdly, in relation to\nthe achievements of UNPROFOR. 506\n the extension of close air support to UNPROFOR\n The representative of the United States stated that operations in Croatia, such air support should only be\nhis Government had consistently supported, and used to ensure the safety of UNPROFOR personnel in\ncontinued to support, UNPROFOR which had been the performance of its mandate and for self-defence,\ncalled on to provide vital missions in the former rather than for punitive purposes. Fourthly, the\nYugoslavia. In recent weeks there had been many settlement of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia\nencouraging developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, could only be achieved by the people of that region\nand rapidly expanding challenges that had taxed themselves. Lastly, the difficulties faced by\nUNPROFOR resources to the limit. The United States UNPROFOR with regard to manpower and financial\nagreed with the members of the Council that resources needed to be removed, although the\nUNPROFOR must have the necessary resources to deployment of UNPROFOR troops should be\nmeet these challenges. In the context of the resolution undertaken in a flexible manner, according to the\njust adopted, his Government’s concern had been to degree of urgency in each specific situation.508\nensure that the financial resources were available to\n The representative of the Russian Federation\nsustain that vital operation. The resolution stated that\n stated that, while favouring the continuation of\nthe Council would review, within one month, the\n UNPROFOR, his delegation believed that UNPROFOR\nquestion of the requirements of UNPROFOR. During\n efforts should be directed towards the essential purpose\nthat month, the United States Government would be\n for which it was established, paying particular attention\nconsidering the question seriously and urgently, for\n to the priority tasks highlighted in paragraph 50 of the\npeacekeeping was so important that the international\n Secretary-General’s report of 16 March, and taking into\ncommunity must do its best to regularize the way it\n account the need to adopt a rational attitude towards\nprovided the money to support those operations. The\n the limited resources available to the United Nations.\nspeaker also commended the Council’s authorization of\n Noting that the United Nations had been faced with\nclose air support for UNPROFOR troops operating in\n new tasks, his delegation believed that those tasks\nCroatia, and pointed out that NATO implementation\n should be performed strictly in accordance with, and in\nwould require the agreement of the North Atlantic\n__________________ the framework of, the existing mandate of\n 506 Ibid., pp. 8-9.\n UNPROFOR. If, however, it was felt necessary either\n __________________\n 507 Ibid., p. 9.\n 508 Ibid., pp. 10-11.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 879\n"
[160] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nto amend or expand the mandate, that would require an The Security Council,\nadditional decision to be taken by the Security Council. Reaffirming its resolutions 908 (1994) of 31 March 1994\nThe Russian Federation also supported the extension of and 913 (1994) of 22 April 1994,\nclose air support to Croatia. At the same time, it also\n Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of\nsupported the search for ways and means of achieving 11 March, 16 March and 24 March 1994 and his letter dated\nmaximum cooperation between the United Nations and 30 March 1994,\nNATO, because it believed that deploying air forces in\nsupport of United Nations personnel should be carried Determined to strengthen the operations of the United\n Nations Protection Force in fulfilment of its mandate,\nout, as indicated in the relevant resolutions, under the\nauthority of the Security Council and subject to close Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of the\ncoordination with the Secretary-General and Force and its freedom of movement in all its missions, and to\nUNPROFOR.509 these ends, as regards the Force in the Republic of Croatia and\n in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under\n The President, speaking in his capacity as the Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\nrepresentative of France, stated that his delegation was 1. Welcomes once again the reports of the Secretary-\nparticularly pleased with those aspects of the resolution General of 11 March, 16 March and 24 March 1994 and his\nwhich unambiguously strengthened the Council’s letter dated 30 March 1994;\ncommitment to approve all the reinforcements 2. Decides to authorize, as recommended by the\nrequested by the Secretary-General, for both Bosnia Secretary-General in the above-mentioned documents, an\nand Croatia, by the end of April. Actions must now increase of United Nations Protection Force personnel by up to\nproceed in two directions. The international community 6,550 additional troops, 150 military observers and 275 civilian\nmust consolidate what had been achieved on the police monitors, in addition to the reinforcement already\nground, with UNPROFOR backing the parties’ will to approved in resolution 908 (1994);\nmake peace and, in that regard, UNPROFOR could 3. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\nnever be used to protect territorial gains. On the\ndiplomatic level, discussions on the territorial Speaking after the vote, the representative of\nquestions would soon have to resume and in that France welcomed the fact that the Council had granted\nrespect, the European Union’s plan seemed to be the UNPROFOR the reinforcements requested by the\nonly basis for a possible agreement.510 Secretary-General while stressing that the decision\n should have come at the end of March when the\n Decision of 27 April 1994 (3369th meeting): Force’s mandate had been extended. France could only\n resolution 914 (1994) regret that delay unjustifiable in view of the situation\n on the ground. The Council, from a political\n At its 3369th meeting, on 27 April 1994, the standpoint, had not reflected the clear determination\nCouncil included in its agenda the reports of the which the circumstances had required nor had it shown\nSecretary-General of 11, 16 and 24 March, as well as the support which UNPROFOR had a right to expect\nthe Secretary-General’s letter dated 30 March 1994. from it at a time when, faced with a constant shortage\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council of personnel, they were given additional missions in an\ninvited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, increasingly dangerous environment. As the increases\nat his request, to participate in the discussion without in personnel had been authorized, Member States now\nthe right to vote. The President (New Zealand) then needed to respond to the earnest requests of the\ndrew the attention of the Council members to the text Secretariat.512\nof a draft resolution submitted by France, the Russian\nFederation, Spain and the United Kingdom. 511 The representative of the United Kingdom stated\n that the Council’s decision reaffirmed its support for\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and UNPROFOR and signalled its determination to bring\nadopted unanimously as resolution 914 (1994), which about a cessation of hostilities and a peaceful\nreads: negotiated settlement in that country. He recalled that,\n__________________ at its previous meeting on Bosnia, on 21 April, the\n 509 Ibid., pp. 11-12. Council had adopted resolution 913 (1994),\n 510 Ibid., pp. 13-14.\n __________________\n 511 S/1994/487. 512 S/PV.3369, pp. 2-3.\n\n\n\n\n880 07-63109\n"
[161] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\ncondemning the attacks by Bosnian Serb forces on warned that if the situation were not rectified\nGorazde, demanding their withdrawal, and calling for UNPROFOR would not be able to function in\nan end to the hostilities. In parallel, the United Nations pursuance of its mandates and he recommended that\nand NATO had made it clear that force would be used the Council call upon the Government of Croatia to\nif those elements were not complied with. Thanks to fulfil its obligations to UNPROFOR and end the\nthe determination of UNPROFOR and NATO, the blockade.\nimmediate threat in Gorazde had ended. The United\n At its 3416th meeting, on 11 August 1994, the\nKingdom called upon all parties to cooperate fully with\n Council included the above-mentioned letter in its\nUNPROFOR and other United Nations and relief\n agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\npersonnel working in Gorazde. The speaker warned\n President (Russian Federation) stated that, after\nthat the Bosnian Serbs should not forget that the terms\n consultations among members of the Security Council,\nof the North Atlantic Council’s recent decisions\n he had been authorized to make the following\nremained in force, and that they applied to attacks\n statement on behalf of the Council:515\nagainst or threats to the other safe areas. His\nGovernment was giving its full support to efforts to The Security Council is deeply concerned by the letter\nbring more closely together the diplomatic activity of from the Secretary-General dated 26 July 1994 and by further\nthe United Nations, the European Union, the United reports from the Secretariat of continuing difficulties that have\n arisen for the operations of the United Nations Protection Force\nStates and the Russian Federation, including the action in Croatia owing to blockades of Force traffic into the United\ntaken through the establishment of a Contact Group. 513 Nations Protected Areas by demonstrators. The Council\n considers that such blockades by Croatian citizens as well as\n Decision of 11 August 1994 (3416th meeting): related impediments imposed by the Croatian authorities on the\n statement by the President freedom of movement of the Force are inadmissible. In that\n context the Council deplores the remaining blockades of access\n By a letter dated 26 July 1994 addressed to the roads to the United Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of\nPresident of the Security Council, the Secretary- Croatia.\nGeneral reported that serious difficulties had arisen for The Council is encouraged by the signing on 4 August\nUNPROFOR operations in Croatia, as a result of 1994 of an agreement between the Government of the Republic\nblockades being implemented by demonstrators against of Croatia and the United Nations Protection Force regarding the\nall UNPROFOR traffic into the United Nations procedures regulating Force traffic to and from the United\nProtected Areas.514 The blockades had severely Nations Protected Areas, and calls on the Croatian authorities to\nundermined the ability of UNPROFOR to monitor the implement its provisions faithfully. The Council welcomes the\n29 March ceasefire agreement, resulting in an progress that has been made since the signature of this\n agreement to open eleven of nineteen crossing points. However,\nincreased number of violations of that Agreement and the Council reminds the Government of the Republic of Croatia\ncausing rising tensions within the zone of separation. of its obligation to facilitate the unimpeded access of the Force\nThe blockades were also preventing UNPROFOR from to all nineteen crossing points agreed upon in the ceasefire\nperforming its other basic tasks. The Special agreement of 29 March 1994.\nRepresentative of the Secretary-General had met with In this context the Council is also concerned about the\nofficials of the Government of Croatia to impress upon continuing unacceptable practice of the Government of the\nthem the Government’s responsibility to ensure that the Republic of Croatia of levying tolls and other taxes on the Force\nwork of UNPROFOR was not impeded. He had for the use of roads and airports in the Republic of Croatia. The\ninformed them that the Force had clear evidence of the Council strongly disapproves of any action that would both\nparticipation of Croatian police in several of the impede the functioning of the Force and add to the already high\nblockades, rendering the Government in violations of cost of the peacekeeping operation in Croatia. Recalling\n paragraph 7 of its resolution 908 (1994) of 31 March 1994, the\naspects of the ceasefire agreement. While the Council again urges the Government of the Republic of Croatia\nGovernment might not have been fully in control of the to conclude without further delay a status-of-forces agreement\ndemonstrators, it was undeniably responsible for with the United Nations Protection Force and to resolve the\nensuring that their actions did not prevent UNPROFOR above and any other issues in accordance with the provisions of\nfrom carrying out its mandate. The Secretary-General that agreement.\n__________________\n __________________\n 513 Ibid., p. 3.\n 515 S/PRST/1994/44.\n 514 S/1994/888.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 881\n"
[162] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n The Council reaffirms its commitment to the sovereignty temporary mechanism by which some vulnerable\nand territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia and the right populations could be protected pending a\nof all displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes. comprehensive negotiated political settlement. The\nThe Council expects the Government of the Republic of Croatia\nto cooperate fully with the efforts of the Force.\n Secretary-General therefore recommended that the\n Security Council approve the statement of the Force’s\n Decision of 30 September 1994 (3434th mission in relation to the safe areas, authorize\n meeting): resolution 947 (1994) UNPROFOR to promulgate precise boundaries for\n those areas and approve the arrangements outlined in\n On 9 May 1994, pursuant to resolutions 836 his report.\n(1993) and 844 (1993), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report to inform the Council On 17 September 1994, pursuant to resolution\nof the results achieved and lessons learned in the 908 (1994), the Secretary-General submitted to the\nimplementation of the safe areas concept in Bosnia and Council a report intended to assist the Council in its\nHerzegovina, as well as to propose some improvements deliberations on the renewal of the UNPROFOR\nin the short term.516 mandate. 517\n\n The Secretary-General noted that the existing The Secretary-General noted that the conflicts in\napproach to safe areas required reworking. In his view, the former Yugoslavia were closely interrelated and\nthe successful implementation of the safe area concept had a direct impact on UNPROFOR operations in\nrequired the acceptance of three overriding principles: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former\n(a) the intention of safe areas was primarily to protect Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In that context, the\npeople and not to defend territory; (b) the method of work of the Contact Group which involved five major\nexecution of the safe area task should not detract from, Powers working with the Co-Chairmen of the Steering\nbut rather enhance, the original mandates of Committee of the International Conference on the\nUNPROFOR, namely supporting humanitarian Former Yugoslavia, could be of great significance for\nassistance and contributing to the overall peace process the future of UNPROFOR.\nthrough the implementation of ceasefires and local With regard to Croatia, the Secretary-General\ndisengagements; and (c) the mandate must take into outlined four problem areas in the UNPROFOR\naccount UNPROFOR’s resource limitations. mandate which required assessment: the\n The Secretary-General did not believe that demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Areas;\nextending the safe area concept to other parts of Bosnia the restoration of Croatian authority in the “pink\nand Herzegovina would be advisable. While zones”; the establishment of border controls; and\nreaffirming the Council’s commitments in relation to assistance for the return of refugees and displaced\nexisting safe areas, he believed that sources of tension persons. All four required either enforcement or the\nelsewhere in the Republic needed to be dealt with by consent of both parties for their implementation.\nother measures, including local ceasefires and modest UNPROFOR had neither the means nor the mandate\ndeployments of UNPROFOR observers. In addition to for enforcement action of that nature and the\nthe arrangements already in place for protection of safe cooperation of the parties had been elusive.\nareas it was necessary that: (a) the mission of The Secretary-General further noted that progress\nUNPROFOR in the safe areas be clearly defined; in Croatia had been slow and had proved insufficient to\n(b) the safe areas be clearly delineated; (c) the safe moderate Croatian impatience for a quick solution to\nareas be respected; and (d) complete freedom of the problem of reintegration of the United Nations\nmovement, on a “notification basis” be ensured for the Protected Areas into Croatia. Assistance in the creation\nprovision of humanitarian aid to safe areas. While safe of conditions that would permit the voluntary return of\nareas could be made more effective and manageable, displaced persons to their homes in or near the\nthey did not in themselves represent a long-term Protected Areas continued to be of the highest priority\nsolution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. for UNPROFOR and discussions were taking place\nRather, the safe area concept should be viewed as a among the Office of the United Nations High\n__________________ __________________\n 516 S/1994/555. 517 S/1994/1067 and Add.1.\n\n\n\n\n882 07-63109\n"
[163] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nCommissioner for Refugees, UNPROFOR and both He did not, therefore, recommend the withdrawal of\nparties on the implementation of a pilot project for the Force at that time. He did recommend, however,\nvoluntary return to a few selected villages in or near that due to the continued harassment of minorities in\nthe zone of separation.518 Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly by the Bosnian\n Serbs, the Security Council might consider providing\n In considering the various options for the\n UNPROFOR with a more comprehensive, uniform,\nUNPROFOR presence in Croatia, the Secretary-General\n United Nations civilian police mandate throughout the\nwas aware that the situation on the ground could be\n territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, similar to that\nfrozen in a stalemate in which the Force’s continued\n already mandated for Croatia.\npresence contributed only to the maintenance of an\nunsatisfactory status quo. In the current circumstances, The Secretary-General also recommended the\nhowever, it was very important to secure continued renewal of UNPROFOR mandate for a further period of\nrespect for the ceasefire agreement. At the same time, six months. He further suggested that the Council might\nfurther efforts would have to be made for the reopening wish to endorse the Force’s activities in relation to mine-\nof negotiations. These tasks would require the continued clearing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and support the\npresence of UNPROFOR in Croatia. acquisition of a small number of protected vehicles for\n uses in areas of mine hazard. He also recommended that\n With regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n the Council endorse the Force’s public information\nexperience gained over the last six months had\n policy and programmes, including the establishment of\nenhanced mutual understanding, joint planning and\n an independent radio station to provide the population\ncooperation between UNPROFOR and NATO, and the\n within the mission area access to impartial, factual and\nsuccessful deployment of long-awaited additional\n timely information, thereby increasing public\nforces had enabled UNPROFOR to improve its ability\n understanding and support for UNPROFOR\nto seize opportunities for progress. Nevertheless, the\n “peacemaking” efforts in the former Yugoslavia.\npossibility of a further exacerbation and intensification\nof the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina had At its 3434th meeting, on 30 September 1994, the\nhighlighted the limitations of UNPROFOR, and Council included the report of the Secretary-General of\nunderlined a number of areas of concern. The 17 September 1994 in its agenda. Following the\nSecretary-General acknowledged that some Member adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nStates might believe that the international community’s representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and\nstrategy of deploying peacekeeping operations only Croatia, at their request, to participate in the discussion\nupon the active cooperation of the parties was no without the right to vote. The Council also invited\nlonger adequate to serve the objectives proclaimed in Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, at his request, to address the\nthe Council’s resolutions. He warned, however, that the Council in the course of its consideration of the item.\nuse of disincentives would change the nature of the The President (Spain) then drew the attention of the\nUnited Nations presence in the area, entailing Council members to the text of a draft resolution,\nunacceptable risks to UNPROFOR. The result would submitted by France, Spain and the United\nbe a fundamental shift from the logic of peacekeeping Kingdom, 519 and read out some revisions that had been\nto the logic of war and would require the withdrawal of made to the draft in its provisional form. He also drew\nUNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The the attention of the Council members to several other\nSecretary-General had therefore directed that plans be documents.520\nmade for a potential withdrawal at short notice. Any __________________\nconsideration of decisions leading to the withdrawal of 519 S/1994/1120.\nUNPROFOR had, however, to be weighed against the 520 Letters dated 9 and 28 September 1994, respectively,\ntasks that were currently being implemented from the representative of Yugoslavia addressed to the\nsuccessfully by UNPROFOR and in the absence of an Secretary-General (S/1994/1045 and S/1994/1108);\noverall political settlement acceptable to all the parties. letters dated 15 and 26 September 1994, respectively,\n__________________ from the representative of Croatia addressed to the\n 518 The Secretary-General’s comments relating to the return President of the Security Council (S/1994/1058 and\n of refugees and displaced persons (S/1994/1067, S/1994/1095); and letter dated 16 September 1994 from\n para. 39) were subsequently referred to by the Council in the representative of Croatia addressed to the Secretary-\n resolution 947 (1994), para. 13. General (S/1994/1062).\n\n\n\n07-63109 883\n"
[164] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina applied to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its\noutlined two reflections with respect to the renewal of “proxies” in Knin. It further underlined the importance\nthe UNPROFOR mandate. First, every Security of the mutual recognition of existing borders between\nCouncil resolution mandating UNPROFOR had Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as the\nreflected the commitment of the Council to the next step for the Contact Group’s activities. Before\nterritorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and concluding, the speaker expressed regret that the\nHerzegovina. Secondly, although some might wish to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been permitted to\ncharacterize UNPROFOR as a peacekeeping mission, address the Council. His Government had taken the\nits mandate was more complex. Within the mandate position that the UNPROFOR mandate only applied to\nthere was no reference to peacekeeping, while there the territories of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and\nwas reference to specific assignments calling for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and that\n“necessary measures” and appropriate responses to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not therefore\nattacks on civilian safe areas and violations of possess any special status in relation to the\nhumanitarian standards. The speaker contended that, in UNPROFOR issue.522\nthat context, any threats directed at Bosnia and\n Mr. Jovanovic stated that the Federal Republic of\nHerzegovina and its defence forces exercising the\n Yugoslavia considered that the conditions for\nresponsibility of defending its civilians and its\n terminating the UNPROFOR peace operation had not\nterritorial integrity and sovereignty must be viewed as\n yet been created and that its continued presence in the\ncontrary to the word and spirit of the relevant Security\n protected areas was necessary until an overall political\nCouncil resolutions. He argued that the mandate should\n solution was reached. The UNPROFOR presence in the\nnot be redefined, but rather that if there was a\n protected areas had been of vital importance for the\n“practical incapacity to execute the original mandate”,\n protection of the Serbian civilian population of\nthen additional resources should be provided or the\n Krajina. He contended that the question of extending\nmandate must be terminated. It was necessary to re-\n the UNPROFOR mandate should be viewed apart from\nestablish the clear objectives of the UNPROFOR\n the search for a political solution to the crisis. The\nmandate. 521\n extension of the Force’s mandate and the protection of\n The representative of Croatia stated that his the Serbian population could not be used by one side as\nGovernment remained bound by the decision of the an instrument for exerting political pressure in the\nCroatian parliament on the UNPROFOR mandate and negotiating process. On the contrary, the presence of\nit welcomed the elements of that decision which had UNPROFOR was a precondition for facilitating a\nbeen incorporated in the draft resolution, especially in political solution. His delegation fully agreed with the\nrespect of the “pink zones”, the border monitors and Secretary-General’s assessment that resort to a military\nthe pilot project for the return of displaced persons to option would have incalculable consequences. It also\ntheir homes in the occupied areas. His delegation shared the Secretary-General view that not all efforts\nbelieved that the draft resolution pointed the solution- towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict had yet\nseeking process in the right direction and it hoped that been exhausted. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nthe Contact Group and the United Nations would was convinced that a three-phase policy was the only\nimmediately begin to pursue measures consistent with way to achieve peace. Building on the results of the\nthe letter and spirit of the draft resolution so that the ceasefire, negotiations should be speedily resumed on\nrelevant parties would not be compelled to consider a confidence-building measures and the re-establishment\nnew UNPROFOR mandate after 100 days. It also of economic relations and infrastructure, which would\nemphasized that the decision to accept the new enable the Vance plan to be realized. The speaker\nUNPROFOR mandate in Croatia had been made with further stated that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nthe view that the Contact Group would immediately had given its full support to the Contact Group’s plan\ncommence work on the comprehensive reintegration and had tried to convince the Bosnian Serb leadership\nplan for Croatia, which would provide local autonomy to accept it. He hinted that a clear-cut, written\nin pre-war Serbian majority areas in Croatia, with the agreement by the Contact Group that the Bosnian Serbs\nsame acceptance/rejection measures that should be should have the equal right to establish confederal ties\n__________________ __________________\n 521 S/PV.3434, pp. 2-3. 522 Ibid., pp. 3-4.\n\n\n\n\n884 07-63109\n"
[165] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nwith the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would open Paying tribute to the Force personnel in the performance\nthe door for the Bosnian Serbs to agree to the Contact of the mandate of the Force, in particular in assisting the\nGroup. Turning to the draft resolution before the delivery of humanitarian assistance and monitoring the\n ceasefires,\nCouncil, he expressed regret that it contained certain\nprovisions which, he contended, dealt with issues that Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of the\nshould not have been addressed in a “technical Force and its freedom of movement in all its missions, and to\nresolution” on the extension of the UNPROFOR these ends, as regards the Force in the Republic of Croatia and\n in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under\nmandate. In that respect, he referred in particular to the Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\nthird and fifth preambular paragraphs, as well as to\noperative paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13 and 14. He 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of\nfurther contended that the provisions of operative 17 September 1994, and approves the proposals therein\n concerning the activities of the United Nations Protection Force\nparagraph 14 attempted to impose political solutions in relation to mine clearance, public information and civilian\nwhich were in “flagrant contravention” of the Vance police;\nplan, as the Vance plan provided that the political\nstatus of the protected areas should be resolved only 2. Decides to extend the mandate of the Force for an\n additional period terminating on 31 March 1995;\nafter all of the plan’s provisions had been\nimplemented. 523 3. Urges all the parties and others concerned to\n cooperate with the Force in carrying out its mandate, to refrain\n The draft resolution, as orally revised in its from any hostile and provocative acts against Force personnel,\nprovisional form, was then put to the vote and adopted and to ensure their security and their freedom of movement;\nunanimously as resolution 947 (1994), which reads: 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report no later\n The Security Council, than 20 January 1995 on progress towards the implementation of\n the United Nations peacekeeping plan for the Republic of\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the Croatia and all relevant Security Council resolutions, taking into\nconflicts in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia, and account the position of the Croatian Government, and decides to\nreaffirming in this context its resolution 908 (1994) of 31 March reconsider the mandate of the Force in the light of that report;\n1994, on the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force,\n 5. Also requests the Secretary-General, in the light of\n Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of resolution 871 (1993), to include in that report information on\n9 May and 17 September 1994, progress towards (a) opening the road and railway\n Affirming its commitment to the search for an overall communications with the United Nations Protected Areas and\nnegotiated settlement of the conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia the rest of the Republic of Croatia, (b) establishing the water\nensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States and electricity supply in all regions of Croatia for the mutual\nthere within their internationally recognized borders, and benefit of all its citizens, and (c) opening the Adriatic pipeline;\nstressing the importance it attaches to the mutual recognition 6. Invites the Secretary-General to update his report\nthereof, submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 838 (1993) of\n Welcoming the continuing efforts of the Co-Chairmen of 10 June 1993 and to expand it as appropriate to cover other\nthe Steering Committee of the International Conference on the areas where the Force is deployed;\nFormer Yugoslavia, 7. Affirms the right of all displaced persons to return\n Welcoming also the efforts of Member States in the voluntarily to their homes of origin in safety and dignity with\ncontext of the Contact Group, and emphasizing the utmost the assistance of the international community;\nimportance of the work of the Contact Group and its role in the 8. Reaffirms its support for the established principle\noverall peace process in the area, that all statements or commitments made under duress,\n Recognizing that the major provisions of the United particularly those regarding land and ownership, are null and\nNations peacekeeping plan for the Republic of Croatia and void;\nrelevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 9. Calls on all parties and others concerned fully to\n871 (1993) of 4 October 1993, still remain to be implemented, comply with all Security Council resolutions regarding the\n Stressing that the Force plays an essential role in situation in the Former Yugoslavia and concerning in particular\npreventing and containing hostilities and thus creating the the Force in Croatia, to create the conditions that would\nconditions for achieving an overall political settlement, facilitate the full implementation of its mandate;\n\n__________________ 10. Expresses its concern that the necessary\n 523 Ibid., pp. 4-6.\n arrangements, including, where appropriate, agreements on the\n\n\n\n07-63109 885\n"
[166] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nstatus of forces and other personnel, have not yet been instructions along those lines would be issued to the\nconcluded by the Republic of Croatia, the Former Yugoslav leaders of the Force.524\nRepublic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n(Serbia and Montenegro), and calls upon them to conclude such The representative of the Russian Federation\narrangements without delay; stated that his delegation supported the resolution just\n 11. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council adopted because it believed that UNPROFOR was\nregularly informed on progress with regard to the playing an extremely important role in efforts to settle\nimplementation of the mandate of the Force, and to report, as the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. He cautioned\nnecessary, on any developments on the ground and other that everything needed to be done to ensure that\ncircumstances affecting the mandate of the Force; UNPROFOR did not become a party to the conflict or\n 12. Urges the Bosnian Serb party fully to respect the a “hostage” to the forces participating in it. He\nterritorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia and to refrain emphasized that the effectiveness of UNPROFOR\nfrom any actions that are threatening its security; depended to a large extent on the good will of the\n 13. Also urges that the pilot project described in parties. In Croatia, it was clear that the unimpeded\nparagraph 39 of the report of the Secretary-General of fulfilment by the Force of its mandate in the United\n17 September 1994 be put into effect as soon as possible; Nations Protected Areas was the most important\n 14. Declares that the restoration of the authority of the\n prerequisite for the implementation of the Vance plan.\nRepublic of Croatia in the “pink zones”, to the extent that it is The Russian Federation also attached particular\ncompatible with the 29 March 1994 ceasefire agreement, must importance to the continued efforts of the countries of\nbe accomplished under the close supervision of the Force, and in the Contact Group to develop their cooperation with\nsuch a manner as to avoid any further destabilization of the the Security Council. It was important to increase\nregion; pressure on all parties to promote a comprehensive\n 15. Decides to remain seized of the matter. peace settlement Such a settlement should be based on\n a territorial arrangement and on constitutional\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of principles placing all parties on an equal footing. 525\nFrance contended that without UNPROFOR there\nwould have been increased suffering for the civilian The representative of New Zealand welcomed the\npopulation, increased movements of refugees and Council’s decision to extend the UNPROFOR mandate\nirreversible developments on the ground that would for a further six months. He cautioned, however, that if\nhave confronted the international community with an UNPROFOR were to continue to be supported, the\ninsoluble problem. While acknowledging that more status quo could not be continued. He therefore urged\ncould have been done, he pointed out that UNPROFOR the parties to reinvigorate the progress towards\nhad neither the mandate nor the military means to implementation of the peace plan. Recalling that the\nimpose peace. The speaker further stated that Council had adopted the previous week a series of\nUNPROFOR had reached a turning point in its history. measures, the speaker noted that those measures\nEither a dynamic for peace would gain strength in the needed to be followed up with further specific steps.\ncoming weeks, or, on the contrary hope of a negotiated First, there should be early recognition of Bosnia and\nsettlement would fade, and then decisions would Herzegovina and Croatia. Secondly, there needed to be\ninevitably have to be taken involving the withdrawal of firm and united resolve on the part of UNPROFOR and\nUNPROFOR. Thus that was undoubtedly the last time NATO to use force where warranted for the protection\nthat the Council would be extending the UNPROFOR of the safe areas and the enforcement of the exclusion\nmandate in a routine manner. In the next stage, which zones. Thirdly, the “strangulation” of Sarajevo must\nwould be crucial, UNPROFOR would have to strive to cease. Fourthly, the progressive withdrawal of the\nensure strict implementation of the Council’s decisions, Bosnian Serbs to positions consistent with the\nparticularly those concerning safe areas. That might territorial settlement proposal should be pursued. The\nimply the use of force, if necessary, especially to speaker also observed that the resolution just adopted\nensure respect for the exclusion zones. The was less specific than his delegation would have liked\nGovernment of France therefore hoped that explicit on the question of the mutual recognition of\n __________________\n 524 Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n 525 Ibid., p. 8.\n\n\n\n\n886 07-63109\n"
[167] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\ninternational boundaries in the region of the former well as the Secretary-General’s proposals for its future\nYugoslavia. He emphasized that it was the view of his mandate.\ndelegation that mutual recognition should be the\n The Secretary-General recalled that, in his interim\nstarting point for the overall settlement of the conflict\n report of 14 January 1995, he had noted that, despite the\nin the former Yugoslavia. 526\n earlier inability of UNPROFOR to fulfil important parts\n The representative of the United States observed of its mandate under the United Nations peacekeeping\nthat, in Bosnia, the most important development had plan in Croatia, the successful implementation of the\nbeen the Contact Group’s presentation of its territorial ceasefire agreement of 29 March 1994 and the\nproposal to the parties. Unfortunately, while the conclusion of the economic agreement on 2 December\nBosnian Federation had accepted the proposal, the 1994 had been positive steps towards confidence-\nBosnian Serbs had not. The United States would building and reconciliation. He had expressed\ncontinue to demand that the Bosnian Serbs accept the disappointment that the potential for success through the\nproposal, which represented the best opportunity for a three-step approach — cessation of hostilities, economic\njust and equitable settlement to the conflict. Just a normalization and political negotiations — had not been\nweek earlier, with its adoption of a resolution fully explored before the decision of the Government of\ntightening sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, the Croatia on 12 January 1995 to withdraw its support for\nCouncil had reminded the Bosnian Serbs that their the continuing role of UNPROFOR. The Secretary-\ncontinuing “obstinacy” was incurring substantial costs. General therefore welcomed the announcement on\nIn respect of the situation in Croatia, the United States 12 March 1995 by Croatia’s President that he had agreed\nGovernment strongly supported the basic precept, to the retention of UNPROFOR.529 The maintenance of a\nreflected in the resolution just adopted, that a reduced force in Croatia under a new mandate thus\nsettlement of the conflict must be in conformity with seemed the only way to reduce the risks of a renewed\nCroatia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The major war, while permitting continued progress in\nspeaker also expressed her Government’s concern at implementing the economic agreement and beginning\nthe increasing violations of the exclusion zones, as political negotiations. He had instructed his Special\nwell as its commitment to their strict enforcement. She Envoy to conduct negotiations with the parties on the\nexpressed confidence that, should strict enforcement mandate of a future United Nations peacekeeping force\ncontinue to be necessary, UNPROFOR would work in Croatia. The gulf between the positions of the\nclosely with NATO to ensure that the intent of the Government of Croatia and the Krajina Serb authorities\nCouncil to protect the safe areas was carried out. on the role and functions of the new force remained\nBefore concluding, she noted that the resolution just wide. Further negotiations were necessary. The\nadopted lay upon the parties — and her Government Secretary-General was, however, able to report the basis\ninterpreted that to refer especially to the Serb party — could be established for agreement that the mandate\nthe responsibility to create the conditions that would should include the following: (a) support for the\nallow UNPROFOR to fulfil its mandate.527 implementation of the ceasefire agreement of 29 March\n 1994; (b) support for the implementation of the\n Decisions of 31 March 1995 (3512th meeting): __________________\n resolutions 981 (1995), 982 (1995) and 529 In the announcement the President of Croatia stated that\n\n 983 (1995) his country would seek to negotiate a new mandate for\n an international presence in Croatia that would\n On 22 March 1995, pursuant to resolution 947 (a) control the international borders between Croatia and\n(1994), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and between Croatia\na report on UNPROFOR.528 The report was intended, and Bosnia and Herzegovina; (b) control access and\nin conjunction with the report of the Secretary-General communications for UNPROFOR and other international\n humanitarian operations to Bosnia through territory not\ndated 14 January 1995, to assist the Council in its\n under the control of Croatia; and (c) facilitate the\nconsideration of the mandate of UNPROFOR. It continued implementation of existing and future\ncontained an overview of the activities of the Force, as agreements and the relevant Security Council and\n__________________ General Assembly resolutions. In the meantime, the\n 526 Ibid., pp. 8-9. Government of Croatia agreed to the continuation of the\n 527 Ibid., pp. 9-10. current force.\n 528 S/1995/222 and Corr.1 and 2.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 887\n"
[168] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\neconomic agreement of 2 December 1994; and restructuring of UNPROFOR into three forces, each\n(c) implementation of these elements of the existing with a mandate extending to 30 November 1995;\nUnited Nations peacekeeping plan for Croatia that were (b) the negotiation, on the basis of the elements\naccepted by both parties as having continuing relevance. previously identified, of a new mandate and functions\nIn addition to that “core mandate”, the new force would for UNPF-1, which would be significantly smaller that\ncontinue to perform functions arising from the accord on the existing UNPROFOR strength in Croatia; (c) the\nthe Prevlaka peninsula and from relevant resolutions of conversion of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina\nthe Security Council, such as monitoring the “no-fly and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into\nzone” and the extension of close air support in Croatia. UNPF-2 and UNPF-3, respectively, with the same\n responsibilities and composition as UNPROFOR had\n Concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, the\n possessed in those Republics; (d) appeals to the\nSecretary-General observed that the inability of\n respective Governments to conclude status-of-forces\nUNPROFOR to deter attacks on Bihac had brought to\n agreements with the United Nations and to grant it\nthe fore some of the key issues addressed in previous\n suitable broadcasting facilities;531 and (e) the transfer\nreports on the concept of safe areas. Until the Council\n to the three United Nations Peace Forces of the\nwas able to provide clear guidance on those matters, it\n applicability of all relevant Security Council\nwas unlikely that the commitment of the parties or the\n resolutions relating to the functioning of UNPROFOR\nForce’s performance in the safe areas would improve,\n in the territories of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina\nand there was a danger that situations such as that in\n and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,\nBihac would recur. The Secretary-General further\n respectively.\nnoted that the current impasse on the Contact Group’s\nproposal had created a vacuum in which the Force had At its 3512th meeting, on 31 March 1995, the\nlittle or no political context for the pursuit of local Council included the report of the Secretary-General in\ninitiatives, and the parties had little or no incentive to its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\ncooperate. He appealed to the members of the contact Council invited the representatives of Bosnia and\nGroup to renew their efforts to fill the current vacuum. Herzegovina, Croatia and the former Yugoslav\n Republic of Macedonia, at their request, to participate\n Regarding the former Yugoslav Republic of\n in the discussion without the right to vote. The\nMacedonia, the Secretary-General suggested that the\n President (China) then drew the attention of the\nCouncil might wish to call, in the context of Article 50\n Council members to the text of three draft resolutions\nof the Charter, for increased international economic\n submitted by Argentina, the Czech Republic, France,\nsupport to be provided to the former Yugoslav\n Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United\nRepublic of Macedonia.\n Kingdom and the United States,532 as well as to several\n The Secretary-General further reported that the other documents.533\nGovernments of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and __________________\nthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had 531 See S/1995/222, paras. 47-51. The appeal to facilitate\nexpressed the wish that the United Nations in their suitable radio and television broadcasts for the United\ncountries should be separate from UNPROFOR. He Nations was subsequently endorsed by the Council in\ntherefore proposed that UNPROFOR be replaced by resolution 981 (1995), para. 12; and resolution 982\nthree separate, but interlinked, peacekeeping (1995), para. 10.\n 532 S/1995/242-244.\noperations: United Nations Peace Force — one in\n 533 Letter dated 22 March 1995 from the representative of\nCroatia (UNPF-1), one in Bosnia and Herzegovina\n Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security\n(UNPF-2), and one in the former Yugoslav Republic of\n Council (S/1995/214); letters dated 22, 28 and 29 March\nMacedonia (UNPF-3).530 1995, respectively, from the representative of Bosnia and\n The Secretary-General accordingly recommended Herzegovina addressed to the Secretary-General\n (S/1995/216, S/1995/227 and S/1995/245); letters dated\nthat the Security Council approve the following: (a) the\n__________________ 22, 27, 28 and 29 March 1995, respectively, from the\n representative of Croatia addressed to the Secretary-\n 530 See S/1995/222, para. 84. These proposals were\n General (S/1995/221, S/1995/223, S/1995/229 and\n subsequently endorsed by the Council in resolution 981 S/1995/232); letter dated 29 March 1995 from the\n (1995), paras. 1 and 2; resolution 982 (1995), para. 1; representative of the former Yugoslav Republic of\n and resolution 983 (1995), para. 1.\n\n\n\n888 07-63109\n"
[169] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina The representative of Croatia stated that\ncharged that UNPROFOR had become a “substitute for UNPROFOR had contributed positively by keeping\nreal peacemaking” in his country. After three years of relative peace in Croatia and had given the\nthat imposed role, UNPROFOR must be judged a international community time to establish a political\nfailure. Moreover, those behind the strategy of framework and binding legal decisions that would\n“usurping” UNPROFOR for the purpose of substituting assist in reintegrating the occupied territories and their\nit for peacemaking must be judged guilty also of residents into Croatia peacefully and in a manner\nallowing aggression and genocide to continue, of consistent with Croatia’s sovereignty and territorial\nendangering international peace and security, and of integrity. But its mission had fallen short because of\nbetraying their responsibilities to the United Nations. the uncompromising resistance of the local Croatian\nHe further contended that the Force’s limited success Serbs and Belgrade. His Government emphasized that\nin providing humanitarian assistance was gradually it had an exclusive right of veto in the upcoming\neroding and that UNPROFOR’s mission was actually negotiations over the operational definitions for the\nbeing brought into contradiction with efforts to bring new arrangements within its sovereign territory granted\nabout peace. For that reason, the delegation of Bosnia by the Charter and the relevant resolutions. Croatia\nand Herzegovina had requested that the UNPROFOR disputed the Vance plan per se as a legal basis for the\nmandate be comprehensively reviewed. The modalities new arrangement but remained committed to the\nand a time frame must be established for that review. unfulfilled humanitarian elements of the Vance plan.\nMost important, the review should incorporate the\n His Government welcomed the draft resolution,\ncontributions of the Security Council, of the troop\n which not only recognized Croatia’s sovereignty over\ncontributors, of interested regional organizations and\n its occupied territories and defined its international\nMember States. Referring to the situation in and\n borders, but also called for control and demarcation of\naround Sarajevo, the speaker argued that the “Blue\n those borders. The draft resolution gave the United\nRoute” must be placed under United Nations\n Nations ample legal ground to control the relevant\nprotection, the Sarajevo airport access routes must be\n borders of Croatia. Croatia also attached the utmost\nfreed of roadblocks, and Sarajevo citizens must be\n importance to paragraph 3 (d), which should be\nliberated from snipers. Those requests were not new,\n thoroughly planned and effectively executed. It\nnor did they require fresh Security Council action;\n believed that a peaceful settlement in Croatia was\nauthority already existed for such steps. All that was\n possible only if that paragraph was strictly\nneeded was the will to carry out that existing authority.\n implemented. The border mechanism could be made\n Referring to the report of the Secretary-General, effective by taking measures beyond those expressed in\nthe speaker requested that modalities be established to the Vance plan and by imposing punitive measures\nprevent further violations of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s against violators, in the form of sanctions. He noted, in\nterritorial integrity and sovereignty by the Krajina that regard, that the Council had already established in\nSerbs, and he noted that Bosnia and Herzegovina resolution 871 (1993) that the sanctions regime\nsupported Croatia’s efforts to have those borders imposed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nsealed. He also argued that the international arms could be linked to developments in the occupied\nembargo restricted Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capacity territories in Croatia.\nfor self-defence, making it even more dependent upon\n Croatia also welcomed operative paragraph 5 of\nthe international community’s responsibility for\n the draft resolution, which stated that the final political\npreserving international peace and security.534\n solution in regard to the rights of the Croatian Serb\n__________________ minority must be consistent with the territorial\n Macedonia addressed to the Secretary-General integrity and sovereignty of Croatia. That paragraph,\n (S/1995/236); and letter dated 30 March 1995 from the along with the third and fourth preambular paragraphs,\n representative of Croatia, transmitting the text of a letter confirmed and supported the territorial integrity of\n of the same date from the Deputy Prime Minister and\n Croatia in its internationally recognized borders.\n Minister for Foreign Affairs of Croatia addressed to the\n President of the Security Council (S/1995/246).\n Croatia hoped that both Knin and Belgrade would\n 534 S/PV.3512, pp. 2-5. understand that message and would finally accept that\n the only way to achieve a solution to the problem of\n\n\n\n07-63109 889\n"
[170] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nthe occupied territories was for Belgrade to recognize become a major problem for UNPROFOR in Croatia.\nCroatia and for Knin to permit the peaceful The speaker welcomed the decision of the Croatian\nreintegration of the occupied territories into the legal President to agree to a continued but modified presence\nand administrative systems of Croatia. The speaker of the United Nations. Germany shared the view of the\nexpressed the concern of his delegation that the draft Secretary-General that a three-phase process of\nresolution did not give enough consideration to the negotiations — ceasefire; implementation of the\nright of displaced persons and refugees to return to Economic Agreement; and political negotiations —\ntheir homes. His delegation hoped that the upcoming was the only practical path to durable peace. It\nreport of the Secretary-General might mitigate those welcomed the fact that that was also the basic approach\nconcerns.535 underlying the mandate of UNCRO. He expressed\n concern at the continued refusal of the Government of\n Speaking before the votes on the draft\n the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to recognize Bosnia\nresolutions, the representative of Indonesia stated that\n and Herzegovina and Croatia, which he suggested was\nCroatia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity could not\n effectively blocking the peace process. Finally, the\nbe compromised. That must also remain a guiding\n speaker stressed that close cooperation between the\nprinciple for the United Nations presence in Croatia\n three peacekeeping operations and NATO would be\nand in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In relation to the new\n essential.537\nUnited Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in\nCroatia (UNCRO), he stressed the importance of The representative of the Russian Federation\ncontrolling the manner in which military personnel, stated that the adoption of a new mandate for the\nequipment, supplies and weapons crossed the operation in Croatia was absolutely necessary, but was\ninternational borders between Croatia and Bosnia and only a first step. The Secretary-General had work of\nHerzegovina, and between Croatia and the Federal the utmost importance to do on continuing the\nRepublic of Yugoslavia. He also emphasized that the consultations on the implementation of the mandate\ntroop strength of UNCRO should be sufficient not only and the modalities for the operation, all aspects of\nto implement the operation’s mandate, but also to serve which had to be acceptable to both parties. The\na deterrent function. Another important element of the Government of Croatia and local Serb authorities must\nUNCRO mandate was facilitating the delivery of demonstrate a constructive attitude to the discussions.\nhumanitarian assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina Turning to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the\nthrough Croatian territory. In relation to the operations speaker urged the parties to abide strictly by the\nin Bosnia and Herzegovina, the speaker noted that his agreements on a ceasefire and the cessation of\ndelegation wished to draw attention to the past hostilities and to cooperate with UNPROFOR in\ndiscrepancies between the UNPROFOR mandate and carrying out the provisions of those agreements. He\nits implementation, and to emphasize the importance of also urged the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact\neffective implementation. In that connection, his Group plan. He contended that the flare-up of\ndelegation emphasized the importance of the tenth hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina was linked to the\npreambular paragraph of the second draft resolution on illegal supplies of arms to the region, which were\nthe need for Member States to take appropriate steps to hardening the positions of the parties and creating the\nenhance UNPROFOR’s capacity to execute its impression that the conflict could be resolved by\nmandate. 536 military means. There must be a “clamp-down” in\n implementing the arms embargo against all the\n The representative of Germany pointed out that\n Republics of the former Yugoslavia, established by\nthe fact that a new mandate for the presence of the\n resolution 713 (1991). The Security Council must pay\nUnited Nations had become necessary was, in his\n greater attention to the issue and the Committee on\ndelegation’s view, a consequence of the obstructive\n sanctions should take up the problem of the violations\nattitude of the Croatian Serbs towards the United\n of the embargo, as the Council had instructed it to do.\nNations peacekeeping plan for Croatia. Also the\n The Russian Federation attached particular importance\nSerbian refusal to implement the Vance plan had\n__________________ to the fact that the Security Council, in reorganizing\n 535 Ibid., pp. 5-8.\n UNPROFOR and establishing three independent\n __________________\n 536 Ibid., pp. 9-10.\n 537 Ibid., pp. 11-13.\n\n\n\n\n890 07-63109\n"
[171] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\npeacekeeping operations, had taken the important United Nations regarding his Government’s views on the\ndecision to maintain a unified political and military establishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in the\ncommand for the three operations.538 Republic of Croatia,\n Emphasizing that improved observance of human rights,\n The first draft resolution 539 was then put to the including appropriate international monitoring thereof, is an\nvote and adopted unanimously as resolution 981 essential step towards restoration of confidence between the\n(1995), which reads: parties and building a durable peace,\n The Security Council, Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security and\n freedom of movement of personnel of United Nations\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the\n peacekeeping operations in the territory of the former\nconflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia,\n Yugoslavia, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of Charter of the United Nations,\n22 March 1995,\n 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of\n Affirming its commitment to the search for an overall 22 March 1995, and in particular approves the arrangements in\nnegotiated settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia paragraph 84 thereof;\nensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States\n 2. Decides to establish under its authority the United\nthere within their internationally recognized borders, and\n Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which\nstressing the importance it attaches to the mutual recognition\n shall be known as UNCRO, in accordance with paragraph 84 of\nthereof,\n the above-mentioned report, for a period terminating on\n Reaffirming its commitment to the independence, 30 November 1995, and requests the Secretary-General to take\nsovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, the measures necessary to ensure its earliest possible\nincluding its rights and obligations in respect of control over its deployment;\ninternational trade,\n 3. Decides that, in accordance with the report of the\n Welcoming the continuing efforts of representatives of the Secretary-General, and based on the United Nations\nUnited Nations, the European Union, the Russian Federation and peacekeeping plan for the Republic of Croatia, relevant\nthe United States of America to facilitate a negotiated solution to resolutions of the Security Council, the ceasefire agreement of\nthe conflict in the Republic of Croatia, and reaffirming its call 29 March 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the local\nupon the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities and the economic agreement of 2 December\nSerb authorities to enter into the negotiations, urgently and 1994 concluded under the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the\nwithout preconditions, for such a settlement, making full use of Steering Committee of the International Conference on the\nthe plan presented to them by those representatives, Former Yugoslavia, the mandate of UNCRO shall include:\n Recognizing that major provisions of the United Nations (a) Performing fully the functions envisaged in the\npeacekeeping plan for the Republic of Croatia remain to be ceasefire agreement of 29 March 1994;\nimplemented, in particular those regarding demilitarization of\n (b) Facilitating implementation of the economic\nthe areas under the control of the local Serb authorities, the\n agreement of 2 December 1994;\nreturn of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes and\nthe establishment of local police forces to carry out their duties (c) Facilitating implementation of all relevant Security\nwithout discrimination against persons of any nationality in Council resolutions, including the functions identified in\norder to protect the human rights of all residents, and urging the paragraph 72 of the above-mentioned report;\nparties to agree to their implementation,\n (d) Assisting in controlling, by monitoring and\n Recognizing also that major provisions of relevant reporting, the crossing of military personnel, equipment,\nSecurity Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 871 supplies and weapons over the international borders between the\n(1993) of 4 October 1993 and 947 (1994) of 30 September 1994, Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and\nstill remain to be implemented, Herzegovina, and the Republic of Croatia and the Federal\n Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) at the border\n Noting that the mandate of the United Nations Protection\n crossings for which UNCRO is responsible, as specified in the\nForce in the Republic of Croatia expires on 31 March 1995, in\n United Nations peacekeeping plan for the Republic of Croatia;\nconformity with resolution 947 (1994),\n (e) Facilitating the delivery of international\n Noting also the letter dated 17 March 1995 from the\n humanitarian assistance to the Republic of Bosnia and\nPermanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia to the\n__________________ Herzegovina through the territory of the Republic of Croatia;\n 538 Ibid., pp. 18-20.\n 539 S/1995/242.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 891\n"
[172] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n (f) Monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka 12. Urges the Government of the Republic of Croatia\npeninsula in accordance with resolution 779 (1992) of 6 October to provide suitable radio broadcasting frequencies and television\n1992; broadcasting slots at no cost to the United Nations as described\n in paragraphs 47 to 51 of the report of the Secretary-General of\n 4. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his\n 22 March 1995;\nconsultations with all concerned on the detailed implementation\nof the mandate outlined in paragraph 3 above and to report to 13. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\nthe Council not later than 21 April 1995 for its approval;\n The second draft resolution 540 was then put to the\n 5. Decides that UNCRO shall be an interim vote and adopted unanimously as resolution 982\narrangement to create the conditions that will facilitate a (1995), which reads as follows:\nnegotiated settlement consistent with the territorial integrity of\nthe Republic of Croatia and guaranteeing the security and rights The Security Council,\nof all communities living in a particular area of the Republic of\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the\nCroatia, irrespective of whether they constitute in this area a\n conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and\nmajority or minority;\n reaffirming in this context its resolution 947 (1994) of\n 6. Decides that Member States, acting nationally or 30 September 1994 on the mandate of the United Nations\nthrough regional organizations or arrangements, may take, under Protection Force and subsequent relevant resolutions,\nthe authority of the Security Council and subject to close\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of\ncoordination with the Secretary-General and the United Nations\n 22 March 1995,\nTheatre Force Commander, using the existing procedures which\nhave been agreed with the Secretary-General, all necessary Affirming its commitment to the search for an overall\nmeasures to extend close air support to the territory of the negotiated settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia\nRepublic of Croatia in defence of UNCRO personnel in the ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States\nperformance of the UNCRO mandate, and requests the there within their internationally recognized borders, and\nSecretary-General to continue to report to the Council on any stressing the importance it attaches to the mutual recognition\nuse of close air support; thereof,\n 7. Emphasizes the responsibility of the parties and Reaffirming its commitment to the independence,\nothers concerned in the Republic of Croatia for the security and sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia\nsafety of UNCRO, and in this context demands that all parties and Herzegovina,\nand others concerned refrain from any acts of intimidation or\nviolence against UNCRO; Welcoming the continuing efforts of the Co-Chairmen of\n the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the\n 8. Calls upon the Government of the Republic of Former Yugoslavia,\nCroatia and the local Serb authorities to refrain from the threat\nor use of force and to reaffirm their commitment to a peaceful Welcoming also the efforts of Member States, in particular\nresolution of their differences; those of the Contact Group, and emphasizing the utmost\n importance of the work of the Contact Group in the overall\n 9. Invites the Secretary-General to report as peace process in the area,\nappropriate and not less than every four months on progress\ntowards a peaceful political settlement and the situation on the Welcoming further the acceptance by the Government of\nground, including the ability of UNCRO to implement its the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the Contact Group\nmandate as described above, and undertakes in this connection peace plan,\nto examine without delay any recommendations that the Welcoming the agreements between the Bosnian parties on\nSecretary-General may make in his reports and adopt a ceasefire and on the complete cessation of hostilities in the\nappropriate decisions; Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, concluded on 23 and\n 10. Calls upon Member States to consider favourably 31 December 1994, and the essential role the United Nations\nrequests by the Secretary-General for necessary assistance to Protection Force plays in implementation of these agreements,\nUNCRO in the performance of its mandate; and stressing the importance it places thereupon,\n\n 11. Stresses the importance of the necessary Wishing to encourage the efforts of the United Nations\narrangements, including agreements on the status of forces and Protection Force, as part of its activities to facilitate an overall\nother personnel, being concluded by the Republic of Croatia, settlement of the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and\ncalls upon it to agree to such arrangements without delay, and Herzegovina and as detailed in paragraphs 30 to 32 of the\nrequests the Secretary-General to inform the Council of progress above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General, to help the\n __________________\non this issue in the report mentioned in paragraph 4 above;\n 540 S/1995/243.\n\n\n\n\n892 07-63109\n"
[173] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nparties to implement the Washington agreements regarding the 2. Decides to extend the mandate of the United\nFederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nations Protection Force in the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina for an additional period terminating on\n Recognizing the need for Member States to take\n 30 November 1995, and further decides that all previous\nappropriate steps to enhance the capacity of the United Nations\n relevant resolutions relating to the Force shall continue to apply;\nProtection Force in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to\nexecute its mandate as set out in the relevant resolutions of the 3. Authorizes the Secretary-General to redeploy\nSecurity Council, including providing the Secretary-General before 30 June 1995 all United Nations Protection Force\nwith all the resources authorized by previous resolutions of the personnel and assets from the Republic of Croatia with the\nSecurity Council, exception of those whose continued presence in the Republic of\n Croatia is required for United Nations Confidence Restoration\n Reiterating the importance of maintaining Sarajevo, the\n Operation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO, or for the\ncapital of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a united\n functions referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 below;\ncity and a multicultural, multi-ethnic and plurireligious centre,\nand noting in this context the positive contribution that 4. Decides that the United Nations Protection Force\nagreement between the parties on the demilitarization of shall continue to perform fully the functions envisaged in the\nSarajevo could make to this end, to the restoration of normal life implementation of the ceasefire agreement of 29 March 1994\nin Sarajevo and to achieving an overall settlement, consistent and the economic agreement of 2 December 1994 between the\nwith the Contact Group peace plan, Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities and all\n relevant Security Council resolutions, including the functions\n Noting that the United Nations Protection Force plays an\n identified in paragraph 72 of the report of the Secretary-General\nessential role in preventing and containing hostilities, thus\n of 22 March 1995, and to facilitate the delivery of international\ncreating the conditions for achieving an overall political\n humanitarian assistance to the Republic of Bosnia and\nsettlement, and paying tribute to all Force personnel, especially\n Herzegovina through the territory of the Republic of Croatia\nthose who have given their lives for the cause of peace,\n until the effective deployment of UNCRO or 30 June 1995,\n Noting also that the mandate of the United Nations whichever is sooner;\nProtection Force expires on 31 March 1995, in conformity with\n 5. Decides that the United Nations Protection Force\nresolution 947 (1994),\n shall retain its existing support structures in the Republic of\n Noting further the letter dated 29 March 1995 from the Croatia, including the operation of its headquarters;\nPermanent Representative of the Republic of Bosnia and\n 6. Emphasizes the responsibility of the parties and\nHerzegovina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-\n others concerned in the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of\nGeneral,\n Bosnia and Herzegovina for the security and safety of the United\n Noting the letter dated 17 March 1995 from the Nations Protection Force, and in this context demands that all\nPermanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia to the parties and others concerned refrain from any acts of\nUnited Nations regarding his Government’s views on the intimidation or violence against the Force;\ncontinued presence of the United Nations Protection Force in the\n 7. Reiterates the importance it attaches to full\nRepublic of Croatia,\n compliance with the agreements between the Bosnian parties on\n Paying tribute to the United Nations Protection Force a ceasefire and on a complete cessation of hostilities in the\npersonnel in the performance of the mandate of the Force, in Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, calls upon them to agree\nparticular in assisting the delivery of humanitarian assistance to a further extension and implementation of these agreements\nand monitoring the ceasefires, beyond 30 April 1995 and to use that period to negotiate an\n overall peaceful settlement on the basis of the acceptance of the\n Emphasizing that improved observance of human rights, Contact Group peace plan as a starting point, and further calls\nincluding appropriate international monitoring thereof, is an upon the Bosnian Serb party to accept this;\nessential step towards restoration of confidence between the\nparties and building a durable peace, 8. Calls upon Member States to consider favourably\n requests by the Secretary-General for necessary assistance to the\n Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security of the United Nations Protection Force in the performance of its\nUnited Nations Protection Force and freedom of movement for mandate;\nall its missions, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of\nthe Charter of the United Nations, as regards the Force in the 9. Calls upon all parties and others concerned to\nRepublic of Croatia and in the Republic of Bosnia and comply fully with all Security Council resolutions regarding the\nHerzegovina, situation in the former Yugoslavia to create the conditions that\n would facilitate the full implementation of the mandate of the\n 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of United Nations Protection Force;\n22 March 1995, and in particular approves the arrangements\ncontained in paragraph 84 thereof; 10. Notes with satisfaction the progress made in the\n discussions between the Government of the Republic of Bosnia\n\n\n\n07-63109 893\n"
[174] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nand Herzegovina and the United Nations referred to in paragraph 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of\n49 of the report of the Secretary-General of 22 March 1995, and 22 March 1995, and in particular approves the arrangements\nurges the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and contained in paragraph 84 thereof;\nHerzegovina to provide suitable radio broadcasting frequencies\n 2. Decides that the United Nations Protection Force\nand television broadcasting slots at no cost to the United Nations\n within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia shall be\nfor the purposes described in paragraphs 47 to 51 of that report;\n known as the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force,\n 11. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council with the mandate set out in paragraph 85 of the report of the\nregularly informed of progress with regard to the Secretary-General of 22 March 1995, and that the mandate of\nimplementation of the mandate of the United Nations Protection the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force shall continue\nForce and to report, as necessary, on any developments on the for a period terminating on 30 November 1995;\nground, the attitude of the parties and other circumstances\n 3. Urges the United Nations Preventive Deployment\naffecting the mandate of the Force, and in particular to report\n Force to continue the current cooperation between the United\nwithin eight weeks of the adoption of the present resolution,\n Nations Protection Force and the mission of the Organization for\ntaking into account, inter alia, the concerns raised by the\n Security and Cooperation in Europe;\nmembers of the Council and issues raised by the Government of\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 4. Calls upon Member States to consider favourably\n requests by the Secretary-General for necessary assistance to the\n 12. Urges the Government of the Republic of Bosnia\n United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in the\nand Herzegovina to implement fully the provisions of the status-\n performance of its mandate;\nof-forces agreement of 15 May 1993 between that Government\nand the United Nations; 5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council\n regularly informed of any developments on the ground and other\n 13. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n circumstances affecting the mandate of the United Nations\n The third draft resolution541 was then put to the Preventive Deployment Force;\nvote and adopted unanimously as resolution 983 6. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n(1995), which reads:\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the\n The Security Council, United States stated that the creation of the new force\n Recalling its resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December 1992 in Croatia underlined the Council’s commitment to the\nand all subsequent relevant resolutions, sovereignty and territorial integrity of that country\n Affirming its commitment to the search for an overall within its internationally recognized borders. His\nnegotiated settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia Government was concerned that goods were crossing\nensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States those borders in violation of paragraph 12 of resolution\nthere within their internationally recognized borders, and 820 (1993), without Croatia’s permission or\nstressing the importance it attaches to the mutual recognition knowledge. In Bosnia, his Government was concerned\nthereof, by the recent violations of the ceasefire. With regard to\n Reaffirming its commitment to the independence, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the speaker noted that the\nsovereignty and territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav presence of United Nations forces there was not an end\nRepublic of Macedonia, in itself: to have meaning, it must contribute to\n Recalling its concern about possible developments which political progress. Such progress was dependent, in\ncould undermine confidence and stability in the former Yugoslav turn, on the will of the parties. Here the responsibilities\nRepublic of Macedonia or threaten its territory, for failure rested on the Bosnian Serb party for its\n Welcoming the positive role played by the United Nations unwillingness to enter into negotiations on the basis of\nProtection Force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Contact Group Plan. He stated that the changes to\nand paying tribute to the personnel of the Force in the UNPROFOR acknowledged that the circumstances in\nperformance of its mandate in the former Yugoslav Republic of the three countries differed and that specifically\nMacedonia, tailored mandates were required. At the same time, by\n Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of retaining important links between the forces the\n22 March 1995, Council was recognizing that tensions and conflict in\n__________________ the region were closely connected and that the\n 541 S/1995/244.\n efficiency of the operations was essential.542\n __________________\n 542 S/PV.3512, pp. 20-22.\n\n\n\n\n894 07-63109\n"
[175] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n The representative of France stated that the urged the parties to respond constructively to the\nresolution just adopted, in relation to the situation in proposals of the Contact Group.544\nCroatia, should permit UNCRO to carry out several\n The President, speaking in his capacity as the\nessential missions: implementation of the ceasefire\n representative of China, reiterated China’s position that\nagreement, the application of the Economic\n the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States of\nAgreement, and the monitoring of Croatia’s\n the region should be respected. Settlement of the\ninternational borders, which reflected the Council’s\n conflict would ultimately depend on the peoples of the\nconcern that its sovereignty and territorial integrity be\n region themselves and must be achieved through\npreserved. Keeping UNPROFOR in Bosnia and\n peaceful means, with the United Nations peacekeeping\nHerzegovina was not an end in itself. It sole purpose\n operations playing only a complementary role. China\nwas to facilitate the conclusion of a political\n hoped that the division of UNPROFOR into three parts,\nsettlement. Referring to the restructuring of\n as proposed by the Secretary-General, would give\nUNPROFOR into three distinct operations, the speaker\n further impetus to the political settlement process. For\nstated that his delegation was satisfied that the solution\n those reasons, the Chinese delegation had voted in\nchosen preserved the unity of command and political\n favour of the three resolutions just adopted. The\nleadership over the entire theatre, as well as the\n President stated that the United Nations peacekeeping\nlogistical and organizational interrelationship between\n operations should conform strictly to the purposes and\nthe three Forces. His delegation believed that respect\n principles of the Charter and should enjoy the consent\nfor that principle of unity strengthened both the\n and support of the parties concerned. He also reiterated\nsecurity of the troops deployed and the means available\n China’s reservations in relation to enforcement action\nto the United Nations. It emphasized that the theatre\n and the use of force in peacekeeping operations under\ncommander must continue to exercise full authority\n Chapter VII of the Charter. 545\nover all the Blue Helmets deployed throughout the\nterritories of successor States to the former Yugoslavia.\n Decision of 16 June 1995 (3543rd meeting):\nThat meant that the civilian authorities under the\n resolution 998 (1995)\nSpecial Representative of the Secretary-General would\nnot assume responsibilities within the chain of military On 30 May 1995, pursuant to resolutions 982\ncommand, and that the theatre commander would have (1995) and 987 (1995), the Secretary-General\nfull responsibility for the implementation of the three submitted to the Council a report on UNPROFOR.546\nmandates entrusted to the United Nations forces.543\n The Secretary-General reported that hostilities\n The representative of the United Kingdom noted had intensified in and around Sarajevo, particularly\nthat UNCRO would need to continue to monitor the after the expiry of the cessation-of-hostilities\nceasefire, which was vital to continued stability, and it agreement on 1 May 1995, despite the persistent efforts\nwould also need to facilitate the implementation of the of his Special Representative to obtain its renewal.\nEconomic Agreement and monitor Croatia’s That had led to the sustained use of heavy weapons by\ninternationally recognized borders. The United the two sides, increased civilian and UNPROFOR\nKingdom remained fully committed to Croatia’s casualties and mounting calls for stricter enforcement\nsovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, of the exclusion zone. As previous measures had failed\nit was essential that a satisfactory autonomous status and as neither side had appeared ready to stop fighting,\nand protection for individual rights be firmly UNPROFOR had decided to use all available means to\nestablished for the Krajina Serbs. The deployment of restore compliance with the Sarajevo agreement of\nUNCRO would clear the way for further talks on February 1994. At the expiration of an ultimatum by\neconomic normalization and on a political solution. In UNPROFOR addressed to both parties, air strikes had\nBosnia, the United Kingdom appealed to all sides to taken place on 25 and 26 May 1995. Bosnian Serb\nshow restraint and to cooperate with UNPROFOR in forces had reacted by surrounding additional weapons\nimplementing the cessation-of-hostilities agreement, collection points, taking United Nations military\nwhich should be extended in order to permit the __________________\npolitical process to continue. The United Kingdom also 544 Ibid., pp. 24-25.\n\n__________________ 545 Ibid., p. 28.\n 546 S/1995/444.\n 543 Ibid., pp. 22-23.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 895\n"
[176] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nobservers into custody and using a number of them as provide military reinforcements for UNPROFOR in\nhuman shields and by cutting electricity to the city. A order to reduce the vulnerability of its personnel and\nrelative calm had eventually prevailed in Sarajevo at a enhance its capacity to carry out its mandate.548 The\nhigh cost for UNPROFOR. The ability of UNPROFOR, three Governments had made it clear that their\nhowever, to operate effectively throughout Bosnia and intention was that the reinforced UNPROFOR would\nHerzegovina was seriously compromised. continue to be a peacekeeping mission. The Secretary-\n General noted that the proposal would provide the\n The Secretary-General noted that UNPROFOR\n Commander of UNPROFOR with well-armed and\nremained deployed in a war situation where there was\n mobile forces, with which to respond promptly to\nno peace to keep. Its position was complicated by the\n threats to United Nations personnel. He therefore\nfact that its original peacekeeping mandate, which\n recommended that the Security Council accept the\ncould not be implemented without the cooperation of\n proposal, as it would enhance the ability of\nthe parties, had gradually been enlarged to include\n UNPROFOR to continue its humanitarian efforts, with\nelements of enforcement, which caused it to be seen as\n less danger to its personnel. In order to accommodate\na party to the conflict. The safe-areas mandate, for\n the additional troops that would be required under the\ninstance, required it to cooperate and negotiate with a\n reinforcements, the Council would need to increase the\nparty upon whom it was also expected to call air\n authorized UNPROFOR troop levels by 12,500.\nstrikes. Similarly, the United Nations had imposed\nsanctions upon one party, whilst at the same time At its 3543rd meeting, on 16 June 1995, the\nsending out a Force that was obliged to work with the Council included the above-mentioned report and letter\nconsent and cooperation of that party. The result was in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\nthat Bosnian Serb leaders had largely withdrawn their Council invited the representatives of Bosnia and\nconsent and cooperation from UNPROFOR, declaring Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Malaysia and Turkey, at\nthat they were applying their own “sanctions” to the their request, to participate in the discussion without\nUnited Nations in response to United Nations sanctions the right to vote. The President (Germany) then drew\non them. As a result of those contradictions, the attention of the Council members to the text of a\nUNPROFOR found itself in an intolerable draft resolution submitted by the Czech Republic,\npredicament. Urgent measures needed to be taken to France, Germany, Honduras, the Netherlands, Oman\nrelease the hostages, to adapt the UNPROFOR mandate and the United Kingdom. 549 He also read out a revision\nand its implementation to the political and operational that had been made to the draft in its provisional form,\nrealities on the ground and to relaunch the peace and referred to several other documents.550\nprocess.\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n The Secretary-General presented four options as stated that the measures offered to his country by the\nto the future role of UNPROFOR: withdraw United Nations, which had helped to sustain its people,\nUNPROFOR, leaving only a small political mission, if had almost totally “evaporated”. Sarajevo, Srebrenica,\nthe parties so wished; retain its existing tasks and Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac were being denied any\nmethods; change the existing mandate to permit the humanitarian assistance, and the “stranglehold” was\ngreater use of force; or revise the mandate to include __________________\nonly those tasks that a peacekeeping operation could 548 S/1995/470, annex.\n 549 S/1995/478.\nrealistically be expected to perform in the\n 550 Identical letters dated 12 June 1995 from the\ncircumstances prevailing in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n representative of Morocco addressed to the Secretary-\nThe Secretary-General was of the opinion that the\n General and the President of the Security Council\nfourth option would give UNPROFOR a realistic (S/1995/477); letter dated 12 June 1995 from the\nmandate. representative of Kazakhstan addressed to the Secretary-\n General (S/1995/480); and letter dated 14 June 1995\n By a letter dated 9 June 1995 addressed to the\n from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nPresident of the Security Council, 547 the Secretary- addressed to the President of the Security Council,\nGeneral conveyed a proposal by the Governments of transmitting the text of a letter of the same date from the\nFrance, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n__________________ addressed to the President of the Security Council\n 547 S/1995/470 and Add.1. (S/1995/483).\n\n\n\n896 07-63109\n"
[177] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\ntightening without response. Furthermore, Serbian defence, as provided for in the Charter, including by\nforces had become so emboldened as to take United lifting the arms embargo. 552\nNations personnel as human shields. In addition, the\n The representative of Egypt commented on some\nexclusion zone was being violated by the Serbs and\n aspects of the Secretary-General’s report. First, in\nignored by those who were obligated to enforce it. The\n order to ensure the credibility of the United Nations\nGovernment of Bosnia and Herzegovina looked\n and to force the Serb party to respect international\nforward to the deployment of the rapid-reaction force\n legality, the provisions of the Charter should be\nand expected that it would enable the United Nations\n applied, and the resolutions of the Council should be\nmission to be fully and faithfully implemented.551\n implemented. Secondly, the international community\n The representative of Malaysia stated that by must not accept the demilitarization of the safe areas.\ntaking United Nations peacekeepers hostage and While the purpose of the safe area was to provide\ndefying Security Council resolutions, the Bosnian international protection for the territories and their\nSerbs were giving the impression that the United population, their demilitarization would mean that they\nNations, and in particular the Security Council, was would be under the Serb forces’ domination if the\nineffective in addressing a threat to international peace international forces withdraw or were unable to ensure\nand security. His delegation did not agree with the their defence. Thirdly, the options available to the\nattempt to characterize UNPROFOR as merely a Council must be studied in the light of the detailed\npeacekeeping operation and to downplay the Force’s information contained in the report, because the four\nmandate relating to its enforcement responsibilities. operations could not be studied in isolation from other\nThe UNPROFOR mandate had been clearly spelled out options and possibilities. The third option would\nin the relevant Security Council resolutions, including presuppose a strengthening of the mandate, but it\nin the context of Chapter VII of the Charter and its would also mean modifying that mandate. That was not\nenforcement. He further stated that the existing possible because the current mandate of UNPROFOR\nmandate was suffering from a lack of implementation, was sufficient. Lastly, Egypt supported the conclusions\nand UNPROFOR should be provided with the means of the Secretary-General that the international\nnecessary for its full implementation. Of the four mediation efforts had come to a standstill, and that the\noptions proposed by the Secretary-General, the Council should therefore reassess the situation and\nMalaysian delegation favoured option C, being of the adopt another initiative to relaunch the peace\nview that assertive action could be taken without process.553\nchanging the existing mandate. It did not agree that\n The representative of Croatia stated that his\noption D was the way to move forward and argued that\n country welcomed the establishment of the rapid\nthat option would weaken the UNPROFOR mandate\n reaction force and was ready to provide logistical\nrather than strengthen it. Malaysia welcomed the\n support. It was Croatia’s understanding that, while the\nestablishment of the rapid reaction capacity to assist\n rapid reaction force would use some command and\nUNPROFOR in the robust implementation of its\n logistic facilities on the territory of Croatia, its theatre\nmandate. The rapid reaction capacity should also be\n of operation would be exclusively on the territory of\nused for the protection of the civilian population,\n Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Government of Croatia\nparticularly in the safe areas, with air support from\n was of the firm view that any operational use of the\nNATO, in addition to the protection of UNPROFOR\n rapid reaction force on Croatian territory could proceed\npersonnel. The rapid reaction capacity should also\n only with its prior consent.554\nestablish land corridors for humanitarian aid. It was\nalso necessary to withdraw the United Nations military The representative of Turkey stated that the\nobservers, who had become “pawns” in the Serb international community was committed, under\nstrategy to embarrass the United Nations. Malaysia General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, to\nalso stressed the need for security guarantees for the preserving the territorial integrity, unity and\nBosnian Government in terms of its right to self- independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He noted\n__________________ __________________\n 551 S/PV.3543, pp. 2-3. 552 Ibid., pp. 3-5.\n 553 Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n 554 Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 897\n"
[178] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nthat almost all of the Security Council resolutions on Federation favoured enhancing the security of United\nBosnia and Herzegovina referred to Chapter VII of the Nations personnel, including through providing\nCharter and he contended that UNPROFOR had been UNPROFOR with a rapid reaction capability.\nestablished as a protection force and had therefore Strengthening the Force’s ability to protect the lives\nnever been a traditional peacekeeping force. It was the and safety of its peacekeepers, however, should in no\nstrong conviction of his Government that UNPROFOR way make them a party to the conflict. Referring to the\nshould be reinforced so that it could implement its draft resolution, the speaker noted that it was of\nexisting mandate robustly and in full. Noting that the paramount importance that it called for the\nForce’s commitment to protect the safe areas pursuant maintenance of the impartial, peacekeeping nature of\nto resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) had yet to be UNPROFOR. He further noted that the sponsors of the\ncarried out, he argued that UNPROFOR needed to be draft resolution did take into account several proposals\nstrengthened in such a way as to enable it to act by the Russian Federation. The draft resolution,\nvigorously to deter attacks on the safe areas. His however, did not manage to avoid the impression that\ndelegation also supported the establishment of the the rapid reaction force was intended to operate against\nrapid reaction force.555 one of the Bosnian parties. While sharing the anger of\n others over the inadmissible acts that had been\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of\n committed by the Bosnian Serbs, his delegation could\nNigeria observed that, although all arguments seemed\n not fail to note that the Government of Bosnia and\nto militate in favour of a total withdrawal of the United\n Herzegovina bore responsibility for provocations, for\nNations from Bosnia and Herzegovina, there was\n violating agreements and for direct attacks on\nagreement that Bosnia should not be abandoned, that\n UNPROFOR. His delegation had also proposed a\nhumanitarian assistance must continue to be rendered\n reference to the inadmissible violations of the arms\nand that the civilian populations must be protected to\n embargo in the former Yugoslavia, but it had not been\nthe extent possible. There was also agreement that the\n incorporated. The Security Council must take genuine\nwar must be contained and that the credibility of the\n steps to put an end to such violations. The Russian\nUnited Nations must not be allowed to suffer\n Federation was also concerned at the haste with which\nirreparably through a precipitate withdrawal. The\n the draft resolution had been brought before the\nSecurity Council’s response to the report of the\n Council, meaning that the Council had not had time to\nSecretary-General — to increase the number of troops\n agree on reliable guarantees against attempts to use the\nin Bosnia to protect UNPROFOR better and enhance\n rapid reaction force to involve UNPROFOR in the\nits ability to discharge its duties — did not answer\n conflict. In the light of those circumstances, the\nsome of the pertinent questions raised by the Secretary-\n Russian Federation would be forced to abstain in the\nGeneral. Nigeria would go along with the draft\n voting.557\nresolution, however, due to its belief that countries in\nthe region had a primary responsibility to resolve the The representative of Indonesia stated that his\ncrisis, and in the light of its commitment not to delegation endorsed the paramount objective of the\nabandon Bosnia as it tried to defend its sovereignty and draft resolution, which was to provide UNPROFOR\nterritorial integrity. The Government of Nigeria also with the necessary means to implement its mandate.\nhoped that initiatives on the diplomatic political track The establishment of the rapid reaction force was an\nwould resume and would be pursued with vigour. 556 important step in pursuing that objective. Although the\n support and cooperation of the parties was a\n The representative of the Russian Federation\n prerequisite for any peacekeeping operation, in the\nstated that, while measures must be taken to prevent\n case of Bosnia and Herzegovina that requirement had\nattacks against United Nations personnel, the main\n been manipulated by the Bosnian Serbs, thereby\nlessons to be drawn from the Bosnian crisis were that\n eroding the authority of UNPROFOR. It was necessary\nthe use of force was not a panacea, and that decisive\n to address such tactics with decisiveness, in order to\naction was needed to achieve a breakthrough for a\n ensure the effective implementation of Security\npolitical settlement. In principle, the Russian\n__________________ Council resolutions. The deployment of a rapid\n 555 Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n reaction force should enhance the capability of\n __________________\n 556 Ibid., pp. 8-9.\n 557 Ibid., pp. 9-11.\n\n\n\n\n898 07-63109\n"
[179] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nUNPROFOR to ensure the security of the civilian into action, UNPROFOR was bound to become a party\npopulation in the safe areas, which was one of its most to the conflict, thus depriving it of its status as a\nimportant tasks. While his delegation was cognizant of peacekeeping force. The establishment of the rapid\nthe calls for the demilitarization of safe areas as a reaction force would also increase substantially the\nmeans to enhance the protection of the civilian peacekeeping expenditure of the United Nations. Given\npopulation therein, it believed, however, that that the United Nations was experiencing a financial\ndemilitarization which was confined to the safe areas crisis, it was all the more necessary for the Security\nwas inherently unjust. It was tantamount to depriving Council to act within the means available to it, without\nthe victims of the necessary means to protect wilfully increasing the burden of the States Members\nthemselves while leaving the aggressors free to of the United Nations. It was neither appropriate nor\ncontinue and intensify their attacks from the desirable to finance the establishment of the rapid\nsurrounding areas. It was in that context that the reaction force from the United Nations peacekeeping\nNon-Aligned Movement caucus had proposed that budget. The Chinese delegation could not support the\ndemilitarization based on mutual agreements should draft resolution, since many of its elements ran counter\napply not only to safe areas, but also to their immediate to its principled position. Taking into account,\nsurroundings. The speaker further emphasized that the however, the fact that many developing countries\ndemilitarization of the safe areas and their surrounding wished the Security Council to take appropriate\nareas should be carried out with due regard for the measures to alleviate the situation in Bosnia and\nneed to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and Herzegovina, as well as the fact that the draft\npolitical independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in resolution stressed the importance of a political\naccordance with the Charter of the United Nations, settlement and of protecting the security of United\nincluding its right to defend itself. 558 Nations personnel, and as the draft had incorporated\n some of its proposed amendments, China would\n The representative of Honduras stated that the\n abstain from the subsequent vote.560\npurpose of UNPROFOR was to keep the peace, not to\nimpose it. A revision of the Force’s mandate in order to The representative of the Czech Republic stated\nallow it to take military action without the cooperation that the draft resolution preserved the peacekeeping\nof one of the parties or to ensure the protection of its nature of UNPROFOR. It was easy to argue that there\nown personnel was not a viable possibility. His was no peace to keep in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The\ndelegation supported the proposal for the integration of important aspect, however, was that, peace or not,\na rapid reaction force under United Nations command UNPROFOR was not turning into a peacemaking or a\nand available to UNPROFOR, not only because its peace-enforcement operation. The Czech delegation\nobjective was to strengthen the Force’s capacity to was satisfied that Chapter VII of the Charter was\nfulfil its mandate, but also because it would enable invoked only in the context of the Force’s self-defence\nUNPROFOR to continue as a peacekeeping operation. and freedom of movement. The Security Council\nReferring to the question of the safe areas, the speaker would therefore be emphasizing once more, through\nargued that the military presence of the parties in the the draft resolution, that peaceful negotiations, not war,\n“safe areas” was totally inconsistent with the were the way to settle the conflict.561\nfundamental principles that should govern those areas.\n The representative of the United States stated that\nHis delegation therefore agreed with the provisions of\n her Government supported the deployment of a rapid\nthe draft resolution relating to the need to demilitarize\n reaction force for the purpose of defending\nthe safe areas by mutual agreement. 559\n UNPROFOR personnel and enabling the peacekeeping\n The representative of China stated that the mission to fulfil its mandate in a more robust and\nestablishment of the rapid reaction force under Chapter successful fashion. However, because of the enormous\nVII of the Charter was for the purpose of enforcement cost of UNPROFOR and the existing budgetary\nactions and therefore brought about a de facto change situation in Washington, the United States could not\nin the status of UNPROFOR. Once the force was put agree to funding the rapid deployment force through\n__________________ __________________\n 558 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 560 Ibid., pp. 13-14.\n 559 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 561 Ibid., pp. 15-16.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 899\n"
[180] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nthe normal United Nations peacekeeping assessment Stressing the importance at this juncture of renewed\nprocess. Nevertheless, it stood ready to consider all efforts to achieve an overall peaceful settlement,\nreasonable alternatives.562 Underlining once again the urgent need for acceptance by\n the Bosnian Serb party of the Contact Group peace plan as a\n The draft resolution, as orally revised in its starting point, opening the way to the negotiation of such an\nprovisional form, was then put to the vote and adopted overall peaceful settlement,\nby 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (China, Russian\nFederation), as resolution 998 (1995), which reads: Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and\n political independence of the Republic of Bosnia and\n The Security Council, Herzegovina,\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, Reaffirming further that the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina, as a State Member of the United Nations, enjoys\n Reaffirming the mandate of the United Nations Protection\n the rights provided for in the Charter of the United Nations,\nForce as referred to in resolution 982 (1995) of 31 March 1995\nand the need for its full implementation, Determining that the situation in the former Yugoslavia\n continues to be a threat to international peace and security,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of\n30 May 1995, Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security of the\n United Nations Peace Forces/United Nations Protection Force\n Having considered also the letter dated 9 June 1995 from\n and freedom of movement for the accomplishment of all its\nthe Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council\n missions, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the\nand the annex thereto,\n Charter of the United Nations,\n Noting that the rapid reaction force referred to in the\n 1. Demands that the Bosnian Serb forces release\nabove-mentioned letter will be an integral part of the existing\n immediately and unconditionally all remaining detained United\nUnited Nations peacekeeping operation and that the status of the\n Nations Protection Force personnel, and further demands that all\nUnited Nations Protection Force and its impartiality will be\n parties fully respect the safety of Force personnel and others\nmaintained,\n engaged in the delivery of humanitarian assistance and ensure\n Deeply concerned by the continuing armed hostilities in their complete freedom of movement;\nthe territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n 2. Emphasizes that there can be no military solution to\n Expressing its deep regret that the situation in the the conflict, stresses the importance it attaches to vigorous\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has continued to pursuit of a political settlement, and reiterates its demand that\ndeteriorate and that the parties were not able to agree to a further the Bosnian Serb party accept the Contact Group peace plan as a\nceasefire following the breakdown of the ceasefire agreement of starting point;\n23 December 1994 and its subsequent expiration on 1 May\n 3. Calls upon the parties to agree without further\n1995,\n delay to a ceasefire and a complete cessation of hostilities in the\n Gravely concerned that the regular obstruction of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;\ndeliveries of humanitarian assistance, and the denial of the use\n 4. Demands that all parties allow unimpeded access\nof Sarajevo airport by the Bosnian Serb side threaten the ability\n for humanitarian assistance to all parts of the Republic of Bosnia\nof the United Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina to carry out its\n and Herzegovina and, in particular, to the safe areas;\nmandate,\n 5. Demands also that the Bosnian Serb forces comply\n Condemning in the strongest possible terms all attacks by\n immediately with the agreement of 5 June 1992 and ensure\nthe parties on United Nations Protection Force personnel,\n unimpeded access by land to Sarajevo;\n Condemning also the increasing attacks on the civilian\n 6. Demands further that the parties respect fully the\npopulation by Bosnian Serb forces,\n status of the safe areas and, in particular, the need to ensure the\n Determined to enhance the protection of the United safety of the civilian population therein;\nNations Protection Force and to enable it to carry out its\n 7. Underlines the need for a mutually agreed\nmandate,\n demilitarization of the safe areas and their immediate\n Noting the letter dated 14 June 1995 from the Minister for surroundings and the benefits this would bring to all parties in\nForeign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina terms of the cessation of attacks on the safe areas and of\naddressed to the President of the Security Council, welcoming launching military attacks therefrom;\nthe reinforcement of the United Nations Protection Force,\n 8. Encourages, in this context, the Secretary-General\n__________________ further to intensify efforts aimed at reaching agreement with the\n 562 Ibid., pp. 16-17. parties on the modalities for demilitarization, taking particular\n\n\n\n900 07-63109\n"
[181] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\naccount of the need to ensure the safety of the civilian however, that the Security Council had no locus to take\npopulation, and calls upon the parties to cooperate fully with decisions on financial questions, as the Charter\nthese efforts; reserved to the General Assembly the responsibility for\n 9. Welcomes the letter dated 9 June 1995 from the budgetary and financial matters. Therefore, the\nSecretary-General on the reinforcement of the United Nations amendment of paragraph 10 could not change the\nProtection Force and the establishment of a rapid reaction financial procedures followed by the Organization.563\ncapacity to enable the United Nations Peace Forces/United\nNations Protection Force to carry out its mandate; The representative of France stated that providing\n 10. Decides accordingly to authorize an increase in\n UNPROFOR with new means had a twofold objective,\nUnited Nations Peace Forces/United Nations Protection Force to assure the security of its personnel and to enable\npersonnel, acting under the present mandate and on the terms set UNPROFOR to fulfil its mission. He emphasized that\nout in the above-mentioned letter, by up to 12,500 additional the Force’s nature would not change. The elements of\ntroops, the modalities of financing to be determined later; the rapid reaction force would act in support of\n 11. Authorizes the Secretary-General to carry forward UNPROFOR within the framework of its mandate. The\nthe implementation of paragraphs 9 and 10 above, maintaining missions of that force would consist essentially of\nclose contact with the Government of the Republic of Bosnia emergency actions to help isolated or threatened units\nand Herzegovina and others concerned; to help in the redeployment of UNPROFOR elements\n 12. Requests the Secretary-General, in taking any in order to make them less vulnerable or facilitate their\ndecisions with respect to the deployment of United Nations freedom of movement. He noted that the resolution\nProtection Force personnel, to take full account of the need to contained a provision relating to the subsequent\nenhance their security and minimize the dangers to which they determination of the financial modalities and stated\nmight be exposed; that his country understood that provision to mean that\n 13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. it was not up to the Council itself to establish the\n modalities for financing an operation upon which it\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the had decided. In view of the serious difficulties faced by\nUnited Kingdom welcomed the resolution just adopted. UNPROFOR on the ground, the Governments of\nThe increase in reinforcements would provide United France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands,\nNations commanders, for the first time, with a credible rather than electing to withdraw from Bosnia, had\nrapid reaction capability. He argued that it was clear proposed that additional means be made available to\nthat the UNPROFOR mission remained one of the United Nations. The Government of France\npeacekeeping. Its purpose was to facilitate the delivery expected these new means to be used judiciously, but\nof humanitarian aid, to assist the parties in developing not weakly.564\nand implementing ceasefire agreements and to provide\na “breathing space” for the political process. His The representative of Argentina stated that his\nGovernment was determined to do everything possible delegation agreed with the Secretary-General that the\nto ensure that UNPROFOR was able to remain in peace process should be relaunched and intensified\nBosnia. But, ultimately, whether it did so was up to the through new political initiatives. It therefore attached\nparties themselves, UNPROFOR could only be particular importance to paragraph 2 of the resolution\nsuccessful if it had the continued consent and just adopted. Referring to the rapid reaction force, the\ncooperation of all sides. The speaker, however, warned speaker argued that the use of force should be\nthat if the parties instead insist on embracing the restricted to self-defence and should be engaged in\nmilitary option, if UNPROFOR was prevented from with great care, lest the line between peacekeeping and\ncarrying out its tasks or it faced unacceptable risks, peace enforcement be crossed. 565\nthen there might be no choice but to withdraw\nUNPROFOR. Turning to the draft resolution, he __________________\n 563 Ibid., pp. 17-19.\nspeaker noted that his delegation had accepted the\n 564 Ibid., pp. 19-20.\naddition of the words at the end of paragraph 10\n 565 Ibid., pp. 21-22.\nbecause it understood the domestic political difficulties\nfacing the United States at that time. He argued,\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 901\n"
[182] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n Decision of 19 August 1995 (3568th meeting): At its 3568th meeting, on 19 August, the Council\n statement by the President included the above-mentioned letter in its agenda.\n Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\n By a letter dated 17 August 1995 addressed to the\n invited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nPresident of the Security Council, 566 the Secretary-\n and Croatia, at their request, to participate in the\nGeneral reported that his Special Representative for the\n discussion without the right to vote. The President\nformer Yugoslavia and the UNPF/UNPROFOR Force\n (Indonesia) drew the attention of the members of the\nCommander had undertaken consultations with the\n Council to a letter dated 18 August 1995 from the\nGovernments of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia,\n representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to\nwith a view to facilitating the deployment of the\n the President of the Security Council567 and stated that,\nadditional troops authorized by the Council under\n after consultations among members of the Security\nresolution 998 (1995) and the freedom of movement of\n Council, he had been authorized to make the following\nthe units of the rapid reaction force. Both Governments\n statement on behalf of the Council: 568\nhad taken the position that the additional troops were\nnot part of the UNPF/UNPROFOR and were therefore The Security Council is deeply concerned by the contents\nnot covered by the relevant status-of-forces agreement. of the letter dated 17 August 1995 from the Secretary-General\nThe Governments further maintained that resolution regarding the continued impediments to the functioning and\n deployment of the rapid reaction force established by resolution\n998 (1995) had been adopted after the conclusion of 998 (1995) of 16 June 1995. The Council reaffirms in this regard\nthe status-of-forces agreement. The Special that the rapid reaction force is an integral part of the United\nRepresentative had outlined the position of the United Nations Peace Forces/United Nations Protection Force and that\nNations, which was that the Council’s decision to its deployment is crucial for the strengthening of the capacity of\nauthorize the addition of the rapid reaction force did the United Nations Protection Force to carry out its mandate in\nnot exclude the expanded UNPF/UNPROFOR from the the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It shares the Secretary-\nscope of the status-of-forces agreement. Once the General’s view that the existing status-of-forces agreements\n constitute an appropriate and sufficient basis for the presence of\nCouncil had authorized a peacekeeping operation, it the United Nations Peace Forces/United Nations Protection\ncould at any time reduce or expand the strength of the Force, including the rapid reaction force. The Council is deeply\noperation, without having to conclude additional concerned at the implications of the continued impediments to\nagreements. The Secretary-General warned that the the functioning of the rapid reaction force for the effectiveness\nposition of the two Governments had delayed the of the United Nations mission in the Republic of Bosnia and\ndeployment of the rapid reaction force, which could Herzegovina. It calls upon the Governments of the Republic of\nhave serious consequences for the United Nations Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n immediately to remove all impediments and to give clear\nforces already deployed. Furthermore, the local Croat undertakings concerning the freedom of movement and\nauthorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been provision of facilities for the rapid reaction force, in order that it\ndemanding that the United Nations sign an agreement may perform its tasks without further delay. It further calls upon\nwith them governing the status of the rapid reaction them to resolve forthwith within the framework of the existing\nforce. The United Nations was of the view that the status-of-forces agreements any outstanding difficulties with the\nstatus-of-forces agreement was applicable throughout relevant United Nations authorities. The Council supports fully\nthe entire territory, and it was not necessary to enter the efforts of the Secretary-General in this matter and will return\n to this question in the light of a further report which the Council\ninto such an agreement with the Federation of Bosnia requests the Secretary-General to submit no later than 24 August\nand Herzegovina. The Special Representative had 1995.\nsuggested to the Bosnian authorities that\nsupplementary arrangements, as envisaged in Decision of 2 December 1993: letter from the\narticle VIII of the existing status-of-forces agreement, President to the Secretary-General\nbe concluded to cover the issues in question. The\nUnited Nations would require that the supplementary By a letter dated 1 December 1993 addressed to\narrangements contain a clause providing that, in the the President of the Security Council,569 the Secretary-\nevent of conflict between the supplementary General referred to the senior-level staffing of the\n __________________\narrangements and the status-of-forces agreement, the\n 567 S/1995/710.\nlatter should prevail.\n 568 S/PRST/1995/40.\n__________________ 569 S/26838.\n 566 S/1995/707.\n\n\n\n\n902 07-63109\n"
[183] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nUnited Nations peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts They take note of the information contained in your letter and\nrelated to the former Yugoslavia. He recalled that in agree with the proposal mentioned therein.\nMay 1993 Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg had been\nappointed as both Special Representative of the E. Establishment of an international\nSecretary-General and Co-Chairman of the Steering\n tribunal for the prosecution of persons\nCommittee of the International Conference on the\nFormer Yugoslavia. At that time it had been hoped that responsible for serious violations of\nthe Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina international humanitarian law\nwould shortly be agreed and that thereafter the main committed in the territory of the\nfocus of United Nations activities in the former former Yugoslavia\nYugoslavia would be implementation of that plan on\nthe ground, together with continuing efforts to Initial proceedings\nimplement the Vance plan related to the United Nations\nProtected Areas in Croatia. However, as the members Decision of 22 February 1993 (3175th meeting):\nof the Council were aware, the Vance-Owen plan had resolution 808 (1993)\nnot been accepted and Mr. Stoltenberg remained\nheavily engaged in continuing negotiations. That had At its 3175th meeting, on 22 February 1993, the\nleft him insufficient time to carry out in full the Security Council included the item entitled\nfunctions of Special Representative of the Secretary- “Establishment of an international tribunal for the\nGeneral and Chief of Mission of UNPROFOR. prosecution of persons responsible for serious\nAccordingly, and after consulting Mr. Stoltenberg and violations of international humanitarian law committed\ncontacting the heads of Government and other parties in the territory of the former Yugoslavia” in its agenda.\ndirectly concerned in the former Yugoslavia, the The Council also included the following documents in\nSecretary-General had come to the conclusion that the its agenda: a letter dated 10 February 1993 from the\nresumption of negotiations in Geneva, following the representative of France addressed to the Secretary-\nmeeting there between the Foreign Ministers of the General, transmitting the report of a Committee of\nEuropean Union, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering French jurists set up to study the establishment of an\nCommittee of the Conference and the parties on international criminal tribunal to judge the crimes\n29 November 1993, made it necessary to separate the committed in the former Yugoslavia;571 a letter dated\nfunctions of Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee 16 February 1993 from the representative of Italy\nand Special Representative. Therefore, it was the addressed to the Secretary-General, forwarding a draft\nSecretary-General’s intention that Mr. Stoltenberg statute for a tribunal for war crimes and crimes against\nshould continue to serve as Co-Chairman and that humanity committed in the territory of the former\nMr. Yasushi Akashi, until recently the Secretary- Yugoslavia; 572 and a letter dated 18 February 1993\nGeneral’s Special Representative for Cambodia, should from the representative of Sweden addressed to the\nbe appointed to the post of Special Representative for Secretary-General, transmitting the decision by the\nthe former Yugoslavia and Chief of Mission of States of the Conference on Security and Cooperation\nUNPROFOR. The Secretary-General further stated that in Europe (CSCE) on a proposal for an international\nhe had so informed the heads of Government and other war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia made by\nparties directly concerned in the former Yugoslavia. the Rapporteurs under the CSCE Moscow Human\n Dimension Mechanism to Bosnia and Herzegovina and\n By a letter dated 2 December 1993,570 the Croatia.573\nPresident of the Security Council informed the\nSecretary-General of the following: Following the adoption of the agenda, the\n Council invited the representatives of Bosnia and\n I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate\n1 December 1993 concerning the staffing of the United Nations in the discussion without the right to vote. The\npeace keeping and peacemaking efforts in the former Yugoslavia __________________\nhas been brought to the attention of the members of the Council.\n 571 S/25266.\n__________________\n 572 S/25300.\n 570 S/26839.\n 573 S/25307.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 903\n"
[184] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nPresident (Morocco) then drew the attention of the Nations, in accordance with Article 24 (1) of the\nCouncil members to several documents,574 and to the Charter. Its powers could not be created, recreated or\ntext of a draft resolution that had been prepared in the reinterpreted by decisions of the Council itself, but\ncourse of the Council’s prior consultations.575 must be based on specific Charter provisions. Because\n the Council exercised a delegated responsibility, the\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of\n task of interpreting its competence called for extreme\nBrazil stated that the information gathered by the\n caution, in particular when invoking Chapter VII of the\nCommission of Experts and by the Special Rapporteur\n Charter. The Security Council should play a strong and\nof the Commission on Human Rights had provided\n positive role in promoting the implementation of the\nsubstantial evidence of grave breaches of humanitarian\n various elements that would contribute to the peace\nlaw being committed on a massive scale and in a\n efforts developed by the International Conference on\nsystematic fashion. The international community could\n the Former Yugoslavia, but that role should remain\nnot allow that to continue unpunished. These grave\n within the scope of the powers expressly granted to the\nbreaches of the most elementary norms of humanity\n Security Council in accordance with the Charter. In a\nmust be treated as what they were: criminal acts,\n rapidly changing world, Brazil considered it\ncrimes against women and children and other\n increasingly important to promote the rule of law in\ndefenceless victims, but also crimes against humanity.\n international relations by acting to ensure strict respect\nBrazil favoured strong action to ensure the full\n for the provisions of the Charter and other norms of\nascertainment of the truth about each of the cases of\n international law.576\nwar crimes and crimes against humanity committed in\nthe territory of the former Yugoslavia and, in that The representative of China stated that his\nregard, supported the establishment of an international delegation supported the thrust of the draft resolution\ncriminal tribunal to bring to justice the individuals and would therefore vote in favour. That vote would\nfound to be responsible for such “abominable acts”. not, however, prejudge China’s position on future\n Security Council actions on the subject.577\n The speaker further observed that it was of\nparticular importance that the international tribunal The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nshould rest on a solid legal foundation, in order to adopted as resolution 808 (1993), which reads:\nensure the effectiveness of its actions. Addressing the The Security Council,\nquestion of the best method for establishing an ad hoc\ninternational criminal tribunal, he noted that the Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September\nauthority of the Security Council was not self- 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,\nconstituted but originated from a delegation of powers Recalling paragraph 10 of its resolution 764 (1992) of\nby the whole membership of the Organization. The 13 July 1992, in which it reaffirmed that all parties are bound to\nSecurity Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities, comply with the obligations under international humanitarian\nacted on behalf of the States Members of the United law, in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,\n__________________ and that persons who commit or order the commission of grave\n breaches of the Conventions are individually responsible in\n 574 Report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the\n respect of such breaches,\n International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia\n (S/25221); letter dated 9 February 1993 from the Recalling also its resolution 771 (1992) of 13 August\n Secretary-General addressed to the President of the 1992, in which, inter alia, it demanded that all parties and others\n Security Council, transmitting the interim report of the concerned in the former Yugoslavia, and all military forces in\n Commission of Experts established pursuant to Bosnia and Herzegovina, immediately cease and desist from all\n resolution 780 (1992) to provide the Secretary-General breaches of international humanitarian law,\n with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of\n Recalling further its resolution 780 (1992) of 6 October\n the Geneva Conventions and other violations of\n 1992, in which it requested the Secretary-General to establish,\n international humanitarian law committed in the territory\n as a matter of urgency, an impartial commission of experts to\n of the former Yugoslavia (S/25274); and letter dated\n examine and analyse the information submitted pursuant to\n 2 February 1993 from the representative of Denmark\n resolutions 771 (1992) and 780 (1992), together with such\n addressed to the Secretary-General, forwarding the final\n further information as the commission may obtain, with a view\n report of the investigative mission into the treatment of __________________\n Muslim women in the former Yugoslavia (S/25240).\n 576 S/PV.3175, pp. 4-7.\n 575 S/25314.\n 577 Ibid., p. 7.\n\n\n\n\n904 07-63109\n"
[185] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nto providing the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the Speaking after the vote, the representative of\nevidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other France stated that the atrocities committed by all sides\nviolations of international humanitarian law committed in the in the Yugoslav crisis had given rise to an intolerable\nterritory of the former Yugoslavia,\n situation which was fanning the flames of conflict and,\n Having considered the interim report of the Commission therefore, constituted a threat to international peace\nof Experts established pursuant to resolution 780 (1992), in and security. Prosecuting the guilty was necessary in\nwhich the Commission observed that a decision to establish an order to do justice to the victims and to the\nad hoc international tribunal in relation to events in the territory\nof the former Yugoslavia would be consistent with the direction\n international community. It would also send a clear\nof its work, message to those continuing to commit such crimes\n that they would be held responsible for their acts. For\n Expressing once again its grave alarm at continuing the United Nations and, particularly, for the Security\nreports of widespread violations of international humanitarian\nlaw occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia,\n Council, prosecuting the guilty was also a matter of\nincluding reports of mass killings and the continuance of the doing their duty to maintain and restore peace. With\npractice of “ethnic cleansing”, those considerations in mind, the French Foreign\n Minister had asked a group of jurists to draw up a\n Determining that this situation constitutes a threat to\ninternational peace and security,\n report on setting up an international criminal tribunal\n that could prosecute persons responsible for the serious\n Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take violations of international humanitarian law that had\neffective measures to bring to justice the persons who are been committed in the territory of the former\nresponsible for them,\n Yugoslavia since the beginning of Yugoslavia’s\n Convinced that in the particular circumstances of the dissolution. The report had concluded that the creation\nformer Yugoslavia the establishment of an international tribunal of an international tribunal for the former Yugoslavia\nwould enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to could be decided on by the Security Council, within\nthe restoration and maintenance of peace,\n the framework of its powers under Chapter VII of the\n Noting in this regard the recommendation by the Charter to maintain or restore international peace and\nCo-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International security. France had endorsed that conclusion and had\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia for the establishment of taken the initiative of proposing to the Security\nsuch a tribunal,\n Council a draft resolution for its implementation. The\n Taking note with grave concern of the report of the speaker further observed that the Security Council had\nEuropean Community investigative mission into the treatment of taken a decision of major significance. For the first\nMuslim women in the former Yugoslavia, time in history, the United Nations would be setting up\n Taking note of the report of the committee of jurists an international criminal jurisdiction — one that would\nsubmitted by France, the report of the commission of jurists be competent to try those who had committed serious\nsubmitted by Italy, and the report transmitted by the Permanent violations of international humanitarian law in the\nRepresentative of Sweden on behalf of the Chairman in Office territory of the former Yugoslavia. The tribunal should\nof the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,\n be established as soon as possible, through a further\n 1. Decides that an international tribunal shall be decision of the Security Council under the provisions\nestablished for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious of Chapter VII, which established the Council’s\nviolations of international humanitarian law committed in the competence in the maintenance and restoration of\nterritory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991;\n international peace and security.578\n 2. Requests the Secretary-General to submit for\nconsideration by the Council at the earliest possible date, and if The representative of the United States stated that\npossible no later than sixty days after the adoption of the present her delegation strongly supported the historic\nresolution, a report on all aspects of this matter, including resolution just adopted, which took the first step in\nspecific proposals and where appropriate options for the establishing an ad hoc tribunal to prosecute persons\neffective and expeditious implementation of the decision accused of war crimes and other serious violations of\ncontained in paragraph 1 above, taking into account suggestions international humanitarian law in the territory of the\nput forward in this regard by Member States;\n former Yugoslavia. Her delegation looked forward to\n 3. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. working with the Secretary-General to accomplish\n __________________\n 578 Ibid., pp. 8-11.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 905\n"
[186] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nexpeditiously his task of providing the Council with reports from various sources confirmed that the gravity\noptions for a statute and rules of procedure of the and massive nature of those violations constituted a\ntribunal. Once the Secretary-General’s report had been threat to international peace and security.\nreceived, the United States would act quickly, along Consequently, there should be no doubt about the\nwith the other members of the Council, to establish a competence of the Security Council to deal with the\ntribunal under Chapter VII.579 matter.582\n The representative of the United Kingdom said The representative of Spain stated that his\nthat it was vital that an international legal mechanism delegation understood that some might harbour certain\nbe established to bring those accused of war crimes, doubts about the competence of the Council to take the\nfrom whatever party to the conflict, to justice. His step of establishing a tribunal, as it was a novel one.\ndelegation welcomed the valuable work that had been Spain did not share those doubts, however, for it was a\ndone on possible mechanisms and which would limited and precise action with the clear objective of\ncontribute to the study by the Secretary-General of the restoring peace, which was perfectly in keeping with\nmost effective and feasible way of establishing a the competence of the Council. In fact, the Council was\ntribunal or a court. The Secretary-General’s task would not attempting to establish a new jurisdictional or\nnot be easy. The Commission of Experts in its interim legislative framework of a permanent nature. It was not\nreport had noted the difficulties of identifying the setting itself up as a permanent judge or legislator. It\nperpetrators of those crimes. It was vital that whatever was only attempting to create an ad hoc mechanism\ncourt or tribunal was established would be provided that, by applying existing laws, would assign\nwith the necessary evidence. The Commission must responsibility for acts committed in an ongoing conflict\ntherefore be given adequate resources to continue its that had already been seen to threaten and undermine\nwork. He noted that the “court” was an ad hoc legal peace. That mechanism would contribute, by means of\nframework to deal with war crimes committed only in recourse to justice and punishment of the guilty, to\nthe territory of the former Yugoslavia.580 restoring the peace and ensuring its maintenance, so as\n to deter the repetition of similar acts in the future. The\n The representative of the Russian Federation\n speaker noted that Spain would have preferred the\nstated that the resolution just adopted reflected the\n establishment of a criminal tribunal with universal\ninternational community’s will to exert its influence on\n jurisdiction, but it recognized that to create one would\nall parties to the conflict in order to accelerate the\n have required more time than was available.\npeace process. The legal basis, status, composition and\n Nevertheless, the Spanish delegation was confident\npowers of the international tribunal, and the modalities\n that the resolution just adopted was the first step\nfor its establishment and functioning, would be decided\n towards the future creation of an international,\nby the Council subsequently, but already the resolution\n universal, permanent criminal jurisdiction, and it\nshould serve the purpose of “bringing to their senses”\n would continue to support and promote the efforts\nthose who were ready to sacrifice the lives and dignity\n towards that end being made in other forums within the\nof hundreds of thousands of innocent people. The\n Organization. 583\nRussian delegation believed that resolution 808 (1993)\nwould also serve as a warning to those guilty of mass\n Decision of 25 May 1993 (3217th meeting):\ncrimes and flagrant violations of human rights in other\n resolution 827 (1993)\nparts of the world. 581\n On 3 May 1993, pursuant to resolution 808\n The representative of Hungary considered the\n (1993), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council\nSecurity Council’s decision of the previous October to\n a report on the establishment of an international\nset up a Commission of Experts charged with studying\n tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for serious\nand analyzing information on the grave violations of\n violations of international humanitarian law committed\ninternational humanitarian law in the former\n in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, to\nYugoslavia, to be of great importance. Information and\n__________________ which was annexed a draft statute.584 The Secretary-\n __________________\n 579 Ibid., pp. 11-14.\n 582 Ibid., pp. 18-21.\n 580 Ibid., pp. 14-15.\n 583 Ibid., pp. 21-26.\n 581 Ibid., p. 16.\n 584 S/25704 and Add.1 and Corr.1.\n\n\n\n\n906 07-63109\n"
[187] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nGeneral believed that the international tribunal should in the discussion without the right to vote. The\nbe established by a decision of the Security Council on President (Russian Federation) drew the attention of\nthe basis of Chapter VII of the Charter. Such a decision the Council members to the text of a draft resolution\nwould constitute a measure to maintain or restore submitted by France, New Zealand, the Russian\ninternational peace and security, following the requisite Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United\ndetermination of the existence of a threat to the peace, States, 585 and to several other documents.586\nbreach of the peace or act of aggression. It would also\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nhave the advantage of being expeditious and of being\n adopted unanimously as resolution 827 (1993), which\nimmediately effective, as all States would be under a\n reads:\nbinding obligation to take whatever action was\nrequired to carry out a decision taken as an The Security Council,\nenforcement measure under Chapter VII. The Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September\nSecretary-General also believed that the establishment 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,\nof the tribunal by means of a Chapter VII decision\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of\nwould be legally justified, both in terms of the object 3 and 17 May 1993 pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 808\nand purpose of the decision and of past Security (1993),\nCouncil practice. He recalled, in that regard, that the\nCouncil had on various occasions adopted decisions Expressing once again its grave alarm at continuing\n reports of widespread and flagrant violations of international\nunder Chapter VII, aimed at restoring of maintaining humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former\ninternational peace and security, which had involved Yugoslavia, and especially in the Republic of Bosnia and\nthe establishment of subsidiary organs for a variety of Herzegovina, including reports of mass killings, massive,\npurposes. organized and systematic detention and rape of women and the\n continuance of the practice of “ethnic cleansing”, including for\n The Secretary-General pointed out that the the acquisition and the holding of territory,\nSecurity Council would be establishing a subsidiary\norgan within the terms of Article 29 of the Charter, but Determining that this situation continues to constitute a\n threat to international peace and security,\none of a judicial nature. The organ would have to\nperform its functions independently of political __________________\nconsiderations; it would not be subject to the authority 585 S/25826.\n 586 Note verbale dated 12 March 1993 from the\nor control of the Security Council with regard to the\nperformance of its judicial functions. As an representative of Mexico addressed to the Secretary-\n General (S/25417); letters dated 31 March and 13 April\nenforcement measure under Chapter VII, however, the\n 1993 from the representative of Canada addressed to the\nlifespan of the tribunal would be linked to the Secretary-General (S/25504 and S/25594); letter dated\nrestoration and maintenance of international peace and 5 April 1993 from the representative of the Russian\nsecurity in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In Federation addressed to the Secretary-General\nassigning to the tribunal the task of prosecuting (S/25537); letter dated 6 April 1993 from the\npersons responsible for serious violations of representative of Brazil addressed to the Secretary-\ninternational humanitarian law, the Security Council General (S/25540); letter dated 5 April 1993 from the\n representative of the United States addressed to the\nwould not, however, be creating nor purporting to\n Secretary-General (S/25575); letter dated 20 April 1993\n“legislate” that law. Rather, the international tribunal from the representative of Slovenia addressed to the\nwould have the task of applying existing international Secretary-General (S/25652); note verbale dated\nhumanitarian law. The Secretary-General therefore 30 April 1993 from the representative of the Netherlands\nproposed that the Security Council, acting under addressed to the Secretary-General (S/25716); letter\nChapter VII of the Charter, establish the international dated 11 May 1993 from the representative of Canada\ntribunal. addressed to the Secretary-General (S/25765); letter\n dated 19 May 1993 from the representative of\n At its 3217th meeting, on 25 May 1993, the Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General\nCouncil included the report of the Secretary-General in (S/25801); and letter dated 24 May 1993 from the\nits agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the representatives of France, the Russian Federation, Spain,\n the United Kingdom and the United States addressed to\nCouncil invited the representatives of Bosnia and\n the President of the Security Council (S/25829).\nHerzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate\n\n\n\n07-63109 907\n"
[188] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a trial\neffective measures to bring to justice the persons who are chamber under article 29 of the statute;\nresponsible for them,\n 5. Urges States and intergovernmental and\n Convinced that in the particular circumstances of the non-governmental organizations to contribute funds, equipment\nformer Yugoslavia the establishment as an ad hoc measure by and services to the International Tribunal, including the offer of\nthe Council of an international tribunal and the prosecution of expert personnel;\npersons responsible for serious violations of international\n 6. Decides that the determination of the seat of the\nhumanitarian law would enable this aim to be achieved and\n International Tribunal is subject to the conclusion of appropriate\nwould contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace,\n arrangements between the United Nations and the Netherlands\n Believing that the establishment of an international acceptable to the Council, and that the Tribunal may sit\ntribunal and the prosecution of persons responsible for the elsewhere when it considers it necessary for the efficient\nabove-mentioned violations of international humanitarian law exercise of its functions;\nwill contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and\n 7. Decides also that the work of the International\neffectively redressed,\n Tribunal shall be carried out without prejudice to the right of the\n Noting in this regard the recommendation by the victims to seek, through appropriate means, compensation for\nCo-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International damages incurred as a result of violations of international\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia for the establishment of humanitarian law;\nsuch a tribunal,\n 8. Requests the Secretary-General to implement\n Reaffirming in this regard its decision in resolution 808 urgently the present resolution and in particular to make\n(1993) of 22 February 1993 that an international tribunal shall practical arrangements for the effective functioning of the\nbe established for the prosecution of persons responsible for International Tribunal at the earliest time and to report\nserious violations of international humanitarian law committed periodically to the Council;\nin the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991,\n 9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n Considering that, pending the appointment of the\nprosecutor of the international tribunal, the Commission of Speaking after the vote, the representative of\nExperts established pursuant to resolution 780 (1992) should Venezuela recalled that his delegation had voted in\ncontinue on an urgent basis the collection of information relating favour of resolution 808 (1993), because it had been\nto evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and convinced of the duty incumbent upon the international\nother violations of international humanitarian law as proposed in community to reaffirm that the commission of crimes\nits interim report, such as those committed in the former Yugoslavia\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United could not pass without political condemnation and\nNations, penal sanctions. The Venezuelan delegation recognized\n 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General; that the Tribunal was intended to deal with a specific\n and limited crisis that the Council had been addressing\n 2. Decides hereby to establish an international under Chapter VII of the Charter. It also recognized\ntribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible\nfor serious violations of international humanitarian law\n that the Tribunal, as a subsidiary organ of the Council,\ncommitted in the territory of the former Yugoslavia between would not be empowered with — nor would the\n1 January 1991 and a date to be determined by the Security Council be assuming — the ability to set down norms\nCouncil upon the restoration of peace and to this end to adopt of international law or to legislate with respect to those\nthe statute of the International Tribunal annexed to the report of rights. The Tribunal simply applied existing\nthe Secretary-General; international humanitarian law. It further\n 3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the acknowledged that, in adopting the draft statute, the\njudges of the International Tribunal, upon their election, any Council was also taking exceptional action. Venezuela\nsuggestions received from States for the rules of procedure and believed that the ad hoc Tribunal had thus been\nevidence called for in article 15 of the statute of the Tribunal; established to act in support of the purposes and\n 4. Decides that all States shall cooperate fully with principles of the Charter.587\nthe International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the\npresent resolution and the statute of the Tribunal and that\n The representative of France noted that, through\nconsequently all States shall take any measures necessary under resolution 827 (1993), the Council had established an\ntheir domestic law to implement the provisions of the present International Tribunal that would prosecute, judge and\nresolution and the statute, including the obligation of States to __________________\n 587 S/PV.3217, pp. 6-10.\n\n\n\n\n908 07-63109\n"
[189] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\npunish people from any community who had Statute. The speaker also commented on the statute of\ncommitted or continued to commit crimes in the the Tribunal.589\nterritory of the former Yugoslavia. He also noted that\n The representative of the United Kingdom stated\nresolution 827 (1993) had been adopted under\n that all parties in the former Yugoslavia shared some\nChapter VII of the Charter. The threat to international\n responsibility for the crimes committed and that it was\npeace and security created by the situation in the\n important to emphasize that the Council’s action of that\nformer Yugoslavia justified recourse to those\n day was not aimed at one party alone. The Security\nprovisions. As a decision within the meaning of\n Council had repeatedly demanded the immediate\nArticle 25 of the Charter, that resolution applied to all\n cessation of such atrocities, but those demands had not\nStates, meaning that all States were required to\n been heeded. It was essential that those who committed\ncooperate fully with the Tribunal, even if that obliged\n such acts be in no doubt that they would be held\nthem to amend certain provisions of their domestic law.\n individually responsible and that those atrocities be\nThe speaker also made comments relating to the statute\n investigated and the perpetrators called to account. The\nof the Tribunal.588\n establishment of the Tribunal was an exceptional step\n The representative of the United States stated that needed to deal with exceptional circumstances. At the\nthe crimes being committed in the former Yugoslavia same time, the Government of the United Kingdom\nwere often the systematic and orchestrated crimes of continued to support the work of the International Law\nGovernment officials, military commanders, and Commission, which would result in the establishment\ndisciplined artillerymen and foot soldiers. The men and of an international criminal court with general\nwomen behind those crimes were individually jurisdiction. Like the previous speakers, the speaker\nresponsible for the crimes of those they purported to commented on the Statute of the Tribunal.590\ncontrol; the fact that their power was often\n The representative of New Zealand noted that the\nself-proclaimed did not lessen their culpability.\n establishment of the Tribunal and the prosecution of\nAddressing those “who derided the tribunal as being\n persons suspected of crimes against international\npowerless because the suspects may avoid arrest”, she\n humanitarian law were closely related to the wider\nargued that the tribunal would issue indictments\n efforts to restore peace and security to the former\nwhether or not suspects could be taken into custody.\n Yugoslavia. He stressed that the Tribunal was a court,\nWhile they might be able to hide within the borders of\n with the task of applying independently and impartially\nSerbia or in parts of Bosnia or Croatia, they would be\n the rules of customary international law and\nimprisoned for the rest of their lives within their own\n conventional law applicable in the territory of the\nland. She further stressed that under the resolution just\n former Yugoslavia. The Tribunal must be left to carry\nadopted every Government, including each one in the\n out its work until it had discharged its mandate under\nformer Yugoslavia, would be obliged to hand over\n its statute or until the Council decided that its work\nthose indicted by the Tribunal. Regarding resolution\n should be brought to an end. 591\n827 (1993), she made the following remarks. First, the\nCommission of Experts would continue to pursue its The representative of Japan suggested that\nwork of establishing a database and preparing evidence perhaps more extensive legal studies could have been\nduring the interim period before the appointment of the undertaken on various aspects of the statute. At the\nTribunal’s Prosecutor, and hiring of staff to begin same time, Japan fully shared the determination of the\nauthoritative investigations and preparations for trials. international community, which called for the\nAt the appropriate time, her delegation expected that exhaustion of all possible measures, including the\nthe Commission would cease to exist and its work expeditious establishment of the Tribunal, to put an end\nwould be “folded” into the Prosecutor’s office. to the ongoing atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and\nSecondly, States were encouraged to submit proposals to restore justice. That was why Japan supported the\nfor the rules of evidence and procedure for adoption of the resolution and why it intended to\nconsideration by the judges of the Tribunal. Thirdly, cooperate in its implementation to the best of its\nStates should take measures under their domestic law __________________\nto enable them to implement the provisions of the 589 Ibid., pp. 12-17.\n\n__________________ 590 Ibid., pp. 17-19.\n 591 Ibid., pp. 22-23.\n 588 Ibid., pp. 10-12.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 909\n"
[190] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nability, in accordance with the spirit of international but the first step in a long and complex process. His\nestablished principles on criminal matters and within delegation considered that the establishment of the\nits Constitution. The speaker contended that the statute Tribunal would be a positive step only if it was viewed\nof the Tribunal reflected the way of thinking of the as closely connected to a suitably comprehensive peace\nSecurity Council. First, the commencement of plan capable of preserving international peace and\nactivities by the Tribunal in no way relieved the parties security throughout the territory of the former\nof their obligation to enforce international Yugoslavia. His delegation considered the\nhumanitarian law. Secondly, such legal remedies in no establishment of the Tribunal to be an instrument for\nway relieved the Security Council of its responsibility the promotion of international peace and security. 594\nto address the Yugoslav crisis in its entirety. Thirdly,\n The representative of Pakistan argued that “ethnic\ncooperation and assistance on the part of the States\n cleansing”, genocide and other heinous crimes had\nconcerned was essential to guarantee the smooth\n been committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in flagrant\nfunctioning of the Tribunal. All States must exhaust all\n violation of international humanitarian law, with the\nmeans to cooperate in good faith. Before concluding,\n specific objective of acquiring territory and as a\nthe speaker stated that the Security Council was\n deliberate campaign to exterminate Bosnia and\nobliged to take the exceptional measures it was taking\n Herzegovina, a sovereign State Member of the United\nthat day. Yet it could not be argued that those measures\n Nations. His delegation hoped that the establishment of\nlay outside the Council’s jurisdiction, for the\n the Tribunal would help to halt such crimes and would\ncomplexity of the threat and the gravity of the crisis\n lead to the vacating by the aggressors of territories\nhad made the Council’s action inevitable. On the\n forcefully occupied and to the full restoration of the\ncontrary, it might be argued that, without a\n unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia\ncomprehensive strategy on the part of the international\n and Herzegovina. Pakistan believed that the resolution\ncommunity, the complex situation in the former\n just adopted was an important element of the Vance-\nYugoslavia could not be properly addressed. 592\n Owen plan and fell squarely within its ambit. The\n The representative of Morocco noted that it had speaker further stated that the international community\nalways been his delegation’s view that an international must halt the aggression, reverse it through\ntribunal must be but one element of a plan, based on withdrawals from all territories occupied by the use of\nthe principles of the Charter, to put an end to Serb force and “ethnic cleansing” and restore international\naggression, to demand the return of territory acquired legality. He contended that the Security Council needed\nby force and “ethnic cleansing” and fully to restore the to move swiftly to take further appropriate and\nterritorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of Bosnia effective enforcement actions in that direction. The\nand Herzegovina. The Tribunal must seek to punish Pakistan delegation could not accept, even by\nserious violations of international humanitarian law in implication, the status quo imposed by aggression, the\nthe broadest sense as crimes against international peace use of force and “ethnic cleansing”, as that would set a\nand security. He argued that the legitimacy and legality dangerous precedent for the civilized world. 595\nof the Tribunal should not be questioned, and that the\n The representative of China stated that, bearing in\nTribunal should hand down deterrent sentences both\n mind the particular circumstances in the former\nfor those who committed crimes and for their\n Yugoslavia and the urgency of restoring and\naccomplices, and should not ignore appropriate\n maintaining world peace, the Chinese delegation had\ncompensations for victims and their families, nor the\n voted in favour of the resolution just adopted. He\nresponsibility of States for breaches of international\n cautioned, however, that that should not be construed\nlaw attributable to them. He also stressed that States\n as an endorsement of the legal approach involved.\nhad the obligation to cooperate with and support the\n China had always held that, to avoid setting any\nTribunal.593\n precedent for abusing Chapter VII of the Charter, a\n The representative of Cape Verde expressed the prudent attitude should be adopted with regard to the\nbelief that the establishment of the Tribunal should be establishment of an international tribunal by means of\n__________________ __________________\n 592 Ibid., pp. 23-26. 594 Ibid., pp. 28-31.\n 593 Ibid., pp. 26-28. 595 Ibid., pp. 31-32.\n\n\n\n\n910 07-63109\n"
[191] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nSecurity Council resolutions under Chapter VII. It was jurisdiction and containing the terms of reference for\nthe consistent position of the Chinese delegation that its exercise. The option of establishing the Tribunal\nan international tribunal should be established by through a resolution of the Security Council, which\nconcluding a treaty so as to provide a solid legal Brazil had not favoured, left unresolved a number of\nfoundation for it and ensure its effective functioning. serious legal issues relating to the powers and\nFurthermore, the statute of the Tribunal just adopted competencies attributed to the Council by the Charter.\nwas a legal instrument with the attributes of an It was the view of the Brazilian delegation that the\ninternational treaty, involving complicated legal and resolution just adopted was aimed at addressing a\nfinancial questions. It ought to become effective only specific and unique situation with a view to producing\nafter having been negotiated and concluded by one specific result: bringing to justice the persons\nsovereign States and ratified by their national responsible for serious violations of international\nlegislative organs in accordance with domestic laws. humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. Both the\nTherefore, to adopt by a Security Council resolution a resolution and the statute it adopted were thus not\nstatute that gave the Tribunal both preferential and meant to establish new norms or precedents of\nexclusive jurisdiction was not in compliance with the international law. The representative of Brazil stated\nprinciple of State judicial sovereignty. The adoption of that by adopting the resolution, the Council was not\nthe Statute of the International Tribunal by the Security creating, nor purporting to legislate, international\nCouncil through a resolution invoking Chapter VII humanitarian law. Rather, the Tribunal would have the\nmeant that United Nations Member States must task of applying existing norms of international\nimplement it to fulfil their obligations under the humanitarian law. Before concluding, the speaker\nCharter. That would bring many problems and noted that for the work of the Tribunal to be effective,\ndifficulties both in theory and in practice. For that it would need to receive the fullest cooperation from\nreason, China had consistently maintained its all States. That was a clear obligation resulting from\nreservations. In short, the Chinese delegation the resolution just adopted.597\nemphasized that the Tribunal established in the current\n The representative of Spain stated that the statute\nmanner could only be an ad hoc arrangement, suited\n of the Tribunal could be improved upon. Nevertheless,\nonly to the special circumstances of the former\n Spain had preferred to retain the form proposed by the\nYugoslavia. It should not constitute a precedent. 596\n Secretary-General in its entirety for several reasons.\n The representative of Brazil observed that the First, certain clarifications could be found by reading\nproposals for the establishment by the Security Council the statute in the light of the explanations provided in\nof an international tribunal had posed intricate and not the Secretary-General’s report with respect to each\nunimportant legal difficulties, many of which had not article. Other clarifications could be contributed by the\nbeen resolved to the satisfaction of his delegation. It Tribunal itself when it drafted its rules of procedure\nhad only been the consideration of the “unique and and began carrying out its judicial activities. Moreover,\nexceptionally serious circumstances” in the former the goal of restoring peace in the territory of the former\nYugoslavia that had determined the vote cast by Brazil Yugoslavia required prompt action, which might have\non the resolution just adopted. The positive Brazilian been compromised through a prolonged and detailed\nvote should not be construed as an overall endorsement discussion of a statute which satisfied the fundamental\nof legal formulas involved in the foundation or in the prerequisites for ensuring the achievement of that goal.\nstatute of the Tribunal. The speaker believed that the Although the statute lacked express provisions in that\nmatter should also have been brought to the attention respect, the tribunal was clearly an independent organ\nof the General Assembly. The views of the Government and that such independence was not at all incompatible\nof Brazil on the main legal issues had been expressed with the Tribunal’s formal character as a subsidiary\nwhen the Council had adopted resolution 808 (1993). organ of the Council, as was borne out by the\nIn particular, Brazil had expressed the view that the International Court of Justice with respect to the\nmost appropriate and effective method for establishing United Nations Administrative Tribunal and its\nthe Tribunal would have been the conclusion of a relations with the General Assembly. Second, the\nconvention setting up an ad hoc international criminal Tribunal was an impartial body governed by the law\n__________________ __________________\n 596 Ibid., pp. 33-34. 597 Ibid., pp. 34-37.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 911\n"
[192] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nitself in fulfilling its duties. Its jurisdiction members to the text of a draft resolution that had been\nencompassed all of the territory of the former prepared in the course of the Council’s prior\nYugoslavia and actions by all parties involved in the consultations 600 and to revisions to be made to the\nconflict. Third, as there was a wish for the Tribunal to draft in its provisional form.\nbe effective, it was indispensable to impose upon\n The draft resolution, as orally revised in its\nStates an obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal that\n provisional form, was then put to the vote and adopted\nwas based upon Chapter VII of the Charter. That\n unanimously as resolution 857 (1993), which reads:\nobligation implied the duty to promulgate any domestic\nlegal measures that might be necessary. A particularly The Security Council,\nimportant feature of that obligation was the primacy Recalling its resolutions 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993\naccorded the Tribunal over national courts. Lastly, the and 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993,\nresolution created an ad hoc body with a jurisdiction\n Having decided to consider the nominations for Judges of\nlimited not only geographically and temporally, but the International Tribunal received by the Secretary-General\nalso materially, in that it would be circumscribed to before 16 August 1993,\napplying the international law in force. In fact, with the\nestablishment of the Tribunal the aim was not to create Establishes the following list of candidates in accordance\n with article 13 of the statute of the International Tribunal:\nnew international law nor to change existing law, but to\nguarantee respect for that law. 598 Mr. Georges Michel ABI-SAAB (Egypt)\n Mr. Julio A. BARBERIS (Argentina)\n The President, speaking in his capacity as the Mr. Raphaël BARRAS (Switzerland)\nrepresentative of the Russian Federation, stated that his Mr. Sikhe CAMARA (Guinea)\ndelegation favoured the establishment of the Tribunal Mr. Antonio CASSESE (Italy)\nbecause it saw it as an instrument of justice to restore Mr. Hans Axel Valdemar CORELL (Sweden)\ninternational legality and the faith of the world Mr. Alfonso DE LOS HEROS (Peru)\n Mr. Jules DESCHENES (Canada)\ncommunity in the triumph of justice and reason. That Mr. Jerzy JASINSKI (Poland)\nwas why the Security Council had assumed, in Mr. Heike JUNG (Germany)\naccordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the Mr. Adolphus Godwin KARIBI-WHYTE (Nigeria)\nresponsibility for implementing the appropriate Mr. Valentin G. KISILEV (Russian Federation)\nspecific measures contained in the resolution just Mr. Germain LE FOYER DE COSTIL (France)\nadopted, including the establishment of the Tribunal. Mr. LI Haopei (China)\nWhile supporting the tribunal, the Russian delegation Ms. Gabrielle Kirk McDONALD (United States of\n America)\nbelieved that that body would not abolish nor replace Mr. Amadou N’DIAYE (Mali)\nnational tribunals. The speaker further stated that the Mr. Daniel David Ntanda NSEREKO (Uganda)\nestablishment of the Tribunal, apart from possessing Ms. Elizabeth ODIO BENITO (Costa Rica)\ngreat juridical meaning, also represented an important Mr. Hüseyin PAZARCI (Turkey)\npolitical act taken by the international community, Mr. Moragodage Christopher Walter PINTO (Sri Lanka)\nwhich at the same time fulfilled a preventive function Mr. Rustam S. SIDHWA (Pakistan)\nand promoted the restoration of peace in the region. 599 Sir Ninian STEPHEN (Australia)\n Mr. Lal Chan VOHRAH (Malaysia)\n\n Decision of 20 August 1993 (3265th meeting):\n Decision of 21 October 1993 (3296th meeting):\n resolution 857 (1993)\n resolution 877 (1993)\n At its 3265th meeting, on 20 August 1993, the\n At its 3296th meeting, on 21 October 1993, the\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item and\n Council resumed its consideration of the item and\nincluded in its agenda the sub-item entitled\n included in its agenda the sub-item entitled\n“Establishment of the list of candidates for judges”.\n “Appointment of the Prosecutor”. Following the\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the President\n adoption of the agenda, the President (Brazil) drew the\n(United States) drew the attention of the Council\n__________________ attention of the Council members to the text of a draft\n __________________\n 598 Ibid., pp. 38-41.\n 600 S/26331.\n 599 Ibid., pp. 43-46.\n\n\n\n\n912 07-63109\n"
[193] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nresolution that had been prepared in the course of the Decision of 25 July 1994: letter from the\nCouncil’s prior consultations.601 President to the Secretary-General\n The Council then adopted the draft resolution, By a letter dated 14 July 1994 addressed to the\nwithout a vote, as resolution 877 (1993), which reads: President of the Security Council, 603 the Secretary-\n The Security Council,\n General transmitted copies of the agreement between\n the United Nations and the Netherlands concerning the\n Recalling its resolutions 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993 Headquarters of the International Tribunal for the\nand 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993, Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious\n Having regard to article 16, paragraph 4, of the statute of Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the\nthe International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 and\nResponsible for Serious Violations of International requested that the Security Council confirm that the\nHumanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former arrangements were acceptable and that the seat of the\nYugoslavia since 1991,\n Tribunal had been determined to be at The Hague.\n Having considered the nomination by the Secretary-\nGeneral of Mr. Ramón Escovar-Salom for the position of By a letter dated 25 July 1994,604 the President of\nProsecutor of the International Tribunal, the Security Council informed the Secretary-General of\n the following:\n Appoints Mr. Ramón Escovar-Salom as Prosecutor of the\nInternational Tribunal. I have the honour to refer to your letter of 14 July 1994\n transmitting copies of the agreement between the United Nations\n Decision of 8 July 1994 (3401st meeting): and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning the\n resolution 936 (1994) Headquarters of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of\n Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International\n At its 3401st meeting, on 8 July 1994, the Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item and the Yugoslavia since 1991 and the Agreement for Tenancy of\nsub-item entitled “Appointment of the Prosecutor”. Churchillplein 1, The Hague.\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the President I have the honour to inform you that, in accordance with\n(Pakistan) drew the attention of the Council members paragraph 6 of its resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 and\nto the text of a draft resolution that had been prepared without prejudice to consideration of the arrangements by the\nin the course of the Council’s prior consultations.602 General Assembly, the Security Council finds the arrangements\n between the United Nations and the Netherlands acceptable. The\n The Council then adopted the draft resolution, Council confirms that the seat of the Tribunal has been\nwithout a vote, as resolution 936 (1994), which reads: determined to be in The Hague.\n\n The Security Council, Decision of 23 September 1994: letter from the\n Recalling its resolutions 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993 President to the Secretary-General\nand 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993,\n By a letter dated 23 September 1994,605 the\n Having regard to article 16, paragraph 4, of the statute of President of the Security Council informed the\nthe International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Secretary-General of the following:\nResponsible for Serious Violations of International\nHumanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Article 27 of the statute of the International Tribunal for\nYugoslavia since 1991, the Former Yugoslavia, adopted by the Security Council in its\n resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993, prescribes that\n Having considered the nomination by the Secretary-\n imprisonment imposed by the International Tribunal on a\nGeneral of Mr. Richard J. Goldstone for the position of\n convicted person shall be served in a State designated by the\nProsecutor of the International Tribunal,\n International Tribunal from a list of States which have indicated\n Appoints Mr. Richard J. Goldstone as Prosecutor of the to the Council their willingness to accept convicted persons. In\nInternational Tribunal. the report on the statute of the International Tribunal presented\n by the Secretary-General to the Council, it is suggested that the\n__________________ Council make appropriate arrangements to obtain from States an\n __________________\n 601 S/26608.\n 603 S/1994/848.\n 602 S/1994/805.\n 604 S/1994/849.\n 605 S/1994/1090.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 913\n"
[194] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nindication of their willingness to accept convicted persons. This decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\ninformation would be communicated to the Registrar of the Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations\nInternational Tribunal who would prepare a list of States in and that it shall not participate in the work of the General\nwhich the enforcement of sentences would be carried out. Assembly,\n On behalf of the Security Council, I hereby kindly request Recalling further that the General Assembly in its\nthat you assist the Council in obtaining such indications from resolution 47/1 of 22 September 1992, having received the\nStates. recommendation of the Security Council of 19 September 1992,\n considered that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro) could not continue automatically the membership\n F. Participation of the Federal Republic of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the\n of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) United Nations and therefore decided that the Federal Republic\n of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for\n in the work of the Economic and membership in the United Nations and that it shall not\n Social Council participate in the work of the General Assembly,\n Recalling that in its resolution 777 (1992) it decided to\n Initial proceedings consider the matter again before the end of the main part of the\n forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, and that in\n Decision of 28 April 1993 (3204th meeting): December 1992 the members of the Council agreed to keep the\n resolution 821 (1993) subject-matter of resolution 777 (1992) under continuous review\n and to consider it again at a later date,\n At its 3204th meeting, on 28 April 1993, the\nSecurity Council included the item entitled 1. Reaffirms that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot continue automatically the\n“Participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of\n(Serbia and Montenegro) in the work of the Economic Yugoslavia in the United Nations, and therefore recommends to\nand Social Council” in its agenda. Following the the General Assembly that, further to the decisions taken in\nadoption of the agenda, the President (Pakistan) drew Assembly resolution 47/1, it decide that the Federal Republic of\nthe attention of the Council members to the text of a Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in the\ndraft resolution submitted by France, Spain and the work of the Economic and Social Council;\nUnited Kingdom, 606 and read out a revision to be made 2. Decides to consider the matter again before the end\nto the draft in its provisional form. He also informed of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly.\nthe Council members that the United States had joined\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of\nas a sponsor of the draft resolution.\n China recalled that his delegation had always held that\n The draft resolution, as orally revised in its all the Republics of the former Yugoslavia should take\nprovisional form, was then put to the vote and adopted their own seats in the United Nations, and that no\nby 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (China, Russian Republic should be excluded lightly. His delegation\nFederation) as resolution 821 (1993), which reads: considered that the resolution just adopted was a\n The Security Council,\n transitory arrangement. It hoped that the question of\n the seat of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia might be\n Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September settled properly and that the Federal Republic of\n1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions, Yugoslavia would be able to obtain its own seat in the\n Considering that the State formerly known as the Socialist United Nations and the organs belonging to the United\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia has ceased to exist, Nations system. 607\n Recalling its resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992, in The representative of the United States stated that\nwhich it noted that “the claim by the Federal Republic of her delegation had voted in favour of the resolution\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically\nthe membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of\n just adopted, as it continued to believe that the claim of\nYugoslavia in the United Nations has not been generally the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to membership in\naccepted”, international organizations was legally invalid. The\n United States would support the application of the\n Recalling also its resolution 777 (1992) of 19 September\n1992, in which it recommended to the General Assembly that it\n Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for membership in the\n __________________\n__________________\n 607 S/PV.3204, pp. 3-6.\n 606 S/25675.\n\n\n\n\n914 07-63109\n"
[195] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nUnited Nations only when Serbia and Montenegro met Decision of 17 September 1993: letter from the\nthe criteria in the Charter of the United Nations. The President to the President of the General\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia therefore must show Assembly\nthat it was a peace-loving State and must demonstrate\n By a letter dated 17 September 1993,611 the\nits willingness to comply fully with Chapter VII\n President of the Security Council informed the\nresolutions of the Security Council. The Belgrade\n President of the General Assembly of the following:\nauthorities must end their support for the Bosnian\nSerbs and for aggression in Bosnia and Croatia.608 I have the honour to inform you that in consultations in\n connection with Security Council resolution 821 (1993) of\n The representative of Brazil recalled that his 28 April 1993, the members of the Council agreed to keep the\ndelegation had expressed its views on the question of subject-matter of that resolution under continuous review and to\nthe participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consider it again at a later date.\nwhen the issue had been taken up by the General\nAssembly the previous September. Brazil remained\n G. The situation in the former Yugoslav\nconvinced that questions relating to admission,\nparticipation, suspension or expulsion affected the Republic of Macedonia\nmost basic rights of States in relation to the\nOrganization, and that they should therefore be treated Initial proceedings\nwith the utmost care and attention, bearing in mind the\nfundamental need to follow the Charter strictly. It was Decision of 18 June 1993 (3239th meeting):\nonly in extraordinary circumstances, such as the resolution 842 (1993)\ndeteriorating situation in the territories of the former At its 3239th meeting, on 18 June 1993, the\nYugoslavia, and particularly in Bosnia and Security Council included in its agenda the item\nHerzegovina, that the application of extraordinary entitled “The situation in the former Yugoslav Republic\nmeasures could be justified. By voting in favour of the of Macedonia” as well as a letter dated 15 June 1993\nresolution just adopted, Brazil wished to signify its from the Secretary-General addressed to the President\nsupport for the urgent efforts of the Security Council to of the Security Council.612 By that letter, the Secretary-\nbring to an end to the conflict in the territory of the General transmitted a letter dated 11 June 1993 from\nformer Yugoslavia.609 the representative of the United States, stating that the\n The representative of the Russian Federation United States had decided to offer a reinforced\nnoted that his delegation had abstained in the voting on company team of approximately 300 troops to operate\nthe resolution just adopted because it was against with the United Nations Protection Force\ntaking further steps to separate Belgrade, and (UNPROFOR) stationed in the former Yugoslav\nexcluding it from the international organizations. He Republic of Macedonia. Following the adoption of the\ncontended that recent events in the Yugoslav crisis, agenda, the President (Spain) drew the attention of the\ncombined with the fact that the leadership of the Council members to the text of a draft resolution that\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia had undertaken had been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior\nspecific steps to apply pressure on the Bosnian Serbs in consultations.613\norder to ensure that they adhered to the Vance-Owen The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nplan, rendered inappropriate the idea of meting out adopted unanimously as resolution 842 (1993) which\nfurther punishment to Belgrade. The speaker also reads:\ncautioned that such action might give the impression\nthat the international community regarded such The Security Council,\npunishment as an end in itself, to the detriment of Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992\nongoing efforts to seek a peaceful settlement. 610 and all subsequent resolutions relating to the United Nations\n Protection Force,\n__________________ __________________\n 608 Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n 611 S/26466.\n 609 Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n 612 S/25954 and Add.1. For details see chapter V.\n 610 Ibid., p. 8.\n 613 S/25955.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 915\n"
[196] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n Recalling in particular resolution 795 (1992) of By a letter dated 22 July 1993,616 the President of\n11 December 1992, by which it authorized the presence of the the Security Council informed the Secretary-General of\nForce in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the following:\n Welcoming the important contribution of the existing\n The members of the Security Council have noted your\nForce presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\n report of 13 July 1993 pursuant to resolution 795 (1992) on the\nto stability in the region,\n deployment and activities of the United Nations Protection\n Seeking to support efforts for a peaceful resolution of the Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslav Republic of\nsituation in the former Yugoslavia as it relates to the former Macedonia, prior to its expansion in accordance with resolution\nYugoslav Republic of Macedonia as provided for in the report of 842 (1993) of 18 June 1993. They welcome the fact that,\nthe Secretary-General of 9 December 1992 and approved in subsequent to the events recorded in your report, the further\nresolution 795 (1992) of 11 December 1992, addition to UNPROFOR’s strength pursuant to the latter\n resolution has now been completed. The members of the Council\n Noting with appreciation the offer made by a Member are conscious of the important contribution made by\nState (S/25954 and Add.1) to contribute additional personnel to UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to\nthe Force presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of stability in the region. They welcome the establishment of close\nMacedonia, and the latter Government’s favourable response coordination with the CSCE missions there, as called for in\nthereto, paragraph 4 of resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December 1992, and\n 1. Welcomes the offer made by a Member State to welcome UNPROFOR’s increased ability to fulfil its mandate in\ncontribute additional personnel to the presence of the United the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security\nNations Protection Force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Council.\nMacedonia, and decides to expand the size of the Force The members of the Council look forward to receiving\naccordingly and to authorize the deployment of these additional further reports in due course on UNPROFOR’s activities in the\npersonnel; former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.\n 2. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n Decision of 30 November 1995 (3602nd\n Decision of 22 July 1993: letter from the meeting): resolution 1027 (1995)\n President to the Secretary-General On 23 November 1995, pursuant to resolutions\n On 13 July 1993, pursuant to Security Council 981 (1995), 982 (1995) and 983 (1995), the Secretary-\nresolution 795 (1992), the Secretary-General submitted General submitted to the Council a report on\nto the Council a report on the deployment and activities peacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia,\nof UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslav Republic of including the United Nations Preventive Deployment\nMacedonia prior to its expansion.614 The Secretary- Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic\nGeneral noted that UNPROFOR had so far been of Macedonia.617 The report was intended to assist the\nsuccessful in its preventive mandate in the former Council in its deliberations on the future of the\nYugoslav Republic of Macedonia. However, it was still missions.\ntoo early to draw definitive conclusions about the The Secretary-General noted that the preventive\neffectiveness of that deployment in the highly volatile deployment role of UNPREDEP had contributed\nsituation prevailing in the region. He recalled that in greatly to the peace and stability of the southern\nproposing the initial deployment of UNPROFOR in the Balkans. The operation had proved that preventive\nformer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on deployment was an effective form of peacekeeping and\n9 December 1992, he had expressed the belief that a that results could be achieved even with a small,\nsmall preventive United Nations deployment would almost symbolic deployment of United Nations\nhelp the countries concerned “to make safe passage peacekeepers, if it was done at the right time and with\nthrough a potentially turbulent and hazardous a clear mandate. He noted, however, that the\nperiod”.615 That remained his hope at a time when the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of\nconflagration in other parts of the former Yugoslavia Macedonia was of the opinion, which he shared, that\nshowed little sign of abating. the causes leading to the establishment of UNPREDEP\n__________________ had not ceased to exist. The continued presence of\n 614 S/26099. __________________\n 615 See S/24923. 616 S/26130.\n 617 S/1995/987.\n\n\n\n\n916 07-63109\n"
[197] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nUNPREDEP, with basically the same mandate, strength 4. Calls upon Member States to consider favourably\nand troop composition, was vital to the maintenance of requests by the Secretary-General for necessary assistance to the\npeace and stability in the country. The Secretary- Force in the performance of its mandate;\nGeneral recommended that the mandate of UNPREDEP 5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council\nshould be renewed for a further 12-month period. He regularly informed of any developments on the ground and other\nalso noted that it was his intention to make, as soon as circumstances affecting the mandate of the Force, and in\npossible, recommendations relating to the particular to submit, if possible by 31 January 1996, a report on\n all aspects of the Force, in the light of developments in the\nestablishment of UNPREDEP on “a fully independent region, for review by the Council;\nfooting”, reporting directly to New York.\n 6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n At its 3602nd meeting, on 30 November 1995,\nthe Council resumed its consideration of the item and Speaking after the vote, the representative of the\nincluded the above-mentioned report of the Secretary- former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia stated that it\nGeneral in its agenda. Following the adoption of the was his Government’s view that UNPREDEP should\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of the become a completely independent United Nations\nformer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, at his operation reporting directly to the Secretary-General,\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the with its base, military command and logistics structure\nright to vote. The President (Oman) then drew the located in Skopje. His Government also requested that\nattention of the Council members to the text of a draft the mandate of UNPREDEP be extended until\nresolution submitted by Argentina, the Czech Republic, 30 November 1996.619\nFrance, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the\nUnited Kingdom, the United States and Honduras. 618 H. Applications made under Article 50\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and of the Charter of the United Nations as\nadopted unanimously as resolution 1027 (1995), which a consequence of the implementation\nreads: of measures imposed against the\n The Security Council, former Yugoslavia\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions and in\nparticular its resolution 983 (1995) of 31 March 1995, Initial proceedings\n Reaffirming its commitment to the independence,\nsovereignty and territorial integrity of the former Yugoslav\n Decision of 18 June 1993 (3240th meeting):\nRepublic of Macedonia, resolution 843 (1993)\n Recalling its concern about possible developments which At its 3240th meeting, on 18 June 1993, the\ncould undermine confidence and stability in the former Yugoslav Security Council included the item entitled\nRepublic of Macedonia or threaten its territory, “Applications made under Article 50 of the Charter of\n Welcoming the positive role played by the United Nations the United Nations as a consequence of the\nPreventive Deployment Force, and paying tribute to the implementation of measures imposed against the\npersonnel of the Force in the performance of their mandate, former Yugoslavia” in its agenda. Following the\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of\n adoption of the agenda, the President (Spain) drew the\n23 November 1995, attention of the Council members to the text of a draft\n resolution that had been prepared in the course of the\n 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General; Council’s prior consultations.620\n 2. Decides to extend the mandate of the United\nNations Preventive Deployment Force for a period terminating\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\non 30 May 1996; adopted unanimously as resolution 843 (1993), which\n reads:\n 3. Urges the Force to continue its cooperation with\nthe mission of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in __________________\nEurope; 619 S/PV.3602, pp. 2-5.\n 620 S/25956.\n__________________\n 618 S/1995/996.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 917\n"
[198] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n The Security Council, entrusted with the task of examining requests for assistance\n under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United\n Recalling its resolution 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991\n Nations and making recommendations to the President of the\nconcerning Yugoslavia and all other relevant resolutions,\n Security Council for appropriate action.\n Recalling also Article 50 of the Charter of the United\n By a letter dated 2 July 1993, the acting Chairman of the\nNations,\n Committee transmitted the recommendations of the Committee\n Conscious of the fact that an increasing number of with regard to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Uganda and\nrequests for assistance have been received under the provisions Ukraine.\nof Article 50 of the Charter,\n At consultations of the whole of the Security Council,\n Noting that the Security Council Committee established held on 2 July 1993, it was agreed to inform you of the above-\npursuant to resolution 724 (1991), at its 65th meeting, set up a mentioned recommendations of the Committee in connection\nworking group to examine the above-mentioned requests, with the requests for assistance under the provision of Article 50\n of the Charter and to request you to implement the actions\n 1. Confirms that the Committee established pursuant contained in the recommendations. For this purpose, I am\nto resolution 724 (1991) is entrusted with the task of examining transmitting herewith for your information and appropriate\nrequests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the action the text of the letter and its enclosures from the Acting\nCharter of the United Nations; Chairman of the Committee.\n 2. Welcomes the establishment by the Committee of\nits working group and invites the Committee, as it completes the Decision of 9 August 1993: letter from the\nexamination of each request, to make recommendations to the President to the Secretary-General\nPresident of the Security Council for appropriate action.\n By a letter dated 4 August 1993 addressed to the\n Decision of 6 July 1993: letter from the President of the Security Council,623 the Chairman of\n President to the Secretary-General the Security Council Committee established pursuant\n to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia\n By a letter dated 2 July 1993 addressed to the transmitted, pursuant to resolution 843 (1993), the\nPresident of the Security Council,621 the Acting recommendations of the Committee relating to the\nChairman of the Security Council Committee established request made by Albania for assistance under the\npursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United\ntransmitted, pursuant to resolution 843 (1993), the Nations.624\nrecommendations of the Committee relating to the\nrequests made by Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Uganda By a letter dated 9 August 1993,625 the President\nand Ukraine for assistance under the provisions of of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General\nArticle 50 of the Charter of the United Nations. In its of the following:\nrecommendations, the Committee recognized the urgent By a letter dated 6 July 1993, addressed to you by my\nneed to assist the interested State and appealed to all predecessor in his capacity as President of the Security Council,\nStates to provide immediate assistance to such State; you were informed, by agreement of all the members of the\ninvited the competent organs and specialized agencies of Council, of the recommendations formulated by the Committee\nthe United Nations system to consider how their established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning\n Yugoslavia and submitted to the President by the Chairman of\nassistance programmes and facilities might be helpful to the Committee in respect of the applications made by five States\nthe interested State; and requested the Secretary-General under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United\nto report on the implementation of such Nations. You were also requested to implement the actions\nrecommendations. contained in those recommendations as appropriate.\n\n By a letter dated 6 July 1993,622 the President of I have now received a further letter dated 4 August 1993,\nthe Security Council informed the Secretary-General of addressed to me by the Chairman of the Committee, submitting\nthe following: a recommendation formulated by the Committee in respect of\n the application made by Albania under the terms of Article 50.\n By resolution 843 (1993), adopted on 18 June 1993, the In the course of their consultations of the whole today, the\nSecurity Council confirmed that its Committee established __________________\npursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia was 623 S/26040/Add.1.\n__________________ 624 The recommendations were similar to those previously\n 621 S/26040. made.\n 622 S/26056. 625 S/26282.\n\n\n\n\n918 07-63109\n"
[199] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nmembers of the Council reviewed the recommendation on appropriate action, the text of the letter and its enclosures from\nAlbania and agreed that, as in the case of the previous the Chairman of the Committee.\nrecommendations, you should be similarly requested to\nimplement the actions contained in the above-mentioned\nrecommendation on Albania. For this purpose, I am transmitting I. Follow-up to resolution 817 (1993):\nherewith, for your information and appropriate action, the text letter dated 26 May 1993 from the\nof the letter and its enclosure from the Chairman of the\nCommittee.\n Secretary-General addressed to the\n President of the Security Council\n Decision of 20 December 1993: letter from the\n President to the Secretary-General Initial proceedings\n By a letter dated 14 December 1993 addressed to Decision of 18 June 1993 (3243rd meeting):\nthe President of the Security Council,626 the Chairman resolution 845 (1993)\nof the Security Council Committee established\npursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning By a letter dated 26 May 1993 addressed to the\nYugoslavia transmitted, pursuant to resolution 843 President of the Security Council, 629 the Secretary-\n(1993), the recommendations of the Committee relating General transmitted, pursuant to resolution 817\nto the requests made by Slovakia and the former (1993),630 his report of 14 May 1993 on the exercise of\nYugoslav Republic of Macedonia for assistance under good offices by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering\nthe provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the Committee of the International Conference on the\nUnited Nations.627 Former Yugoslavia, in respect of the difference that had\n arisen in connection with the request for admission to\n By a letter dated 20 December 1993,628 the membership in the United Nations of the State\nPresident of the Security Council informed the admitted as the former Yugoslav Republic of\nSecretary-General of the following: Macedonia.631 In doing so, he drew the attention of the\n By letters dated 6 July and 9 August 1993, respectively, members of the Council to the fact that an early\naddressed to you by my predecessors in their capacity as endorsement by the Council of the proposals contained\nPresident of the Security Council, you were informed, by in annex V to the report would help the parties to reach\nagreement of all the members of the Council, of the agreement. Annex V contained a draft Treaty proposed\nrecommendations formulated by the Committee established\npursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia and\n by the Co-Chairmen Confirming the Existing Frontier\nsubmitted to the President by the Chairman of the Committee in and Establishing Measures for Confidence Building,\nrespect of the applications made by six States under the Friendship and Neighbourly Cooperation between the\nprovisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations. Republic of Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic\nYou were also requested to implement the actions contained in of Macedonia.\nthose recommendations, as appropriate.\n The Secretary-General noted that the draft Treaty\n I have now received a further letter dated 10 December presented to the parties by the Co-Chairmen had been\n1993, addressed to me by the Chairman of the Committee,\nsubmitting recommendations formulated by the Committee in\n prepared on the basis of extensive consultations with\nrespect of the applications made by Slovakia and the former the parties. The main outstanding point of contention\nYugoslav Republic of Macedonia under the terms of Article 50. remained the name to be used by the State that had\nIn the course of their consultations of the whole today, the been admitted to the United Nations with the\nmembers of the Council reviewed the recommendations on provisional name “the former Yugoslav Republic of\nSlovakia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Macedonia”. The Greek delegation’s position was that\nagreed that, as in the case of the previous recommendations, you the other party should not use, whether for domestic or\nshould be similarly requested to implement the actions\ncontained in the above-mentioned recommendations on Slovakia\n international purposes, a name that included the word\n __________________\nand the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. For this\n 629 S/25855 and Add.1 and 2.\npurpose, I am transmitting herewith, for your information and\n 630 Resolution 817 (1993) was adopted at the 3196th\n__________________\n 626 S/26040/Add.2. meeting of the Council on 7 April 1993 under the item\n 627 The recommendations were similar to those previously “Admission of New Members”. For more information,\n see chapter VII.\n made. 631 S/25855, annex I.\n 628 S/26905.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 919\n"
[200] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n“Macedonia”. It had indicated, however, that if that Former Yugoslavia in order to arrive at a speedy settlement of\nterm were to be included in a name, then the name their difference,\n“Slavomacedonia” could be envisaged. The delegation Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of\nof the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, for its 28 May and 3 June 1993 submitted pursuant to resolution 817\npart, maintained that its name should be “The Republic (1993), together with the statement of the Government of Greece\nof Macedonia”. It was, however, prepared to discuss and the letter of the President of the former Yugoslav Republic\nthe modalities of the use of an alternative name, but for of Macedonia dated 27 and 29 May 1993, respectively, annexed\n thereto,\ninternational purposes only. The Co-Chairmen\nproposed the name “The Republic of Nova 1. Expresses its appreciation to the Co-Chairmen of\nMakedonia”, to be used for all official purposes. the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the\n Former Yugoslavia for their efforts, and commends to the parties\n In two addenda to the report submitted on 3 June as a sound basis for the settlement of their difference the\n1993, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Council proposals set forth in annex V to the report of the Secretary-\na statement made by the Government of Greece on General;\n27 May 1993 and a letter dated 29 May 1993 from the 2. Urges the parties to continue their efforts under the\nPresident of the former Yugoslav Republic of auspices of the Secretary-General to arrive at a speedy\nMacedonia, concerning the draft Treaty. In the settlement of the remaining issues between them;\nstatement the Government of Greece reiterated its 3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council\nposition and added that the name proposed by the informed on the progress of these further efforts, the objective\nCo-Chairmen posed serious difficulties. In his letter, of which is to resolve the difference between the two parties\nthe President of the former Yugoslav Republic of before the commencement of the forty-eighth session of the\nMacedonia raised objections to several provisions General Assembly, and to report to the Council on their outcome\ncontained in the Co-Chairmen’s proposed draft Treaty in good time, and decides to resume consideration of the matter\n in the light of the report.\nand argued that the constitutional name, “The Republic\nof Macedonia”, did not imply territorial or other\n Decision of 15 July 1993: letter from the\naspirations. On the contrary, confirmation of such a\n President to the Secretary-General\nname would represent a significant contribution to the\nmaintenance of peace and stability in the region, which By a letter dated 13 July 1993 addressed to the\nwas an essential requirement of resolution 817 (1993). President of the Security Council, the Secretary-\n General reported that Mr. Cyrus Vance, the former\n At its 3243rd meeting, on 18 June 1993, the\n Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the\nCouncil included the item entitled “Follow-up to\n International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,\nresolution 817 (1993)” and the above-mentioned report\n had accepted his request to continue his good offices to\nof the Secretary-General in its agenda. Following the\n help the parties reach an agreement.634 Mr. Vance\nadoption of the agenda, the President (Spain) drew the\n would begin his assignment on 1 August 1993. The\nattention of the Council members to the text of a draft\n Secretary-General hoped, as stated in resolution 845\nresolution632 and to a letter dated 7 June 1993 from the\n (1993), that it would be possible to resolve the\nrepresentative of Albania addressed to the President of\n difference between the parties before the\nthe Security Council.633\n commencement of the forty-eight session of the\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and General Assembly.\nadopted unanimously as resolution 845 (1993), which\n By a letter dated 15 July 1993,635 the President of\nreads:\n the Security Council informed the Secretary-General of\n The Security Council, the following:\n Recalling its resolution 817 (1993) of 7 April 1993, in The members of the Council thank you for your letter of\nwhich it urged Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of 13 July 1993 concerning Security Council resolution 845 (1993)\nMacedonia to continue to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen of and welcome the acceptance by Mr. Cyrus Vance of your\nthe Steering Committee of the International Conference on the invitation to continue his good offices with the objective of\n__________________ helping the parties to resolve the difference between them before\n 632 S/25968. __________________\n 633 S/25892. 634 S/26088.\n 635 S/26089.\n\n\n\n\n920 07-63109\n"
[201] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nthe commencement of the forty-eighth session of the General between the Governments of Greece and the former\nAssembly. Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.638 He reported that\n his Special Envoy had held two series of discussions\n Decision of 11 April 1994: letter from the with the parties, with the aim of reaching an agreement\n President to the Secretary-General on a draft interim accord. The draft interim accord was\n By a letter dated 31 March 1994 addressed to the a condensation of the draft accord which Mr. Vance\nPresident of the Security Council, the Secretary- had given the parties on 10 March 1994. It addressed a\nGeneral updated the Council on the progress of further limited number of issues, including the question of the\nefforts under his auspices in relation to the difference frontier between the parties, the interpretation of the\nbetween Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Constitution of the former Yugoslav Republic of\nMacedonia.636 He reported that the parties had met Macedonia, the question of “hostile activities and\nseparately with Mr. Vance in Geneva on 10 March propaganda”, and the “countermeasures” adopted by\n1994. Mr. Vance had told both parties that the situation Greece. The other issues would be left to a second\nhad increased in gravity, and that time had been of the phase. However, it had still not been possible to reach\nessence in reaching an agreement. In order to help the agreement on all points. The parties had therefore\nparties to find common ground, he had submitted a agreed to participate in further talks, under the auspices\ndraft accord confirming the existing common frontier of the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, around\nas an inviolable international border and establishing 13 June 1994.\nmeasures for confidence-building, friendship and By a letter dated 7 June 1994,639 the President of\nneighbourly cooperation, based in substantial part on the Security Council informed the Secretary-General of\nthe draft treaty. Having expressed preliminary views on the following:\nthe draft, the parties had agreed that Mr. Vance should\ncontinue to assist them to reach a settlement on the The members of the Security Council have considered\n your report of 27 May 1994 pursuant to resolution 845 (1993)\nremaining issues. concerning the difference between Greece and the Former\n By a letter dated 11 April 1994,637 the President Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.\nof the Security Council informed the Secretary-General The members of the Council have asked me to convey to\nof the following: you their appreciation for your efforts and those of your Special\n Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance. They welcome the steps taken so far\n The members of the Security Council have considered\n under your auspices and support your intention to proceed with\nyour letter of 31 March 1994 in which you advised the Council\n further discussions as expeditiously as possible. They welcome\nof the progress of further efforts, under your auspices, in\n the fact that both parties have agreed to take part in further talks\nrelation to the difference between Greece and the Former\n at the Minister for Foreign Affairs level on or about 13 June\nYugoslav Republic of Macedonia.\n 1994. They urge both parties to cooperate fully with you and\n The members of the Council have asked me to convey to Mr. Vance in order to reach agreement on outstanding issues as\nyou their support for your efforts and those of your Special soon as possible.\nEnvoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance, and their hope that both parties will\n The members of the Council welcome your intention to\ncooperate fully with you and Mr. Vance to resolve the difference\n report further on the substance of Mr. Vance’s discussions after\nbetween them.\n his meetings with the parties in June.\n The members of the Council request you to keep them\nfully informed of developments. Decision of 17 August 1994: letter from the\n President to the Secretary-General\n Decision of 7 June 1994: letter from the\n President to the Secretary-General By a letter dated 5 August 1994 addressed to the\n President of the Security Council, the Secretary-\n On 27 May 1994, pursuant to resolution 845 General informed the Council on the progress of\n(1993), the Secretary-General submitted an interim further efforts under his auspices, in relation to the\nreport on the progress of further efforts taken under his difference between Greece and the former Yugoslav\nauspices by his Special Envoy to resolve the difference __________________\n__________________ 638 S/1994/632.\n 636 S/1994/376. 639 S/1994/679.\n 637 S/1994/415.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 921\n"
[202] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nRepublic of Macedonia.640 The talks planned for this autumn. They call upon both parties to cooperate fully with\n13 June 1994 had been delayed, for reasons beyond the you and Mr. Vance in order to reach agreement on outstanding\ncontrol of the parties. Instead, the Special Envoy of the issues as soon as possible.\nSecretary-General had met separately with both parties\nbetween 10 and 13 July 1994, and had discussed with Decision of 15 September 1995 (3579th\nthem the issue of the name. Both parties had agreed to meeting): statement by the President\nresume discussions with the Special Envoy in the By a letter dated 13 September 1995 addressed to\nautumn. The Secretary-General himself had met with the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-\nthe Foreign Minister of Greece on 12 July, and with the General informed the Council that the Foreign\nForeign Minister of the former Yugoslav Republic of Ministers of Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic\nMacedonia on 13 July 1994. He had emphasized to of Macedonia had signed a wide-ranging interim\nboth parties his concern that they reach an early accord that day at United Nations Headquarters in New\nagreement on a solution to their difference. Both York, in the presence of himself and Mr. Vance.642\nMinisters had confirmed their Government’s desire to Article 5 of the accord provided, inter alia, that the\ncontinue with the discussions under his auspices and parties would continue negotiations, under the auspices\nhad expressly stated their strong preference that of the Secretary-General and pursuant to resolutions\nMr. Vance should continue his mission of good offices. 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), to resolve the difference\n By a letter dated 17 August 1994, 641 the President between them with respect to the name of the former\nof the Security Council informed the Secretary-General Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.\nof the following: At its 3579th meeting, on 15 September 1995, the\n The members of the Security Council have considered Council resumed its consideration of the item and\nyour letter of 5 August 1994 pursuant to resolution 845 (1993) included in its agenda the sub-item entitled “Interim\nconcerning the difference between Greece and the Former Accord between Greece and the former Yugoslav\nYugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Republic of Macedonia”. Following the adoption of the\n The members of the Council have asked me to convey to agenda, the President (Italy) stated that, after\nyou their continuing appreciation for your efforts and those of consultations among members of the Security Council,\nyour Special Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance. They note that at the he had been authorized to make the following\nlatest round of discussions both parties thoroughly reviewed a statement on behalf of the Council: 643\nnumber of proposals addressing the principal difference of\nsubstance, the name. The Security Council welcomes the signing of the Interim\n Accord between Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of\n The members of the Council expressed some concern that, Macedonia and looks forward to the establishment of a new\nin spite of several rounds of discussions between the parties relationship between the parties based on international law and\nfollowing the adoption of resolution 845 (1993) on 18 June peaceful, friendly relations. The Council believes the Accord\n1993, the principal difference of substance — the name — will promote the strengthening of stability in the region.\nremains unresolved. They were also concerned at the possible\nconsequences that continuation of the current situation might The Council commends both parties, the Secretary-\nhave for the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. General, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, Mr. Cyrus\nThey fully shared the views you expressed on 12 and 13 July to Vance, and the United States envoy, Mr. Matthew Nimetz, for\nthe Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Greece and the Former their efforts in bringing about this important achievement,\nYugoslav Republic of Macedonia that the parties should reach pursuant to Council resolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993). The\nan early agreement on a solution to the difference between them. Council encourages them to continue their efforts to resolve the\n remaining differences between the parties and urges the parties\n The members of the Council welcome the desire of both to implement fully the Interim Accord.\nparties to continue with discussions under your auspices, and\n __________________\ntheir commitment to resume those discussions with Mr. Vance\n__________________ 642 S/1995/794, annex I.\n 643 S/PRST/1995/46.\n 640 S/1994/978.\n 641 S/1994/979.\n\n\n\n\n922 07-63109\n"
[203] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n J. Conference on Security and take a seat at the Council table during the course of the\n Cooperation in Europe missions in discussion of the item. The President (United States)\n Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina, the then drew the attention of the Council members to the\n Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia text of a draft resolution that had been prepared in the\n course of the Council’s prior consultations, 646 as well\n and Montenegro)\n as to two letters dated 28 July and 3 August 1993 from\n the representative of Yugoslavia addressed to the\n Initial proceedings Secretary-General. 647 The letters transmitted letters\n dated 28 and 29 July 1993 from the Minister for\n Decision of 9 August 1993 (3262nd meeting): Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n resolution 855 (1993) addressed to the President of the Security Council and\n By a letter dated 20 July 1993 addressed to the the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE Council,\nPresident of the Security Council, the representative of respectively, in which the Minister objected to the fact\nSweden transmitted a letter of the same date from the that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been\nChairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers of the suspended from participating in CSCE activities since\nConference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 8 July 1992 and made the point that his Government\n(CSCE), in which, in accordance with Article 54 of the was willing and ready to continue to cooperate with\nCharter, he informed the Council that at the end of CSCE and would allow the CSCE missions back,\nJune 1993, the Government of the Federal Republic of should Serbia and Montenegro be reintegrated into\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had withdrawn its CSCE.\nacceptance of the CSCE missions in Kosovo, Sandzak Speaking before the vote, the representative of\nand Vojvodina and its cooperation with them. 644 The China contended that the issue of Kosovo was an\nChairman-in-Office also noted that it was the internal affair of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nconsidered opinion of the CSCE participating States and that the sovereignty, political independence and\nthat the decision by the Belgrade authorities aggravated territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of\nthe existing threats to peace and security in the region. Yugoslavia should be respected, in line with the basic\n By a letter dated 23 July 1993 addressed to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and\nPresident of the Council, the representative of Sweden international law. Based on that consideration, his\ntransmitted a letter of the same date from the delegation believed that the Council should exercise\nChairman-in-Office addressed to the Minister for extreme prudence and should act in strict conformity\nForeign Affairs of Yugoslavia, as well as a related with the purposes and the principles of the Charter,\nstatement by the Chairman-in-Office.645 In his letter, especially the principle of non-interference in the\nthe Chairman-in-Office called upon the authorities of internal affairs of sovereign States. The speaker also\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to revoke its contended that recourse to preventive diplomacy, as\ndecision not to allow the CSCE missions to continue part of the pacific settlement of conflicts embodied in\ntheir activities and display its willingness to live up to Chapter VI of the Charter, should be carried out at the\nthe norms and principles it had accepted as a CSCE explicit request or with the prior consent of the States\nparticipating State. and parties concerned, and should never be imposed\n against their will. Practice over the years had shown\n At its 3262nd meeting, on 9 August 1993, the that the consent and cooperation of the parties\nCouncil included in its agenda the item entitled concerned were essential factors in ensuring the\n“Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe success of the endeavours of the United Nations and\n(CSCE) missions in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina, regional organizations. The dispute should therefore be\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and solved through continued dialogue and consultation,\nMontenegro)” and the two above-mentioned letters. without outside interference or pressure. The speaker\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council observed that, when differences arose between a\ninvited Ambassador Dragomir Djokic, at his request, to regional organization and a sovereign State, it was\n__________________\n __________________\n 644 S/26121.\n 646 S/26263.\n 645 S/26148.\n 647 S/26210 and S/26234, respectively.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 923\n"
[204] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nimportant to consider the question whether the Security resumption of the activities of these missions and to agree to an\nCouncil should involve itself and, if so, according to increase in the number of monitors as decided by the\nwhat principle. He noted that, in the spirit of Conference;\nconsensus, the Chinese delegation had offered specific 3. Also calls upon the authorities in the Federal\namendments to the draft resolution. As those Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to assure the\namendments had not been accepted, however, it would monitors’ safety and security and to allow them free and\nabstain from the voting on the draft resolution.648 unimpeded access necessary to accomplish their mission in full;\n 4. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nadopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (China) Speaking after the vote, the representative of\nas resolution 855 (1993), which reads: Hungary stated that the CSCE missions had proved\n The Security Council,\n extremely valuable in promoting stability and\n counteracting the risk of ethnically motivated violence\n Taking note of the letters of 20 and 23 July 1993 from the in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina. The Hungarian\nChairman in Office of the Council of Ministers of the delegation strongly believed that transparency in the\nConference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,\n protection of human rights was an important factor of\n Also taking note of the letters of 28 July and 3 August stability and security, being a litmus test of a\n1993 circulated by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Government’s fulfilment of its obligations under the\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Charter and other relevant international instruments.\n Deeply concerned at the refusal of the authorities in the Hungary, like the CSCE community as a whole, was of\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the view that the expulsion of the CSCE missions was\nallow the CSCE missions of long duration to continue their an act that further aggravated the threat to peace and\nactivities, security in the Balkan region. It considered the\n Bearing in mind that the CSCE missions of long duration Council’s call to the Belgrade Government to\nare an example of preventive diplomacy undertaken within the re-examine its position to be “a perfectly legitimate\nframework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in and sound action”.649\nEurope and have greatly contributed to promoting stability and\ncounteracting the risk of violence in Kosovo, Sandzak and The representative of Brazil stated that his\nVojvodina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and delegation had voted in favour of the resolution just\nMontenegro), adopted, bearing in mind that the consideration of the\n Reaffirming its relevant resolutions aimed at putting an substantive aspects of the dispute fell within the\nend to conflict in the former Yugoslavia, competence of the regional arrangement represented by\n Determined to avoid any extension of the conflict in the\n the relationship between CSCE and its member States.\nformer Yugoslavia, and in this context attaching great The Brazilian delegation hoped that the resolution just\nimportance to the work of the CSCE missions and to the adopted would help to create conditions for the\ncontinued ability of the international community to monitor the adoption of measures of cooperation and ultimately for\nsituation in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina, the Federal the solution of the differences between the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Republic of Yugoslavia and CSCE.650\n Stressing its commitment to the territorial integrity and The representative of France stated that his\npolitical independence of all States in the region,\n delegation was pleased that the Council was giving its\n 1. Endorses the efforts of the Conference on Security support to CSCE, so that the activities of its missions\nand Cooperation in Europe as described in the letters noted could continue. As stated in the letters of the\nabove from the Chairman in Office of the Council of Ministers Chairman-in-Office, it was a question of ensuring the\nof the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;\n stability of the region. As the resolution just adopted\n 2. Calls upon the authorities in the Federal Republic emphasized, the activities of the missions were in no\nof Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to reconsider their way aimed at affecting the sovereignty of a State, but\nrefusal to allow the continuation of the activities of the CSCE were designed to ensure respect for the fundamental\nmissions in Kosovo, Sandzjak and Vojvodina, the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to cooperate\n principles to which all the member States of CSCE,\n __________________\nwith the Conference by taking the practical steps needed for the\n__________________ 649 Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n 650 Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n 648 S/PV.3262, pp. 3-5.\n\n\n\n\n924 07-63109\n"
[205] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nincluding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, had K. The situation in Croatia\ncommitted themselves. The presence of the missions\ncontributed to avoiding any extension of the conflict in Initial proceedings\nthe former Yugoslavia to Kosovo, Sandzak and\nVojvodina. 651 Decision of 14 September 1993 (3275th\n The representative of the United Kingdom meeting): statement by the President\nreminded the authorities in Belgrade that they At its 3275th meeting, on 14 September 1993, the\ncontinued to be bound by obligations which had been Security Council began its consideration of the item\nentered into in the context of CSCE and the binding entitled “The situation in Croatia”. Following the\ncommitment under the “Moscow mechanisms”. The adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nmissions were a source of objective information and representative of Croatia, at his request, to participate\nthey promoted security and dialogue between the in the discussion without the right to vote. The\ncommunities, and would avoid the spread of conflict to President (Venezuela) then stated that, after\nother parts of the former Yugoslavia. 652 consultations among members of the Security Council,\n The President, speaking in her capacity as the he had been authorized to make the following\nrepresentative of the United States, stated that the statement on behalf of the Council:655\nUnited States strongly supported the activities of the The Security Council expresses its profound concern at\nCSCE missions, as they were vital to the international the reports from the Secretariat of recent military hostilities in\ncommunity’s efforts to prevent the spread of the Croatia, in particular the escalation of the means employed, and\nconflict in the former Yugoslavia. By monitoring the the grave threat they pose to the peace process in Geneva and\n overall stability in the former Yugoslavia.\nhuman rights situation in Kosovo, Sandzak and\nVojvodina, those missions had announced clearly to the The Council reaffirms its respect for the sovereignty and\nauthorities in Belgrade that the international territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, and calls on both\ncommunity would not tolerate Serbian oppression of sides to accept the proposal of the United Nations Protection\n Force for an immediate ceasefire. It calls on the Government of\nlocal non-Serb populations. She warned that the United\n Croatia to withdraw its armed forces to positions occupied\nStates was prepared to respond against Serbia in the before 9 September 1993, on the basis of that proposal, and calls\nevent of a conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action. on the Serbian forces to halt all provocative military actions.\nShe also stressed that human rights abuse would simply\ndelay Serbia and Montenegro’s return to the Decision of 7 February 1995 (3498th meeting):\ncommunity of nations. 653 statement by the President\n In the course of the debate, other speakers shared At its 3498th meeting, on 7 February 1995, the\nthe view that the CSCE missions were fundamental to Council resumed its consideration of the situation in\nthe maintenance of peace and stability in the region Croatia. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\nand that their departure would further aggravate the Council invited the representative of Croatia, at his\nexisting threat to that peace and stability.654 request, to participate in the discussion without the\n right to vote. The President (Botswana) drew the\n__________________ attention of the members of the Council to several\n 651 Ibid., pp. 9-10. documents.656 The President then stated that, after\n 652 Ibid., p. 14. consultations among members of the Security Council,\n 653 Ibid., pp. 17-18. __________________\n 654 Ibid., pp. 7-9 (Pakistan); pp. 10-11 (Japan); and 655 S/26436.\n\n pp. 12-13 (Spain). 656 Letter dated 18 January 1995 from the representative of\n\n Croatia addressed to the President of the Security\n Council (S/1995/56); and letters dated 25 and 31 January\n 1995, respectively, from the representative of Croatia\n addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1995/82 and\n S/1995/93).\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 925\n"
[206] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nhe had been authorized to make the following The Secretary-General observed that the plan did\nstatement on behalf of the Council: 657 not have the formal acceptance and the full support of\n The Security Council reiterates its support for the efforts\n either the Government of Croatia or the local Serbs\nto bring about a political settlement in the Republic of Croatia authorities. Thus there was a risk that either or both\nwhich ensures full respect for the sovereignty and territorial sides would fail to cooperate with the United Nations\nintegrity of the Republic of Croatia and which guarantees the in its implementation. On the other hand, the plan\nsecurity and rights of all communities living in a particular area provided for the pragmatic implementation of\nirrespective of whether they constitute in this area the majority paragraph 3 of resolution 981 (1995), and the\nor a minority. alternative to its adoption would be the withdrawal of\n The Council strongly supports the recent efforts of United Nations forces and the resumption of war. If the\nrepresentatives of the International Conference on the Former two sides seriously wished to avoid a renewal of the\nYugoslavia, the European Union, the Russian Federation and the conflict, it was up to them to provide the necessary\nUnited States of America aimed at achieving a political conditions for the new operation to discharge its\nsettlement in the Republic of Croatia. The Council calls upon\nthe Government of the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb\n responsibilities successfully. He therefore\nauthorities in the United Nations Protected Areas to enter recommended that the Council approve the\nurgently and without preconditions into negotiations on such a arrangements contained in the report and authorize the\nsettlement, benefiting from proposals now made to them as part deployment of UNCRO to secure their implementation.\nof these efforts. It calls upon all other relevant parties to support\nthis process. At its 3527th meeting, on 28 April 1995, the\n Council included the report of the Secretary-General in\n The Council reaffirms its commitment to the search for an its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\noverall negotiated settlement of the conflicts in the former\nYugoslavia ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of\n Council invited the representative of Croatia, at his\nall the States there within their internationally recognized request, to participate in the discussion without the\nborders and stresses the importance it attaches to the mutual right to vote. The President (Czech Republic) then\nrecognition thereof. drew the attention of the Council members to the text\n The Council reaffirms its view that the continued and\n of a draft resolution that had been prepared in the\neffective presence of the United Nations Protection Force in the course of the Council’s prior consultations660 and to a\nRepublic of Croatia is of vital importance for regional peace and letter dated 28 April 1995 from the representative of\nsecurity and expresses its desire that discussions over the weeks Croatia addressed to the President of the Security\nahead will lead the Government of the Republic of Croatia to Council. 661\nre-examine its position taken on 12 January 1995 in relation to\nthe continuing role of the Force in the Republic of Croatia. The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\n was adopted as resolution 990 (1995), which reads:\n Decision of 28 April 1995 (3527th meeting): The Security Council,\n resolution 990 (1995)\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the\n On 18 April 1995, pursuant to resolution 981 conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in particular\n(1995), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council resolutions 981 (1995) and 982 (1995) of 31 March 1995,\na report on the implementation of the mandate of the Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of\nUnited Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in 18 April 1995,\nCroatia (UNCRO).658 The report contained a detailed\n Bearing in mind the importance of any information\nplan for the implementation of the UNCRO mandate, relevant to the implementation of all its previous resolutions\nas well as an assessment of the resources needed, being made available to the Secretary-General,\nindicating that the strength of the United Nations\nforces currently in Croatia could be reduced to 8,750 Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security and\n freedom of movement of personnel of United Nations\ntroops and that their deployment could be completed peacekeeping operations in the territory of the former\nby 30 June 1995. 659 Yugoslavia, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the\n__________________ Charter of the United Nations,\n 657 S/PRST/1995/6. __________________\n 658 S/1995/320.\n 660 S/1995/334.\n 659 For further details see S/1995/320, paras. 11 to 29.\n 661 S/1995/339.\n\n\n\n\n926 07-63109\n"
[207] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General, and and therefore to remove all restrictions placed on United Nations\nin particular approves the arrangements in paragraphs 11 to personnel.\n28 thereof for the implementation of the mandate of the United\n The Council urges the parties, in order to achieve these\nNations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is\n objectives, to accept without delay the proposals put to them by\nknown as UNCRO;\n the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.\n 2. Decides to authorize the deployment of UNCRO as\n The Council expresses its full support to the Secretary-\nset out in paragraph 29 of the above-mentioned report;\n General and his Special Representative in their efforts. The\n 3. Calls upon the Government of the Republic of Council further requests the Secretary-General to keep it\nCroatia and the local Serb authorities to cooperate fully with informed of developments on the ground as well as in the\nUNCRO in the implementation of its mandate; ongoing talks.\n 4. Expresses its concern that an agreement on the\nstatus of forces and other personnel has not yet been signed, Decision of 4 May 1995 (3531st meeting):\ncalls once again on the Government of the Republic of Croatia statement by the President\nto conclude expeditiously such an agreement, and requests the\nSecretary-General to report to the Council no later than 15 May\n At its 3531st meeting, on 4 May 1995, the\n1995; Council resumed its consideration of the item.\n Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\n 5. Decides to remain seized of the matter. invited the representative of Croatia, at his request, to\n participate in the discussion without the right to vote.\n Decision of 1 May 1995 (3529th meeting): The President (France) drew the attention of the\n statement by the President members of the Council to two letters663 dated 2 and\n At its 3529th meeting, on 1 May 1995, the 3 May respectively from the representative of Croatia\nCouncil continued its consideration of the item. addressed to the President of the Security Council. The\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council President then stated that, after consultations among\ninvited the representative of Croatia, at his request, to members of the Security Council, he had been\nparticipate in the discussion without the right to vote. authorized to make the following statement on behalf\nThe President (France) then stated that, after of the Council:664\nconsultations among members of the Security Council, The Security Council is deeply concerned at the\nhe had been authorized to make the following continuation of hostilities in the Republic of Croatia.\nstatement on behalf of the Council: 662\n The Council reaffirms in this context its statement of\n The Security Council is deeply concerned by the 1 May 1995 in all its aspects and demands that the parties\nresumption of hostilities in the Republic of Croatia over the last comply with the requirements set out therein immediately and in\nfew days. full.\n The Council demands that the Government of the The Council condemns the incursions into the zone of\nRepublic of Croatia put an end immediately to the military separation by the forces of the Government of the Republic of\noffensive launched by its forces in the area of Western Slavonia Croatia in Sectors North and South and by both sides in Sector\nknown as Sector West, which started on the morning of 1 May East. It demands that the forces in question withdraw\n1995 in violation of the ceasefire agreement of 29 March 1994. immediately.\n The Council also demands that the parties respect the The Council also condemns the bombardment of Zagreb\neconomic agreement signed between them on 2 December 1994 and other centres of civilian population by the forces of the local\nand, in particular, take all necessary steps to ensure the safety Serb authorities and demands that they cease immediately.\nand security of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway and its immediate\n The Council further condemns acts of harassment and\nenvirons.\n intimidation against United Nations personnel and reminds the\n The Council urges the parties to cease hostilities and parties of their obligations to respect such personnel at all times\ncomply with the existing ceasefire agreement. and to ensure their safety, security and freedom of movement.\n The Council calls upon the parties to respect fully the The Council calls upon the parties to cooperate fully with\nsafety and freedom of movement of all United Nations and the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia,\nEuropean Community Monitoring Mission personnel in the area which is known as UNCRO, the Office of the United Nations\nconcerned, in the area known as Sector South and elsewhere, __________________\n__________________ 663 S/1995/349 and S/1995/351.\n 662 S/PRST/1995/23. 664 S/PRST/1995/26.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 927\n"
[208] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nHigh Commissioner for Refugees and the International The Security Council,\nCommittee of the Red Cross in protecting and assisting the local\n Recalling all its previous resolutions on the conflicts in\ncivilian population and any displaced persons. The Council is\n the territory of the former Yugoslavia and in particular\ndeeply concerned by reports that the human rights of the Serb\n resolutions 981 (1995) and 982 (1995) of 31 March 1995 and\npopulation of Western Slavonia are being violated. It demands\n 990 (1995) of 28 April 1995,\nthat the Government of the Republic of Croatia respect fully the\nrights of the Serb population concerned, in conformity with Deeply concerned that the objectives set out in the\ninternationally recognized standards. statements by the President of the Security Council of 1 May\n and 4 May 1995 have not been implemented in all their aspects\n The Council insists that the authority of UNCRO be\n and that the agreement reached by the parties on 7 May 1995\nre-established and respected in Sector West and other areas\n through the mediation of the United Nations Peace Forces\naffected by the hostilities.\n headquarters has been violated, in particular regarding the\n The Council demands that the parties act in accordance withdrawal of forces from the zones of separation,\nwith the proposals put to them by the Special Representative of\n Emphasizing the necessity for full compliance by the\nthe Secretary-General, that they cease all hostilities immediately\n parties with the ceasefire agreement of 29 March 1994, and\nand that they cooperate fully with the Special Representative of\n stressing the importance of such compliance for the\nthe Secretary-General and with UNCRO.\n implementation of the mandate of the United Nations\n The Council further calls upon the parties to enter without Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known as\ndelay into the discussions at Geneva to which they have been UNCRO,\ninvited by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\n Emphasizing further that withdrawal from the zones of\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.\n separation is a condition for the implementation of the mandate\n The Council will remain actively seized of the matter and of UNCRO,\nwill be ready to consider further steps as necessary.\n Affirming its commitment to the search for an overall\n negotiated settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia\n Decision of 17 May 1995 (3537th meeting): ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States\n resolution 994 (1995) there within their internationally recognized borders, stressing\n the importance it attaches to the mutual recognition thereof, and\n At its 3537th meeting, on 17 May 1995, the in this context welcoming all international efforts to facilitate a\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item. negotiated solution to the conflict in the Republic of Croatia,\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council\ninvited the representative of Croatia, at his request, to Emphasizing that full observance of human rights,\n including appropriate international monitoring thereof, in\nparticipate in the discussion without the right to vote. particular in the area of Western Slavonia known as Sector West,\nThe President (France) drew the attention of the is an essential step towards restoration of confidence between\nCouncil members to the text of a draft resolution the parties and building a durable peace,\nsubmitted by France, Germany, Italy, the Russian\n Condemning in the strongest terms all unacceptable acts\nFederation, the United Kingdom and the United which were directed at the personnel of the United Nations\nStates 665 and read out some revisions that had been peacekeeping forces, and determined to obtain strict respect of\nmade to the draft. He also drew the attention of the the status of such personnel in the Republic of Croatia as\nCouncil members to several other documents.666 provided for in the Agreement between the United Nations and\n the Government of the Republic of Croatia signed on 15 May\n The draft resolution, as orally revised in its 1995,\nprovisional form, was then put to the vote and adopted\nunanimously as resolution 994 (1995), which reads: Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security and\n freedom of movement of the personnel of United Nations\n__________________ peacekeeping operations in the territory of the former\n 665 S/1995/395. Yugoslavia, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the\n 666 Letters dated 8 and 17 May 1995, respectively, from the Charter of the United Nations,\n representative of Croatia addressed to the President of 1. Reaffirms the statements by the President of the\n the Security Council (S/1995/363 and S/1995/397); and Security Council of 1 May and 4 May 1995 issued as a result of\n letter dated 10 May 1995 from the representative of the military offensive launched by the forces of the Government\n Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security of Croatia in the area of Western Slavonia known as Sector West\n Council (S/1995/383). on 1 May 1995 in violation of the ceasefire agreement of\n 29 March 1994;\n\n\n\n\n928 07-63109\n"
[209] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n 2. Notes with satisfaction the steps taken so far as to Speaking after the vote, the representative of Italy\nmeet the requirements set out in the above-mentioned stated that the resolution just adopted could and must\nstatements, but demands that the parties complete without encourage the parties to speed up their complete and\nfurther delay the withdrawal of all their troops from the zones of\nseparation and refrain from any further violations of those\n unconditional withdrawal from the zones of separation\nzones; in order to allow the complete and immediate\n deployment of UNCRO, and the full implementation of\n 3. Stresses the need for the early re-establishment of its mandate as outlined in resolutions 981 (1995) and\nthe authority of UNCRO, in accordance with its mandate;\n 990 (1995). Nevertheless, resolution 994 (1995) was\n 4. Requests the Secretary-General to make the not merely an attempt to remedy a situation created on\nnecessary arrangements in order to ensure full deployment of the ground by the recent Croatian offensive: it also\nUNCRO, after the withdrawal of the troops of the parties, as looked to the future. In that regard, the speaker\nprovided for in its mandate established by resolutions 981\n(1995) and 990 (1995);\n emphasized the importance of paragraph 10, which\n contained a firm warning to the parties, demanding that\n 5. Demands that the status and the mandate of they refrain from taking any further military initiatives\nUNCRO as well as the safety and security of its personnel be that could lead to a new escalation of the conflict. If\nrespected;\n the parties did not refrain from such initiatives, the\n 6. Demands also that the Government of the Republic Council should not hesitate to consider further\nof Croatia respect fully the rights of the Serb population, measures to ensure compliance with that demand.667\nincluding their freedom of movement, and allow access to this\npopulation by international humanitarian organizations, in The representative of the United Kingdom noted\nconformity with internationally recognized standards; that the resolution just adopted condemned in the\n 7. Requests the Secretary-General, in cooperation strongest possible terms any action against United\nwith the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Nations personnel. Progress towards the withdrawal of\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the troops from the zones of separation was welcome, but\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross and other relevant it was essential that such a withdrawal be completed\ninternational humanitarian institutions, to assess the forthwith. Otherwise, there was little chance of getting\nhumanitarian situation of the local Serb population in Sector the political process back on track, and only when\nWest, including the problem of refugees, and to report thereon as\nsoon as possible;\n withdrawal had been completed would UNCRO be able\n to redeploy so as to begin its tasks of implementing its\n 8. Fully supports the efforts of the Special mandate. It was also essential that the United Nations\nRepresentative of the Secretary-General to achieve the and other international bodies be given full access to\nobjectives outlined in the statements by the President of the\nSecurity Council of 1 and 4 May 1995, and requests the parties\n Western Slavonia, so as to lay to rest concerns about\nto cooperate fully to this end; human rights. The report of the Secretary-General on\n the implementation of resolution 994 (1995), to be\n 9. Calls upon the parties to respect the economic submitted within the following two weeks, would be\nagreement signed by them on 2 December 1994, and in\nparticular to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety and\n important as the Council would need to consider at that\nsecurity of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway and its immediate stage how best to ensure full deployment of UNCRO in\nenvirons as provided for in that agreement; accordance with its mandate.668\n 10. Demands that the parties refrain from taking any The representative of the Russian Federation\nfurther military measures or actions that could lead to the stated that it was the non-compliance with the demands\nescalation of the situation, and warns that in the event of failure set forth in the presidential statements of 1 and 4 May,\nto comply with this demand it will consider further steps needed that had forced his delegation to consider the real need\nto ensure such compliance;\n to adopt a resolution that would demonstrate that the\n 11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council did not intend to go along with violations of its\nCouncil for its consideration within two weeks on the decisions. His delegation assumed that the adoption of\nimplementation of the provisions of the present resolution, resolution 994 (1995) would lead to: a full restoration\nincluding on the modalities for the implementation of the\nmandate of UNCRO in Sector West;\n of the mandate of UNCRO; a full withdrawal of the\n __________________\n 12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 667 S/PV.3537, pp. 2-3.\n 668 Ibid., pp. 3-4.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 929\n"
[210] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nforces of all sides from the zones of separation; and the The Secretary-General noted that the Croatian\nappropriate implementation of the ceasefire agreement military offensive in Sector West on 1 May 1995 had\nand the economic agreement. Referring to paragraph 6 underlined the reality that peacekeeping forces could\nof that resolution, the speaker said that the Russian not keep the peace without the cooperation of the\nFederation expected that the Secretary-General would parties. While the presence of United Nations forces\ncarry out the request to prepare a report on the was critical for achieving the cessation-of-hostilities\nhumanitarian situation of the Serb population in Sector agreement of 3 May 1995, for preventing escalation\nWest. He further noted that his delegation would have and for monitoring the subsequent humanitarian and\npreferred the resolution to contain a clearer assessment human rights situation of Serbs in the Sector, it had not\nof the situation that had arose as a result of the been sufficient to prevent the sequence of events\nCroatian attacks, such as the failure to observe the leading to the Croatian offensive nor to forestall the\nmilitary embargo against Croatia. He concluded by offensive itself. In these circumstances, he had\npointing out that the resolution just adopted did not in seriously re-examined the role of UNCRO. In meetings\nany way conclude the Council’s consideration of with his Special Representative, both sides had stated\nCroatia. In that regard, he referred to paragraph 10 of their desire that the peacekeeping mission should\nthe resolution in which the Council warned the parties continue. But cooperation on the ground had been\nthat in the event they would not comply with the unsatisfactory and UNCRO personnel had been put at\ndemand contained in that paragraph, it would consider risk. Concerning the UNCRO mandate, there appeared\nadditional steps.669 to be common ground between the parties that the\n mission should fulfil the tasks arising from the\n The President, speaking in his capacity as the\n ceasefire and economic agreements and from its\nrepresentative of France, recalled that the Council had\n humanitarian and human rights mandates. The\ndemanded in clear terms, in its presidential statements\n redeployment of the mission by 30 June 1995 was no\nof 1 and 4 May, that an end be put to the armed\n longer possible however.\nincursions in the zones of separation in Croatia. He\nnoted that, in spite of the commitments announced in The Secretary-General stated that the parties’\nthat respect by the Croatian authorities, concrete request that UNCRO should stay was a positive\nwithdrawal operations on the ground had been partial deployment. He therefore intended to monitor closely\nand delayed. That was why France had voted in favour the continuing level of the parties’ cooperation with\nof resolution 994 (1995) which demanded that a total UNCRO and particularly the extent to which they\nwithdraw be completed without further delay. That complied with the ceasefire agreement, allowed\ndemand was also addressed to the Croatian Serb forces UNCRO full freedom of movement and made serious\nwhich were still in the zones of separation. The efforts to protect its personnel. UNCRO would\nsituation could not truly be stabilized unless both coordinate closely with the Croatian Government as\nparties respect the buffer zones. 670 well as with international organizations and agencies,\n to ensure full respect for the human rights of the Serb\n Decision of 16 June 1995 (3545th meeting): minority in Sector West and to report on the extent to\n statement by the President which purposeful policies of reconciliation and\n confidence-building were being implemented in the\n On 9 June 1995, pursuant to resolution 994\n Sector. The Secretary-General was conscious that there\n(1995), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council\n remained, on both sides, influential elements that\na report on the implementation of that resolution,\n continued to be unreconciled to the objectives of the\nincluding on the modalities for the implementation of\n international community and who were inclined to\nthe mandate in Sector West of UNCRO, and on the\n pursue their ends by military means.\nhumanitarian situation of the local Serb population in\nSector West. 671 At its 3545th meeting, on 16 June 1995, the\n__________________ Council included the report of the Secretary-General in\n 669 Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\n 670 Ibid., p. 7. Council invited the representative of Croatia, at his\n 671 S/1995/467. request, to participate in the discussion without the\n right to vote. The President (Germany) then stated that,\n\n\n\n930 07-63109\n"
[211] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nafter consultations among members of the Security in its resolution 982 (1995) of 31 March 1995 is no longer\nCouncil, he had been authorized to make the following possible. It requests the Secretary-General to proceed as\nstatement on behalf of the Council: 672 expeditiously as possible with this redeployment with the aim of\n fulfilling all tasks under the mandate of UNCRO. It demands\n The Security Council has considered the report of the that the parties cooperate with the efforts of UNCRO to\nSecretary-General of 9 June 1995 submitted pursuant to its implement fully its mandate.\nresolution 994 (1995) of 17 May 1995. It is concerned at the\n The Council notes the fact that both parties have stated\nsituation described therein, and at the continuing failure of the\n their desire that the peacekeeping mission should continue and\nparties to cooperate satisfactorily with the United Nations\n that they are seeking the assistance of UNCRO. It welcomes the\nConfidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known as\n Secretary-General’s intention to monitor closely their\nUNCRO, and to comply fully with the demands of the Council.\n cooperation with UNCRO and their compliance with the\nIt condemns in particular the continuation of offensive actions\n ceasefire agreement of 29 March 1994, and requests him to keep\nand the intimidation of UNCRO personnel in violation of its\n the Council fully informed. Such cooperation and compliance\nresolution 994 (1995).\n are essential for the implementation of the mandate of UNCRO\n The Council looks to the parties to cooperate fully and and for progress towards a negotiated settlement which respects\nunconditionally with UNCRO in the performance of its mandate fully the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of\nand to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of Croatia and which guarantees the security and rights of all\nits personnel. The Council demands that they fulfil their communities.\ncommitment under the ceasefire agreement of 29 March 1994, in\n The Council could not countenance moves by the local\nparticular in respect of the withdrawal of all forces and heavy\n Serb authorities in the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of\nweapons from the zones of separation, and fully implement the\n Bosnia and Herzegovina to establish a union between them,\nagreement of 2 December 1994 on economic confidence-\n since this would be inconsistent with the Council’s commitment\nbuilding measures. It calls upon the parties, and in particular the\n to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of\nGovernment of Croatia, to cease all military action in and\n Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\naround Sector South. It also calls upon all parties to respect fully\nthe international border between the Republic of Croatia and the The Council stresses that there can be no military solution\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to stop any action that to the conflict and calls upon the parties to reaffirm their\nextends the conflict across this border, since this is in violation commitment to a peaceful resolution of their differences.\nof the Council’s resolutions. It reiterates its warning that in the\nevent of failure to comply with the demand in its resolution 994 The Council notes with distress the loss of life and\n(1995) that the parties refrain from taking any further military casualties which have been suffered by UNCRO and extends its\nmeasures or actions that could lead to the escalation of the condolences to the families of the bereaved.\nsituation, it will consider further steps needed to ensure such The Council will remain seized of the matter.\ncompliance.\n The Council requests the Committee established under Decision of 3 August 1995 (3560th meeting):\nresolution 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991 to continue to statement by the President\ninvestigate, in accordance with its mandate, reports of violations\nof resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991. At its 3560th meeting, on 3 August 1995, the\n Council resumed its consideration of the item.\n The Council welcomes the agreement of the Government\nof Croatia to a continued UNCRO presence in the area of\n Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\nWestern Slavonia known as Sector West for the purposes of invited the representative of Croatia, at his request, to\nimplementing its mandate, in particular in respect of human participate in the discussion without the right to vote.\nrights, to which it continues to attach great importance. It The President (Indonesia) then stated that, after\nendorses the Secretary-General’s view as to the necessity for consultations among members of the Security Council,\nreconciliation and confidence-building in that Sector. It stresses he had been authorized to make the following\nthe importance it attaches to full respect for the human rights of statement on behalf of the Council:673\nthe Serb population there. It encourages the Secretary-General to\ncontinue his coordination with the United Nations High The Security Council is deeply concerned at the\nCommissioner for Human Rights as well as other international deterioration in the situation in and around the Republic of\norganizations and agencies in this regard. Croatia.\n The Council notes the Secretary-General’s judgement that The Council fully supports the efforts of the Special\ncompletion of the redeployment of United Nations peacekeeping Representative of the Secretary-General and of the Co-Chairman\npersonnel in the Republic of Croatia by 30 June 1995 envisaged of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on\n__________________ __________________\n 672 S/PRST/1995/30. 673 S/PRST/1995/37.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 931\n"
[212] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nthe Former Yugoslavia to defuse the situation, in line with the Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of\nCouncil’s previous resolutions. the Red Cross in ensuring access and protection to the local\n civilian population as appropriate.\n The Council stresses that there can be no military solution\nto the conflict in Croatia and welcomes the holding of talks The Council strongly condemns attacks by Croatian\nbetween the parties at Geneva earlier today. It calls on both Government forces on personnel of the United Nations\nparties to commit themselves fully to that process and to peacekeeping forces, which have resulted in casualties,\nacceptance of the draft agreement drawn up by the Co-Chairman including the death of one member of the peacekeeping forces.\nas a basis for continuing those talks. It demands that such attacks cease immediately and that all\n detained personnel be released. It also reminds the parties, and\n The Council demands that the parties halt all military\n in particular the Croatian Government, that they have an\nactions and exercise the utmost restraint.\n obligation to respect United Nations personnel, to ensure their\n safety and freedom of movement at all times and to enable\n Decision of 4 August 1995 (3561st meeting): UNCRO to fulfil its mandate in accordance with the relevant\n statement by the President Council resolutions. The Council expresses condolences to the\n Government of Denmark and to the family of the member of the\n At its 3561st meeting, on 4 August 1995, the United Nations peacekeeping forces who lost his life.\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item.\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council The Council deeply regrets the breakdown of the talks\n which began at Geneva on 3 August 1995. It calls upon the\ninvited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatian Government to return to the talks. It reiterates that\nand Croatia, at their request, to participate in the there can be no military solution to the conflict in Croatia. It\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The President reaffirms its call for an unreserved commitment to the search for\n(Indonesia) drew the attention of the members of the a negotiated settlement and to resumption of talks on the basis\nCouncil to a letter dated 4 August 1995 from the of the draft agreement drawn up by the Co-Chairman of the\nrepresentative of Croatia addressed to the President of Steering Committee of the International Conference on the\nthe Security Council, transmitting a letter of the same Former Yugoslavia.\ndate from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for The Council will remain seized of the matter and will\nForeign Affairs of Croatia.674 consider any further measures that may be necessary.\n\n The President then stated that, after consultations Decision of 10 August 1995 (3563rd meeting):\namong members of the Security Council, he had been resolution 1009 (1995)\nauthorized to make the following statement on behalf\nof the Council:675 On 3 August 1995, pursuant to resolution 981\n (1995), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council\n The Security Council is deeply concerned at the\nresumption of hostilities in and around the Republic of Croatia.\n a report on the situation in Croatia, including on the\nThe Council recalls the statement by its President of 3 August ability of UNCRO to implement its mandate.676 The\n1995. It strongly deplores the decision by the Croatian Secretary-General reported that, although there had\nGovernment to launch a broad military offensive, thereby been no large-scale hostilities since May 1995, there\nunacceptably escalating the conflict, with the risk of further had been almost continuous skirmishes, exchanges of\nconsequent attacks by whatever party, and demands that all fire, incidents and troop deployments within the zones\nmilitary action cease immediately and that there be full of separation, and an increased number of violations of\ncompliance with all Council resolutions including resolution 994\n(1995).\n the heavy weapons withdrawal zones. Those actions,\n by both sides, had eroded the credibility of the\n The Council condemns any shelling of civilian targets. It ceasefire agreement to the point where neither side\ndemands that no military action be taken against civilians and appeared committed to its key provisions. Moreover,\nthat their human rights be fully respected. It reminds the parties\nof their responsibilities under international humanitarian law\n the existing military situation, coupled with restrictions\nand reiterates that those who commit violations of international on freedom of movement constantly imposed by both\nhumanitarian law will be held individually responsible in respect sides, had prevented UNCRO from taking any\nof such acts. The Council calls on the parties to cooperate fully significant remedial action and, in some cases, from\nwith the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in even monitoring the situation. Peacekeepers had been\nCroatia, which is known as UNCRO, the United Nations High __________________\n__________________ 676 S/1995/650.\n 674 S/1995/647.\n 675 S/PRST/1995/38.\n\n\n\n\n932 07-63109\n"
[213] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nunable to position themselves between the warring course of the Council’s prior consultations 678 and to\nfactions and had been prevented from deploying along several other documents.679\nthe international border. The Secretary-General\n The representative of Croatia stated that Croatia’s\nconcluded that, given the high degree of uncertainty\n action had been carried out mostly on its\nconcerning developments in Croatia, it was not\n internationally recognized territory and in part of the\npossible at that time to make a recommendation as to\n territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the express\nthe future of UNCRO. It was his intention, however, to\n request of that Government, arguing that establishing\nrevert to the Security Council with such a\n sovereignty and security on its own territory and\nrecommendation at an appropriate time in the future.\n coming to the aid of a friendly Government were fully\n By a letter dated 7 August 1995 addressed to the consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. The\nPresident of the Security Council, 677 the Secretary- speaker further claimed that the siege of Bihac, which\nGeneral reported that on 4 August, the Croatian Army had been a serious concern for the international\nhad launched a major offensive against the Krajina community, had been resolved at minimal cost to the\nregion, and a significant number of United Nations international community and to the civilian population\nobservation posts had been overrun by the Croatian in the area. Croatia therefore regretted that the Council\nArmy, with some coming under fire. On two occasions, had not accepted an amendment that would have\nUnited Nations troops and Serb prisoners had been acknowledged that the siege of Bihac had been\nused as human shields by Croatian Army units. successfully lifted. His Government had accepted\nSubsequently, the United Nations had suffered a total responsibility for those and other casualties amongst\nof 18 casualties, three of which had been fatal. On United Nations personnel and had taken appropriate\n6 August, the Co-Chairmen of the International measures to remedy the costs of individual\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia and “indiscretions” and criminal acts against the\nrepresentatives of the European Union had met in peacekeepers. His Government also fully supported the\nGeneva with the Foreign Minister of Croatia, who had new initiative by the United States to restart the\nexpressed confidence that the Croatian military negotiating process in a timely manner, and it would\noperation would be completed within 24 hours and had support a new conference along the lines suggested by\nindicated that Croatia would investigate incidents in President Yeltsin of the Russian Federation. The new\nwhich United Nations troops had been attacked. The negotiations should be based on the principle of mutual\nMinister had also given assurances about granting recognition among all successor States of the former\nhumanitarian organizations access to civilians Yugoslavia and on the linkage of the sanctions regime\ndisplaced by the fighting. The Secretary-General against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to its role in\nfurther noted that a refugee crisis of major proportions the implementation of a negotiated settlement for the\nhad begun. Tensions remained high and the possibility Serbian minority in Croatia. Such a linkage would be\nof continuing hostilities could not be ruled out. __________________\n 678 S/1995/676.\n At its 3563rd meeting, on 10 August 1995, the 679 Letters dated 7 August 1995 from the representative of\nCouncil included the above-mentioned report and letter Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security\nin its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council (S/1995/658 and S/1995/660); letters dated\nCouncil invited the representatives of Bosnia and 4 and 6 August 1995, respectively, from the\nHerzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate representative of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-\nin the discussion without the right to vote. The Council General (S/1995/656 and S/1995/663); letters dated 6\n and 7 August 1995, respectively, from the representative\nalso invited Ambassador Dragomir Djokic, at his\n of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the Secretary-\nrequest, to address the Council in the course of the General (S/1995/662 and S/1995/664); letter dated\nsubsequent discussion. The President (Indonesia) then 8 August 1995 from the representative of Croatia\ndrew the attention of the Council members to the text addressed to the President of the Security Council\nof a draft resolution that had been prepared in the (S/1995/670); letter dated 8 August 1995 from the\n__________________ representative of the Russian Federation addressed to the\n 677 S/1995/666. Secretary-General (S/1995/672); and letter dated\n 9 August 1995 from the representative of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security\n Council (S/1995/675).\n\n\n\n07-63109 933\n"
[214] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nimportant in respect of a successful resolution to the actions against Croatia had been ignored. He further\nproblem of the remaining occupied territory in urged the Security Council to make Croatia allow\nCroatia — the Vukovar region (the former Sector East). access to representatives of the United Nations and\nThe speaker also contended that the Belgrade humanitarian organizations to the territories of Krajina\noccupation of that territory could not be more evident in order to conduct a thorough and objective\nand warned that the premature easing of the sanctions investigation into the events that had taken place\nregime before that problem had been resolved might during the Croatian offensive, including alleged\nleave the Government of Croatia with no option other massacres, torture, opening fire on refugees, and the\nthan a military one. Before concluding, the speaker use of United Nations personnel and Serb soldiers and\nnoted that Croatia would look to UNCRO to assist it in civilians as human shields. He added that the draft\nresolving the problem of the Vukovar region resolution before the Council represented a totally\npeacefully. As UNCRO redefined its role in the inadequate response to the drama that had been\n“reintegrated areas” of Croatia, the Government of unfolding in Krajina. 682\nCroatia would welcome a redeployment of its excess\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of\nresources to the international border in the Vukovar\n Germany stated that his delegation deplored the\nregion.680\n Croatian Government’s decision to use military means\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina to regain those territories previously known as Sector\nargued that Croatia’s action had been in defence of its South and Sector North. At the same time it was ready\nterritories and rights and in promotion of peace and to acknowledge that Croatia’s patience had been tested\nstability within its borders and had preserved the Bihac severely by the intransigence of the Croatian Serb\nsafe area. That was a victory of the Croatian army over leadership and by the great number of ceasefire\nthe terrorists and criminals among the Serbians who violations committed by Croatian Serb forces and their\nwanted to carry out violence against innocent civilians pattern of cross border attacks, in particular in the area\non both sides.681 of Bihac. From the German view, there were now three\n priorities. First, the urgent humanitarian needs must be\n Mr. Djokic stated that, by opting for “all-out\n addressed, and full respect for human rights must be\naggression”, Croatia had not simply attacked the Serb\n ensured. Second, the situation in and around Croatia\npopulation, but also fragrantly violated the Security\n must be stabilized. Third, the conflicting parties must\nCouncil resolutions establishing the United Nations\n be brought back to the negotiating table. In concluding,\nprotected areas in Krajina, and had breached the Vance\n the speaker stated that Croatia needed to ensure that\nplan. The Government of Croatia had acted in total\n the human rights and minority rights of the Serbs of the\ndisregard of the unambiguous and clear-cut demands of\n former Sector East and Sector North were fully\nthe Security Council, that it refrain from taking any\n respected. Germany was deeply concerned about the\nfurther actions that could lead to the escalation of the\n fate of the Croatian Serb refugees and considered it\nsituation, and particularly that it cease all military\n crucial that Croatia guarantee the right of those\nactions in and around sector South. It was particularly\n refugees to return, and that the Croatian authorities do\nworrisome that the Security Council and the\n everything in their power to create circumstances and a\ninternational community had not condemned the\n climate conductive to such a return.683\n“brutal” Croatian aggression. Particular responsibility\nlay with the Security Council, whose primary role The representative of China stated that his\nunder Chapter VII of the Charter was to maintain peace delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution\nand security and protect the victims of aggression, to because it urged the parties to stop hostilities\ntake “concrete and resolute measures” against Croatia. immediately and resume negotiations at an early date,\nThe speaker noted that it was particularly distressing it called for an urgent solution to humanitarian\nthat the Council did not demand that Croatian troops problems, and it called upon the parties to ensure the\nwithdraw to the positions held prior to 4 August 1995 freedom of movement of UNCRO personnel. China\nand that the calls for the introduction of comprehensive maintained its reservation, however, with regard to the\n__________________ __________________\n 680 S/PV.3563, pp. 2-4. 682 Ibid., pp. 7-9.\n 681 Ibid., pp. 5-7. 683 Ibid., pp. 11-12.\n\n\n\n\n934 07-63109\n"
[215] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nreferences in the draft resolution to Chapter VII of the those who believed that the Council’s decision were\nCharter and resolution 816 (1993).684 not binding on them. 685\n The representative of the Russian Federation The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nstated that the Croatian offensive had brought to was adopted unanimously as resolution 1009 (1995),\nnaught the efforts of the international community to which reads:\nfind a political solution. He argued that Zagreb had The Security Council,\ntaken a stance of integrating Serb-populated regions by\nforce, meaning that the principle of a just solution had Recalling all its previous resolutions on the conflicts in\nbeen sacrificed to a philosophy of fait accompli. The the territory of the former Yugoslavia, in particular resolutions\n 981 (1995) of 31 March 1995, 990 (1995) of 28 April 1995 and\nRussian Federation believed that such an approach 994 (1995) of 17 May 1995,\nwould have harmful consequences both for the\nsettlement of the Yugoslav crisis and for the role to be Reaffirming the statements by its President of 3 and\nplayed by the United Nations in maintaining and 4 August 1995, and deeply concerned that the demands set out\n therein have not yet been fully complied with by the\nrestoring international peace and security. The speaker Government of the Republic of Croatia,\nstated that the gravity of the situation required the\nadoption of urgent measures. The Russian Federation Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of\ntherefore had taken an active part in the preparation of 3 August 1995 and his letter of 7 August 1995,\nthe draft resolution. Of special importance in the Noting with concern reports of violations of resolution\nRussian Federation’s view was the demand that Croatia 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 as reflected in the report of\ncease immediately all hostilities and comply with all the Secretary-General of 3 August 1995,\nrelevant Council resolutions, including resolution 994 Deeply regretting the breakdown of the talks which began\n(1995), and that it fully respect the rights of the local at Geneva on 3 August 1995,\nSerb population. No less important was the demand by Affirming its commitment to the search for an overall\nthe Council that Croatia respect the status of United negotiated settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia\nNations personnel, put an end to attacks on it and ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States\npunish those guilty of perpetrating them. Noting that there within their internationally recognized borders, stressing\nthe draft resolution referred with concern to reports of the importance it attaches to the mutual recognition thereof, and\nviolations of resolution 713 (1991), the speaker stated in this context welcoming all international efforts to facilitate a\nthat the tragic events in Croatia had reaffirmed that if negotiated solution to the conflict in the Republic of Croatia,\nviolations of the arms embargo went unpunished, the Strongly deploring the broad military offensive launched\nparties would be tempted to try to solve disputes not on 4 August 1995 by the Government of the Republic of Croatia,\naround the negotiating table, but by force of arms. It thereby unacceptably escalating the conflict, with the risk of\nwas therefore necessary to adopt additional measures further consequent attacks by whatever party,\nto ensure effective compliance with resolution 713 Condemning the shelling of civilian targets,\n(1991). Another clear conclusion was that the United Deeply concerned at the grave situation of persons\nNations peacekeeping operations in Croatia must displaced from their homes as a result of the conflict and at\ncontinue in order to prevent a complete humanitarian reports of violations of international humanitarian law,\ncatastrophe and to ensure objective international\n Stressing the need to protect the rights of the local Serb\nobservation of the actions of the Croatian authorities population,\nwith regard to the Serbian population that had come\nunder its control. In that regard, any violations of Condemning in the strongest terms the unacceptable acts\ninternational law required the adoption of effective and by Croatian Government forces against personnel of the United\n Nations peacekeeping forces, including those which have\nimpartial measures, including by the Council. The resulted in the death of one Danish and two Czech members of\nsituation in Croatia had to remain under the close those forces, and expressing its condolences to the Governments\nscrutiny of the Council which would be prepared to concerned,\nconsider further measures to achieve compliance with\n Taking note of the agreement between the Republic of\nthe draft resolution. There were such measures that the Croatia and the United Nations Peace Forces signed on 6 August\nCouncil could take, and that should be remembered by __________________\n__________________\n 685 Ibid., pp. 13-15.\n 684 Ibid., p. 12.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 935\n"
[216] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n1995, and stressing the need for the Government of the Republic auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\nof Croatia to adhere strictly to its provisions, International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia;\n Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security and 10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the\nfreedom of movement of the personnel of the United Nations Council within three weeks of the adoption of the present\npeacekeeping operations in the territory of the former resolution on its implementation and on the implications of the\nYugoslavia, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the situation for the United Nations Confidence Restoration\nCharter of the United Nations, Operation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO, and expresses\n its readiness to consider promptly his recommendations in\n 1. Demands that the Government of the Republic of\n relation to UNCRO;\nCroatia cease immediately all military actions and that there be\nfull compliance with all Council resolutions, including 11. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and\nresolution 994 (1995); to consider further measures to achieve compliance with the\n present resolution.\n 2. Demands also that the Government of the Republic\nof Croatia, in conformity with internationally recognized Speaking after the vote, the representative of\nstandards and in compliance with the agreement of 6 August France noted that while Sector North and Sector South,\n1995 between the Republic of Croatia and the United Nations where the Croatian offensive unfolded, were part of\nPeace Forces, (a) respect fully the rights of the local Serb\npopulation, including their rights to remain, leave or return in\n Croatia, the Serb population in these regions did have\nsafety, (b) allow access to this population by international rights recognized by the international community. In\nhumanitarian organizations and (c) create conditions conducive that regard, he recalled that recognition of Croatia by\nto the return of those persons who have left their homes; the European Union was made expressly contingent on\n 3. Reminds the Government of the Republic of\n recognition by that State of the rights of the Serb\nCroatia of its responsibility to allow access for representatives minority. The speaker further stated that the resolutions\nof the International Committee of the Red Cross to members of of the Security Council made it incumbent upon the\nthe local Serb forces who are detained by the Croatian Croatian authorities to turn to negotiation to bring\nGovernment forces; about reintegration within the Republic of the\n 4. Reiterates that all those who commit violations of territories in question. By putting an end to discussions\ninternational humanitarian law will be held individually in Geneva with the Serb party in Croatia and\nresponsible in respect of such acts; deliberately choosing the military option to restore\n 5. Requests the Secretary-General, in cooperation\n their authority in these sectors, the Zagreb authorities\nwith the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the had taken a decision contrary to their international\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the obligations. Turning to the resolution, the speaker\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross and other relevant noted that the resolution just adopted was timely and\ninternational humanitarian institutions, to assess the fitting for three reasons. First, it placed very special\nhumanitarian situation of the local Serb population, including emphasis on respect for the rights of civilians. The\nthe problem of refugees and displaced persons, and to report Serb populations must be free to move about and those\nthereon as soon as possible;\n who had fled must be able to come back in satisfactory\n 6. Demands that the Government of the Republic of conditions of safety and security to their region of\nCroatia fully respect the status of United Nations personnel, origin. It was also essential that humanitarian\nrefrain from any attacks against them, bring to justice those organizations be able to monitor the situation.\nresponsible for any such attacks and ensure the safety and\nfreedom of movement of United Nations personnel at all times,\n Secondly, the resolution embodied a very forceful\nand requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed condemnation of the behaviour of Croatian\nof steps taken and decisions rendered in this regard; Government forces towards United Nations forces.\n Those responsible for violations of the laws of war\n 7. Urges the parties and others concerned to exercise\nmaximum restraint in and around Sector East, and requests the\n would have to be brought to justice. Finally, the\nSecretary-General to keep the situation there under review; resolution clearly warned that hostilities should not be\n pursued in the direction of Sector East, because that\n 8. Reminds all parties of their obligation to comply would raise by yet another notch the escalation and the\nfully with the provisions of resolution 816 (1993) of 31 March\n1993;\n risk of generalization of the conflict.686\n __________________\n 9. Reiterates its call for a negotiated settlement that\n 686 Ibid., pp. 16-17.\nguarantees the rights of all communities, and urges the\nGovernment of the Republic of Croatia to resume talks under the\n\n\n\n936 07-63109\n"
[217] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n The representative of the United States noted that The Secretary-General reported that since his last\nher Government regretted the decision by the report of 3 August and his letter of 7 August, neither\nGovernment of Croatia to launch an offensive against party had ceased military actions, nor had they\nthe Krajina region. It also urged all parties to refrain complied fully with relevant Security Council\nfrom further attacks, whether within Croatia or Bosnia resolutions. Tensions had remained high, especially in\nand Herzegovina. The speaker urged that it must be a Sector East, and the Croatian Army had not always\npriority for all parties to protect civilian refugees who prosecuted its campaigns with sufficient regard for the\nhad been forced to flee the military operations. The safety of United Nations personnel or Krajina Serb\nrights of those Serbs who chose to remain in Croatia civilians. Croatia’s reintegration by force of the former\nmust also be respected and it was essential that Sectors West, South and North had eliminated the need\ninternational agencies had unimpeded access to for infantry battalions in these areas. The Theatre Force\nobserve conditions in Krajina and provide Commander had therefore initiated the immediate\nhumanitarian relief where needed. The United States reduction of the UNCRO troop strength. The Secretary-\nexpected the war-crimes Tribunal to investigate General observed that UNCRO’s immediate task in\nallegations of abuse against unarmed civilians, and it Sector East was to try to re-establish the regime\njoined in condemning the wrongful acts committed created by the ceasefire agreement. If that could be\nagainst United Nations peacekeepers. The resolution achieved, he would be inclined to think that there\njust adopted reminded Croatia of its obligation to would be a continuing role for United Nations forces in\ncreate conditions conducive to the safe return of those Sector East. He had instructed his Special\npersons who had fled their homes, and it stressed the Representative to consult with the Government of\nimportance of granting the International Committee of Croatia and the local Serb leadership in Sector East, in\nthe Red Cross access to those who had been detained. order to define a possible mandate for UNCRO. He had\nAt the same time, while the United States regretted the also requested him to discuss with the Government of\nmeans used, it was also necessary to recognize that the Croatia what tasks, if any, UNCRO could perform\nnew safe area of Bihac was now open to humanitarian elsewhere in Croatia. The Secretary-General\nrelief.687 recommended that the Security Council approve the\n further repatriation, during the existing mandate, of all\n The President, speaking in his capacity as the\n remaining battalions, with the exception of two in\nrepresentative of Indonesia, stated that his delegation\n Sector East.690\nhad voted in favour of the resolution just adopted since\nit embodied principles that Indonesia had consistently By a letter dated 29 August 1995, 691 the President\nespoused, including commitment to the search for a of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General\ncomprehensive negotiated settlement of the conflicts in of the following:\nthe former Yugoslavia, the need to respect international The members of the Security Council have considered\nhumanitarian law and the inviolability of all United your report of 23 August 1995 pursuant to resolution 1009\nNations personnel, as well as the sovereignty and (1995).\nterritorial integrity of all States of the former\n The members of the Council agree with your\nYugoslavia.688 recommendation set out in paragraph 32 of that report\n concerning the repatriation of remaining battalions of the United\n Decision of 29 August 1995: letter from the Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is\n President to the Secretary-General known as UNCRO, with the exception of the two in Sector East.\n They support the views you express concerning the possible\n On 23 August 1995, pursuant to resolution 1009 future configuration and tasks of UNCRO and urge you to\n(1995), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council continue your contacts in this regard. They express their\na report on the implications of the situation in Croatia readiness to consider further recommendations in the light of\non the mandate of UNCRO. 689 those contacts. Pending such consideration, they stress the\n importance they attach to the retention of the current\n__________________\n configuration and tasks of UNCRO in Sector East. They\n 687 Ibid., p. 20. __________________\n 688 Ibid., p. 21.\n 690 Ibid., para. 32.\n 689 S/1995/730.\n 691 S/1995/748.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 937\n"
[218] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nunderline the need for a new spirit of cooperation with UNCRO The Council welcomes efforts made by the Secretary-\nthere and elsewhere in the Republic of Croatia. General in coordination with international humanitarian\n organizations in response to this acute humanitarian situation. It\n The members of the Council fully support you in your\n calls upon all Member States to provide urgent humanitarian\nefforts to ensure that the parties and others concerned exercise\n relief and assistance to those refugees and displaced persons.\nmaximum restraint in and around Sector East and pursue a\nnegotiated solution. The Council reiterates that all those who commit\n violations of international humanitarian law will be held\n The members of the Council note with concern the\n individually responsible in respect of such acts. The Council\ndifficulties you report concerning implementation by the\n reiterates in this context that all States shall cooperate fully with\nCroatian Government of the agreement on the status of forces.\n the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons\nThey look to the Croatian Government to implement fully and\n Responsible for Serious Violations of International\nunconditionally the terms of that agreement in all aspects.\n Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former\n The members of the Council express their concern over the Yugoslavia since 1991, established pursuant to its resolution 827\nhumanitarian problems described in your report. They stress the (1993), and its organs.\nimportance they attach to fulfilment of the provisions of the\n The Council will remain actively seized of the matter.\nCouncil’s resolutions in this regard and to efforts by the\ninternational community to alleviate the plight of refugees and\ndisplaced persons. Decision of 3 October 1995 (3584th meeting):\n statement by the President\n Decision of 7 September 1995 (3573rd meeting): At its 3584th meeting, on 3 October 1995, the\n statement by the President Council continued its consideration of the item.\n At its 3573rd meeting, on 7 September 1995, the Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\nCouncil included the report of the Secretary-General of invited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n23 August 1995 in its agenda. Following the adoption and Croatia, at their request, to participate in the\nof the agenda, the Council invited the representative of discussion without the right to vote. The President\nCroatia, at his request, to participate in the discussion (Nigeria) then stated that, after consultations among\nwithout the right to vote. The President (Italy) then members of the Security Council, he had been\nstated that, after consultations among members of the authorized to make the following statement on behalf\nSecurity Council, he had been authorized to make the of the Council:693\nfollowing statement on behalf of the Council:692 The Security Council expresses its concern at the\n humanitarian situation in and around the Republic of Croatia,\n The Security Council has considered the report of the\n including the situation of refugees from the Republic of Bosnia\nSecretary-General of 23 August 1995 submitted pursuant to its\n and Herzegovina.\nresolution 1009 (1995) of 10 August 1995 and in particular the\nhumanitarian situation and human rights violations described The Council is particularly concerned at the withdrawal of\ntherein. refugee status from and the consequent ending of assistance to\n many refugees from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at\n The Council expresses its deep concern at the grave\n present in the Republic of Croatia. The decisions of the\nsituation of refugees and persons displaced during the Croatian\n Government of Croatia in this regard may lead to the\noffensive and at reports of violations of international\n involuntary return of tens of thousands of people to an area that\nhumanitarian law as described in the report of the Secretary-\n is neither safe nor prepared to receive them. The Council\nGeneral. The Council shares the view of the Secretary-General\n stresses the importance of the principle of non-refoulement set\nthat the mass exodus of the local Serb population has created a\n out in the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of\nhumanitarian crisis of significant proportions. The Council is\n Refugees, to which Croatia is a party. The Council urges the\nalso concerned by reports of human rights violations, including\n Government of Croatia to continue to provide asylum to all\nthe burning of houses, looting of property and killings, and\n refugees regardless of their origin.\ndemands that the Government of Croatia immediately\ninvestigate all such reports and take appropriate measures to put The Council is also seriously concerned at the situation of\nan end to such acts. the refugees from the Republic of Croatia wishing to return, as\n well as of those ethnic Serbs who have chosen to remain in the\n The Council reiterates its demand that the Government of\n Republic of Croatia. It reiterates its demands, contained, inter alia,\nthe Republic of Croatia respect fully the rights of the local Serb\n in its resolution 1009 (1995), that the Government of Croatia\npopulation, including their right to remain or return in safety.\n respect fully the rights of the local Serb population, including\n__________________ __________________\n 692 S/PRST/1995/44. 693 S/PRST/1995/49.\n\n\n\n\n938 07-63109\n"
[219] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\ntheir right to remain or return in safety, investigate all reports of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Secretary-General therefore\nhuman rights violations and take appropriate measures to put an recommended that the Council approve the plan. It would\nend to such acts. The Council calls upon the Government of apply to the remainder of the current mandate of\nCroatia to lift any time-limits placed on the return of refugees to\nCroatia to reclaim their property. The Council also calls upon\n UNCRO, pending ongoing negotiations on the ultimate\nthe Government to cooperate with international humanitarian future of Sector East in the context of an overall political\norganizations in the creation of conditions conducive to the settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia.\nrepatriation of refugees in safety and dignity.\n By a letter dated 10 October 1995, 695 the\n The Council will remain actively seized of the matter. President of the Security Council informed the\n Secretary-General of the following:\n Decision of 10 October 1995: letter from the\n The members of the Security Council have considered\n President to the Secretary-General your report of 29 September 1995 submitted pursuant to Council\n On 29 September 1995, pursuant to resolution resolution 1009 (1995). The members of the Council agree with\n1009 (1995), the Secretary-General submitted to the the arrangements set out in that report for the remainder of the\n current mandate of the United Nations Confidence Restoration\nCouncil a report on consultations held by his Special Operation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO, pending, in\nRepresentative with the Government of Croatia, the case of Eastern Slavonia, the outcome of the ongoing\nBelgrade and the local Serb authorities in Sector East negotiations on the subject.\non the tasks of UNCRO.694 He reported that, after\nintensive consultations, his Special Representative had Decision of 22 November 1995 (3596th\nbeen assured by the parties that they were willing to meeting): resolution 1023 (1995)\nresolve the issue of Sector East through negotiation. In\naddition, both sides had undertaken to improve their By a letter dated 15 November 1995 addressed to\nlevel of compliance with existing agreements, and the Secretary-General, the representative of Croatia\nspecific regard to cooperation with UNCRO. Following transmitted the text of the Basic Agreement on the\nhis discussions, his Special Representative had Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western\nproposed a plan based on the six following main tasks: Sirmium, signed by the Government of Croatia and the\n(a) performing fully the functions envisaged in the local Croatian Serb authorities in Eastern Slavonia on\nCeasefire Agreement between Croatia and the local 12 November 1995.696 The Agreement provided, inter\nSerb authorities in Sector East; (b) facilitating the alia, that there would be a transitional period of\nimplementation of the sections of the Economic 12 months, extendable to 24 months if one of the parties\nAgreement of 2 December 1994 which were relevant to so requested, and that the Security Council would\nSector East, and arranging local economic initiatives as establish a Transitional Administration and an\nappropriate; (c) facilitating the implementation of all international force, respectively, to govern the region\nrelevant Council resolutions, including the functions during that transitional period and to maintain peace\nidentified in paragraph 72 of the Secretary-General’s and security.\nreport of 22 March 1995, in particular the continuation At its 3596th meeting, on 22 November 1995, the\nof confidence-building and humanitarian tasks, such as Council included the letter in its agenda. Following the\nassistance to refugees and displaced persons and the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nmonitoring of the treatment of ethnic minorities; representative of Croatia, at his request, to participate\n(d) assisting in controlling, by monitoring and reporting, in the discussion without the right to vote. The\nthe crossing of military personnel, equipment, supplies President (Oman) then drew the attention of the\nand weapons, over the international borders between Council members to the text of a draft resolution\nCroatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the submitted by Argentina, the Czech Republic, France,\nborder crossings where UNCRO was deployed; Germany, Honduras, Italy, the Russian Federation,\n(e) monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka __________________\npeninsula in accordance with resolution 779 (1992); and 695 S/1995/859.\n\n(f) observing and reporting on military incidents in the 696 S/1995/951.\n\nvicinity of the international border between Croatia and\n__________________\n 694 S/1995/835.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 939\n"
[220] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nRwanda, the United Kingdom and the United States, 697 cautioned that those requests involved many\nas well as to several other documents.698 complicated political and legal issues, thus making it\n necessary to conduct careful studies and to refrain from\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of\n making hasty decisions as to how the United Nations\nthe Russian Federation pointed out that the Basic\n might facilitate and participate in the implementation\nAgreement on the Region of Slavonia, Baranja and\n of the peace plan in the region.700\nWestern Sirmium had been made possible by the\nparties’ realism and sense of responsibility, as well as The representative of the Czech Republic stated\nthe considerable contribution of international mediators that the cornerstone of the Basic Agreement was the\nand States members of the Contact Group. The Basic setting up of a Transitional Administration in Sector\nAgreement provided for restoration of security East for one year. His delegation had noted with\nguarantees that had been undermined for the entire concern, however, the generality of many of the\npopulation during the years of conflict, securing for provisions of the Basic Agreement. It understood from\nCroats, Serbs and representatives of other nationalities, that fact that the parties had agreed on general language\nin equal measure, basic human rights and freedoms, but had been divided on the details, thus passing over to\nadequate conditions for the return of refugees, and the Council the “hot potato” of the details. The parties\nnormalization of life. The Agreement also removed the were eager to pass the responsibility for the consent of\nobstacles to the full normalization of relations between their Agreement to the Council, even while the Czech\nCroatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which delegation had always argued that the prime\nwas of decisive significance for a comprehensive responsibility for shaping their future must reside with\nsettlement of the crisis in the Balkans. In that regard, the parties in conflict themselves.701\nthe Russian Federation believed that the draft\n The representative of Germany observed that the\nresolution before the Council was appropriate and\n Basic Agreement was based on two important\ntimely. In its view, the United Nations must play an\n principles. On the one side, the sovereignty of Croatia\nimportant role in the promotion of the peace process,\n with regard to Eastern Slavonia was acknowledged. On\nincluding the creation of a Transitional Administration\n the other hand, there needed to be full protection of\nand an international force. The Russian Federation, for its\n and guarantees for the rights of the local Serb\npart was prepared to continue its contribution to ensuring\n population. The speaker cautioned, however, that there\npeace and security in the region. It also supported the\n should be no misunderstanding: the Basic Agreement\ncontinuation and expansion of international efforts to\n would enter into force only upon the Council’s\nensure human rights in Croatia. 699\n adoption of a resolution establishing a Transitional\n The representative of China stated that his Administration and authorizing an international force.\ndelegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution Thus, the Basic Agreement conferred upon the Security\non the basis of its position that, in any settlement of the Council important responsibilities. In the following\nCroatian question, the sovereignty and territorial days and weeks, the members of the Council would\nintegrity of Croatia should be respected and that the have to work intensively on the details and modalities\nGovernment of Croatia and the local Serbian of the envisaged international force and Transitional\nauthorities should seek a solution acceptable to both Administration. Ultimately, however, it was only the\nsides to the conflict, through peaceful negotiation. Government of Croatia and the local Serb party that\nNoting that the Agreement contained requests to the could make the Basic Agreement a success. It was\nUnited Nations and the Security Council concerning therefore right that the draft resolution stressed the\nauthorization by the Council of a Transitional need for them to cooperate fully on the basis of the\nAdministration and an international force, the speaker Agreement and to refrain from any measures that might\n__________________ hinder its implementation. That also held true for the\n 697 S/1995/979. Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.702\n 698 Letter dated 6 October 1995 from the representative of\n __________________\n Croatia addressed to the President of the Security\n 700 Ibid., p. 3.\n Council (S/1995/843); and letter dated 15 November\n 701 Ibid., p. 4.\n 1995 from the representative of Ukraine addressed to the\n 702 Ibid., pp. 4-5.\n Secretary-General (S/1995/964).\n 699 S/PV.3596, pp. 2-3.\n\n\n\n\n940 07-63109\n"
[221] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and lasting peace for all the inhabitants of Eastern\nwas adopted unanimously as resolution 1023 (1995), Slavonia. It was necessary to show that the\nwhich reads: international community supported the peace process\n The Security Council,\n under way and the principles that had inspired it,\n including: the sovereignty and territorial integrity of\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, Croatia; the recognition and protection of the\n Reaffirming its commitment to the search for an overall fundamental rights of the whole population of the\nnegotiated settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, region; the need for the rapid return of all displaced\nensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the States persons and refugees; and the guarantee that all the\nthere within their internationally recognized borders, and inhabitants of Eastern Slavonia would be able to live in\nstressing the importance it attaches to the mutual recognition peace and dignity.703\nthereof,\n Reaffirming once again its commitment to the\n The representative of the United States noted that\nindependence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the the resolution just adopted was an important step in\nRepublic of Croatia, and emphasizing in this regard that the building confidence between Croatians and Serbs, but\nterritories of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, much still remained to be done before a final peace was\nknown as Sector East, are integral parts of the Republic of established. The parties to the Basic Agreement had\nCroatia, asked the international community not only to\n Affirming the importance it attaches to full respect for underwrite, but also to administer the region in its\nhuman rights and fundamental freedoms of all in those transition period. That was a large undertaking, which\nterritories, would require consultation, planning and coordination\n Commending the continuing efforts of the representatives between interested parties. Before concluding, the\nof the United Nations, the European Union, the Russian speaker noted that the efforts of the Security Council,\nFederation and the United States of America to facilitate a including establishing and enforcing sanctions,\nnegotiated solution to the conflict in the Republic of Croatia, authorizing peacekeeping forces, and responding\n 1. Welcomes the Basic Agreement on the Region of aggressively to human rights violations on all sides,\nEastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium between the had finally come to fruition, through the initialling of\nGovernment of the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb the Dayton Agreement and the adoption of the Basic\nrepresentatives, signed on 12 November 1995 in the presence of Agreement.704\nthe United Nations mediator and the United States Ambassador\nto the Republic of Croatia; The President, speaking in his capacity as the\n representative of Oman, while welcoming the signing\n 2. Recognizes the request to it contained in the Basic\nAgreement to establish a transitional administration and\n of the Basic Agreement, cautioned that the Agreement\nauthorize an appropriate international force, stands ready to was not an end in itself. Rather, it was a first step\nconsider the above request expeditiously in order to facilitate the towards establishing peace and the normalization of\nimplementation of the Agreement, and invites the Secretary- relations in that region. Referring to the resolution just\nGeneral to maintain the closest possible contact with all those adopted, he stated that the most important provision\nconcerned in order to assist with its work on the matter; was the reference to mutual recognition between all\n 3. Stresses the need for the Government of the States in the area of the former Yugoslavia. Such\nRepublic of Croatia and the local Serb party to cooperate fully recognition would ensure the sovereignty and\non the basis of the Basic Agreement and refrain from any territorial integrity of all the States within their\nmilitary activity or any measure that might hinder the internationally recognized borders, helping to establish\nimplementation of the transitional arrangements set out in it, and confidence between the States of the region.705\nreminds them of their obligation to cooperate fully with the\nUnited Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia,\n __________________\nwhich is known as UNCRO, and to ensure its safety and\n 703 Ibid., p. 6.\nfreedom of movement;\n 704 Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n 4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter. 705 Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of\nFrance stated that the principle goal of the resolution\njust adopted, was to establish and guarantee a just and\n\n\n\n07-63109 941\n"
[222] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n Decision of 30 November 1995 (3600th the presence of UNCRO, for a period of two months,\n meeting): resolution 1025 (1995) as a transitional arrangement pending the establishment\n of an international force; designate, as quickly as\n On 23 November 1995, pursuant to resolutions\n possible, a civilian transitional administrator for the\n981 (1995), 982 (1995) and 983 (1995), the Secretary-\n region; and determine the date on which\nGeneral submitted to the Council a report on the\n implementation of the Basic Agreement should begin.\npeacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia.706\nThe report was intended to assist the Council in its At its 3600th meeting, on 30 November 1995, the\ndeliberations on the future of those missions, as their Council included the report of the Secretary-General in\nmandates were due to terminate on 30 November 1995. its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\nThe Secretary-General observed that the Basic Agreement Council invited the representative of Croatia, at his\non the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western request, to participate in the discussion without the\nSirmium was a landmark accomplishment that provided right to vote. The President (Oman) then drew the\nfor the peaceful integration into Croatia of the region attention of the Council members to the text of a draft\nknown as Sector East. Recalling that the Basic resolution submitted by Argentina, the Czech Republic,\nAgreement requested the Council to establish a France, Germany, Honduras, Italy, the Russian\ntransitional administration and to authorize an Federation, the United Kingdom and the United\ninternational force, he stressed that timeliness of its States, 707 and to a letter dated 15 November 1995 from\nimplementation was of the essence for the present the representative of Croatia addressed to the\nmomentum of peace to be sustained and required full Secretary-General. 708\ninternational support. Addressing the future of UNCRO,\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of\nthe Secretary-General stated that there appeared to be\n China said that his delegation agreed in principle with\nonly two realistic options. Either the Security Council\n the Secretary-General’s proposal that the mandate of\ncould decide to terminate the functions of UNCRO\n the three United Nations peacekeeping operations in\nwhen its mandate expired on 30 November 1995, in the\n the former Yugoslavia be extended so that studies\nexpectation that interested States, international\n might be conducted on ways and means for the United\norganizations and other institutions would assume\n Nations to participate in peacekeeping operations in\nresponsibility for implementing the Basic Agreement\n that region in the future, and would vote in favour of\non the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and\n the draft resolutions before the Council. The speaker\nWestern Sirmium (the former Sector East), or the\n pointed out that many lessons had been learned from\nCouncil could decide to maintain UNCRO for a limited\n the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the\nperiod, during which it would perform its existing tasks\n region. For instance, mandatory action under\nuntil the transitional administration was established\n Chapter VII of the Charter involving the use of force,\nand an international force deployed.\n including air power, had been “most improper” and had\n The Secretary-General further noted that, the affected the legal and neutral status of those\nPresident of Croatia had stated clearly that he could not peacekeeping operations. Noting that the Basic\nagree to a further extension of the UNCRO mandate, Agreement and the Dayton Agreement both contained\nalthough he would agree to retain the two currently requests for the implementation of peace in that region,\ndeployed UNCRO battalions as a transitional the speaker also observed that the United Nations and\narrangement. The President of Croatia had also insisted the Council would undoubtedly have to shoulder\nthat the implementation of the Basic Agreement, important responsibilities, since those requests\nparticularly its demilitarization aspects, begin on involved many complex political, legal, military and\n1 December. The Secretary-General warned, however, financial questions. The Council therefore needed to\nthat to terminate the UNCRO mandate on 30 November study those questions carefully and to discuss them\n1995, without certainty that other institutions were able thoroughly, in order to take a sound decision. Referring\nto assume responsibility for the implementation of the to recent discussion on the potential deployment of\nBasic Agreement, could severely destabilize the area. implementation forces in the former Yugoslavia, the\nHe therefore recommended that the Council confirm __________________\n__________________ 707 S/1995/994.\n\n 706 S/1995/987. 708 S/1995/951.\n\n\n\n\n942 07-63109\n"
[223] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nspeaker cautioned that such deployment could amount 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of\nto a major operation. He argued that those operations 23 November 1995;\nshould be placed under the control and guidance of the 2. Requests the Secretary-General to submit for\nCouncil, so that it could prevent the operations from consideration by the Council at the earliest possible date and no\ndeparting from the principles governing United Nations later than 14 December 1995 a report on all aspects of the\npeacekeeping operations and avoid the “abuse of establishment by the Council of an operation consisting of a\nforce” and involvement in the conflict. He cautioned transitional administration and a transitional peacekeeping force\n to implement the relevant provisions of the Basic Agreement on\nthat the Council should not become a “rubber stamp” the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium,\nwith regard to matters beyond its control and that no including on the possibilities for assistance from the host\n“blank cheques” should be written. In addressing such country in offsetting the costs of the operation;\nquestions, the Council should adopt a prudent and\n 3. Decides that, in order to allow for the orderly\nresponsible approach, rather than rushing into any establishment of the operation referred to in paragraph 2 above,\ncommitments or decisions.709 the mandate of UNCRO shall terminate after an interim period\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and ending on 15 January 1996 or when the Council has decided on\n the deployment, including on the necessary period for the\nwas adopted unanimously as resolution 1025 (1995), transfer of authority, of the transitional peacekeeping force\nwhich reads: referred to in that paragraph, whichever is sooner;\n The Security Council, 4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions and in\nparticular its resolution 981 (1995) of 31 March 1995, Decision of 22 December 1995 (3615th meeting):\n Recalling also the report of the Secretary-General of\n statement by the President\n29 September 1995 and the letter dated 10 October 1995 from On 21 December 1995, pursuant to resolution\nthe President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General, 1019 (1995), the Secretary-General submitted to the\n Reaffirming its resolution 1023 (1995) of 22 November Council a report on the human rights situation in\n1995, Croatia.710 The Secretary-General observed that human\n Reaffirming once again its commitment to the rights violations continued to be reported in the former\nindependence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic Sectors North and South. The right of Krajina Serbs to\nof Croatia, and emphasizing in this regard that the territories of remain in their homes had not been adequately\nEastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, known as safeguarded. The remaining Serbs had faced extensive\nSector East, are integral parts of the Republic of Croatia, harassment and intimidation; looters and armed thieves\n Affirming the importance it attaches to full respect for the had robbed Serb residents of both their property and\nhuman rights and fundamental freedoms of all in those their sense of security. Furthermore, the rights of the\nterritories and elsewhere in the Republic of Croatia, Serb population who had fled during the military\n Welcoming again the Basic Agreement on the Region of operation to return to their homes were being seriously\nEastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium between the curtailed by the absence of constructive measures to\nGovernment of the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb facilitate their return. In addition, the rights of the\nrepresentatives, signed on 12 November 1995, minority population in Croatia were being restricted by\n Welcoming the positive role played by the United Nations changes in the Constitution. New legal provisions, such\nConfidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known as as the law concerning the return and reclamation of\nUNCRO, and paying tribute to the personnel of UNCRO in the property, were inhibiting the full enjoyment of human\nperformance of their mandate, rights and fundamental freedoms. It was therefore\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of necessary to ensure that the rights of the Serb minority\n23 November 1995, were adequately safeguarded in Croatia’s legal and\n constitutional framework.\n Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security and\nfreedom of movement of the personnel of United Nations At its 3615th meeting, on 22 December 1995, the\npeacekeeping operations in the territory of the former Council included the report in its agenda. Following\nYugoslavia, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nCharter of the United Nations, __________________\n__________________ 710 S/1995/1051.\n 709 S/PV.3600, pp. 2-3.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 943\n"
[224] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nrepresentative of Croatia, at his request, to participate General of NATO,713 and a letter dated 19 November\nin the discussion without the right to vote. The 1994 from the representative of Bosnia and\nPresident (Russian Federation) then stated that, after Herzegovina addressed to the President of the\nconsultations among members of the Security Council, Council. 714 In the letter to the President of the\nhe had been authorized to make the following Council, 715 the President of Croatia reported that rebel\nstatement on behalf of the Council:711 Serb forces had been attacking Bosnia and\n The Security Council takes note of the report of the\n Herzegovina from the United Nations Protected Areas\nSecretary-General of 21 December 1995, which it has just in Croatia, including via air strikes, artillery barrages\nreceived. and cross-border ground troop attacks. His Government\n urgently requested assistance from the United Nations\n The Council, as a matter of urgency, expresses its grave\nconcern that, according to information in that report, the\n in ending those attacks, in the form of air strikes\nGovernment of the Republic of Croatia has ignored the call of against the attacking Serb forces. In the letter to the\nthe Council in the statement by its President of 3 October 1995 Secretary-General of NATO,716 the President of\nthat it lift any time-limits placed on the return of refugees to Croatia noted that, in order to end the attacks on\nreclaim their property. The requirement that owners must Bosnia and Herzegovina from Croatian soil by rebel\nreclaim their property by 27 December 1995 constitutes a Serb forces in the United Nations Protected Areas, his\nvirtually insurmountable obstacle for most Serb refugees. Government approved the use of NATO air strikes\n The Council strongly demands that the Government of the against those forces for a period of one week.\nRepublic of Croatia lift immediately any time-limits placed on\nthe return of refugees to reclaim their property. The representative of Croatia stated that the\n actions by the so-called Krajina Serb forces in Croatia\n The Council shall continue its consideration of the report could no longer be tolerated and he urged that, upon its\nof the Secretary-General.\n adoption, the draft resolution should be fully\n implemented. His delegation was pleased that the draft\n L. The situation prevailing in and around resolution would further strengthen Croatia’s territorial\n the safe area of Bihac integrity and sovereignty. The speaker further stated\n that Croatia would continue to play its constructive\n Initial proceedings role in the peace process so long as the international\n community continued to uphold its commitment to\n Decision of 19 November 1994 (3461st meeting): Croatia in full compliance with the relevant Security\n resolution 958 (1994) Council resolutions but he warned that his country\n would not wait for ever. He argued that the continuing\n At its 3461st meeting, on 19 November 1994, the violations of Croatia’s borders, such as the violations\nSecurity Council included the item entitled “The of resolution 820 (1993) and of the border-monitoring\nsituation prevailing in and around the safe area of mission arrangements of the International Conference\nBihac” in its agenda. Following the adoption of the on the Former Yugoslavia, contributed to the escalation of\nagenda, the Council invited the representatives of activities in the Bihac region by providing fuel for those\nBosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Germany, at their attacking Bihac. Croatia demanded that the illegal\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the trans-shipment of fuel and goods stop immediately. 717\nright to vote. The President (United States) then drew\nthe attention of the Council members to the text of a The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\ndraft resolution submitted by France, Germany, the said that his delegation was not convinced that the\nRussian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the draft resolution was necessary in order to allow an\nUnited States,712 as well as to a letter dated 18 November appropriate response to the attacks against the Bihac\n1994 from the representative of Croatia to the safe area. He contended that the basis for such action\nPresident of the Council, transmitting two letters of the already existed. He added that the actions by the\n __________________\nsame date from the President of Croatia addressed to the\n 713 S/1994/1312.\nPresident of the Security Council and the Secretary- 714 S/1994/1319.\n__________________\n 715 S/1994/1312, annex I.\n 711 S/PRST/1995/63.\n 716 Ibid., annex II.\n 712 S/1994/1316.\n 717 S/PV.3461, pp. 2-3.\n\n\n\n\n944 07-63109\n"
[225] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nso-called Krajina Serbs were also violations of the Determining that the situation in the Former Yugoslavia\nno-fly zone, of the supposedly demilitarized status of continues to constitute a threat to international peace and\nthe United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia, and of security, and determined to support the United Nations\n Protection Force in the performance of its mandate set out in\nthe territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Any paragraphs 5 and 9 of resolution 836 (1993), and to this end\nattack against the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\nwould amount to a violation of its territorial integrity,\nrequiring the necessary response to such aggression as Decides that the authorization given in paragraph 10 of its\n resolution 836 (1993) to Member States, acting nationally or\na threat to international peace and security, regardless through regional organizations or arrangements, to take, under\nof whether or not it involved a safe area. The speaker the authority of the Security Council and subject to close\nalso expressed the view that, under the draft resolution, coordination with the Secretary-General and the United Nations\nany cross-border attack against civilians or UNPROFOR Protection Force, all necessary measures, through the use of air\ntargets within the Bihac region would meet with a power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia\nresponse. He urged the Council to adopt further and Herzegovina referred to in its resolution 824 (1993) of\nmeasures to improve the situation, provide the 6 May 1993, to support the Force in the performance of its\n mandate set out in paragraphs 5 and 9 of its resolution 836\nnecessary practical support for UNPROFOR within the (1993) shall apply also to such measures taken in the Republic\nBihac area, and put an end to measures inconsistent of Croatia.\nwith the peace process. In particular, he urged the\nCouncil to foreclose all flows of fuel to the Krajina Speaking after the vote, the representative of the\nSerbs from Serbia and Montenegro through the United Kingdom contended that the resolution just\noccupied areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. adopted was needed to close the gap revealed by the air\nHe referred to estimates that Bosnian Serb forces attacks launched by Krajina Serb forces in Bihac and\nneeded 5 to 15 truckloads of fuel per day to pursue was in line with the approach the Council had received\ntheir war effort and noted that, according to reports from President Tudjman and the Croatian authorities.\nfrom the Border Monitoring Mission of the He added that the resolution was clear and\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, straightforward and simply extended the provisions of\nbetween 15 and 20 fuel trucks were in fact being resolution 836 (1993), in relation to the use of air\nallowed across the border from Serbia and Montenegro power, to Croatian territory. The resolution mirrored in\neach day. That fuel was enough for both the so-called every way paragraph 10 of resolution 836 (1993), and\nBosnian Serbs and Krajina Serbs to carry out the the procedures to implement it would similarly mirror\nattacks that the Council was seeking to confront with these set in place to implement that resolution. It made\nthe draft resolution before it.718 possible the extension of the geographical scope of\n existing procedures for the use of air power rather than\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and creating new ones. 719\nwas adopted unanimously as resolution 958 (1994),\nwhich reads: The representative of France recalled that the\n UNPROFOR Commander had asked for an appropriate\n The Security Council, response, with the use of air strikes, to the aerial\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, in particular bombardment of Bihac. His Government took the view\nits resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, that resolutions 836 (1993) and 908 (1994) made it\n Recalling also the statements by the President of the possible to respond favourably to that request. His\nSecurity Council of 13 November and 18 November 1994, and delegation regretted that none of the options proposed\nreiterating its concern about the deteriorating situation in and by the UNPROFOR Commander had been adopted.\naround the safe area of Bihac, France believed that, in situations that clearly\n Having considered the letter dated 18 November 1994 identified the aggressor and the victim, the response\nfrom the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia called for by UNPROFOR should be put into effect as\naddressed to the President of the Security Council, soon as possible. He also believed that the resolution\n Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty and\n would contribute to that. 720\nterritorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, __________________\n__________________ 719 Ibid., p. 4.\n 720 Ibid., p. 4.\n 718 Ibid., pp. 3-4.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 945\n"
[226] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation “all necessary measures”, which seemed to be\nstated that his delegation voted in favour of the becoming a standard expression of the Council\nresolution just adopted, because it believed that the associated with the use of military force, to the\norder which had been established for the use of air detriment of diplomatic efforts. It was also his\npower in Bosnia and Herzegovina and surrounding delegation’s understanding, as had been confirmed by\nareas and which had now been extended to the territory the sponsors of the resolution, that the requirement\nof Croatia to ensure the protection of the Bihac safe contained in paragraph 11 of resolution 836 (1993),\narea, fully corresponded to the rules for the use of air relating to the need for Member States cooperating\npower in the other safe areas. It was important that the with UNPROFOR to report to the Council through the\nresolution confirmed that the appropriate measures Secretary-General, also applied to the resolution just\nwould be taken under the guidance of the Security adopted.723\nCouncil and in close coordination with the Secretary- The President, speaking in her capacity as the\nGeneral and UNPROFOR. In that context, the speaker representative of the United States, stated that the\nstressed that the use of air power by the United Nations Council had clarified that the use of air power was\nforces should be impartial, regardless of who might be authorized to attack targets in Croatia that threatened\nthe violator. It was also important that the main safe areas in Bosnia or United Nations troops operating\nprinciple of the safe areas be fully and consistently in Bosnia. Referring to the fact that the previous day,\nimplemented. These areas were intended for the after the Krajina Serbs had attacked Bosnia, the United\n Nations Commander for the Former Yugoslavia had\nprotection of the civilian population and could not be raised the issue of a NATO response from the air, she\nused for offensive military action or for preparations noted that her Government believed that an immediate,\nfor such action. The best solution would be the affirmative response would have been legally\ndemilitarization of the safe areas.721 authorized by previous resolutions of the Council. 724\n The representative of China stated that his\ndelegation had voted in favour of the resolution just M. Letter dated 14 December 1994 from\nadopted because it was aimed at protecting the safe the Chairman of the Security Council\narea of Bihac and the safety of the civilians there, as Committee established pursuant to\nwell as at ensuring that the UNPROFOR mandate was resolution 724 (1991) concerning\nsuccessfully implemented. He, however, expressed his\n Yugoslavia addressed to the President\ndelegation’s reservations concerning the mandatory\nactions authorized by invoking Chapter VII of the of the Security Council\nCharter in the resolution and said that the Security\nCouncil should be extremely prudent and cautious Initial proceedings\nregarding the use of air power in Croatia. Air power\nshould be used only for the purpose of self-defence to Decision of 14 December 1994 (3480th meeting):\nprotect the safety and security of UNPROFOR resolution 967 (1994)\npersonnel and the civilians in the safe area. It should By a letter dated 14 December 1994 addressed to\nnot be “abused” for punitive or pre-emptive purposes. the President of the Security Council, the Chairman of\nMoreover, in the use of air power, strict measures the Security Council Committee established by\nshould be taken to avoid harming innocent civilians. 722 resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia, reported\n The representative of Brazil stated that, while his that the Acting Executive Director of United Nations\ndelegation concurred with the need for a technical Children’s Fund (UNICEF) had informed the\nadjustment to resolution 836 (1993) in order to protect Committee that several countries in Central Asia and\nthe safe area of Bihac, it was nevertheless concerned Eastern Europe were facing a major resurgence of\nthat the “extraordinary” recourse to air power was diphtheria and that the only available stocks of\nbeing extended to another country. He reiterated his antiserum to combat this serious condition were\ndelegation’s reservations on the use of the expression located in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.725 The\n__________________ __________________\n 723 Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n 721 Ibid., p. 5.\n 724 Ibid., pp. 9-10.\n 722 Ibid., p. 7.\n 725 S/1994/1418.\n\n\n\n\n946 07-63109\n"
[227] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nActing Executive Director of UNICEF had therefore N. The situation in the former Yugoslavia\nrequested that the Committee facilitate the shipment of\n12,000 vials of diphtheria antiserum from the Federal Initial proceedings\nRepublic of Yugoslavia for use in the affected\ncountries. The Chairman noted that, taking into Decision of 6 October 1995 (3585th meeting):\naccount the exceptional humanitarian circumstances of statement by the President\nthe situation, the Committee had decided to\nrecommend that the Council adopt a resolution At its 3585th meeting, on 6 October 1995, the\npermitting, for a period of 30 days, the export from the Security Council included the item entitled “The\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia of 12,000 vials of situation in the former Yugoslavia” in its agenda.\ndiphtheria antiserum. The Committee had also Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\nrecommended that any payments for such authorized invited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nshipments should be made only into frozen accounts. and Croatia, at their request, to participate in the\n discussion without the right to vote.\n At its 3480th meeting, on 14 December 1994, the\nCouncil began its consideration of the item. Following The President (Nigeria) then stated that, after\nthe adoption of the agenda, the President (Rwanda) consultations among members of the Security Council,\ndrew the attention of the Council members to the text he had been authorized to make the following\nof a draft resolution that had been prepared in the statement on behalf of the Council:727\ncourse of the Council’s prior consultations.726 The The Security Council welcomes the 5 October\ndraft resolution was then put to the vote and was 1995 agreement by the Bosnian parties to a ceasefire,\nadopted unanimously as resolution 967 (1994), which including the agreement to terminate all hostile\nreads: military activities throughout the territory of the\n The Security Council, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as of 10 October\n 1995, provided that full gas and electrical utility\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the\n service is restored to Sarajevo. It welcomes all efforts\nsituation in the Former Yugoslavia, in particular its resolution\n757 (1992) of 30 May 1992,\n to restore such service and calls upon the parties to\n cooperate fully with such efforts. The Council urges\n Taking note of the letter dated 14 December 1994 from the parties fully to comply with all provisions in the\nthe Chairman of the Security Council Committee established\n ceasefire agreement once they come into effect.\npursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia and the\ncommunication from the Acting Executive Director of the The Council also welcomes the decision of the\nUnited Nations Children’s Fund of 13 December 1994 annexed Governments of the Republic of Bosnia and\nthereto, in which the Council is informed of a major resurgence\n Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal\nof diphtheria and that the only available stocks of antiserum to\ncombat this serious condition are located in the Federal Republic\n Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to\nof Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), attend proximity peace talks by the end of this month,\n to be followed by a peace conference. It reiterates that\n Recognizing that the export of antiserum from the Federal\n there can be no military solution to the conflict in the\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) will require an\nexemption from the provisions of resolution 757 (1992) of\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and strongly\n30 May 1992, and acting in this respect under Chapter VII of the urges the parties to negotiate in good faith on the basis\nCharter of the United Nations, of the Agreed Basic Principles signed at Geneva on\n 8 September 1995, and the Further Agreed Principles\n 1. Decides to permit, for a period of thirty days from\nthe date of the adoption of the present resolution, the export of\n of 26 September 1995.\n12,000 vials of diphtheria antiserum from the Federal Republic The Council also welcomes the agreement of\nof Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);\n 3 October 1995 by the Government of the Republic of\n 2. Decides further that any payments for such Croatia and the local Croatian Serb authorities in\nauthorized shipments shall be made only into frozen accounts; Eastern Slavonia to guiding basic principles for\n 3. Decides to remain seized of the matter. negotiations. It strongly urges both parties to negotiate\n __________________\n__________________ 727 S/PRST/1995/50.\n 726 S/1994/1419.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 947\n"
[228] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nin good faith towards a peaceful final settlement to the self-proclaimed entities de facto exercising\nconflict consistent with the Council’s resolutions. governmental functions — must comply with their\n legal obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal.\n Decision of 9 November 1995 (3591st meeting):\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of\n resolution 1019 (1995)\n Germany recalled that his delegation had taken the\n At its 3591st meeting, on 9 November 1995, the initiative in October for another attempt to establish\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the situation in the fate and the whereabouts of the missing Bosnian\nthe former Yugoslavia. Following the adoption of the men from Srebrenica, Zepa and the Banja Luka area.\nagenda, the Council invited the representatives of That initiative had led to the draft resolution before the\nBosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, Council. Noting that the draft resolution also addressed\nto participate in the discussion without the right to the human rights situation in Croatia, the speaker\nvote. The Council also invited Mr. Vladislav stated that, while his delegation was deeply concerned\nJovanovic, at his request, to take a seat at the side of about the situation in Croatia, it was also aware of the\nthe Council chamber. different qualitative and quantitative dimensions of the\n violations of international humanitarian law and human\n The President (Oman) then drew the attention of\n rights committed by the Bosnian Serbs. He pointed out\nthe Council members to the text of a draft resolution\n that the Croatian side had consistently granted access\nsubmitted by Argentina, the Czech Republic, France,\n to human rights observers to the Krajina region,\nGermany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United\n whereas the Bosnian Serbs had systematically blocked\nKingdom and the United States.728 He also drew the\n all access to the Bosnian Serb sites in question. That\nattention of the Council members to a letter dated\n attitude had led to the formal request from the\n31 October 1995 in which the President of the\n President of the Tribunal for the Security Council to\nInternational Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons\n consider further measures to achieve cooperation by\nResponsible for Serious Violations of International\n the Bosnian Serbs with the Tribunal. Germany felt that\nHumanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the\n there was an urgent need for the Council to react to the\nFormer Yugoslavia informed the President of the\n strong indications of war crimes and to prevent further\nCouncil that an indictment against an individual named\n human rights violations in the area. It welcomed the\nDragan Nikolic had been issued on 4 November 1994,\n request in the draft resolution to the Secretary-General\nand that the Tribunal had requested that both the\n to submit a written report on recent violations of\nGovernment of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\n international humanitarian law in Srebrenica, Zepa and\nBosnian Serb administration issue a warrant for his\n the wider Banja Luka area as such a report would\narrest.729 The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n provide a solid base of information upon which the\nhad indicated that Mr. Nikolic was residing in territory\n Security Council could act.730\noutside their control, but the Bosnian Serb\nadministration had not responded to the Tribunal’s The representative of China stated that, as the\nrequest. The letter noted that, under Article 29 of the main purpose of the draft resolution was to call for the\nstatute of the Tribunal, States were obligated to early settlement of the questions regarding persons\ncooperate with the Tribunal. It also recalled that, in detained or reported missing, his delegation would vote\nresolution 771 (1992), the Council had decided, acting in favour of it. He argued, however, that each United\nunder Chapter VII of the Charter, that all parties in the Nations body had its own responsibilities and functions\nformer Yugoslavia, and all military forces in Bosnia and should act accordingly to fulfil its own mandate, as\nand Herzegovina, should comply with the resolution, set forth in the Charter. The Security Council should\nfailing which the Council would need to take further not, in principle, deal with questions of human rights.\nmeasures under the Charter. The letter further noted Moreover, the Council should refrain from involving\nthat, in order for the Tribunal to succeed in its mandate itself in the Tribunal’s work, as the Tribunal had its\nof prosecuting serious violations of international own explicit provisions for the prosecution of persons\nhumanitarian law, all States in the region — including responsible for serious violations of international\n__________________ humanitarian law. The Chinese delegation therefore\n 728 S/1995/940. __________________\n 729 S/1995/910. 730 S/PV.3591, pp. 2-3.\n\n\n\n\n948 07-63109\n"
[229] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nhad reservations with regard to the relevant portions of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia,\nthe draft resolution.731 regardless of who committed them. The Russian\n Federation was seriously concerned by reports on\n The representative of the United Kingdom stated\n violations of international humanitarian law in\nthat the draft resolution underlined the importance the\n Srebrenica and Zepa, as well as by the fact that\nCouncil attached to the highest respect for human\n representatives of the Office of the United Nations\nrights and international humanitarian law in the former\n High Commissioner for Refugees and the International\nYugoslavia, making it clear that there were no\n Committee of the Red Cross had still not been allowed\nexceptions and that all parties must comply with their\n access to the regions where those violations were\nobligations. Against that background, however, it was\n thought to have occurred. The wording of the draft\nright that the Council should address three recent and\n resolution in that respect was “tough but fair”, while\ndeeply disturbing events: the disappearance of large\n setting out clearly the Council’s conviction that there\nnumbers of civilians following the fall of Srebrenica\n must not be a selective approach to the protection of\nand Zepa to Bosnian Serb forces; the brutal campaign\n human rights in the former Yugoslavia. Before\nof “ethnic cleansing” in the Banja Luka region; and\n concluding, the speaker noted that the Russian\nsystematic violations of the rights of Croatian Serbs in\n Federation supported the demand to all States and\nthe Krajinas. The speaker reminded the parties of their\n parties in the former Yugoslavia to cooperate with the\nobligation to cooperate fully with the work of the\n Tribunal, and confirmed his delegation’s position with\nTribunal, calling on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n regard to the inadmissibility of the use of the\nto facilitate the establishment of an office of the\n Tribunal’s activities to “demonize” any parties to the\nTribunal in that country without delay, and on the\n conflict. He argued that it was the task of the Tribunal\nBosnian Serbs to comply with the Tribunal’s orders and\n to elucidate the truth and to punish appropriately those\ndecisions. 732\n specific persons whose guilt of crimes against\n The representative of Botswana expressed the humanity had been established, regardless of their\nstrong disquiet of his delegation at the reported ethnic or religious affiliation. 734\nincidents of human rights violations perpetrated by the\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and\nBosnian Serbs and insisted that they abide by the\n was adopted unanimously as resolution 1019 (1995),\nresolutions of the Council, and cooperate fully with the\n which reads:\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross and other\ninternational humanitarian organizations. Against that The Security Council,\nbackground Botswana would vote in favour of the draft Recalling all its earlier resolutions on the situation in the\nresolution. The speaker noted, however, that while it Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reaffirming its\nwas almost impossible to draw a line between the resolutions 1004 (1995) of 12 July 1995 and 1010 (1995) of\npolitical and human rights aspects of the war in Bosnia, 10 August 1995 and the statements by its President of\nit was important that the Security Council guard 7 September 1995 and 12 October 1995, and deeply concerned\nagainst the possibility of infringing on the that, despite repeated calls that it should do so, the Bosnian Serb\n party has not complied with the demands contained therein,\nresponsibility of the competent bodies of the United\nNations, especially the International Tribunal. It was Gravely concerned at reports, including by the\nalso important that the temptation to politicize human representative of the Secretary-General, of grave violations of\nrights be avoided. Botswana believed that all human international humanitarian law and of human rights in and\n around Srebrenica and in the areas of Banja Luka and Sanski.\nrights violations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Most, including reports of mass murder, unlawful detention and\nCroatia should be investigated and those found forced labour, rape, and deportation of civilians,\nresponsible should be brought to justice. 733\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions on the\n The representative of the Russian Federation situation in the Republic of Croatia, and reaffirming its\nstrongly supported the draft resolution’s condemnation resolution 1009 (1995) of 10 August 1995 and the statements by\nof all violations of international humanitarian law and its President of 7 September 1995, and 3 October 1995,\n__________________\n Deeply concerned at reports, including by the United\n 731 Ibid., p. 4. Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is\n 732 Ibid., p. 5. __________________\n 733 Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n 734 Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 949\n"
[230] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nknown as UNCRO, and United Nations humanitarian agencies, 5. Demands that all detention camps throughout the\nof serious violations of international humanitarian law and of territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina be\nhuman rights in the former Sectors West, North, and South, in immediately closed;\nthe Republic of Croatia, including burning of houses, looting of\n 6. Reaffirms its demand that the Government of the\nproperty, and killings of civilians,\n Republic of Croatia take urgent measures to put an end to\n Reiterating its strong support for the efforts of the violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross in seeking access to and investigate all reports of such violations so that those\ndisplaced persons and to persons detained or reported missing, responsible in respect of such acts may be judged and punished;\nand condemning in the strongest possible terms the failure of the\n 7. Reiterates its demand that the Government of the\nBosnian Serb party to comply with its commitments in respect\n Republic of Croatia respect fully the rights of the local Serb\nof such access,\n population, including their right to remain or return in safety,\n Commending the efforts of the United Nations Peace and reiterates also its call upon the Government of the Republic\nForces and other United Nations personnel in the former of Croatia to lift any time-limits placed on the return of refugees\nYugoslavia, in particular in the Republic of Bosnia and to Croatia to reclaim their property;\nHerzegovina, despite extreme difficulties,\n 8. Demands that all States, in particular those in the\n Taking note of the letter dated 31 October 1995 to the region of the former Yugoslavia, and all parties to the conflict in\nPresident of the Security Council from the President of the the former Yugoslavia comply fully and in good faith with the\nInternational Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons obligations contained in paragraph 4 of resolution 827 (1993) to\nResponsible for Serious Violations of International cooperate fully with the International Tribunal established\nHumanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former pursuant to that resolution, including by providing access to\nYugoslavia since 1991, established pursuant to resolution 827 individuals and sites the Tribunal deems important for its\n(1993) of 25 May 1993, investigations and by complying with requests for assistance or\n orders issued by a Trial Chamber under article 29 of the statute\n Expressing its strong support for the work of the\n of the Tribunal, and calls upon them to allow the establishment\nInternational Tribunal,\n of offices of the Tribunal;\n 1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms all\n 9. Demands that all parties, and in particular the\nviolations of international humanitarian law and of human rights\n Bosnian Serb party, refrain from any action intended to destroy,\nin the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and demands that all\n alter, conceal, or damage any evidence of violations of\nconcerned comply fully with their obligations in this regard;\n international humanitarian law and that they preserve such\n 2. Reaffirms its demand that the Bosnian Serb party evidence;\ngive representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner\n 10. Reaffirms its support for the actions of the United\nfor Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross and\n Nations Peace Forces and other United Nations personnel,\nother international agencies immediate and unimpeded access to\n including the great importance of their contribution in the\npersons displaced and to persons detained or reported missing\n humanitarian field, and demands that all parties fully ensure\nfrom Srebrenica, Zepa and the regions of Banja Luka and Sanski\n their safety and cooperate fully with them;\nMost who are within the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces and that 11. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the\nthe Bosnian Serb party permit representatives of the Council as soon as possible a written report based on all\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross (a) to visit and information available to the United Nations concerning recent\nregister any persons detained against their will, whether violations of international humanitarian law in the areas of\ncivilians or members of the forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sanski Most;\nHerzegovina, and (b) to have access to any site it may deem\n 12. Also requests the Secretary-General to continue to\nimportant;\n inform the Council on a regular basis of measures taken by the\n 3. Also reaffirms its demand that the Bosnian Serb Government of the Republic of Croatia to implement resolution\nparty respect fully the rights of all such persons, ensure their 1009 (1995) and the present resolution;\nsafety and release them immediately;\n 13. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n 4. Reaffirms the obligation of all the parties to ensure\nthe complete freedom of movement of personnel of the United Speaking after the vote, the representative of the\nNations and other relevant international organizations United States stressed that the Bosnian Serb side must\nthroughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and allow access to the sites and individuals which the\nHerzegovina at all times; Tribunal deemed important for its investigations and\n that it must grant international agencies access to the\n refugees displaced from the regions. He also stated that\n\n\n\n950 07-63109\n"
[231] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nthe authorities in Belgrade should allow the Tribunal to Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former Yugoslav\nestablish an office in Belgrade. His Government also Republic of Macedonia.738\nstrongly believed that the Government of Croatia must\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of\ntake steps to ensure that the rights of all its citizens\n the United Kingdom welcomed the Peace Agreement\nwere respected, whether they were Croats or Serbs.\n on Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been endorsed\nThe United States Government recognized that all\n by the parties the previous day at Dayton, Ohio. The\nviolations of human rights were deplorable. It was also\n speaker argued that the existence of the Peace\nnecessary, however, to recognize the differences in the\n Agreement was “the clearest possible vindication” of\ncircumstances and magnitude of crimes. The murder of\n the Council’s use of economic sanctions to bring about\nlarge numbers of civilians by Bosnian Serb forces had\n change. It was therefore right that the Council should\nnot been the act of a few individuals acting alone. The\n reward Belgrade’s contribution to the successful\nsystematic and apparently planned nature of the\n outcome of the Dayton negotiations by granting\natrocities was evidence of an active and “astonishingly\n substantial sanctions relief. He cautioned, however,\nbrutal” Bosnian Serb policy. 735\n that the Council was giving a conditional reward. One\n of the draft resolutions before the Council held out the\n Decisions of 22 November 1995 (3595th\n prospect of the permanent removal of sanctions, once\n meeting): resolutions 1021 (1995) and\n the Agreement had been implemented and free and fair\n 1022 (1995)\n elections had been held. It also provided that sanctions\n At its 3595th meeting, on 22 November 1995, the relief could be retracted if there was a failure to\nCouncil resumed its consideration of the item. cooperate in the implementation of the Agreement. In\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council addition, the draft resolution did not prejudice the\ninvited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, complex issue of succession to the former Socialist\nBrazil, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Egypt, the Islamic Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, providing that frozen\nRepublic of Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Morocco, Norway, assets subject to claims by any of the successor States\nPakistan, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia, Spain, the should remain frozen until such claims had been\nformer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and resolved. In that context, the British Government\nUkraine, at their request, to participate in the would when implementing the resolution interpret the\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The Council also reference to “claims” as meaning those raised in the\ninvited Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, at his request, to current legal proceedings. The speaker further argued\naddress it in the course of the subsequent discussion. that the Council was also right to allow a phased lifting\n of the arms embargo, in the context of the\n The President (Oman) then drew the attention of\n implementation of the Peace Agreement and given the\nthe Council members to the texts of two draft\n shared interest of all the States in the region in\nresolutions. The first draft resolution had been\n concluding regional arms controls arrangements. There\nsubmitted by Argentina, France, Germany, Honduras,\n could be no doubt that both the economic sanctions and\nIndonesia, Italy, Oman, Rwanda, the United Kingdom\n the arms embargo had played an important part in\nand the United States, 736 and the second draft\n containing the conflict and persuading the parties to\nresolution by Argentina, the Czech Republic, France,\n negotiate in earnest. Finally, the draft resolutions\nGermany, Honduras, Italy, the Russian Federation,\n referred only briefly to one very important aspect of\nRwanda, the United Kingdom and the United States. 737\n the Council’s policy towards the situation in Bosnia,\nThe President then drew the attention of the members\n namely the work of the International Tribunal. It was\nof the Council to a letter dated 20 November 1995\n as important as ever that all sides cooperate fully with\nfrom the representative of the former Yugoslav\n the Tribunal, as the process of rebuilding a war-torn\nRepublic of Macedonia addressed to the Secretary-\n society required not just reconciliation, but also justice.\nGeneral, transmitting a letter of the same date from the\n__________________ No Government should suppose that it was at liberty to\n 735 Ibid., pp. 12-13.\n obstruct the Tribunal’s work.739\n 736 S/1995/977. __________________\n 737 S/1995/978.\n 738 S/1995/972.\n 739 S/PV.3595, pp. 2-4.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 951\n"
[232] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n The representative of Germany stated that the encourage mutual confidence and trust among the\ndraft resolutions before the Council marked the first parties in the former Yugoslavia, and Indonesia hoped\nstep in the implementation of the Peace Agreement. that the Agreement on Regional Stabilization, set out in\nNoting that the arms embargo, which had not always Annex 1B of the Dayton Agreement, would contribute\nbeen easy to reconcile with Article 51 of the Charter as to peace and security in the region. The speaker\nit had simultaneously covered both attacker and acknowledged the limitations of sanctions as an\ndefender, would be lifted in three phases, the speaker instrument to maintain or restore international security.\ncontended that both the arms embargo and the Nevertheless, Indonesia believed that the Council had\neconomic sanctions had proved to be important in the succeeded in clearly defining the objectives of the\npeace process. The German delegation shared the view sanctions. The sanctions had not been punitive\nthat the sanctions regime had essentially been measures designed to inflict hardship on the people of\neffective. The speaker expressed the hope that the the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but rather had been\n“defreezing” of funds and assets that could be allocated intended to encourage Belgrade to modify its policy by\nto the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, would enable it playing a constructive role in the peace process.\nto re-establish trade links and commerce with other Indonesia welcomed the more positive role that had\ncountries as soon as the sanctions had been suspended. been played recently by the Federal Republic of\nHe noted, however, that the draft resolution requested Yugoslavia and hence deemed it appropriate for the\nthat assets and funds subject to third-party claims Council to suspend the sanctions. Nevertheless, it\nshould remain impounded or frozen. Germany urged emphasized that the continuation of the suspension of\nthe successor States to seek agreement on disputed sanctions was contingent upon the fulfilment by the\nassets, funds and liabilities as soon as possible, so that Bosnian Serbs of their obligations under the Peace\nthey could be released and therefore contribute to the Agreement. With regard to the provisions contained in\npositive development of the economy in the countries the draft resolution relating to funds and assets frozen\nconcerned and the region as a whole. Germany also or impounded by Security Council’s resolutions, his\nstressed the importance of achieving substantial arms delegation cautioned that founds or assets should not\ncontrol agreements, as outlined in Annex 1B of the be unfrozen prematurely, as hasty action might pre-\nDayton Agreement, to offset the danger that the lifting empt a consensual agreement among the successor\nof the arms embargo might trigger a new regional arms States as to the disposition of such funds and assets.741\nrace.740\n The representative of China stated that his\n The representative of Indonesia expressed the delegation was of the view that any action by the\nhope that the parties would make the Peace Agreement Council should contribute to, rather than undermine,\nwork and that that Agreement would lead to the the consolidation of the negotiation results. China\nachievement of the ultimate goal not only of preserving feared that lifting the arms embargo at that stage might\nBosnia and Herzegovina as a single State under have an adverse impact on peace and stability in the\ninternational law, but also of preserving the people of region. Furthermore, China had never favoured\nBosnia and Herzegovina as one nation. Recalling that exerting pressure by means of sanctions in the former\nhis delegation had consistently called on the Council to Yugoslavia. It supported the early lifting of the\npronounce itself unequivocally on the non-applicability sanctions, believing that the international community\nof resolution 713 (1991) to Bosnia and Herzegovina, should acknowledge the efforts made by the Federal\nhe contended that the arms embargo had had the Republic of Yugoslavia to promote the Bosnian peace\nunintended effect of freezing the advantage in weapons process. The speaker contended that it was\nin favour of the Bosnian Serbs, thus denying Bosnia inappropriate to link the lifting of sanctions with the\nand Herzegovina the right to defend itself, as enshrined holding of elections in Bosnia, as it would set a bad\nin the Charter. Long-term security could only be precedent. His delegation therefore expressed serious\nrealized through confidence-building measures rather reservations. He also argued that the status of the\nthan by a massive arms build-up undertaken to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations\ncompensate for perceived vulnerability and insecurity. should be reconsidered, once all parties had signed the\nThe international community therefore needed to Peace Agreement. The Chinese delegation would vote\n__________________ __________________\n 740 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 741 Ibid., pp. 5-7.\n\n\n\n\n952 07-63109\n"
[233] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nin favour of the two draft resolutions, however, based a fresh inflow of weapons into Bosnia and\non its position of supporting the peaceful settlement of Herzegovina.744\nthe question of the former Yugoslavia.742\n The representative of the Russian Federation\n The representative of Nigeria expressed the hope noted that his delegation attached particular importance\nthat none of the parties would view the lifting of the to the fact that, immediately after the initialling of the\narms embargo as a license to relaunch any military Dayton Agreement, the provision of the draft\ncampaign. Rather, Nigeria hoped that the termination resolution relating to the indefinite suspension of the\nof the embargo would play a positive and reassuring sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nrole, by ensuring that all States of the region had the and the Bosnian Serbs should come into operation. The\nmeans to defend their sovereignty and territorial Russian Federation believed that the conclusion of the\nintegrity. The speaker further stated that the suspension “economic blockade” against Yugoslavia was timely, as\nof the sanctions against the Federal Republic of the humanitarian crisis there had worsened\nYugoslavia was consistent with his delegation’s belief considerably over the preceding few months and\nthat sanctions should not be punitive, but should be required immediate steps. The speaker further observed\ndesigned to modify the behaviour of Governments. that the draft resolution was a balanced document\nNigeria hoped that such a flexible approach to which envisaged various situations, including the\nsanctions would be applied to other sanctions regimes, possibility of the reintroduction of sanctions, should\nas objective conditions on the ground changed.743 there be any gross violation of the commitments made\n under the Peace Agreement. He noted, in that regard,\n The representative of the Czech Republic noted\n that the Security Council would decide whether such\nthat the draft resolution easing the sanctions against the\n violations were taking place, based upon reports\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia left open the\n arising from joint consultations of senior leaders of the\npossibility for reversing the suspension should the\n international military and civilian structures in Bosnia.\nsubjects of the sanctions fail to take the steps\n Referring to the draft resolution on the lifting of the\nanticipated of them in Dayton. Noting that the draft\n arms embargo, the speaker noted that his country had\nresolution mentioned, in the preamble but not in the\n serious doubts, even though the draft had certain\noperative section of the draft, compliance with requests\n merits, including an even approach to all the parties\nand orders of the International Tribunal as an essential\n and the fact that the Security Council would be\naspect of implementing the Peace Agreement, he\n exercising control over measures to prevent an arms\nwarned against interpreting that fact as diminishing its\n race in the region. Nevertheless, neither the spirit nor\nimportance. Individual responsibility, established by\n the letter of the text of the draft was in harmony with\nand punished by the Tribunal, was necessary not only\n the logic of the political process, which aimed to end\nfor justice to be done, but also to prevent the\n military confrontation in the region. The Russian\nemergence in Bosnia and Herzegovina of a culture of\n Federation was in favour not of an arms build-up in the\nimpunity. The speaker further noted that one of the\n region, but of restriction and reduction of arms.\ndifficult issues among the south Slav States was the\n Furthermore, it would have preferred the draft to\nmatter of succession. In that regard, the draft resolution\n provide for a more clear-cut mechanism that would\nrightly stressed the need for successors to the former\n operate in the event that the peace process was\nSocialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to reach\n derailed. Of particular importance in that connection\nagreements on the distribution of funds and assets. He\n would be the reports from the Secretary-General to the\nalso observed that his Government was uncertain about\n Council that the parties were in fact fulfilling their\nthe wisdom of lifting the arms embargo at a time when\n obligations on arms limitation. Nevertheless, in view of\nthe implementation force would be deployed in Bosnia\n the fact that the first draft resolution was an integral\nand Herzegovina. The Czech Republic was concerned\n part of the Dayton Agreement package, the Russian\nabout the potential for suffering casualties as a result of\n__________________ Federation would abstain in the voting. 745\n 742 Ibid., pp. 7-8. __________________\n 743 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 744 Ibid., pp. 9-10.\n 745 Ibid., pp. 11-13.\n\n\n\n\n07-63109 953\n"
[234] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\n The first draft resolution was then put to the vote 2. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare in a\nand was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention timely way and to submit to the Council the reports referred to\n(Russian Federation), as resolution 1021 (1995), which in paragraph 1 above;\nreads: 3. Maintains its commitment to progressive measures\n for regional stability and arms control and, if the situation\n The Security Council,\n requires, to consider further action;\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions concerning\n 4. Requests the Security Council Committee\nthe conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, in particular its\n established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) to review and to\nresolutions 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and 727 (1992) of\n amend its guidelines in the light of the provisions of the present\n8 January 1992,\n resolution;\n Reaffirming its commitment to a negotiated political\n 5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\nsettlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, preserving\nthe territorial integrity of all States there within their The second draft resolution was then put to the\ninternationally recognized borders, vote and was adopted unanimously as resolution 1022\n Welcoming the initialling of the General Framework (1995), which reads:\nAgreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\n The Security Council,\nannexes thereto (collectively the “Peace Agreement”) by the\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions concerning\nand the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other parties the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia,\nthereto on 21 November 1995 at Dayton, Ohio, signifying\n Reaffirming its commitment to a negotiated political\nagreement between the parties to sign formally the Peace\n settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, preserving\nAgreement,\n the territorial integrity of all States there within their\n Welcoming also the commitments of the parties set out in internationally recognized borders,\nannex 1-B (Agreement on Regional Stabilization) of the Peace\n Commending the efforts of the international community,\nAgreement,\n including those of the Contact Group, to assist the parties in\n Determining that the situation in the region continues to reaching a settlement,\nconstitute a threat to international peace and security,\n Praising the decision of the Governments of the Republic\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the\nNations, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to attend and participate\n constructively in proximity talks in the United States of\n 1. Decides that the embargo on deliveries of weapons\n America, and acknowledging with appreciation the efforts made\nand military equipment imposed by resolution 713 (1991) shall\n by these Governments to reach a lasting peace settlement in\nbe terminated as follows, beginning from the day the Secretary-\n Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nGeneral submits to the Council a report stating that the Republic\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Welcoming the initialling of the General Framework\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia have formally signed the Peace Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\nAgreement: annexes thereto (collectively the “Peace Agreement”) by the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia\n (a) During the first ninety days following the\n and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other parties\nsubmission of such a report, all the provisions of the embargo\n thereto on 21 November 1995 at Dayton, Ohio, signifying\nshall remain in place;\n agreement between the parties to sign formally the Peace\n (b) During the second ninety days following the Agreement,\nsubmission of such a report, all provisions of the arms embargo\n Taking note of the Concluding Statement issued at the\nshall be terminated, except that the delivery of heavy weapons\n adjournment of the proximity talks, in which all parties\n(as defined in the Peace Agreement), ammunition therefore,\n undertook, inter alia, to assist in locating the two French pilots\nmines, military aircraft and helicopters shall continue to be\n missing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to ensure their\nprohibited until the arms control agreement referred to in annex\n immediate and safe return,\n1-B has taken effect;\n Stressing the need for all parties to comply fully with all\n (c) After the one hundred and eightieth day following\n provisions of the Peace Agreement,\nthe submission of such a report and after the submission of a\nreport from the Secretary-General on the implementation of Noting that compliance with the requests and orders of the\nannex 1-B as agreed by the parties, all provisions of the arms International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons\nembargo terminate unless the Council decides otherwise; Responsible for Serious Violations of International\n Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former\n\n\n\n954 07-63109\n"
[235] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nYugoslavia since 1991 constitutes an essential aspect of to in paragraph 1 above shall terminate on the fifth day\nimplementing the Peace Agreement, following the Council’s receipt of such a report, unless the\n Council decides otherwise taking into consideration the nature\n Recognizing the interests of all States in the\n of the non-compliance;\nimplementation of the suspension and subsequent termination of\nmeasures imposed by the Council and, in particular, the interests 4. Decides that it will terminate the measures\nof the successor States to the State formerly known as the described in paragraph 1 above on the tenth day following the\nSocialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with respect to the occurrence of the first free and fair elections provided for in\ndisposition of assets affected by the fact that that State has annex 3 of the Peace Agreement, provided that the Bosnian Serb\nceased to exist, and the desirability of accelerating the process forces have withdrawn from, and have continued to respect, the\nnow under way under the auspices of the International zones of separation as provided in the Peace Agreement;\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia to reach a consensual\n 5. Decides also that, so long as the measures referred\nagreement among the successor States as to the disposition of\n to in paragraph 1 above remain suspended or are terminated by a\nsuch assets,\n subsequent Council decision in accordance with paragraph 4\n Determining that the situation in the region continues to above, all funds and assets previously frozen or impounded\nconstitute a threat to international peace and security, pursuant to resolutions 757 (1992) and 820 (1993) may be\n released by States in accordance with law, provided that any\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United\n such funds and assets that are subject to any claims, liens,\nNations,\n judgements or encumbrances, or which are the funds or assets of\n 1. Decides that the measures imposed by or any person, partnership, corporation or other entity found or\nreaffirmed in resolutions 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992, 787 deemed insolvent under law or the accounting principles\n(1992) of 16 November 1992, 820 (1993) of 17 April 1993, 942 prevailing in such State, shall remain frozen or impounded until\n(1994) and 943 (1994) of 23 September 1994, 988 (1995) of released in accordance with applicable law, and decides further\n21 April 1995, 992 (1995) of 11 May 1995, 1003 (1995) of that obligations of States related to freezing or impounding\n5 July 1995 and 1015 (1995) of 15 September 1995 are funds and assets contained in such resolutions shall be\nsuspended indefinitely with immediate effect subject to the suspended pursuant to paragraph 1 above with respect to all\nprovisions of paragraphs 2 to 5 below, and provided that, if the funds and assets not currently frozen or impounded until the\nSecretary-General reports to the Council that the Federal measures concerned are terminated by a subsequent Council\nRepublic of Yugoslavia has failed formally to sign the Peace decision;\nAgreement on the date announced by the Contact Group for such\n 6. Decides further that the suspension or termination\npurpose and that the other parties thereto have expressed their\n of obligations pursuant to the present resolution is without\nreadiness so to sign, the measures described above shall be\n prejudice to claims of successor States to the former Socialist\nautomatically reimposed from the fifth day following the date of\n Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with respect to funds and assets,\nsuch report;\n stresses the need for the successor States to reach agreement on\n 2. Decides also that the suspension referred to in the distribution of funds and assets and the allocation of\nparagraph 1 above shall not apply to the measures imposed on liabilities of the former Socialist Federal Republic of\nthe Bosnian Serb party until the day after the commander of the Yugoslavia, encourages all States to make provision under their\ninternational force to be deployed in accordance with the Peace national law for addressing competing claims of States, as well\nAgreement, on the basis of a report transmitted through the as claims of private parties affecting funds and assets, and\nappropriate political authorities, informs the Council through the further encourages States to take appropriate measures to\nSecretary-General that all Bosnian Serb forces have withdrawn facilitate the expeditious collection of any funds and assets by\nbehind the zones of separation established in the Peace the appropriate parties and the resolution of claims related\nAgreement, and urges all parties concerned to take all necessary thereto;\nmeasures to assist in locating the two French pilots mission in\n 7. Decides that all States shall continue to take the\nBosnia and Herzegovina, and to ensure their immediate and safe\n necessary measures to ensure that there shall be no claim in\nreturn;\n connection with the performance of any contract or other\n 3. Decides further that if at any time, with regard to a transaction where such performance was affected by the\nmatter within the scope of their respective mandates and after measures imposed by the resolutions referred to in paragraph 1\njoint consultation if appropriate, either the High Representative above and related resolutions;\ndescribed in the Peace Agreement, or the commander of the\n 8. Requests the Security Council Committee\ninternational force to be deployed in accordance with the Peace\n established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) to review and to\nAgreement, on the basis of a report transmitted through the\n amend its guidelines in the light of the provisions of this\nappropriate political authorities, informs the Council through the\n resolution;\nSecretary-General that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the\nBosnian Serb authorities are failing significantly to meet their 9. Pays tribute to the neighbouring States, the mission\nobligations under the Peace Agreement, the suspension referred of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the\n\n\n\n07-63109 955\n"
[236] "Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council\n\n\nEuropean Union/Organization for Security and Cooperation in speaker noted, however, that the terms of resolution\nEurope Sanctions Coordinator, the Sanctions Assistance Missions 1022 (1995) were calibrated to the realities of the\nCommunications Centre and the Sanctions Assistance Missions, situation in the former Yugoslavia. If the Government\nthe Western European Union operation on the Danube and the\nNorth Atlantic Treaty Organization/Western European Union Sharp\n in Belgrade or the Pale Serbs were to fail to fulfil their\nGuard operation in the Adriatic Sea for their significant obligations, then the sanctions would be reimposed.\ncontribution to the achievement of a negotiated peace; With that possibility in mind, the United States\n believed that the infrastructure established and a cadre\n 10. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n of personnel assigned to monitor sanctions\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the enforcement should remain in place until sanctions\nUnited States contended that it was logical to lift the were fully and finally lifted. The United States also\nembargo against Bosnia, as an embargo should not be believed that there should be an orderly and equitable\nmaintained against a country whose only crime had distribution of the real and financial property of the\nbeen to preserve its sovereignty and defend its people. former Yugoslavia between the successor States. To\nShe noted, however, that the Council’s plan was to that end, it did not intend to release any assets itself\ndiscourage an arms race and to encourage a stable until all assets had been examined against possible\nbalance of military power. Thus the Framework claims by the successor States and against outstanding\nAgreement placed restrictions on the military forces commercial or private claims.746\nand heavy weapons of each party, established an arms\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\ncontrol mechanism, and called for talks on measures to\n argued that the arms embargo should have been lifted\nincrease the confidence of all sides so that no side\n much earlier. He underlined that the Council should\nwould seek to evade or take military advantage of the\n make sure that the suspension of sanctions be understood\nAgreement. Turning to resolution 1022 (1995), the\n as a reprieve and not as an exoneration. Failure to honour\nspeaker observed that the suspension of the economic\n the peace or Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity\nsanctions was a conditional step, as the sanctions\n would result in the immediate reversal and re-imposition\nwould be reimposed if Belgrade failed to sign the\n of sanctions. The speaker also warned that the sanctions\nformal Peace Agreement, or if Belgrade or the Bosnian\n could not be terminated until the Peace Agreement had\nSerbs failed to meet their obligations under the\n been implemented fully and there was genuine\nAgreement. She underscored that the international\n compliance on the part of the Federal Republic of\ncommunity needed to be vigilant in monitoring\n Yugoslavia with human rights and democratic standards\ncompliance with the terms of the Agreement and in\n within its territory, as well as full compliance with the\nheeding the explicit language of the resolution, which\n International Tribunal. He contended that without such\nnoted that compliance with the requests and orders of\n compliance the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could not\nthe International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia\n be admitted as a Member of the United Nations or other\nwas an essential part of the Agreement’s\n international institutions.747\nimplementation. She also noted that the suspension of\nsanctions would not apply immediately to measures The representative of Croatia stated that his\nimposed on the Bosnian Serbs. Those measures would country supported the resolutions just adopted. The\nremain in effect until all Bosnian Serb military forces sanctions regime had been a just and necessary\nhad withdrawn behind the zones of separation mechanism to make leaders accept responsibility for the\nestablished in the Peace Agreement. The speaker “ills” they had brought upon the people in Croatia and\nfurther observed that the adoption of resolution 1022 Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was Croatia’s understanding\n(1995) reflected not a change in policy, but a change in that paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution 1022 (1995) would\ncircumstances. The Council had imposed economic prevent the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from\nsanctions for the explicit purpose of encouraging transferring and using common funds until there was\nSerbia to choose the path of peace, and the sanctions agreement among all successor States on the succession\nappeared to have achieved their purpose. Indeed, the and distribution of such assets and approval by the\nmuch-criticized sanctions tool had proved critical in Council of such an agreement. The speaker argued that\nbringing about the decision in Dayton, and the leverage __________________\nit had brought the Council would continue to serve it 746 Ibid., pp. 14-16.\n 747 Ibid., pp. 20-21.\nwell in the complicated task of implementation. The\n\n\n\n956 07-63109\n"
[237] " Chapter VIII. Consideration of questions under the\n responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance\n of international peace and security\n\n\nthe Council should act immediately to endorse the basic precondition if the Agreement was to be fully\nexisting succession and distribution agreement proposed implemented by all sides.749\nby the European Union and the Russian Federation. He\n Referring to resolution 1022 (1995), the\nalso expressed the hope that resolution 1021 (1995),\n representative of Slovenia argued that it was crucial\nlifting the arms embargo, would achieve its goal of\n that the suspension of sanctions did not apply to the\nmaintaining a balance of power in the region and that it\n frozen assets that were the common property of the\nwould not become a new source of instability. In that\n States of the former Yugoslavia, and he noted that the\nregard, Croatia called for prudent use of the resolution,\n issue was addressed in operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of\nwithin a broader framework of collective security\n the resolution. Slovenia requested that States consider\narrangements in Europe.748\n all assets owned or controlled by the Government or\n Mr. Jovanovic stated that the sanctions against governmental agencies of the Federal Republic of\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should cease Yugoslavia to be assets on which Slovenia had a legal\nimmediately, and that the rights of the Federal and legitimate claim. It urged that such assets remain\nRepublic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations should frozen until a final resolution regarding the distribution\nbe restored quickly. He contended that the Federal of those assets and liabilities had been reached by the\nRepublic of Yugoslavia had demonstrated successor States. The speaker warned that any\nunequivocally its commitment to peace and to ending unilateral disposal of the relevant funds would force\nthe civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina by its active Slovenia to take appropriate legal steps to have such\ncontribution to the negotiation of the Peace Agreement, transactions declared null and void. Slovenia\nand by its acceptance of all previous peace proposals in welcomed resolution 1021 (1995), lifting the arms\nconnection with the Bosnian crisis. The international embargo and expected the immediate termination of\ncommunity should treat all sides equally since equality the arms embargo as far as Slovenia was concerned.750\nwas an essential element of the Peace Agreement and a __________________\n__________________\n 749 Ibid., pp. 24-25.\n 748 Ibid., pp. 21-23.\n 750 Ibid., pp. 38-40.\n\n\n\n\n 22. Complaint by Ukraine regarding the Decree of the Supreme\n Soviet of the Russian Federation concerning Sevastopol\n Initial proceedings\n\n Decision of 20 July 1993 (3256th meeting): Government with the task of working out a State\n statement by the President programme to ensure the status of Sevastopol.\n By a letter dated 16 July 1993 addressed to the In his letter, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of\nPresident of the Security Council,1 the representative of Ukraine stated that the Supreme Soviet’s action was in\nUkraine transmitted to the Council the text of a letter flagrant disregard of universally recognized principles\ndated 14 July 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs and norms of international law, in particular\nof Ukraine, addressed to the President of the Council, Article 2 (4) of the Charter. It also constituted an overt\nrequesting an urgent meeting of the Security Council, to encroachment on the territorial inviolability of\nconsider the situation which had been created as a result Ukraine, an interference in its internal and external\nof the adoption, on 9 July 1993, of a decree of the affairs, and was incompatible with the aims and\nSupreme Soviet of the Russian Federation concerning the principles of the United Nations. The letter concluded\nUkrainian city of Sevastopol. The decree cited “Russian by rejecting any territorial claims and appealed to the\nfederal status for the city of Sevastopol within the Security Council to use its full authority to have the\nadministrative and territorial borders of the city district “illegal decision” cancelled by the Parliament of the\nas of December 1991”, and entrusted the Russian Russian Federation and to warn it against taking\n__________________ further decisions, which could jeopardize international\n 1 S/26100. peace and security.\n\n\n07-63109 957\n"
[[5]]
[1] " Items relating to the Former Yugoslavia\n\n\n\n Applications made under Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations as a\n consequence of the implementation of measures imposed against the former\n Yugoslavia\n\n\n\n INITIAL PROCEEDINGS\n\n\n\nDecision of 18 June 1993 (3240th meeting): resolution 843 (1993)\n\n At its 3240th meeting, on 18 June 1993, the Council included the item entitled\n“Applications made under Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations as a\nconsequence of the implementation of measures imposed against the former Yugoslavia”\nin its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (Spain) drew the\nattention of the Council members to the text of a draft resolution 1 that had been prepared\nin the course of the Council’s prior consultations.\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote, and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 843 (1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling its resolution 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991 concerning Yugoslavia and all\n other relevant resolutions,\n Recalling also Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations,\n Conscious of the fact that an increasing number of requests for assistance have been\n received under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter,\n Noting that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724\n (1991), at its 65th meeting, set up a working group to examine the above-mentioned requests,\n\n\n\n\n 1\n S/25956.\n\n\n 1\n"
[2] " 1. Confirms that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) is entrusted\n with the task of examining requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the\n Charter of the United Nations;\n 2. Welcomes the establishment by the Committee of its working group and invites the\n Committee, as it completes the examination of each request, to make recommendations to the\n President of the Security Council for appropriate action.\n\n\nDecision of 6 July 1993: letter from the President\n\n\n 2\n By a letter dated 2 July 1993 addressed to the President of the Security Council,\nthe Acting Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to\nresolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia transmitted, pursuant to resolution 843\n(1993), the recommendations of the Committee relating to the requests made by Bulgaria,\nHungary, Romania, Uganda and Ukraine for assistance under the provisions of Article 50\nof the Charter of the United Nations. In its recommendations, the Committee recognized\nthe urgent need to assist the interested State and appealed to all States to provide\nimmediate assistance to such State; invited the competent organs and specialized\nagencies of the United Nations system to consider how their assistance programmes and\nfacilities might be helpful to the interested State; and requested the Secretary-General to\nreport on the implementation of such recommendations.\n\n\n 3\n By a letter dated 6 July 1993, the President of the Security Council informed the\nSecretary-General as follows:\n\n\n “By resolution 843 (1993), adopted on 18 June 1993, the Security Council confirmed that\n its Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia was\n entrusted with the task of examining requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50\n of the Charter of the United Nations and making recommendations to the President of the\n Security Council for appropriate action.\n\n\n 2\n S/26040.\n 3\n S/26056.\n\n\n 2\n"
[3] " “By a letter dated 2 July 1993, the acting Chairman of the Committee transmitted the\n recommendations of the Committee with regard to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Uganda and\n Ukraine.\n “At consultations of the whole of the Security Council, held on 2 July 1993, it was agreed\n to inform you of the above-mentioned recommendations of the Committee in connection with\n the requests for assistance under the provision of Article 50 of the Charter and to request you\n to implement the actions contained in the recommendations. For this purpose, I am\n transmitting herewith for your information and appropriate action the text of the letter and its\n enclosures from the Acting Chairman of the Committee.”\n\n\n Decision of 9 August 1993: letter from the President\n\n\n\n By a letter 4 dated 4 August 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to\nresolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia transmitted, pursuant to resolution 843\n(1993), the recommendations 5 of the Committee relating to the request made by Albania\nfor assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations.\n\n\n 6\n By a letter dated 9 August 1993, the President of the Security Council informed\nthe Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n “By a letter dated 6 July 1993, addressed to you by my predecessor in his capacity as\n President of the Security Council, you were informed, by agreement of all the members of the\n Council, of the recommendations formulated by the Committee established pursuant to\n resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia and submitted to the President by the Chairman\n of the Committee in respect of the applications made by five States under the provisions of\n Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations. You were also requested to implement the\n actions contained in those recommendations as appropriate.\n\n\n\n\n 4\n S/26040/Add.1.\n 5\n The recommendations were similar to those previously made.\n 6\n S/26282.\n\n\n 3\n"
[4] " “I have now received a further letter dated 4 August 1993, addressed to me by the\n Chairman of the Committee, submitting a recommendation formulated by the Committee in\n respect of the application made by Albania under the terms of Article 50. In the course of\n their consultations of the whole today, the members of the Council reviewed the\n recommendation on Albania and agreed that, as in the case of the previous recommendations,\n you should be similarly requested to implement the actions contained in the above-mentioned\n recommendation on Albania. For this purpose, I am transmitting herewith, for your\n information and appropriate action, the text of the letter and its enclosure from the Chairman\n of the Committee.”\n\n\n Decision of 20 December 1993: letter from the President to the Secretary-General\n\n\n\n By a letter 7 dated 14 December 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to\nresolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia transmitted, pursuant to resolution 843\n(1993), the recommendations 8 of the Committee relating to the requests made by\nSlovakia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for assistance under the\nprovisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations.\n\n\n By a letter 9 dated 20 December 1993, the President of the Security Council\ninformed the Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n “By letters dated 6 July and 9 August 1993, respectively, addressed to you by my\n predecessors in their capacity as President of the Security Council, you were informed, by\n agreement of all the members of the Council, of the recommendations formulated by the\n Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia and\n submitted to the President by the Chairman of the Committee in respect of the applications\n made by six States under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations.\n\n\n\n 7\n S/26040/Add.2.\n 8\n The recommendations were similar to those previously made.\n 9\n S/26905.\n\n\n 4\n"
[5] "You were also requested to implement the actions contained in those recommendations, as\nappropriate.\n “I have now received a further letter dated 10 December 1993, addressed to me by the\nChairman of the Committee, submitting recommendations formulated by the Committee in\nrespect of the applications made by Slovakia and the former Yugoslav Republic of\nMacedonia under the terms of Article 50. In the course of their consultations of the whole\ntoday, the members of the Council reviewed the recommendations on Slovakia and the\nformer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and agreed that, as in the case of the previous\nrecommendations, you should be similarly requested to implement the actions contained in\nthe above-mentioned recommendations on Slovakia and the former Yugoslav Republic of\nMacedonia. For this purpose, I am transmitting herewith, for your information and\nappropriate action, the text of the letter and its enclosures from the Chairman of the\nCommittee.”\n\n\n\n\n 5\n"
[6] " The situation prevailing in and around the safe area of Bihac\n\n\n\n INITIAL PROCEEDINGS\n\n\n\n At its 3461st meeting, held on 19 November 1994, the Council included the item\nentitled “The situation prevailing in and around the safe area of Bihac” in its agenda.\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina, Croatia and Germany, at their request, to participate in the discussion\nwithout the right to vote. The President (United States) then drew the attention of the\nCouncil members to the text of a draft resolution 10, submitted by France, Germany, the\nRussian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as to a\n 11\nletter dated 18 November 1994 from the representative of Croatia to the President of\nthe Council, transmitting copies of two letters of the same date from the President of the\nRepublic of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-\nGeneral of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and a letter 12 dated 19\nNovember 1994 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the\nPresident of the Council. In the letter 13 to the President of the Council, the President of\nCroatia reported that rebel Serb forces had been attacking Bosnia and Herzegovina from\nthe United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia, including via air strikes, artillery\nbarrages and cross-border ground troop attacks. His Government urgently requested\nassistance from the United Nations in ending those attacks, in the form of air strikes\n 14\nagainst the attacking Serb forces. In the letter to the Secretary-General of NATO, the\nPresident of Croatia noted that, in order to end the attacks on Bosnia and Herzegovina\n\n\n\n\n 10\n S/1994/1316.\n 11\n S/1994/1312.\n 12\n S/1994/1319.\n 13\n See Annex I of letter dated 18 November 1994 (S/1994/1312).\n 14\n See Annex II of letter dated 18 November 1994 (S/1994/1312).\n\n\n 6\n"
[7] "from Croatian soil by rebel Serb forces in the UNPAs, his Government approved the use\nof NATO air strikes against those forces for a period of one week.\n\n\n At the 3461st meeting, the representative of Croatia stated that the actions by the\nso-called Krajina Serb forces in Croatia could no longer be tolerated and he urged that,\nupon its adoption, the draft resolution should be fully implemented. His delegation was\npleased that the draft resolution would further strengthen Croatia’s territorial integrity\nand sovereignty. The speaker further stated that Croatia would continue to play its\nconstructive role in the peace process so long as the international community continued\nto uphold its commitment to Croatia in full compliance with the relevant Security\nCouncil resolutions but he warned that his country would not wait for ever. He argued\nthat the continuing violations of Croatia’s borders, such as the violations of resolution\n820 (1993) and of the border-monitoring mission arrangements of the International\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia, contributed to the escalation of activities in the\nBihac region by providing fuel for those attacking Bihac. Croatia demanded that the\n 15\nillegal transshipment of fuel and goods stop immediately.\n\n\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina said that his delegation was not\nconvinced that the draft resolution was necessary in order to allow an appropriate\nresponse to the attacks against the Bihac safe area. He contended that the basis for such\naction already existed. He added that the actions by the so-called Krajina Serbs were also\nviolations of the no-fly zone, of the supposedly demilitarized status of the UNPAs in\nCroatia, and of the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Any attack against the\nterritory of Bosnia and Herzegovina would amount to a violation of its territorial\nintegrity, requiring the necessary response to such aggression as a threat to international\npeace and security, regardless of whether or not it involved a safe area. The speaker also\nexpressed the view that, under the draft resolution, any cross-border attack against\ncivilians or UNPROFOR targets within the Bihac region would meet with a response. He\nurged the Council to adopt further measures to improve the situation, provide the\n\n\n 15\n S/PV.3461, pp. 2-3.\n\n\n 7\n"
[8] "necessary practical support for UNPROFOR within the Bihac area, and put an end to\nmeasures inconsistent with the peace process. In particular, he urged the Council to\nforeclose all flows of fuel to the Krajina Serbs from Serbia and Montenegro through the\noccupied areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. He referred to estimates that Bosnian\nSerb forces needed 5 to 15 truckloads of fuel per day to pursue their war effort and noted\nthat, according to reports from the Border Monitoring Mission of the International\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia, between 15 and 20 fuel trucks were in fact being\nallowed across the border from Serbia and Montenegro each day. That fuel was enough\nfor both the so-called Bosnian Serbs and Krajina Serbs to carry out the attacks that the\n 16\nCouncil was seeking to confront with the draft resolution before it.\n\n\nDecision of 19 November 1994 (3461st meeting): resolution 958 (1994)\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 958 (1994). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, in particular its resolution 836 (1993) of 4\n June 1993,\n Recalling also the statements by the President of the Security Council of 13 November\n and 18 November 1994, and reiterating its concern about the deteriorating situation in and\n around the safe area of Bihac,\n Having considered the letter dated 18 November 1994 from the Permanent\n Representative of the Republic of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council,\n Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of\n Croatia,\n Determining that the situation in the Former Yugoslavia continues to constitute a threat to\n international peace and security, and determined to support the United Nations Protection\n Force in the performance of its mandate set out in paragraphs 5 and 9 of resolution 836\n (1993), and to this end acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n\n\n\n 16\n Ibid., pp. 3-4.\n\n\n 8\n"
[9] " Decides that the authorization given in paragraph 10 of its resolution 836 (1993) to\n Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take,\n under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the\n Secretary-General and the United Nations Protection Force, all necessary measures, through\n the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n referred to in its resolution 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993, to support the Force in the\n performance of its mandate set out in paragraphs 5 and 9 of its resolution 836 (1993) shall\n apply also to such measures taken in the Republic of Croatia.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom contended that\nthe resolution just adopted was needed to close the gap revealed by the air attacks\nlaunched by Krajina Serbs forces in Bihac and was in line with the approach the Council\nhad received from President Tudjman and the Croatian authorities. He added that the\nresolution was clear and straightforward and simply extended the provisions of resolution\n836 (1993), in relation to the use of air power onto Croatian territory. The resolution\nmirrored in every way paragraph 10 of resolution 836 (1993), and the procedures to\nimplement it would similarly mirror these set in place to implement that resolution. It\nmade possible the extension of the geographical scope of existing procedures for the use\nof air power rather than creating new ones. 17\n\n\n The representative of France recalled that the UNPROFOR Commander had\nasked for an appropriate response, with the use of air strikes, to the aerial bombardment\nof Bihac. His Government took the view that resolutions 836 (1993) and 908 (1994)\nmade it possible to respond favourably to that request. His delegation regretted that none\nof the options proposed by the UNPROFOR Commander had been adopted. France\nbelieved that, in situations that clearly identified the aggressor and the victim, the\nresponse called for by UNPROFOR should be put into effect as soon as possible. He also\nbelieved that the resolution would contribute to that.\n\n\n\n\n 17\n Ibid., p. 4.\n\n\n 9\n"
[10] " The representative of the Russian Federation stated that his delegation voted in\nfavour of the resolution just adopted, because it believed that the order which had been\nestablished for the use of air power in Bosnia and Herzegovina and surrounding areas and\nwhich had now been extended to the territory of Croatia to ensure the protection of the\nBihac safe area, fully corresponded to the rules for the use of air power in the other safe\nareas. It was important that the resolution confirmed that the appropriate measures would\nbe taken under the guidance of the Security Council and in close coordination with the\nSecretary-General and UNPROFOR. In that context, the speaker stressed that the use of\nair power by the United Nations forces should be impartial, regardless of who might be\nthe violator. It was also important that the main principle of the safe areas be fully and\nconsistently implemented. These areas were intended for the protection of the civilian\npopulation and could not be used for offensive military action or for preparations for such\n 18\naction. The best solution would be the demilitarization of the safe areas.\n\n\n The representative of China stated that his delegation had voted in favour of the\nresolution just adopted because it was aimed at protecting the safe area of Bihac and the\nsafety of the civilians there, as well as at ensuring that UNPROFOR’s mandate was\nsuccessfully implemented. He, however, expressed his delegation’s reservations\nconcerning the mandatory actions authorized by invoking Chapter VII of the Charter in\nthe resolution and said that the Security Council should be extremely prudent and\ncautious regarding the use of air power in Croatia. Air power should be used only for the\npurpose of self-defence to protect the safety and security of UNPROFOR personnel and\nthe civilians in the safe area. It should not be “abused” for punitive or pre-emptive\npurposes. Moreover, in the use of air power, strict measures should be taken to avoid\n 19\nharming innocent civilians.\n\n\n The representative of Brazil stated that, while his delegation concurred with the\nneed for a technical adjustment to resolution 836 (1993) in order to protect the safe area\nof Bihac, it was nevertheless concerned that the “extraordinary” recourse to air power\n\n 18\n Ibid., p. 5.\n 19\n Ibid., p. 7.\n\n\n 10\n"
[11] "was being extended to another country. He reiterated his delegation’s reservations on the\nuse of the expression “all necessary measures”, which seemed to be becoming a standard\nexpression of the Council associated with the use of military force, to the detriment of\ndiplomatic efforts. It was also his delegation’s understanding, as had been confirmed by\nthe sponsors of the resolution, that the requirement contained in paragraph 11 of\nresolution 836 (1993), relating to the need for Member States cooperating with\nUNPROFOR to report to the Council through the Secretary-General, also applied to the\n 20\nresolution just adopted.\n\n\n The President, speaking in her capacity as the representative of the United States,\nstated that the Council had clarified that the use of air power was authorized to attack\ntargets in Croatia that threatened safe areas in Bosnia or United Nations troops operating\nin Bosnia. Referring to the fact that the previous day, after the Krajina Serbs had attacked\nBosnia, the United Nations Commander for the Former Yugoslavia had raised the issue\nof a NATO response from the air, she noted that her Government believed that an\nimmediate, affirmative response would have been legally authorized by previous\nresolutions of the Council. 21\n\n\n\n\n 20\n Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n 21\n Ibid., pp. 9-10.\n\n\n 11\n"
[12] " The situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n\n\n INITIAL PROCEEDINGS\n\n\nDecision of 8 January 1993 (3159th meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n 22\n By a letter dated 8 January addressed to the President of the Security Council,\nthe representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina informed the Council that the Deputy\nPrime Minister for Economic Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina had\nbeen killed by Serbian extremists, as he was returning from the airport in an UNPROFOR\nconvoy. Bosnia and Herzegovina requested an emergency meeting of the Security\nCouncil to consider immediate and resolute action, including the use of force under\nChapter VII of the Charter.\n\n\n The representative of Turkey made a similar request by a letter 23 of the same date\naddressed to the President of the Security Council.\n\n\n At its 3159th meeting, on 8 January 1993, the Council included the above letters in\nits agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey, at their request, to participate in the discussion\nwithout the right to vote. The President (Japan) then stated that, after consultations\namong members of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following\n 24\nstatement on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n “The Security Council is profoundly shocked to learn of the killing of Mr. Hakija\n Turajlic, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and\n\n\n\n 22\n S/25074.\n 23\n S/25077.\n 24\n S/25079.\n\n\n 12\n"
[13] " Herzegovina, by Bosnian Serb forces, while he was under the protection of the United\n Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).\n “The Council strongly condemns this outrageous act of terrorism which is a grave\n violation of international humanitarian law and a flagrant challenge to the authority and the\n inviolability of UNPROFOR, as well as to the serious efforts undertaken with the aim of\n achieving an overall political settlement of the crisis.\n “The Council urges all parties and others concerned to exercise the utmost restraint and to\n refrain from taking any action which might further exacerbate the situation.\n “The Council requests the Secretary-General to undertake a full investigation of the\n incident and to report to it without delay. Upon receipt of that report the Council will consider\n the matter forthwith.\n “The members of the Council extend their sincere condolences to the bereaved family of\n Mr. Turajlic and to the people and the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina.”\n\n\n\nDecision of 8 January 1993 (3160th meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n At its 3160th meeting, on 8 January 1993, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request,\nto participate in the discussion without the right to vote.\n The President then stated that, after consultations among members of the Security\n 25\nCouncil, he had been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the\nCouncil:\n\n\n “The Security Council fully supports the efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering\n Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia aimed at achieving an\n overall political settlement of the crisis through a complete cessation of hostilities and the\n establishment of a constitutional framework for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In\n this connection, the Council reaffirms the need to respect fully the sovereignty, territorial\n integrity and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n\n 25\n S/25080.\n\n\n 13\n"
[14] " 26\n “The Council fully endorses the view of the Secretary-General described in his report\n that it is the duty of all the parties involved in the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite\n the recent provocation, to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen in bringing this conflict to an end\n swiftly.\n “The Council appeals to all the parties involved to cooperate to the fullest with the peace\n efforts and warns any party which would oppose an overall political settlement against the\n consequences of such an attitude; lack of cooperation and non-compliance with its relevant\n resolutions will compel the Council to review the situation in an urgent and most serious\n manner and to consider further necessary measures.”\n\n\nDecision of 25 January 1993 (3164th meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n At its 3164th meeting, on 25 January 1993, the Council resumed its consideration\nof the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request,\nto participate in the discussion without the right to vote.\n The President (Japan) then stated that, after consultations among members of the\nSecurity Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement 27 on behalf of\nthe Council:\n\n\n “The Security Council notes with appreciation the efforts of the international community\n to alleviate the plight of the civilian population in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n whose lives have been severely affected by the fighting there. The Council has the highest\n regard for the efforts of the brave people who have undertaken to deliver urgently needed\n humanitarian assistance under extremely trying conditions to the civilian population in\n Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular, the efforts of the United Nations Protection Force and\n the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. However, the Council deeply regrets\n\n\n 26\n In his report dated 6 January 1993 (S/25050) on the activities of the International Conference on the\nFormer Yugoslavia, the Secretary-General reported on the peace talks among the three sides held in Geneva from 2 to 4\nJanuary 1993. Discussions took place on the constitutional principles, the delimitation of provinces and arrangements\nfor implementing and monitoring a cessation of hostilities. The Secretary-General concluded that should the Council\nadopt a resolution enforcing the ban on non-authorized flights over Bosnia and Herzegovina, it would be helpful, in\nview of the ongoing talks, that its implementation be delayed for a reasonable period of time.\n 27\n S/25162.\n\n\n 14\n"
[15] " that the situation there has imposed great limits on the international community in the\n fulfilment of its humanitarian mandate.\n “The Council reaffirms its demand that all parties and others concerned, in particular\n Serb paramilitary units, cease and desist forthwith from all violations of international\n humanitarian law being committed in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in\n particular the deliberate interference with humanitarian convoys. The Council warns the\n parties concerned of serious consequences, in accordance with relevant resolutions of the\n Security Council, if they continue to impede the delivery of humanitarian relief assistance.\n “The Council invites the Secretary-General to keep under continuous review the\n possibility of air-dropping humanitarian assistance to areas isolated by the conflict in Bosnia\n and Herzegovina.\n “The Council will remain actively seized of the matter.”\n\n\nDecision of 17 February 1993 (3173rd meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n At its 3173rd meeting, on 17 February 1993, the Council resumed its consideration\nof the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n The President (Morocco) then stated that, after consultations among members of\nthe Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement 28 on behalf\nof the Council:\n\n\n “The Security Council recalls all relevant resolutions of the Council and its statement of\n 25 January concerning the provision of humanitarian relief in the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina. It notes with deep concern that, notwithstanding the Council's demand in that\n statement, relief efforts continue to be impeded. It condemns the blocking of humanitarian\n convoys and the impeding of relief supplies, which place at risk the civilian population of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina and endanger the lives of personnel delivering such supplies. It\n remains deeply concerned at reports of pressing humanitarian need in Bosnia and\n Herzegovina, particularly in the eastern part of the country.\n\n\n\n\n 28\n S/25302.\n\n\n 15\n"
[16] " “The Council reiterates its demand that the parties and all others concerned allow\n immediate and unimpeded access to humanitarian relief supplies. It further demands that the\n parties and others concerned give the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees the\n guarantees she has sought that they will abide by the promises they have made to comply\n with the Council's decisions in this regard and thus facilitate the resumption of the full\n humanitarian relief programme, to which the Council attaches the greatest importance.”\n\n\nDecision of 24 February 1993 (3176th meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n At its 3176th meeting, on 24 February 1993, the Council resumed its consideration\nof the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request,\nto participate in the discussion without the right to vote.\n\n\n The President (Morocco) then stated that, after consultations among members of\nthe Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement 29 on behalf\nof the Council:\n\n\n “The Security Council, having heard a report from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering\n Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, is concerned that the\n present opportunity to reach a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be\n allowed to slip by. It endorses fully the statement by the President of the United States of\n America and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 23 February, calling on the\n leaders of the parties involved in the peace talks on Bosnia and Herzegovina to come to New\n York immediately to resume discussions with a view to the early conclusion of an agreement\n to end the conflict. The Council urges these leaders to respond quickly and positively to that\n call and stands ready to give its full support to the efforts of the Co-Chairmen to bring the\n talks to a successful conclusion.”\n\n\n\n\n 29\n S/25328.\n\n\n 16\n"
[17] "Decision of 25 February 1993 (3177th meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n At its 3177th meeting, on 25 February 1993, the Council resumed its consideration\nof the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request,\nto participate in the discussion without the right to vote.\n\n\n The President (Morocco) then stated that, after consultations among members of\nthe Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement 30 on behalf\nof the Council:\n\n\n “The Security Council, having received a report from the Secretary-General, recalls all its\n relevant resolutions and its statements of 25 January and 17 February 1993 concerning the\n provision of humanitarian relief in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is deeply\n concerned that, in spite of its repeated demands, relief efforts continue to be impeded by Serb\n paramilitary units, especially in the eastern part of the country, namely in the enclaves of\n Srebrenica, Cerska, Gorazde and Zepa.\n “The Council deplores the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Bosnia and\n Herzegovina at a time when discussions are to resume with a view to reaching a just and\n durable agreement to end the conflict. It regards the blockade of relief efforts as a serious\n impediment to a negotiated settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to the efforts of the\n Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former\n Yugoslavia. It notes with concern that the measures taken by Serb paramilitary units to\n interdict humanitarian convoys, in flagrant violation of relevant Council resolutions, expose\n the personnel of the United Nations Protection Force and the Office of the United Nations\n High Commissioner for Refugees as well as other humanitarian organizations to physical\n harm.\n “The deliberate impeding of the delivery of food and humanitarian relief essential for the\n survival of the civilian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina constitutes a violation of the\n Geneva Conventions of 1949, and the Council is committed to ensuring that individuals\n responsible for such acts are brought to justice.\n\n\n 30\n S/25334.\n\n\n 17\n"
[18] " “The Council strongly condemns once again the blocking of humanitarian convoys that\n has impeded the delivery of humanitarian supplies. It reiterates its demand that the Bosnian\n parties grant immediate and unimpeded access for humanitarian convoys and fully comply\n with the Council's decisions in this regard. The Council expresses its strong support for the\n use, in full coordination with the United Nations and in accordance with the relevant Security\n Council resolutions, of humanitarian air drops in isolated areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n that are in critical need of humanitarian supplies and cannot be reached by ground convoys. It\n reaffirms its firm commitment to the full implementation of the humanitarian relief\n programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n “The Council remains actively seized of the matter and continues its consideration of\n further steps, in accordance with its relevant resolutions.”\n\n\nDecision of 3 March 1993 (3180th meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n\n By a letter 31 dated 3 March 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina informed the Council that Serbian\nand Montenegrin extremist forces had overrun the town of Cerska in a new round of\nexpulsions and genocide and that they were threatening the region of Srebrenica. They\nhad also blocked all humanitarian convoys. Bosnia and Herzegovina requested an\nemergency meeting of the Council.\n\n\n 32\n The representative of the United States made a similar request by a letter of the\nsame date.\n\n\n At its 3180th meeting, on 3 March 1993, the Council included the above letters in\nits agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the\nright to vote.\n\n\n\n\n 31\n S/25358\n 32\n S/25353.\n\n\n 18\n"
[19] " The President (New Zealand) then stated that, after consultations among members\nof the Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement 33 on\nbehalf of the Council:\n\n\n “The Security Council, recalling all its relevant resolutions and statements, expresses its\n grave concern at and condemns the continuing unacceptable military attacks in eastern\n Bosnia and the resulting deterioration in the humanitarian situation in that region. It is\n appalled that even as peace talks are continuing, attacks by Serb paramilitary units, including,\n reportedly, the killings of innocent civilians, continue in eastern Bosnia. In this connection,\n the Council is particularly concerned about the fall of the town of Cerska and the imminent\n fall of neighbouring villages. The Council demands that the killings and atrocities must stop\n and reaffirms that those guilty of crimes against international humanitarian law will be held\n individually responsible by the world community.\n “The Council demands that the leaders of all the parties to the conflict in the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina remain fully engaged in New York in a sustained effort with the Co-\n Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former\n Yugoslavia to reach quickly a fair and workable settlement. In this connection, the Council\n also demands that all sides immediately cease all forms of military action throughout Bosnia\n and Herzegovina, cease acts of violence against civilians, comply with their previous\n commitments including the cease-fire, and redouble their efforts to settle the conflict.\n “The Council further demands that the Bosnian Serb side as well as all other parties\n refrain from taking any action which might endanger the lives and well-being of the\n inhabitants of eastern Bosnia, particularly in the areas near the town of Cerska, and that all\n concerned allow the unimpeded access of humanitarian relief supplies throughout Bosnia and\n Herzegovina, especially humanitarian access to the besieged cities of eastern Bosnia, and\n permit the evacuation of the wounded.\n “Having determined in the relevant resolutions that this situation constitutes a threat to\n international peace and security, the Council insists that these steps must be taken\n immediately.\n “The Council also requests the Secretary-General to take immediate steps to increase the\n presence of the United Nations Protection Force in eastern Bosnia.\n\n\n\n 33\n S/25361.\n\n\n 19\n"
[20] " “The Council remains seized of the matter and is ready to meet at any moment to\n consider further action.”\n\n\nDecision of 17 March 1993 (3184th meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n At its 3184th meeting, on 17 March 1993, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n\n\n Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (New Zealand) stated that,\nafter consultations among members of the Security Council, he had been authorized to\n 34\nmake the following statement on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n “The Security Council has been informed by the Secretary-General in a letter dated 12\n March 1993 of the violation on 11 March 1993 by military jets, proceeding from the airport\n of Banja Luka, of Council resolution 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992, relating to the\n prohibition of military flights in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n notwithstanding the fact that the Bosnian Serbs at the airport had received appropriate\n notification by United Nations observers that such flights would constitute a violation of the\n said resolution.\n “The Council equally takes note of the report by the Secretary-General in his letter of 16\n March 1993 indicating that on 13 March 1993 new violations of the no-fly zone took place by\n planes that proceeded to bomb the villages of Gladovici and Osatica in the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina before leaving in the direction of the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The above flights are the first violations of resolution\n 781 (1992) observed by the United Nations Protection Force which involved combat activity.\n “The Council strongly condemns all violations of its relevant resolutions and underlines\n the fact that since the beginning of the monitoring operations in early November 1992, the\n United Nations has reported 465 violations of the no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n “The Council demands that these violations cease forthwith and reiterates its strong\n determination to ensure full respect for its resolutions. It particularly underlines its\n condemnation of all violations, especially those reported by the Secretary-General in his\n\n\n 34\n S/25426.\n\n\n 20\n"
[21] " letters referred to above, at a time when the peace process has reached a critical juncture and\n when humanitarian relief efforts require full cooperation by all parties.\n “The Council demands from the Bosnian Serbs an immediate explanation of the\n aforementioned violations and particularly of the aerial bombardment of the villages of\n Gladovici and Osatica.\n “It requests the Secretary-General to ensure that an investigation is made of the reported\n possible use of the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)\n to launch air attacks against the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n “The Council has mandated its President to convey to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of\n the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and to the leader of the Bosnian\n Serbs its deepest concern about the above-mentioned developments and its demand that they\n take immediate action to prevent any repetitions of these attacks.\n “The Council will continue to consider what additional steps may be required to secure\n implementation of the provisions of relevant Security Council resolutions.”\n\n\nDecision of 25 March 1993 (3186th meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n At its 3186th meeting, on 25 March 1993, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request,\nto participate in the discussion without the right to vote.\n\n\n The President (New Zealand) then stated that, after consultations among members\nof the Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement 35 on\nbehalf of the Council:\n\n\n “The Security Council warmly welcomes the signature by President Alija Izetbegovic\n and Mr. Mate Boban of all four documents of the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina\n worked out by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference\n on the Former Yugoslavia.\n\n\n\n 35\n S/25471.\n\n\n 21\n"
[22] " “On this important occasion the Council pays tribute to the untiring efforts of the\n Co-Chairmen, Secretary Vance and Lord Owen.\n “The Council commends the action of the two parties who have signed all the documents\n and calls on the remaining party to sign without delay the two documents of the peace plan\n that it has not already signed and to cease its violence, offensive military actions, ‘ethnic\n cleansing’ and obstruction of humanitarian assistance.\n “The Council calls for an immediate cessation of hostilities by all parties.\n “The Council looks forward to receiving a report from the Secretary-General on the\n developments in the International Conference and stands ready to take action to follow up on\n the report and to take the steps required to bring about the peace settlement.”\n\n\nDecision of 31 March 1993 (3191st meeting): resolution 816 (1993)\n\n\n\n By a letter 36 dated 18 March 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina informed the Council that\nSrebrenica and Sarajevo had been attacked by Serbian forces, and that non-Serb citizens\nof Bjelina were issued an ultimatum to leave immediately or face consequences. Bosnia\nand Herzegovina requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council, in light of\ncontinuing hostilities directed against its citizens, gross violations of Security Council\nresolution 781 (1992), grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and acts of foreign\naggression against a Member State.\n\n\n The representative of Turkey made a similar request on behalf of the Contact\n 37\nGroup of the OIC by a letter of the same date addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil urging the Council to take effective measures to deal with the continuing\nchallenge to the United Nations including, in particular, the adoption of a resolution to\nenforce the “no-fly zone” established under resolution 781 (1992).\n\n\n\n\n 36\n S/25434.\n 37\n S/25437.\n\n\n 22\n"
[23] " At its 3191st meeting, on 31 March 1993 in response to the requests contained in\nthe above letters, the Council resumed its consideration of the situation in the Republic of\nBosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion\nwithout the right to vote. The President (New Zealand) then drew the attention of the\nCouncil members to the text of a draft resolution 38 submitted by France, Morocco,\nPakistan, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States and to several other\n 39\ndocuments.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of France stated that the Security\nCouncil was meeting to adopt a resolution of great political importance. The previous\nweek the Council had welcomed decisive progress in the search for a peaceful solution,\nwith the signing by two of the parties concerned of the Vance-Owen peace plan. All that\nwas lacking was the agreement of the Bosnian Serb side. It was in that context that the\nCouncil would be adopting under Chapter VII, a resolution authorizing the use of force to\nensure compliance with the ban on flights in the no-fly zone established by resolution 781\n(1992). It was essential that the Serbian side understand that a new stage had been\nreached in the conflict and that the Security Council had decided to have recourse to\nforce to see that its decisions were respected. The resolution that the Council was about to\nadopt would mark the involvement of new actors – States or regional organizations\narrangements – which would intervene in new circumstances, as peacemakers and not\nsimply as peacekeepers. The speaker also welcomed the fact that a balance had been\nstruck between the technical necessity of setting up effective military structures and the\npolitical need to place them under the authority of the Security Council, in close\ncoordination with the Secretary-General. Those principles should serve as a model for\nfuture peace-keeping or peacemaking operations, to be carried out with Member States\n\n 38\n S/25440.\n 39\n Communications dated 6,13,20,27 November and 4 December 1992, 12, 16, 19 and 22 March 1993 from\nthe Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/24783, S/24810, S/24840, S/24870,\nS/24900 and Addenda 1 to 31, S/25443, S/25444, S/25456 and S/25457, respectively); letter dated 22 March 1993 from\nthe representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/25459); letters\ndated 22 and 23 March, respectively, from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the\nSecurity Council (S/25450 and S/25467).\n\n\n\n 23\n"
[24] "acting in their national capacity or in the framework of regional organizations or\narrangements. 40\n\n\n The representative of the United Kingdom believed that the Council should be\nslow to authorize the use of force. However, combat flights, that had been flown against\nEast Bosnian villages a few days earlier, had been a step too far to tolerate under any\ncircumstances. He noted that the enforcement of the no-fly zone, which the Council\nwould authorize under the draft resolution before it, would not be directed against any\none party. All sides had violated the no-fly zone, although the Serb parties had done so\nmore than others. Nor did the no-fly zone require the use of force; no force would need to\nbe used if no flights violated the no-fly zone. If the Serbs in Bosnia and the authorities in\nBelgrade did not heed the Council, then the prospects would be grim indeed, with\nincreasing isolation, both economic and political. If they did heed the Council’s message,\nhowever, then all the republics of the former Yugoslavia would be able to take their\nplaces as European States, with the prospect of putting the horrors of the previous two\n 41\nyears behind them.\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and adopted by 14 votes to none,\nwith one abstention (China) as resolution 816 (1993) which reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling its resolutions 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992 and 786 (1992) of 10 November\n 1992,\n Recalling also paragraph 6 of resolution 781 (1992) and paragraph 6 of resolution 786\n (1992) in which the Council undertook to consider urgently, in the case of violations of the\n ban on military flights in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the further\n measures necessary to enforce the ban,\n\n\n\n\n 40\n S/PV.3191, pp. 3-5.\n 41\n Ibid., pp. 16-17.\n\n\n 24\n"
[25] " Deploring the failure of some parties concerned to cooperate fully with airfield monitors\nof the United Nations Protection Force in the implementation of resolutions 781 (1992) and\n786 (1992),\n Deeply concerned by the various reports of the Secretary-General concerning violations\nof the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Deeply concerned in particular by the letters dated 12 and 16 March 1993 from the\nSecretary-General to the President of the Security Council concerning new blatant violations\nof the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and recalling in this\nregard the statement by the President of the Security Council of 17 March 1993, and in\nparticular the reference to the bombing of villages in Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n Determining that the grave situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be a threat\nto international peace and security,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,\n 1. Decides to extend the ban established by resolution 781 (1992) to cover flights by all\nfixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, this ban not to apply to flights authorized by the United Nations Protection\nForce in accordance with paragraph 2 below;\n 2. Requests the Force to modify the mechanism referred to in paragraph 3 of resolution\n781 (1992) so as to provide for the authorization, in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nof humanitarian flights and other flights consistent with relevant resolutions of the Council;\n 3. Also requests the Force to continue to monitor compliance with the ban on flights in\nthe airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and calls on all parties urgently to cooperate with the\nForce in making practical arrangements for the close monitoring of authorized flights and\nimproving the notification procedures;\n 4. Authorizes Member States, seven days after the adoption of the present resolution,\nacting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take, under the\nauthority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General\nand the Force, all necessary measures in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the event\nof further violations, to ensure compliance with the ban on flights referred to in paragraph 1\nabove, and proportionate to the specific circumstances and the nature of the flights;\n 5. Requests the Member States concerned, the Secretary-General and the Force to\ncoordinate closely on the measures they are taking to implement paragraph 4 above,\nincluding the rules of engagement, and on the starting date of its implementation, which\n\n\n 25\n"
[26] " should be no later than seven days from the date when the authority conferred by paragraph 4\n above takes effect, and to report the starting date to the Council through the\n Secretary-General;\n 6. Decides that, in the event of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\n International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia notifying the Council that all the Bosnian\n parties have accepted their proposals on a settlement before the starting date referred to in\n paragraph 5 above, the measures set forth in the present resolution will be subsumed into the\n measures for implementing that settlement;\n 7. Also requests the Member States concerned to inform the Secretary-General\n immediately of any actions they take in exercise of the authority conferred by paragraph 4\n above;\n 8. Requests the Secretary-General to report regularly to the Council on the matter and to\n inform it immediately of any actions taken by the Member States concerned in exercise of the\n authority conferred by paragraph 4 above;\n 9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of Brazil stated that enforcement\nactions under Chapter VII should be a last resort. The resolution just adopted derived not\nonly from non-compliance with previous relevant resolutions, but also from changes in\nthe qualitative nature of the violations. Brazil attached particular importance to the fact\nthat, in accordance with the resolution just adopted, the implementation of the\nauthorization contained in operative paragraph 4 would be conducted with the Secretary-\nGeneral and UNPROFOR; the Security Council would be kept thoroughly informed of\nthe relevant actions; the measures to be taken in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nin the event of further violations would be proportionate to the specific circumstances and\nthe nature of the flights; regional organizations or arrangements involved in the action\nwould be doing so under the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter; and all care would\nbe taken to ensure the safety on the ground of the personnel of the United Nations and of\nhumanitarian organizations. His delegation also understood that the measures taken\nwould be of limited duration and that, as soon as the situation were to warrant it, the\n\n\n\n\n 26\n"
[27] "Council, which would remain actively seized of the matter, would proceed to review\nthese measures. 42\n\n\n The representative of the United States stated that the Bosnian Serbs must\nunderstand that the resolution just adopted was evidence of the international community’s\ngrowing concern with, and intolerance of, their acts of aggression. The credibility of the\nUnited Nations and its entire approach to resolving the conflict rested on its willingness\nto act strongly and effectively, as the Council was doing through the resolution just\nadopted. The resolution just adopted should send the message that, if the Bosnian Serbs\nwanted to rejoin the family of nations, then their behaviour must conform to international\nnorms. The speaker also observed that, while the international community had a duty to\nencourage the parties to reach a settlement, it also needed to demonstrate that signing\npieces of paper without intent to implement them was not enough. By showing its will to\nenforce agreements, the Council had demonstrated its commitment to peace and its\n 43\nresolve to end the conflict.\n\n\n The representative of China stated that, in principle, his delegation did not oppose\nthe establishment of a no-fly zone in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the consent of the\nparties concerned, with a view to easing the tension and ensuring the smooth conduct of\ninternational humanitarian relief activities. However, China’s principled position on\nSecurity Council resolution 781 (1992) remained unchanged. The Chinese delegation had\nreservations on the invocation of Chapter VII to authorize countries to use force in\nimplementing the no-fly zone. Moreover, it noted that the Secretary-General had sent a\nletter to the President of the Security Council dated 22 March 1993, stating that the Force\nCommander of UNPROFOR had taken the view that the enforcement action authorized\nby the resolution would have negative consequences for the viability of UNPROFOR\n\n\n\n\n 42\n Ibid., pp. 17-20.\n 43\n Ibid., pp. 19-21.\n\n\n 27\n"
[28] "within its existing mandate. In view of those considerations, the Chinese delegation had\nabstained in the vote on the resolution just adopted. 44\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation observed that no one had the right to\nviolate Security Council resolutions and yet all three Bosnian parties, notwithstanding the\nban on unauthorized military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nestablished by the Council in resolution 781 (1992), had perpetrated acts that ran counter\nto the demands of the Security Council. The resolution just adopted envisaged the\napplication of enforcement measures against those who violated the airspace of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina. That included the possibility of appropriate self-defence measures on\nthe part of the monitoring aircraft. The speaker drew attention to the fact that the\nappropriate rules of conduct of the operation must, as stated in paragraph 5 of the\nresolution, be coordinated with the Secretary-General and with UNPROFOR. The\nprovision of the resolution regarding the 14-day deferral of the start of the\nimplementation of the measures envisaged in the resolution was also important. The\nRussian Federation hoped that the adoption of the resolution would send a serious\nmessage to all Bosnian parties regarding the resolve of the Security Council to seek a\nspeedy end to the Bosnian conflict through implementation of the Vance-Owen peace\nplan. For its part, it would continue to do everything to promote the attainment of that\n 45\ngoal.\n\n\n Other speakers also stressed that the action taken by the Council should be\nsupplemented by other measures and, in particular, a ban on the use of heavy weapons\n 46\nand effective international control of such weapons.\n\n\nDecision of 3 April 1993 (3192nd meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n\n\n 44\n Ibid., p. 22.\n 45\n Ibid., pp. 23-25.\n 46\n Ibid., Cape Verde, pp. 13-15; Pakistan, pp. 29-31.\n\n\n 28\n"
[29] " By a letter 47 dated 2 April 1993, the Secretary-General transmitted to the\nPresident of the Security Council a letter from the United Nations High Commissioner\nfor Refugees. The letter described the disturbing situation that had developed in\nSrebrenica following the decision of Bosnian Serb military authorities not to permit any\nfurther aid to be delivered to that town and proposed two options. The first option would\nbe to turn Srebrenica into a United Nations protected area, and the second to organize a\nlarge-scale evacuation of the population. The Secretary-General noted that the Force\nCommander of UNPROFOR had been instructed to take the matter up immediately with\nthe Bosnian Serb leadership and to insist that UNHCR be permitted to resume delivering\naid to Srebrenica. In the meantime, he suggested that the members of the Security\nCouncil might wish to consider supportive action in relation to the situation.\n\n\n At its 3192nd meeting, held on 3 April 1993, the Council included the above letter\nin its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion\nwithout the right to vote.\n The President (Pakistan) then stated that, after consultations among members of\n 48\nthe Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement on behalf\nof the Council:\n\n\n “The Security Council is shocked by and extremely alarmed at the dire and worsening\n humanitarian situation which has developed in Srebrenica in the eastern part of the Republic\n of Bosnia and Herzegovina following the unacceptable decision of the Bosnian Serb party not\n to permit any further humanitarian aid to be delivered to that town and to allow only\n evacuation of its civilian population. The relevant facts are contained in a letter dated 2 April\n 1993, addressed to the Secretary-General by the United Nations High Commissioner for\n Refugees.\n “The Council recalls and reaffirms all its relevant resolutions and statements and\n condemns the continuing disregard and wilful flouting of them by the Bosnian Serb party,\n\n\n\n 47\n S/25519.\n 48\n S/25520.\n\n\n 29\n"
[30] " which once again, in pursuit of its unlawful, unacceptable and abhorrent policy of ‘ethnic\n cleansing’ aimed at territorial aggrandizement, has blocked the United Nations humanitarian\n relief efforts.\n “Recognizing the imperative need to alleviate, with the utmost urgency, the sufferings of\n the population in and around Srebrenica who are in desperate need of food, medicine, clothes\n and shelter, the Council demands that the Bosnian Serb party cease and desist forthwith from\n all violations of international humanitarian law, including in particular the deliberate\n interference with humanitarian convoys, and allow all such convoys unhindered access to the\n town of Srebrenica and other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council demands that the\n Bosnian Serb party strictly comply with all relevant resolutions of the Council. It further\n demands that the Bosnian Serb party honour forthwith its most recent commitment ‘to\n guarantee the free movement of humanitarian convoys and the protection of endangered\n civilians’. The Council also reaffirms that those guilty of crimes against international\n humanitarian law will be held individually responsible by the world community.\n “The Council commends and strongly supports the efforts of the brave people who have\n undertaken to deliver urgently needed humanitarian assistance, under extremely trying\n conditions, to the civilian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular the efforts\n of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations Protection\n Force.\n “The Council recalls the request it made to the Secretary-General in its statement of 3\n March 1993 to take immediate steps to increase the presence of the Force in eastern Bosnia,\n welcomes the action taken already in that respect, and urges the Secretary-General and the\n High Commissioner to use all the resources at their disposal within the scope of the relevant\n resolutions of the Council to reinforce the existing humanitarian operations in Bosnia and\n Herzegovina.\n “The Council will remain actively seized of the matter.”\n\n\n\n\nDecision of 8 April 1993: statement by the President to the media\n\n\n\n\n 30\n"
[31] " On 8 April 1993, after consultations with the members of the Council, the\nPresident made the following statement to the media 49 on behalf of the members of the\nCouncil:\n\n “The members of the Security Council express their concern at the report of the\n International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), according to which 17 detainees lost their\n lives on 26 March 1993 in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, when the vehicle\n transporting them from the Batkovic Camp (under the control of Serb forces) for work at the\n front was ambushed.\n “The members of the Council, recalling all the relevant resolutions and statements of the\n Council, remind all the parties that they are responsible at all times for the detainees' safety\n and that they must not compel detainees to do work of a military nature or destined to serve a\n military purpose. The ICRC had already repeatedly called on all parties to the conflict in\n Bosnia and Herzegovina strictly to observe the provisions of international humanitarian law.\n “The members of the Council condemn all violations of the Third and Fourth Geneva\n Conventions, which the parties have undertaken to respect, and reaffirm once again that those\n who commit or order the commission of such acts will be held personally responsible.\n “The members of the Council request the Commission of Experts established pursuant to\n resolution 780 (1992) to carry out an investigation of these abominable practices and to make\n a report.”\n\n\n\n\nDecision of 9 April 1993: letter from the President to the Secretary-General\n\n\n By a letter 50 dated 9 April 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General, referring to resolution 816 (1993) of 31 March 1993,\nreported that Member States concerned, acting nationally as well as through the regional\narrangement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), had been closely\ncoordinating with him and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) on the\nmeasures they were taking to ensure compliance with the ban on all flights in the airspace\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina. He also reported that the NATO Secretary-General had\n\n 49\n S/25557.\n 50\n S/25567.\n\n\n 31\n"
[32] "informed him, in a letter dated 8 April 1993, that the North Atlantic Council had adopted\nthe necessary arrangements. The Secretary-General further noted that the rules of\nengagement established by the Member States concerned were in conformity with the\nrequirements set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 816 (1993), and that, as requested in\nparagraph 2 of that resolution, UNPROFOR had modified the mechanism referred to in\nparagraph 3 of Council resolution 781 (1992). The revised guidelines for the\nauthorization of non-UNPROFOR and non-UNHCR flights in the airspace of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina were attached as an annex to the letter. The Secretary-General, lastly,\nreported that the NATO Secretary-General had informed him that his military authorities\nwere prepared to begin the operation at noon GMT on Monday, 12 April 1993.\n\n\n 51\n By a letter dated 10 April 1993, the President of the Security Council informed\nthe Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n “Your letter dated 9 April 1993 has been brought to the attention of the Security Council.\n “The Council takes note that the operations authorized by its resolution 816 (1993) will\n start on Monday, 12 April 1993 at 1200 GMT, in accordance with the modalities described in\n the annex to your above-mentioned letter.”\n\n\n\nDecision of 16 April 1993 (3199th meeting): resolution 819 (1993)\n\n At its 3199th meeting, on 16 April 1993, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request,\nto participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President (Pakistan) then\ndrew the attention of the Council members to the text of a draft resolution 52 prepared in\nthe course of the Council’s prior consultations and to several other documents. 53\n\n\n\n\n 51\n S/25568.\n 52\n S/25617.\n 53\n Letters dated 5, 15 and 16 April 1993, respectively, from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\naddressed to the President of the Security Council (S/25529, S/25609 and S/25616).\n\n\n 32\n"
[33] " The draft resolution was then put to the vote and adopted unanimously as\nresolution 819 (1993) which reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all its subsequent\n relevant resolutions,\n Noting that the International Court of Justice in its Order of 8 April 1993 in the case\n concerning application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of\n Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) unanimously\n indicated as a provisional measure that the Government of the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should immediately, in pursuance of its undertaking in\n the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9 December\n 1948, take all measures within its power to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide,\n Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Reaffirming also its call on the parties and others concerned to observe immediately the\n cease-fire throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Reaffirming further its condemnation of all violations of international humanitarian law,\n including, in particular, the practice of “ethnic cleansing”,\n Concerned by the pattern of hostilities by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against towns\n and villages in eastern Bosnia, and in this regard reaffirming that any taking or acquisition of\n territory by the threat or use of force, including through the practice of “ethnic cleansing”, is\n unlawful and unacceptable,\n Deeply alarmed at the information provided by the Secretary-General to the Security\n Council on 16 April 1993 on the rapid deterioration of the situation in Srebrenica and its\n surrounding areas, as a result of the continued deliberate armed attacks and shelling of the\n innocent civilian population by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units,\n Strongly condemning the deliberate interdiction by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units of\n humanitarian assistance convoys,\n Also strongly condemning the actions taken by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units against\n the United Nations Protection Force, in particular, their refusal to guarantee the safety and\n freedom of movement of Force personnel,\n Aware that a tragic humanitarian emergency has already developed in Srebrenica and its\n surrounding areas as a direct consequence of the brutal actions of Bosnian Serb paramilitary\n\n 33\n"
[34] "units, forcing the large-scale displacement of civilians, in particular women, children and the\nelderly,\n Recalling the provisions of resolution 815 (1993) of 30 March 1993 on the mandate of\nthe Force, and in that context acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Demands that all parties and others concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as\na safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile act;\n 2. Demands also to that effect the immediate cessation of armed attacks by Bosnian Serb\nparamilitary units against Srebrenica and their immediate withdrawal from the areas\nsurrounding Srebrenica;\n 3. Demands further that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)\nimmediately cease the supply of military arms, equipment and services to the Bosnian Serb\nparamilitary units in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 4. Requests the Secretary-General, with a view to monitoring the humanitarian situation\nin the safe area, to take immediate steps to increase the presence of the United Nations\nProtection Force in Srebrenica and its surroundings, demands that all parties and others\nconcerned cooperate fully and promptly with the Force towards that end, and requests the\nSecretary-General to report urgently thereon to the Security Council;\n 5. Reaffirms that any taking or acquisition of territory by the threat or use of force,\nincluding through the practice of “ethnic cleansing”, is unlawful and unacceptable;\n 6. Condemns and rejects the deliberate actions of the Bosnian Serb party to force the\nevacuation of the civilian population from Srebrenica and its surrounding areas as well as\nfrom other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of its overall abhorrent campaign of\n“ethnic cleansing”;\n 7. Reaffirms its condemnation of all violations of international humanitarian law, in\nparticular the practice of “ethnic cleansing”, and reaffirms that those who commit or order the\ncommission of such acts shall be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;\n 8. Demands the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance to all parts of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, in particular to the civilian population of Srebrenica and its surrounding areas,\nand recalls that such impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance constitute a\nserious violation of international humanitarian law;\n 9. Urges the Secretary-General and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees\nto use all the resources at their disposal within the scope of the relevant resolutions of the\nCouncil to reinforce the existing humanitarian operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in\nparticular Srebrenica and its surroundings;\n\n\n 34\n"
[35] " 10. Also demands that all parties guarantee the safety and full freedom of movement of\n the United Nations Protection Force and of all other United Nations personnel as well as\n members of humanitarian organizations;\n 11. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the High Commissioner and the\n Force, to arrange for the safe transfer of the wounded and ill civilians from Srebrenica and its\n surrounding areas and urgently to report thereon to the Council;\n 12. Decides to send, as soon as possible, a mission of members of the Council to Bosnia\n and Herzegovina to ascertain the situation and report thereon to the Council;\n l3. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and to consider further steps to achieve\n a solution in conformity with its relevant resolutions.\n\n\n Decision of 17 April 1993 (3200th meeting): resolution 820 (1993)\n\n The Security Council,\n\n Reaffirming all its earlier relevant resolutions,\n\n 54 55 56\n Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of 2 and 8 February and 12 and\n 57\n 26 March 1993 on the peace talks held by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of\n the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,\n\n\n Reaffirming the need for a lasting peace settlement to be signed by all of the Bosnian parties,\n\n Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n\n\n Reaffirming once again that any taking of territory by force or any practice of \"ethnic\n cleansing\" is unlawful and totally unacceptable, and insisting that all displaced persons be\n enabled to return in peace to their former homes,\n\n\n\n\n54\n Official Records of the Security Council, Forty-eighth year, Supplement for January, February and March 1993,\ndocument S/25221.\n55\n Ibid., document S/25248.\n56\n Ibid., document S/25403\n57\n Ibid., document S/25479\n\n\n 35\n"
[36] "Reaffirming in this regard its resolution 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993 in which it decided\nthat an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible\nfor serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the\nformer Yugoslavia since 1991 and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report at the\nearliest possible date,\n\n\nDeeply alarmed and concerned about the magnitude of the plight of innocent victims of the\nconflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n\nExpressing its condemnation of all the activities carried out in violation of resolutions 757\n(1992) of 30 May 1992 and 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992 between the territory of the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Serb-controlled areas in the\nRepublic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n\n\nDeeply concerned by the position of the Bosnian Serb party as reported in paragraph 17, 18\nand 19 of the report of the Secretary-General of 26 March 1993 (S/25479),\n\n\nRecalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n\n\n A\n\n1. Commends the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the form agreed to by two of\n the Bosnian parties and set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 26 March 1993\n (S/25479), namely the Agreement on Interim Arrangements (annex I), the nine\n Constitutional Principles (annex II), the provisional provincial map (annex III) and the\n Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (annex IV);\n2. Welcomes the fact that this plan has now been accepted in full by two of the Bosnian\n parties;\n3. Expresses its grave concern at the refusal so far of the Bosnian Serb party to accept the\n Agreement on Interim Arrangements and the provisional provincial map, and calls on\n that party to accept the peace plan in full;\n4. Demands that all parties and others concerned continue to observe the cease-fire and\n refrain from any further hostilities;\n5. Also demands full respect for the right of the United Nations Protection Force\n (UNPROFOR) and the international humanitarian agencies to free and unimpeded access\n to all areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that all parties, in particular\n\n 36\n"
[37] " the Bosnian Serb party and others concerned, cooperate fully with them and take all\n necessary steps to ensure the safety of their personnel;\n 6. Condemns once again all violations of international humanitarian law, including in\n particular the practice of \"ethnic cleansing\" and the massive, organized and systematic\n detention and rape of women, and reaffirms that those who commit or have committed or\n order or have ordered the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible\n in respect of such acts;\n 7. Reaffirms its endorsement of the principles that all statements or commitments made\n under duress, particularly those relating to land and property, are wholly null and void\n and that all displaced persons have the right to return in peace to their former homes and\n should be assisted to do so;\n 8. Declares its readiness to take all the necessary measures to assist the parties in the\n effective implementation of the peace plan once it has been agreed in full by all the\n parties, and requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council at the earliest date,\n and if possible not later than nine days after the adoption of the present resolution, a\n report containing an account of the preparatory work for the implementation of the\n proposals referred to in paragraph 28 of the Secretary-General's report of 26 March 1993\n (S/25479) and detailed proposals for the implementation of the peace plan, including\n arrangements for the effective international control of heavy weapons, based inter alia on\n consultations with Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or\n arrangements;\n 9. Encourages Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or\n arrangements, to cooperate effectively with the Secretary-General in his efforts to assist\n the parties in implementing the peace plan in accordance with paragraph 8 above;\n\n\n B\n\nDetermined to strengthen the implementation of the measures imposed by its earlier relevant\nresolutions,\n\n\nActing under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n\n\n 10. Decides that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 12 to 30 below shall, to the extent that\n they establish obligations beyond those established by its earlier relevant resolutions,\n come into force nine days after the date of the adoption of the present resolution unless\n\n\n 37\n"
[38] " the Secretary-General has reported to the Council that the Bosnian Serb party has joined\n the other parties in signing the peace plan and in implementing it and that the Bosnian\n Serbs have ceased their military attacks;\n11. Decides also that if, at any time after the submission of the above-mentioned report of the\n Secretary-General, the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the Bosnian Serbs\n have renewed their military attacks or failed to comply with the peace plan, the\n provisions set forth in paragraphs 12 to 30 below shall come into force immediately;\n12. Decides that import to, export from and transshipment through the United Nations\n Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, with the exception of essential\n humanitarian supplies including medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by\n international humanitarian agencies, shall be permitted only with proper authorization\n from the Government of the Republic of Croatia or the Government of the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively;\n13. Decides that all States, in implementing the measures imposed by resolutions 757 (1992),\n 760 (1992) of 18 June 1992, 787 (1992) and the present resolution, shall take steps to\n prevent diversion to the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro) of commodities and products said to be destined for other places, in\n particular the United Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia and those areas\n of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces;\n14. Demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with the United Nations\n Protection Force in the fulfilment of its immigration and customs control functions\n deriving from resolution 769 (1992) of 7 August 1992;\n15. Decides that transshipments of commodities and products through the Federal Republic\n of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the Danube shall be permitted only if\n specifically authorized by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) and that\n each vessel so authorized must be subject to effective monitoring while passing along the\n Danube between Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs;\n16. Confirms that no vessels (a) registered in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro) or (b) in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or\n undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro) or (c) suspected of having violated or being in violation of resolutions 713\n (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present resolution shall be permitted to pass\n through installations, including river locks or canals within the territory of Member\n\n\n 38\n"
[39] " States, and calls upon the riparian States to ensure that adequate monitoring is provided\n to all cabotage traffic involving points that are situated between Vidin/Calafat and\n Mohacs;\n17. Reaffirms the responsibility of riparian States to take necessary measures to ensure that\n shipping on the Danube is in accordance with resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787\n (1992) and the present resolution, including any measures under the authority of the\n Security Council to halt or otherwise control all shipping in order to inspect and verify\n their cargoes and destinations, to ensure effective monitoring and to ensure strict\n implementation of the relevant resolutions, and reiterates its request in resolution 787\n (1992) to all States, including non-riparian States, to provide, acting nationally or through\n regional organizations or arrangements, such assistance as may be required by the\n riparian States, notwithstanding the restrictions on navigation set out in the international\n agreements which apply to the Danube;\n18. Requests the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) to make periodic reports to\n the Security Council on information submitted to the Committee regarding alleged\n violations of the relevant resolutions, identifying where possible persons or entities,\n including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations;\n19. Reminds States of the importance of strict enforcement of measures imposed under\n Chapter VII of the Charter, and calls upon them to bring proceedings against persons and\n entities violating the measures imposed by resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787\n (1992) and the present resolution and to impose appropriate penalties;\n20. Welcomes the role of the international Sanctions Assistance Missions in support of the\n implementation of the measures under resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992)\n and the present resolution and the appointment of the Sanctions Coordinator by the\n Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and invites the Sanctions Coordinator\n and the Sanctions Assistance Missions to work in close cooperation with the Committee\n established by resolution 724 (1991);\n21. Decides that States in which there are funds, including any funds derived from property,\n (a) of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or\n (b) of commercial, industrial or public utility undertakings in the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or (c) controlled directly or indirectly by such\n authorities or undertakings or by entities, wherever located or organized, owned or\n controlled by such authorities or undertakings, shall require all persons and entities\n within their own territories holding such funds to freeze them to ensure that they are not\n\n\n 39\n"
[40] " made available directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of the authorities in the Federal\n Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or to any commercial, industrial or\n public utility undertaking in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro), and calls on all States to report to the Committee established by resolution\n 724 (1991) on actions taken pursuant to this paragraph;\n22. Decides to prohibit the transport of all commodities and products across the land borders\n or to or from the ports of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),\n the only exceptions being:\n a. The importation of medical supplies and foodstuffs into the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as provided for in resolution 757 (1992), in\n which connection the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) will draw\n up rules for monitoring to ensure full compliance with this and other relevant\n resolutions;\n b. The importation of other essential humanitarian supplies into the Federal\n Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), approved on a case-by-case\n basis under the no-objection procedure by the Committee established by\n resolution 724 (1991);\n c. Strictly limited transshipments through the territory of the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), when authorized on an exceptional basis\n by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991, provided that nothing in\n this paragraph shall affect transshipment on the Danube in accordance with\n paragraph 15 above;\n23. Decides that each State neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro) shall prevent the passage of all freight vehicles and rolling stock onto or out\n of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), except at a strictly\n limited number of road and rail border crossing points, the location of which shall be\n notified by each neighbouring State to the Committee established by resolution 724\n (1991) and approved by the Committee;\n24. Decides that all States shall impound all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and\n aircraft in their territories in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or\n undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro) and that these vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft may be\n forfeit to the seizing State upon a determination that they have been in violation of\n resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present resolution;\n\n\n 40\n"
[41] "25. Decides that all States shall detain pending investigation all vessels, freight vehicles,\n rolling stock, aircraft and cargoes found in their territories and suspected of having\n violated or being in violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the\n present resolution, and that, upon a determination that they have been in violation, such\n vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft shall be impounded and, where\n appropriate, they and their cargoes may be forfeit to the detaining State;\n26. Confirms that States may charge the expense of impounding vessels, freight vehicles,\n rolling stock and aircraft to their owners;\n27. Decides to prohibit the provision of services, both financial and non-financial, to any\n person or body for purposes of any business carried on in the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) the only exceptions being telecommunications,\n postal services, legal services consistent with resolution 757 (1992) and, as approved, on\n a case-by-case basis by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991), services\n whose supply may be necessary for humanitarian or other exceptional purposes;\n28. Decides to prohibit all commercial maritime traffic from entering the territorial sea of the\n Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) except when authorized on a\n case-by-case basis by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) or in case of\n force majeure;\n29. Reaffirms the authority of States acting under paragraph 12 of resolution 787 (1992) to\n use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary\n under the authority of the Security Council to enforce the present resolution and its other\n relevant resolutions, including in the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro);\n30. Confirms that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 12 to 29 above, strengthening the\n implementation of the measures imposed by its earlier relevant resolutions, do not apply\n to activities related to UNPROFOR, the International Conference on the Former\n Yugoslavia or the European Community Monitor Mission;\n\n C\n\n\nDesirous of achieving the full readmittance of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia\nand Montenegro) to the international community once it has fully implemented the relevant\nresolutions of the Council,\n\n\n\n\n 41\n"
[42] " 31. Expresses its readiness, after all three Bosnian parties have accepted the peace plan and\n on the basis of verified evidence, provided by the Secretary-General, that the Bosnian\n Serb party is cooperating in good faith in effective implementation of the plan, to review\n all the measures in the present resolution and its other relevant resolutions with a view to\n gradually lifting them;\n 32. Invites all States to consider what contribution they can make to the reconstruction of the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 33. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n\nDecision of 17 April1993 (3200th meeting): resolution 820 (1993)\n\n\n By a letter 58 dated 17 April 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of France requested an immediate meeting of the Council to\ndiscuss the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n A similar request was made by the representatives of Cape Verde, Djibouti,\nMorocco, Pakistan and Venezuela in a letter 59 dated 17 April 1993 addressed to the\nPresident of the Council. In that letter, the Council was to consider the situation in the\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in Srebrenica, and to take action on a\nproposed draft resolution, 60 since the conditions justifying the adoption of resolution 819\n(1993) had not been met.\n At its 3200th meeting, held on 17 April 1993 in response to the requests contained\nin the above letters, the Council included these letters in its agenda. Following the\nadoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The\nCouncil also invited Ambassador Dragomir Djokic, at his request, to take a seat at the\nCouncil table, and it extended an invitation to Mr. Cyrus Vance, Co-Chairman of the\nSteering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY).\n\n\n\n 58\n S/25622.\n 59\n S/25623.\n 60\n S/25558.\n\n\n 42\n"
[43] " The President (Pakistan) then drew the attention of the Council members to the\ntext of a draft resolution 61 submitted by Cape Verde, Djibouti, France, Morocco, Spain,\nthe United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela and read out revisions to be made\nto the draft. He also drew attention to a series of Secretary-General’s reports 62, including\na report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the International Conference on the\nFormer Yugoslavia dated 26 March 1993, and to several other documents. 63 In the report\nof 26 March, the Secretary-General informed the Council on the latest round of peace\ntalks held from 16 to 25 March 1993 by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of\nthe ICFY with the three sides to the conflict. The Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian\nGovernment had signed all the elements of the peace package put forward by the Co-\nChairmen, namely the Constitutional Principles, the map of provincial boundaries, the\nmilitary agreement and the interim arrangements whereas the Bosnian Serbs had declined\nto sign the provincial map and the agreement on interim arrangements. The Secretary-\nGeneral urged the Council to approve the peace package proposed by the Co-Chairmen\nof the Steering Committee of the ICFY and to call upon the Bosnian Serbs side to sign\nthe remaining two parts of the peace plan. He also recommended the early establishment\nof an International Human Rights Monitoring Mission, which all three sides had\naccepted.\n At the same meeting, Mr. Vance stated that the Co-Chairmen of the International\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia hoped that the Council would adopt the draft\nresolution forthwith, and thus send the clear message to the Bosnian Serb side and its\nsupporters that time was running out and the international community would wait no\n\n\n 61\n Ibid.\n 62\n S/25221, S/25248, S/25403, S/25479 and S/25490.\n 63\n Letter dated 6 April from the representatives of France, Spain and the United Kingdom addressed to the\nPresident of the Security Council (S/25546); letter dated 22 February 1993 from the representatives of Bulgaria,\nRomania and Ukraine addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/25322); letter dated 6 April 1993 from the\nChargé d’affaires a.i. of Italy addressed to the Secretary-General (S/25551); letter dated 8 April 1993 from the\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/25566); letter dated 12\nApril 1993 from the representatives of France, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States addressed to the\nPresident of the Security Council (S/25580); letter dated 15 April 1993 from the representatives of Cape Verde,\nDjibouti, Morocco, Pakistan and Venezuela addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/25604); letter dated\n15 April 1993 from the representative of Venezuela addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/25605); letter\ndated 15 April 1993 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Turkey addressed to the President of the Security Council\n(S/25607); letter dated 14 April 1993 from the Chargé d’affaires of Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the\nSecurity Council (S/25619); and letter dated 17 April 1993 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\naddressed to the President of the Security Council (S/25624).\n\n\n 43\n"
[44] "longer. Should the measures envisaged in it fail to achieve the desired effect, they should\nbe followed by additional measures of sterner persuasion. The speaker added that\neverything possible must be done to bring humanitarian relief and assistance to the\nsuffering communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. There could be no excuse for\n 64\nobstructing humanitarian convoys.\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of France noted that, by agreeing, as\na last concession, to postpone the adoption of the draft resolution, his delegation had\nhoped that the situation on the ground would stabilize and that there would be progress in\nnegotiating the Vance-Owen plan. On the contrary, the Serbian side had taken advantage\nof that postponement to take control of Srebrenica, while at the same time rejecting the\npeace plan. His delegation believed that the Council should vote to strengthen the\nsanctions. He further observed that the draft resolution, by strengthening the provisions of\nresolution 757 (1992), marked the total economic and financial isolation of Serbia.\nFrance was prepared to take immediate steps to make the implementation of the\nresolution effective and was working on setting up assistance to the countries along the\nDanube to suspend all river traffic destined for Serbia. Stating that the measures\ncontained in the draft resolution were not “sanctions for sanctions’ sake”, but rather part\nof a global political plan, the speaker observed that the Council’s support for the Vance-\nOwen plan sent a clear signal to the Serbs that there was a path other than conflict. In that\nrespect, section C of the draft resolution was something new and reflected the desire to\nsee the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) rejoin the international\n 65\ncommunity, provided that it fully respected the relevant United Nations resolutions.\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the adoption, at that\njuncture, of a resolution strengthening the sanctions, was quite untimely. The Russian\nFederation supported all the provisions of part A of the draft resolution, under which the\nSecurity Council would call upon all sides to reach a rapid and peaceful solution. It was\nimportant to give the parties the possibility, through international mediation, of reaching\nan agreement on the Vance-Owen plan, and of completing the intensive negotiations that\nwere proceeding at that time. It was the Russian Federation’s view, however, that the\n\n 64\n S/PV.3200, pp. 6-7.\n 65\n Ibid., pp. 7-10.\n\n\n 44\n"
[45] "Security Council should provide one last chance – which should be used primarily by the\nSerbian side – for the achievement of a realistic agreement by observing a cease-fire and\nrefraining from any actions that might be regarded as “ethnic cleansing”. The most\nreasonable approach would have been to delay voting on the draft resolution until 26\nApril. Since the majority of the Council members, however, had insisted upon an\nimmediate vote, the Russian Federation would not hinder the adoption of that decision,\nparticularly in view of the fact that it would enter into force only nine days after its\nadoption, unless an agreement were to be signed on the Vance-Owen plan. Nevertheless,\nit retained serious misgivings about the possible negative consequences of the Council’s\n 66\nhaste, and it would abstain in the voting on the draft resolution.\n The representative of Brazil stated that the draft resolution presented three\nfundamental aspects. The first aspect was the support by the Security Council for the\nVance-Owen peace plan. In that respect, his delegation believed that the Security Council\nshould always favour the resort to and the exhaustion of the peaceful and negotiated\nmeans for the settlement of disputes. The second aspect was the strengthening of the\nmeasures imposed by earlier resolutions. As a matter of principle, Brazil had always held\nthat action under Chapter VII of the Charter should be taken only in extreme\ncircumstances. In the case before it, the grave deterioration of the situation in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina justified such an exceptional course of action. Brazil was aware that the\nmeasures that the Council was about to approve would entail complex considerations of a\nlegal, economic, financial and administrative order. While some of these measures could\nbe readily implemented, others might require the enactment of appropriate enabling\nlegislation. He stated that his Government would take all necessary steps to put such\nlegislation in place as soon as possible. It was his understanding that the specific\nprovisions of paragraph 29 of the draft resolution, as they referred to the territorial sea of\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), were of an exceptional\nnature, related specifically to the particular situation, and that they could not be\nconsidered as a precedent that in any way altered or derogated from the régime of\ncoastal-State rights in that territorial sea, in accordance with the 1982 United Nations\n\n\n 66\n Ibid., pp. 11-12.\n\n\n 45\n"
[46] "Convention on the Law of the Sea and other relevant norms of international law. The\nthird aspect – namely, the provisions of part C of the draft resolution, to which Brazil\nattached importance, made it clear that the exceptional measures contained in part B were\nnot irreversible. He hoped that they might soon lead to the creation of conditions that\nwould permit resort to the review mechanisms provided for in paragraph 31 of the draft\n 67\nresolution.\n The representative of Spain noted that the draft resolution before the Council\nincorporated essential elements for a package proposed by the European Community with\na view to increasing the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed on the FRY and at the\nsame time opened up other prospects if there was a radical change in the attitude of the\nBosnian Serbs. Indeed, if the Bosnian Serbs accepted the peace plan and implemented it\nfully and in good faith, it would make possible a gradual easing of the pressure brought to\nbear on them and the FRY; it would pave the way for a review of the sanctions and their\neventual lifting. If, on the contrary, the Bosnian Serbs did not desist from their current\npolicy, they and the FRY would remain isolated from the rest of the international\ncommunity and would suffer the full effects of the Council’s sanctions. The speaker\nfurther noted that the time allowed by the Council, as a gesture of goodwill had in fact\nbeen used to create de facto situations in the field. These situations were contrary to the\nobjectives sought by the international community as embodied in the Vance-Owen plan.\nIn these circumstances, his Government had reached the conclusion that the draft\nresolution must be put to a vote without further delay.\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote, as orally revised in its provisional\nform, and was adopted by 13 votes to none, with two abstentions (China, the Russian\nFederation), as resolution 820 (1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Reaffirming all its earlier relevant resolutions,\n\n\n\n\n 67\n Ibid., pp. 12-13.\n\n\n 46\n"
[47] " Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of 2 and 8 February and 12 and\n26 March 1993 on the peace talks held by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,\n Reaffirming the need for a lasting peace settlement to be signed by all of the Bosnian\nparties,\n Reaffirming also the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Reaffirming once again that any taking of territory by force or any practice of “ethnic\ncleansing” is unlawful and totally unacceptable, and insisting that all displaced persons be\nenabled to return in peace to their former homes,\n Reaffirming in this regard its resolution 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993 in which it\ndecided that an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons\nresponsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory\nof the former Yugoslavia since 1991 and requested the Secretary-General to submit a report\nat the earliest possible date,\n Deeply alarmed and concerned about the magnitude of the plight of innocent victims of\nthe conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Expressing its condemnation of all the activities carried out in violation of resolutions\n757 (1992) of 30 May 1992 and 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992 between the territory of the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Serb-controlled areas in the\nRepublic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Deeply concerned by the position of the Bosnian Serb party as reported in paragraphs 17,\n18 and 19 of the report of the Secretary-General of 26 March 1993,\n Recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n\n\n A\n\n\n 1. Commends the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the form agreed to by two of\nthe Bosnian parties and set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 26 March 1993,\nnamely the Agreement on Interim Arrangements (annex I), the nine Constitutional Principles\n(annex II), the provisional provincial map (annex III) and the Agreement for Peace in Bosnia\nand Herzegovina (annex IV);\n 2. Welcomes the fact that this plan has now been accepted in full by two of the Bosnian\nparties;\n\n\n 47\n"
[48] " 3. Expresses its grave concern at the refusal so far of the Bosnian Serb party to accept the\nAgreement on Interim Arrangements and the provisional provincial map, and calls on that\nparty to accept the peace plan in full;\n 4. Demands that all parties and others concerned continue to observe the cease-fire and\nrefrain from any further hostilities;\n 5. Also demands full respect for the right of the United Nations Protection Force and the\ninternational humanitarian agencies to free and unimpeded access to all areas in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, and that all parties, in particular the Bosnian Serb party and others concerned,\ncooperate fully with them and take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of their personnel;\n 6. Condemns once again all violations of international humanitarian law, including in\nparticular the practice of “ethnic cleansing” and the massive, organized and systematic\ndetention and rape of women, and reaffirms that those who commit or have committed or\norder or have ordered the commission of such acts will be held individually responsible in\nrespect of such acts;\n 7. Reaffirms its endorsement of the principles that all statements or commitments made\nunder duress, particularly those relating to land and property, are wholly null and void and\nthat all displaced persons have the right to return in peace to their former homes and should\nbe assisted to do so;\n 8. Declares its readiness to take all the necessary measures to assist the parties in the\neffective implementation of the peace plan once it has been agreed in full by all the parties,\nand requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council at the earliest possible date, and\nif possible not later than nine days after the adoption of the present resolution, a report\ncontaining an account of the preparatory work for the implementation of the proposals\nreferred to in paragraph 28 of his report of 26 March 1993 and detailed proposals for the\nimplementation of the peace plan, including arrangements for the effective international\ncontrol of heavy weapons, based, inter alia, on consultations with Member States, acting\nnationally or through regional organizations or arrangements;\n 9. Encourages Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or\narrangements, to cooperate effectively with the Secretary-General in his efforts to assist the\nparties in implementing the peace plan in accordance with paragraph 8 above;\n\n\n B\n\n\n\n\n 48\n"
[49] " Determined to strengthen the implementation of the measures imposed by its earlier\nrelevant resolutions,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 10. Decides that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 12 to 30 below shall, to the extent\nthat they establish obligations beyond those established by its earlier relevant resolutions,\ncome into force nine days after the date of the adoption of the present resolution unless the\nSecretary-General has reported to the Council that the Bosnian Serb party has joined the other\nparties in signing the peace plan and in implementing it and that the Bosnian Serbs have\nceased their military attacks;\n 11. Decides also that if, at any time after the submission of the above-mentioned report of\nthe Secretary-General, the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the Bosnian Serbs\nhave renewed their military attacks or failed to comply with the peace plan, the provisions set\nforth in paragraphs 12 to 30 below shall come into force immediately;\n 12. Decides that import to, export from and transshipment through the United Nations\nProtected Areas in the Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, with the exception of essential\nhumanitarian supplies including medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by international\nhumanitarian agencies, shall be permitted only with proper authorization from the\nGovernment of the Republic of Croatia or the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina respectively;\n 13. Decides that all States, in implementing the measures imposed by resolutions 757\n(1992), 760 (1992) of 18 June 1992, 787 (1992) and the present resolution, shall take steps to\nprevent diversion to the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) of commodities and products said to be destined for other places, in particular\nthe United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia and those areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nunder the control of Bosnian Serb forces;\n 14. Demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with the United\nNations Protection Force in the fulfilment of its immigration and customs control functions\nderiving from resolution 769 (1992) of 7 August 1992;\n 15. Decides that transshipment of commodities and products through the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the Danube shall be permitted only if\nspecifically authorized by the Security Council Committee established by resolution 724\n(1991) and that each vessel so authorized must be subject to effective monitoring while\npassing along the Danube between Vidin/Calafat and Mohacs;\n\n\n 49\n"
[50] " 16. Confirms that no vessels (a) registered in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia\nand Montenegro) or (b) in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or\nundertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) or (c) suspected of having violated or being in violation of resolutions 713\n(1991) of 25 September 1991, 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present resolution shall be\npermitted to pass through installations, including river locks or canals within the territory of\nMember States, and calls upon the riparian States to ensure that adequate monitoring is\nprovided to all cabotage traffic involving points that are situated between Vidin/Calafat and\nMohacs;\n 17. Reaffirms the responsibility of riparian States to take necessary measures to ensure\nthat shipping on the Danube is in accordance with resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787\n(1992) and the present resolution, including any measures under the authority of the Security\nCouncil to halt or otherwise control all shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes\nand destinations, to ensure effective monitoring and to ensure strict implementation of the\nrelevant resolutions, and reiterates its request in resolution 787 (1992) to all States, including\nnon-riparian States, to provide, acting nationally or through regional organizations or\narrangements, such assistance as may be required by the riparian States, notwithstanding the\nrestrictions on navigation set out in the international agreements which apply to the Danube;\n 18. Requests the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) to make periodic\nreports to the Security Council on information submitted to the Committee regarding alleged\nviolations of the relevant resolutions, identifying where possible persons or entities, including\nvessels, reported to be engaged in such violations;\n 19. Reminds States of the importance of strict enforcement of measures imposed under\nChapter VII of the Charter, and calls upon them to bring proceedings against persons and\nentities violating the measures imposed by resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992)\nand the present resolution and to impose appropriate penalties;\n 20. Welcomes the role of the international Sanctions Assistance Missions in support of\nthe implementation of the measures imposed under resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787\n(1992) and the present resolution and the appointment of the Sanctions Coordinator by the\nConference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and invites the Sanctions Coordinator\nand the Sanctions Assistance Missions to work in close cooperation with the Committee\nestablished by resolution 724 (1991);\n 21. Decides that States in which there are funds, including any funds derived from\nproperty, (a) of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n\n\n 50\n"
[51] "Montenegro), or (b) of commercial, industrial or public utility undertakings in the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), or (c) controlled directly or indirectly by\nsuch authorities or undertakings or by entities, wherever located or organized, owned or\ncontrolled by such authorities or undertakings, shall require all persons and entities within\ntheir own territories holding such funds to freeze them to ensure that they are not made\navailable directly or indirectly to or for the benefit of the authorities in the Federal Republic\nof Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) or to any commercial, industrial or public utility\nundertaking in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and calls on all\nStates to report to the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) on actions taken\npursuant to this paragraph;\n 22. Decides to prohibit the transport of all commodities and products across the land\nborders or to or from the ports of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro), the only exceptions being:\n (a) The importation of medical supplies and foodstuffs into the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as provided for in resolution 757 (1992), in which\nconnection the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) will draw up rules for\nmonitoring to ensure full compliance with this and other relevant resolutions;\n (b) The importation of other essential humanitarian supplies into the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) approved on a case-by-case basis under the\nno-objection procedure by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991);\n (c) Strictly limited transshipment through the territory of the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), when authorized on an exceptional basis by the\nCommittee established by resolution 724 (1991), provided that nothing in this paragraph shall\naffect transshipment on the Danube in accordance with paragraph 15 above;\n 23. Decides that each State neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) shall prevent the passage of all freight vehicles and rolling stock into or out of\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), except at a strictly limited\nnumber of road and rail border crossing points, the location of which shall be notified by each\nneighbouring State to the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) and approved by\nthe Committee;\n 24. Decides that all States shall impound all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and\naircraft in their territories in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or\nundertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) and that these vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft may be forfeit\n\n\n 51\n"
[52] "to the seizing State upon a determination that they have been in violation of resolutions 713\n(1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present resolution;\n 25. Decides that all States shall detain pending investigation all vessels, freight vehicles,\nrolling stock, aircraft and cargoes found in their territories and suspected of having violated\nor being in violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present\nresolution, and that, upon a determination that they have been in violation, such vessels,\nfreight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft shall be impounded and, where appropriate, they\nand their cargoes may be forfeit to the detaining State;\n 26. Confirms that States may charge the expense of impounding vessels, freight vehicles,\nrolling stock and aircraft to their owners;\n 27. Decides to prohibit the provision of services, both financial and non-financial, to any\nperson or body for purposes of any business carried on in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n(Serbia and Montenegro), the only exceptions being telecommunications, postal services,\nlegal services consistent with resolution 757 (1992) and, as approved on a case-by-case basis\nby the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991), services whose supply may be\nnecessary for humanitarian or other exceptional purposes;\n 28. Decides to prohibit all commercial maritime traffic from entering the territorial sea of\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) except when authorized on a\ncase-by-case basis by the Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) or in case of force\nmajeure;\n 29. Reaffirms the authority of States acting under paragraph 12 of resolution 787 (1992)\nto use such measures commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary\nunder the authority of the Security Council to enforce the present resolution and its other\nrelevant resolutions, including in the territorial sea of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n(Serbia and Montenegro);\n 30. Confirms that the provisions set forth in paragraphs 12 to 29 above, strengthening the\nimplementation of the measures imposed by its earlier relevant resolutions, do not apply to\nactivities related to the United Nations Protection Force, the International Conference on the\nFormer Yugoslavia or the European Community Monitor Mission;\n\n\n C\n\n\n\n\n 52\n"
[53] " Desirous of achieving the full readmittance of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro) to the international community once it has fully implemented the\n relevant resolutions of the Council,\n 31. Expresses its readiness, after all three Bosnian parties have accepted the peace plan\n and on the basis of verified evidence, provided by the Secretary-General, that the Bosnian\n Serb party is cooperating in good faith in effective implementation of the plan, to review all\n the measures in the present resolution and its other relevant resolutions with a view to\n gradually lifting them;\n 32. Invites all States to consider what contribution they can make to the reconstruction of\n the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 33. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom said that the\nresolution just adopted had a triple purpose. The first purpose was to throw the weight of\nthe Council firmly behind the peace process of the two Co-Chairmen and to get across to\nthe Bosnian Serbs that signature of these documents represented the only way to assure\ntheir future as a distinct community within Bosnia. The second purpose was to bring\nhome to the Bosnian Serbs and their backers in Belgrade the consequences of rejection,\nin the form of tightened sanctions and complete isolation. The third was to show that\nacceptance and implementation of the peace process and the plan, and the cessation of all\nmilitary attacks, would bring real benefits to all Serbs in the form of a gradual lifting of\n 68\nsanctions and a reintegration into the international family.\n\n\n The representative of Venezuela stated that only the acceptance of the proposed\nPeace Agreements offered the international community a chance to improve the situation\nin Bosnia and Herzegovina. The resolution just adopted was still aimed at applying\npressure for peace. He warned, however, that as long as the Security Council did not act\nto put under real and effective control the heavy arms that were solely in the hands of the\nSerbs, little would be achieved through economic sanctions, whose effects took time.\nVenezuela believed that it was essential to discourage the illusion that war and genocide,\n\n\n 68\n Ibid., pp. 26-27.\n\n\n 53\n"
[54] "carried out with impunity, were legitimate means of manifesting the right to self-\ndetermination. It was also necessary to curtail any claim that ethnic, cultural or religious\n 69\nties gave States the right to interfere in the internal crises of any other State.\n\n\n The representative of China noted that the resolution just adopted commended the\nunremitting efforts of the Co-Chairmen in the peace negotiations, reiterated the necessity\nof achieving a lasting peace acceptable to all the parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and\nemphasized the importance of ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those elements were in conformity with China’s\nprincipled position and it therefore welcomed and supported them in the resolution. At\nthe same time, however, China found it difficult to support such elements in the\nresolution as the invocation of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the adoption of\nenforcement measures and the authorization of measures to strengthen and expand the\nexisting sanctions régime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. History had shown\nthat it was impossible to find lasting solutions to conflicts and disputes by exerting\npressure externally and adopting such enforcement actions as sanctions. The speaker\ncontended that the actions authorized by the resolution would not only bring suffering to\nthe people in the country targeted by the sanctions régime, but would also be gravely\ndetrimental to the economies of the third countries implementing such sanctions\nprovisions. From the long-term point of view, such a practice would create adverse\npolitical and economic consequences for the regions concerned. It was China’s view that\nthe international community should continue to explore all possibilities to promote peace\nnegotiations and that it should avoid taking action that might further complicate the issue.\nChina had also noted that there were also some elements in the resolution just adopted\nthat ran counter to the principle of respect for sovereignty contained in the United\nNations Charter. Since the resolution contained both elements that China could support\n 70\nand elements that it could not support, the Chinese delegation had abstained in the vote.\n\n\n\n\n 69\n Ibid., pp. 28-31.\n 70\n Ibid., pp. 31-32.\n\n\n 54\n"
[55] " The representative of Hungary stated that the resolution just adopted was a\ndilemma for his delegation. He contended that the general arms embargo as well as the\neconomic sanctions regime were not producing the results that the international\ncommunity had expected because of the specific conditions in the former Yugoslavia, the\nparticular features resulting from the geographic situation of the country, the\nestablishment of domestic mitigating arrangements, and the nature of any sanctions\nregime which was porous. The Hungarian economy had suffered important losses\nbecause of the sanctions regime and the strengthening of the sanctions was going to\nengender further economic difficulties. However, everything had to be done to put an end\nto the activity between the territory of the FRY and the zones controlled by the Serbs in\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the military machine of the Serbs in\nBosnia was immobilized. In conclusion, his delegation had voted in favour of the\nresolution just adopted because it was an important step toward a settlement of the crisis\nin the former Yugoslavia. It had also voted in favour because of the resolution’s\nstipulations reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the illegality and unacceptable nature of any\nacquisition of territory by force and of any practice of “ethnic cleansing”, as well as the\ninternational community’s readiness to take all necessary measures to help implement the\n 71\npeace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n\n\n The President, speaking in his capacity as representative of Pakistan, stated that\nhis delegation had consistently declared that the time had come for the international\ncommunity to demonstrate its firm resolve in compelling the Bosnian Serb party to\naccept in full the Vance-Owen peace package. In that context, it believed that the Council\nshould take immediate measures for the immobilization of heavy weapons in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, and place them under effective international control; that the Council\nshould adopt appropriate measures to ensure the interdiction of arms supplies to the\nBosnian Serb party; and that further measures, including stringent financial sanctions, be\nimposed against the FRY. Pakistan was also of the view that immediate measures should\n\n\n 71\n Ibid., pp. 33-42.\n\n\n 55\n"
[56] "be taken for the partial lifting of the arms embargo in order to enable the Muslims of\nBosnia and Herzegovina to exercise their inherent right of self-defence. 72\n\n\n Consideration of the item at the 3201st, 3202nd and 3203rd meetings (19, 20 and\n20 April 1993)\n\n\n The Council began its consideration of the item at its 3201st and continued\nthrough its 3203rd meeting. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nfollowing, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. At the\n3201st meeting, the representatives of Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Austria,\nBahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, the Comoros, Croatia, Denmark,\nEcuador, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jordan,\nLithuania, Malaysia, Malta, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone,\nSlovenia, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates; and at the 3202nd\nmeeting, the representative of the Czech Republic. The Council also extended an\ninvitation, at its 3201st meeting, respectively to Mr. Engin Ansay, Permanent Observer of\nthe Organization of the Islamic Conference and at his request, to Ambassador Dragomir\nDjokic to address the Council in the course of the discussion of the item. At the 3202nd\n 73\nmeeting, the President drew the attention of the Council members to a letter dated 19\nApril 1993 from the representative of Iran addressed to the Secretary-General.\n\n\n Commencing the discussion, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina stated\nthat the international community had an obligation to take concrete steps to halt\nimmediately genocide and aggression in his country. Genocide and aggression were the\nreality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, no matter what attempts were made to exclude those\nwords from the relevant resolutions. The International Court of Justice had defined the\nsituation in Bosnia and Herzegovina as genocide and the Security Council had failed to\nfulfil its responsibility to stop the aggression and genocide. Nevertheless, the efforts of\nthe non-aligned caucus and other members of the Security Council, in promoting the\n\n 72\n Ibid., pp.44-45.\n 73\n S/25632.\n\n\n 56\n"
[57] "swift adoption of resolutions 819 (1993) and 820 (1993), and in calling for a more legally\nand ethically responsible answer to genocide and aggression against Bosnia were most\nconsistent with the principles of the United Nations and international law. Bosnia and\nHerzegovina fully endorsed the draft resolution before the Council and demanded that the\nfollowing measures be considered: (a) to take control of or neutralize, by all necessary\nmeans, heavy weapons; (b) to interdict supply lines from Serbia and Montenegro to\nBosnia and Herzegovina; and (c) to clarify that the arms embargo did not apply to the\ndefence forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Should these measures pose an unacceptable\nrisk to the UNPROFOR, the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina would request that\nsuch mission be modified and that its personnel take precautionary measures or withdraw\n 74\nif necessary.\n\n\n The representative of Slovenia noted that the need for action by the international\ncommunity was becoming more and more compelling. While resolution 820 (1993)\nrepresented a step in the right direction, further thought should be given to the adoption\nof measures to assist in the implementation of peace, particularly in the case the Vance-\nOwen plan was not accepted by all parties or if it was accepted in bad faith. The speaker\nrecalled the proposal made on 8 April 1993 by the Foreign Minister of Slovenia, noting\nthat its main thrust was the immediate deployment of the United Nations peacekeeping\nforces in the territories controlled by the parties which had accepted the Vance-Owen\npeace plan. Several reasons supported that line of action. First, the troops would be\ndeployed in areas in which United Nations protection was accepted. Secondly, the troops\nwould have a preventive role as a deterrent to further acts of aggression. Thirdly, such\ndeployment would provide an opportunity to develop a more robust mandate of the\npeacekeeping force in Bosnia and Herzegovina and fourthly, the proposed action was\ncompatible with the existing humanitarian missions. He stressed that further action by the\nCouncil should not be made contingent upon agreement of the Serbs to the Vance-Owen\npeace plan.\n\n\n\n\n 74\n S/PV.3201, pp. 6-11.\n\n\n 57\n"
[58] " The representative of Croatia, referring to the resolution of the General Assembly\nof 18 December 1992, in which the General Assembly had expressed determination to\nrestore peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as to preserve its unity, sovereignty,\npolitical independence and territorial integrity, pointed out that none of those goals had\nbeen achieved. Noting that operative paragraph 7 of that resolution had urged the\nSecurity Council to consider measures on an urgent basis, no later than 15 January 1993,\nusing all necessary means to stop the Serbian aggression, including the lifting of the arms\nembargo, he observed that that date had passed long ago and there had only been further\ndestruction and additional territory “ethnically cleansed” by Serbian forces. The fact that\nSerbian extremists were openly refusing to honour the relevant Security Council\nresolutions emphasizing the commitment to ensure respect for the sovereignty and\nterritorial integrity of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina must lead to appropriate\nUnited Nations action. UNPROFOR mandate should be strengthened and the force\nshould be changed from a peacekeeping to a peacemaking force. The Security Council,\nacting under Chapter VII, should immediately take the strongest possible measures\nagainst the Serbian aggressors. The United Nations must at least lift the arms embargo\nagainst Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and provide the Croats and Muslims the\nopportunity to defend their freedom and human dignity. The speaker concluded by saying\nthat the legitimate right to self-defence inscribed in the United Nations Charter must not\n 75\nbe limited for the sake of “dubious political pragmatism”.\n\n\n Mr. Ansay, Permanent Observer of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to\nthe United Nations, stated that the Secretary-General of the Organization of the Islamic\nConference regarded resolutions 819 (1993) and 820 (1993) on Srebrenica and the\neconomic sanctions adopted as inadequate and insufficient. For the OIC, the fall of\nSrebrenica would sound the “death knell” of the ongoing peace efforts under the auspices\nof the United Nations and the European Community. Those tragic events constituted an\n“affront” to the authority of the United Nations and compelled a reassessment of the\nefficacy of the principle of collective security. The speaker noted that the question before\n\n\n 75\n Ibid., pp. 73-80.\n\n\n 58\n"
[59] "the Council was no longer one of acting with a view to isolating Serbia or decreeing new\neconomic sanctions against it. Rather, the tragic course of events called for vigorous and\ndetermined action on the part of the Security Council. The OIC called for the immediate\nlifting of the “iniquitous” arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\nadoption of effective military measures under the aegis of the Security Council to bring\nthe Serbian aggression to an end. Those measures included, inter alia, interdicting the\nsupply line from Serbia and Montenegro and placing all heavy weapons under the control\n 76\nof the international community.\n\n\n The representative of the Ukraine said that in his delegation’s view, enforcement\nmeasures taken so far by the Council against the FRY were designed to bring about a\nspeedy resolution to the crisis in the region. At the same time, it was incumbent upon the\nSecurity Council to adopt measures to mitigate the negative consequences of the\nsanctions for those States which not only complied with the sanctions, but were also\nentrusted with the task of ensuring the enforcement of the sanctions régime. Ukraine\nbelieved that the time had come, especially after the adoption of resolution 820 (1993), to\nfind practical ways to implement Article 50 of the United Nations Charter. Such a\ndecision would make sanctions an effective instrument, enjoying the support of the\ninternational community as a whole. It was necessary to remember that Security Council\nsanctions were directed against a specific State or States, and that other countries of the\nregion must not be the eventual or unintentional targets of enforcement measures. Thus,\nthere should be close cooperation between the Sanctions Committees and regional\n 77\narrangements, including sanctions assistance missions.\n\n\n Ambassador Djokic noted that despite the fact that his delegation had stated on\nnumerous occasion that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had no territorial claims on\nits neighbours and that, since May 1992, not a single soldier of the Yugoslav army had\nremained in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international community\ncontinued to label Yugoslavia as the aggressor and called for its punishment and\n\n 76\n Ibid., pp. 81-85.\n 77\n Ibid., pp. 31-35.\n\n\n 59\n"
[60] "isolation. Moreover, the positive role of the FRY in the peace process had been ignored\nby the Security Council in all its relevant resolutions. While the FRY shared the concern\nand impatience of the international community and understood the responsibility of the\nSecurity Council in its effort to reinstate peace and security in the region, it believed,\nhowever, that peace and security could not be achieved by isolating one side and\nimposing new sanctions on the people of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The\nisolation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could not lead to peace, but could only\ncontribute to the destabilization of the entire Balkan region. The closing of the Danube\nwas itself a measure which posed a great danger to the region and the introduction of new\npunitive measures could only cause more innocent victims, suffering and instability. The\nspeaker concluded by saying that the FRY remained fully committed to the policy of\npeace and to overcoming the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina by political means, on the\nbasis of equal respect for the legitimate rights of all three constituent peoples. In that\nregard, the FRY would continue to cooperate closely with the United Nations and its\nrepresentatives. It would, however, firmly defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity\n 78\nif forced to do so.\n\n\n In the course of the discussions, several speakers 79 agreed that the situation on the\nground in Bosnia called for more decisive action to be taken by the Council. Proposed\nmeasures included the following: (a) placing heavy weapons under United Nations\ncontrol; (b) establishing additional safe areas; (c) interdicting the supply lines of the\nSerbian forces in Bosnia; and (d) lifting the arms embargo in order to allow the Republic\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina to exercise its right to self defence under Article 51 of the\n 80\nCharter. Concerning the lifting of the arms embargo, some speakers , however, were of\nthe view that such measure would more likely lead to further escalation of violence.\n\n\n\n\n 78\n S/PV.3203., pp. 26-38.\n 79\n S/PV.3201: Turkey, pp.11-18; Austria, pp. 18-22; Malaysia, pp. 23-27; Senegal, pp. 27-31; Iran, pp. 31-\n 37; Indonesia, pp. 38-43; Afghanistan, pp. 67-72; S/PV. 3202: United Arab Emirates, pp. 10-13; Comoros,\n pp. 13-22; Egypt, pp. 28-30; Jordan, pp. 3-8; Algeria, pp. 12-16; Saudi Arabia, pp. 16-21;\n 80\n S/PV.3201: Sweden, pp. 43-47; S/PV.3203: Denmark, pp. 45-48; Argentina, pp. 57-62.\n\n\n 60\n"
[61] " A number 81 of speakers argued that if the Council did not shoulder its\nresponsibilities and did not act, then the Members of the United Nations should consider\nconvening a special session of the General Assembly to take action.\n Several speakers 82 drew attention to the effects of economic sanctions on\nneighbouring countries and to the need for the international community and the Security\nCouncil to address that issue.\n\n\n Decision of 21 April 1993: note by the President\n\n\n On 21 April 1993, after consultations with the members of the Council, the\nPresident issued the following note 83 on behalf of the members of the Council:\n\n\n “The President of the Security Council wishes to refer to resolution 819 (1993) adopted\n by the Council at its 3199th meeting on 16 April 1993 in connection with the situation in the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n “In paragraph 12 of the resolution, the Council decided to send, as soon as possible, a\n mission of members of the Council to Bosnia and Herzegovina to ascertain the situation and\n report thereon to the Council.\n “In accordance with that decision, the President wishes to report that he has had\n consultations with the members of the Council and that agreement has been reached that the\n mission will be composed of the following six members of the Council: France, Hungary,\n New Zealand, Pakistan, The Russian Federation n Federation and Venezuela.”\n\n\n Decision of 21 April 1993: statement by the President to the media\n\n On 21 April 1993, after consultations with the members of the Council, the\n 84\nPresident made the following statement to the media on behalf of the members of the\nCouncil:\n\n\n\n 81\n S/PV.3201: Malaysia, pp. 23-27; S/PV.3202: Egypt, pp.22-30.\n 82\n S/PV.3201: Romania, pp. 59-66; S/PV. 3202: Bulgaria, pp. 3-10; S/PV.3203: Argentina, pp. 57-62.\n 83\n S/25645.\n 84\n S/25646.\n\n\n 61\n"
[62] " “The members of the Security Council are deeply concerned by the reports on the\n outbreak of military hostilities between Bosnian governmental forces and Bosnian Croat\n paramilitary units north and west of Sarajevo. They are appalled by the reports corroborated\n by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) of atrocities and killings, in particular\n the setting on fire of Muslim houses and the shooting of entire families in two villages by\n Bosnian Croat paramilitary units.\n “The members of the Council strongly condemn this new outbreak of violence\n undermining the overall efforts to establish a cease-fire and achieve a political solution of the\n conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and demand that Bosnian governmental\n forces and Bosnian Croat paramilitary units cease immediately those hostilities and that all\n parties refrain from taking any action which endangers the lives and well-being of the\n inhabitants of the region, strictly comply with their previous commitments including the\n cease-fire, and redouble their efforts to settle the conflict. They call upon all the parties to\n cooperate with the current efforts in this regard by UNPROFOR and Lord Owen, Co-\n Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former\n Yugoslavia.\n “The members of the Council also demand that the Bosnian Serbs fully implement\n resolution 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993, including the immediate withdrawal from the areas\n surrounding Srebrenica, and allow UNPROFOR personnel unimpeded access to the town.”\n\n\n\n\n Decision of 6 May 1993 (3208th meeting): resolution 824 (1993)\n\n By a letter 85 dated 30 April 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Security Council mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, pursuant to resolution\n819 (1993), transmitted its report to the Council. The mission composed by France,\nHungary, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and Venezuela reported that it\nhad traveled to the region from 22 to 27 April 1993 and met with the leaders of all the\nparties to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as with the President of Croatia,\nthe Vice-President of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Force Commander of\n\n\n\n 85\n S/25700\n\n\n 62\n"
[63] "UNPROFOR. The mission found that Srebrenica was under siege and that the conditions\nthere were inhuman. As for Gorazde, Zepa, Tuzla and Sarajevo they should be declared\nimmediately safe areas. In its conclusions, the mission recognized that the designation of\nthose towns as safe areas would require a larger UNPROFOR presence and a revised\nmandate to encompass cease-fire/safe area monitoring, and different rules of engagement.\nEnforcement measures could be considered at a later stage if the Serbs were to ignore the\nintegrity of Security Council safe areas.\n At its 3208th meeting, on 6 May 1993, the Council included the above report in its\nagenda.\n Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right\nto vote. The President (the Russian Federation) then drew the attention of the Council\nmembers to the text of a draft resolution 86 prepared in the course of the Council’s prior\nconsultations and to several other documents. 87\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of France stated that the draft\nresolution was intended to convey the concern of the Council in the face of a further\ndeterioration in the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a growing threat to the\nsecurity of the civilian population in a number of communities, particularly in the eastern\npart of the country. The Council’s concern had been heightened by the fact that\nUNPROFOR military observers had recently been prevented from reaching the city of\nZepa, where they had intended to gain an overview of the situation. In requesting that the\nparties treat the cities of Zepa, Gorazde, Tuzla, Bihac and Sarajevo as safe areas, free\nfrom armed attacks and from other hostile acts likely to endanger the well-being and\nsafety of their inhabitants, the Security Council was sending a signal to the parties: the\ncivilian population must no longer be made to bear the consequences of the Bosnian\nconflict. In that regard, the example of Srebrenica had provided a valuable experience by\nshowing both the limits and the advantages arising from the establishment of a safe area.\n\n 86\n S/25722.\n 87\n Letter dated 30 April 1993 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the\nSecurity Council (S/25170); letter dated 30 April 1993 from the representative of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-\nGeneral (S/25714); letters dated 4 and 5 May respectively, from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\naddressed to the President of the Security Council (S/25718, S/25728 and S/25730); letter dated 6 May 1993 from the\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/25731).\n\n\n 63\n"
[64] "The most important thing was to save human lives seriously threatened by the extension\nof the conflict. 88\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and adopted unanimously as\nresolution 824 (1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Reaffirming all its earlier relevant resolutions,\n Reaffirming also the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Having considered the report of the Security Council mission to the Republic of Bosnia\n and Herzegovina authorized by resolution 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993, and in particular its\n recommendations that the concept of safe areas be extended to other towns in need of safety,\n Reaffirming again its condemnation of all violations of international humanitarian law, in\n particular “ethnic cleansing” and all practices conducive thereto, as well as the denial or the\n obstruction of access of civilians to humanitarian aid and services such as medical assistance\n and basic utilities,\n Taking into consideration the urgent security and humanitarian needs faced by several\n towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina as exacerbated by the constant influx of large numbers of\n displaced persons including, in particular, the sick and wounded,\n Taking also into consideration the formal request submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Deeply concerned at the continuing armed hostilities by Bosnian Serb paramilitary units\n against several towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and determined to ensure peace and\n stability throughout the country, most immediately in the towns of Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa,\n Gorazde and Bihac, as well as Srebrenica,\n Convinced that the threatened towns and their surroundings should be treated as safe\n areas, free from armed attacks and from any other hostile acts which endanger the well-being\n and the safety of their inhabitants,\n Aware in this context of the unique character of the city of Sarajevo, as a multicultural,\n multi-ethnic and pluri-religious centre which exemplifies the viability of coexistence and\n interrelations between all the communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and of the need to\n preserve it and avoid its further destruction,\n\n\n\n 88\n S/PV.3208, pp. 8-10.\n\n\n 64\n"
[65] " Affirming that nothing in the present resolution should be construed as contradicting or in\nany way departing from the spirit or the letter of the peace plan for the Republic of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina,\n Convinced that treating the towns referred to above as safe areas will contribute to the\nearly implementation of the peace plan,\n Convinced also that further steps must be taken as necessary to achieve the security of all\nsuch safe areas,\n Recalling the provisions of resolution 815 (1993) of 30 March 1993 on the mandate of\nthe United Nations Protection Force, and in that context acting under Chapter VII of the\nCharter of the United Nations,\n 1. Welcomes the report of the Security Council mission established pursuant to resolution\n819 (1993), and in particular its recommendations concerning safe areas;\n 2. Demands that any taking of territory by force cease immediately;\n 3. Declares that the capital city of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo,\nand other such threatened areas, in particular the towns of Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac, as\nwell as Srebrenica, and their surroundings should be treated as safe areas by all the parties\nconcerned and should be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act;\n 4. Also declares that in these safe areas the following should be observed:\n (a) The immediate cessation of armed attacks or any hostile act against these safe areas,\nand the withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb military or paramilitary units from these towns to a\ndistance wherefrom they cease to constitute a menace to their security and that of their\ninhabitants, to be monitored by United Nations military observers;\n (b) Full respect by all parties of the rights of the United Nations Protection Force and the\ninternational humanitarian agencies to free and unimpeded access to all safe areas in Bosnia\nand Herzegovina and full respect for the safety of the personnel engaged in these operations;\n 5. Demands to that end that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with the\nForce and take any necessary measures to respect these safe areas;\n 6. Requests the Secretary-General to take appropriate measures with a view to monitoring\nthe humanitarian situation in the safe areas, authorizes to that end the strengthening of the\nForce by an additional fifty United Nations military observers, together with related\nequipment and logistical support, and in this connection also demands that all parties and all\nothers concerned cooperate fully and promptly with the Force;\n 7. Declares its readiness, in the event of the failure by any party to comply with the\npresent resolution, to consider immediately the adoption of any additional measures\n\n\n 65\n"
[66] " necessary with a view to its full implementation, including to ensure respect for the safety of\n United Nations personnel;\n 8. Declares that arrangements pursuant to the present resolution shall remain in force\n until the provisions for the cessation of hostilities, separation of forces and supervision of\n heavy weaponry as envisaged in the peace plan for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina\n are implemented;\n 9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United States reminded the\nBosnian Serb leadership that her Government had made it clear that it was consulting\nwith its allies about new, stronger and tougher measures. The implementation, or lack\nthereof, of the resolution just adopted and all other relevant Security Council resolutions\nover the following few days would determine whether the United States and the rest of\nthe international community would have to decide that the use of force was inevitable. 89\n\n\n The representative of Pakistan stated that his delegation was pleased at the\nunanimous adoption of resolution 824 (1993). Pakistan believed that declaring those\nthreatened areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be safe areas would go a long way to\nensuring the safety of civilian populations in the region. He observed that the\ninternational community was witnessing escalating defiance of its will by the Bosnian\nSerbs. In total disregard of the mandatory resolutions of the Security Council, the\nBosnian Serbs had persisted in their “repulsive” policy of “ethnic cleansing” and\ngenocide. The time had come for the Council to compel the Serbian side to accept the\nVance-Owen peace plan. Pakistan believed that the Council should take immediate\nappropriate measures, including the authorization of the use of force under Chapter VII of\nthe United Nations Charter, to ensure: (a) that all heavy weapons in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina were placed under effective international physical control or neutralized;\n(b) the interdiction of all arms supplies to the Bosnian Serbs; (c) the institution of\nappropriate measures for reparations for the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina by\nSerbia and Montenegro; (d) that Serbia and Montenegro was liable, under international\n\n\n 89\n Ibid., pp. 11-13.\n\n\n 66\n"
[67] "law, for any direct loss or damage, including environmental damage, or injury to foreign\nGovernments, nationals or corporations as a result of its aggression against Bosnia and\nHerzegovina; and (e) the effective imposition of a comprehensive economic and financial\nblockade against Serbia and Montenegro. Pakistan also believed that States Members of\nthe United Nations should extend their cooperation to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the\nexercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defence, in accordance with\nArticle 51 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, including the supply of arms to\n 90\nenable them to defend themselves.\n\n\n The representative of Hungary noted that the resolution just adopted reaffirmed\nthe inadmissibility of any acquisition of territory by force. Hungary believed that the\nresolution could be seen, on the one hand, as part of the process of implementation of the\nVance-Owen plan and, on the other hand, as a follow-up to the preventive diplomacy\nefforts. The Council must be prepared, if necessary, to consider immediately the\nnecessary steps to ensure implementation of resolution 824 (1993). 91\n\n\n The President, speaking in his capacity as representative of the Russian\nFederation, noted that his country’s leaders had repeatedly said that there was no\nalternative to the Vance-Owen plan, and that they had pointed out that any party that did\nnot adopt the plan bore a heavy responsibility. Following the talks in Athens, there should\nbe no further obstacles to the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan. If the plan was\nnot adopted and carried out, the Russian Federation delegation was prepared to discuss\nfurther and harsher steps, to put an end to attempts to attain further territorial gains by\nmilitary force, to any actions that resulted in suffering for the Bosnian people and in\nviolations of international humanitarian law. The Russian Federation supported the\ncreation of additional safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and had therefore voted in\nfavour of the resolution just adopted. It believed that the creation of safe areas, with the\n\n\n\n\n 90\n Ibid., pp. 14-16.\n 91\n Ibid., pp. 18-20.\n\n\n 67\n"
[68] "presence of United Nations personnel, would help to improve the humanitarian situation\nin Bosnia and Herzegovina and to achieve a peaceful settlement. 92\n\n\n Decision of 10 May 1993 (3210th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3210th meeting, on 10 May 1993, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request,\nto participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President (the Russian\nFederation) then stated that, after consultations among members of the Security Council,\n 93\nhe had been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council which\nincluded a number of revisions agreed upon by Council members:\n\n\n “The Security Council, recalling its statement of 21 April 1993 concerning the atrocities\n and killings in areas north and west of Sarajevo, expresses its grave concern at the major new\n military offensive launched by Bosnian Croat paramilitary units in the areas of Mostar,\n Jablanica and Dreznica.\n “The Council strongly condemns this major military offensive launched by Bosnian\n Croat paramilitary units, which is totally inconsistent with the signature of the peace plan for\n the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Bosnian Croat party. The Council demands\n that the attacks against the areas of Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica cease forthwith, that\n Bosnian Croat paramilitary units withdraw immediately from the area and that all the parties\n strictly comply with their previous commitments as well as with the cease-fire agreed to\n today between the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian\n Croat party.\n “The Council also expresses its deep concern that the battalion of the United Nations\n Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the area has been forced under fire to redeploy as a result\n of this latest offensive and condemns the refusal of Bosnian Croat paramilitary units to allow\n the presence of United Nations military observers, in particular in the city of Mostar.\n “The Council once again reiterates its demand that UNPROFOR personnel be allowed\n unimpeded access throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in this particular case demands\n\n\n 92\n Ibid., pp. 24-26.\n 93\n S/25746.\n\n\n 68\n"
[69] " that the Bosnian Croat paramilitary units ensure the safety and security of UNPROFOR as\n well as all United Nations personnel in the areas of Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica. In this\n connection, the Council expresses its deep concern at the increasing hostile attitude of\n Bosnian Croat paramilitary units towards UNPROFOR personnel.\n “The Council calls upon the Republic of Croatia, in accordance with the commitments\n under the Zagreb agreement of 25 April 1993, to exert all its influence on the Bosnian Croat\n leadership and paramilitary units with a view to ceasing immediately their attacks particularly\n in the areas of Mostar, Jablanica and Dreznica. It further calls on Croatia to adhere strictly to\n its obligations under Council resolution 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992, including putting an end\n to all forms of interference and respecting the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n “The Council once again reaffirms the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence\n of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the unacceptability of the acquisition of\n territory by force and the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’.\n “The Council remains seized of the matter and is ready to consider further measures to\n ensure that all parties and others concerned abide by their commitments and fully respect\n relevant Council decisions.”\n\n\n Decision of 22 May 1993: letter from the President to the Secretary-General\n\n By a letter 94 dated 14 May 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General referred to recent developments in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina and attached the text of an agreement on the cessation of hostilities,\nconcluded between the Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Muslim sides on 12 May 1993, in\nMostar. The Secretary-General noted that in terms of its mandate under resolution 776\n(1992), UNPROFOR had found that the fighting in Mostar was extremely disruptive for\nthe delivery of humanitarian relief aid. The Force therefore had no choice but to intervene\nif its original mandate were to be implemented. Recalling resolution 824 (1993), in which\nthe Council had declared a number of safe areas and had referred to “other such\nthreatened areas”, the Secretary-General observed that Mostar qualified as a “threatened\narea.” That consideration had helped to set the terms of UNPROFOR's active\ninvolvement in witnessing the agreement concluded on 12 May 1993 and in, inter alia,\n\n\n\n 94\n S/25824.\n\n\n 69\n"
[70] "deploying a company of the Spanish Battalion in an interposition role. The presence of\nUNPROFOR was an integral part of the cease-fire agreement and had without doubt\nhelped to defuse the tension and stabilize the situation. Nonetheless, some concern had\nbeen expressed in the Security Council about the formal mandate of UNPROFOR in that\nregard. That concern also applied to the involvement of civilian police officers provided\nfor in the agreement of 12 May 1993, for which no authorization from the Security\nCouncil existed. In order to clarify the mandate, the Secretary-General requested\nconfirmation as to whether the above interpretation of the mandate of UNPROFOR was\nacceptable to the Security Council.\n 95\n By a letter dated 22 May 1993, the President of the Security Council informed\nthe Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n “I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 14 May 1993 concerning the\n United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)45 has been brought to the attention of the\n members of the Council. Regarding the situation in the area of Mostar, they agree with the\n interpretation of the mandate of UNPROFOR contained in your letter.”\n\n\n Decision of 4 June 1993 (3228th meeting): resolution 836 (1993)\n\n At its 3228th meeting, on 4 June 1993, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey, at\ntheir request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President\n(Spain) then drew the attention of the Council members to the text of a draft resolution 96\nsubmitted by France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United\nStates, and to several other documents. 97\n\n\n 95\n S/25825.\n 96\n S/25870.\n 97\n Note verbale dated 19 May 1993 from the representative of France addressed to the President of the\nSecurity Council (S/25800); letter dated 21 May 1993 from the representative of Italy addressed to the Secretary-\nGeneral (S/25823); letter dated 24 May 1993 from the representatives of France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the\nUnited Kingdom and the United States addressed to the President of the Security Council, enclosing a joint action\nprogramme on Bosnia and Herzegovina, formulated by the Foreign Ministers of those States in Washington, D.C., on\n22 May 1995 (S/25829); letter dated 14 May 1993 from the representative of Pakistan addressed to the President of the\nSecurity Council, transmitting a memorandum on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina that was formulated by the\n\n\n 70\n"
[71] " At the meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that,\nalthough his delegation had not been consulted on the content of the draft resolution, it\nhad nevertheless made a number of key suggestions which had been rejected. First, the\nsafe areas concept should be applied more broadly to address the threats against other\npopulation centres in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Second, a time-frame should be\nestablished in which there would be a shift from the temporary relief offered by the safe\nareas programme to the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan. Third, if the Bosnian\nSerbs were unwilling to accept the Vance-Owen plan by a stipulated date, then either all\nnecessary measures should be employed to restore peace, or the right of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina to act in self-defence, consistent with Article 51, should be fully recognized.\nFourth, the United Nations should develop a mandate, drawing on all the resources\nnecessary to defend the safe areas, and produce a realistic plan for implementing and\nenforcing that mandate. Fifth, the period for reviewing the implementation of the\n 98\nresolution should have been shortened from 60 days to 30 days.\n\n\n The representative of Turkey observed that the draft resolution fell short of his\ndelegation’s expectations. The draft resolution should have included a deadline for\ninitiating the implementation of the Vance-Owen plan; a guarantee of effective\nenforcement measures to reverse the consequences of the use of force; and an\nacknowledgement of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s inherent right to self-defense. He\nstressed that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be exempted without delay from the arms\nembargo, in accordance with its inherent right of collective self-defence under Article 51\n 99\nof the Charter of the United Nations.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of France noted that, following the\nadoption by France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of\n\n\nmembers of the Council that were members of the Non-Aligned Movement (S/25782); letter dated 25 May 1993 from\nthe representative of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a declaration on the situation in Bosnia\nand Herzegovina, adopted by the OIC in New York on 29 May 1993 (S/25860); letters dated 30 May, 2 June and 2\nJune 1993, respectively, from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil (S/25872, S/25877 and S/25878).\n 98\n S/PV.3228, pp. 3-8.\n 99\n Ibid., pp. 8-11.\n\n\n 71\n"
[72] "a joint programme of action on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on 22 May 1993\nin Washington, France and its partners had proposed that the Council adopt a resolution\nensuring full respect for the safe areas named in resolution 824 (1993) and extending the\nmandate of UNPROFOR. The draft resolution addressed an “immediate, vital\nhumanitarian objective” of ensuring the survival of civilian populations in the safe areas,\nas well as a “paramount political objective” of maintaining the territorial basis necessary\nfor the development and implementation of the Peace Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nStressing that the designation and protection of safe areas was a temporary measure and\nnot an end in itself, the speaker stated that the Vance-Owen plan remained the basis for\nany settlement. He added that the draft resolution would strengthen UNPROFOR,\nenabling it to protect the safe areas by deterring attacks, monitoring the cease-fire,\npromoting the withdrawal of military units, and by occupying several key points on the\nground. Furthermore, the draft resolution explicitly provided for the possibility of using\nforce to respond to bombardments against the safe freedom of movement of UNPROFOR\nand of humanitarian convoys. It also provided for the use of air power within and around\n 100\nthe safe areas, if necessary to support UNPROFOR in the fulfilment of its mandate.\n\n\n The representative of Venezuela noted that the draft resolution had been put to the\nvote despite a request made by his delegation to wait for a report by the Secretary-\nGeneral on the means he would need to implement the resolution. He contended that\nthe draft resolution was incomplete in scope and contrary to its own objectives.\nFurthermore, his delegation was of the view that safe areas should be temporary,\nintermediate steps in the peace process. They should not be a substitute for peace. Safe\nareas should guarantee freedom of movement into and out of the area; international\nmilitary presence, unrestricted presence of humanitarian agencies; the right to\nhumanitarian assistance; respect for human rights; uninterrupted access to basic services;\nand access to economic activities. In addition to being provided security, these areas\nshould be able to restore their civil government, local police and social services. These\nconditions were almost the exact opposite of these existing today in the so-called safe\n\n\n 100\n Ibid., pp. 11-14.\n\n\n 72\n"
[73] "areas and the draft resolution before the Council did not address their main points. The\nspeaker further noted that the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina had communicated\nto the Council its rejection of the particular modality of “safe areas” as contained in the\ndraft resolution but that position had not even been considered by the Council. He also\nrecalled that his delegation had taken an active part in working on the resolutions that\nprovided for the creation of “safe areas” for Sarajevo and other cities and it could thus\nnever be opposed to the concept. His delegation was opposed to the shape that\nhumanitarian modality had taken in practice. The speaker concluded by saying that while\nthere had been an attempt to negotiate the Peace Plan, Bosnia had lost two thirds of its\nterritory and its people had been the victims of crimes and violations on an unprecedented\nscale. That was the time for the Council to really take action, not just appear to be taking\naction. For all these reasons, his delegation would abstain from the vote on the draft\n 101\nresolution.\n The representative of Pakistan recalled that his country, together with other non-\naligned members of the Council, had been the proponent of the concept of safe areas. The\nexperience in Srebrenica, Zepa and Gorazde, however, had revealed fundamental\nshortcomings in that concept in the absence of the international community’s\ncommitment to endorse the Vance-Owen peace plan. Turning to the draft resolution, he\nstated that in his delegation view, the draft resolution did not address certain core issues\nin the conflict. Unless the measures contained in the draft resolution were supplemented\nby enforcement actions in a given time-frame and as part of an overall plan, the situation\non the ground might be frozen to the advantage of the Serbs. Moreover, the modality of\nsafe areas as contained in the draft resolution was not in full conformity with Pakistan’s\npolitical and humanitarian concerns. The concept of safe area would only be acceptable\nto the Pakistani delegation if the international community committed itself to the full\nimplementation of the Vance-Owen peace plan, and in particular to its provisions on\nterritorial arrangements for Bosnian Muslim communities. All Bosnian Muslim regions,\nas specified in the Peace Plan, and Sarajevo, should be declared safe areas, and those\n\n\n\n\n 101\n Ibid., pp. 14-26.\n\n\n 73\n"
[74] "regions already identified as safe areas should be given the maximum possible protection.\nFor these reasons, his delegation would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution. 102\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and adopted by 13 votes to none,\nwith 2 abstentions (Pakistan, Venezuela) as resolution 836 (1993). The resolution reads\nas follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant\n resolutions,\n Reaffirming in particular its resolutions 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993 and 824 (1993) of 6\n May 1993, in which it demanded that certain towns and their surrounding areas in the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be treated as safe areas,\n Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina and the responsibility of the Security Council in this regard,\n Condemning military attacks, and actions that do not respect the sovereignty, territorial\n integrity and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which, as a State Member of\n the United Nations, enjoys the rights provided for in the Charter of the United Nations,\n Reiterating its alarm at the grave and intolerable situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina\n arising from serious violations of international humanitarian law,\n Reaffirming once again that any taking of territory by force or any practice of “ethnic\n cleansing” is unlawful and totally unacceptable,\n Commending the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\n Bosnian Croat party for having signed the Vance-Owen plan,\n Gravely concerned at the persistent refusal of the Bosnian Serb party to accept the\n Vance-Owen plan, and calling upon that party to accept the peace plan for the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina in full,\n Deeply concerned by the continuing armed hostilities in the territory of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina which run totally counter to the peace plan,\n Alarmed by the resulting plight of the civilian population in the territory of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina, in particular in Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Tuzla and Zepa,\n\n\n\n 102\n Ibid., pp. 27-30.\n\n\n 74\n"
[75] " Condemning the obstruction, primarily by the Bosnian Serb party, of the delivery of\nhumanitarian assistance,\n Determined to ensure the protection of the civilian population in safe areas and to\npromote a lasting political solution,\n Confirming the ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nestablished by resolutions 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992, 786 (1992) of 10 November 1992\nand 816 (1993) of 31 March 1993,\n Affirming that the concept of safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina as contained in\nresolutions 819 (1993) and 824 (1993) was adopted to respond to an emergency situation, and\nnoting that the concept proposed by France in document S/25800 and by others could make a\nvaluable contribution and should not in any way be taken as an end in itself, but as a part of\nthe Vance-Owen process and as a first step towards a just and lasting political solution,\n Convinced that treating the towns and surrounding areas referred to above as safe areas\nwill contribute to the early implementation of that objective,\n Stressing that the lasting solution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be\nbased on the following principles: immediate and complete cessation of hostilities,\nwithdrawal from territories seized by the use of force and “ethnic cleansing”, reversal of the\nconsequences of “ethnic cleansing” and recognition of the right of all refugees to return to\ntheir homes, and respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of\nBosnia and Herzegovina,\n Noting the crucial work being done throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina by the United\nNations Protection Force and the importance of such work continuing,\n Determining that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be a threat to\ninternational peace and security,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,\n 1. Calls for the full and immediate implementation of all its relevant resolutions;\n 2. Commends the peace plan for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as contained in\ndocument S/25479;\n 3. Reaffirms the unacceptability of the acquisition of territory by the use of force and the\nneed to restore the full sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina;\n 4. Decides to ensure full respect for the safe areas referred to in resolution 824 (1993);\n 5. Also decides to extend to that end the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force\nin order to enable it, in the safe areas referred to in resolution 824 (1993), to deter attacks\n\n\n 75\n"
[76] "against the safe areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the withdrawal of military or\nparamilitary units other than those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina and to occupy some key points on the ground, in addition to participating in the\ndelivery of humanitarian relief to the population as provided for in resolution 776 (1992) of\n14 September 1992;\n 6. Affirms that these safe areas are a temporary measure and that the primary objective\nremains to reverse the consequences of the use of force and to allow all persons displaced\nfrom their homes in Bosnia and Herzegovina to return to their homes in peace, beginning,\ninter alia, with the prompt implementation of the provisions of the Vance-Owen plan in areas\nwhere those have been agreed by the parties directly concerned;\n 7. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation, inter alia, with the Governments of\nthe Member States contributing forces to the Force:\n (a) To make the adjustments or reinforcement of the Force which might be required by\nthe implementation of the present resolution, and to consider assigning elements of the Force\nin support of the elements entrusted with protection of safe areas, with the agreement of the\nGovernments contributing forces;\n (b) To direct the Force Commander to redeploy to the extent possible the forces under his\ncommand in Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 8. Calls upon Member States to contribute forces, including logistic support, to facilitate\nthe implementation of the provisions regarding the safe areas, expresses its gratitude to\nMember States already providing forces for that purpose, and invites the Secretary-General to\nseek additional contingents from other Member States;\n 9. Authorizes the Force, in addition to the mandate defined in resolutions 770 (1992) of\n13 August 1992 and 776 (1992), in carrying out the mandate defined in paragraph 5 above,\nacting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to\nbombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them or\nin the event of any deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of\nmovement of the Force or of protected humanitarian convoys;\n 10. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraph 1 of resolution 816 (1993), Member States,\nacting nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, may take, under the\nauthority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General\nand the Force, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe\nareas in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support the Force in the performance of its mandate set\nout in paragraphs 5 and 9 above;\n\n\n 76\n"
[77] " 11. Requests the Member States concerned, the Secretary-General and the Force to\n coordinate closely on the measures they are taking to implement paragraph 10 above and to\n report to the Council through the Secretary-General;\n 12. Invites the Secretary-General to report to the Council, for decision, if possible within\n seven days of the adoption of the present resolution, on the modalities of its implementation,\n including its financial implications;\n 13. Also invites the Secretary-General to submit to the Council, not later than two months\n after the adoption of the present resolution, a report on the implementation of and compliance\n with the present resolution;\n 14. Emphasizes that it will keep open other options for new and tougher measures, none\n of which is prejudged or excluded from consideration;\n 15. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter, and undertakes to take prompt action,\n as required.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of Brazil observed that the resolution\njust adopted was to be understood as a temporary measure, with the twofold objective of\npreserving the safety of the populations in the safe areas and restoring normalcy to those\nareas. Referring to the concern that the implementation of the safe areas concept might\nlead to a freezing of the existing situation, thus rewarding “military might” to the\ndetriment of the Muslim community, the speaker noted that Brazil considered it essential\nthat, in due course, the resolution just adopted be complemented by appropriate\nadditional measures. Brazil continued to believe that the ultimate solution to the conflict\nin Bosnia and Herzegovina must come through negotiation and peaceful means, and that\n 103\nthe Vance-Owen plan therefore retained its “full value”.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the tragic events that had\nrecently taken place in safe areas made it necessary to expand UNPROFOR’s mandate, in\norder to ensure the safe areas, deter aggression, monitor the cease-fire, and allow for the\nunhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Russian Federation was convinced\nthat the implementation of the resolution just adopted would help to curb the violence.\n\n\n\n 103\n Ibid., pp. 42-43.\n\n\n 77\n"
[78] "Henceforth, any military attacks against, shelling of, incursions into, or hindrance of\nhumanitarian deliveries to, the safe areas, would be responded to by United Nations\nforces through the use of all necessary measures, including the use of armed force. That\nwould be an important factor in stabilizing the situation in those areas and for lessening\nthe suffering of the civilian population. The speaker further contended that by adopting\nthe resolution, the Council had taken a concrete step towards the implementation of the\njoint programme of action adopted at Washington on 22 May by the Ministers for\nForeign Affairs of France, the Russian Federation n Federation, Spain, the United\nKingdom and the United States. He noted in that regard that the Washington programme\n 104\ndid not exclude the adoption of new, firmer measures.\n\n\n The representative of the United States observed that the resolution just adopted\nwas an intermediate step. Both the Security Council and the Governments that had\ndeveloped the Washington programme of action had agreed that they would keep open\noptions for new and tougher measures. Her Government’s view of what these tougher\nmeasures should be had not changed. It expected full cooperation of the Bosnian Serb\nparty in implementing the resolution. If that cooperation was not forthcoming, the United\nStates would move to seek further action in the Council. 105\n\n\n The representative of China stated that the continued escalation of the conflict in\nBosnia and Herzegovina constituted a great threat to peace and security in the region.\nUnder those circumstances, the establishment of safe areas might as well be tried as a\ntemporary measure, even though they could not provide a fundamental solution to the\nconflict, and they could not supplant the Vance-Owen plan for a comprehensive political\nsolution to the conflict. Reiterating China’s position that international disputes should be\nsettled through dialogue and negotiation, rather than through the threat or use of force,\nthe speaker stated that his delegation had reservations regarding the invocation of Chapter\n\n\n\n\n 104\n Ibid., pp. 43-47.\n 105\n Ibid., pp. 47-48.\n\n\n 78\n"
[79] "VII in the resolution just adopted, as it feared that further military action might\ncomplicate the issue and adversely affect the peace process. 106\n\n\n The representative of the United Kingdom, acknowledging that the safe areas\nwould not stop the war and were therefore a temporary measure, argued that they could\nnevertheless provide areas of stability and complement the important efforts undertaken\nby United Nations forces throughout Bosnia. Referring to suggestions that the policy of\nsafe areas might be combined with a lifting of the arms embargo, the speaker noted that\nthe two policies were “distinct and alternative” and contended that it would be hard to\nreconcile the supply of arms with United Nations peacekeeping on the ground. He\nconcluded by stating that as the resolution made clear, neither the Washington\nAgreement, nor the view of his Government ruled out other stronger measures as the\n 107\nsituation developed.\n\n\n Decision of 10 June 1993 (3234th meeting): resolution 838 (1993)\n\n At its 3234th meeting, on 10 June 1993, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina at his request,\nto participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President then drew the\nattention of the Council members to the text of a draft resolution 108 submitted by France,\nthe Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, and read out a\nrevision to be made to the draft. He also drew the attention of the Council members to\n 109\nseveral other documents . The draft resolution was then put to the vote, as orally\nrevised in its provisional form, and adopted unanimously as resolution 838 (1993). The\nresolution reads as follows:\n\n\n 106\n Ibid., pp. 48-49.\n 107\n Ibid., pp. 56-58.\n 108\n S/25798.\n 109\n Letter dated 24 May 1993 from the representatives of France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United\nKingdom and the United States addressed to the President of the Council (S/25829); letter dated 1 June 1993 from the\nrepresentative of Croatia addressed to the President of the Council (S/25874); letter dated 8 June 1993 from the\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Council (S/25907).\n\n\n 79\n"
[80] " The Security Council,\n Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant\nresolutions,\n Reaffirming also the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the responsibility of the Security Council in this\nregard,\n Reiterating the demands in its resolution 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992 and subsequent\nrelevant resolutions that all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina cease\nimmediately and that its neighbours take swift action to end all interference and respect its\nterritorial integrity,\n Recalling the demand in its resolution 819 (1993) of 16 April 1993 that the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) immediately cease the supply of military\narms, equipment and services to Bosnian Serb paramilitary units,\n Taking into account the report of the Secretary-General of 21 December 1992 on the\npossible deployment of observers on the borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Expressing its condemnation of all activities carried out in violation of resolutions 757\n(1992) of 30 May 1992, 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992 and 820 (1993) of 17 April 1993\nbetween the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the\nUnited Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of\nBosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces,\n Considering that, in order to facilitate the implementation of the relevant Security\nCouncil resolutions, observers should be deployed on the borders of the Republic of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina, as indicated in its resolution 787 (1992),\n Noting the earlier preparedness of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n(Serbia and Montenegro) to stop all but humanitarian supplies to the Bosnian Serb party, and\nurging full implementation of that commitment,\n Considering that all appropriate measures should be undertaken to achieve a peaceful\nsettlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina provided for in the Vance-Owen peace\nplan,\n Bearing in mind paragraph 4 (a) of its resolution 757 (1992) concerning the prevention\nby all States of imports into their territories of all commodities and products originating in or\nexported from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and paragraph\n\n\n\n\n 80\n"
[81] " 12 of its resolution 820 (1993) concerning import to, export from and transshipment through\n those areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces,\n 1. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council as soon as possible a further\n report on options for the deployment of international observers to monitor effectively the\n implementation of the relevant Council resolutions, to be drawn from the United Nations and,\n if appropriate, from Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations and\n arrangements, on the borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, giving priority to\n the border between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and taking into account developments since his report\n of 21 December 1992 as well as the differing circumstances affecting the various sectors of\n the borders and the need for appropriate coordination mechanisms;\n 2. Invites the Secretary-General to contact immediately Member States, nationally or\n through regional organizations or arrangements, to ensure the availability to him on a\n continuing basis of any relevant material derived from aerial surveillance and to report\n thereon to the Security Council;\n 3. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom noted that the\nresolution just adopted was an important element of the immediate steps that his\nGovernment believed needed to be taken straight way. The placing of border monitors,\nparticularly on the border between Bosnia and the FRY was of considerable significance\nsince it could bring home to the Bosnian Serbs the bankruptcy of their present policies\nand the need to reconsider their rejection of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan. The decision\ntaken a month ago by the authorities of the FRY to limit to humanitarian supplies any\ntraffic across the border between Bosnia and the FRY had been welcome but it was\nessential to put that policy to the test by deploying monitors along that border. 110\n\n\n The representative of France stated that the aim of the resolution just adopted was\nto show the intent of the Council to deploy the necessary observers for effective\nmonitoring of the application of sanctions against the territories controlled by the Bosnian\nSerbs. By controlling the conditions for applications of the embargo against the territories\n\n 110\n Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n\n\n 81\n"
[82] "controlled by the Serbs of Bosnia, Bosnian Serbs would be led to end their attacks and\nthe practice of “ethnic cleansing”, and finally to start out along the road towards a\npeaceful settlement in the accordance with the provisions set out in the Vance-Owen\nPlan. He further stated that the reaction of the FRY, and in particular that of Serbia, to the\nresolution would be significant. If the authorities of these countries were to decide to\nreject the deployment of observers on their side of the frontier with Bosnia, the situation\nwould become clear and the Council would then have to draw the necessary\n 111\nconclusions.\n\n\n The representative of Hungary stated that his delegation had voted in favour of\nthe resolution just adopted, as it was convinced that all foreign interference in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina must cease immediately and that the neighbours of that country must respect\nits territorial integrity. It was clear that there could not be a settlement and lasting peace\nwhile such interference persisted. It was also clear that such a settlement would become\npossible only with the firm determination of the international community. Hungary\nattached particular importance to the fact that the resolution was in strict conformity with\nprevious Council resolutions concerning the sanctions régime imposed on the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The speaker further stated that his\ndelegation considered the resolution primarily as a declaration of intent that would have\nto be followed up as soon as possible by a report from the Secretary-General and a\nresolution on the deployment. In that context there were some important questions that\nwould have to be clarified concerning the mandate, emplacement and other aspects of the\n 112\nobservers’ activities.\n\n\n The representative of China reiterated China’s support for a political settlement of\nthe conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, within the framework of the International\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia. China hoped that the measures envisaged by the\nresolution just adopted would help to realize that objective, and based on that\nconsideration it had voted in favour of the resolution. At the same time, China’s\n\n 111\n Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n 112\n Ibid., pp. 8-10.\n\n\n 82\n"
[83] "affirmative vote did not represent a change in its position vis-à-vis sanctions against the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia. 113\n\n\n\n\n Decision of 18 June 1993 (3241st meeting): resolution 844 (1993)\n\n On 14 June 1993, pursuant to resolution 836 (1993), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 114 containing an analysis of the modalities for\nimplementation of that resolution. The analysis indicated that such implementation would\nrequire the deployment of additional troops on the ground as well as the provision of air\nsupport. While an additional troop requirement of approximately 34,000 would be\nnecessary, it would be possible, however, to start implementing the resolution under a\n 115\nlight option envisaging a troop reinforcement of around 7,600. The Secretary-General\nnoted that while that option could not completely guarantee the defence of safe areas, it\nrelied on the threat of air action against any belligerents. He indicated in that regard that\nhe had invited NATO to coordinate with him the use of air power in support of\nUNPROFOR. It was understood that the first decision to initiate the use of air power\nwould be taken by him in consultation with the Security Council. The Secretary-General\nfurther noted that such option represented an initial approach and had limited objectives.\nIt assumed the consent and cooperation of the parties and provided a basic level of\ndeterrence. In conclusion, he recommended that the Council approve the arrangements\noutlined in his report. At the same time, he stressed the overwhelming importance of\nseeking a comprehensive political solution to the conflict, noting that a negotiated and\nequitable settlement would enable the international community to devote its resources to\nreconstruction and development rather than to successive expansions of the United\nNations activities in the former Yugoslavia.\n At its 3241st meeting, on 18 June 1993, the Council included the above report in\nits agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the\n\n 113\n Ibid., pp. 11-12.\n 114\n S/25939 and Corr.1 and Add.1.\n 115\n For further details see para. 6 of the report of the Secretary-General of 14 June 1993 (S/25939)\n\n\n 83\n"
[84] "right to vote. The President (Spain) then drew the attention of the Council members to the\ntext of a draft resolution 116 submitted by France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the\nUnited Kingdom and the United States. He also referred to several other documents. 117\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 844 (1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant\n resolutions,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 14 and 17 June 1993 pursuant\n to paragraph 12 of resolution 836 (1993) concerning the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia\n and Herzegovina,\n Reiterating once again its alarm at the grave and intolerable situation in Bosnia and\n Herzegovina arising from serious violations of international humanitarian law,\n Recalling the overwhelming importance of seeking a comprehensive political solution to\n the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Determined to implement fully the provisions of resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General;\n 2. Decides to authorize the reinforcement of the United Nations Protection Force to meet\n the additional force requirements mentioned in paragraph 6 of the report of the Secretary-\n General as an initial approach;\n 3. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the consultations, inter alia, with the\n Governments of the Member States contributing forces to the Force, called for in resolution\n 836 (1993);\n 4. Reaffirms its decision in paragraph 10 of resolution 836 (1993) on the use of air power\n in and around the safe areas to support the Force in the performance of its mandate, and\n encourages Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or\n arrangements, to coordinate closely with the Secretary-General in this regard;\n\n\n\n\n 116\n S/25966.\n 117\n S/25908, S/25909, S/25933, S/25943 and S/25959, letters dated 5, 6, 11, 13 and 16 June 1993 from the\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council.\n\n\n 84\n"
[85] " 5. Calls upon Member States to contribute forces, including logistic support and\n equipment, to facilitate the implementation of the provisions regarding the safe areas;\n 6. Invites the Secretary-General to report to the Council on a regular basis on the\n implementation of resolution 836 (1993) and the present resolution;\n 7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of Hungary stated that his delegation’s\nvote in favour of the resolution just adopted, reflected its conviction that resolution 836\n(1993) establishing safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be implemented as\nquickly as possible. For Hungary, the only remaining question related to the specific\nmodalities to do that and the modalities outlined in the resolution just adopted were not\nentirely what it had hoped for. They were acceptable only to the extent that under the\npresent circumstances, the international community was neither in a position, nor was it\ninclined to do more. Hungary hoped that the measures proposed in the report of the\nSecretary-General would be taken as soon as possible and in such a way as to make\npossible progress towards a fair overall settlement of the Bosnian crisis. 118\n The representative of the United States stated that his delegation had voted in\nfavour of the resolution just adopted as an intermediate step that did not foreclose options\ninvolving tougher measures. The United States continued to expect the full cooperation\nof the Bosnian Serb party in implementing the resolution. If that cooperation was not\nforthcoming, then the United States would seek further action in the Security Council to\nstop the violence. 119\n The representative of France said that, although the deployment of reinforcements\nwas what might be called “the light option”, it was nevertheless the only realistic option\nat that time, given the means available to UNPROFOR in the short term. France believed\nthat those measures, coupled with the threat of air strikes, could deter attacks against the\nsafe areas, in conformity with resolution 836 (1993). 120\n\n\n\n\n 118\n S/PV.3241, pp. 6-8.\n 119\n Ibid., p. 8.\n 120\n Ibid., pp. 8-10.\n\n\n 85\n"
[86] " The representative of the Russian Federation noted that his delegation shared the\nSecretary-General’s view that the implementation of the decision to set up safe areas,\nneeded to be predicated upon the consent and cooperation of all the Bosnian parties. The\nRussian Federation called upon them to cooperate with UNPROFOR in implementing the\nCouncil’s resolutions on the safe areas. The parties needed to realize that if they refused\n 121\nsuch cooperation, then new, tougher measures might be adopted.\n\n\n Decision of 29 June 1993 (3247th meeting): rejection of a draft resolution\n\n At its 3247th meeting, on 29 June 1993, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representatives of Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria,\nBangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Comoros, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, Estonia,\nIndonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Latvia, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,\nMalaysia, Senegal, Slovenia, the Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine and the\nUnited Arab Emirates, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to\nvote. The Council also invited Ambassador Dragomir Djokic, at his request, to address\nthe Council. The President (Spain) then drew the attention of the Council members to the\ntext of a draft resolution 122 submitted by Cape Verde, Djibouti, Morocco, Pakistan and\nVenezuela, who were joined as sponsors by Afghanistan, Algeria, the Comoros, Egypt,\n 123\nEstonia, Latvia, Malaysia, Senegal, Syria and Turkey.\n Under the draft resolution, in its preambular part, the Council, inter alia, would\nhave stressed that a solution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be based on\nthe following principles: (a) immediate cessation of hostilities; (b) withdrawal from the\nterritories occupied by forces and ethnic cleansing; (c) reversal of the consequences of\nthe reprehensible policy of ethnic cleansing and recognition of the right of all Bosnian\nrefugees to return to their homes; and (d) restoration of the territorial integrity and unity\nof the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the operative part of the draft resolution,\n\n\n 121\n Ibid., p. 11.\n 122\n S/25997.\n 123\n During the 3247th meeting, the following also joined as sponsors of the draft resolution: Albania,\nIndonesia, Iran, Jordan, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Tunisia and the United Arab Emirates (S/PV.3247, p. 113).\n\n\n 86\n"
[87] "the Council would have reaffirmed the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political\nindependence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and demanded that all\nhostilities within the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina be halted\nforthwith and the consequences of hostilities against the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina be reversed in accordance with the principles outlined above. It would have\nalso decided to exempt the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina from\nthe arms embargo imposed on former Yugoslavia by its resolution 713 (1991) with the\nsole purpose of enabling the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to exercise its inherent\nright of self-defence.\n At the meeting, the representative of Cape Verde contended that the failure of the\nCouncil to implement effectively the Charter collective security provisions in respect of\nthe situation in Bosnia, would have a negative impact on the outcome of current and\nfuture conflicts. He cautioned that one of the most negative lessons that might be drawn\nfrom the Bosnian conflict was that countries might have to rely on their own capacity to\ndefend themselves in future. For small nations, which were the majority of the Members\nof the Organization, and which could meet their security needs only by relying on respect\nfor the principles and norms of international law and on the effective implementation of\nthe decisions of the Security Council, especially its Chapter VII decisions, the Bosnian\nexperience was very disturbing. For a long time, calls for United Nations action to defend\nthe Bosnian civilian population had gone unheeded, whilst safe areas declared under\nChapter VII continued to be jeopardized. In submitting the draft resolution, the caucus of\nnon-aligned members of the Security Council was responding to a moral call aimed at\nenabling the victims of aggression and ethnic cleansing to exercise their inherent right of\nself-defence, as recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. If the United Nations did\nnot have the political will to take prompt and effective action to stop the killing of\nBosnian Muslim civilians, then it should at least allow them legitimately to defend\nthemselves. Indeed, the draft resolution made it clear that the sole purpose of lifting the\narms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina was to enable that Republic to defend\n 124\nitself from attacks.\n\n\n 124\n S/PV.3247, pp. 6-10.\n\n\n 87\n"
[88] " The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina contended that two questions were\nrelevant in evaluating the merit of the draft resolution. First, had the Security Council\ncompelled the necessary means to stop the aggression and genocide against Bosnia and\nHerzegovina? Second, if not, what were the measures that should be undertaken to stop\nthe aggression and, particularly should the arms embargo against Bosnia and\nHerzegovina be declared invalid in accordance with the United Nations Charter’s\nguarantee of the right of self-defence? Noting that Bosnia and Herzegovina had waited\nfor over a year for “the most empowered members of the Council” to fulfil their\ncommitment to confront the Serbians, the speaker pointed out that his country had sought\nto reassert its right to obtain the means of self-defence only after those members had\nfailed to meet their commitment. The speaker further stated that the Bosnians must be\nprovided with the leverage to undertake fair and promising negotiations or to confront the\n 125\nundiminished aggression.\n The representative of Pakistan argued that Bosnia and Herzegovina had been at a\n“grave disadvantage” in responding to aggression, not only because of the large and well-\nequipped Serb army and paramilitary units, but also because it had been prevented by the\nUnited Nations from acquiring the means for self-defence. He also contended that it had\nbecome clear that Serbian forces would not be deterred by the exhortations of the Council\nso long as it was not prepared to take enforcement measures, including the use of force\nunder Chapter VII of the Charter. The speaker further stated that his country could not\naccept and legitimize the consequences of blatant acts of aggression against a State\nMember of the United Nations, nor could it accept the “disintegration” of a sovereign\nState. He warned that the consequences of accepting the situation in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina would be terrible not only for the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina but for\nthe international community as a whole. It would encourage those who believed that\nforce could be a viable instrument for territorial expansion and political domination, and\nit would erode the credibility of the Security Council as an instrument of peace and\njustice, not only in respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in relation to other\nconflicts and disputes. Furthermore, it would revive the global arms race, as all nations\n\n\n 125\n Ibid., pp. 9-17.\n\n\n 88\n"
[89] "exposed to aggression and domination would seek to arm themselves against such threats.\nReferring to the draft resolution, the speaker stated that the most important provision was\nthe one exempting Bosnia and Herzegovina from the arms embargo imposed against the\nformer Yugoslavia by resolution 713 (1991). That measure had been proposed by a\nmajority of the United Nations membership in General Assembly resolution 47/121 of 18\nDecember 1992. It was also consistent with Article 51 of the Charter. The speaker\nconcluded by stating that the options available to the Security Council were stark: either\nthe international community, in accordance with the collective security system envisaged\nin the Charter, should take effective measures to defend Bosnia and Herzegovina, or it\nshould remove the shackles preventing the victim from exercising its inherent right of\n 126\nself-defence.\n The representative of Croatia said that it was unfortunate that the Security Council\nhad not endorsed, nor been prepared to enforce, the Vance-Owen plan. Although it was\nnecessary for the international community to stop the tragedy taking place in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, Croatia did not believe that providing more arms to Bosnian Muslims\nwould accomplish that purpose. If the arms embargo were to be lifted, the Croatian\nGovernment could only support a general lifting for all the victims of Serbian aggression.\nA selective approach to the issue would only aggravate the ongoing situation. 127\n The representative of Morocco contended that the arms embargo, which the\nCouncil had adopted with a view to reducing violence and suffering, had unfortunately\nnot had any effect on either the Serbs or the Croats. Rather, it had increased the military\nsuperiority of the Serbs. He argued that, as long as an imbalance existed, the Serbs would\ncontinue to impose conditions and refuse to compromise, as they had done with respect to\nthe Vance-Owen plan. The legitimate Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina had\nsuffered the most from the arms embargo. Authorizing the Bosnian Government to\nacquire the means to defend its civilian population would help deter the Serbs from\npursuing policies of aggression and occupation. It was therefore essential to exempt it\nfrom the provisions of resolution 713 (1991). The speaker also argued that the lifting of\nthe arms embargo should be accompanied by strengthened monitoring of the sanctions\n\n 126\n Ibid., pp. 17-26.\n 127\n Ibid., pp. 33-37.\n\n\n 89\n"
[90] "régime, in order to prevent the Bosnian Serbs from continuing to acquire additional\nweapons and territory. 128\n Mr. Djokic stated that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nstrongly opposed exempting one side from the arms embargo imposed by resolution 713\n(1991). He warned that, should the draft resolution be adopted, the Security Council\nwould, under the pretext of protecting the inherent right to self-defence, merely be\ncontravening its past efforts to contain the crisis and find a lasting solution. He further\nargued that lifting the arms embargo and supplying arms to one side would invariably\nlead to an arms race between the warring parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with\nunforeseeable consequences. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, despite the unfair and\ninhumane sanctions imposed against it, would spare no effort to help prevent further\nbloodshed between the “three constituent nations” and to find a solution based on their\nlegitimate interests and rights. Before concluding, the speaker contended that the draft\nresolution was one of war rather than of peace and he urged the Security Council, not to\n 129\nadopt it.\n The representative of Slovenia noted that although the Council had devoted much\nof its time to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina the previous months, the resolutions\nadopted so far had not yielded the expected results and had in some cases avoided the\ncrucial issues. He also stressed the following basic principles. First, the war in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina was neither a civil war, nor an ethnic conflict. It was a war of aggression\nperpetrated from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it was a war for territory. Every\nState had the inherent right, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,\nto legitimate self-defence and that right should not be denied to Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nSecond, genocide must be stopped, and deeds rather than words were necessary to do so.\nThird, the Security Council needed to find a way to preserve the existence of a United\nNations Member State, or else the whole system of collective security would be put in\n\n\n\n\n 128\n Ibid., pp. 47-52.\n 129\n Ibid., pp. 89-91.\n\n\n 90\n"
[91] "jeopardy. Fourth, preservation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a vital requirement for\npeace and political stability in south-eastern Europe and in Europe as a whole. 130\n The representative of Ukraine urged the Council to consider additional effective\nmeasures to protect United Nations peacekeepers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and\nexpressed concern at the possibility that hostilities would be intensified if the arms\nembargo were lifted in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It favoured strict compliance with the\nresolutions that had already been adopted by the Security Council. It suggested that an\nimportant step might be to put under effective United Nations control all heavy weapons\nat the disposal of the Bosnian Serbs. In its opinion, such a step would lower the level of\nmilitary confrontation in the region and would remove from the agenda the question of\n 131\nlifting the arms embargo.\n\n\n During the debate, other speakers also referred to the inability of the Security\nCouncil to fulfil its responsibilities under Article 24 of the Charter and to enforce its\nresolutions adopted under Chapter VII. They reaffirmed the right of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina to self defence in accordance with Article 51 and urged the Council to lift\nthe arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina. 132\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom regretted that\na political settlement had not yet been achieved. But the United Nations could not simply\nimpose a political solution. While acknowledging that the existing situation in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina was “deeply worrying”, the speaker stated that his Government nevertheless\ndid not see a reason for adopting what it regarded as a “solution of despair”, which was\nhow it viewed the proposal to lift the arms embargo. He contended that lifting the arms\nembargo would clearly result in an increase in fighting and would provide an “irresistible\ntemptation” to the Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats to intensify their military efforts\nand to ensure that, by the time any substantial delivery of weapons was made to the\n\n 130\n Ibid., pp. 108-110.\n 131\n Ibid., pp. 111-113.\n 132\n Ibid., Egypt, pp. 26-33; Malaysia, pp. 38-41; Jordan, pp. 41-47; Albania, pp. 52-54; Indonesia, pp. 54-59;\nTurkey, pp. 60-63; Iran, pp. 72-77; United Arab Emirates, pp. 77-83; Senegal, pp. 83-88; Algeria, pp.92-96; the Libyan\nArab Jamahiriya, pp.96-102; Bangladesh, pp. 102-106; Costa Rica, pp. 106-108.\n\n\n 91\n"
[92] "Bosnian Government, the military threat it posed to them had been neutralized. In\naddition to these drawbacks, the United Kingdom did not see how the United Nations\ncurrent efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be sustained following a decision to lift\nthe arms embargo. The United Kingdom was of the view that the adoption of the draft\nresolution would be seen as a signal that the United Nations was turning its back on\nBosnia and leaving its inhabitants to “fight it out, come what may”. It could not therefore\nsupport the draft. The speaker further stated that his delegation regretted that the issue of\nlifting the arms embargo, which was “so divisive”, was being pressed to a vote. The unity\nof the Council was an “absolute prerequisite” to achieving results in handling what was\nthe “most complex and difficult” international issue in recent years. The United Kingdom\nbelieved that priority should be given to making the safe areas safer. In addition, the\neconomic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro should be sustained and strengthened.\nIt was crucial that the Bosnian Serbs and the authorities in Belgrade understood that there\nwould be no easing or lifting of the sanctions until the conditions set out in the Security\nCouncil’s resolutions, most recently in resolution 820 (1993), had been fulfiled. The\nUnited Kingdom also believed that the Council should do everything in its power to\n 133\nsustain and nourish the peace process.\n The representative of France stated that his Government did not believe that the\ndraft resolution should be adopted for reasons of principle, timing and substance. He\nargued that the role of the United Nations and the Security Council was not to organize\nfor war or to wage war. According to the Charter, its role was to contribute to the\nsettlement of conflict by peaceful means. Deciding to lift the arms embargo selectively\nwould mean, contrary to the principles of the Charter, setting out on the path of war\nrather than of peace. Moreover, lifting the arm embargo would put an end to the safe\nareas and could have dangerous consequences for the very existence of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina. 134\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that his delegation could not\naccept the draft resolution. The position of principle of the Russian Federation on the\ncrisis in Bosnia was that there should be a halt in hostilities and a peaceful settlement,\n\n 133\n Ibid., pp. 132-135.\n 134\n Ibid., pp. 136-138.\n\n\n 92\n"
[93] "which would satisfy all three sides within the context of the territorial integrity of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina. Lifting the arms embargo would not increase the chance of achieving\nsuch a settlement; on the contrary, it would open the “floodgates” for an escalation of the\nwar, potentially leading to results completely contradictory to the goals proclaimed in the\ndraft. It might actually neutralize the entire United Nations operation in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina. The Russian Federation continued to support the concept of safe areas and\nof building up an international presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as one way of\n 135\nmaking progress towards a peaceful settlement.\n The representative of Hungary stated that his delegation continued to endorse the\nprinciples set out in the draft resolution, including the cessation of hostilities, the\nwithdrawal from territories occupied by force, reversal of the consequences of the policy\nof “ethnic cleansing”, and restoration of the territorial integrity of Bosnia. Furthermore,\nHungary thought that it was “enormously important” to make a clear distinction between\nthe aggressor and the victim of aggression. It was also intolerable that one of the parties\nto the conflict continued to be supplied with weapons from outside sources, while another\nparty had no such ability. The point was to halt all supplies of weapons and ammunition\nto Bosnia and Herzegovina. To that end, international inspection facilities should be set\nup along all of the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as had been indicated in\nresolution 838 (1993). The Serbs’ heavy weapons should be placed under effective\ncontrol, as they were the weapons that were responsible for so much of the violence. The\nSecurity Council needed only to apply its own resolutions. The speaker further stated that\nthe question before the Council was whether, in the existing circumstances, the actions\nenvisaged in the draft resolution would promote a solution to the Bosnian problem. After\ncarefully weighing the various arguments concerning the draft resolution, however,\nHungary had concluded that lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina\nwould not necessarily have a positive impact on subsequent developments in that country\nand the vicinity. In Hungary’s opinion, lifting the arms embargo would be to admit the\n 136\nirreversible failure of efforts for a negotiated, political solution.\n\n\n\n 135\n Ibid., pp. 138-142.\n 136\n Ibid., pp. 143-147.\n\n\n 93\n"
[94] " The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it received 6 votes to none, with\n9 abstentions (Brazil, China, France, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, the Russian\nFederation, Spain, and United Kingdom). The Council failed to adopt the draft resolution,\nas it had not obtained the required number of votes.\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United States recalled that her\nGovernment had consistently advocated lifting the arms embargo on the Government of\nBosnia and Herzegovina. By voting in favour of the draft resolution, the United States\nreaffirmed its belief that Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a sovereign State and Member of\nthe United Nations, had a right to defend itself. The speaker warned that, although the\nCouncil had not acted on the arms embargo, it would be a grave mistake for the Bosnian\nSerbs to interpret that action as an endorsement of their intransigence or of their attempts\nto use military force to change international boundaries and destroy a neighbour. Nor\nshould the vote be seen as an indication that the international community was willing to\nturn a blind eye to the gross violations of human rights committed in Bosnia, primarily by\nthe Bosnian Serbs. The United States would continue to insist that, if the authorities in\nBelgrade wanted to rejoin the family of nations, they would have to stop the violence and\ncomply with all relevant Security Council resolutions. Until that day, the Council would\nhave no choice but to maintain the pressure. The goal remained a negotiated settlement\nfreely agreed to by all the parties, and the United States continued to believe that\nexempting Bosnia and Herzegovina from the arms embargo was a means to that end.\n The representative of China stated that his delegation held that the sovereignty,\npolitical independence and territorial integrity of all United Nations Member States\nshould be fully respected by the international community. It therefore supported such\nelements in the draft. Based on China principled position, the Chinese delegation had\n 137\nabstained on the vote on the draft resolution.\n The representative of Brazil stated that his delegation had supported many of the\nelements in the draft resolution, including that there should be an immediate cessation of\nhostilities, a halt to the abhorrent practice of ethnic cleansing, and that the acquisition of\nterritories by the use of force could not be tolerated. Notwithstanding those\n\n\n 137\n Ibid., pp. 150-151.\n\n\n 94\n"
[95] "considerations, however, the Brazilian delegation had not been in a position to vote in\nfavour of the draft resolution. Brazil continued to believe in the overwhelming\nimportance of seeking a comprehensive political solution to the Bosnian conflict. It\nmaintained that the international community needed to aim its actions and decisions at\nrestraining and putting an end to the armed conflict and should avoid the risk that, as a\nconsequence of its actions and decisions, war might escalate or expand. Furthermore,\nthere appeared to be grounds to fear that some of the measures envisaged in the draft\nresolution, if they were to be implemented, might prompt drastic actions which would\naffect the very populations that the Security Council would be trying to protect. The\ninternational community should not give up on the hope of reaching a peaceful solution\n 138\nto the conflict.\n The representative of New Zealand noted that his delegation shared a deep sense\nof frustration about the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It believed, however, that a\ndurable solution to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina should come through\nintensified efforts towards a political settlement. New Zealand continued to support\nUnited Nations humanitarian efforts and Security Council measures, such as sanctions,\ndesigned to persuade the parties of the need to look for a political solution, but the action\nproposed in the draft resolution had been of quite a different nature. Lifting the arms\nembargo would, in New Zealand’s view, immediately intensify the military pressure on\nthe Bosnian forces, inevitably resulting in more civilian casualties and more refugees. It\nwould also force an end to the United Nations humanitarian operations. The speaker\ncautioned that the Council’s decision should not be misinterpreted as meaning that the\nCouncil had turned its back on the Bosnian people. On the contrary, the Council had\nestablished safe areas under resolution 836 (1993) and had decided to respond with force\nif those areas were threatened. It was necessary to address urgently the practical\n 139\nimplementation of the safe areas.\n The President, speaking in his capacity as representative of Spain, stated that his\ndelegation shared, in large measure, the motivations of the countries that had sponsored\nthe draft resolution. It was Spain’s view, however, that lifting the arms embargo would\n\n 138\n Ibid., pp. 151-153.\n 139\n Ibid., pp. 153-155.\n\n\n 95\n"
[96] "lead to an escalation of the violence and would only increase the suffering of the civilian\npopulation. Moreover, the measures proposed in the draft resolution would escalate the\nrisk of an expansion of the conflict, with potentially serious consequences for the entire\nregion. In addition, lifting the arms embargo would be incompatible with the maintenance\nof the presence of UNPROFOR and that therefore the humanitarian agencies would not\nbe able to operate. Spain believed that the Council should not abandon its efforts to\nachieve the implementation of resolutions 836 (1993) and 844 (1993), on the safe areas.\nHe noted that, if all else failed, Spain was prepared to consider recourse to more forceful\n 140\nmeasures, without prejudging or excluding consideration of any of them.\n\n\n Decision of 7 July 1993: letter from the President to the Secretary-General\n\n On 1 July 1993, pursuant to resolution 838 (1993), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 141 on options for the deployment of international\nobservers on the borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Secretary-\nGeneral noted that the relevant resolutions of the Security Council would require border\nmonitors to address movements of regular and irregular military personnel, weapons and\nother military equipment and supplies, as well as goods subject to sanctions from\nneighbouring countries destined for Bosnia and Herzegovina or the United Nations\nProtected Areas (UNPAs) of Croatia. Two options were proposed, the first consisting of\nborder monitoring and the second consisting of border control. Both options were based\non the following assumptions: (a) border monitoring arrangements would require the full\ncooperation of all parties concerned; (b) border monitoring would include all\ninternational borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with priority given to those with the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); (c) given the nature of the\nterrain and the length of the borders, only major crossing points could be effectively\nmonitored; and (d) where applicable, UNPROFOR would focus its monitoring activity on\nthe work of the national border control agencies.\n\n\n\n\n 140\n Ibid., pp. 156-159.\n 141\n S/26018 and Corr.1and Add.1.\n\n\n 96\n"
[97] " The Secretary-General noted that option two would be unrealistic taking into\naccount that the world-wide resources for additional peace-keeping troops were\nincreasingly stretched. Option one, however, would also required substantial additional\nresources in terms of observers and equipment. He further noted that even if the\nnecessary personnel and financial resources were available, the effectiveness of the first\noption would depend entirely on the cooperation of the neighbouring countries and of the\nparties concerned.\n 142\n By a letter dated 7 July 1993, the President of the Security Council informed\nthe Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n “The members of the Security Council have considered your report of 1 July 1993 on\n options for the deployment of international observers on the borders of the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina. They continue to believe that, in order to facilitate the\n implementation of the relevant Council resolutions, international observers should be\n deployed on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with priority being given to the border\n between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro).\n “Bearing in mind the observations in your report, they invite you to contact Member\n States in order to establish whether they are ready, individually or through regional\n organizations or arrangements, to make qualified personnel available to act as observers\n along the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to continue to explore all possibilities for\n implementation of the border monitors concept. They also invite you to pursue the question\n of implementation with a view to obtaining full cooperation from the authorities in the\n neighbouring countries.\n “The members of the Council look forward to receiving further information on the\n contacts proposed in the previous paragraph, as well as reports pursuant to paragraph 2 of\n resolution 838 (1993) of 10 June 1993 concerning material derived from aerial surveillance.”\n\n\n Decision of 22 July 1993 (3257th meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n\n\n 142\n S/26049.\n\n\n 97\n"
[98] " By a letter 143 dated 19 July 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina transmitted a letter of the same\ndate from the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which he reported\nthat Serbian forces had launched an offensive towards the Sarajevo safe zone, and that\nforces had been also directed to Mount Igman. He called upon the Council to intervene\nimmediately to stop the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n At its 3257th meeting, on 22 July 1993, the Council included the letter from the\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its agenda. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request,\nto participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President (United Kingdom)\nstated that, after consultations among members of the Security Council, he had been\n 144\nauthorized to make the following statement on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n “The Security Council has noted with grave concern the letter of 19 July 1993 from the\n President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the\n President of the Security Council about the Bosnian Serb military offensive in the area of\n Mount Igman, close to Sarajevo, a city which has stood for centuries as an outstanding\n example of a multicultural, multi-ethnic and pluri-religious society, which needs to be\n protected and preserved.\n “The Council renews its demand that all hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina cease and\n that the parties and others concerned refrain from any hostile acts. It supports the call from\n the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in this regard,\n designed to facilitate the peace talks.\n “The Council reaffirms its resolutions 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993 and 836 (1993) of 4\n June 1993, in the first of which it declared Sarajevo a safe area that should be free from\n armed attacks and any hostile acts, and from which Bosnian Serb military or para-military\n units should be withdrawn to a distance wherefrom they cease to constitute a menace to its\n security and that of its inhabitants. It condemns the offensive by the Bosnian Serbs on Mount\n Igman aimed at further isolating Sarajevo and escalating the recent unprecedented and\n unacceptable pressures on the Government and people of the Republic of Bosnia and\n\n\n 143\n S/26107.\n 144\n S/26134.\n\n\n 98\n"
[99] " Herzegovina before the forthcoming talks in Geneva. It demands an immediate end to this\n offensive and to all attacks on Sarajevo. It also demands an immediate end to all violations of\n international humanitarian law. It demands an end to the disruption of public utilities\n (including water, electricity, fuel and communications) by the Bosnian Serb party and to the\n blocking of, and interference with, the delivery of humanitarian relief by both the Bosnian\n Serb and the Bosnian Croat parties.\n “The Council calls on the parties to meet in Geneva under the auspices of the\n Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. It calls on the\n parties to negotiate in earnest with the aim of achieving a just and equitable settlement on the\n basis of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina and the principles agreed at the International Conference on the Former\n Yugoslavia in London on 26 August 1992 and supported by the Council in its statement of 2\n September 1992. In particular it reaffirms the unacceptability of ethnic cleansing, or the\n acquisition of territory by the use of force, or any dissolution of the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina.\n “The Council emphasizes that it will keep open all options, none of which is prejudged or\n excluded from consideration.”\n\n\n Decision of 24 August 1993 (3269th meeting): resolution 859 (1993)\n\n At its 3269th meeting, on 24 August 1993, the Council resumed its consideration\nof the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request,\nto participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President (United States)\n 145\nthen drew the attention of the Council members to letters dated 3, 6, 20 and 23 August\n1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council,\nconveying the reports dated 2, 5 and 20 August 1993 by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering\nCommittee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, as well as to the\ntext of a draft resolution146 prepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations and\na number of other documents. 147\n\n\n 145\n S/25233, S/26260, S/26337 and S/26337 Add.1, respectively.\n 146\n S/26182.\n 147\n S/26227, S/26232, S/26244, S/26245, S/26256, S/26309, S/26340 and S/26342, letters dated 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,\n\n\n 99\n"
[100] " At the meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that the last\ntime he had spoken before the Council, his country had been told that its right to obtain\ndefensive weapons and fully exercise self-defence would pose a threat to United Nations\nforces and prolong the war. Now it was being suggested that the reemphasis of the\nprinciples of the United Nations Charter, international law, Security Council resolutions,\ndecisions of the International Court of Justice and the London Conference on the former\nYugoslavia would somehow undermine the chances for a negotiated settlement. He urged\nthe Security Council to adhere to its resolutions and commitments, warning that failure to\ndo so would be “catastrophic”, not only for the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but\nalso for the people of the world, who deserved and commanded the very ideals upon\nwhich the Council had been established. Turning to the draft resolution he stated that it\nwas timely, in that it was being adopted prior to the resumption of the Geneva process to\nfind a just and durable peace. Bosnia and Herzegovina hoped that the members of the\nSecurity Council would remain committed to the application of the draft resolution’s\nprinciples and that they would ensure that the Co-Chairmen of the ICTY would promote\n 148\nthose principles in Geneva.\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of Pakistan noted that the non-aligned\nmembers of the Security Council had originally submitted the draft resolution with a\nview to achieving two fundamental objectives: first, to ensure a complete cease-fire and\ncessation of all hostilities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was an essential\nprerequisite for a just and equitable political solution to the conflict through peaceful\nnegotiations; and second, to set out a framework of principles which should constitute the\nfundamental basis for peace and a politically negotiated settlement of the crisis. Despite\nthe unanimous view that the tragedy in Bosnia and Herzegovina was caused by flagrant\nviolations of international law and the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter,\nthe political will to end it appeared to be deficient. The draft resolution came at a crucial\ntime, and Pakistan therefore hoped that its successful adoption would help to create the\n\n\n\n16 and 23 August 1993 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil; S/26257 and S/26266, letters dated 6 August 1993 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Morocco addressed to the\nPresident of the Security Council; and S/26281, letter dated 9 August 1993 from the Chargé d’affaires of Croatia\naddressed to the Secretary-General.\n 148\n S/PV.3269, pp. 7-15.\n\n\n 100\n"
[101] "conditions necessary for transparent and free negotiations among the parties\nconcerned. 149\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 859 (1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous resolutions on the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina,\n Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina and the responsibility of the Security Council in this regard,\n Reaffirming also that Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a State Member of the United Nations,\n enjoys the rights provided for in the Charter of the United Nations,\n Noting that Bosnia and Herzegovina has continued to be subject to armed hostilities in\n contravention of Security Council resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and other\n relevant Council resolutions and that, despite all efforts by the United Nations as well as\n regional organizations and arrangements, there is still no compliance with all relevant\n Council resolutions, in particular by the Bosnian Serb party,\n Condemning once again all war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian\n law, by whomsoever committed, Bosnian Serbs or other individuals,\n Deeply concerned at the deterioration of humanitarian conditions in Bosnia and\n Herzegovina, including in and around Mostar, and determined to support in every possible\n way the efforts by the United Nations Protection Force and the United Nations High\n Commissioner for Refugees to continue providing humanitarian assistance to civilian\n populations in need,\n Concerned about the continuing siege of Sarajevo, Mostar and other threatened cities,\n Strongly condemning the disruption of public utilities (including water, electricity, fuel\n and communications), in particular by the Bosnian Serb party, and calling upon all parties\n concerned to cooperate in restoring them,\n Recalling the principles for a political solution adopted by the London International\n Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,\n\n\n\n 149\n Ibid., pp. 22-23.\n\n\n 101\n"
[102] " Reaffirming once again the unacceptability of the acquisition of territory through the use\nof force and the practice of “ethnic cleansing”,\n Stressing that an end to the hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina is necessary to achieve\nmeaningful progress in the peace process,\n Mindful of its primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of\ninternational peace and security,\n Taking into account the reports of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia contained in documents S/26233,\nS/26260 and S/26337,\n Determining that the grave situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to be a threat\nto international peace and security,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,\n 1. Notes with appreciation the report by the Special Representative of the Secretary-\nGeneral on the latest developments at the Geneva peace talks, and urges the parties, in\ncooperation with the Co-Chairmen, to conclude as soon as possible a just and comprehensive\npolitical settlement freely agreed by all of them;\n 2. Calls for an immediate cease-fire and cessation of hostilities throughout the Republic\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina as essential for achieving a just and equitable political solution to\nthe conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina through peaceful negotiations;\n 3. Demands that all concerned facilitate the unhindered flow of humanitarian assistance,\nincluding the provision of food, water, electricity, fuel and communications, in particular to\nthe safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 4. Demands also that the safety and operational effectiveness of personnel of the United\nNations Protection Force and of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for\nRefugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina be fully respected by all parties at all times;\n 5. Takes notes with appreciation of the letter of the Secretary-General dated 18 August\n1993 stating that the United Nations has now the initial operational capability for the use of\nair power in support of the Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 6. Affirms that a solution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be in conformity\nwith the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, and also\naffirms the continuing relevance in this context of:\n (a) The sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina;\n\n\n\n\n 102\n"
[103] " (b) The fact that neither a change in the name of the State nor changes regarding the\n internal organization of the State such as those contained in the constitutional agreement\n annexed to the Co-Chairmen's report in document S/26337 would affect the continued\n membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the United Nations;\n (c) The principles adopted by the London International Conference on the Former\n Yugoslavia, including the need for a cessation of hostilities, the principle of a negotiated\n solution freely arrived at, the unacceptability of the acquisition of territory by force or by\n “ethnic cleansing” and the right of refugees and others who have suffered losses to\n compensation in accordance with the statement on Bosnia adopted by the London\n Conference;\n (d) Recognition and respect for the right of all displaced persons to return to their homes\n in safety and honour;\n (e) The maintenance of Sarajevo, capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a united city and\n a multicultural, multi-ethnic and pluri-religious centre;\n 7. Recalls the principle of individual responsibility for the perpetration of war crimes and\n other violations of international humanitarian law and its decision in resolution 827 (1993) of\n 25 May 1993 to establish an international tribunal;\n 8. Declares its readiness to consider taking the necessary measures to assist the parties in\n the effective implementation of a fair and equitable settlement once it has been freely agreed\n by the parties, which would require a decision by the Council;\n 9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of France contended that the terms for\na comprehensive settlement as defined after the most recent negotiations certainly did not\nrepresent an ideal solution. However, they had the merit of preserving what was essential:\nthe continued existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina through a union of three member\nRepublics; a territorial base for each of the three communities, but above all for the most\nsorely tried community, the Bosnian Muslims, economically viable areas; and finally the\nmaintenance of Sarajevo as the united capital of that entity. Another essential element,\nthe continued membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the United Nations, was\npresently assured by the Council. Therefore, in his Government view, such an accord, if\nscrupulously adhered to, would be a realistic solution, permitting the foundation of a\nlasting agreement. His delegation welcomed the fact that the Council had stressed its\n\n\n 103\n"
[104] "readiness to take immediately the necessary measures to implement a political solution.\nThe speaker noted that such action clearly benefited the party who was in a situation of\nweakness. A massive United Nations presence in Bosnia was the best guarantee of the\nrights of the weakest. 150\n\n\n The representative of New Zealand noted that for the past months the Council had\nbeen seriously divided on how to respond to the increasingly tragic situation in Bosnia.\nThat division, and the consequent inaction, had put at risk not only the interests of Bosnia\nbut also the longer-term credibility of the United Nations system and the Council’s role in\ncollective security. His delegation was pleased that the Council had finally rose to the\nchallenge. The small and the vulnerable must be able to depend on the collective security\nmechanism of the United Nations, and that meant that the Council must be willing to act\nwhen it was seized of an issue. The speaker further stated that the resolution just adopted\nunderlined the importance the Council attached to backing up UNPROFOR with force,\nand it emphasized the support that the Secretary-General enjoyed on that issue. The\nresolution also addressed three other matters that his delegation believed to be essential\nfor any fair and freely accepted settlement: first, the continuity of the Bosnian State;\nsecondly, the special status of Sarajevo as a unified capital; and, thirdly, the reiteration of\nthe general principles under which the negotiations had proceeded. On the question of the\nimplementation of the settlement, his delegation was very pleased that the resolution\nlooked forward to the role that the Council would have to play once a settlement was\n 151\nconcluded.\n\n\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that his delegation had voted\nin favour of the resolution just adopted on the basis of its firm conviction that all steps\ntaken by the Security Council on the issue of a Bosnian settlement must be aimed solely\nat assisting the negotiations in Geneva, which provided a “unique opportunity” to halt the\nbloodshed and lead to a political settlement. It was the Russian Federation’s fundamental\n\n 150\n Ibid., pp. 26-27.\n 151\n Ibid., pp. 33-36.\n\n\n 104\n"
[105] "position that the international community, through the Security Council, must give clear\nsignals promoting peacemaking and not actions likely to impede the negotiating process.\nThe speaker contended that there remained “unbalanced and biased elements” in the\nresolution concerning one of the parties to the conflict, thus incorrectly reflecting the\nstate of affairs existing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, in connection with\nparagraph 5, The Russian Federation unequivocally believed in the need for the\nSecretary-General to hold consultations with members of the Security Council before\nadopting a decision on air support for UNPROFOR. He warned that there should be no\n“automatic response” on that important question. The Russian Federation also\nemphasized that such air power could only be used in support of UNPROFOR, as\nprovided in resolution 836 (1993). In conclusion, the speaker stated that, in the view of\nhis delegation, the Security Council must not only promote the speedy achievement of an\nagreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, but it should also specify its own role as a\nguarantor of the agreement’s implementation. Immediately after the signing of the\nGeneva package, the Security Council should therefore adopt a supporting resolution,\nproviding not only for active, positive steps to implement the agreements, but also for\n 152\nstricter measures concerning those who violated them.\n The President, speaking in her capacity as representative of the United States,\nstated that the resolution just adopted, fairly and properly urged the parties to reach a just\nand comprehensive political settlement as soon as possible. The resolution did not take a\nstand on the points that the parties had taken to their constituencies from the Geneva\nnegotiations. The decision had to remain with the parties. It was also necessary to keep in\nmind that signing a political settlement was only the first step towards a return to\nnormalcy. The United States would continue to support efforts to reach a solution,\nconsistent with Security Council resolutions, to the problem of the United Nations\nprotected areas in Croatia. Similarly, the parties must cooperate with the international war\ncrimes tribunal. The speaker reiterated her Government’s belief that signing a political\n\n\n\n\n 152\n Ibid., pp. 47-50.\n\n\n 105\n"
[106] "agreement was not enough; a willingness effectively to implement what they had signed\nwould be the real test of any of the parties’ good will. 153\n\n\n Decision of 14 September 1993 (3276th meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n At its 3276th meeting, on 14 September 1993, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the\nadoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The\nPresident (Venezuela) then stated that, after consultations among members of the\n 154\nSecurity Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of\nthe Council:\n\n\n “The Security Council expresses its profound concern over recent reports that Bosnian\n Croats have been holding Bosnian Muslims in detention camps under deplorable conditions.\n The Council recalls the international revulsion and condemnation that accompanied\n revelations last year of the conditions under which Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats\n were being held in Bosnian Serb detention camps.\n “The Council reiterates the principle that the International Committee of the Red Cross\n (ICRC) must be given access to all detainees in Bosnia wherever they may be held. It notes\n that the ICRC has recently been given access to some detainees, but recalls with\n condemnation the obstacles which the Bosnian Croats have previously placed in the way of\n the ICRC's attempts to gain access to the camps in order to ascertain the conditions of the\n detained. It also notes the recent appeal addressed by the President of Croatia to the Bosnian\n Croats.\n “The Council emphasizes the fact that inhumane treatment and abuses in detention\n centres violate international humanitarian law. Moreover, as the Council has previously\n recalled, persons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva\n Conventions of 12 August 1949 are individually responsible in respect of such breaches.\n\n\n\n 153\n Ibid., pp. 58-59.\n 154\n S/26437.\n\n\n 106\n"
[107] " “The Council calls upon the Bosnian Croats to supply immediately to the ICRC complete\n information on all camps where Bosnian Muslim and other prisoners are being held, and to\n assure the ICRC and all other legitimately concerned international bodies free and unhindered\n access to the detained, wherever they may be held.\n “The Council believes that the Government of Croatia has a responsibility to use its\n influence with the Bosnian Croats to secure compliance with this statement and calls on the\n Government of Croatia to take immediate steps to that end.\n “The Council further reaffirms that all parties to the conflict are bound to comply with\n their obligations under international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva\n Conventions, and reminds them of its willingness to consider appropriate actions if any of\n them should fail to abide scrupulously by their obligations.\n “The Council decides to remain seized of the matter.”\n\n\n Decision of 28 October 1993: statement by the President\n\n On 28 October 1993, after consultations with the members of the Council, the\nPresident made the following statement 155 on behalf of the members of the Council:\n\n “The members of the Security Council have heard an initial oral report by the Secretariat\n concerning the massacre of the civilian population in the village of Stupni Do on 23 October\n 1993 by troops of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO). They also heard accounts of attacks\n against the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) by armed persons bearing\n uniforms of the Bosnian Government forces, and of an attack to which an humanitarian\n convoy under the protection of UNPROFOR was subjected on 25 October 1993 in central\n Bosnia.\n “The members of the Council unreservedly condemn these acts of violence. They express\n their profound concern about the preliminary information to the effect that regular and\n organized armed forces were probably involved. They have requested the Secretary-General\n to submit as soon as possible a complete report on the responsibility for these acts. The\n members of the Council are prepared to draw all the relevant conclusions from this report,\n which will also be transmitted to the Commission of Experts established by resolution 780\n (1992).\n\n\n\n\n 155\n S/26661.\n\n\n 107\n"
[108] " “The members of the Council reiterate their demand that all the parties in the former\n Yugoslavia comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law, and that\n those responsible for such violations of international humanitarian law should be held\n accountable in accordance with the relevant Council resolutions. The members of the Council\n call upon all the parties in the former Yugoslavia to guarantee the unimpeded access of\n humanitarian assistance and the security of the personnel responsible for it.”\n\n\n Decisions of 9 November 1993 (3308th meeting): statements by the President\n\n At its 3308th meeting, on 9 November 1993, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the\nadoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The\nPresident (Cape Verde) drew the attention of the members of the Council to several\ndocuments 156 and stated that, after consultations among members of the Security\nCouncil, he had been authorized to make the following two statements 157 on behalf of the\nCouncil:\n\n\n “The Security Council expresses its deep concern at the reports on the deterioration of the\n situation in central Bosnia where increased military activities are seriously threatening\n security of the civilian population.\n “The Council demands that all parties and others concerned refrain from taking any\n action that threatens the safety and well-being of the civilian population.\n “The Council is equally concerned at the overall humanitarian situation prevailing in the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It reiterates its demand to all parties and others\n concerned to guarantee unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance.\n “The Council, aware of the heavy burden that these developments add to the existing\n precarious humanitarian situation of the refugees and displaced persons in Bosnia and\n Herzegovina and in the surrounding countries, calls on all parties to assist the competent\n\n\n\n\n 156\n S/26690 and S/26715, letters dated 3 and 9 November 1993 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Croatia\naddressed to the President of the Security Council; S/26692, letter dated 8 November 1993 from the representative of\nBosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council.\n 157\n S/26716.\n\n\n 108\n"
[109] " United Nations agencies and other humanitarian organizations in their efforts to provide relief\n to the affected civilian population in those countries.\n “The Council urges all parties and others concerned to exert the utmost restraint and\n refrain from taking any action which might exacerbate the situation.”\n\n\n The text of the second statement 158 reads as follow:\n\n\n “The Security Council is profoundly shocked to learn of the incident which took place on\n 8 November 1993 in which two persons were taken hostage by the Bosnian Serb forces,\n while members of a delegation headed by Monsignor Vinko Puljic, the Archbishop of\n Sarajevo, travelling to the city of Vares on a mission of peace under the protection of the\n United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).\n “The Council strongly condemns this outrageous act, which is a flagrant challenge to the\n authority and inviolability of UNPROFOR.\n “The Council notes that, despite the prompt and commendable intervention of the Special\n Representative of the Secretary-General, neither of the hostages has been released, and it\n demands that the Bosnian Serb forces proceed immediately to release them. The Council\n reminds the perpetrators of this act that they are obligated to ensure that no harm comes to the\n individuals being held and that those responsible for violations of international humanitarian\n law will be held personally accountable for their actions.\n “The Council requests the Secretary-General to undertake a thorough investigation of the\n incident and to report to the Council without delay. It urges all parties and others concerned\n to refrain from taking any action which might further exacerbate the situation.\n “The Council condemns all attacks and hostile acts against UNPROFOR by all parties in\n the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in the Republic of Croatia, which have\n become more frequent over the last weeks, and demands that they cease forthwith.”\n\n\n Decision of 7 January 1994 (3327th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3327th meeting, on 7 January 1994, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\nCouncil invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to\n\n\n 158\n S/26717.\n\n\n 109\n"
[110] "participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President (Czech Republic)\ndrew the attention of the members of the Council to a letter 159 dated 6 January 1994 from\nthe representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, transmitting the text of a letter of the same date from the President of the\nPresidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil. The President then stated that, after consultations among members of the\nSecurity Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement 160 on behalf of\nthe Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council expresses its deep concern at the continuing widespread hostilities\n in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It deplores the failure of the parties to honour\n the agreements they have already signed, in the context of the International Conference on the\n Former Yugoslavia, to implement a cease-fire and to permit the delivery of humanitarian\n assistance. It condemns the flagrant violations of international humanitarian law which have\n occurred, for which it holds the perpetrators personally responsible.\n \"The Council condemns any hostilities in the United Nations-designated safe areas,\n especially in the Sarajevo area. In particular, it strongly condemns the continuing military\n pressure on and the relentless bombardment by Bosnian Serb forces of the capital city,\n Sarajevo. It demands the immediate end to attacks against Sarajevo, which have resulted in a\n high number of civilian casualties, seriously disrupted essential services and aggravated an\n already severe humanitarian situation. In this regard, the Council once again reaffirms its\n commitment to implement fully all its relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 836 (1993)\n of 4 June 1993.\n \"The Council strongly deplores the abhorrent practice of deliberate obstruction of\n humanitarian relief convoys by any party and reiterates its demand that there be unimpeded\n access of humanitarian relief assistance to their intended destinations. The Council further\n demands that all parties fully abide by their commitments in this regard and facilitate timely\n delivery of humanitarian aid.\n \"The Council also condemns recent attacks against the personnel of the United Nations\n Protection Force as well as of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for\n\n\n\n 159\n S/1994/15.\n 160\n S/PRST/1994/1.\n\n\n 110\n"
[111] " Refugees and other humanitarian organizations. It reiterates the demand that all parties\n ensure the safety and security of the Force, as well as all other United Nations personnel and\n those of non-governmental organizations, and their unimpeded access throughout the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n \"The Council calls on all the parties to cease hostilities throughout the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina and to honour the commitments they have entered into. It calls upon\n them to negotiate in earnest in the framework of the International Conference on the Former\n Yugoslavia to achieve an early settlement.\n \"The Council remains seized of the matter and is ready to consider further measures to\n ensure that all parties and others concerned abide by their commitments and fully respect\n relevant Council resolutions.\"\n\n\n Decision of 3 February 1994 (3333rd meeting): statement by the President\n\n By a letter 161 dated 28 January 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina transmitted a letter of the same\ndate from the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the Security\nCouncil, in which he requested an emergency meeting of the Council pursuant to a\nmilitary intervention of the armed forces of Croatia against Bosnia and Herzegovina. He\nfurther requested the Security Council to condemn firmly Croatia’s military activities and\nto take all the necessary measures in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations\nCharter and all of the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.\n At its 3333rd meeting, held on 3 February 1994 in response to the request\ncontained in the above letter, the Council included the letter of the representative of\nBosnia in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (Djibouti) drew\nthe attention of the members of the Council to several documents 162 and stated that, after\nconsultations among members of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make\n 163\nthe following statement on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n\n 161\n S/1994/95.\n 162\n S/1994/109, letter dated 1 February 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the\nSecurity Council; S/1994/101 and S/1994/110, letters dated 30 January and 2 February 1994, respectively, from the\nrepresentative of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council.\n 163\n S/PRST/1994/6.\n\n\n 111\n"
[112] " \"The Security Council is deeply concerned that the Republic of Croatia has deployed\nelements of the Croatian Army along with heavy military equipment in the central and\nsouthern parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as described in the letter from the\nSecretary-General dated 1 February 1994.\n \"The Council strongly condemns the Republic of Croatia for this serious hostile act\nagainst a State Member of the United Nations, which constitutes a violation of international\nlaw, the Charter of the United Nations and relevant Council resolutions, in particular\nresolution 752 (1992) of 15 May 1992, in which the Council demanded an immediate end to\nall forms of interference and full respect for the territorial integrity of the Republic of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina.\n \"The Council demands that the Republic of Croatia withdraw forthwith all elements of\nthe Croatian Army along with military equipment and fully respect the territorial integrity of\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n \"The Council once again reaffirms the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence\nof the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the unacceptability of the acquisition of\nterritory by force or ethnic cleansing, and condemns such acquisition, as well as the practice\nof ethnic cleansing, by whomsoever committed.\n \"The Council requests the Secretary-General to monitor the situation closely and report to\nthe Council within two weeks from the date of the present statement on progress towards the\ncomplete and full withdrawal of all elements of the Croatian Army, as well as military\nequipment, from the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n \"The Council will consider other serious measures if the Republic of Croatia fails to put\nan immediate end to all forms of interference in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n \"The Council reiterates its presidential statement of 7 January 1994, in which it expressed\nits deep concern at the continuing widespread hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina. The Council calls once more on all the parties to cease hostilities throughout\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to honour the commitments they have entered\ninto and refrain from actions which escalate or widen the conflict. It calls upon them to\nnegotiate in earnest in the framework of the International Conference on the Former\nYugoslavia to achieve an early settlement.\n \"The Council will remain seized of the matter.\"\n\n\n\n\n 112\n"
[113] " Consideration of the item at the 3336th meeting (14-15 February 1994)\n\n By a letter 164 dated 5 February 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina transmitted a letter from the Prime\nMinister of Bosnia and Herzegovina in which he reported that Serbian gunners had\nshelled a market in Sarajevo, killing 66 civilians and wounding 197 civilians. The Prime\nMinister requested an emergency meeting of the Security Council to determine why the\nexisting mandate given by the Council under resolution 836 (1993) to “deter attacks\nagainst the safe area” had not been utilized to confront those who had committed these\nacts.\n 165\n By a letter dated 8 February 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of Pakistan requested, on behalf of the Organization of the\nIslamic Conference Contact Group 166 on Bosnia and Herzegovina, that an urgent meeting\nof the Council be convened, to consider the extremely grave situation in Sarajevo.\n By a letter 167 dated 10 February 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of the Russian Federation transmitted a statement dated 10\nFebruary 1994 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation containing a\nrequest for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider practical ways to\ndemilitarize Sarajevo and introduce a United Nations administration\n At its 3336th meeting, held on 14 and 15 February 1994 in response to the\nrequests contained in the above letters, the Council included the letters in its agenda.\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives of\nAfghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia,\nFinland, Germany, Greece, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan,\nJordan, Kuwait, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway,\nPortugal, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovenia, the Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine\nand the United Arab Emirates, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the\n\n 164\n S/1994/124.\n 165\n S/1994/135.\n 166\n Egypt, Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Turkey.\n 167\n S/1994/152.\n\n\n 113\n"
[114] "right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the\nCouncil’s provisional rules of procedure. The Council also invited Ambassador Dragomir\nDjokic, at his request, to address the Council in the course of its consideration of the\nitem. The Council further extended an invitation to Mr. Mohammed Peyrovi, Deputy\nPermanent Observer of the OIC and to Mr. Ahmet Engin Ansay, Permanent Observer of\nthe Organization of the Islamic Conference to the United Nations, under rule 39 of the\nprovisional rules of procedure.\n The President (Djibouti) then drew the attention of the Council members to\n 168\nseveral documents.\n At the meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina welcomed NATO’s\nultimatum to the Serbian forces besieging Sarajevo and commended the Secretary-\nGeneral for initiating the use of air strikes to deter further attacks. He observed in that\nregard, that resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) did not require any further action or\nconsultation by the Security Council, if the terms of those resolutions and ultimatum were\nnot met by the Serbians. The conditions of resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) and the\nwithdrawal of Serbian forces and their weapons should be executed fully and in a timely\nmanner. The speaker added that the Secretary-General and NATO had been delegated\n\n\n 168\n S/1994/124, letter dated 5 February 1994 from the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed\nto the President of the Council, transmitted by a letter of the same date from the Deputy Permanent Representative of\nBosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Council; S/1994/135, letter dated 8 February 1994 from the\nPermanent Representative of Pakistan addressed, on behalf of the members of the OIC Contact Group on Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, to the President of the Council; S/1994/152, letter dated 10 February 1994 from the Permanent\nRepresentative of the Russian Federation addressed to the President of the Council; S/1994/123, 134 and 142, letters\ndated 4, 8 and 9 February 1994, respectively, from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the\nPresident of the Security Council; S/1994/126, letter dated 7 February 1994 from the representative of Turkey\naddressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1994/127, letter dated 6 February 1994 from the Chargé d’affaires\na.i. of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1994/129, letter dated 7 February 1994 from the representative\nof Slovenia addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1994/136, letter dated 8 February 1994 from the representative of\nPakistan addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1994/137, letter dated 7 February 1994 from the representatives of\nFrance, Spain and the United Kingdom addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1994/138, letter dated 7\nFebruary 1994 from the representative of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1994/139, letter\ndated 8 February 1994 from the representative of Egypt addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1994/143,\nletter dated 9 February 1994 from the representative of the Sudan addressed to the President of the Security Council;\nS/1994/144, letter dated 9 February 1994 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Azerbaijan addressed to the Secretary-\nGeneral; S/1994/145, letter dated 7 February 1994 from the representative of Algeria addressed to the Secretary-\nGeneral; S/1994/146, letter dated 9 February 1994 from the representative of Malaysia addressed to the President of the\nSecurity Council; S/1994/148, note verbale dated 5 February 1994 from the representative of Tunisia addressed to the\nSecretary-General; S/1994/153, letter dated 10 February 1994 from the representative of Lithuania addressed to the\nSecretary-General; S/1994/158, letter dated 10 February 1994 from the representative of Israel addressed to the\nSecretary-General; S/1994/166, letter dated 11 February 1994 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia addressed\nto the Secretary-General; S/1994/173, letter dated 14 February 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the\nPresident of the Council, transmitting the report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the ICFY.\n\n\n 114\n"
[115] "that responsibility, and the international community and Member States expected that\nthose delegated obligations and commitments would be carried out without equivocation.\nNoting that the plight of Sarajevo was “only the tip of the iceberg” of the suffering of the\nBosnian people, the speaker stressed that, if peace were to be secured and the credibility\nof the negotiating process established, the international community must implement\nresolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) in the other five safe areas and take the necessary\nmeasures to secure the safety of Bosnians throughout the country. He contended that the\nCouncil’s commitment to ensure full and timely compliance with resolutions 824 (1993)\nand 836 (1993) around Sarajevo, and to extend that commitment to the other safe areas\nand the remainder of the country would be critical in determining the necessity for Bosnia\nand Herzegovina to exercise its full rights under Article 51. He added that although his\ndelegation was prepared to consider United Nations demilitarization and administration\nof Sarajevo as part of a final and overall peace plan, such premature attempts could only\ndelay the taking of the necessary steps and deviate from the desired conclusion. In\nconclusion, Bosnia and Herzegovina would support any efforts to broaden the\ninvolvement of the Security Council and Member States in the peace process, and in that\n 169\ncontext it backed the relocation of talks to New York.\n\n\n The representative of France stated that the only purpose of recent decisions of\nStates members of NATO was to make available to the United Nations the means to\nimplement Security Council decisions, and thus to improve the chances for peace. In that\nperspective, the top priority was to lift the siege of Sarajevo, to begin the demilitarization\nof the city, by giving UNPROFOR control of heavy weapons, and to place the city under\nprovisional United Nations administration as contemplated in the European Union plan.\nHe contended that the NATO decisions fell “squarely” within the framework of\nresolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993). There was thus no need for the decisions of the\nNATO Council to be submitted to the Security Council for any further decision.\nMoreover, the French Government believed that the Secretary-General had been acting\nwithin his authority and in accordance with Security Council resolutions when he had\n\n\n 169\n S/PV.3336, pp. 7-13.\n\n\n 115\n"
[116] "contacted NATO. The French Government also took note of the desire of the Russian\nFederation that the Security Council consider steps to raise the siege of Sarajevo, and to\nplace the city under United Nations administration. While it shared that objective, it\nbelieved that such a consideration should in no way call into question the decisions of the\n 170\nNATO Council, which should be implemented fully.\n\n\n The representative of the United States stated that her Government believed that\nthe conflict should be resolved at the negotiating table, not on the battlefield. She argued,\nhowever, that diplomacy must be backed by a willingness to use force, when essential, in\nthe cause of peace, for it was only “force plus diplomacy” that could stop the “slaughter”\nin Sarajevo and break the “stalemate” in Geneva. Referring to the decisions taken by the\nNATO Council, she stated that those steps were consistent with resolutions adopted by\nthe Council, and did not require further Council action. She recalled in that regard that\nthe decision to initiate air strikes lay in the hands of the Secretary-General and that it had\nbeen the Council that had placed it there. Acknowledging that neither NATO nor the\nSecurity Council should impose a settlement upon the parties, as such a settlement would\nnot be lasting, the speaker stated that by seeking to reduce the level of violence around\nSarajevo, it was hoped that the negotiating process would be reinvigorated. She also\nnoted that, for the first time, a regional security organization, NATO, had acted to\nimplement a decision of the Council to use force under Chapter VII of the United Nations\nCharter. Cooperation between NATO and the United Nations would be essential, not only\nfor the citizens of Sarajevo and the other safe areas in Bosnia, but also for the precedent it\n 171\nwould set for the future of collective security.\n\n\n The representative of Pakistan recalled that his country had consistently urged the\ninternational community to act decisively in order to halt and reverse aggression against\nthe Bosnian Government. Pakistan had advocated resolute action, including the use of\nforce, and in particular air strikes, to enforce and implement the mandatory decisions of\nthe Council. Regrettably, despite the fact that most of the Council resolutions on Bosnia\n\n 170\n Ibid., pp. 14-18.\n 171\n Ibid., pp. 18-21.\n\n\n 116\n"
[117] "and Herzegovina were adopted under Chapter VII, they remained by and large\nunimplemented. His delegation believed that only the decisive use of force, through the\nuse of “surgical, punitive air strikes”, would make the Serbs conform to Security Council\nresolutions. It further considered that the requisite legal framework for such action\nexisted in Security Council resolutions, and in particular in resolution 836 (1993). The\nspeaker also reiterated the view that the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina\nwas “selective” and “contrary” to Article 51 of the Charter, arguing that it had prevented\nthe victim of aggression from exercising its legitimate right of self-defence. He observed\nthat the need to allow the Bosnian Government to defend itself had became all the more\nurgent given recent reports of the presence of regular troops of the Serbian and Croatian\narmies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His delegation was awaiting with “keen interest” a\nreport by the Secretary-General on the full withdrawal of Croatian army troops and\nmilitary equipment from Bosnia and Herzegovina. If Croatia failed to comply with the\ndemands of the Council than stringent sanctions should be imposed against that country.\nIn conclusion, his delegation shared the view that the peace negotiations should be moved\nto New York, so that they would be under the “direct supervision” of the Security\n 172\nCouncil.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the proposal to convene\nan immediate meeting of the Council to consider practical ways to demilitarize Sarajevo\nand introduce United Nations control had been put forward by his country, in view of the\nneed for the international community to take the most decisive action to put an end to the\nescalating violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. His delegation welcomed the agreement\nbetween the Bosnian Serbs and the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina on a cease-\nfire and on action towards ensuring that all sides either placed their heavy weapons in the\nSarajevo area under UNPROFOR control or withdrew them from the area. Such steps\nwould constitute major progress towards settling the conflict. The speaker noted,\nhowever, that as past cease-fires and agreements between the parties had often broken\ndown, it was of great importance that the Security Council “back up” its demands with a\n\n\n 172\n Ibid., pp. 36-41.\n\n\n 117\n"
[118] "strong decision supporting the Secretary-General’s request to NATO, encouraging\npositive progress in Sarajevo, and supporting the prompt conclusion of an agreement on:\nan effective cease-fire in and around Sarajevo; the withdrawal or placing under United\nNations control of heavy weapons; and ensuring strict compliance with the security\nrégime in the Sarajevo area, including protection for UNPROFOR personnel, in\n 173\naccordance with Security Council decisions.\n\n\n The representative of China believed that the fundamental solution to the conflict\nin Bosnia and Herzegovina would come in the form of a political settlement, which\ndepended on the parties themselves. Recalling that China had always advocated the\npeaceful settlement of conflict through dialogue and negotiation, he noted that his\ndelegation was opposed to the use or threat of force. He contended that the peace process\nwas at a crucial juncture and further military actions would not help achieve a political\nsettlement. Rather, such actions would entail negative consequences. His delegation’s\nunderstanding with regard to the use of air power in Bosnia and Herzegovina was that\nsuch actions should be limited to self-defence by UNPROFOR. The speaker also\nexpressed his country anxiety at the possible serious consequences of air strikes for the\nsafety of UNPROFOR and humanitarian personnel. It was therefore necessary to act\nprudently and refrain from taking hasty action. 174\n\n\n The representative of Germany welcomed the decision by the NATO Council,\nnoting that the decisions taken by the NATO Council and the Council of Europe were\npart of the political process towards a negotiated settlement. Only when a political\nsolution proved impossible was the use of force permitted to achieve the aims set out in\nSecurity Council resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993). The decision of the NATO\nCouncil was aimed at demilitarizing Sarajevo and placing it under United Nations\nadministration, through negotiations and in agreement with the European Union’s Action\nPlan. Germany had always supported the Bosnian Muslims in the search for a solution\nwhich secured the physical and political survival of the Muslims as a nation in their home\n\n 173\n Ibid., pp. 41-44.\n 174\n S/PV.3336 (Resumption 1), pp. 68-70.\n\n\n 118\n"
[119] "State of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That implied a satisfactory territorial solution,\nincluding access to the Sava River and to the sea. The speaker also argued that the city of\nMostar should be placed under the administration of the European Union and noted that\nGermany had offered to provide an administrator for that city. 175\n\n\n The representative of Malaysia sated that his Government had always maintained\nthat firmness of authority and commitment were necessary to make the Serbs respond\npositively or comply. It would appeal to the United States and other members of NATO\nthat the recourse to credible threat of force should not apply only to Sarajevo. His\nGovernment further opposed the idea of a United Nations administration in Sarajevo,\ncontending that Sarajevo was the political capital, symbol and heart of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina’s resistance against genocide and aggression. It was also of the view that the\nefforts so far had not taken fully into account the serious implications of the provisions of\nthe Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. That raised\nthe question again of whether the Council arms embargo on Bosnia and Herzegovina\nremained valid in the presence of evidence that maintaining the embargo favoured or\ncontributed to the commission of genocide. In such circumstances, resolution 713 (1991)\ncould not apply to Bosnia and Herzegovina, thus making the lifting of the arms embargo\nagainst Bosnia and Herzegovina the most pressing issue before the Council. The speaker\nalso noted that his Government had always maintained that the central authority and\nresponsibility for bringing about a comprehensive and honourable peace in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina lay with the Security Council and not with the efforts in Geneva, which\nMalaysia contended had deviated from the relevant Security Council resolutions.\nMalaysia therefore felt that it was time for the negotiations to be held directly under the\n 176\nauspices of the Council, in New York.\n\n\n The representative of Croatia believed that NATO’s decision to relieve the siege\nof Sarajevo was mandated by the Council’s existing resolutions. What was needed in\nBosnia and Herzegovina was a carefully balanced policy of a credible threat of force and\n\n 175\n Ibid., pp. 76-79.\n 176\n Ibid., pp. 79-85.\n\n\n 119\n"
[120] "straight forward support for the peace plans. Croatia had always advocated a peaceful,\npolitical settlement of the conflict. It had accepted the Vance plan for Croatia and it was\nnow advocating the European Union Action Plan for Croatia and for Bosnia.\nFurthermore, it was the view of the Croatian Government that the Council should also\ngive its unequivocal support to that plan. Stressing that the recent joint statement made by\nthe Foreign Minister of Croatia and the Prime Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a\nfurther step towards peace, the speaker noted that the statement had, inter alia, requested\ninternational control of the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with\nSecurity Council resolutions 787 (1992) and 838 (1993), and that it had called for a\ncease-fire agreement between the Bosnian Croat army and the Bosnian Muslim army\n 177\nwithin seven days.\n\n\n The representative of Egypt stated that the Council must take the following\nmeasures. First, it should implement previous resolutions such as those concerning a\ncease-fire and the use of international force, including air strikes. Secondly, it should\nexempt Bosnia and Herzegovina from the arms embargo, so that the Government of\nBosnia and Herzegovina could ensure its self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.\nThirdly, it was necessary to ensure that any settlement was peaceful and just. In that\nregard, the speaker stressed that the Council must exercise its prerogatives in order to\nbring about a peaceful resolution. The Council, in that regard, should examine existing\nsettlement plans to ensure that they were in accordance with the United Nations Charter,\nnorms of international law and Council resolutions. It must also directly oversee the\nnegotiations, because it was the body which determined the mandate of the Secretary-\nGeneral’s Special Representative. He stressed that the Special Representative must in no\ncircumstances deviate from the mandate given to him by the Council. He must also return\nto the Council and report to it and he must not make any amendments to the settlement\nplan contrary to Council’s resolutions without its prior authorization. The speaker noted\nthat it was time to change the mandate of the negotiations in Geneva, as well as the team\ncharged with those negotiations. Neighbouring States, States which had contributed to\n\n\n 177\n Ibid., pp. 85-90.\n\n\n 120\n"
[121] "United Nations forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and States members of the Islamic\ncontact group dealing with Bosnia and Herzegovina should be included in the\n 178\nnegotiations.\n\n\n The representative of Slovenia noted that many lessons could be draw from the\nefforts made so far for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The most important lesson was\nthat diplomacy could not produce good results without realistic and well-informed\nanalysis. Another major lesson was that diplomacy without strength was fruitless when\nconfronted with the forces of aggression. Noting that the efforts for peace had been\nevolving for two years, he stressed the need to develop an imaginative framework for\nthese efforts. In that context, the speaker recalled that his Government had recently\nformulated a four-point appeal containing the core elements of a framework to resolve\nthe situation. First, heavy weapons should be withdrawn from the vicinity of Sarajevo\nand other areas with a high concentration of civilians. Second, there should be unimpeded\ndelivery of humanitarian assistance to the civilian population. Third, private property\nshould be restored and places of worship safeguarded. Fourth, territories seized by force\n 179\nand “ethnic cleansing” should be returned without delay.\n\n\n Mr. Djokic stated that his country strongly opposed NATO’s decision to use air\nstrikes. That decision was politically and military unwise and could have serious\nconsequence on the ground. He further argued that it did not fall within the purview of\nthe relevant resolutions of the Security Council authorizing air strikes and that any\nattempt to carry out air strikes on the basis of that decision would represent a direct\ninvolvement in the civil war, on one side. He also contended that while the Muslim side\nhad rejected all peace projects, the Serbian Serbs had proved their readiness to accept a\nviable compromise by offering numerous concessions. Yugoslavia expected that, in the\nlight of that situation, the international community would made it clear to the Muslim\nside that it only stood to lose if it persisted with the war option. Instead, some influential\ncountries were ready to use force, thus jeopardizing the results of the negotiations\n\n 178\n Ibid., pp. 95-101.\n 179\n S/PV.3336 (Resumption 2), pp. 141-145.\n\n\n 121\n"
[122] "reached so far. The speaker concluded by stating that peace could not be achieved in\nBosnia and Herzegovina through “one-sided accusations” or “irrational demands” for the\nlifting of the arms embargo for one of the sides, nor through the escalation of military\nactivities. The only possible solution was a political one. 180\n\n\n While considering the NATO decision as another important element of\ninternational efforts aimed at resolving the Yugoslav crisis that under certain\ncircumstances could bring about positive results, the representative of Ukraine warned\nthat that decision could have negative consequences, such as bringing about new\nsuffering, jeopardizing the delivery of international humanitarian aid, and placing\nUNPROFOR personnel at risk of retaliatory strikes by the Serb forces. His delegation,\nhowever, did not rule out the possibility of using all necessary means, including force, to\naddress deliberate hostile acts against areas of deployment of United Nations contingents,\nwhere there was no other option to stop the killing of innocent people. Such a course of\naction should be undertaken only in the event of a clearly expressed decision by the\ninternational community, namely the Security Council, and not as a result of a decision\nby an individual State. The seriousness of the matter required that all relevant procedures\nbe employed, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, in order to reaffirm\nprevious Council resolutions regarding the complex situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nUkraine shared the view that a viable solution to the crisis might include a cease-fire,\nplacing heavy weapons under UNPROFOR control, the withdrawal of Serb units from\nSarajevo, and the takeover of their positions by UNPROFOR. The demilitarization of\nSarajevo and the introduction of United Nations administrative control in the city would\nstop the “senseless bloodshed” and serve as a starting-point for the achievement of lasting\npeace. Before concluding, the speaker stated that the time had come to address the\nquestion of the effectiveness of the economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia in the context of an overall settlement, with the aim of mitigating the adverse\n\n\n\n\n 180\n Ibid., pp. 194-199.\n\n\n 122\n"
[123] "consequences of the sanctions régime on the economies of third countries, in accordance\nwith Article 50 of the United Nations Charter. 181\n The representative of Greece noted that his Government had expressed\nreservations with regard to the advisability and the repercussions of eventual air strikes,\nand the ensuing escalation of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ultimate goal\nwas the restoration of peace in former Yugoslavia, and the consequences of such air\nstrikes ought to be evaluated very carefully. Greece was one of the countries that were\nclosest to the crisis area and as such, all its initiatives were geared towards the exhaustion\nof all possible means, rather than the resort to force. It could not become involved in\n 182\nmilitary activities and no other country in the region should.\n Mr. Ansay recalled that an extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the OIC Contact\nGroup on Bosnia and Herzegovina, held in Geneva on 17 January 1994, had stressed that,\nin order to have any success and legitimacy, the peace process must ensure the following:\nthe independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina; a\ngeographically and economically viable and defensible territory for Bosnia and\nHerzegovina; the return of all lands seized by force and “ethnic cleansing”; the retention\nby Bosnia and Herzegovina of access to the Sava river and the Adriatic Sea; the retention\nof Sarajevo as the undivided capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the return of refugees\nand displaced persons to their homes; and international guarantees for the implementation\nof a peace agreement and guarantees for future security. The OIC Ministers had also\ncalled for the reopening of the Tuzla airport, as well as the lifting of the siege against\nSarajevo. The speaker noted that the OIC saw the decision of the NATO Council as “a\nstep in the right direction”, but that it believed that the international community should\nalso pay attention to the security of the civilian population in all “safe areas”, and that it\nsupported the concept of declaring the city of Mostar a “safe area”. The OIC also\nbelieved that the International Tribunal should start functioning without further delay.\nReiterating the OIC’s full support for the right of Bosnia and Herzegovina to defend itself\nunder Article 51 of the Charter, the speaker called for the lifting of the arms embargo\nagainst Bosnia and Herzegovina. Referring to reports of the presence of regular troops of\n\n 181\n Ibid., pp. 199-203.\n 182\n Ibid., pp. 223-226 (resumption 3).\n\n\n 123\n"
[124] "the Serbian and Croatian armies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the speaker noted that the\nOIC was awaiting with keen interest the report by the Secretary-General regarding the\nfull withdrawal of Croatian army elements from Bosnia. If the Croats failed to comply\nwith the Council’s demand on that score, then stringent economic sanctions should be\n 183\nimposed on Croatia immediately.\n\n\n Most of the speakers 184 in the debate supported the use of air strikes by NATO to\ndeter further attacks against Sarajevo by Bosnian Serbs, and shared the view that the\ndecisions taken by NATO were consistent with resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993)\nand did not require further approval by the Security Council. A number of them,\nhowever, stressed that the use of force should always be an instrument of last resort. 185\nOthers advocated the extension of use of force to the other five safe areas. 186\n\n\n Some speakers supported the proposal to place Sarajevo under temporary United\n 187\nNations administration.\n\n\n Several speakers reiterated that Bosnia and Herzegovina should be allowed to\nexercise its right of self-defence and demanded that the Council lift the arms embargo\nagainst the Bosnian Government. 188\n\n\n 183\n Ibid., pp. 237-242.\n 184\n Ibid., Spain, pp.25-32; United Kingdom, pp. 22-25; New Zealand, pp. 44-49; Nigeria, pp. 49-54;\nArgentina, pp. 54-59; Oman, pp. 60-63; Czech Republic, pp. 64-67; S/PV. 3336 (Resumption 1): Rwanda, pp. 71-73 ;\nDjibouti, pp. 73-76; Austria, pp. 90-92; Norway, pp. 93-95; Afghanistan, pp. 102-106; Turkey, pp. 107-111; Sweden,\npp. 112-116; Italy, pp. 116-120; Iran, pp.120-124; Indonesia, pp. 129-133; Netherlands, pp. 133-136; Canada, pp. 136-\n139; Japan, pp.139-140; S/PV.3336 (Resumption 2): Algeria, pp. 146-148; Jordan, pp. 148-156; Tunisia, pp. 157-163;\nAlbania, pp. 164-167; Senegal, pp. 167-174; Colombia, pp. 174-177; Finland, pp.178-179; Belgium, pp. 179-181;\nSaudi Arabia, pp. 181-187; Sudan, pp. 187-190; Ireland, pp. 190-193; Portugal, pp. 204-207; Luxembourg, pp. 207-\n210; Denmark, pp. 210-211; S/PV. 3336 (Resumption 3): Morocco, pp. 213-216; Bangladesh, pp. 216-219; United\nArab Emirates, pp. 219-223; Kuwait, pp. 226-231; Estonia, pp. 232-235; Brunei Darussalam, pp. 235-236; Lithuania,\npp. 242-244.\n 185\n S/PV. 3336: New Zealand, pp. 44-49; Austria, pp. 90-92; Sweden, pp. 112-116; S/PV. 3336 (Resumption\n2): Finland, pp. 178-179.\n 186\n S/PV. 3336: Djibouti, pp.73-76; Iran, pp. 120-124; S/PV. 3336 (Resumption 2): Tunisia, pp. 157-163;\nSenegal, pp. 167-174; Saudi Arabia, pp. 181-187; S/PV. 3336 (Resumption 3): Morocco, pp. 213-216; Bangladesh,\npp.216-219; United Arab Emirates, pp. 219-223; Kuwait, pp. 226-231.\n 187\n S/PV. 3336: Argentina, pp. 54-59; S/PV. 3336 (Resumption 2): Portugal, pp. 204-207.\n 188\n S/PV.3336: Nigeria, pp. 49-54; Oman, pp. 60-63; S/PV.3336 (Resumption 1): Rwanda, pp. 71-73;\nAfghanistan, pp. 102-106; Turkey, pp. 107-111; Iran, pp. 120-124; Azerbaijan pp. 124-129; Indonesia, pp. 129-133;\n\n\n 124\n"
[125] " A number of speakers called for the perpetrators of war crimes and crimes against\nhumanity committed on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be brought before the\nInternational Tribunal on ex-Yugoslavia. 189\n\n\n Some speakers endorsed the proposal that the peace talks be relocated to New\nYork, in the proximity of the Security Council. 190\n\n\n Decision of 25 February 1994: letter from the President to the Secretary-General\n\n On 10 February 1994, pursuant to the statement 191 by the President dated 28\nOctober 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report192 on the massacre\nof the civilian population in Stupni Do, on 23 October 1993. The Secretary-General\nreported on the findings of the investigation carried out by UNPROFOR military police.\nTwenty-three victims so far had been clearly identified, with a further thirteen villagers\nunaccounted for and presumed dead. The main suspects for the crimes appeared to be\nextremist elements of the Croatian Defence Council (HVO). Investigations were\ncontinuing in order to gather as much evidence as possible, with a view to identifying the\nperpetrators for eventual trial before the International Tribunal.\n By a letter 193 dated 25 February 1994, the President of the Security Council\ninformed the Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n \"The members of the Security Council are grateful for your report of 10 February 1994\n on the massacre of the civilian population in Stupni Do, Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n\n\n\n\nS/PV.3336 (Resumption 2): Algeria, pp. 146-148; Jordan, pp. 148-156; Tunisia, pp. 157-153; Albania, pp. 164-167;\nSaudi Arabia, pp. 181-187; Sudan, pp. 187-190; S/PV.3336 (Resumption 3): United Arab Emirates, pp.219-223;\nKuwait, pp, 226-231; Estonia, pp. 232-235.\n 189\n S/PV.3336: Turkey, pp. 107-111; Azerbaijan, pp. 124-129; S/PV.3336 (Resumption 2): Jordan, pp. 148-\n156; S/PV.3336 (Resumption 3): United Arab Emirates, pp. 219-223; Kuwait, pp. 226-231.\n 190\n S/PV. 3336 (Resumption 2): Tunisia, pp. 157-163; S/PV. 3336 (Resumption 3): Kuwait, pp. 226-231.\n 191\n S/26661.\n 192\n S/1994/154.\n 193\n S/1994/217.\n\n\n 125\n"
[126] " \"The members of the Council are greatly disturbed by the findings of the investigation\n contained in your report and thus request you to transmit the report, as well as all information\n at the disposal of the Secretariat that may reveal serious violations of international\n humanitarian law committed in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia, to the Prosecutor of\n the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations\n of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia\n since 1991.\n \"The members of the Council welcome the fact that investigations are continuing in order\n to gain as much evidence as possible and would be grateful if they could be kept informed of\n the progress of the investigations.\"\n\n\n Decision of 4 March 1994 (3344th meeting): resolution 900 (1994)\n\n At its 3344th meeting, on 4 March 1994, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request,\nto participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President (France) then drew\nthe attention of the Council members to the text of a draft resolution 194 submitted by\nFrance, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States, and to\nseveral other documents. 195\n At the meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina noted that three\nrecent developments had created a sense of optimism. First, the NATO ultimatum to the\nBosnian Serbs had resulted in the cessation of the shelling of Sarajevo. Second, NATO\nplanes had recently confronted Serbian planes violating the no-fly zone over the airspace\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina. Third, there had been an agreement between Croatia, Bosnia\nand Herzegovina and Bosnian Croat elements establishing a confederation between\nCroatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as a federation within Bosnia and\nHerzegovina. The speaker felt that the draft resolution before the Council should aim for\n\n\n 194\n S/1994/224.\n 195\n S/1994/216, letter dated 24 February 1994 from the representative of Croatia addressed to the President\nof the Security Council; S/1994/221, letter dated 24 February 1994 from the representative of Indonesia addressed to\nthe Secretary-General; S/1994/249, letter dated 3 March 1994 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\naddressed to the President of the Security Council; and S/1994/255, letter dated 3 March 1994 from the representatives\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia addressed to the Secretary-General.\n\n\n 126\n"
[127] "the full implementation of resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) in regard to Sarajevo,\nthus resulting in the full withdrawal of Serb forces, the full lifting of the road blocks and\nthe restoration of essential services to the city and its population. He stressed that unless\nthe draft resolution was correctly implemented, Sarajevo would remain under siege.\nWhile the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina welcomed the assistance of all\nGovernments in trying to bring peace, it would not feel bound by agreements reached\nbetween forces occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina and members of the Security Council,\nunless such agreements were consistent with the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a\n 196\nMember of the United Nations and with its sovereignty and territorial integrity.\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of Pakistan, while welcoming the\nprogress that had resulted from the NATO ultimatum, expressed concern over the fact\nthat the Bosnian Serbs were persisting with the siege of Sarajevo and were refusing to\nremove all their heavy weaponry from certain locations around the city. He warned that\nthe international community should not become complacent, nor relent in its resolve to\nsecure the safety and security of the civilian population in all designated “safe areas” and\nother threatened towns and cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Turning to the draft\nresolution, the speaker noted that the draft resolution reflected the determination of the\ninternational community to secure the end of the siege of Sarajevo, including the\nrestoration of essential services and a return to normal life, in accordance with the\nobjectives set by the Council in resolution 824 (1993). It, however, could have been\nreinforced by a reference to the threat of air strikes, in the event that the aggressors were\nto resume bombardment of Sarajevo or to redeploy heavy weapons in the exclusion zone.\nThe speaker further noted that with the adoption of the draft resolution, the Council\nwould be setting in motion a process which could lead to the effective lifting of the siege\nof Sarajevo. It should also lead to a mechanism to secure the protection of other safe\n 197\nareas and threatened towns such as Maglaj, Mostar and Vitez.\n\n\n The representative of the Czech Republic stated that the draft resolution before\nthe Council was directed at capitalizing on the Sarajevo success. Several warning points,\n\n 196\n S/PV.3344, pp. 2-4.\n 197\n Ibid., pp. 4-5.\n\n\n 127\n"
[128] "however, had to be made in that context. First, the Security Council had declared as safe\nareas not just Sarajevo, nor the three cities mentioned in the preamble of the draft\nresolution, but six cities, including Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac. It was necessary to pay\nheed to seeing that earlier commitments made by the Council were met as well. Secondly,\nUNPROFOR was already stretched thin and it was important that its size be\ncommensurate to the tasks it was given by the Council. Thirdly, while the draft welcomed\nthe significant developments that had taken place in negotiations between Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, Croatia and the Bosnian Croats, there still remained the “vexing” question\nof the involvement of Croatian troops - the Hrvatsko Vijece Obrane - in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina. Those troops must leave, as the Council had demanded in its presidential\n 198\nstatement of the previous month.\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 900 (1994). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia\n and Herzegovina,\n Taking note of the positive developments in and around Sarajevo, which constitute only a\n first step towards the restoration of peace and security throughout the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina on the basis of a negotiated settlement between the parties, recalling the\n measures taken in and around Sarajevo under resolutions 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993 and 836\n (1993) of 4 June 1993, and welcoming the agreement between the Government of the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General\n for the Former Yugoslavia and between the Bosnian Serb party and the Special\n Representative of the Secretary-General on the cease-fire and measures related to heavy\n weapons in and around Sarajevo, reached on 9 February 1994,\n Emphasizing the crucial importance of achieving complete freedom of movement for the\n civilian population and humanitarian goods and of the restoration of normal life in Sarajevo,\n Determined to restore essential public services in Sarajevo,\n Welcoming, as part of the international effort to restore normal life to the city, the\n intention of the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland\n\n\n 198\n Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n\n\n 128\n"
[129] "and the United States of America, announced on 2 March 1994, to send immediately a joint\ncivil mission to Sarajevo to assess the requirements for the restoration of essential public\nservices, within the United Nations framework,\n Reaffirming in this context the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence\nof the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Reiterating the importance of maintaining Sarajevo, capital of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, as a united city and a multicultural, multi-ethnic and plurireligious centre,\n Welcoming the goal of achieving the prompt rotation of United Nations Protection Force\npersonnel in Srebrenica and the early reopening of the Tuzla airport,\n Mindful of the serious discussions which have taken place on the issue of Sarajevo, as\npart of an overall settlement, at the negotiations in the context of the International Conference\non the Former Yugoslavia,\n Deeply concerned by the deteriorating situation in Maglaj,\n Deeply concerned also by the situation of the civilian population in other parts of the\nterritory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in and around Mostar and\nVitez,\n Welcoming in this context the recent significant developments in peace negotiations\nbetween the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Croat\nparty and with the Government of the Republic of Croatia, as steps towards an overall\npolitical settlement, as well as negotiations involving the Bosnian Serb party,\n Bearing in mind the importance of facilitating the return of refugees and displaced\npersons to their homes,\n Stressing the importance it attaches to full compliance with international humanitarian\nlaw in all its aspects in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Recalling the provisions of its resolution 824 (1993) concerning safe areas, determining\nthat the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to constitute a threat\nto international peace and security, and in this context acting under Chapter VII of the\nCharter of the United Nations,\n 1. Calls for all parties to cooperate with the United Nations Protection Force in the\nconsolidation of the cease-fire in and around Sarajevo;\n 2. Calls upon all parties, with the assistance of the United Nations, to achieve complete\nfreedom of movement for the civilian population and humanitarian goods to, from and within\nSarajevo, to remove any hindrance to such freedom of movement, and to help restore normal\nlife to the city;\n\n\n 129\n"
[130] " 3. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, as a matter of urgency, for a limited period,\n a senior civilian official, who will act under the authority of the Special Representative of the\n Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia, to draw up an overall assessment and plan of\n action, in conjunction with the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and\n also in consultation with all relevant local authorities, for the restoration of essential public\n services in the various opstine of Sarajevo, other than the city of Pale; this official will be\n empowered to assist the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in\n close coordination with all relevant local authorities and the local representatives of the\n United Nations, to work to implement the plan;\n 4. Invites the Secretary-General to establish a voluntary trust fund, to be disbursed within\n the framework set out in paragraph 3 above, for the restoration of essential public services in\n Sarajevo to promote a return to normal life in the city, and encourages States and other\n donors to contribute thereto;\n 5. Requests the Secretary-General to present within one week of the adoption of the\n present resolution a report on ways and means for, including the estimated cost of, the\n implementation of the objectives set forth above;\n 6. Calls upon States and other donors to assist the Secretary-General, in particular by\n contributing personnel and equipment, in the implementation of the relevant Security Council\n resolutions concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 7. Further requests the Secretary-General to report within ten days of the adoption of the\n present resolution on the feasibility and modalities for the application of the protection,\n defined in resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993), to Maglaj, Mostar and Vitez, taking into\n account all developments both on the ground and in the negotiations between the parties;\n 8. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of China noted that the main purpose of\nthe resolution just adopted was to improve the humanitarian situation in Sarajevo and to\nrestore essential services. On the basis of humanitarian considerations, the Chinese\ndelegation had voted in favour. Reiterating the Chinese position that conflicts should be\nsettled by peaceful means, the speaker expressed his delegation’s reservations on the\nresolution’s invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter. China also maintained that the\nestablishment of safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina was only a temporary measure\nand not a fundamental solution. When considering additional safe areas, it would be\n\n\n 130\n"
[131] "necessary to conduct a serious review of whether the expected results had been achieved\nin the safe areas already established and whether, in existing circumstances, UNPROFOR\n 199\npossessed sufficient human and financial resources to perform additional tasks.\n\n\n The President, speaking in his capacity as representative of France, noted that the\nCouncil had adopted the resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter, as the other\nresolutions on Bosnia had been since August 1992. In the existing context, not to have\nresorted to Chapter VII would have been “the worst of signals”. Beyond that, the\napplication of Chapter VII, which did not imply an automatic resort to force, would give\nUNPROFOR the authority necessary to surmount obstacles that might complicate the\nexecution of its mandate. 200\n\n\n Decision of 14 March 1994 (3349th meeting): statement by the President\n\n On 11 March 1994, pursuant to resolution 900 (1994), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 201 on the feasibility of extending the safe area concept\nto the cities of Maglaj, Mostar and Vitez. The report also provided an outline of the major\nconcepts and requirements of UNPROFOR. The Secretary-General noted that the utility\nof extending the concept of safe areas to Mostar and Vitez must be considered in the\nlarger context of the overall situation on the ground. Had the conflict still been in\nprogress, the prospect of deterring attacks might have warranted such a step. With the\ncease-fire signed on 23 February between Bosnia and Croatia, new priorities commended\nthemselves. UNPROFOR did not believe there was, at that point, a need to apply the\nprotection defined in resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) to Mostar and Vitez. It,\nhowever, believed that there might be merit, in extending the safe area concept to Maglaj,\nin view of the continuing hostilities there. At the same time, it was clear that\nUNPROFOR would not be able to provide the protection concerned with its present\nresources. The Secretary-General observed in that regard that should the Council decide\n\n\n 199\n Ibid., p. 11.\n 200\n Ibid., pp. 14-15.\n 201\n S/1994/291.\n\n\n 131\n"
[132] "to declare Maglaj a safe area, an additional 1,500 troops would be required. In addition,\nimplementation of resolution 900 (1994) would require an increase of the authorized\nstrength of UNPROFOR by a total of 8,250 troops. He therefore recommended that the\nCouncil authorize such an increase in order to enable UNPROFOR to demilitarize\nSarajavo, restore normal live to the city and preserve peace in Central Bosnia.\n At its 3349th meeting, on 14 March 1994, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right\nto vote. The President (France) then drew the attention of the members of the Council to\n 202\nthe above report and to a letter dated 11 March 1994 from the representative of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina addressed to the Secretary-General. The President then stated that, after\nconsultations among members of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make\nthe following statement 203 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council remains gravely concerned at the continuing hostilities in the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It especially deplores the rapidly deteriorating situation\n in the Maglaj area and the threat it poses to the survival of the remaining civilian population.\n It notes that this intolerable situation has been perpetuated by the intensity of the nine-month\n siege of the town, for which the Bosnian Serb party is primarily responsible.\n \"The Council strongly condemns the indiscriminate shelling by the Bosnian Serb party of\n the civilian population of Maglaj, which has resulted in heavy casualties, loss of life and\n material destruction.\n \"The Council notes with particular concern reports of the recurrent obstruction and\n looting of humanitarian aid convoys destined for the civilian population of Maglaj, including\n the most recent incident which took place on 10 March 1994, in which six aid trucks were\n prevented from reaching the town. It is appalled that not one convoy has reached the town\n since 25 October 1993. The Council notes that the civilian population has been totally\n dependent on airdrops and commends those who have provided these vital missions. The\n Council demands that the Bosnian Serb party and the Bosnian Croat party allow forthwith\n and without conditions passage to all humanitarian convoys and the immediate evacuation of\n\n\n 202\n S/1994/293.\n 203\n S/PRST1994/11.\n\n\n 132\n"
[133] " those in need of urgent medical attention. The Council also demands that the siege of Maglaj\n be ended immediately.\n \"The Council welcomes the fact that United Nations Protection Force personnel have\n now obtained access to Maglaj. It demands that the Bosnian Serb party permit unimpeded\n and continuing access by the Force to Maglaj.\n \"The Council also condemns recent attacks against the personnel of the Force as well as\n of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian\n organizations. It reiterates its demands that all parties ensure the safety and security of the\n Force as well as all other United Nations personnel and those of non-governmental\n organizations and their unimpeded freedom of movement throughout the Republic of Bosnia\n and Herzegovina.\n \"The Council affirms its determination to maintain and build upon the recent positive\n developments towards peace in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in this context\n notes the importance of protecting Maglaj and its civilian population from further hostilities.\n It will consider the situation in Maglaj further in the context of its examination of the report\n of the Secretary-General pursuant to its resolution 900 (1994) of 4 March 1994.\"\n\n\n Decision of 6 April 1994 (3359th meeting): statement by the President\n\n By a letter 204 dated 2 April 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina transmitted a letter dated 1 April\n1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the\nPresident of the Security Council. In that letter, the Prime Minister reported that a new\nSerb offensive was under way against the besieged town of Gorazde, in defiance of\nrelevant Council resolutions, and particularly resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993),\naccording to which Gorazde had been designated a “safe area”. He requested that the\nSecurity Council convene an emergency session to determine why the mandate to “deter\nattacks against the safe area” given by resolution 836 (1993) had not been utilized to\nconfront those who had attacked the United Nations designated “safe area” of Gorazde.\n At its 3359th meeting, held on 6 April 1994 in response to the request contained in\nthe letter dated 2 April 1994 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the\n\n\n\n 204\n S/1994/378.\n\n\n 133\n"
[134] "Council included the above letter in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\nCouncil invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to\nparticipate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President (New Zealand) then\ndrew the attention of the members of the Council to several documents 205 and stated that,\nafter consultations among members of the Security Council, he had been authorized to\nmake the following statement 206 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council is deeply concerned at the continuing violence in the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly the attacks on the safe area of Gorazde and the recent\n acts of violence and terror, including reported acts of ethnic cleansing in Banja Luka and\n Prijedor.\n \"The Council takes note of the letter dated 1 April 1994 from the Minister for Foreign\n Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which he reported, inter alia, on the\n hostilities in the eastern parts of his country. The Council, taking note also of the assessment\n 207\n of the situation provided by the Secretariat and in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the report of\n the Secretary-General of 11 March and paragraphs 29 and 30 of his report of 16 March 1994,\n calls for an end to any provocative actions by whomsoever committed in and around the safe\n areas.\n \"The Council strongly condemns the shelling and infantry and artillery attacks by the\n besieging Bosnian Serb forces against the safe area of Gorazde in which many civilians have\n lost their lives and several hundreds have been wounded. The Council takes serious note of\n the continuing defiance of the relevant Council resolutions, in particular of resolutions 824\n (1993) of 6 May 1993 and 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993 related to the protection of safe areas.\n The Council demands the immediate cessation of any further attacks against the safe area of\n Gorazde and its population and calls upon those concerned to take all measures to ensure full\n\n\n\n\n 205\n S/1994/364, S/1994/382 and S/1994/386, letters dated 30 March and 4 April 1994 from the Deputy\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council; and S/1994/396 and\nS/1994/400, letters dated 5 and 6 April 1994 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the\nPresident of the Security Council.\n 206\n S/PRST/1994/14.\n 207\n The assessment revealed that the safe-area concept had had mixed results. While the presence of\nUNPROFOR in the safe areas had deterred major attacks, lowered casualties and improved basic humanitarian\nconditions, living conditions remained appalling. In addition, the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina had used the safe\nareas as location for its troops. If the concept was to be sustained, the term of “safe areas” needed to be redefined.\n\n\n 134\n"
[135] " respect for the status of the safe areas in accordance with the relevant provisions of resolution\n 824 (1993).\n \"The Council welcomes the measures being taken by the United Nations Protection Force\n to strengthen its presence in Gorazde, and the impending visit of the Force Commander for\n Bosnia and Herzegovina to assess the situation further. The Council calls upon the parties to\n ensure that troops of the Force have unimpeded access to the area in and around Gorazde and\n to assure the safety and security of those troops. The Council underlines the importance it\n attaches to ensuring the safety and security of the troops of the Force in and around Gorazde.\n \"The Council stresses the need to achieve normal conditions of life in Gorazde, including\n restoration of essential public services, with the assistance of the United Nations and with the\n cooperation of the parties.\n \"The Council deplores recent acts of violence and terror including ethnic cleansing,\n particularly in Prijedor and Banja Luka. It reaffirms that the International Tribunal was\n established under its resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 for the purpose of investigating\n crimes of this sort and trying persons accused of committing such crimes. The Council\n stresses the importance it attaches to full compliance with international humanitarian law in\n all its aspects throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n \"The Council calls upon all parties to join the negotiation process aimed at the peaceful\n resolution of the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and further calls for an\n immediate cease-fire, the cessation of hostilities and an exchange of all persons imprisoned as\n a result of the war. The Council welcomes the planned meeting between the military\n commanders in Sarajevo under the auspices of the Force.\n \"The Council affirms its determination to remain seized of the matter.\"\n\n\n Decision of 14 April 1994 (3364th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3364th meeting, on 14 April 1994, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (New Zealand) stated that,\nafter consultations among members of the Security Council, he had been authorized to\nmake the following statement 208 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n\n\n 208\n S/PRST/1994/19.\n\n\n 135\n"
[136] " \"The Security Council is deeply concerned at recent incidents in the Republic of Bosnia\n and Herzegovina affecting the safety and freedom of movement of United Nations Protection\n Force personnel as reported by the Secretariat. These incidents constitute clear violations of\n the Council's resolutions, which bind the parties. The Council condemns such incidents and\n warns those responsible of the serious consequences of their actions.\n \"The Council affirms its full support for the Force in its execution of the Council's\n relevant resolutions. It demands that all parties, in particular the Bosnian Serb party, allow\n the Force unimpeded freedom of movement and refrain from any further actions which could\n threaten the safety of Force personnel. It calls upon them to work closely with the Force, to\n cease all hostilities and to cooperate fully in efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution of the\n conflict throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n \"The Council will remain seized of the matter.\"\n\n\n Decision of 22 April 1994 (3367th meeting): resolution 913 (1994)\n\n At its 3367th meeting, on 21 and 22 April 1994, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the\nadoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives of Afghanistan, Albania,\nAlgeria, Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Egypt, Finland, Greece,\nHungary, Indonesia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Norway,\nPoland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovenia, the Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey and\nthe United Arab Emirates, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the\nright to vote. The Council also invited Ambassador Dragomir Djokic, at his request, to\naddress the Council in the course of its consideration of the item and it extended an\ninvitation to Mr. Engin Ahmet Ansay, Permanent Observer of the Organization of the\nIslamic Conference to the United Nations.\n The President (New Zealand) then drew the attention of the Council members to\nthe text of a draft resolution 209 submitted by France, the Russian Federation, Spain and\nthe United Kingdom, and to several other documents. 210\n\n\n 209\n S/1994/465.\n 210\n S/1994/400, 404, 412, 426, 451, 456 and 467, letters dated 6, 7, 9, 13, 15, 17 and 19 April 1994,\nrespectively, from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council;\nS/1994/407, letter dated 7 April 1994 from the representative of Iran addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1994/418\nand 449, letters dated 12 and 15 April 1994, respectively, from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia addressed to the\n\n\n 136\n"
[137] " At the meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina endorsed the letter\ndated 18 April 1994 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Secretary-\nGeneral of NATO, in which he requested the latter to authorize the launching of air\nstrikes against Serbian’s positions in and around the five other safe areas in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, as well as the draft resolution before the Council. He also welcomed\nPresident Clinton’s course of action with respect to NATO. The speaker noted, however,\nthat none of these steps addressed the following considerations. First, it was imperative\nthat the Council act immediately to respond to the “slaughter of innocents” in Gorazde.\nThose who had voted for the designation of Gorazde as a safe area could not avoid the\nburden they bore for the lives of the city’s residents. It was that designation and the\nCouncil’s commitment to it that had been offered in lieu of Bosnia right to self-defence.\nSecond, the Council could not continue to impede Bosnia right to self-defence unless it\nwas prepared to accept responsibility in full for the safety of the citizens of Bosnia. Third,\nthe precedent of Gorazde posed a danger to the peace process in Croatia as well as in\nBosnia and Herzegovina, and must be addressed directly. Lastly, Bosnia and Herzegovina\nwas fully prepared to take part in good faith negotiations. The speaker concluded by\nreminding Members of the United Nations that the Security Council and NATO already\npossessed the necessary authority to provide close air-to-ground support for humanitarian\n 211\nworkers and did not need new debates or authority.\n\n\n The representative of Croatia stated that, after two years of “unthinkable\nsuffering”, during which 150,000 innocent lives had been lost, the time had come to\nimpose peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A credible threat of resolute force combined\n\n\nSecretary-General; S/1994/443, letter dated 14 April1994 from the representative of the Russian Federation addressed\nto the Secretary-General; S/1994/450, letter dated 15 April 1994 from the Deputy representative of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1994/453, letter 15 April 1994 from the\nrepresentative of Turkey addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1994/457, letter dated 17 April 1994\nfrom the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1994/460, letter dated 18\nApril 1994 from the representative of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1994/466, letter\ndated 18 April 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1994/469, letter\ndated 18 April 1994 from the representatives of France, Spain and the United Kingdom addressed to the President of\nthe Security Council; S/1994/475, letter dated 20 April 1994 from the representative of India addressed to the\nSecretary-General; S/1994/478, letter dated 20 April 1994 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Malaysia addressed to the\nSecretary-General; S/1994/480, letter dated 21 April 1994 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\naddressed to the President of the Security Council; and S/1994/483, letter dated 21 April 1994 from the representative\nof Brunei Darussalam addressed to the President of the Security Council.\n 211\n S/PV.3367, pp. 3-5.\n\n\n 137\n"
[138] "with equally assertive diplomatic efforts should finally bring peace to the people of\nBosnia and Herzegovina. That was why Croatia supported President Clinton’s call that\nthe Sarajevo model of a clear ultimatum be extended to Gorazde and other safe areas in\nBosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia would also support the use of the Sarajevo ultimatum\nmodel in the implementation of the Security Council’s resolutions and the peace\nagreements for the occupied territories in Croatia. It would consider the extension of the\nexclusion zones for certain safe areas, such as Bihac and Tuzla, into the territory of\nCroatia. If the international community was not able to impose peace in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina by the resolute use of force and assertive diplomacy, then the Security\nCouncil would have to consider other ways to achieve the desired balance of power in the\nregion, including through allowing Bosnia and Herzegovina to exercise its right to defend\n 212\nitself under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.\n\n\n The representative of Turkey stated that Gorazde was a “test case” for the United\nNations commitments in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the role it would play in\nshaping the future of the international system. The lack of decisive action had sent the\nwrong signals to the aggressors. In order to be viable, the peace process must be backed\nby sufficient force to make the Serbs realize that more war would lead to “more pain than\ngain”. That would only be possible if the Government and people of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina were given the chance to exercise their right to self-defence. Arguing that\nthe arms embargo adopted by the Council in resolution 713 (1991) was in clear\ncontradiction of Article 51 of the Charter, the speaker urged the Council to clarify the\nlegal opinion that resolution 713 (1991) should not apply to Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nTurning to the safe areas, the speaker recalled that the concept of safe areas had been\nbased on the assumption that the resolutions establishing them would be implemented\neffectively and immediately. Regrettably, however, those areas had been almost\nabandoned by the United Nations. Emphasizing that resolutions 824 (1993) and 836\n(1993) provided a clear legal framework for the use of all necessary means, including air\nstrikes against the aggressors for the defence of the safe areas, the speaker welcomed the\n\n\n 212\n Ibid., pp. 5-7.\n\n\n 138\n"
[139] "letter from the Secretary-General to NATO and President Clinton’s announcement as\n“steps in the right direction”. Nevertheless, Turkey wanted to see “concrete action”. It\nalso welcomed the preambular paragraph of the draft resolution reaffirming the urgency\nof bringing the perpetrators of crimes against humanity before the International Tribunal\nestablished by resolution 827 (1993). He emphasized that what was needed was a quick\nprosecution process. Furthermore, Turkey had hoped that the draft resolution would\ncontain a reference to the need to tighten the diplomatic isolation and economic embargo\n 213\nimposed on “the aggressor”.\n\n\n The representative of Tunisia stated that the draft resolution should have indicated\nthe Council’s determination to use any means to put an end to the systematic violation of\nits resolutions by the Serb side. He argued that Article 51 of the Charter permitted resort\nto Article 42 of Chapter VII as the provisions of Article 41, which had been the only\nprovisions invoked during the two years since the Council first passed a resolution on the\nmatter, had not achieved the desired results. If the Council was not prepared, however, to\nfollow the sequence of the various provisions in Chapter VII, then it should redefine the\napplicability of resolution 713 (1991) in respect of the Bosnian side. Referring to the safe\nareas, the speaker welcomed the movement towards applying the “Sarajevo model” to the\nother safe areas. He noted, however, that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was\nnot confined to a few zones defined by the Security Council, and he urged the Council to\ndeclare the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be a safe area and to clarify that the\nacquisition of any portion of that territory was “null and void”. Before concluding, the\nspeaker stated that Bosnia and Herzegovina was an integral part of the international\ncommunity and that the States Member of the United Nations had only agreed, in the\nCharter, to delegate a portion of their responsibilities with respect to the maintenance of\ninternational peace and security on the understanding that the Council would be “the\n 214\ninstrument of legality and right”.\n\n\n\n\n 213\n Ibid., pp. 7-9.\n 214\n Ibid., pp. 9-11.\n\n\n 139\n"
[140] " Noting that the international community, the United Nations and the Security\nCouncil had exerted great efforts over the preceding two years to resolve the crisis, Mr.\nDjokic contended that those efforts had not sought a comprehensive solution taking\naccount of the vital interests of the three constituent peoples on the basis of equality.\nRather, support and legitimacy had effectively been given to one side only - the Bosnian\nMuslims. At the same time, only the Bosnian Serbs and the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia had been confronted with “harsh sanctions”. The speaker contended that there\nwould not be and could not be peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina if the pressure was put\nonly on one side – the Serb side – demanding that only it make concessions whereas the\nMuslim sides enjoyed massive political and military support to advance the military\noption. He stated that calls for lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslim side,\nand for offensive air strikes to be carried out against the Bosnian Serbs could only lead to\nan escalation of the conflict. The speaker warned that, if those calls were acted upon, the\nUnited Nations would become fully engaged on one side in the civil war. What was most\nimportant was that the Security Council gave full support to an urgent, unconditional\ncessation of hostilities and to a comprehensive cease-fire, which could be reached only\n 215\nthrough negotiations on the basis of equality, thus implying the lifting of sanctions.\n\n\n Mr. Ansay indicated that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member\ncountries of the OIC Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina would hold an\nextraordinary ministerial meeting in New York in the following days, aiming to secure all\nnecessary measures to be taken by the United Nations to protect the safe areas.\nMeanwhile, the OIC urged the Council to take effective steps to enforce the observance\nof its resolutions relating to the protection of the safe areas, and in particular Gorazde,\nand to authorize strong retaliatory action, including NATO air strikes, against the Serbian\naggressor, to prevent the continuation of massacres and genocide in Gorazde and the\nspread of conflict to other areas. The Council should also restore without delay the right\nof individual and collective self-defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The OIC believed\n\n\n\n\n 215\n Ibid., pp. 11-13.\n\n\n 140\n"
[141] "that any decision precluding Bosnia and Herzegovina from exercising that right was\nunconstitutional. The only entity that should be bound by the embargo was the Serbian\naggressor. The European Union, NATO and the international community as a whole must\ntake urgent steps to restore the status quo ante in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to\ndemonstrate that they were prepared to stand up in defence of international law and\nmorality by all necessary means at their disposal to stop aggression and atrocities. The\nOIC also believed that for the sake of international justice and the prevention of more\nacts of genocide and other crimes against humanity, the International Tribunal should\n 216\nstart functioning without delay.\n\n\n The representative of Slovenia said that his delegation joined those who had\nexpressed support for the Secretary-General’s recent appeal to NATO to provide the\nnecessary protection of the safe areas. It also supported the approach proposed by\nPresident Clinton, agreeing that it was time for vigorous action and tightened sanctions.\nMoreover, Slovenia felt that equal resolve should be shown in matters concerning State\nsuccession and other issues resulting from the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. The\nUnited Nations should definitively terminate the membership of the former Yugoslavia in\norder to improve the conditions for a real and durable peace. Referring to the issue of the\narms embargo, the speaker stated that it was important to recognize that the embargo had\nbeen extended on the former Yugoslavia and its successor States in a specific situation in\n1992. It was therefore time for a decision that took into account the new realities and\ndifferent situations of each of the successor States. There were reasons for keeping the\narms embargo as a part of the sanctions against the main successor State of the former\nYugoslavia, against which sanctions were imposed, however, there was a need to\nreconsider the merits of applying the embargo against those engaged in legitimate self-\ndefence, which was an inherent right of all United Nations Members. Finally, in the case\nof Slovenia, there was no justification for maintaining the embargo, as Slovenia was not\n 217\ninvolved in the armed conflicts which had prompted the adoption of that measure.\n\n\n\n 216\n Ibid., pp. 25-26.\n 217\n Ibid., pp. 35-36.\n\n\n 141\n"
[142] " The representative of Bulgaria noted that, as his country was in close proximity to\nthe conflict, it had always insisted on firm judgement and energetic steps on the part of\nthe United Nations to contain and end the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bulgaria had a\nkey role to play in implementing the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and, being\nfully aware of its responsibilities, it was adhering strictly to the relevant resolutions, at\ngreat economic sacrifice. It was Bulgaria’s expectation that its difficulties would be kept\n 218\nin mind and taken into account.\n\n\n Other speakers also welcomed the request of the Secretary-General to NATO to\n 219\nauthorize air strikes to protect Gorazde, while some reiterated their support for the\nlifting of the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina. 220\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of Pakistan stated that his delegation\nhad expected the draft resolution to include a reference to the review of the applicability\nof resolution 713 (1991). Regrettably, its inclusion had not been acceptable to some\nmembers of the Council. His delegation support for the draft had therefore been diluted\nby that omission. Pakistan was also concerned that the draft resolution did not address the\nissue of an increase in troop levels. Therefore, while his delegation would reserve the\nright to introduce another draft resolution calling for the lifting of the arms embargo\nagainst Bosnia and Herzegovina, it would nevertheless support the draft resolution. 221\n\n\n The representative of the United States observed that the civilians of Gorazde\nwere being subjected to murderous attacks by the Bosnian Serbs on a daily basis. These\nattacks were an outrage to the conscience of the Council and an affront to international\nlaw. Noting that President Clinton had outlined the position of her Government in that\nregard, she indicated that her delegation was consulting with other members of the\n\n\n 218\n Ibid., pp. 38-39.\n 219\n Ibid., Hungary, pp. 17-18; Senegal, pp. 20-21; Indonesia, pp. 21-22; United Arab Emirates, pp. 27-28;\nMalaysia, pp. 29-31; Norway, p.31; Austria, pp. 31-32; Poland, pp. 36-37.\n 220\n Ibid., Afghanistan, pp. 18-20; Senegal, pp. 20-21; Indonesia, pp. 21-22; Jordan, pp. 22-24; United Arab\nEmirates, pp. 27-28; Malaysia, pp. 29-31; Iran, pp. 33-34; Qatar, pp. 37-38; Sudan, pp. 39-41.\n 221\n Ibid., pp. 43-45.\n\n\n 142\n"
[143] "Council on measures to provide more adequate protection to the safe areas, in keeping\nwith Council resolutions, and it had proposed the extension of the approach used around\nSarajevo to other safe areas. The United States would also work with other members of\nthe Council to tighten enforcement of the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and it\nwould continue to support UNPROFOR, which genuinely needed increased manpower. It\nwould also continue to support fully the International Tribunal. The speaker further\nindicated that the United States Senate had debated a resolution calling for the United\nStates to lift the arms embargo unilaterally. So far, the United States had resisted a\nunilateral approach, because it believed in the sanctity of the sanctions imposed by the\nUnited Nations. Nevertheless, Council members should understand that the Government\nof the United States supported changing resolution 713 (1991) so that the victims of\n 222\naggression might finally be permitted to defend themselves.\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and adopted unanimously as\nresolution 913 (1994), which reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia\n and Herzegovina, and reaffirming in this context its resolution 908 (1994) of 31 March 1994,\n Recalling also the statement by the President of the Security Council of 6 April 1994\n relating to the situation in the safe area of Gorazde,\n Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the responsibility of the Security Council in this\n regard,\n Deeply concerned by the ongoing hostilities in and around Gorazde, as well as by the\n consequences for the situation in other areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and\n on the negotiation process aimed at an overall political settlement,\n Condemning in the strongest possible terms the Bosnian Serb forces for their continued\n offensive against the safe area of Gorazde, which has resulted in the death of numerous\n civilians and tremendous human suffering,\n\n\n\n 222\n Ibid., pp. 49-50.\n\n\n 143\n"
[144] " Condemning all attacks against civilian populations and humanitarian relief workers, and\nreiterating that any persons committing violations of international humanitarian law will be\nheld individually responsible,\n Condemning also the Bosnian Serb party for its failure to negotiate in good faith and to\nuphold its commitments made to the representatives of the United Nations and the The\nRussian Federation n Federation in respect of cease-fire arrangements in and around Gorazde,\n Sharing the concern expressed by the Secretary-General in his reports of 11 March and\n16 March 1994, and taking note of the recommendations of the Secretary-General concerning\nthe definition and implementation of the concept of safe areas,\n Determined to contribute to the immediate establishment of a lasting cease-fire in\nGorazde as well as throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nthrough negotiations between the parties, and to ensure its respect,\n Reaffirming the mandate conferred on the United Nations Protection Force by its\nresolutions 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993, 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, 844 (1993) of 18 June\n1993 and 908 (1994), and emphasizing that the Force will continue to make full use of this\nmandate as and when needed in execution of the relevant resolutions of the Council,\n Praising the untiring and courageous action of the personnel of the Force and of other\nUnited Nations agencies in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Condemning the harassment and the detention of Force personnel by the Bosnian Serb\nforces and all obstacles to the freedom of movement of the Force,\n Paying tribute to the enlargement of diplomatic efforts towards the conclusion of an\noverall political settlement, welcoming in this context the ongoing international efforts by\nrepresentatives of the United Nations, the European Union, the United States of America and\nthe The Russian Federation n Federation, and determined to strengthen and coordinate these\ninternational efforts in order to bring together the current diplomatic initiatives with the aim\nof securing the participation of all the parties concerned in an overall political settlement,\n Determining that the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to\nconstitute a threat to international peace and security, reiterating its determination to ensure\nthe security of the Force and its freedom of movement in all its missions, and to these ends\nacting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n A\n 1. Demands the immediate conclusion by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina and the Bosnian Serb party of a cease-fire agreement, under the auspices of the\nUnited Nations Protection Force, in Gorazde and throughout the territory of the Republic of\n\n\n 144\n"
[145] " Bosnia and Herzegovina, leading to an agreement on cessation of hostilities, and demands\n that all parties comply strictly with such agreements;\n 2. Invites the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to ensure that the Force is\n able, within the limits of its available resources, to monitor the situation in Gorazde and\n respect of any cease-fire and disengagement of the military forces in Gorazde, including any\n measure to put heavy weapons of the parties under United Nations control;\n 3. Condemns the shelling and attacks by the Bosnian Serb forces against the safe area of\n Gorazde as defined in resolution 824 (1993), and demands the withdrawal of these forces and\n their weapons to a distance to be agreed by the Force wherefrom they cease to constitute a\n threat to the status of Gorazde as a safe area;\n B\n 4. Calls for an end to any provocative action by whomsoever committed in and around\n the safe areas;\n 5. Demands the immediate release of all United Nations personnel still held by the\n Bosnian Serb forces;\n 6. Also demands unimpeded freedom of movement for the Force in the fulfilment of all\n its tasks and the removal of all obstacles to such freedom of movement;\n 7. Confirms the decision in resolution 908 (1994) to take action by 30 April 1994 at the\n latest on the further troop requirements recommended by the Secretary-General;\n C\n 8. Underlines the urgent need to intensify the efforts towards an overall political\n settlement agreed by all parties in the Former Yugoslavia, in particular in the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 9. Calls for the intensification of the efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement with\n coordination and close consultation between the representatives of the United States of\n America and the Russian Federation and those of the United Nations and the European\n Union, with the aim of bringing together current diplomatic initiatives;\n D\n 10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter, and stands ready promptly to\n consider taking further measures as required.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of France stated that firm pressure on\nthe Bosnian Serbs was indispensable. The resolution just adopted provided an appropriate\nresponse in that respect, by calling for the immediate conclusion of a cease-fire\n\n 145\n"
[146] "agreement and the withdrawal of Serb forces to a distance that would guarantee the\nsecurity of Gorazde. These demands would be more rapidly implemented and the\nprotection of the safe areas ensured when there was a credible prospect for military action\nagainst those responsible for the attacks upon the safe areas. France supported the\nSecretary-General’s request that NATO authorize air strikes, as well as the proposals by\nthe United States Government to expand the use of air action to protect the safe areas in\nBosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to these initiatives, diplomatic efforts should be\nresumed in order to achieve a political settlement and should revolve around a common\nposition between the various protagonists participating in the quest for a settlement - the\nUnited States, the Russian Federation, the European Union and the United Nations. Such\na common position should be based upon the major principles of the European Union\nplan, including, inter alia, programming the progressive suspension and lifting the\n 223\nsanctions at the appropriate time.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the resolution just\nadopted was an important, unanimous step in response to the alarming situation around\nGorazde and in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole. The leadership of the Bosnian Serbs\nshould comply with its obligations, cease attacks, withdraw their forces from Gorazde\nand allow the entry of the United Nations into that city. At the same time, acts of\nprovocation in and around Gorazde should be halted. That demand in the resolution was\naddressed to all sides. In that context, it was important that the resolution adopted shared\nthe concern expressed by the Secretary-General in his reports of 10 and 16 March,\nregarding the misuse of the safe areas, and took note of his recommendations concerning\nthe definition and implementation of the concept of safe areas. In order to steer the\nconflict towards peaceful settlement, resolute and determined steps were needed. At the\nsame time, however, the Russian Federation called for restraint and caution, because the\nlogic of increasing air strikes contained an inherent danger of escalation. It also\nemphasized that the idea of lifting the arms embargo in an area of conflict ran counter to\nthe idea of the speedy attainment of peace and could only “fan the flames” of the conflict.\n\n\n 223\n Ibid., pp. 50-51.\n\n\n 146\n"
[147] "Referring to a recent initiative by President Yeltsin to hold a high-level meeting between\nhis country, the United States, the EU and the United Nations, the speaker stated that the\ntime was ripe for those parties to work together towards a political solution to the\nBosnian problem, and to put it before the belligerent parties, so that they were absolutely\nclear that it was essential to negotiate. At the same time, the Serbian side should\nunderstand that each step towards a complete cessation of hostilities would be\n 224\naccompanied by a corresponding lifting of the sanctions.\n\n\n The representative of Brazil stated that his delegation was in full agreement with\nthe main objectives of the resolution just adopted. It had been the consistent position of\nthe Brazilian Government that the use of force must be a last resort, to be employed only\nunder well-defined circumstances and in strict compliance with relevant Security Council\nresolutions. As a corollary to that principle, the Council should direct its actions to\nfacilitating the achievement of an overall negotiated settlement. Brazil therefore\nwelcomed endeavours to bring together the various existing diplomatic initiatives.\nReferring to UNPROFOR, the speaker stated that Brazil believed that the Force must be\nprovided with the necessary means and “humanpower” to carry out its mandate.\nNevertheless, should circumstances so require, the Council must be prepared to review all\n 225\naspects of the United Nations presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n\n\n The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the resolution just adopted\nwas clear-cut in its condemnation of the way in which the Bosnian Serbs had continued\nto shell Gorazde, while giving undertakings to the United Nations and others about cease-\nfires. Noting that UNPROFOR had been given a “multiplicity” of roles in Bosnia, the\nspeaker urged that the Force must be given the troops to do its job without delay.\nObserving that a negotiated settlement remained the only path to a lasting peace, he\nstated that the latest actions of the Serbs had only served to underline the case for\ntightening the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As the Council had\nmade clear, the road to lifting the sanctions would first require the negotiation and\n\n 224\n Ibid., pp. 52-53.\n 225\n Ibid., pp. 53-54.\n\n\n 147\n"
[148] "implementation of a just overall settlement of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia.\nReferring to the Secretary-General’s request to NATO, the speaker noted that his\nGovernment was participating actively in NATO’s consultations regarding the next step.\nThe Serbs would be well-advised to withdraw, respect the resolution just adopted and\nseek in good faith a peace settlement which could secure the interests of all communities\n 226\nin Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n\n\n The representative of China stated that there were no alternatives to settling the\nconflict through peaceful negotiation. China supported the efforts to strengthen and\ncoordinate the various political and diplomatic initiatives, and had therefore voted in\nfavour of the resolution just adopted. The speaker reiterated, however, that China\nopposed the use or threat of force, as well as any attempt to stop war by expanding its\nscope. Any escalation of military conflict could only lead to further military\nconfrontation and intensified conflict, thus making more remote any chance of political\nsettlement. China continued to have reservations on the invocation of Chapter VII for\nmandatory actions and the implied possible military actions in the resolution. 227\n\n\n\n\nConsideration of the item at the 3370th meeting (27 April 1994)\n\n By a letter 228 dated 22 April 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of Pakistan, in his capacity as the Chairman of the Islamic\nConference of Foreign Ministers, requested that a formal meeting of the Security Council\non the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina be scheduled for 27 April 1994. The request\nwas being made to facilitate a debate on the deteriorating situation in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina.\n At its 3370th meeting, held on 27 April 1994 in response to the request contained\nin the above letter, the Council included the letter in its agenda. Following the adoption\n\n\n 226\n Ibid., pp. 54-55.\n 227\n Ibid., pp. 55.\n 228\n S/1994/492.\n\n\n 148\n"
[149] "of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives of Albania, Azerbaijan,\nBangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran,\nMalaysia, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia and Turkey, at their\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The Council also invited\nAmbassador Dragomir Djokic, at his request, to address it in the course of the subsequent\ndiscussion and it extended an invitation to Mr. Hamid Algabid, the Secretary-General of\nthe Islamic Conference.\n\n\n At the meeting, the representative of Pakistan stated that the Council should use\nits authority to persuade the Bosnian Serbs to accept the agreement signed between the\nBosnian Government and the Croats on the creation of a federation. He contended that a\nnew political process, which should secure the full participation of the Islamic countries\nand enjoy the support of the Council, could create a momentum towards a comprehensive\npeace agreement. The speaker further indicated that at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers\nof the Islamic Conference Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina, that had taken\nplace that same day, the Ministers had declared, inter alia, that resolution 713 (1991) did\nnot apply to Bosnia and Herzegovina and that the arms embargo against the Bosnian\nGovernment was “unjust, illegal and in direct contradiction of Article 51 of the United\nNations Charter”. The Ministers had also demanded the withdrawal of Serbian heavy\nweapons from Gorazde, and had called for the strengthening of UNPROFOR.\nFurthermore, Islamic Conference Ambassadors in New York had been mandated to\npursue the objectives of the declaration, in particular with respect to the modification of\nresolution 713 (1991) to enable the Bosnian Government to exercise its right to self-\ndefence. Pakistan would propose, on behalf of the OIC, that the Council adopt a\nresolution declaring that the provisions of resolution 713 (1991) did not apply to Bosnia\nand Herzegovina. If these efforts were to fail, an urgent session of the General Assembly\n 229\nwould be sought, in order to seek “peace with justice” in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n\n\n\n\n 229\n S/PV.3370, pp. 2-5.\n\n\n 149\n"
[150] " The representative of Turkey noted that his delegation had tried several times to\nconvince the Security Council to set a time-limit for the Serbian side to comply with its\nresolutions. It had also underlined that the aggressors should be warned very clearly that\nif they failed to comply they would face the consequences. It was such convictions that\nhad prompted Turkey to actively participate in the formulation of the NATO’s decisions.\nThe speaker pointed out that the option of air strikes had been favoured by his\nGovernment since 1992. Turkey had also defended the view that it should be applicable\nnot only to Sarajevo but to all six United Nations safe areas. The speaker argued that had\nthat proposal been accepted on time, it would have spared many lives in Gorazde. He\nfurther contended that while the accountability of the perpetrators of war crimes\nconstituted one of the main pillars of credible deterrence against aggression, nothing was\nmore important for deterrence, however, than letting the Bosnians acquire the means to\nexercise their inherent right to defend themselves. Turkey would continue to insist that\nthe Council clarify the legal opinion that its resolution 713 (1991) did not and should not\napply to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Noting that the Council had reaffirmed in all relevant\nresolutions the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and\nrejected the acquisition of territory through the use of force and the practice of “ethnic\ncleansing”, the speaker stated that the time had come for the Council to put these\nprinciples into practice. Furthermore, the diplomatic isolation and economic embargo\nimposed on the FRY should be tightened. Welcoming the calls for the convening of a\nhigh – level meeting on Bosnia, Turkey expected the Member States of the OIC Contact\n 230\nGroup on Bosnia to be invited to take part to such a meeting.\n\n\n The representative of Egypt welcomed the decision by NATO, as a regional\norganization under Chapter VIII of the Charter, to carry out air strikes against Serb\nmilitary positions from which attacks had been launched. His delegation was also\nconsidering with interest the idea of holding a new international conference. If such a\nconference were to proceed, it would need to address a number of points. First, the terms\nof reference must be in conformity with the Charter and international law and should\n\n\n 230\n Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n\n\n 150\n"
[151] "include the non-acquisition of territory by force. Second, any proposed peace settlement\nmust be in accordance with the Charter and the resolutions of the Council. Third, the\nconference should concentrate on settling the problem of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nFourth, the international community must ensure that the plan was put into effect through\nbinding international measures. Finally, the International Tribunal must be provided with\nthe necessary resources to undertake its responsibilities. The speaker further stated that\nthe Council must take charge and decide on a set of measures, including lifting the arms\nembargo. Otherwise, the only alternative would be to have recourse to a special\nemergency session of the General Assembly to take a decision on that important issue.\nQuoting Article 51 of the Charter, he argued that the provision implied that no\ninternational body or authority, including the Council itself, should undermine the natural\nor inherent right of all States to self-defence. Furthermore, the right to self-defence\napplied and was applied, as provided by Article 51, “until the Council had taken\nmeasures necessary to maintain international peace and security”. Obviously, all\nresolutions adopted by the Council in that regard over the past two years were far from\nadequate to preserve international security since fighting and acts of aggression had\ncontinued. Therefore, the Council could not use these resolutions as a pretext for not\nlifting the embargo. Lastly, by placing the aggressor and the victim on an equal footing,\nthe Council had contravened the provisions of the Charter. Stressing that the legality of\nthe measures taken by the Council depended on the degree to which they conformed to\nthe provisions of the Charter and referring to Article 103 of the Charter, the speaker\ncontended that Council’s decisions did not prevail over the Charter. The speaker hoped\nthat the Council would shoulder its responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of\nthe Charter, adopt a resolution to support Bosnia and Herzegovina, and decide to lift the\n 231\narms embargo in order to enable it to exercise its legitimate right to self-defence.\n\n\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina called for a decisive approach by\nthe United Nations towards his country pointing out that the recent ultimatum issued by\nNATO and the United Nations was an example of what could be achieved when the\n\n\n 231\n Ibid., pp. 17-20.\n\n\n 151\n"
[152] "international community showed resolve and will for action. The speaker stressed a\nnumber of points. Firstly, the Serbs should withdraw from the safe areas and their\nsurroundings and their heavy weapons should be removed and returned to Serbia. The\narms embargo should be lifted and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s right to self-defence under\nArticle 51 of the Charter restored. Secondly, a process of neutralization of weaponry\nmust be workout. Thirdly, the peace process must be based on respect for the sovereignty\nand territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the return of territories seized by\nforce. Fourthly, the United Nations had an obligation to ensure that resolution 913\n(1994), which called for the withdrawal of Serbian forces from the safe area of Goradze,\nwas implemented based upon resolution 824 (1993), by which Goradze was declared a\nsafe area. It must also ensure that the boundaries of the safe area existing prior to the\nSerbian offensive were restored pending the final outcome of the negotiations. Lastly, the\nnewly formed Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina should include a representative\n 232\nof the OIC.\n\n\n The representative of Greece, speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU),\nnoted that the EU had called for an intensified diplomatic effort by the international\ncommunity, involving the United Nations, the EU, the United States and the Russian\nFederation, to ensure the convergence of their initiatives. Particularly at that critical\njuncture, the goal was to establish conditions which would lead to a comprehensive\ncessation of hostilities and a peace settlement. It was now more important than ever that\nthe parties engaged in meaningful negotiations. The speaker further stated that the EU\nAction Plan provided the only appropriate basis for a negotiated settlement and a lasting\npeace. Referring to UNPROFOR, he urged that the Force should be provided with the\nnecessary means to carry out its mandate without which any progress in the peace process\nwould be meaningless. In that regard, the adoption of resolution 914 (1994) that day on\nthe strengthening of UNPROFOR was welcomed. 233\n\n\n\n\n 232\n Ibid., pp. 22-23.\n 233\n Ibid., pp. 23-24.\n\n\n 152\n"
[153] " The representative of the Russian Federation noted that the normalization of the\nsituation around Gorazde and the fulfilment by the Bosnian Serb party of its obligations\nwere creating positive opportunities for a swift settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He\nfurther noted that the initiative of his President for holding a summit meeting between the\nRussian Federation, the United States, the EU and the United Nations was aimed at\nachieving such a settlement. The most important point was that military measures should\nnot overshadow the political settlement. The Russian Federation expected that the\nBosnian parties and the Russian Federation’s partners would join in that process and\nconcentrate their efforts on the following. First, the system of safe areas should be\nstrengthened in accordance with Council resolutions. Second, the Serbs and the Muslims\nshould sign an unconditional agreement as soon as possible on a halt to all hostilities.\nThird, there should be a comprehensive political settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina,\ntaking into account the legitimate interests and equal status of all inhabitants of that\nterritory. Lastly, progress in restoring peace to Bosnia and Herzegovina should be\naccompanied by an appropriate easing of sanctions against the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia. Referring to the arms embargo, the speaker argued that the demands for the\nembargo to be lifted ran counter to efforts aimed at political settlement and could only\nlead to an escalation of the war. He further noted that his delegation had repeatedly drawn\nattention to the ideas expressed by the Secretary-General with respect to the need for a\nrevision of the concept of safe areas, whose status was frequently abused. In that\nconnection, his delegation believed that the United Nations forces, together with the\nparties concerned, should be entrusted with the task of defining a system and borders for\neach of the safe areas. It was important that United Nations forces be deployed in the safe\nareas. An important condition for respecting the status of the safe areas was their\ndemilitarization. Heavy weapons must be placed under control and unimpeded\nhumanitarian assistance to the safe areas must be guaranteed. The Russian Federation felt\nthat it was particularly important for the Council to begin work and shoulder its\n 234\nresponsibility for determining the system of safe areas.\n\n\n\n\n 234\n Ibid., pp. 25-27.\n\n\n 153\n"
[154] " Mr. Djokic stated that in that critical phase, it was imperative that the\ninternational community and the Council did everything in their power to facilitate a\nnegotiated settlement of peace. All efforts must be concerted to establish a\ncomprehensive cease-fire throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only the urgent and\nunconditional cessation of all hostilities, without prejudice to the final political solution,\ncould pave the way for the resumption of the peace process. For its part, the leadership of\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had throughout the conflict invested efforts towards\nfinding a peaceful solution and influencing the Bosnian Serbs to make compromises. The\nFormer Republic of Yugoslavia welcomed the recent renewed efforts directed towards\nthe resumption of the peace process and the active participation of the United Nations,\nthe European Union, the Russian Federation and the United States in that regard. The\nactivities of the newly created Contact Group could be a step in the right direction. The\nFormer Republic of Yugoslavia, however, was concerned by the reservations of some\ncountries regarding the initiatives for resolving the conflict by peaceful means and the\npersistence of threats and punitive measures. The speaker further argued that the complex\nnature of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina made it necessary that no former\noccupying Power of the territories of the former Yugoslavia or any neighbouring States\nshould be involved in peacekeeping activities. In that regard, the decision to send Turkish\ntroops to Bosnia and Herzegovina was not only against the interest of easing the situation\n 235\nin the region, but could also have a direct bearing on the escalation of the conflict.\n\n\n The representative of Croatia noted that the presence of so many high\nrepresentatives of the Governments in the debate indicated on the one hand the urgency\nof the situation in the region and, on the other hand, gave hope that their commitment\nwould bring that crisis to a fair conclusion. In that regard, Croatia emphasized the\nimportance of the views of the OIC in the peace process. That was why it had called for\nthe inclusion of a high-ranking representative of the OIC in the process of finding a\npolitical solution to the conflict. International mediation could, however, have its limits.\nThe international community had been unable to find the appropriate balance of power to\n\n\n 235\n Ibid., pp. 32-33.\n\n\n 154\n"
[155] "match its attempts at political mediation. As long as this imbalance continued, the\nCroatian Government would support the lifting of the arms embargo. The speaker\nemphasized in that regard, that the arms embargo would not necessarily promote war.\nRather it would create a balance that would promote non-violent options for a fair and\nsustainable settlement. He argued that the international community must use all\nnecessary means to “disengage” the Serbian military capacity, or lift the arms embargo,\nthus enabling Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to acquire the defence capacity to\ncompel the Serbian side to accept and implement the results of international mediation\nand the relevant Security Council resolutions. Otherwise, the war in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina would continue, and the political situation in Croatia might be jeopardized\n 236\nto the point of renewed fighting.\n\n\n The representative of Albania reiterated his country’s position, that intensive\ndiplomatic action combined with other measures, including the use of force, would be the\nmost suitable means to bring peace. He welcomed the initiative to convene a high-level\nconference, whilst drawing attention to the serious situation in Kosovo and stating that\ndealing with the crisis in Kosovo should be an integral element in the peace process. The\nAlbanian Government reiterated the view that the sanctions against the Federal Republic\nof Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) constituted an important component of the\ninternational community’s efforts to bring peace to the region and should be maintained\ndespite the fact that Albania was experiencing “enormous difficulties” as a result of these\n 237\nsanctions.\n\n\n During the debate, a number of speakers called for the lifting of the arms\nembargo in order to enable Bosnia and Herzegovina to exercise its inherent right to self-\ndefence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter.238 Other speakers opposed the idea,\n 239\narguing that such a step would not facilitate a peaceful resolution of the conflict.\n\n\n 236\n Ibid., pp. 34-36.\n 237\n Ibid., p. 40.\n 238\n Ibid., Pakistan, pp. 3-5; Turkey, pp. 6-7; Malaysia, pp. 8-11; Iran, pp. 11-13; Senegal, pp. 13-14; Saudi\nArabia, pp. 14-16; Tunisia, pp. 16-17; Egypt, pp. 17-20; OIC, pp. 20-22; Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp. 22-23; Oman,\n\n\n 155\n"
[156] " Decision of 29 April 1994: letter from the President to the Secretary-General\n 240\n By a letter dated 29 April 1994, the President of the Security Council informed\nthe Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n \"The members of the Security Council, while discussing the situation in the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the safe areas established by the relevant resolutions of the\n Council, took note of the recommendations of the Secretary-General concerning the\n definition and implementation of the concept of safe areas, as contained in his reports of 11\n March and 16 March 1994.\n \"The members of the Council request the Secretary-General to submit by 10 May 1994\n further specific recommendations on modalities of the implementation of the concept of safe\n areas as defined in resolutions 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993 and 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993.\"\n\n\n Decision of 4 May 1994 (3374th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3374th meeting, on 4 May 1994, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right\nto vote. The President (Nigeria) then stated that, after consultations among members of\nthe Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement 241 on\nbehalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council calls upon the parties to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina to agree to a complete cessation of hostilities, to comply fully therewith, and to\n resume immediately negotiations, without preconditions, for the conclusion of an overall\n settlement. It demands that the parties immediately refrain from any offensive military action\n and any action likely to lead to renewed fighting.\n\n\n\npp. 24-25; Djibouti, pp. 27-28; Croatia, pp. 34-36; Sudan, pp. 36-37; Bangladesh, pp. 37-38.\n 239\n Ibid., the Russian Federation, pp. 25-27; New Zealand, pp. 28-29; Canada, pp. 29-30; Sweden, pp. 31-32;\nFRY, pp. 32-33; Norway, pp. 33-34.\n 240\n S/1994/521.\n 241\n S/PRST/1994/23.\n\n\n 156\n"
[157] " \"The Council is concerned at recent indications of increasing tension in a number of areas\n in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular the Posavina 'corridor'.\n \"The Council welcomes the arrangements reported by the Secretariat to establish a\n United Nations Protection Force presence in the region of the Posavina 'corridor'. It\n encourages the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia to\n pursue this rapidly and also to seek enhanced aerial surveillance of this and other areas of\n tension. The Council calls on all the parties to cooperate fully with the Special\n Representative and the Force in the planned deployment. It warns the parties of the serious\n consequences of any offensive military action in or around the Posavina 'corridor'.\n \"The Council is considering further decisions on the matter and will remain actively\n seized of it.\"\n\n\n Decision of 25 May 1994 (3380th meeting): statement by the President\n\n On 19 May 1994, pursuant to resolution 913 (1994), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 242 on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in\nparticular in Gorazde. The Secretary-General reported that the situation in Gorazde\nremained one of stalemate and tensions continued to be high. He further noted that\ndespite the limitation of its mandate and military resources, UNPROFOR had played a\nmajor stabilizing role and contributed to normalizing the situation, particularly in and\naround Sarajevo, along the entire confrontation line between Bosnian Croat and Bosnian\ngovernment forces, in Gorazde, and in Brcko and the Posavina corridor with the\ndeployment of military observers since 7 May 1994. UNPROFOR could not, however, be\nexpected indefinitely to preserve such achievements unless early progress was made\ntowards an agreement on a comprehensive cessation of hostilities and a halt to the\nmovement of military forces, equipment and supplies. In that regard, the Secretary-\nGeneral had requested his Special Representative and UNPROFOR to approach the\nparties immediately to bring about an early meeting and an agreement on such issue\ntaking into account the separation of forces, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the\ninterposition of UNPROFOR troops. He also welcomed the call by the Troika of the EU,\nFrance, the Russian Federation, the United States and the United Kingdom in Geneva, on\n\n\n 242\n S/1994/600.\n\n\n 157\n"
[158] "13 May 1994, for a further reinforcement of UNPROFOR and requested the Council’s\nsupport for his proposals.\n At its 3380th meeting, on 25 May 1994, the Council included the above report in\nits agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the\nright to vote. The President (Nigeria) then stated that, after consultations among members\nof the Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement 243 on\nbehalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council has considered the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to its\n resolution 913 (1994).\n \"The Council reiterates the urgent need to intensify efforts towards an overall political\n settlement of the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It calls on the parties to\n resume, without preconditions, serious efforts to reach a political settlement.\n \"The Council reaffirms the urgent need for a comprehensive cessation of hostilities\n throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this regard, the\n Council supports the decision of the Secretary-General, in accordance with paragraph 1 of\n resolution 913 (1994), to entrust his Special Representative and the Force Commander of the\n United Nations Protection Force with the task of achieving a comprehensive cessation of\n hostilities. In this context it welcomes the call for such a cessation of hostilities in the\n communiqué dated 13 May 1994 issued at the meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs at\n Geneva.\n \"The Council demands immediate and full compliance with its resolution 913 (1994) and,\n in respect of Gorazde, calls upon the parties to cooperate fully with the Force to that end.\"\n\n\n Decision of 1 June 1994 (3387th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3387th meeting, on 1 June 1994, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right\nto vote. The President (Oman) then stated that, after consultations among members of the\n\n\n\n 243\n S/PRST/1994/26.\n\n\n 158\n"
[159] "Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement 244 on behalf of\nthe Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council recalls its presidential statement of 25 May 1994.\n \"The Council reiterates the urgent need for a comprehensive cessation of\n hostilities throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and\n calls upon the parties to resume, without preconditions, serious efforts to reach a\n political settlement. In that regard, it fully supports efforts by the Special\n Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia and the Force\n Commander of the United Nations Protection Force to negotiate such a cessation of\n hostilities, and welcomes the decision to convene a meeting with the parties at Geneva\n on 2 June 1994. It also welcomes the reported decision of the Government of the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the Bosnian Serb party to attend that\n meeting. The Council strongly encourages the parties to negotiate in good faith, so\n that a cessation of hostilities can be agreed to as quickly as possible.\n \"To that end, the Council strongly demands immediate, full and unconditional\n compliance with its resolution 913 (1994) of 22 April 1994, and in this context\n endorses the efforts made by the Force to ensure the implementation of that resolution.\n It calls upon both parties to cooperate fully with the Force in these efforts.\"\n\n\n Decision of 30 June 1994 (3399th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3399th meeting, on 30 June 1994, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right\nto vote. The President (Oman) then stated that, after consultations among members of the\nSecurity Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement 245 on behalf of\nthe Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council underlines its support for the 8 June 1994 agreement of the parties\n to the conflict, in which they agreed to observe a cease-fire for a period of one month starting\n\n\n 244\n S/PRST/1994/29.\n 245\n S/PRST/1994/31.\n\n\n 159\n"
[160] " from 10 June 1994. The Council expresses its grave concern at the parties' failure to comply\n with the agreement to date.\n \"The Council calls once again on the parties to stop all offensive military operations and\n other provocative actions, as well as all cease-fire violations and ethnic cleansing, and to\n cooperate with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former\n Yugoslavia and the United Nations Protection Force. It also calls on the parties to resume\n negotiations on a comprehensive cessation of hostilities for the entire territory of the Republic\n of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a view to reaching agreement before the expiration of the 8\n June agreement on 10 July 1994, while continuing negotiations to achieve a just and\n comprehensive peace agreement.\n \"The Council deplores all attacks on United Nations personnel and calls on those\n responsible to ensure that such attacks do not take place. It also condemns the restrictions\n imposed on the freedom of movement of the Force, and demands that these restrictions be\n immediately lifted, so as to enable the Force to assist in the implementation of the 8 June\n agreement.\"\n\n\n Decision of 7 July 1994: letter from the President to the Secretary-General\n\n By a letter 246 dated 24 May 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General transmitted the final report of the Commission of Experts\nestablished pursuant to resolution 780 (1992). The Commission had been established to\nexamine and analyse information gathered with a view to providing the Secretary-\nGeneral with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva\nConventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the\nterritory of the former Yugoslavia. The Commission had concluded that such breaches\nhad been committed on a large scale. It further had noted that the practice of the so-called\n“ethnic cleansing” had been carried out by some of the parties so systematically that they\nstrongly appeared to be the product of a policy. The Secretary General indicated that he\nshared the conclusions of the Commission and had instructed that all relevant information\ngathered by the Commission be forward to the Office of the Prosecutor of the\nInternational Tribunal.\n\n\n 246\n S/1994/674.\n\n\n 160\n"
[161] " By a letter 247 dated 7 July 1994, the President of the Security Council informed\nthe Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n \"I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 24 May 1994 transmitting the final report\n of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780 (1992)\n of 6 October 1992.\n \"The members of the Council are grateful to the Commission of Experts for the work\n done in the discharge of its mandate. They have noted with appreciation that the database\n and all the other information gathered by the Commission in the course of its work have been\n forwarded to the office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal.\"\n\n\n Decision of 2 September 1994 (3421st meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3421st meeting, on 2 September 1994, the Council resumed its consideration\nof the item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the\nright to vote. The President (Spain) then drew the attention of the members of the Council\nto a letter 248 dated 1 September 1994 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\naddressed to the President of the Security Council and stated that, after consultations\namong members of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following\nstatement 249 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council is deeply disturbed at continuing reports of acts of ethnic cleansing\n by the Bosnian Serb party in the Bijeljina area. It condemns this practice wherever it occurs\n and by whomsoever it is committed and demands its immediate cessation. It further\n condemns all violations of international humanitarian law in the conflict in the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina, for which those who commit them are personally responsible. In\n this context it calls for the full implementation of the agreement on the release of detainees\n contained in the 8 June 1994 agreement concluded at Geneva. It calls for the early release of\n all detainees and, to this end, calls for the delegates of the International Committee of the Red\n\n\n 247\n S/1994/800.\n 248\n S/1994/1023.\n 249\n S/PRST/1994/50.\n\n\n 161\n"
[162] " Cross to be granted access in particular to all detainees in Lopare and other parts of the\n Bijeljina area.\n \"The Council reaffirms the importance it attaches to the right of freedom of movement\n throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the United Nations Protection Force.\n It notes with dismay that the Bosnian Serb party has not allowed the Special Representative\n of the Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia to visit Banja Luka, Bijeljina and other\n areas of concern, and strongly urges it to permit such access both to the Special\n Representative and to the Force. It also expresses its concern about continuing restrictions on\n access to Sarajevo, in particular the closure by the Bosnian Serb party of the routes across the\n airport opened in cooperation with the Force following the 17 March 1994 agreement.\"\n\n\n Decisions of 23 September 1994 (3428th meeting): resolutions 941, 942 and 943\n(1994)\n\n At its 3428th meeting, on 23 September 1994, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the\nadoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives of Afghanistan, Albania,\nBangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Croatia, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, the\nIslamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Malaysia, Senegal, Tunisia and Turkey, at their request,\nto participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The Council also invited\nAmbassador Dragomir Djokic, at his request, to address the Council in the course of its\nconsideration of the item. The President (Spain) then drew the attention of the Council\nmembers to the text of three draft resolutions: the first draft resolution 250 had been\n 251\nprepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations; the second draft resolution\nhad been submitted by Argentina, the Czech Republic, Djibouti, France, Germany,\nNigeria, Oman, Pakistan, the Russian Federation, Rwanda, Spain, the United Kingdom\nand the United States; and the third draft resolution 252 had been submitted by the Czech\nRepublic, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the\n\n\n\n\n 250\n S/1994/1083.\n 251\n S/1994/1084.\n 252\n S/1994/1085.\n\n\n 162\n"
[163] "United States. The President also drew the attention of the Council members to several\nother documents. 253\n\n\n At the meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina noted that his\ndelegation had “mixed views” on the three draft resolutions before the Council. While his\ndelegation supported the first draft resolution addressing the crimes of ethnic cleansing\nbeing perpetrated in Serb-occupied areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it wondered why it\nhad taken in excess of three months to bring that draft to a vote and why the text had been\nso watered down as to diminish the commitment of UNPROFOR to deploy in the places\nwhere ethnic cleansing had been executed. Concerning the second draft resolution on the\ntightening of sanctions against the Bosnia Serbs, his delegation supported it spirit but\nquestioned the effectiveness of such measure in securing the desired objectives,\nespecially the reversal of the consequences of aggression and ethnic cleansing. Regarding\nthe third draft resolution on easing the sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia\nand Herzegovina was opposed to it for it sought to reward those who had been complicit\nin crimes and war-making, without assisting the victim to confront ongoing crimes and\naggression, therefore lacking balance. Furthermore, the draft undermined the necessary\nimprovements in human rights standards within Kosovo, Vojvodino and Sandjak, and did\nnot address the ongoing occupation of Croatia. It also sought to reward Serbia and\nMontenegro for a set of “self-designed measures of self-policing”, and Serbia and\nMontenegro had not been required to endorse the Contact Group peace plan by\n\n\n 253\n S/1994/1037, 1038, 1046, 1056 and 1087, letters dated 7, 12, 14 and 22 September 1994 from the\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1994/1040 and 1072,\nletters dated 9 and 19 September 1994, respectively, from the representative of Croatia addressed to the President of the\nSecurity Council; S/1994/1044 and 1079, letters dated 8 and 21 September 1994, respectively, from the Deputy\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1994/1052 and 1062,\nletters dated 14 and 16 September, respectively, from the representative of Croatia addressed to the Secretary-General;\nS/1994/1055, letter dated 9 September 1994 from the representative of Slovenia addressed to the President of the\nSecurity Council; S/1994/1060, letter dated 15 September 1994 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia addressed\nto the President of the Security Council; S/1994/1074, letter dated 19 September 1994 from the Secretary-General\naddressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering\nCommittee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission on the establishment and\ncommencement of operations of an International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission to the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); S/1994/1075 and 1076, letters dated 19 and 20 September 1994,\nrespectively, from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1994/1081, letter\ndated 21 September 1994 from the representatives of France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom\nand the United States addressed to the Secretary-General; and S/1994/1088, letter dated 22 September 1994 from the\nrepresentative of Pakistan addressed to the President of the Security Council.\n\n\n 163\n"
[164] "recognizing Bosnia and Herzegovina within its own borders. The speaker also questioned\nthe ability of the monitoring régime to monitor effectively the closure of the border\nbetween Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro. In conclusion, he urged\nmembers of the Council not to support the draft resolution. 254\n\n\n The representative of Croatia expressed his Government reservations on the draft\nresolution easing sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He argued that\nthe sanctions should only be suspended after the Council had received concrete and\nundisputed evidence of real progress on the ground, not only in Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nbut also in Croatia. Furthermore, his delegation could not overlook the fact that the draft\nresolution might not follow the spirit of resolution 871 (1993), which linked the sanction\nregime imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the implementation of all\nrelevant Council resolutions, including those relating to the United Nations peacekeeping\nplan for the Republic of Croatia. His Government would therefore support the suspension\nof the sanctions régime against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia only if there was real\nprogress on the ground in relation to the implementation of resolution 871 (1993). An\nessential first step would be the recognition by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the\nnew States on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, within their internationally\nrecognized borders. Should the Council adopt the draft resolution, however, the\nmonitoring Mission of the ICFY, which was operating with meager resources, would\nbecome very important. He warned that the Mission should not be used to satisfy short-\n 255\nterm political goals.\n\n\n The representative of Germany, speaking on behalf of the EU, stated that the\nadoption of the three draft resolutions would constitute an important step in the\ninternational peace effort and would convey an unequivocal message to the Bosnian\nSerbs. Firstly, the European Union condemned “the ethnic cleansing” which the Bosnian\nSerbs had systematically carried out in the areas they occupied and reemphasized the\nimportance of the work of the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.\n\n 254\n S/PV.3428, pp. 3-5.\n 255\n Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n\n\n 164\n"
[165] "Secondly, the Bosnian Serbs must realize that they would remain totally isolated as long\nas they blocked the peace process and continue the abhorrent practice of “ethnic\ncleansing.” The European Union therefore welcomed the tightening of sanctions as a\nmeans to increase the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept the territorial proposal\nsubmitted by the Contact Group. Thirdly, concerning the suspension of certain sanctions\nagainst the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the EU was united\nin the view that the decision of President Milosevic to close the border deserved a\npositive reaction from the international community. Thus through the adoption of the\nthree draft resolutions, the Council would emphasize that these who choose the course of\npeace would receive its support and those who persisted in rejecting peace and embracing\n 256\nwar would be isolated and prosecuted.\n\n\n The representative of Turkey noted that his delegation considered both the first\ndraft resolution, on ethnic cleansing, and the second draft resolution, on strengthening\nsanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, to be timely steps and believed that they should both\nbe adopted immediately and implemented effectively. Turkey had serious doubts,\nhowever, about the timing and content of the third draft resolution, relaxing sanctions\nagainst Serbia and Montenegro, as it was necessary to verify Serbia’s claim that it had\nclosed its border with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the conclusion of the Mission\nof the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia was in direct contradiction\nwith independent reports suggesting that there had been continuing unauthorized\nhelicopter flights between Serbia and Montenegro and the Serbian-held areas of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina. Turkey had appealed to the President of the Security Council to\npostpone consideration of the draft resolution in order to allow a comprehensive\ninvestigation into that matter. Regrettably, that request had not been considered\nfavourably. The speaker argued that the easing of sanctions at that time would send the\nwrong signal to the aggressor and would undermine the peace process. Meanwhile,\nBosnia and Herzegovina, which had accepted the Contact Group peace plan in good faith,\nwas awaiting the fulfilment of the promises made by the Contact Group, including true\n\n\n 256\n Ibid., pp. 11-12.\n\n\n 165\n"
[166] "and effective border-monitoring, measures in response to the “strangulation” of Sarajevo,\nthe expansion of exclusion zones, and the lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia and\nHerzegovina. Before concluding, the speaker urged the Serbian side to stop its genocidal\ncampaign to consolidate its territorial gains and to accept the peace plan. If it failed to do\nso, then the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be provided with all means\n 257\nnecessary to exercise its inherent right to self-defence.\n\n\n Mr. Djokic noted that the decision to partially suspend the existing sanctions,\nwhilst it represented an important shift in attitude towards Yugoslavia, did not constitute\nan adequate response to the constructive role played by the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia in the search for a solution to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. What was\nreally needed was the complete lifting of all sanctions and it was unfortunate therefore\nthat the conditions were set for the ultimate and absolute lifting of all sanctions\nexclusively in the function of maintaining political pressure. The Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia expected that, with the adoption of the draft resolution relaxing the sanctions,\nthe process of lifting all sanctions would gather momentum and the legitimate rights of\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations and other international\norganizations would soon be restored so that it could be fully reintegrated into the\ninternational community. 258\n\n\n During the debate several speakers questioned the appropriateness of a decision\neasing sanctions against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, raising doubts about the\ncredibility of the claims by the Belgrade authorities regarding the closure of their borders\nwith the territories occupied by the Bosnian Serbs, in the absence of an effective\nmonitoring mechanism. They argued that before adopting such decision, the Council\nshould ensure that Serbia and Montenegro take a number of steps including, its\nrecognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its current borders, its cooperation with the\nInternational Tribunal, and its acceptance of the designation of 51 percent of the territory\nallocated to the Muslim Croat federation as safe area, and the lifting of the Sarajevo\n\n 257\n Ibid., pp. 13-14.\n 258\n Ibid., pp. 14-17.\n\n\n 166\n"
[167] "siege. Instead of easing the sanctions, the Security Council should enforce the\nimplementation of its earlier resolutions, and enable the Government of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina to exercise its right of self-defence by lifting the arms embargo imposed\nagainst it. 259\n Other speakers, however, supported the easing of sanctions as a way of\nacknowledging the positive reaction by the Belgrade authorities to the peace plan put\nforward by the Contact Group and their decision to close their borders, arguing that it was\na measure that could be reversed if Serbia and Montenegro violated its commitments. 260\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of Djibouti was of the view that some\ncrucial issues ought to have been addressed before embarking on the exercise of easing\nsanctions such as the military and humanitarian imbalance in the conflict, the recognition\nby the FRY of Bosnia within its current borders, the cooperation of the FRY with the\nInternational Tribunal, the protection of Bosnia’s safe area and the end of the siege of\nSarajevo. His delegation therefore found it very difficult to support any draft resolution\n 261\ncalling for the partial lifting of sanctions at that moment.\n\n\n The representative of China stated that his delegation would vote in favour of the\ndraft resolutions condemning violations of international humanitarian law and suspending\naspects of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro), as both draft resolutions reflected China’s basic position on those\nquestions. He reiterated, however, that his country, in principle, was not in favour of\nusing sanctions or mandatory measures to resolve the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.\nAll efforts should be made to resolve the conflict peacefully. The speaker argued that\ninstead of bringing the war to an end, the use of sanctions or mandatory measures had\nbrought enormous suffering to the countries and people of the region, and had inflicted\ntremendous losses on the economies of those third countries that had implemented the\n\n 259\n Ibid., Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp. 3-5; Croatia, pp. 5-6; Malaysia, pp. 6-8; Iran, pp. 8-9; Senegal, pp, 9-\n10; Albania, pp. 10-11; Egypt, pp. 12-13; Turkey, pp. 13-14; Jordan, pp. 18-20; Afghanistan, pp. 20-21; Bangladesh, p.\n21; Tunisia, p. 22.\n 260\n Ibid., Germany (on behalf of the EU), pp. 11-12; Canada, pp. 17-18.\n 261\n Ibid., pp. 22-23.\n\n\n 167\n"
[168] "sanctions, in particular the States neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.\nTherefore, on the basis of that principled position, China would abstain on the draft\n 262\nresolution tightening sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs.\n\n\n The representative of Pakistan stated that his delegation was not prepared to\nconsider even the partial lifting of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nunless and until the consequences of its aggression in Bosnia and Herzegovina were\nreversed and territories occupied by force surrendered. Easing the sanctions in the current\ncircumstances was tantamount to appeasing and rewarding the aggressor and would\nundermine the peace process, sacrificing the principles of justice and equity enshrined in\nthe United Nations Charter. Furthermore, his delegation considered the timing for the\nsubmission of the draft resolution to be most inopportune, inappropriate and premature.\nPakistan would therefore vote against the draft relaxing the sanctions. 263\n\n\n The representative of Rwanda expressed his delegation’s support for the draft\nresolutions on ethnic cleansing and on strengthening the sanctions against the Bosnian\nSerbs. While his delegation had no quarrel with the content of the draft resolution\nrelaxing sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),\nit believed that its adoption would not be opportune, because developments on the ground\nclashed with the Rwandan Government policy with regard to the universal principles of\nhuman rights, and because previous Council resolutions had not been implemented. His\n 264\ndelegation would therefore abstain in the voting of that draft resolution.\n\n\n The first draft resolution 265 was then put to the vote and was adopted\nunanimously as resolution 941 (1994). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n\n\n 262\n Ibid., pp. 23-24.\n 263\n Ibid., pp. 26-27.\n 264\n Ibid., p. 27.\n 265\n S/1994/1083.\n\n\n 168\n"
[169] " Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions,\n Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Taking note of the information provided by the Office of the United Nations High\nCommissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross and that\ncontained in other relevant reports, particularly regarding grave violations of international\nhumanitarian law affecting the non-Serb population in those areas of the Republic of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces,\n Gravely concerned at the persistent and systematic campaign of terror perpetrated by the\nBosnian Serb forces in Banja Luka, Bijeljina and other areas of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, as described in paragraphs 5 to 79 of\nthe above-mentioned report,\n Emphasizing that this practice of ethnic cleansing by the Bosnian Serb forces constitutes\na clear violation of international humanitarian law and poses a serious threat to the peace\neffort,\n Expressing its deep concern over the continued denial by Bosnian Serb forces of prompt\nand unimpeded access to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former\nYugoslavia and the United Nations Protection Force to Banja Luka, Bijeljina and other areas\nunder Bosnian Serb control as demanded by the Security Council in its presidential statement\nof 2 September 1994,\n Recognizing that the International Tribunal has jurisdiction over serious violations of\ninternational humanitarian law committed in the territory of the Former Yugoslavia and that\nthe Council remains committed to its previous resolutions on the importance of cooperation\nwith the Tribunal,\n Determined to put an end to the abhorrent and systematic practice of ethnic cleansing\nwherever it occurs and by whomsoever it is committed,\n Determining that the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to\nconstitute a threat to international peace and security, reiterating its determination to ensure\nthe security of the Force and its freedom of movement in all its missions and, to these ends,\nacting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Reaffirms that all parties to the conflict are bound to comply with their obligations\nunder international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August\n1949;\n\n\n\n\n 169\n"
[170] " 2. Strongly condemns all violations of international humanitarian law, including in\n particular the unacceptable practice of ethnic cleansing perpetrated in Banja Luka, Bijeljina\n and other areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb\n forces, and reaffirms that those who have committed or have ordered the commission of such\n acts will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;\n 3. Reaffirms its support for the established principles that all declarations and actions\n made under duress, particularly those regarding land and ownership, are null and void, and\n that all displaced persons should be enabled to return in peace to their Former homes;\n 4. Demands that the Bosnian Serb authorities immediately cease their campaign of ethnic\n cleansing;\n 5. Demands that the Bosnian Serb party accord the Special Representative of the\n Secretary-General, the United Nations Protection Force, the Office of the United Nations\n High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross\n immediate and unimpeded access to Banja Luka, Bijeljina and other areas of concern;\n 6. Requests the Secretary-General to arrange, when conditions permit, the deployment of\n troops of the Force and United Nations monitors to Banja Luka, Bijeljina and other areas of\n concern and to intensify his efforts in this regard;\n 7. Also requests the Secretary-General to report urgently to the Council on the\n implementation of the present resolution;\n 8. Determines to consider any further steps that it may deem necessary;\n 9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n 266\n The second draft resolution was then put to the vote and was adopted by 14\nvotes to none, with 1 abstention (China) as resolution 942 (1994). The resolution reads as\nfollows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions,\n Affirming its commitment to a negotiated settlement of the conflict in the Former\n Yugoslavia, preserving the territorial integrity of all the States there within their\n internationally recognized borders,\n\n\n\n 266\n S/1994/1084.\n\n\n 170\n"
[171] " Expressing appreciation for the efforts undertaken by the representatives of the United\nNations, the European Union, the United States of America and the Russian Federation to\nassist the parties in reaching a settlement,\n Reaffirming the need for a lasting peace settlement to be signed by all the Bosnian parties\nand implemented in good faith by them, and condemning the decision by the Bosnian Serb\nparty to refuse to accept the proposed territorial settlement,\n Viewing the measures imposed by the present resolution and by its previous relevant\nresolutions as a means towards the end of producing a negotiated settlement to the conflict,\n Expressing its support for the continuing efforts of Member States, in particular States in\nthe region, to implement its relevant resolutions,\n Determining that the situation in the Former Yugoslavia continues to constitute a threat to\ninternational peace and security,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n\n\n A\n\n\n 1. Expresses its approval of the proposed territorial settlement for the Republic of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina which has been put to the Bosnian parties as part of an overall peace\nsettlement;\n 2. Expresses its satisfaction that the proposed territorial settlement has now been\naccepted in full by all except the Bosnian Serb party;\n 3. Strongly condemns the Bosnian Serb party for its refusal to accept the proposed\nterritorial settlement, and demands that that party accept this settlement unconditionally and\nin full;\n 4. Requires all parties to continue to observe the cease-fire as agreed on 8 June 1994 and\nto refrain from all new acts of hostility;\n 5. Declares its readiness to take all measures necessary to assist the parties to give effect\nto the proposed settlement once it has been accepted by all parties, and in this connection\nencourages States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or arrangements, to\ncooperate in an effective manner with the Secretary-General in his efforts to aid the parties to\nimplement the proposed settlement;\n\n\n B\n\n\n\n\n 171\n"
[172] " Resolved to reinforce and extend the measures imposed by its previous resolutions with\nregard to those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian\nSerb forces,\n 6. Calls upon States to desist from any political talks with the leadership of the Bosnian\nSerb party as long as that party has not accepted the proposed settlement in full;\n 7. Decides that States shall prevent:\n (i) Economic activities carried on, after the date of adoption of the present resolution,\nwithin their territories by any entity, wherever incorporated or constituted, which is owned or\ncontrolled, directly or indirectly, by:\n (a) Any person in, or resident in, or any entity, including any commercial,\nindustrial or public utility undertaking, in those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, or\n (b) Any entity incorporated in or constituted under the law of those areas of the\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, as well as\n (ii) Economic activities carried on, after the date of adoption of the present resolution,\nwithin their territories, by any person or entity, including those identified by States for the\npurpose of the present resolution, found to be acting for or on behalf of and to the benefit of\nany entity, including any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in those areas of\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, or any\nentity identified in subparagraph (i) above, provided that:\n (a) States may authorize such activities to be carried on within their territories,\nhaving satisfied themselves on a case-by-case basis that the activities do not result in the\ntransfer of property or interests in property to any person or entity described in subparagraph\n(i) (a) or (b) above;\n (b) Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the provision of supplies intended\nstrictly for medical purposes and foodstuffs notified to the Security Council Committee\nestablished pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia, or commodities and\nproducts for essential humanitarian needs approved by the Committee;\n 8. Decides that States shall revoke existing, and issue no further, authorization under\nparagraph 7 above in respect of any person or entity violating the measures imposed by the\npresent resolution or violating the measures imposed by earlier relevant resolutions, where\nthose violations have occurred after the date of adoption of the present resolution;\n 9. Decides that States shall consider the term \"economic activities\" used in paragraph 7\nabove to mean:\n\n\n 172\n"
[173] " (a) All activities of an economic nature, including commercial, financial and\nindustrial activities and transactions, in particular all activities of an economic nature\ninvolving the use of or dealing in, with or in connection with property or interests in property;\n (b) The exercise of rights relating to property or interests in property;\n (c) The establishment of any new entity or change in management of an existing\nentity;\n 10. Decides that States shall consider the term \"property or interests in property\" used in\nparagraphs 7 and 9 above to mean funds, financial, tangible and intangible assets, property\nrights and publicly and privately traded securities and debt instruments and any other\nfinancial and economic resources;\n 11. Decides that States in which there are funds or other financial assets or resources of:\n (i) Any entity, including any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in those\nareas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, or\n (ii) Any entity identified in paragraph 7 (i) above or any person or entity identified in\nparagraph 7 (ii) above,\n shall require all persons and entities within their territories holding such funds or other\nfinancial assets or resources to freeze them to ensure that neither they nor any other funds or\nany other financial assets or resources are made available directly or indirectly to or for the\nbenefit of any of the above-mentioned persons or entities, except:\n (a) Payments made in connection with activities authorized in accordance with\nparagraph 7 above, or\n (b) Payments made in connection with transactions authorized by the\nGovernment of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with regard to persons or entities\nwithin its territory, provided that States are satisfied that payments to persons outside their\nterritories will be used for the purpose or in connection with the activities and transactions for\nwhich permission is sought, and that in the case of payments made under exception (a) above,\nStates may authorize such payments only after they are satisfied on a case-by-case basis that\nthe payments do not result in the transfer of funds or other financial assets or resources to any\nperson or entity described in subparagraph (a) or (b) of paragraph 7 (i) above;\n 12. Decides that States shall ensure that all payments of dividends, interest or other\nincome on shares, interest, bonds or debt obligations or amounts derived from an interest in,\nor the sale or other disposal of, or any other dealing with, tangible and intangible assets and\nproperty rights, accruing to:\n\n\n\n\n 173\n"
[174] " (i) Any entity, including any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in those\nareas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, or\n (ii) Any entity identified in paragraph 7 (i) or any person or entity identified in paragraph\n7 (ii) above, are made only into frozen accounts;\n 13. Decides that the provision of services, both financial and non-financial, to any person\nor body for the purposes of any business carried on in those areas of the Republic of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces shall be prohibited, the only\nexceptions being (a) telecommunications, postal services and legal services consistent with\nthe present resolution and earlier relevant resolutions, (b) services whose supply may be\nnecessary for humanitarian or other exceptional purposes, as approved on a case-by-case\nbasis by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991), and (c) services\nauthorized by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 14. Decides that States shall prevent the entry into their territories of:\n (a) The members of the authorities, including legislative authorities, in those\nareas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces\nand officers of the Bosnian Serb military and paramilitary forces, and those acting on behalf\nof such authorities or forces;\n (b) Persons found, after the adoption of the present resolution, to have provided\nfinancial, material, logistical, military or other tangible support to Bosnian Serb forces in\nviolation of relevant resolutions of the Council;\n (c) Persons in or resident in those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces found to have violated or contributed\nto the violation of the measures set out in resolution 820 (1993) of 17 April 1993 and in the\npresent resolution, and requests that the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724\n(1991) establish and maintain an updated list, based on information provided by States and\ncompetent regional organizations, of the persons falling within this paragraph, provided that\nnothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to refuse entry into its territory to its own\nnationals; and provided that the entry of a person included in the list into a particular State on\na specified date may be authorized, for purposes consistent with the pursuit of the peace\nprocess and with the present resolution and earlier relevant resolutions, by the Committee or,\nin the event of disagreement in the Committee, by the Council;\n 15. Decides to prohibit all commercial riverine traffic from entering ports of those areas\nof the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces except\nwhen authorized on a case-by-case basis by the Committee established pursuant to resolution\n\n\n 174\n"
[175] "724 (1991), or by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for its\nterritory, or in case of force majeure;\n 16. Decides that States shall require that all shipments of commodities and products\ndestined for those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of\nBosnian Serb forces be properly manifested and either be physically inspected by the\nSanctions Assistance Missions or the competent national authorities at loading to verify and\nseal their contents or be laden in a manner which permits adequate physical verification of the\ncontents;\n 17. Decides that States shall, in notifying or submitting applications to the Committee\nestablished pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) in respect of supplies intended strictly for\nmedical purposes and foodstuffs and essential humanitarian supplies in respect of those areas\nof the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, report\nfor information purposes to the Committee on the source of funds from which payment is to\nbe made;\n 18. Decides that States shall, in implementing the measures imposed by the present\nresolution, take steps to prevent the diversion of benefits to those areas of the Republic of\nBosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces from other places, in\nparticular from the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia;\n 19. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary assistance to the Committee\nestablished pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) and to make the necessary arrangements in the\nSecretariat for that purpose;\n 20. Decides that the provisions set forth in the present resolution do not apply to activities\nrelated to the United Nations Protection Force, the International Conference on the Former\nYugoslavia or the European Community Monitoring Missions;\n 21. Decides to review the measures imposed by the present resolution whenever\nappropriate and in any event every four months from the date of adoption of the present\nresolution, and expresses its readiness to reconsider those measures if the Bosnian Serb party\naccepts the proposed territorial settlement unconditionally and in full;\n 22. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and to consider immediately,\nwhenever necessary, further steps to achieve a peaceful solution in conformity with relevant\nresolutions of the Council.\n\n\n\n\n 175\n"
[176] " The third draft resolution 267 was thereafter put to the vote and was adopted by 11\nvotes in favour, 2 against (Djibouti, Pakistan), and 2 abstentions (Nigeria, Rwanda), as\nresolution 943 (1994). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions,\n Affirming its commitment to a negotiated settlement of the conflict in the Former\n Yugoslavia, preserving the territorial integrity of all the States there within their\n internationally recognized borders,\n Expressing its appreciation for the efforts of the representatives of the United Nations,\n the European Union, the United States of America and the Russian Federation to assist the\n parties in reaching a settlement,\n Welcoming the decision by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia\n and Montenegro) to support the proposed territorial settlement for the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina which has been put to the Bosnian parties,\n Also welcoming the decision by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro) to close the international border between the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with\n respect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential\n humanitarian needs,\n Further welcoming the decision by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro) to invite international assistance with regard to the passage of\n supplies for essential humanitarian needs through the border between the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Noting in this regard the letter dated 19 September 1994 from the Secretary-General\n addressed to the President of the Security Council, conveying a report from the Co-Chairmen\n of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the\n establishment and commencement of operations on a mission of the International Conference\n to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),\n Calling upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro) to maintain the effective closure of the border between the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with\n\n 267\n S/1994/1085.\n\n\n 176\n"
[177] "respect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential\nhumanitarian needs;\n Noting that paragraph 9 of resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992 remains in force,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Decides that:\n (i) The restrictions imposed by paragraph 7 of resolution 757 (1992), paragraph 24 of\nresolution 820 (1993) with regard to aircraft which are not impounded at the date of adoption\nof the present resolution and by other relevant resolutions which relate to the provision of\ngoods and services, with respect to all civilian passenger flights to and from the Belgrade\nairport carrying only passengers and personal effects and no cargo unless authorized under\nthe procedures of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724\n(1991) concerning Yugoslavia;\n (ii) The restrictions imposed by paragraphs 24 and 28 of resolution 820 (1993) and by\nother relevant resolutions which relate to the provision of goods and services, with respect to\nthe ferry service between Bar in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)\nand Bari in Italy carrying only passengers and personal effects and no cargo unless authorized\nunder the procedures of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991);\n (iii) The measures imposed by paragraph 8 (b) and (c) of resolution 757 (1992)\nconcerning participation in sporting events and cultural exchanges,\n shall be suspended for an initial period of one hundred days from the day following the\nreceipt by the Security Council of a report from the Secretary-General that the Co-Chairmen\nof the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia have\ncertified that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)\nare effectively implementing their decision to close the border between the Federal Republic\nof Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with\nrespect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential\nhumanitarian needs, and that arrangements are in place pursuant to the decision of the\nauthorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to invite\ninternational assistance with regard to the passage of supplies for essential humanitarian\nneeds through that border;\n 2. Invites the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) to adopt\nappropriate streamlined procedures for expediting its consideration of applications\nconcerning legitimate humanitarian assistance, in particular applications from the United\nNations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross;\n\n\n 177\n"
[178] " 3. Requests that every thirty days the Secretary-General submit to the Security Council\n for its review a report as to whether the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\n International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia have certified that the authorities of the\n Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are effectively implementing their\n decision to close the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all goods except\n foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs, and further\n requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council immediately if he has evidence,\n including from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference\n on the Former Yugoslavia, that those authorities are not effectively implementing their\n decision to close the border;\n 4. Decides that if at any time the Secretary-General reports that the authorities of the\n Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are not effectively implementing\n their decision to close the border, the suspension of the measures referred to in paragraph 1\n above shall terminate on the fifth working day following the report of the Secretary-General,\n unless the Security Council decides to the contrary;\n 5. Decides to keep the situation closely under review and to consider further steps with\n regard to measures applicable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro) in the light of further progress in the situation;\n 6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation stressed the\nimportance of operative paragraph 5 of resolution 943 (1994), which provided that the\nCouncil would consider further steps to ease the sanctions in light of further progress in\nthe situation. Concerning resolution 942 (1994), tightening sanctions against the Bosnian\nSerbs, the speaker stated that the purpose of that resolution was to make the Bosnian\nSerbs recognize that there was no alternative to a political solution. He further stated that\nhis country deemed the policy of “ethnic cleansing” to be repugnant and demanded its\nimmediate cessation. Accordingly, his delegation had supported the adoption of the\nresolution that condemned the policy conducted by the Bosnian Serbs and noted, in\nparticular, the provision of the resolution that condemned any “ethnic cleansing” of\nwhatever origin, and whoever might perpetrate it. The Russian Federation also deemed\nimportant the provisions contained in the resolutions adopted on the commitment to a\n\n 178\n"
[179] "settlement of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia through negotiation, while\nmaintaining the territorial integrity of all States there within the confines of their\n 268\ninternationally recognized borders.\n\n\n The representative of the United States noted that the resolutions just adopted\naimed to pressure the Bosnian Serbs and to demonstrate the Council’s determination to\nuse “both carrots and sticks” to move the parties towards a negotiated settlement. In\npreparing to ease sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Council was\nacknowledging that its Government had taken an important step to persuade the Bosnian\nSerbs to accept the negotiated settlement. The United States continued to believe that\nBelgrade bore primary responsibility for events in the former Yugoslavia over the\npreceding three years. While it welcomed the first indications that the Federal Republic\nof Yugoslavia might have changed course, it would insist that that country comply with\nits commitment to keep the border closed. The suspended sanctions would come into\neffect, without the need for further Council action, if at any time the international Mission\nwas no longer able to confirm the border closure. The Government of the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia should not doubt the will of the United States to cancel the\nsuspension of the sanctions if it believed that the border had been reopened. The people\nof Serbia and Montenegro should also understand that further concrete steps towards\npeace would lead to additional easing of sanctions. The United States urged Belgrade to\nrecognize Croatia and Bosnia within their internationally recognized borders, and to use\nits influence with the Croatian Serbs to push them towards a settlement consistent with\nCroatia’s territorial integrity. It would also insist that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nnot be allowed to rejoin the family of nations until it was in compliance with all relevant\nCouncil resolutions. Belgrade should understand that a decision to choose conflict would\nstop limited sanctions relief and would lead to the adoption of even tougher measures.\nReferring to resolution 941 (1994), the speaker noted that the condemnation of ethnic\n 269\ncleansing was an integral part of efforts to end the conflict.\n\n\n\n 268\n Ibid., pp. 30-31.\n 269\n Ibid., pp. 33-34.\n\n\n 179\n"
[180] " The representative of Nigeria observed that it was appropriate that resolution 941\n(1994) had been adopted under Chapter VII, for the Council could not be indifferent to\ngrave violations of international humanitarian law. Referring to resolution 942 (1994),\nthe speaker stated that the Bosnian Serb leadership must be made to realize that the only\nway to join other members of the international community was to accept a negotiated\nsettlement. Nigeria called on the members of the international community, especially\nneighbouring States and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to\ndischarge their obligations under that resolution in order to ensure a complete and total\nisolation of the Bosnian Serb political and military leadership. Referring to resolution 943\n(1994), the speaker noted that his delegation was uneasy with the loosening of sanctions\nagainst the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), primarily due to its\ntiming. If the Council had considered the draft resolution on easing the sanctions after it\nhad received a report from the Secretary-General that the border was being effectively\nclosed, then some of Nigeria’s concerns would have been addressed. The Council’s\ndecision to loosen sanctions when nothing had changed on the ground, however, might\ngive the wrong impression. In addition, a fundamental condition for the easing of the\nsanctions should have been an immediate and explicit recognition of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina within its internationally recognized borders. Nigeria had therefore\n 270\nabstained in the vote on resolution 943 (1994).\n\n\n The representative of Oman stated that, despite the positions of both the OIC and\nthe Non-Aligned Group which advocated that submitting resolution 943 (1994) at that\nstage was premature, his delegation had voted in favour of resolution 943 (1994) in\ndeference to the wishes of the majority of members of the Council, and in the hope that\nthe resolution would help to resolve the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nNevertheless, it stressed that the lifting of the sanctions must be subject to a “trial\nperiod”, in order to gauge the peaceful intentions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n(Serbia and Montenegro). Should there be no concrete progress, then the measures in the\n\n\n\n\n 270\n Ibid., pp. 34-36.\n\n\n 180\n"
[181] "resolution would become null and void and the situation would revert to its earlier\nstatus. 271\n\n\n Decision of 30 September 1994 (3433rd meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3433rd meeting, on 30 September 1994, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the\nadoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The\nPresident (Spain) then stated that, after consultations among members of the Security\n 272\nCouncil, he had been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the\nCouncil:\n\n\n \"The Security Council is deeply concerned at the deteriorating security situation in the\n safe area of Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has included\n increased levels of armed violence, deliberate attacks on United Nations Protection Force\n troops and on humanitarian flights, severe restrictions on public utilities and continued\n restriction of the flow of transport and communications. It notes that normal life has not been\n fully restored to Sarajevo, as called for in its resolution 900 (1994) of 4 March 1994.\n \"The Council expresses concern at the deliberate interruptions of utilities and\n communications to the civilian population in Sarajevo, as well as the extended period of\n closure of the Sarajevo airport to humanitarian flights and of the route across that airport\n opened in cooperation with the Force following the agreement of 17 March 1994, as a result\n of the actions by the Bosnian Serb party. The Council calls upon the Bosnian Serb party not\n to interfere with the normal functioning of the Sarajevo airport. It further calls upon the\n Bosnian Serb party to cooperate with efforts to restore fully the flow of gas and electricity to\n Sarajevo, to reopen all land routes to Sarajevo and, now and in the future, to refrain from\n impeding the normal operations of these and all other utilities and means of communication\n and transport. It calls upon all parties not to interfere with the supply of gas or electricity to\n the civilian population. It reiterates its call to all parties, with the assistance of the United\n Nations, to achieve complete freedom of movement for the civilian population and for\n\n 271\n Ibid., pp. 37-39.\n 272\n S/PRST/1994/57.\n\n\n 181\n"
[182] " humanitarian goods to, from and within Sarajevo, to remove any hindrance to such freedom\n of movement and to help restore normal life to the city.\n \"The Council condemns in particular the deliberate attack on 22 September 1994 on\n troops of the Force in Sarajevo, just one of a number of attacks which clearly suggest a\n deliberate pattern. The Council also notes with alarm, and condemns without reservation, the\n reported statements of the Bosnian Serb leadership that the Bosnian Serb party would target\n activities of the Force in retaliation for the passage of a Council resolution tightening\n sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs. It warns the Bosnian Serb leadership against any\n retaliatory action, whether against the Force or any other party and in that context welcomes\n efforts to support troops of the Force.\n \"The Council fully supports the efforts of the Force to assure compliance with measures\n designed by the international community to improve conditions in Sarajevo. It advises both\n parties, in particular the Bosnian Serbs, to comply with those measures.\n \"The Council strongly condemns any provocative actions in Sarajevo and elsewhere in\n Bosnia and Herzegovina by whomsoever committed, and demands immediate cessation of\n such actions.\n \"The Council encourages the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the\n Former Yugoslavia and the Force to explore as a matter of priority proposals for the\n demilitarization of Sarajevo.\n \"The Council affirms its determination to remain seized of the matter.\"\n\n\n Consideration of the item at the 3454th meeting (8-9 November 1994)\n 273\n By a letter dated 3 November 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of Pakistan requested an urgent meeting of the Security\nCouncil to consider the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in light of resolution 49/10,\nwhich had been adopted by the General Assembly on the same date.\n At its 3454th meeting held on 8 and 9 November 1994, the Council included the\nabove letter in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentatives of Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nBrunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Canada, Croatia, Ecuador, Egypt, Germany,\nGuinea-Bissau, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Latvia, Malaysia, Morocco,\n\n 273\n S/1994/1248.\n\n\n 182\n"
[183] "Nicaragua, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Slovenia, the Sudan,\nThailand, Tunisia and Turkey, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the\nright to vote. The Council also invited Ambassador Dragomir Djokic, at his request, to\naddress the Council in the course of its consideration of the item and it extended an\ninvitation to Mr. Engin Ahmet Ansay, Permanent Observer of the Organization of the\nIslamic Conference to the United Nations.\n At the meeting, the representative of Pakistan, also speaking as the Chairman of\nthe OIC Contact Group, noted that the OIC Foreign Ministers at the Seventh\nExtraordinary Session, held at Islamabad from 7 to 9 September 1994, had reiterated the\ninapplicability of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 713 (1991) to Bosnia and\nHerzegovina and Croatia, and had called upon the Security Council to confirm that\nposition. They had further noted that should the Council not confirm that position, then\nthe OIC membership, along with other States Member of the United Nations, would\nconclude that members acting individually or collectively could provide the means of\nself-defence to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As far as Pakistan was\nconcerned, it had consistently advocated that the inherent right of the Bosnian people to\nself-defence under Article 51 of the Charter should be restored without delay. In that\ncontext, Pakistan welcomed the United States’ recent initiative to lift the arms embargo\nand would extend its support to the early adoption of the draft resolution. At the same\ntime, measures should be adopted by the Council to declare the entire 51 per cent of the\nterritory allocated to the Muslim-Croat Federation a “safe area”. The Council should also\nrespond effectively to any further violations of its resolutions, particularly those\n 274\nconcerning safe areas, by the use of force and air strikes.\n\n\n The representative of France stated that the international community would now be\npursuing its efforts to overcome the obstinacy of the Bosnian Serbs, who had rejected the\npeace plan presented by the Contact Group, and to encourage those who had approved it to\nwork towards an overall settlement. In that regard, Belgrade was expected to recognize\nBosnia and Herzegovina, to continue its support for the plan of the Contact Group, and to\n\n\n 274\n S/PV.3454, pp. 2-4.\n\n\n 183\n"
[184] "have no political and economic relations with the Bosnian Serbs, and to approve the plan of\nthe International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. With respect to the Bosnian Serbs,\nthere were two ways to bring them to accept the Contact Group’s plan, through continued\nstrict political and economic isolation or by confirming that the various communities would\nenjoy equal rights with regard to the constitution. Addressing the question of lifting the\narms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina, the speaker cautioned that if the embargo\nwere lifted, diplomatic efforts would be jeopardized. In addition, UNPROFOR would be\nexposed to the consequences of offensive military action and reprisals. Such a measure\nwould lead to withdrawal, which would mean the end of assistance and protection for\nmany peoples. Moreover, a lifting of the arms embargo would intensify tensions between\nthe communities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the successor countries of the former\n 275\nYugoslavia.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation expressed concern at reports that the\npresent military escalation in Bosnia had resulted from continued deliveries of arms to\nthe Bosnian Government troops, in violation of resolution 713 (1993). Particularly\nalarming had been the use of the safe areas by those same troops to carry out attacks. The\nRussian Federation called on the Bosnian Government and all parties to reject attempts to\nsolve the problem by military means. In addition, it was necessary to introduce certain\nchanges into the concept and regime of the safe areas, taking into account the Secretary-\nGeneral’s recommendations contained in his report of 9 May 1994. Referring to the\nquestion of lifting the embargo, the speaker expressed the belief that such a step would be\nan extreme measure and should be considered only after all political means had been\nexhausted. He argued that lifting the embargo would have negative consequences for the\npolitical process, for the continued provision of humanitarian assistance, and for the\nactivities of UNPROFOR. 276\n\n\n The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the continued intransigence\nof the Bosnian Serbs represented by far the greatest obstacle on the path to peace in\n\n 275\n Ibid., pp. 4-6.\n 276\n Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n\n\n 184\n"
[185] "Bosnia. But the new readiness of Belgrade to back the Contact’s Group efforts and to\nisolate the Bosnian Serbs also offered an opportunity. What was asked from Belgrade\nwas that it took significant steps and recognized Croatia and Bosnia, maintained its\nsupport for the Contact Group plan, continued its embargo against the Bosnian Serbs and\nthrew its weight behind a peace plan for Croatia as well. The speaker further warned that\nthe progress achieved so far in the quest for peace would be endangered if the arms\nembargo were to be lifted. The United Kingdom therefore could not support the draft\n 277\nresolution before the Council.\n\n\n The representative of Senegal argued that the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina\nhad shown that sanctions, however effective, would not be sufficient to stem the hostile\ninclinations of the aggressor. Senegal, therefore, believed that the adoption of the\nproposed draft resolution, lifting the arms embargo, could make a decisive contribution to\nrestoring the balance of power. Referring to General Assembly resolution A/49/10, the\nspeaker noted that the General Assembly had urged the Council to fulfil its responsibility\nunder Article 24 of the Charter and to take appropriate steps to restore the sovereignty,\npolitical independence, territorial integrity and unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He\nnoted that the measures proposed in the draft resolution before the Council came in\nresponse to a renewed appeal by the General Assembly, most of whose members were of\nthe view that the non-application to the Bosnian and Croat parties of resolution 713\n(1991) constituted not a potential threat of wider conflict, but an easing of a burden which\nhad seriously hampered the ability of a Member of the United Nations to exercise its\ninherent right to individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter. In\n 278\nconclusion, his delegation fully supported the draft resolution before the Council.\n\n\n The representative of Germany, speaking on behalf of the European Union, stated\nthat Belgrade could significantly improve the prospects for a peaceful settlement by\ntaking a number of steps, including recognizing Bosnia and Croatia within their\ninternationally recognized borders, continuing to endorse the Contact Group plan,\n\n 277\n Ibid., pp. 7-9.\n 278\n Ibid., pp. 16-17.\n\n\n 185\n"
[186] "endorsing the ICFY plan for Croatia, and continuing to implement the sanctions against\nthe Bosnian Serbs. Referring to the question of lifting the arms embargo, the speaker\nstated that such a step must remain a last resort, to be used only once all avenues for a\npolitical settlement had been exhausted. 279\n\n\n The representative of Slovenia recalled that the embargo was imposed on the\nformer Yugoslavia back in 1991, when that former State still existed and had been\nextended to the successor States of the former Yugoslavia in a specific situation in 1992.\nSince that time almost everything had changed for each of the successor States and a\ndebate which would take into account the new realities was long overdue. The speaker\nnoted that while there were many reasons for keeping the arms embargo as a part of\nsanctions imposed by the Council, until the conditions for lifting these sanctions were\nfulfiled, there was a need to recognize the inapplicability of an arms embargo to those\nengaged in legitimate self-defence. The entire concept of collective security was based\nupon complementarity of self-defence and international action so as to provide effective\nprotection of States’ existence and their territorial integrity and political independence.\nHe further contended that in the case of his country, there was no justification for\ncontinuing the arms embargo. Slovenia was not, and had never been, involved in an\narmed conflict that prompted the imposition of that arms embargo. Therefore, it would be\nnot only appropriate, but necessary for the Council to declare that relevant paragraphs of\n 280\nresolutions 713 (1991), 724 (1991), 727 (1992) and 762 (1992) no longer applied.\n\n\n Referring to the question of lifting the arms embargo, the representative of the\nRepublic of Korea stated that his delegation shared the apprehensions of those States who\nwere concerned that lifting the embargo would aggravate the situation. For that reason,\nthe Republic of Korea had abstained in the voting the previous year on General Assembly\nresolution 48/88. In the most recent vote, however, on resolution 49/10, the Republic of\nKorea had registered an affirmative vote, with the view that as the international\ncommunity had failed to secure peace in the region, it had a moral and political obligation\n\n 279\n Ibid., pp. 19-20.\n 280\n Ibid., pp. 22-24.\n\n\n 186\n"
[187] "to respond to the legitimate concern of the Bosnian people for their very existence. His\ndelegation noted that the draft resolution provided for the deferral of such lifting for a\nperiod of six months, which it believed to be a “judicious step”. It emphasized that the\ndraft was not meant to lead to an intensified arms struggle in Bosnia, but to bring armed\nhostilities to an end. The international community must exert more pressure on the\nBosnian Serbs, and the Republic of Korea believed that the prospect of lifting the arms\n 281\nembargo was the most persuasive weapon against “Serbian intransigence”.\n\n\n The representative of Croatia noted that the balance of power which was a\nprerequisite for a political settlement and for a just and lasting peace in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, had not been achieved through the measures thus far taken by the\ninternational community. The Council must now plan for new mechanisms that would\nimpose peace such as the lifting of arms embargo against the Federation of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina. The lifting of the arms embargo would be not a step towards war but a\n“leap towards peace”, moving the region towards a new, desirable balance. Referring to\nthe situation in Croatia, the speaker welcomed the inclusion of a paragraph in the\npreamble of the draft resolution before the Council which called into question the\ncontinued application of the arms embargo against Croatia. The speaker argued that since\nthe draft resolution deferred the lifting of the arms embargo for six months, it was only\nlogical to make his Government, too, eligible for a lifting of the arms embargo in six\n 282\nmonths.\n\n\n Mr. Djokic argued that calls for lifting the arms embargo against the Bosnian\nMuslims and carrying out air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs could only lead to an\nescalation of the conflict. Noting that the effort to resolve the crisis had been ineffective\nso far, he contended that the urgent and unconditional lifting of all sanctions against the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia would create the conditions for the establishment of an\nearly, just and lasting peace. Yugoslavia was ready to accept any solution agreed to by\nthe warring parties, on the basis of full equality and respect for the legitimate rights of all\n\n 281\n Ibid., pp. 24-25.\n 282\n Ibid., pp. 26-27.\n\n\n 187\n"
[188] "three Bosnian peoples and it stood ready to recognize the former Yugoslav republics once\nall outstanding issues had been resolved. It was convinced that the Contact Group plan\nwas the only viable way to end the crisis and establish a just and lasting solution and it\ncalled on all sides to cease immediately and unconditionally all military activities and to\n 283\nabide strictly by the cease-fire agreement.\n\n\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina questioned what option was left to\nhis country. If the choice were between retaining UNPROFOR and the lifting of arms\nembargo, then his country would choose the latter. The choice, however, might not be\nbetween one and the other. Rather, both options might be possible. His Government\nbelieved that UNPROFOR’s efforts could be supplemented by measures that effectively\nallowed the Bosnians to defend themselves by the lifting of the arms embargo or, through\nan overall peacemaking process. Noting that his country had made many concessions in\nthe past, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina believed that one more\ncompromise had been made by asking the Council to lift the arms embargo and to defer\nthe application of that decision for six months, to give the international community and\nthe Contact Group a last opportunity to compel the Bosnian Serbs to accept the peace\nplan. 284\n\n\n The President, speaking in her capacity as representative of the United States,\nstated that her Government had presented a draft resolution that would lift the arms\nembargo after six months if the Bosnian Serbs had not yet agreed to a settlement. She\nargued that there were no grounds in justice or law for denying the Government of\nBosnia the right to defend itself. Bosnia and Herzegovina had not attacked its neighbours,\nsupported international terrorism or otherwise abused its responsibilities as a sovereign\nPower. The real question before the Council was whether it would at long last translate\nwords into actions, for it was only bold action that could provide the pressure necessary\nto end the war. The speaker argued that, under the draft resolution, arms would not begin\nto flow into Bosnia for a period of six months. During that time, the capacity of the\n\n 283\n Ibid., pp. 31-34.\n 284\n Ibid., pp. 36-43 (Resumption 1).\n\n\n 188\n"
[189] "Bosnian Serbs to wage war could be limited through tighter sanctions. Moreover, the\nprospect that the embargo would be lifted if the Bosnian Serbs continued to reject the\npeace process should give them a “weighty” reason to accept the Contact Group’s\nproposed territorial arrangements. The United States was determined to proceed on a firm\ncourse. Debates in the Council and the General Assembly had indicated that a strong\nmajority of the United Nations membership supported lifting the arms embargo against\n 285\nBosnia.\n\n\n While several speakers 286 expressed support to the United States draft resolution\non the lifting of the arms embargo and a number 287 of them called for the strengthening\nof UNPROFOR mandate, others 288 opposed the lifting or expressed doubts about it,\narguing that it would lead to the disintegration of UNPROFOR and that efforts should\nfocused on a political solution.\n\n\n\n\n Decision of 13 November 1994 (3456th meeting): statement by the President\n\n By a letter 289 dated 11 November 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina transmitted a letter of the same\ndate from the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In that letter, the President reported\nthat the situation in and around the Bihac “safe area” continued to deteriorate, and that\nnumerous attacks had been launched by rebel Serbs from the United Nations Protected\n\n\n\n 285\n Ibid., pp. 68-70 (Resumption 2).\n 286\n Ibid., Pakistan, pp. 2-4; Oman, pp. 12-13; Senegal, pp. 16-17; Croatia, Malaysia, pp. 17-18; Turkey, pp.\n18-19; Brunei Darussalem, pp. 20-21; Afghanistan, pp. 21-22; Republic of Korea, pp. 24-25; Croatia, pp. 26-27;\nBangladesh, pp. 27-28; Iran, pp. 29-30; Algeria, pp. 30-31; S/PV. 3454 (Resumption 1): Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp.\n36-43; Jordan, pp. 44-46; Morocco, pp. 46-48; Egypt, pp. 48-50; Cambodia, pp. 51-52; Nicaragua, pp. 52-53; Albania,\npp. 53-54; Indonesia, pp. 54-55; S/PV. 3454 (Resumption 2): Sudan, pp. 58-59; Tunisia, pp. 59-60; Guinea-Bissau, pp.\n63-64; OIC, pp. 64-66; Thailand, p.66; Djibouti, pp. 67-68; the United States, pp. 68-70.\n 287\n Ibid., Malaysia, pp. 17-18; Turkey, pp. 18-19; Bangladesh, pp. 27-28; S/PV. 3454 (Resumption 2): OIC,\npp. 64-66.\n 288\n Ibid., France, pp. 4-6; the Russian Federation, pp. 6-7; United Kingdom, pp. 7-9; Czech Republic, pp. 9-\n10; New Zealand, pp. 10-12; Brazil, pp. 13-14; Spain, pp. 14-15; Germany (on behalf of the European Union), pp. 19-\n20; RFY, pp. 31-34; S/P.V 3454 (Resumption 1): Norway (on behalf of the Nordic countries), pp. 43-44; Ecuador, p.\n50; Honduras, p.56; S/PV. 3454 (Resumption 2): Canada, pp. 61-62; Bulgaria, pp. 62-63.\n 289\n S/1994/1283.\n\n\n 189\n"
[190] "Areas (UNPAs), inflicting heavy casualties upon the civilian population. In view of the\nsituation, he requested an emergency session of the Security Council.\n 290\n By a letter dated 12 November 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of Croatia transmitted a letter of the same date from the\nDeputy Prime Minister of Croatia. In that letter, the Deputy Prime Minister reported that\nthe situation in the UNPAs and in Bosnia and Herzegovina had deteriorated to such an\nextent that it warranted decisive and immediate action by the Security Council,\nUNPROFOR and NATO, and requested that the Council, at an emergency session,\nreview the overall situation in the area and consider the demands that had been elaborated\n 291\nin a letter dated 11 November 1994 from the representative of Croatia addressed to the\nPresident of the Security Council. Those demands included: (a) the extension of the\nexclusion zone régime in the occupied parts of Croatian territory; and (b) the engagement\nof NATO forces in the occupied territories and the airspace of Croatia, whenever Security\nCouncil and General Assembly resolutions were being violated.\n At its 3456th meeting, held on 13 November 1994 in response to the requests\ncontained in the above letters, the Council included the letters in its agenda. Following\nthe adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the\nright to vote. The President (United States) then drew the attention of the members of the\nCouncil to several documents 292 and stated that, after consultations among members of\nthe Security Council, she had been authorized to make the following statement 293 on\nbehalf of the Council:\n\n\n\n\n 290\n S/1994/1286.\n 291\n S/1994/1285.\n 292\n S/1994/1271, letter dated 9 November 1994 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\naddressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1994/1285, letter dated 11 November 1994 from the Chargé\nd’affaires a.i. of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council; and S/1994/1287, letter dated 12 November\nfrom the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting a\nletter dated 11 November 1994 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the\nPresident of the Security Council.\n 293\n S/PRST/1994/66.\n\n\n 190\n"
[191] " \"The Security Council views with alarm the escalation in recent fighting in the Bihac area\n and the flow of refugees and displaced persons resulting from it. It strongly urges all parties\n and others concerned to refrain from all hostile actions and to exercise the utmost restraint.\n \"The Council condemns any violation of the international border between the Republic of\n Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It demands that all parties and others\n concerned, in particular the so-called Krajina Serb forces, fully respect that border and refrain\n from hostile acts across it.\n \"The Council calls upon all parties and others concerned to abstain from any action that\n could cause a further escalation in the fighting.\n \"The Council demands that all parties and others concerned immediately ensure, in\n cooperation with the United Nations Protection Force, unimpeded access for humanitarian\n supplies.\n \"The Council expresses full support for the efforts of the Force and calls on the parties to\n respect the safety and security of the Force, its unimpeded access to supplies and its freedom\n of movement.\n \"The Council emphasizes the significance of its resolutions on safe areas and demands\n that all concerned facilitate implementation of these resolutions, and in this connection\n requests the Secretary-General to report as soon as possible on any further measures to\n stabilize the situation in and around the safe area of Bihac, drawing on the experience of the\n Force in Bihac and the other safe areas.\"\n\n\n Decision of 18 November 1994 (3460th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3460th meeting, on 18 November 1994, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate in\nthe discussion without the right to vote. The President (United States) drew the attention\nof the members of the Council to several documents 294 and stated that, after consultations\namong members of the Security Council, she had been authorized to make the following\n 295\nstatement on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n 294\n S/1994/1289, 1292, 1294 and 1300, letters dated 14, 14, 15 and 16 November 1994, respectively, from\nthe representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council; and S/1994/1295,\nletter dated 15 November 1994 from the representative of Iran addressed to the Secretary-General.\n 295\n S/PRST/1994/69.\n\n\n 191\n"
[192] " \"The Security Council condemns in the strongest possible terms the attack on the safe\n area of Bihac by aircraft belonging to the so-called Krajina Serb forces, which involved the\n dropping of napalm and cluster bombs in south-west Bihac, in clear violation of the status of\n Bihac as a safe area. This violation is all the more grave because of the threat it poses to the\n United Nations Protection Force troops deployed in the safe area of Bihac.\n \"The Council also condemns the shelling by the so-called Krajina Serb forces from the\n United Nations Protected Areas as a flagrant violation of the territorial integrity of the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and relevant Council resolutions. It demands that all\n parties and others concerned, in particular the so-called Krajina Serb forces, cease\n immediately all hostile actions across the international border between the Republic of\n Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n \"The Council further demands an immediate end to all military activity which endangers\n the lives of the Force personnel deployed in the Bihac area and demands that all parties and\n others concerned, in particular the so-called Krajina Serb forces, restore the freedom of\n movement of Force personnel in and around the Bihac area, including their unimpeded access\n to supplies.\n \"The Council calls on all parties and others concerned to refrain from any hostile action\n that could cause further escalation in the fighting, and also calls on them to achieve urgently a\n cease-fire in the Bihac area.\"\n\n\n Decision of 19 November 1994 (3462nd meeting): resolution 959 (1994)\n\n At its 3462nd meeting, on 19 November 1994, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the\nadoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, Croatia and Germany, at their request, to participate in the discussion\nwithout the right to vote. The President (United States) then drew the attention of the\nCouncil members to the text of a draft resolution 296 submitted by France, Germany, the\nRussian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.\n At the meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that it was\nhis delegation’s understanding that the draft resolution was designed to facilitate\n\n 296\n S/1994/1317.\n\n\n 192\n"
[193] "UNPROFOR’s efforts under its peace-keeping mandate. Bosnia and Herzegovina\nsupported all such efforts in keeping with its territorial integrity and sovereignty and the\ninterests of its citizens. Until the Bosnian Serbs accepted the Contact Group plan and\nuntil there was a comprehensive effort at peacemaking, the safe areas concept would only\nbe a secondary tool to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s responsibilities and efforts at defence\nand peacemaking. Referring to the issue of Sarajevo, the speaker noted that his delegation\nfavoured the demilitarization of that city, consistent with the Contact Group plan. Bosnia\nand Herzegovina was prepared to evaluate options for other safe areas that would not\n 297\nundermine its territorial integrity or sovereignty.\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 959 (1994). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia\n and Herzegovina, in particular its resolutions 824 (1993) of 6 May 1993 and 836 (1993) of 4\n June 1993,\n Reaffirming the need for a lasting peace settlement to be signed by all the Bosnian parties\n and implemented in good faith by them, and condemning the decision by the Bosnian Serb\n party to refuse to accept the proposed territorial settlement,\n Reaffirming also the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Expressing special concern about the escalation in recent fighting in the Bihac pocket,\n including in, from and around the safe areas, and the flow of refugees and displaced persons\n resulting from it,\n Bearing in mind the importance of facilitating the return of refugees and displaced\n persons to their homes,\n Taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General of 11 March and 16 March 1994 and\n of his recommendations concerning the definition and implementation of the concept of safe\n areas in his report of 9 May 1994,\n Recalling the statements by the President of the Security Council of 6 April, 30 June, 13\n November and 18 November 1994,\n\n\n 297\n S/PV.3462, pp. 2-3.\n\n\n 193\n"
[194] " Reaffirming its previous calls on all parties and others concerned to refrain from any\nhostile action that could cause further escalation in the fighting and to achieve urgently a\ncease-fire in the Bihac area,\n Reiterating the importance of maintaining Sarajevo, the capital of the Republic of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina, as a united city and a multicultural, multi-ethnic and plurireligious centre,\nand noting in this context the positive contribution that agreement between the parties on the\ndemilitarization of Sarajevo could make to this end, to the restoration of normal life in\nSarajevo and to achieving an overall settlement, consistent with the peace plan of the Contact\nGroup,\n Taking note of the communiqué on Bosnia and Herzegovina issued on 30 July 1994 by\nthe Troika of the European Union and the foreign ministers of the Russian Federation, the\nUnited Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America and,\nin particular, of their commitment to strengthen the regime of safe areas,\n 1. Expresses its grave concern over the recent hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 2. Condemns any violation of the international border between the Republic of Croatia\nand the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and demands that all parties and others\nconcerned, in particular the so-called Krajina Serb forces, fully respect the border and refrain\nfrom hostile acts across it;\n 3. Expresses its full support for the efforts by the United Nations Protection Force to\nensure implementation of the Security Council resolutions on safe areas;\n 4. Calls upon all the Bosnian parties to respect fully the status and functions of the Force\nand to cooperate with it in its efforts to ensure implementation of the Security Council\nresolutions on safe areas, and demands that all parties and others concerned show maximum\nrestraint and put an end to all hostile actions in and around the safe areas in order to ensure\nthat the Force can carry out its mandate in this regard effectively and safely;\n 5. Requests the Secretary-General to update his recommendations on modalities of the\nimplementation of the concept of safe areas and to encourage the Force, in cooperation with\nthe Bosnian parties, to continue the efforts to achieve agreements on strengthening the\nregimes of safe areas taking into account the specific situation in each case, and recalls its\nrequest to the Secretary-General made in the statement by the President of the Security\nCouncil of 13 November 199438 to report as soon as possible on any further measures to\nstabilize the situation in and around the safe area of Bihac;\n 6. Further requests the Secretary-General and the Force to intensify efforts aimed at\nreaching agreement with the Bosnian parties on the modalities of demilitarization of\n\n\n 194\n"
[195] " Sarajevo, bearing in mind the need for the restoration of normal life to the city and for free\n access to and from the city by land and air and the free and unimpeded movement of people,\n goods and services in and around the city in line with its resolution 900 (1994), particularly\n paragraph 2 thereof;\n 7. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the present\n resolution by 1 December 1994;\n 8. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of New Zealand noted that, while his\ndelegation had voted in favour of the resolution just adopted, it nevertheless retained\nsome reservations. Those reservations stemmed from the belief that the safe areas had\nbeen restrictively implemented on a number of occasions, contrary to the spirit and\nintention of resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993). Moreover, his delegation had\nreservations about many of the conclusions of the Secretary-General’s reports. New\nZealand believed that any updating, as called for in operative paragraph 5 of the\nresolution would, require some radical new thinking rather than simple updating. It\nfurther believed that the Contact Group plan had significantly changed the underlying\nparameters against which the concept of safe areas should be reviewed. The Security\nCouncil had approved and endorsed the Contact Group plan, but any proposals for\ndefining the geographical scope of future demilitarized safe areas, if they were to meet\nwith consensus in the Council, should envisage sufficiently large areas for the population\nto lead a normal life. Moreover, the overall framework for such future demilitarized safe\n 298\nareas should reinforce, not undermine, the areas envisaged in the Contact Group plan.\n\n\n Decision of 26 November 1994 (3466th meeting): statement by the President\n 299\n By a letter dated 25 November 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina requested an emergency meeting\nof the Council, in view of the continuing attacks on, and occupation of, the Bihac safe\narea, by the so-called Bosnian/Croatian Serb forces.\n\n 298\n Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n 299\n S/1994/1342.\n\n\n 195\n"
[196] " At its 3466th meeting, held on 26 November 1994 in response to the request\ncontained in the above letter from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the\nCouncil included that letter in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\nCouncil invited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President (United\n 300\nStates) drew the attention of the members of the Council to a number of documents\nand stated that, after consultations among members of the Security Council, she had been\nauthorized to make the following statement 301 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council reiterates its deep concern over the deteriorating situation in the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly the Bihac region and especially in the safe\n area of Bihac. It condemns in the strongest possible terms all the violations of the safe area\n of Bihac by whomsoever committed, in particular the flagrant and blatant entry into the safe\n area by the Bosnian Serb forces. It also notes with concern the hostilities around Velika\n Kladusa. It demands that all parties and others concerned agree to and implement an\n immediate and unconditional cease-fire in the Bihac region, in particular in and around the\n safe area of Bihac. It calls on all parties to intensify negotiations for a cease-fire and a\n cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in\n pursuit of the territorial settlement for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina proposed by\n the Contact Group as part of an overall peace settlement.\n \"The Council expresses its full support for the continued efforts by United Nations\n personnel to achieve a cease-fire in the Bihac area, as well as for the efforts of the United\n Nations Protection Force to implement its mandate to deter attacks against the safe areas.\n The Council insists on the withdrawal of all Bosnian Serb military forces from the Bihac safe\n area and on the need to ensure full respect by all parties of the safe areas, particularly for the\n benefit of the civilian population. The Council calls on all parties and others concerned fully\n to cooperate with these efforts. The Council underlines the terms of resolution 836 (1993) of\n 4 June 1993, which enable the Force to carry out its mandate in relation to safe areas.\n\n\n 300\n S/1994/1319, 1325, 1328, 1343, 1346, 1347 and 1348, letters dated 19, 21, 22, 25, 26, 26 and 26\nNovember 1994, respectively, from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the\nSecurity Council; S/1994/1327, letter dated 22 November 1994 from the representative of Croatia addressed to the\nPresident of the Security Council; S/1994/1329, letter dated 22 November 1994 from the Chargé d’affaires of\nYugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security Council; and S/1994/1345, letter dated 25 November 1994 from\nthe representative of the the Russian Federation n Federation addressed to the Secretary-General.\n 301\n S/PRST/1994/71.\n\n\n 196\n"
[197] " \"The Council commends the Force, including those of its personnel serving in the Bihac\n region, in particular the Bangladeshi troops, for the important contributions they are making\n under the most difficult conditions. It calls on the parties and all others concerned to ensure\n freedom of movement for personnel of the Force and the Office of the United Nations High\n Commissioner for Refugees and access to necessary supplies for the Force and the civilian\n population throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia.\n \"The Council condemns violations of the international border between the Republic of\n Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the so-called Krajina Serb forces and\n others concerned in the Bihac region. It demands that all hostile acts across that international\n border cease immediately, and also demands that all so-called Krajina Serb forces withdraw\n immediately from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n \"The Council reiterates its full support for the proposed territorial settlement for the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina which has been put by the Contact Group to the parties\n as part of an overall peace settlement. The Council reiterates its condemnation of the\n Bosnian Serb party's refusal to accept the proposed territorial settlement and demands that\n that party accept it unconditionally and in full.\n \"The Council will monitor compliance with the terms of the present statement and react\n appropriately.\"\n\n\n Decision of 29 November 1994 (3471st meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3471st meeting, on 29 November 1994, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (United\n 302\nStates) drew the attention of the members of the Council to several documents and\nstated that, after consultations among members of the Security Council, she had been\nauthorized to make the following statement 303 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council reiterates its concern over the continuing conflict in the Republic\n of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including in the Bihac region and in particular in and around the\n safe area of Bihac. It remains concerned over the blatant violation of the Bihac safe area.\n\n\n\n 302\n S/1994/1348 and 1351, letters dated 26 and 28 November 1994 from the representative of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council.\n 303\n S/PRST/1994/74.\n\n\n 197\n"
[198] " The Council remains determined fully to support efforts to negotiate a peaceful resolution of\n that conflict consistent with its previous resolutions and the proposals of the Contact Group.\n \"The Council expresses its full support for the efforts of United Nations officials to\n stabilize the situation in and around the safe area of Bihac. It takes note with satisfaction of\n the proposal put to the parties by United Nations officials for an immediate and unconditional\n cease-fire in the Bihac region to be followed by a cease-fire throughout the territory of the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the interposition of the United Nations Protection Force\n in the Bihac safe area, a complete demilitarization of the safe area involving the withdrawal\n from it by all military forces and opening corridors for humanitarian relief. The Council\n welcomes the acceptance by the Bosnian Government of this proposal and calls on the\n Bosnian Serb party also to accept it.\n \"The Council welcomes the impending visit of the Secretary-General to the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina. It demands that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully\n with the Secretary-General's efforts to stabilize the situation in and around the safe area of\n Bihac and throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and ensure the\n security of the Force as it implements its mandate.\"\n\n\n Decision of 2 December 1994 (3475th meeting): rejection of a draft resolution\n\n At its 3475th meeting, on 2 December 1994, the Council resumed its consideration\nof the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,\nEgypt and Turkey, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to\nvote. The President (Rwanda) then drew the attention of the Council members to the text\nof a draft resolution 304 submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Djibouti, Egypt,\nNigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Rwanda and Turkey, and to a number of other documents. 305\n\n\n 304\n S/1994/1358.\n 305\n S/1994/1246 and 1372, letters dated 2 November and 1 December 1994 from the Secretary-General\naddressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the reports of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering\nCommittee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, concerning the operations of the International\nConference’s Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); S/1994/1375, letter dated 2\nDecember 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the report\nof the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the\nconclusion of an Economic Agreement between the Croatian Government and the Serb local authorities; S/1994/1355,\nletter dated 25 November 1994 from the representative of Pakistan addressed to the President of the Security Council;\nS/1994/1361, letter dated 28 November 1994 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia addressed to the President\nof the Security Council; and S/1994/1364 and 1366, letters dated 30 November 1994 from the representative of Bosnia\n\n\n 198\n"
[199] " Under the draft resolution, in its preambular part, the Council, inter alia, would\nhave: expressed concern about the continuing threat to international peace and security\nposed by the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the situation in the UNPAs in\nCroatia, and at the military activities by the local Serb paramilitary forces within the\nUNPAs in Croatia against Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bihac safe area. In the\noperative part of the draft resolution, the Council, inter alia, would have: (i) reconfirmed\nthat the requirements of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including in particular\nparagraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993) and resolution 943 (1994), should be strictly\napplied in respect of all goods crossing the border between the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina, including goods\ndestined for the UNPAs in Croatia; and (ii) demanded that the provisions of paragraph 12\nof resolution 820 (1993) be applied strictly and in full on the international border between\nCroatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and on the\ninternational border between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in regard to the\nimport, export, and transshipment of all commodities with the exception of essential\nhumanitarian supplies, including medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by\ninternational humanitarian agencies.\n At the meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina contended that the\nneed for the draft resolution had been brought about not only because resolution 820\n(1993), and specifically paragraph 12 of that resolution, had not been implemented, but\nalso because the monitoring Mission of the International Conference on the Former\nYugoslavia (ICFY) itself had facilitated the violation of that paragraph, as indicated in\nthe 2 November report of the International Conference’s Co-Chairmen. It was\nunfortunate that because of an absence of will on the part of UNPROFOR command to\nimplement Council resolutions, the Council had, for the second time in as many weeks, to\nconsider mandates already in existence. Nevertheless, the Bosnian delegation would\nwelcome the draft resolution, as it sent a message that strategic resources such as fuel\ncould not be used for the pursuit of war, violations of international law, nor for the\nbenefit of the Bosnian Serbs. The draft resolution would also help to reinforce the\n\n\n\nand Herzegovina addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council, respectively.\n\n\n 199\n"
[200] "importance of the delivery of humanitarian aid. The failure to adopt the draft resolution,\nhowever, would signify an evasion of responsibility. 306\n The representative of Croatia stated that his delegation believed that the draft\nresolution would send the message that the international community was willing to take\nsteps to minimize the suffering of the civilian population in the region. Contending that\nthe Security Council had not been addressing adequately the violation of the border\nbetween Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the speaker stated that the result was the\npromotion of a de facto unification of the local Croatian Serb and Bosnian Serb parties,\ninto a single military and territorial entity. The draft resolution would dispel any\npossibility of such unification by reinforcing principles already established in resolution\n820 (1993). Moreover, the draft would send a message that strategic resources, such as\nfuel, directed to the local Croatian Serb party, could not be used for the benefit of the\nBosnian Serbs, nor by the local Croatian Serb party to violate the territorial integrity of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, and that arrangements to supply the Croatian Serb party must\ncease unless there had been approval by the Croatian Government. Noting that some\ndelegations had expressed the view in prior consultations that the draft resolution would\nnegatively affect the economic reintegration agreement between the Croatian\nGovernment and the local Croatian Serb party, the speaker argued that, on the contrary,\nthe draft resolution would promote the implementation of the agreement. The\nimplementation of the agreement would only be possible when the borders were sealed\nand the local Croatian Serb party had decided to cooperate with the Croatian Government\nto satisfy its economic and humanitarian needs. Thus, the adoption of the draft resolution\n 307\nwould give political support to the implementation of the agreement.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of Nigeria noted that the primary\nobjective of the draft resolution was to reaffirm and clarify the provisions of previous\nresolutions on the movement of non-humanitarian goods across the international borders\nin the areas of conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The draft would not create new\nmeasures. Rather, it would strengthen the implementation of the relevant resolutions\n\n 306\n S/PV.3475, pp. 2-4.\n 307\n Ibid., pp. 4-5.\n\n\n 200\n"
[201] "already adopted. Nigeria also believed that the draft would create neither new incentives\nnor disincentives. It was Nigeria’s view that the draft would not negatively affect the\neconomic agreement, but would facilitate efforts on the ground, such as the attempts of\nthe Contact Group to gain the acceptance of the peace plan by the Bosnian Serbs. 308\n\n\n The representative of China, whilst noting that his delegation understood the\nconcern of the sponsors of the draft resolution over the worsening situation in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, stated that it could not agree to invoking Chapter VII of the United Nations\nCharter for sanctions in the region of the former Yugoslavia. China believed that such a\nstep would only further aggravate the confrontation and would not be conducive to a\nfinal, comprehensive political solution to the problems in the region of the former\nYugoslavia. Based on its stated position on resolution 820 (1993), China would have\ndifficulties with regard to the portion of the draft resolution that sought to reaffirm the\nrelevant elements of resolution 820 (1993). The Chinese delegation would therefore\n 309\nabstain in the voting on the draft resolution.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation expressed regret that the draft\nresolution had been brought to the vote. It was his delegation’s view that tightening\nrestrictions against the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs would in fact lead to a “tightening of\nscrews” in the implementation of resolution 820 (1993), whose basic purpose had been to\nstrengthen the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The speaker argued\nthat there could hardly have been a more untimely moment for the submission of the draft\nresolution, given that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had begun\nto cooperate with international efforts, such as those of the Contact Group, had\nunconditionally supported the territorial settlement plan, had closed its border to all\nprohibited deliveries of goods to the Bosnian Serbs, and was cooperating with the ICFY\nMission. The Russian Federation was therefore of the opinion that the positive approach\nof the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia deserved further encouragement, inter alia by\n\n\n\n 308\n Ibid., p. 7.\n 309\n Ibid., pp. 9-10.\n\n\n 201\n"
[202] "suspending the applicability of resolution 820 (1993). Accordingly, it had no choice but\nto vote against the draft resolution.310\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and received 13 votes in favour, one\nagainst (The Russian Federation) and one abstention (China). The draft therefore failed of\nadoption, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United States stated that the draft\nresolution would have reaffirmed decisions already taken by the Council. It would have\naddressed a serious discrepancy between the requirements of resolution 943 (1994) and\nactual practice, and more specifically the transshipment of prohibited goods from the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) through Bosnia to the UNPAs\nin Croatia. The draft’s failure to pass was regrettable, but that did not change the fact that\na strict régime of economic measures against the Bosnian Serbs was already embodied in\nbinding Council resolutions. The United States would continue its efforts to ensure the\nfirm application of those measures, in order to persuade the Bosnian Serbs that\n 311\nacceptance of the Contact Group plan was in their best interests and rejection was not.\n\n\n Decision of 11 December 1994 (3478th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3478th meeting, on 11 December 1994, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate in\nthe discussion without the right to vote. The President (Rwanda) then drew the attention\n 312\nof the members of the Council to a letter dated 12 December 1994 from the\nrepresentative of Bangladesh addressed to the President of the Security Council and\n\n\n\n\n 310\n Ibid., pp. 10-11.\n 311\n Ibid., p. 11.\n 312\n S/1994/1414.\n\n\n 202\n"
[203] "stated that, after consultations among members of the Security Council, he had been\nauthorized to make the following statement 313 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council strongly condemns the deliberate attack on Bangladeshi United\n Nations peace-keepers on 12 December 1994 in Velika Kladusa, in the region of Bihac in the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The attacked personnel of the United Nations\n Protection Force were travelling in an armoured personnel carrier, unmistakably carrying\n clear United Nations markings. It was hit by a wire-guided anti-tank missile resulting in one\n death and injuries to four other Bangladeshi personnel.\n \"The Council expresses profound regret at the casualties suffered by the United Nations\n peace-keepers as a result of this unprovoked and dastardly attack. It wishes to convey its\n deep condolences to the Government of Bangladesh as well as to the families of the affected\n soldiers.\n \"The Council endorses the protest that the Force has made to the Abdic forces and to the\n local Serb authorities in Knin, and its warning to the authorities in Pale.\n \"The Council is outraged at this incident of direct attack on the Force personnel and\n demands that such attacks do not recur. It warns the perpetrators of the attack that their\n heinous act of violence carries corresponding individual responsibility.\"\n\n\n Decision of 6 January 1995 (3486th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3486th meeting, on 6 January 1995, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right\nto vote. The President (Argentina) drew the attention of the members of the Council to\nseveral documents 314 and stated that, after consultations among members of the Security\n 315\nCouncil, he had been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the\nCouncil:\n\n\n 313\n S/PRST/1994/79.\n 314\n S/1995/8, letter dated 6 January 1995 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the\nCouncil, transmitting the text of the Comprehensive Cease-fire Agreement, signed on 23 December 1994 and the\nAgreement on Complete Cessation of Hostilities, signed on 31 December 1994; S/1994/1389, report of the Secretary-\nGeneral pursuant to resolution 959 (1994); S/1994/1452, letter dated 27 December 1994 from the representative of\nBosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council.\n 315\n S/PRST/1995/1.\n\n\n 203\n"
[204] " \"The Security Council welcomes the agreements between the Bosnian parties on a\n ceasefire and on a complete cessation of hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina concluded on 23 and 31 December 1994. It commends the efforts of all who\n worked to achieve them.\n \"The Council stresses the importance it attaches to immediate and full compliance with\n the agreements. It attaches the highest priority at this juncture to the timely completion of the\n various steps envisaged in the agreement on a complete cessation of hostilities. It looks to the\n parties and others concerned to cooperate fully with the United Nations Protection Force in\n their implementation. The Council calls upon all forces to cease fighting around Bihac. It\n supports efforts in train to strengthen the Force, and encourages Member States to make\n available the personnel and equipment needed for the Force to supervise and monitor the\n agreements.\n \"The Council will continue its consideration of all aspects of the crisis in Bosnia and\n Herzegovina and of the report of the Secretary-General of 1 December 1994.\n \"The Council deems it imperative to intensify efforts under the auspices of the Contact\n Group to achieve an overall settlement on the basis of the acceptance of the Contact Group\n peace plan as a starting point. It will give its full support to such efforts.\"\n\n\n Decision of 12 January 1995 (3487th meeting): resolution 970 (1995)\n\n By a letter 316 dated 4 January 1995 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General transmitted the report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering\nCommittee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, concerning the\noperations of the ICTY’s Mission to the FRY. The report contained the certification\nreferred to in paragraph 3 of resolution 943 (1994). 317\n At its 3487th meeting, on 12 January 1995, the Council included the above letter\nin its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Malaysia, Pakistan and\n\n\n 316\n S/1995/6.\n 317\n In paragraph 3 of resolution 943 (1994), the Council requested that every 30 days the Secretary-General\nsubmit to the Council a report as to whether the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee had certified that the FRY\nwas effectively implementing its decision to close the border between the FRY and Bosnia and Herzegovina with\nrespect to all goods except for humanitarian needs.\n\n\n 204\n"
[205] "Turkey, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The\nCouncil also invited Ambassador Dragomir Djokic, at his request, to address the Council\nin the course of the subsequent discussion. The President (Argentina) then drew the\nattention of the Council members to the text of a draft resolution318 submitted by the\n 319\nCzech Republic, France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, as well as to a letter\ndated 11 January 1995 from the representative of Morocco addressed to the President of\nthe Security Council, transmitting a note by the OIC Contact Group concerning the report\nof the Co-Chairmen.\n At the meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, noting that the\ndraft resolution before the Council would extend, for a further one-hundred days, the\nsuspension of certain aspects of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n(Serbia and Montenegro) contained in resolution 943 (1994), pointed out that none of the\nobjectives sought by that resolution had been realized. Moreover, there had been counter-\nproductive consequences due to the fact that mechanisms established to monitor the\nborder and implement resolution 943 (1994) had been flawed, enabling the transport of\nfuel that allowed the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs to carry out aggression against the\nBihac region and to pose a threat to UNPROFOR personnel. Nevertheless, Bosnia and\nHerzegovina welcomed the elements of the draft resolution that were designed to\nstrengthen the effectiveness of the border monitoring mission. It also welcomed the\nclarification requiring that the transshipment of goods or personnel through or to Bosnia\nand Herzegovina and Croatia be approved by the respective Government. Bosnia and\nHerzegovina’s endorsement of the draft was, however, tempered by the following. First,\nthe monitoring border mission should be provided with adequate resources and a\ncommand structure that would genuinely seal and monitor the border. Second, the\nCouncil should not reward Belgrade with a further suspension of aspects of the sanctions\nrégime unless it had recognized the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina and the other former Yugoslav Republics. Third, the cross-border\n 320\naggression being carried out by Croatian Serbs must stop.\n\n\n 318\n S/1995/21.\n 319\n S/1995/30.\n 320\n S/PV.3487, pp. 2-4.\n\n\n 205\n"
[206] " The representative of Croatia stated that the draft resolution before the Council\ncontained elements that would be of great benefit to the peace process in Croatia and in\nthe region in general. He noted that paragraph 3 of the draft extended the Yugoslav-\nBosnian border blockade so that it would affect Croatia, meaning that Belgrade would not\nbe able to send non-humanitarian assistance to the occupied territories of Croatia via the\nBosnia and Herzegovina border, without consequences. Furthermore, should the Belgrade\nauthorities choose to violate paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993), in that way, the\nCouncil would be left with no alternative but to reinstate the sanctions suspended by\nresolution 943 (1994). The speaker, however, pointed out that the extension of the border\nblockade was incomplete, because the border between the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Sector East in Croatia’s UNPAs could still be\nused by Belgrade without consequences. He contended that a complete blockade of the\nborder between Serbia and Montenegro and Croatia would further the peace process in\nCroatia. Noting that a political solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina did not appear likely\nin the near future, he argued that by addressing the situation in Croatia first, the\ninternational community could help Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the short term, by\nreallocating the necessary additional UNPROFOR resources into that country, and, in the\nlong term, by creating conditions of balance favourable to continuing with the Contact\n 321\nGroup Plan. The draft resolution was a small but important step in that direction.\n\n\n The representative of Turkey said that his delegation had serious reservations\nabout the draft resolution. It believed that the monitoring mechanism established under\nresolution 943 (1994) was not effective. Despite the certification provided by the ICFY\nMission monitoring the border, independent international sources acknowledged that the\nborder continued to be violated, with the transport of strategic material and personnel. It\nwas therefore extremely important that the monitoring mechanisms be strengthened and\nthe number of monitors increased. Noting that the ICFY Mission had approved fuel\nshipments to the Croatian Serbs, the speaker contended that such a measure violated the\n\n\n 321\n Ibid., pp. 4-6.\n\n\n 206\n"
[207] "territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, as well as\nresolution 820 (1993). He further argued that the fuel shipments had enabled the Croatian\nSerbs to undertake aggression against the safe area of Bihac. Turkey hoped that the\nadoption of the draft resolution would contribute to the termination of such shipments\nand it looked forward to the strengthening of mechanisms for deterring and reporting\n 322\nviolations.\n\n\n The representative of Egypt was of the view that the Council should look into\ntaking immediate, firm and effective measures to implement earlier resolutions on Bosnia\nand Herzegovina before adopting new ones on the subject. He recalled that for years the\nCouncil had tried different means of exerting pressure on the “aggressor responsible for\nthe outbreak and continuation of the military confrontation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.\nBut the Serbian party remained intransigent. It was therefore necessary for the\ninternational community to continue to exert pressure, including through the application\nof sanctions, until the Bosnian Serb party engaged with the peace plan. Egypt called upon\nthe Council to adopt a draft resolution, under which international military observer forces\nwould be deployed along the borders between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), in order to ensure effective monitoring\nand the cutting of the supply line between Serbia and Montenegro and the Bosnian\n 323\nSerbs.\n\n\n The representative of Pakistan expressed the belief that it was essential that the\nresolutions of the Security Council be effectively enforced, in particular those authorizing\nthe use of force and air strikes. The lack of resolve to implement those resolutions had\nemboldened the Serbs in their “intransigence” and had enabled them to continue to\nassault the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pakistan\nreiterated the decision of the Seventh Islamic Summit Conference, held in Casablanca\nfrom 11 to 15 December 1994, which had expressed opposition to the lifting or easing of\nsanctions against Serbia and Montenegro until it had satisfied the following conditions:\n\n 322\n Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n 323\n Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n\n\n 207\n"
[208] "first, the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina within its internationally recognized\nborders; second, the acceptance of United Nations forces on the border to undertake\neffective monitoring; and third, the implementation of the Contact Group peace plan,\nincluding the full withdrawal from all occupied territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 324\n\n\n Mr. Djokic contended that his Government had fulfiled all the obligations and met\nall the conditions set by the relevant Security Council resolutions. Therefore the decision\nby the Council to extend the partial suspension of sanctions for another 100 days and to\nput forward new conditionalities and restrictions was very disappointing. References in\nthe draft resolution to the export of products from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to\nthe Krajina Serbs had nothing to do with the primary objective of the closure of the\nborder, which was to influence the Bosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group’s plan.\nRather, it represented an attempt to impose new conditions on the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia. The draft resolution was not a mere extension of the partial suspension of the\nsanctions but rather called for the cessation of practically all economic relations between\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Krajina Serbs. Moreover, it sought to exact\nan indirect recognition of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was unacceptable\nbefore a political solution had been accepted by all parties to the conflict. The speaker\nfurther argued that, during the preceding one-hundred days, the limited suspension of\nsanctions had not been entirely fulfiled. Despite a call by resolution 943 (1994) to the\nsanctions Committee to adopt streamlined procedures for expediting its consideration of\napplications for exemptions for legitimate humanitarian assistance, the Committee had in\n 325\nfact resorted to stricter implementation of the sanctions.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of Germany stated that, in order to\nextend the provisions of resolution 943 (1994), the Council must decide whether the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia had closed the border effectively and whether it had\nsustained its course with regard to accepting the Contact Group plan and isolating the\nBosnian Serbs. The answer to both of those questions was “a sober yes”. Since the\n\n 324\n Ibid., pp. 8-9.\n 325\n Ibid., pp. 10-12.\n\n\n 208\n"
[209] "adoption of resolution 943 (1994), however, the provision of fuel originating from the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia had facilitated the military activities of the Krajina Serb\nforces, who continued to be active in cross-border attacks on the Bihac area. That\nsituation was unacceptable and Germany demanded that all Krajina Serb forces withdraw\nfrom Bosnian territory. Germany had supported the inclusion in the draft of new\nprovisions to cut off the shipment of fuel and other non-humanitarian supplies via Bosnia\nto the UNPAs. It therefore welcomed the fact that the ICFY Mission would now be\nreporting on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s compliance with that requirement. The\nspeaker further stated that the message of the draft resolution was clear: the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia must withhold all support for the Bosnian Serb military and\nblock all border crossings that the ICFY Mission could not monitor. Germany also\nexpected Belgrade to use its influence with the various Serb parties to bring them closer\nto a negotiated solution. In addition, mutual recognition between all the States of the\n 326\nformer Yugoslavia was an urgent political necessity.\n\n\n The representative of the Czech Republic was of the view that the FRY was\ncooperating with the ICFY Mission. His delegation had seen no evidence that the FRY\nwould have condoned, let alone participated in, the violations of the border regime that\nthe Mission had detected. The situation on the border was far more favourable now than\nit had been when resolution 943 (1994) was adopted. That was why his delegation saw no\nreason to change the regime that resolution 943 had introduced. His delegation would\nhave agreed to an extension even longer than 100 days, but had no problem with the\nproposal at hand. As for the future of sanctions themselves, that was not the time even to\n 327\nconsider their further abatement.\n\n\n The representative of China stated that the international community should\nencourage the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to make further efforts to bring peace to\nBosnia and Herzegovina. He reiterated that China was not in favour of settling the\ndispute through sanctions or mandatory measures, for such steps would aggravate the\n\n 326\n Ibid., pp. 14-15.\n 327\n Ibid., pp. 16-17.\n\n\n 209\n"
[210] "situation, bringing suffering to the people and causing serious damage to the economy of\nthird countries. Based on that position, China supported the extension of the provisions of\nresolution 943 (1994) and would vote in favour of the draft. The speaker pointed out,\nhowever, that China’s position had not changed in relation to certain elements of the draft\n 328\nresolution that were related to resolutions 757 (1992) and 820 (1993).\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that his country was\nconvinced that there were more than adequate grounds for agreeing on new measures to\nencourage Belgrade and that the Council could, as a minimum, decide on the indefinite\nextension of the measures provided for in resolution 943 (1994) and consider a further\neasing of sanctions. The Council had received four reports from the ICFY Mission\ncorroborating the effective closure of the border between the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore, Belgrade’s constructive attitude\nwas yielding practical results, including the economic agreements between the Croatian\nGovernment and the local Serbian authorities in the UNPAS, an agreement on the\ncomplete cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and changes in the Bosnian\nSerb leadership. Russia, therefore, regretted that the Council had not been able to agree\non a draft that would have provided for further measures of encouragement, and it felt\nthat certain aspects of the draft before the Council were “completely unwarranted”,\nrunning counter to the recommendations of the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY. In\nunreservedly favouring the extension of the partial extension of sanctions, Russia could\nnot share responsibility for the potential negative consequences of the adoption of the\ndraft resolution, and thus could not support it. It hoped that the principle that a deserving\n 329\nparty should be encouraged would be implemented more consistently in the future.\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and was adopted by 14 votes to none,\nwith one abstention (Russian Federation) as resolution 970 (1995). The resolution reads\nas follows:\n\n\n\n 328\n Ibid., pp. 19-20.\n 329\n Ibid., pp. 20-21.\n\n\n 210\n"
[211] " The Security Council,\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, in particular resolution 943 (1994) of\n23 September 1994,\n Welcoming the measures taken by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n(Serbia and Montenegro), in particular those detailed in the report transmitted by the letter\ndated 4 January 1995 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, to\nmaintain the effective closure of the international border between the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with\nrespect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential\nhumanitarian needs, and noting that those measures were a necessary condition for the\nadoption of the present resolution,\n Stressing the importance of the maintenance by the authorities of the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of the effective closure of that border, and of further\nefforts by them to enhance the effectiveness of that closure, including by the prosecution of\npersons suspected of violating measures to that end and by sealing border crossing points as\nrequested by the Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,\n Expressing its appreciation for the work of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee\nof the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and of the Mission of the\nInternational Conference to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),\nand stressing the importance it attaches to the availability of all resources necessary for the\nwork of the Mission,\n Noting that paragraph 9 of resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992 remains in force,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Decides that the restrictions and other measures referred to in paragraph 1 of resolution\n943 (1994) shall be suspended for a further period of one hundred days from the adoption of\nthe present resolution;\n 2. Calls upon all States and others concerned to respect the sovereignty, territorial\nintegrity and international borders of all States in the region;\n 3. Reaffirms that the requirements in paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993) that import\nto, export from and trans-shipment through the United Nations Protected Areas in the\nRepublic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the\ncontrol of Bosnian Serb forces, with the exception of essential humanitarian supplies\nincluding medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by international humanitarian agencies,\nshall be permitted only with proper authorization from the Government of the Republic of\n\n\n 211\n"
[212] " Croatia or the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively, apply to\n all shipments across the international border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 4. Requests the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution\n 724 (1991) urgently to expedite its elaboration of appropriate streamlined procedures as\n referred to in paragraph 2 of resolution 943 (1993), and to give priority to its consideration of\n applications concerning legitimate humanitarian assistance, in particular applications from\n the International Committee of the Red Cross and from the Office of the United Nations High\n Commissioner for Refugees and other organizations in the United Nations system;\n 5. Requests that every thirty days the Secretary-General submit to the Security Council\n for its review a report as to whether the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\n International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia have certified that the authorities of the\n Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are effectively implementing their\n decision to close the international border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all\n goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs and\n are complying with the requirements of paragraph 3 above in respect of all shipments across\n the international border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and further requests the\n Secretary-General to report to the Council immediately if he has evidence, including from the\n Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee, that those authorities are not effectively\n implementing their decision to close that border;\n 6. Decides that, if at any time the Secretary-General reports that the authorities of the\n Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are not effectively implementing\n their decision to close that border, the suspension of the measures referred to in paragraph 1\n above shall terminate on the fifth working day following the report of the Secretary-General,\n unless the Security Council decides to the contrary;\n 7. Decides to keep the situation closely under review and to consider further steps with\n regard to measures applicable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro) in the light of further progress in the situation;\n 8. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that the\neconomic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serbs\n\n 212\n"
[213] "had undoubtedly been a major factor in recent progress. The impact of the sanctions upon\nthe economy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been largely responsible for\nBelgrade’s decision to cease assisting the Bosnian Serbs, and to support the Contact\nGroup plan. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s cooperation with the ICFY Mission\nmust continue if the sanctions were to continue to be suspended. The resolution just\nadopted represented a balanced response to the cooperation provided by Belgrade over\nthe preceding hundred days. The resolution allowed for the continued suspension of\naspects of the sanctions for a further hundred days. It also sought to remove any\nambiguity about the application of resolution 820 (1993) concerning transshipments\nacross the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia-Bosnian border, and to give clear priority to\napplications for humanitarian assistance. The speaker further noted that sanctions were\nbeing imposed to achieve changes in policy, rather than to punish. Sanctions reinforced\nthe Contact Group’s strategy of increasing the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to return to\nthe negotiating table. It was essential that Belgrade continued to support the Contact\nGroup approach, maintained the embargo on the Bosnian Serbs and kept up the pressure\non the Krajina Serbs to cease violating the Croatian-Bosnian border, and to implement\nthe economic agreement in Croatia. Further sanctions relief might be possible, but only if\nthere was substantial progress towards the objective of achieving a lasting political\n 330\nsettlement in the former Yugoslavia.\n\n\n The representative of Indonesia reiterated his country’s position that the\nsuspension of certain aspects of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,\ncontained in resolution 943 (1994), had been premature. Equally important, resolutions\nadopted by the Council had explicitly stipulated the steps that the FRY should take if\nsanctions were to be eased. These clearly went beyond the mere promise to close the\nborder with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Indonesia therefore had serious reservations\nregarding the provision for an extension of the suspension of sanctions as contained in the\nresolution just adopted. Despite its misgivings, however, Indonesia was cognizant of the\npositive elements contained in the resolution, such as the call upon all States to respect\n\n\n 330\n Ibid., pp. 22-23.\n\n\n 213\n"
[214] "the sovereignty, territorial integrity and international borders of all States in the region\nand the provision reaffirming the requirement contained in paragraph 12 of resolution\n820 (1993) that imports to, exports from and transshipment through the UNPAs in\nCroatia and those areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian\nSerbs should be permitted only with the authorization of the Government of Croatia or\nBosnia and Herzegovina. Against that background, Indonesia had voted in favour of the\nresolution just adopted. Its position was based on the understanding that Belgrade would\nscrupulously uphold its commitments and that, should the Secretary-General report a\n 331\nwillful violation, then the suspension of the sanctions would be terminated forthwith.\n\n\n The representative of the United States observed that the sanctions régime had\nbeen vital to the effort to persuade the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) and the Bosnian Serbs that a peaceful resolution of the conflict was in their\nbest interests. The resolution just adopted was an indication that the effort to persuade\nBelgrade to pressure the Bosnian Serbs had begun to show results. There should be no\ndoubt that the willingness of the United States Government to support the resolution had\nbeen a direct result of the conclusion that Belgrade had moved to implement its decision\nto close the border. Nevertheless, further efforts must be made to ensure that the border\nwas effectively closed. The United States was therefore gratified that the Council had\nreaffirmed its prohibition of transshipments through Bosnian territory controlled by the\nBosnian Serbs. Such transshipments without the permission of the relevant Governments\nhad been, and continued to be, violations of paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993). The\nspeaker further stated that the effectiveness of the border closure would require continued\nvigilance on the part of the international community, the ICFY Mission and Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia officials. The United States expected that a number of measures\n 332\nwould be taken to ensure effective closure.\n\n\n Decision of 17 February 1995 (3501st meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n 331\n Ibid., pp. 23-25.\n 332\n Ibid., pp. 25-26.\n\n\n 214\n"
[215] " At its 3501st meeting, on 17 February 1995, the Council resumed its consideration\nof the item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the\nright to vote. The President (Botswana) then stated that, after consultations among\nmembers of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following\n 333\nstatement on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council is deeply concerned at the continued fighting around Bihac and\n deplores the serious humanitarian situation in the Bihac area. It reaffirms its support for the\n Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Protection Force.\n \"The Council recalls the statement of the President of the Security Council of 6 January\n 1995. It reiterates the importance it attaches to full compliance with the agreements between\n the Bosnian parties on a ceasefire and on a complete cessation of hostilities in the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina concluded on 23 and 31 December 1994. All involved must now\n make a concerted effort to consolidate what has been achieved so far to avoid the risk of a\n renewed outbreak of hostilities.\n \"The Council demands that all forces in the Bihac area cease fighting immediately and\n cooperate fully with the United Nations Protection Force in achieving an effective ceasefire.\n The Council reiterates its condemnation of the continued violations of the international\n border between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n \"The Council condemns the recent obstruction of humanitarian convoys destined for the\n Bihac area by the Croatian Serb and Abdic forces. It welcomes the fact that convoys are now\n getting through and calls upon all parties and others concerned henceforth to facilitate the\n unhindered flow of humanitarian assistance and complete freedom of movement for the\n United Nations Protection Force.\"\n\n\n Decision of 14 April 1995 (3520th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3520th meeting, on 14 April 1995, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (Czech Republic) stated\n\n\n\n\n 333\n S/PRST/1995/8.\n\n\n 215\n"
[216] "that, after consultations among members of the Security Council, he had been authorized\nto make the following statement 334 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council is gravely concerned at the recent attacks on the United Nations\n Protection Force personnel in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in this regard, has\n learnt with particular indignation that once again a soldier of the Force, this time a soldier of\n the French contingent, was deliberately targeted and shot to death by an unidentified sniper in\n Sarajevo today. The Council notes with similar concern that several other soldiers of the\n United Nations have been killed recently in similar circumstances.\n \"The Council condemns in the strongest terms such acts directed at peacekeepers who are\n serving the cause of peace in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Deliberate targeting\n of the United Nations Protection Force personnel reflects the overall deterioration of the\n situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council wishes to state once again\n that this is totally unacceptable. It reiterates that the cooperation of all parties and others\n concerned is indispensable for the missions of the Force to be carried out and demands that\n they respect fully the status of United Nations personnel.\n \"The Council invites the Secretary-General to investigate the circumstances of these acts\n and to report to the Council, taking into consideration the views of troop-contributing\n countries, on any measures which might be necessary to prevent further similar attacks,\n which should not remain unpunished.\"\n\n\n Decision of 19 April 1995 (3521st meeting): resolution 987 (1995)\n\n At its 3521st meeting, on 19 April 1995, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right\nto vote. The President (Czech Republic) then drew the attention of the Council members\nto the text of a draft resolution 335 submitted by France.\n\n\n At the meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that the\ndeaths of two UNPROFOR soldiers in Sarajevo testified to the continuing terrorization of\n\n\n 334\n S/PRST/1995/19.\n 335\n S/1995/311.\n\n\n 216\n"
[217] "that city; and to the fact that resolutions on safe areas continued to be violated. He argued\nthat the soldiers’ death would not be in vain if they contributed to a change in the\nsituation. The draft resolution before the Council was a first step in that direction. His\ndelegation supported the establishment of new measures to prevent further attacks against\nUNPROFOR troops and improve their security. It hoped that the Council would also\n 336\nreview UNPROFOR’s mandate.\n\n\n The draft resolution was put to the vote and was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 987 (1995). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the conflicts in the territory of the\n former Yugoslavia, and reaffirming in this context its resolution 982 (1995) of\n 31 March 1995, in particular paragraphs 6 and 7 thereof,\n Expressing its grave concern at the continued fighting in the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina despite the agreements on a ceasefire and on a complete cessation of hostilities\n concluded on 23 and 31 December 1994, and deploring the violations of these agreements\n and of the ban imposed by its resolutions 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992 and 816 (1993) of\n 31 March 1993 by whomsoever committed,\n Stressing the unacceptability of all attempts to resolve the conflict in the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina by military means,\n Noting once again the need for resumed negotiations aimed at an overall peaceful\n settlement of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of the\n acceptance of the Contact Group peace plan as a starting-point,\n Gravely preoccupied at the recent attacks on the United Nations Protection Force\n personnel in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and at the fatalities resulting therefrom,\n condemning in the strongest terms such unacceptable acts directed at members of\n peacekeeping forces, and determined to obtain a strict respect of the status of United Nations\n personnel in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n\n\n\n\n 336\n S/PV.3521, pp. 2-3.\n\n\n 217\n"
[218] " Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security of the United Nations Protection\n Force and freedom of movement for all its missions, and, to these ends, acting under\n Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Emphasizes once again the responsibility of the parties and others concerned in the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the security and safety of the United Nations\n Protection Force, and in this context demands again that all parties and others concerned\n refrain from any act of intimidation or violence against the Force and its personnel;\n 2. Recalls its invitation to the Secretary-General, in this context, to submit proposals on\n any measures which could be taken to prevent attacks against the United Nations Protection\n Force and its personnel and allow it to perform effectively its mission, and invites him to\n submit such proposals on an urgent basis;\n 3. Calls upon the Bosnian parties to agree to an extension of the agreements on a\n ceasefire and on a complete cessation of hostilities concluded on 23 and 31 December 1994\n beyond 30 April 1995, and looks to all parties and all others concerned to cooperate fully\n with the United Nations Protection Force in their implementation;\n 4. Urges all parties and others concerned to resume forthwith negotiations towards an\n overall peaceful settlement on the basis of the acceptance of the Contact Group peace plan as\n a starting-point;\n 5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of France stated that it had been a\nmatter of urgency for the Council to react to the murders of UNPROFOR personnel by\ncondemning those unacceptable acts and by giving a sign of its determination that the\nstatus of United Nations personnel be respected. It had also been essential to remind the\nBosnian parties of the need to extend the cease-fire and cessation-of-hostilities\nagreements beyond 30 April and to recommence immediately negotiations towards an\n 337\noverall settlement, by accepting the Contact Group peace plan as a starting point.\n\n\n\n\n 337\n Ibid., p. 5.\n\n\n 218\n"
[219] " Decision of 21 April 1995 (3522nd meeting): resolution 988 (1995)\n\n By a letter 338 dated 13 April 1995 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General transmitted a report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering\nCommittee of the ICFY, concerning the operations of the ICFY Mission. The report\n 339\ncontained the certification referred to in resolution 970 (1995) .\n At its 3522nd meeting, on 21 April 1995, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item and included the above letter in its agenda. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request,\nto participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The Council also invited\nAmbassador Dragomir Djokic, at his request, to address it in the course of the subsequent\ndiscussion. The President (Czech Republic) then drew the attention of the Council\nmembers to the text of a draft resolution 340 submitted by the Czech Republic, France,\nGermany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as to several other\n 341\ndocuments.\n\n\n At the meeting, Mr. Djokic noted with regret that, despite consistently positive\nreports by the ICFY Mission that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was adhering to its\ncommitment to close its border with the Bosnian Serbs, and despite the fact that it had\nfulfiled the provisions of relevant resolutions by which the sanctions had been\nintroduced, the Council was not able to lift the sanctions altogether. He argued that, by\nopting to maintain the greatest part of the most comprehensive sanctions régime adopted\nagainst any State Member of the United Nations, the Council was continuing to pursue a\npolicy of punishing the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Serbian and Montenegrin\npeople for matters for which they bore no responsibility. The speaker further argued that\nthe new conditions being set by some members of the Contact Group, including in\nparticular the calls for the recognition by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of Bosnia\n\n 338\n S/1995/302.\n 339\n See footnote 300.\n 340\n S/1995/319.\n 341\n S/1995/301, letter dated 13 April 1995 from the representative of Croatia addressed to the President of\nthe Security Council; S/1995/309, letter dated 15 April 1995 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\naddressed to the President of the Security Council.\n\n\n 219\n"
[220] "and Herzegovina and Croatia as a prerequisite for the further suspension of sanctions,\nlacked a basis in Security Council resolutions and represented a counterproductive form\nof pressure. Recalling that the decision by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to cut\npolitical and economic links with the Bosnian Serbs had been unilateral, the speaker\nnoted that that step had been taken in order to pressure the Bosnian Serbs to accept the\nContact Group plan. Yugoslavia had therefore accepted the ICFY Mission in order to\nfacilitate that unilateral decision. If further pressure were brought to bear on the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia, however, then Belgrade might begin to question the activities of\n 342\nthe ICFY Mission.\n\n\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina expressed appreciation for the\nCouncil’s efforts to improve the effectiveness of the border-sealing régime. While he\nnoted that the new mechanism and reporting system contained in the draft resolution\nbefore the Council should help advance towards the desired results, he also stressed that\nMember States must provide all the necessary resources for the new system to be\neffective. That included the provision of independent evidence of violations and more\nexperts and troops deployed along the border. In that context, Bosnia and Herzegovina\nwelcomed the provision in paragraph 16 of the draft resolution, calling upon the Mission\nto provide the relevant Government with its observations and findings. It also took note\nof the expiration date of the provision easing the sanctions against the FRY, stating that it\nwas long enough to test the efficacy of both the border closure and monitoring\nmechanism and of the Belgrade regime’s authority. The speaker concluded by saying\nthat the most critical variable in the search for peace was the acceptance and\nimplementation of the peace plan by the Bosnian Serbs. Until that occurred, the\ninternational community should maintain its commitment to the United Nations mandate\nin Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and elsewhere. Bosnia and Herzegovina would\ncontinue to use its capacity, including the right and means to defend its population,\n\n\n\n\n 342\n S/PV.3522, pp. 2-4.\n\n\n 220\n"
[221] "territorial integrity and sovereignty. In that connection, it reasserted its “unabridgable\nright” to defend itself. 343\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of Argentina noted that whilst his\ndelegation was in favour of continuing the suspension of the sanctions, it wished to place\non record its interpretation of certain provisions of the draft resolution. His delegation\ninterpreted the date mentioned in operative paragraph 1 not as curtailing the deadline set\nby resolution 970 (1995), but rather as establishing a new and more clear-cut policy. The\nreason was that it would not be particularly meaningful to interpret it as a setting of a\nshorter deadline for the suspension of sanctions, when it was acknowledged that there had\nbeen no substantive changes warranting that suspension. His delegation also understood\nthe authorization for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to\noperate commercial flights in operative paragraph 2 to mean that it should be able to\nobtain the necessary quantities of fuel, lubricants, equipment and spare parts to ensure\n 344\nthat the flights were safe.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that his delegation would not\nbe able to support the draft resolution, because it did not consider it to be consistent with\nthe principle of positive and negative incentives previously agreed upon in the Contact\nGroup and the Security Council, according to which those that supported the peace plan\nwould be encouraged while pressure would be exerted on those that rejected it. Recalling\nthat it was the FRY’s own decision to close its border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the\nspeaker stated that the Government of the FRY had stuck strictly to its decision to close\nits border with Bosnia and Herzegovina to all except humanitarian goods, as corroborated\nby numerous reports of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the ICFY. In\naddition, its cooperation with the ICFY Mission remained very good. Under these\ncircumstances, the Council would have been justified in adopting further positive stimuli,\nsuch as making the partial suspension of sanctions indefinite. Unfortunately, with each\nextension of the partial suspension, the Council had been inclined to make fresh demands\n\n 343\n Ibid., pp. 4-7.\n 344\n Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n\n\n 221\n"
[222] "on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. An example of that approach was that the draft\nresolution attempted to link the voluntary decision by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nto close its border with Bosnia and Herzegovina to the situation on its border with\nCroatia, thus constituting a serious step towards changing the mandate of the ICFY\nMission without consulting Belgrade. It was beyond Russia’s understanding why it had\nbeen necessary to cut back the draft resolution’s duration to 75 days when a mechanism,\nwhich was still operational, was agreed upon in September last year that provided for the\nimmediate reimposition of full sanctions should the government of FRY fail to\nimplement its decision to close the border. Russia also considered a number of provisions\nof the draft resolution to be “puzzling”. The speaker contended that the Council was\nengaging in “unwarranted micromanagement” whereas in other instances it closed its\neyes to flagrant violations of its own decisions, as had long happening with respect to the\n 345\narms embargo on all successor States of the former Yugoslavia.\n\n\n The representative of China reiterated that his delegation was against the\nintroduction of sanctions or mandatory measures in relation to the conflict in the former\nYugoslavia, contending that events had proven that sanctions or pressure would further\ncomplicate the issue. Stating that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an important\nfactor for restoring peace and stability in the region, and that his government had\nsupported the Mission in the discharge of its duties, and had taken measures to effectively\nclose its border with Bosnia and Herzegovina, the speaker contended that the\ninternational community should continue to encourage rather than discourage the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia for fulfiling its commitment to close the border. Regrettably,\nalthough the draft resolution further extended the provisions for easing the sanctions, it\nhad shortened the period of extension and attached more restrictive conditions to the\nextension, which was a step backward from resolutions 943 (1994) and 970 (1995).\nChina would therefore abstain from the vote on the draft resolution. 346\n\n\n\n\n 345\n Ibid., pp. 13-15.\n 346\n Ibid., pp. 15-16.\n\n\n 222\n"
[223] " The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted by 13 votes to\nnone, with two abstentions (China, Russian Federation) as resolution 988 (1995). The\nresolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 943 (1994) of 23\n September 1994 and resolution 970 (1995) of 12 January 1995,\n Noting the measures taken by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro), as described in the reports transmitted by the letters dated 31\n March 1995 and 13 April 1995 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security\n Council, to maintain the closure of the international border between the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with\n respect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential\n humanitarian needs, and noting that those measures were a necessary condition for the\n adoption of the present resolution,\n Concerned, however, about reports suggesting that helicopter flights may have crossed\n the border between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and noting that an investigation of those reports is\n being undertaken by the Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,\n Noting with satisfaction that the cooperation of the Mission of the International\n Conference with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro) continues to be good, and stressing the importance of effective closure by the\n authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of the\n international border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)\n and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and of further efforts by them to enhance the\n effectiveness of that closure, including by the prosecution of persons suspected of violating\n measures to that end and by sealing border crossing points as requested by the Mission,\n Expressing its appreciation for the work of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee\n of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and of the Mission of the\n International Conference to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),\n Noting that paragraph 9 of resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992 remains in force,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Decides that the restrictions and other measures referred to in paragraph 1 of resolution\n 943 (1994) shall be suspended until 5 July 1995;\n\n 223\n"
[224] " 2. Confirms that commodities and products, including fuel beyond immediate needs for a\nflight or ferry voyage, taking into account internationally recognized safety requirements,\nshall not be carried on flights and ferry services permitted in accordance with paragraph 1\nabove, except in accordance with the provisions of relevant resolutions and in conformity\nwith the procedures of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724\n(1991) of 15 December 1991, and that, if a need is established for the supply of additional\nfuel for the operation of flights permitted in accordance with paragraph 1 above, the\nCommittee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) shall consider such applications on\na case-by-case basis;\n 3. Reminds States of the importance of strict enforcement of measures imposed under\nChapter VII of the Charter, and calls upon all States which allow flights or ferry services\npermitted in accordance with paragraph 1 above from their territories or using their flag\nvessels or aircraft to report to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) on\nthe controls adopted by them to implement such measures in earlier relevant resolutions;\n 4. Calls upon all States and others concerned to respect the sovereignty, territorial\nintegrity and international borders of all States in the region;\n 5. Underlines the importance it attaches to the work of the Mission of the International\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia, expresses its concern that a shortage of resources\nhampers the effectiveness of that work, and requests the Secretary-General to report to the\nSecurity Council within thirty days of the adoption of the present resolution on measures to\nincrease the effectiveness of the work of the Mission, including on the question of helicopter\nflights;\n 6. Requests Member States to make available the necessary resources to strengthen the\ncapacity of the Mission of the International Conference to carry out its tasks, and encourages\nthe authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to give\nadditional support for the operation of the Mission;\n 7. Calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) to cooperate fully with the Mission of the International Conference, in particular\nin investigating alleged breaches of the closure of the border, whether by land or by air,\nbetween the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of\nBosnia and Herzegovina and ensuring the continued closure of that border;\n 8. Stresses the importance it attaches to a thorough investigation of reports that helicopter\nflights may have crossed the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, calls upon the authorities of the\n\n\n 224\n"
[225] "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to comply with their commitment\nto cooperate fully in that investigation, and requests the Secretary-General to report to the\nSecurity Council on the outcome of the investigation;\n 9. Reaffirms its decision that import to, export from and trans-shipment through the\nUnited Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia and those areas of the Republic of\nBosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, with the exception of\nessential humanitarian supplies including medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by\ninternational humanitarian agencies, shall be permitted only with proper authorization from\nthe Government of the Republic of Croatia or the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina;\n 10. Encourages the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) to reinstate the severance of international telecommunication links between the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of\nBosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces which they instituted in\nAugust 1994;\n 11. Requests the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) to conclude\nurgently its elaboration of appropriate streamlined procedures, and invites the Chairman of\nthat Committee to report to the Security Council as soon as possible on the matter;\n 12. Also requests the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) to\ncontinue to give priority to its consideration of applications concerning legitimate\nhumanitarian assistance, in particular applications from the International Committee of the\nRed Cross and from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and\nother organizations in the United Nations system;\n 13. Requests that, every thirty days and no fewer than ten days before the expiration of\nthe period referred to in paragraph 1 above, the Secretary-General submit to the Security\nCouncil for its review a report as to whether the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of\nthe International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, on the basis of information made\navailable to them from the Mission of the International Conference and all other available\nsources deemed relevant by the Mission, have certified that the authorities of the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are implementing their decision to close the\ninternational border, on land and in the air, between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n(Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all\ngoods, except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs and\nare complying with the requirements of paragraph 3 of resolution 970 (1995) in respect of all\n\n\n 225\n"
[226] "shipments across the international border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia\nand Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and requests that the\nSecretary-General inform the Council in his report if the Co-Chairmen of the Steering\nCommittee have received substantiated evidence, from sources deemed relevant by the\nMission, of substantial trans-shipments of goods, except foodstuffs, medical supplies and\nclothing for essential humanitarian needs, from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia\nand Montenegro) through the Republic of Croatia to the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces in violation of earlier relevant\nresolutions;\n 14. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council immediately if\nhe has evidence, including from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\nInternational Conference, that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia\nand Montenegro) are not implementing their decision to close the border between the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina;\n 15. Decides that if at any time the Secretary-General reports that, from sources deemed\nrelevant by the Mission of the International Conference, the authorities of the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are not implementing their decision to close\nthe border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina or that they are permitting substantial diversion of\ngoods, except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs,\nfrom the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) through the Republic of\nCroatia to the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian\nSerb forces in violation of earlier relevant resolutions, the suspension of the measures\nreferred to in paragraph 1 above shall terminate on the fifth working day following the report\nof the Secretary-General, unless the Security Council decides to the contrary;\n 16. Encourages the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International\nConference to ensure that the Mission of the International Conference keeps the Government\nof the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Government of the Republic of Croatia and\nthe authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) fully informed\nabout the findings of the Mission;\n 17. Decides to keep the situation closely under review and to consider further steps with\nregard to measures applicable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) in the light of further progress in the situation;\n\n\n 226\n"
[227] " 18. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United States expressed her\ndelegation’s belief that Belgrade had not done enough to comply with its commitment to\nisolate the Bosnian Serbs. The United States could not, therefore, have supported a\nresolution that represented “business as usual”. The resolution just adopted was designed\nto acknowledge progress, but also to close remaining loopholes. Belgrade must close the\nland and air border with Bosnia, and must not seek to circumvent the closure of the\nborder by illegally shipping goods through Serb-controlled Croatia. The United States\nhad been prepared to block the resolution just adopted if those steps to tighten the border\nclosure had not been included. During the subsequent 75 days, the United States would\nbe watching closely to see if Belgrade was improving its compliance with its\ncommitment to close the border. The speaker urged the ICFY Mission, the Co-Chairmen\nof the ICTY Steering Committee and the Secretary-General to implement fully\nparagraphs 13 and 15 of the resolution, stressing that it was up to them to make sure that\nthe Council’s decisions were more than words on pieces of paper. He noted that border\nclosure was not an end in itself and that the objective remained obtaining the agreement\nof the Bosnian Serbs to the Contact Group plan. Thus it was necessary to maintain the\npressure upon the Bosnian Serbs. The authorities in Belgrade also needed to understand\nthat the suspension of additional sanctions would depend on their willingness to take\nfurther steps towards peace, most notably by recognizing Croatia and Bosnia and\n 347\nHerzegovina within their internationally recognized borders.\n\n\n The representative of France noted that his country had been called upon to make\na difficult choice, which it did on the basis of a number of considerations. Firstly, France\nwas convinced that the mechanisms now in place to monitor the border closure were,\noverall, achieving their objectives. It reaffirmed that the best way of improving the\nMission’s operation was by increasing the resources allocated to it. At the same time,\nFrance recognized that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had demonstrated that it was\n\n\n\n 347\n Ibid., pp. 16-17.\n\n\n 227\n"
[228] "cooperating with the Mission. That was essentially why the French delegation wished to\nextend the suspension of sanctions. Secondly, a number of steps had proved useful in\nplugging the gaps resulting from the shortfalls, the most striking examples of which were\nthe helicopter flights and the sidestepping of the frontier closure by passing goods for\nBosnia and Herzegovina by way of Croatian territory, which was why a part of the\nresolution included a strengthening of the existing measures. That strengthening in\nFrance view, was not such as to cast doubt on the degree of cooperation being afforded\nby the Belgrade authorities, but did respond to the loopholes that had shown up by\nexperience. The speaker further stressed that, even though the length of the extension of\nthe suspension of sanctions had been shortened, it had only been shortened slightly.\nFrance would have agreed with the period provided in previous resolutions, but had\n 348\naccepted the time-frame in the resolution in a spirit of compromise.\n\n\n The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the Bosnian Serb leadership\nmust understand that there was no alternative to resuming peace negotiations, with the\nContact Group plan as the starting point. In relation to the suspended sanctions against\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, two important issues should be addressed without\ndelay. The first was to ensure that the border closure was effective, and the second was to\nreinforce the ICFY Mission so that it was able to carry out its tasks effectively. A limited\nsuspension of the sanctions was the appropriate response to Belgrade’s cooperation.\nAdditional sanctions relief would only be justified, however, if Belgrade were to make\n 349\nfurther commitments to advancing the peace process.\n The President, speaking in his capacity as representative of the Czech Republic,\nstated that keeping up the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and maintaining the régime of\nabated sanctions was the best way forward. In fact, the Czech Republic would have\npreferred that the suspension had been extended significantly beyond the 5 July deadline\nbecause it felt that Belgrade was substantively cooperating. 350\n\n\n\n 348\n Ibid., pp. 17-18.\n 349\n Ibid., pp. 20-21.\n 350\n Ibid., p. 21.\n\n\n 228\n"
[229] " Decisions of 3 May 1995 (3530th meeting): statements by the President\n\n At its 3530th meeting, on 3 May 1995, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right\nto vote. The President (France) then stated that, after consultations among members of\nthe Security Council, he had been authorized to make two statements on behalf of the\nCouncil. The first statement 351 reads as follows:\n\n\n \"The Security Council is deeply concerned about the failure of the Bosnian parties to\n agree to an extension of the agreements on a ceasefire and on a complete cessation of\n hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the recent deterioration of the\n situation there. It stresses once again the unacceptability of all attempts to resolve the\n conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina by military means.\n \"The Council calls upon the Bosnian parties to agree without further delay to a further\n ceasefire and a complete cessation of hostilities and, in this regard, fully supports the\n negotiating efforts of the United Nations Protection Force and other international efforts\n aimed at persuading the Bosnian parties to agree to such a ceasefire and complete cessation of\n hostilities. The Council urges the Bosnian parties to abstain from any steps which may lead\n to further escalation of the conflict and reaffirms the need for a political settlement on the\n basis of the acceptance of the Contact Group peace plan as a starting point.\"\n\n\n 352\n The second statement reads as follows:\n\n\n \"The Security Council is deeply concerned about the obstruction of the normal operation\n of Sarajevo airport, including the suspension of the humanitarian relief airlift, caused by\n Bosnian Serb threats against United Nations aircraft and humanitarian relief flights, and by\n their attempts to impose restrictions on the use of Sarajevo airport by official missions as\n foreseen in the 5 June 1992 agreement (S/24075). Such obstruction is in breach of the\n agreement of 5 June 1992 and of the Council's previous resolutions, in particular resolution\n\n\n\n\n 351\n S/PRST/1995/24.\n 352\n S/PRST/1995/25.\n\n\n 229\n"
[230] " 761 (1992), and is unacceptable. Obstruction of the humanitarian relief also constitutes a\n violation of international humanitarian law.\n \"In that context, the Council demands that all parties and others concerned comply fully\n with the agreement of 5 June 1992 and create immediately the necessary conditions for\n unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other destinations in the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It calls upon the Bosnian Serb party to guarantee the\n safety of all flights to Sarajevo supervised by the United Nations Protection Force, including\n humanitarian relief flights.\n \"The Council requests the Secretary-General to keep it informed of discussions with the\n Bosnian Serb party on the restoration of the normal functioning of the Sarajevo airport so that\n it might take further action as necessary.\"\n\n\n Decision of 23 June 1995 (3548th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3548th meeting, on 23 June 1995, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right\nto vote. The President (Germany) then stated that, after consultations among members of\nthe Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement 353 on\nbehalf of the Council:\n\n\n “The Security Council reiterates its condemnation of interference with humanitarian\n supplies and the freedom of movement of the United Nations Protection Force by all parties\n within the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this context, it is deeply\n concerned by the blockading by Bosnian Government forces of the United Nations Protection\n Force personnel in the Visoko, Gorazde, Gorni Vakuf and Kladanj areas, which included\n placing mines outside the United Nations Protection Force camp in Visoko on 20 June 1995.\n The Council is also deeply concerned at the deterioration in the situation in and around\n Sarajevo, the obstruction by the Bosnian Serb party of freedom of movement and utilities to\n the city and the continued obstruction of the normal operation of Sarajevo airport.\n “The Council stresses that all such actions are unacceptable and demands that all parties\n fully respect the safety and security of the United Nations Protection Force personnel and\n\n\n 353\n S/PRST/1995/31.\n\n\n 230\n"
[231] " ensure their complete freedom of movement to enable the Force to carry out its mandate in\n accordance with the resolutions of the Council.\n “The Council calls upon the parties to enter into negotiations as provided for in its\n resolution 998 (1995) of 16 June 1995 and to agree without further delay to a ceasefire and a\n complete cessation of hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council\n emphasizes that there can be no military solution to the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina. It stresses the importance it attaches to the vigorous pursuit of a political\n settlement and reiterates its demand that the Bosnian Serb party accept the Contact Group\n peace plan as a starting point.”\n\n\n Decision of 5 July 1995 (3551st meeting): resolution 1003 (1995)\n\n By a letter 354 dated 25 June 1995 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General transmitted a report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering\nCommittee of the ICFY, concerning the operations of the ICFY Mission. The report\ncontained the certification referred to in resolution 988 (1995). 355\n\n\n At its 3551st meeting, on 5 July 1995, the Council included the above letter in its\nagenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives of\nBosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate in the discussion\nwithout the right to vote. The Council also invited Ambassador Dragomir Djokic, at his\nrequest, to address the Council in the course of the subsequent discussion. The President\n(Honduras) then drew the attention of the Council members to the text of a draft\nresolution 356 submitted by the Czech Republic, France, Germany, the United Kingdom\nand the United States, as well as to a letter 357 dated 5 July 1995 from the representatives\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil.\n\n\n\n\n 354\n S/1995/510.\n 355\n See footnote 300.\n 356\n S/1995/537.\n 357\n S/1995/538.\n\n\n 231\n"
[232] " At the meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina said that if\nBelgrade wished to secure further sanctions relief or even to maintain the easing of\nsanctions, it must understand that the border closure should be real, that the recognition\nof its neighbours must be unambiguous, and that its support for the peace process needed\nto be sincere and not just tactical. Instead, Belgrade was continuing to provide strategic\nsupport for the so-called Krajina and Bosnian Serbs armies. Bosnia and Herzegovina did\nnot ask anything more than the legal recognition by Belgrade of its sovereignty and\nterritorial integrity, which the United Nations had already recognized in the context of its\n 358\nmembership in the United Nations.\n\n\n The representative of Croatia reiterated his Government position, that the only\nway out of the existing impasse was for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) to recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, and for the international\ncommunity to ensure the effective closure of the relevant borders between the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina and\nCroatia. He contended that the peace process had been derailed by the devaluation of the\nSecurity Council mandate for the ICFY Mission. Clearly, the ICFY had reinterpreted its\nmandate to mean partial closing of the border, and not effective closing, as was originally\nenvisaged by the Council. The Croatian Government had given ample evidence that the\nrelevant border was not effectively closed. It therefore considered the ICFY certification\nof the border closure to be “null and void” and called on the Council to review the work\nof the Mission, and to clarify whether its mandate was to certify a partial or an effective\nclosure of the border. If the Council were to decide that the mandate was indeed for a\npartial closure, then Croatia would have to re-evaluate its position in the peace process\nand on the likelihood of the successful implementation of the UNCRO mandate calling\nfor border control between Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro, and Croatia and Bosnia\n 359\nand Herzegovina.\n\n\n\n\n 358\n S/PV.3551, pp. 2-4.\n 359\n Ibid., pp. 4-5.\n\n\n 232\n"
[233] " Ambassador Djokic stated that his country was prepared to recognize the border\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina once the political problems affecting its nations were closer\nto being resolved. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia also insisted that the sanctions be\nlifted before there was any such recognition. The speaker argued that the perpetuation of\nthe sanctions and the setting of additional conditions for their lifting were absurd and that\ntheir maintenance was untenable now, especially as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nwas investing major efforts to contribute to the search for a just and peaceful settlement.\nOnly negotiations could be conducive to such an outcome, not the use of force, the lifting\nof the arms embargo or the deployment of new troops. If the Council truly wished to\nopen the road towards peace, it must have the courage to lift the sanctions altogether. The\nsanctions only fostered resistance and established limits within the Federal Republic of\n 360\nYugoslavia on greater cooperation.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation said that\nhis delegation would abstain in the vote on the draft resolution, for it believed that the\ndraft did not encourage a constructive policy on the part of the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia. He argued that since the adoption of resolution 943 (1994), the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia had been playing a positive role. In the Russian Federation’s\nview, that merited appropriate encouragement in the form of a further easing of the\nsanctions. At the very least, the Council should have made the partial suspension of the\nsanctions indefinite, as Russia itself had proposed. Instead, the draft resolution as\nextending the suspension of the sanctions for a reduced period of only 75 days, as was the\ncase in the previous resolution. Moreover, a new preambular had appeared that referred\nto the importance of the cessation of military assistance to the Bosnian Serbs. In addition\nto the fact that that provision went beyond resolution 713 (1991), which established a\ngeneral and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment, it\nwas also particularly untenable with respect to assertions concerning the financing and\ncoordination of air defence, and was in no way confirmed by ICFY reports. Most\nimportant, that provision was directed at one of the parties to the conflict, while the\n\n\n 360\n Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n\n\n 233\n"
[234] "responsibility for the recent drastic deterioration of the situation there was borne not only\nand not so much by the Bosnian Serbs. His delegation could not agree with operative\nparagraph 3 which contained a call for mutual recognition between the successor States\nof the former Yugoslavia. That provision did not fit within the context of a generally\ntechnical and limited extension of the suspension of a minimal set of sanctions for a short\n 361\nperiod of time.\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and was adopted by 14 votes to none,\nwith one abstention (Russian Federation) as resolution 1003 (1995). The resolution reads\nas follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 943 (1994) of\n 23 September 1994, 970 (1995) of 12 January 1995 and 988 (1995) of 21 April 1995,\n Calling upon all States and others concerned to respect the sovereignty, territorial\n integrity and international borders of all States in the region,\n Noting the measures taken by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro), in particular those detailed in the report transmitted by the letter\n dated 25 June 1995 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, to\n maintain the effective closure of the international border between the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with\n respect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential\n humanitarian needs, and noting with satisfaction that the cooperation of the Mission of the\n International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia with the authorities of the Federal\n Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continues to be good,\n Reaffirming the importance of further efforts by the authorities of the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to enhance the effectiveness of the closure of the\n international border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)\n and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all goods except foodstuffs,\n medical supplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs,\n\n\n\n\n 361\n Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n\n\n 234\n"
[235] " Underlining the particular importance it attaches to there being no provision of military\n assistance, in terms of finance, equipment, coordination of air defences or recruitment of\n troops, to the Bosnian Serb forces,\n Expressing its appreciation for the work of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee\n of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and of the Mission of the\n International Conference to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),\n and underlining the importance of the necessary resources being made available so as to\n strengthen the capacity of the Mission to carry out its tasks,\n Noting with satisfaction that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to\n resolution 724 (1991) of 15 December 1991 has adopted streamlined procedures for\n expediting its consideration of applications concerning legitimate humanitarian assistance, as\n well as a number of measures facilitating legitimate trans-shipments via the Danube river,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Decides that the restrictions and other measures referred to in paragraph 1 of resolution\n 943 (1994) shall be suspended until 18 September 1995;\n 2. Decides also that the arrangements referred to in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of\n resolution 988 (1995) shall continue to apply;\n 3. Renews its call for early mutual recognition between the States of the former\n Yugoslavia within their internationally recognized borders, recognition between the Republic\n of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)\n being an important first step, and urges the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro) to take that step;\n 4. Reaffirms its decision to keep the situation closely under review and to consider further\n steps with regard to measures applicable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro) in the light of further progress in the situation;\n 5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United States observed that,\nwhilst the ICFY Co-Chairmen had reported some improvement in the effectiveness of the\nborder closure, they had also pointed out at some shortcomings in Belgrade’s willingness\nto implement its decision to isolate the Bosnian Serbs. It was those shortcomings that\nmade the United States Government unwilling to accept an extension of 100 days and to\ninsist on 75 days. She recalled that the goal of extending limited sanctions relief to\n\n\n 235\n"
[236] "Belgrade was to increase the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept a settlement based\non the Contact Group plan. The United States continued to believe that an effectively\nenforced border closure would help to achieve that goal. It was therefore disturbed by\nindications of increasing military cooperation between Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs,\nincluding reports that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were\nproviding financial assistance and equipment to the Bosnian Serb army, cooperating with\nBosnian Serb air defence systems, and returning draft-age Bosnian Serb males to Bosnia.\nIf those reports were accurate, they would weaken the case for continuing the limited\nsuspension of sanctions. Such violations would undermine the Council’s key objective of\npersuading the Bosnian Serbs that there was no alternative to a negotiated solution. The\nspeaker also expressed concern over reports of increased military support by Belgrade for\nthe Croatian Serbs, and noted that her Government would pay close attention to the\n 362\nmanner in which Belgrade continued to implement the border closure.\n The representative of China reiterated that his delegation opposed resorting to\nsanctions or mandatory actions in relation to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, as\nfacts had proven that sanctions or pressure would only further complicate the situation.\nThe international community should encourage the efforts made by the Federal Republic\nof Yugoslavia by gradually removing the sanctions. China regretted that the views of all\ndelegations had not been taken into account during the negotiating process on the draft\nresolution. As the main purpose of the draft, however, had been to continue the partial\nsuspension of the sanctions, China had voted in favour of the resolution just adopted. 363\n\n\n Decision of 12 July 1995 (3553rd meeting): resolution 1004 (1995)\n\n At its 3553rd meeting, on 12 July 1995, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives of\nBosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate in the discussion\nwithout the right to vote. The President (Honduras) then drew the attention of the Council\n\n\n\n\n 362\n Ibid., pp. 11-12.\n 363\n Ibid., pp. 13-14.\n\n\n 236\n"
[237] "members to the text of a draft resolution364 submitted by France, Germany, Italy, the\nUnited Kingdom and the United States and read out a revision that had been made to the\ndraft.\n\n\n At the meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that by\nattacking Srebrenica and threatening Zepa, the Bosnian Serbs continued to realize their\nmain goal: the elimination of the Contact Group plan and the strengthening of their own\nposition with the goal of the legalization of the fait accompli. He recalled the statement\nmade by his President, on 12 July 1995, in which he urged the United Nations and NATO\nto re-establish by force the violated safe zone of Srebrenica, and that tents, food and\nmedicine be provided to the population expelled from that safe area. The speaker further\nnoted that his Government preferred the full rehabilitation of the mandate of\nUNPROFOR and its strengthening. UNPROFOR had an obligation to defend safe areas\nsince that defence had been used as a basis for the argument in favor of the maintenance\nof the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina. The establishment and activation\nof the rapid reaction force also could make a crucial contribution to the rehabilitation of\nthe UNPROFOR mandate and UNPROFOR’s capabilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nThat, combined with NATO activities, could help to reverse the situation in the\n 365\ncountry.\n\n\n The representative of Croatia expressed the concern of his Government at recent\ndevelopments in the six safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He noted that both the\ndecision by the Bosnian Serb leadership to renew its advances in the safe areas and the\nlack of an appropriate response by the international community posed serious risks to\nCroatia and the Bosnian Croat federation. Croatia was especially concerned about the\nsituation in the safe area of Bihac. It would consider the displacement of the population to\nbe a serious threat to its internal security and may be compelled to undertake measures to\nsecure the status of Bihac as a safe area if that status ever became threatened. Croatia\nalso would have to draw conclusions from the international community’s lack of an\n\n 364\n S/1995/560.\n 365\n Ibid., pp. 2-4.\n\n\n 237\n"
[238] "appropriate response to the situation in Srebrenica, in respect of the mandate of the\nUnited Nations in Croatia and the ability and willingness of UNCRO to achieve its\nobjectives and to control Croatia’s relevant international borders. It took the view that\ndevelopments in Bosnia and Herzegovina were a consequence of the international\ncommunity having ignored a serious increase in Serbia’s interference in the occupied\n 366\nterritories of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of France noted that the action\nundertaken by the Bosnian Serbs against Srebrenica was of a different nature since it\nrepresented a deliberate intention on the part of the Bosnian Serbs to use force to occupy\na safe area. He stated that the international community could not accept any questioning\nof the status of the safe areas. The draft resolution therefore called on the Secretary-\nGeneral to take the necessary steps to bring about the withdrawal of Bosnian Serb forces\nfrom Srebrenica. In supporting that request, France did not wish to impose the use of any\nparticular means. It was simply signifying its preparedness to make troops available for\nany operations the civilian and military authorities and the United Nations force might\n 367\nconsider realistic and realizable.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation condemned the actions of the\nBosnian Serb army in violation of Security Council decisions on the safe areas in Bosnia\nand Herzegovina. His delegation concurred with the view that it was necessary to restore\nthe demilitarized status of the safe area of Srebrenica. That task was complex, but in the\nRussian Federation’s view, the solution would not be reached through the use of air\npower or through the withdrawal of United Nations forces from Bosnia. Rather, the\nsecure and effective functioning of UNPROFOR should be ensured. Noting that the draft\nresolution mandated the Secretary-General to use all resources available to restore the\nstatus of the safe area, the speaker expressed the view that that provision precluded the\noption of using force, as that would exceed the existing mandate of the peacekeeping\noperation. It was also extremely important that efforts to restore the safe area status did\n\n 366\n Ibid., pp. 4-5.\n 367\n Ibid., p. 5.\n\n\n 238\n"
[239] "not violate UNPROFOR’s impartiality. United Nations forces could not and should not\nundertake actions that would convert them into a party to the conflict. The Russian\nFederation fully concurred with the Secretary-General’s view that attacks launched from\nsafe areas were inconsistent with the safe area concept and precipitated a disproportionate\nresponse from the Bosnian Serbs. The Russian Federation also agreed with the Secretary-\nGeneral that the only way to make safe areas truly safe was to define a régime acceptable\n 368\nto both parties and to promote mutual respect for that régime.\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote, as orally revised in its provisional\nform, and it was adopted unanimously as resolution 1004 (1995). The resolution reads as\nfollows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions,\n Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political\n independence of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Gravely concerned at the deterioration in the situation in and around the safe area of\n Srebrenica, Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at the plight of the civilian population\n there,\n Gravely concerned also at the very serious situation which confronts personnel of the\n United Nations Protection Force and a great number of displaced persons within the safe area\n at Potocari, especially the lack of essential food supplies and medical care,\n Paying tribute to the United Nations Protection Force personnel deployed in the safe area\n of Srebrenica,\n Condemning the offensive by the Bosnian Serb forces against the safe area of Srebrenica\n and, in particular, the detention by the Bosnian Serb forces of United Nations Protection\n Force personnel,\n Condemning also all attacks on United Nations Protection Force personnel,\n Recalling the agreement of 18 April 1993 (S/25700, annex) by the Government of the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb party for the demilitarization of\n Srebrenica, and regretting that it has not been implemented in full by either party,\n\n\n\n\n 368\n Ibid., pp. 9-10.\n\n\n 239\n"
[240] " Stressing the importance of renewed efforts to achieve an overall peaceful settlement, and\n the unacceptability of any attempt to resolve the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina by military means,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Demands that the Bosnian Serb forces cease their offensive and withdraw from the\n safe area of Srebrenica immediately;\n 2. Demands also that the parties respect fully the status of the safe area of Srebrenica in\n accordance with the agreement of 18 April 1993;\n 3. Demands further that the parties respect fully the safety of United Nations Protection\n Force personnel and ensure their complete freedom of movement, including resupply;\n 4. Demands that the Bosnian Serb forces immediately and unconditionally release\n unharmed all detained United Nations Protection Force personnel;\n 5. Demands also that all parties allow unimpeded access for the Office of the United\n Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international humanitarian agencies to\n the safe area of Srebrenica in order to alleviate the plight of the civilian population and, in\n particular, that they cooperate on the restoration of utilities;\n 6. Requests the Secretary-General to use all resources available to him to restore the\n status, as defined by the agreement of 18 April 1993, of the safe area of Srebrenica in\n accordance with the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force, and calls upon the\n parties to cooperate to that end;\n 7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United States stated that the\nresolution just adopted must be the beginning of “credible resolve”. She further stated\nthat, peaceful means were to be preferred, but when “brutal force” was used the\nSecretary-General must have the right to use the resources available, in consultation with\nthe relevant troop contributors, to meet the humanitarian needs of the civilian population\nand to achieve lasting peace. The United States therefore believed that UNPROFOR must\nremain in Bosnia, supported by the rapid reaction force. The leadership of UNPROFOR\nwould have to make tough decisions in the days ahead. The United States further\nbelieved that the role of NATO would be vital to decisions in support of UNPROFOR. It\n\n\n\n\n 240\n"
[241] "supported the full and speedy deployment of the rapid reaction force and was prepared to\nprovide the necessary air and logistical resources for the purpose. 369\n\n\n The representative of China stated that his delegation had voted in favour of the\nresolution just adopted because it was aimed at protecting the Srebrenica safe area,\nstopping offensives against UNPROFOR, and preventing the further deterioration of the\nhumanitarian situation. China nevertheless had reservations about taking enforcement\naction by invoking Chapter VII of the Charter, as set forth in the resolution. It was also\nconcerned at the serious political and military consequences that might result from the\nactions authorized by the resolution, including the possibility that the peacekeeping force\n 370\ncould become a party to the conflict and thus lose the basis of its continued existence.\n\n\n Decision of 14 July 1995 (3554th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3554th meeting, on 14 July 1995, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right\nto vote. The President (Honduras) drew the attention of the members of the Council to\nseveral documents 371 and stated that, after consultations among members of the Security\nCouncil, he had been authorized to make the following statement 372 on behalf of the\nCouncil:\n\n\n \"The Security Council recalls its resolution 1004 (1995). The Council is deeply\n concerned about the ongoing forced relocation of tens of thousands of civilians from the\n Srebrenica safe area to the Tuzla region by the Bosnian Serb party. Such forced relocation is\n\n\n 369\n Ibid., pp. 10-11.\n 370\n Ibid., pp. 12-13.\n 371\n S/1995/563, letter dated 12 July 1995 from the representative of Morocco addressed to the President of\nthe Security Council, transmitting a statement adopted on 11 July 1995 by the OIC Contact Group at its meeting on the\nsituation in Bosnia and Herzegovina; S/1995/571, letter dated 13 July 1995 from the representative of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1995/572 and S/1995/573, letters dated 13 July 1995\nfrom the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the Secretary-General; and S/1995/574, letter dated 12\nJuly 1995 from the representative of Spain addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the text of a communiqué\nof the same date, issued by the Presidency of the European Union, on Srebrenica.\n 372\n S/PRST/1995/32.\n\n\n 241\n"
[242] " a clear violation of the human rights of the civilian population. It is especially concerned\n about reports of grave mistreatment and killing of innocent civilians. It is equally concerned\n about reports that up to 4,000 men and boys have been forcibly removed by the Bosnian Serb\n party from the Srebrenica safe area. It demands that in conformity with internationally\n recognized standards of conduct and international law the Bosnian Serb party release them\n immediately, respect fully the rights of the civilian population of the Srebrenica safe area and\n other persons protected under international humanitarian law and permit access by the\n International Committee of the Red Cross.\n \"The Council again condemns the unacceptable practice of ethnic cleansing and reaffirms\n that those who have committed or have ordered the commission of such acts will be held\n individually responsible in respect of such acts.\n \"The Council demands that the Bosnian Serb party immediately allow unimpeded access\n to the civilian population of the Srebrenica safe area by international humanitarian\n organizations and cooperate with any procedure established by those organizations to\n determine which civilians wish to depart from the area of Srebrenica. It further demands that\n the Bosnian Serb party respect fully the rights of those civilians who wish to remain in the\n safe area and cooperate with efforts to ensure that civilians who wish to depart are allowed to\n do so with their families in an orderly, safe way in conformity with international law.\n \"The Council demands that both sides allow the unhindered movement of humanitarian\n relief and cooperate with efforts by international organizations and agencies and concerned\n Governments to provide food, medicine, facilities and housing to the displaced.\n \"The Council reiterates its demand that the Bosnian Serb forces immediately and\n unconditionally release unharmed all detained personnel of the United Nations Protection\n Force and that the parties respect fully the safety of all Force personnel and ensure their\n complete freedom of movement.\n \"The Council pays tribute to all the personnel of the United Nations Protection Force and\n of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, especially those\n deployed in the area of Srebrenica. It notes that the presence and bravery of the troops has\n undoubtedly saved the lives of many civilians in the Srebrenica area.\"\n\n\n Decision of 20 July 1995 (3556th meeting): statement by the President\n\n By a letter dated 17 July 1995 addressed to the President of the Security Council,\nthe representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina transmitted a letter of the same date from\n\n\n 242\n"
[243] "the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of\nthe Security Council. In that letter, the Foreign Minister reported that attacks against the\nsafe area of Zepa were continuing and requested an emergency meeting of the Security\nCouncil to consider security measures and the safe evacuation of the civilian population\nfrom Zepa.\n At its 3556th meeting, held on 20 July 1995 in response to the request contained\nin the above letter, the Council included the letter in its agenda. Following the adoption\nof the agenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President\n(Honduras) drew the attention of the members of the Council to a number of\n 373\ndocuments and stated that, after consultations among members of the Security\nCouncil, he had been authorized to make the following statement 374 on behalf of the\nCouncil:\n\n\n \"The Security Council, recalling its previous resolutions, is deeply concerned by the\n situation in and around the safe area of Zepa. It condemns in the strongest possible terms the\n offensive by the Bosnian Serb forces against the safe area. The Council is also concerned in\n particular at the plight of the civilian population there.\n \"The Council attaches the utmost importance to the safety and well-being of the civilian\n population in Zepa. It demands that the Bosnian Serb forces refrain from any further action\n that threatens the safety of that population and that they respect fully the rights of the civilian\n population and other persons protected under international humanitarian law. The Council\n reaffirms its condemnation of all violations of international humanitarian law, and reiterates\n to all concerned that those who have committed or ordered the commission of such acts will\n\n\n 373\n S/1995/576, letter dated 14 July 1995 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to\nthe Secretary-General; S/1995/577, letter dated 14 July 1995 from the representative of the Ukraine addressed to the\nSecretary-General; S/1995/579, letter dated 14 July 1995 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed\nto the President of the Security Council; S/1995/581, letter dated 14 July 1995 from the representative of Iraq addressed\nto the President of the Security Council, transmitting the declaration issued by the Group of Arab States at its meeting\nof the same date; S/1995/583, letter dated 17 July 1995 from the representative of Hungary addressed to the Secretary-\nGeneral, transmitting the text of a statement by the Chairmen-in-Office of the OSCE concerning the situation in Bosnia\nand Herzegovina; S/1995/584, letter dated 17 July 1995 from the representative of Malaysia addressed to the Secretary-\nGeneral; S/1995/589, letter dated 18 July 1995 from the representative of Egypt addressed to the President of the\nSecurity Council; S/1995/590, letter dated 17 July 1995 from the representative of the Ukraine addressed to the\nSecretary-General; and S/1995/598, letter dated 19 July 1995 from the representative of Jordan addressed to the\nSecretary-General.\n 374\n S/PRST/1995/33.\n\n\n 243\n"
[244] " be held individually responsible in respect of such acts. It reminds the military and political\n leaders of the Bosnian Serb party that this responsibility extends to any such acts committed\n by forces under their command.\n \"The Council underlines the importance it attaches to the fullest cooperation with the\n Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international\n humanitarian organizations and demands that they be given unhindered freedom of\n movement and access to that area. It further demands that the Bosnian Serb authorities\n cooperate with all efforts, including those of the United Nations Protection Force, to ensure\n the safety of the civilian population and, in particular, its most vulnerable members, including\n evacuation as requested by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina in his letter of 17 July 1995.\n \"The Council strongly condemns the recent acts of violence and intimidation which have\n occurred against United Nations Protection Force personnel. It demands that both parties\n ensure the safety and freedom of movement of Force personnel at all times.\"\n\n\n Decision of 25 July 1995 (3557th meeting): statement by the President\n\n By a letter 375 dated 24 July 1995 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in light of the deteriorating\nsituation in the safe area of Zepa and the imminent threat to its civilian population,\nrequested an emergency meeting of the Security Council, to address the immediate and\nurgent need for all measures to be taken to ensure a safe and UNPROFOR-escorted\nevacuation of the civilian population of Zepa.\n At its 3557th meeting, held on 25 July 1995 in response to the request contained in\nthe above letter, the Council included the letter in its agenda. Following the adoption of\nthe agenda, the Council invited the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President\n 376\n(Honduras) drew the attention of the members of the Council to several documents and\n\n\n 375\n S/1995/610.\n 376\n S/1995/611, letter dated 25 July 1995 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to\nthe President of the Security Council, transmitting a letter of the same date from the President of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1995/612, letter dated 25 July 1995 from the\nrepresentative of Morocco addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1995/613, letter dated 24 July 1995\nfrom the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security Council; and S/1995/617, letter\ndated 25 July 1995 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security\n\n\n 244\n"
[245] "stated that, after consultations among members of the Security Council, he had been\nauthorized to make the following statement 377 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council is deeply concerned about the situation in and around the safe area\n of Zepa in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council notes the letter of\n 25 July 1995 from the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the President\n of the Security Council.\n \"The Council reaffirms its previous relevant resolutions and the statement by its President\n of 20 July 1995. It reiterates in the strongest possible terms its condemnation of the Bosnian\n Serb offensive against the safe area and demands that the Bosnian Serbs comply fully with\n the requirements set out in that statement as well as its earlier resolutions. The Council\n further demands that Bosnian Serb forces withdraw from the safe areas of Srebrenica and\n Zepa.\n \"The Council remains particularly concerned at the plight of the civilian population and\n other persons protected under international humanitarian law in the Zepa area. It welcomes\n and supports the efforts being made by the United Nations Protection Force and the\n international humanitarian agencies, as requested by the President of the Republic of Bosnia\n and Herzegovina, to achieve a safe evacuation of those civilians who wish to leave and\n stresses the importance it attaches to the success of these efforts. It requests the Secretary-\n General to use all resources available to him to that end and calls upon the parties to\n cooperate.\n \"The Council demands that the United Nations Protection Force and the international\n humanitarian agencies be provided with immediate and unhindered access to the population\n of the area and, in particular, that the Bosnian Serb party provide access for representatives of\n the International Committee of the Red Cross to all civilians who decide to remain and permit\n the International Committee of the Red Cross to register any persons detained against their\n will and visit them immediately.\"\n\n\n Decision of 10 August 1995 (3564th meeting): resolution 1010 (1995)\n\n At its 3564th meeting, on 10 August 1995, the Council resumed its consideration\nof the item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative\n\nCouncil.\n 377\n S/PRST/1995/34.\n\n\n 245\n"
[246] "of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the\nright to vote. The President (Indonesia) then drew the attention of the Council members\nto the text of a draft resolution 378 prepared in the course of the Council’s prior\nconsultations and to two other documents. 379\n\n\n At the meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that the draft\nresolution was a small step forward. Nevertheless, it was a resolution that more clearly\narticulated care, even though it might be irreparably late for many. The draft did not\nmention the destiny of those refugees from Zepa who had fled to Serbia. Bosnia and\nHerzegovina requested international humanitarian organizations to register those refugees\nand to prevent their disappearance or further abuse in violation of the Geneva\nConventions and humanitarian law. The Bosnian delegation also looked forward to the\nreport by the Secretary-General on these issues, as requested by the Council in the draft\nresolution. 380\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of Germany stated that his country\nhad taken the initiative which had led to the draft resolution because it was appalled and\nalarmed. Several weeks after the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa, the whereabouts of about\n7,000 to 8,000 male Bosnians who were taken prisoners by Serbian Serbs were still\nunknown. According to the latest update by the ICRC, only 164 detainees from\nSrebrenica and 44 from Zepa had been registered. Germany insisted that immediate\naccess be granted to international humanitarian organizations to all detainees from\nSrebrenica and Zepa and that the civilian Bosnians taken prisoner be released\nimmediately. It condemned the persistent refusal by the Bosnian Serbs to allow such\naccess to ICRC representatives. That practice constituted a violation of international\n\n\n\n\n 378\n S/1995/677.\n 379\n S/1995/674, letter dated 8 August 1995 from the representative of Kazakhstan addressed to the Secretary-\nGeneral; S/1995/679, letter dated 9 August 1995 from the representative of the Sudan addressed to the Secretary-\nGeneral.\n 380\n S/PV.3564, pp. 2-3.\n\n\n 246\n"
[247] "humanitarian law. The speaker also urged United Nations representatives to continue\ntheir efforts to obtain information on the missing men. 381\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation expressed concern at reports of\nflagrant violations of the norms of international humanitarian law in Srebrenica, which\nshould be duly investigated, as well as at the unavailability of information on the\nwhereabouts of many former inhabitants of Srebrenica. Russia supported the demand in\nthe draft resolution that the Bosnian Serbs grant representatives of UNHCR, the ICRC\nand other international humanitarian agencies access to those who had been displaced\nfrom Srebrenica and Zepa. It also expected all prisoners of war to be treated in\naccordance with international norms and noted that, if the Secretary-General were to\nconfirm that violations of international humanitarian law had indeed taken place, then the\nCouncil would have to respond appropriately. The speaker noted that the lesson to be\ndrawn from events in Srebrenica and Zepa was that there was a need to address the\nconcept of safe areas and the modalities for its implementation. It was important to\ndetermine what kind of safe area was acceptable to both sides. In addition, the relevant\nagreements should include provision for the demilitarization of all territories. He\ncontended that if that had been done earlier, the tragic events in and around Zepa and\n 382\nSrebrenica might have been avoided.\n\n\n The representative of the United States stated that Srebrenica and Zepa should not\nbe forgotten because they were areas for which the Council had assumed a special\nresponsibility. They were United Nations protected safe areas, where the Council hoped\nits authority and legitimacy would offer protection from violence and attack. Tragically,\nthe authority of the Council and the good opinion of the world appeared to mean little to\nthe Bosnian Serb leadership. The Council had a responsibility to investigate what had\nhappened and to ensure that those responsible were brought to justice. Turning to the\nresolution, the speaker noted the demand that the Bosnian Serbs give immediate access to\npersons displaced from Srebrenica and Zepa, as well as the demand that access be\n\n 381\n Ibid., pp. 3-4.\n 382\n Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n\n\n 247\n"
[248] "granted to detained persons and that the rights of those persons be respected. He also\nnoted the resolution’s reiteration that those who had violated international humanitarian\nlaw would be held accountable as individuals for their acts. Establishing the truth about\nwhat had happened in Srebrenica was essential not only to justice, but to peace.\nResponsibility for the atrocities lay with the individuals who had ordered and committed\nthe crimes and true reconciliation would not be possible until the perception of collective\n 383\nguilt had been expunged and personal responsibility assigned.\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 1010 (1995). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, and reaffirming its resolution 1004 (1995) of\n 12 July 1995,\n Reaffirming the statements by its President of 20 and 25 July 1995, and deeply concerned\n that the demands set out therein have not been fully complied with by the Bosnian Serb party,\n Reiterating the unacceptability of the violation of the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa\n by Bosnian Serb forces,\n Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of\n the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Affirming its commitment to the search for an overall negotiated settlement of the\n conflicts in the former Yugoslavia ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the\n States there within their internationally recognized borders, and stressing the importance it\n attaches to the mutual recognition thereof,\n Deeply concerned at reports of grave violations of international humanitarian law in and\n around Srebrenica and at the fact that many of the former inhabitants of Srebrenica cannot be\n accounted for,\n Concerned also at the plight of the civilian population and other persons protected under\n international humanitarian law, originating in the Zepa area,\n Expressing its strong support for the efforts of the International Committee of the Red\n Cross in seeking access to displaced persons, and condemning the failure of the Bosnian Serb\n\n\n\n\n 383\n Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n\n\n 248\n"
[249] " party to comply with their commitments to the International Committee of the Red Cross in\n respect of such access,\n 1. Demands that the Bosnian Serb party give representatives of the United Nations High\n Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross and other\n international agencies immediate access to persons displaced from Srebrenica and Zepa who\n are within the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian\n Serb forces, and that the Bosnian Serb party permit representatives of the International\n Committee of the Red Cross to visit and register any persons detained against their will,\n including any members of the forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 2. Also demands that the Bosnian Serb party respect fully the rights of all such persons\n and ensure their safety, and urges that any persons detained be released;\n 3. Reiterates that all those who commit violations of international humanitarian law will\n be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;\n 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council as soon as possible, and no\n later than 1 September 1995, with any information available to United Nations personnel\n regarding compliance with the present resolution and concerning violations of international\n humanitarian law;\n 5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of France noted that the Council\nrequested the Secretary-General to report to the Council before the end of the month on\nthe implementation of the resolution just adopted, and on the measures taken to end\nviolations of humanitarian law. He, however, warned that the Council might have to take\naction before that date arguing that it owed it to itself to remain vigilant on a question\nwhich involved the fate of thousands of civilians subjected to vile and barbaric treatment.\n384\n\n\n Decision of 7 September 1995 (3572nd meeting): statement by the President\n\n On 30 August 1995, pursuant to resolution 1010 (1995), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 385 concerning events in Srebrenica and Zepa. The\nSecretary-General reported that despite repeated requests by his Special Representative,\n\n\n 384\n Ibid., p. 7.\n 385\n S/1995/755.\n\n\n 249\n"
[250] "the Bosnian Serb authorities had refused access to persons displaced from Srebrenica and\nZepa, making it impossible to collect direct, first-hand evidence of the extent to which the\nBosnian Serbs had respected the rights of displaced persons. There was significant prima\nfacie evidence, however, that violations of international humanitarian law had occurred\nduring and after the Bosnian Serb offensive on Srebrenica. The Secretary-General thus\nrecommended that the Council reiterate its urgent call to the Bosnian Serb leadership to\nauthorize immediate and full access to displaced persons. Such access should include the\npossibility for an impartial international investigation to take place and remained a crucial\nstep in ascertaining the full extent of violations of international humanitarian law and\nhuman rights and in addressing any persisting abuses.\n At its 3572nd meeting, on 7 September 1995, the Council included the above\nreport in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion\nwithout the right to vote. The President (Italy) then stated that, after consultations among\nmembers of the Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement 386 on\nbehalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council has considered the report of the Secretary-General of\n 30 August 1995 submitted pursuant to its resolution 1010 (1995) of 10 August 1995.\n \"The Council strongly condemns the failure of the Bosnian Serb party to comply with the\n demands contained in resolution 1010 (1995). The Bosnian Serb party's refusal to cooperate\n with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of\n the Red Cross cannot but reinforce the deep concern expressed in that resolution and in\n previous resolutions and statements.\n \"The Council stresses its determination that the fate of persons displaced from Srebrenica\n and Zepa be established. It reaffirms its demands to the Bosnian Serb party to give\n representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International\n Committee of the Red Cross and other international agencies immediate access to such\n persons who are within the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the\n control of Bosnian Serb forces and to permit representatives of the International Committee\n of the Red Cross to visit and register any persons detained against their will.\n\n 386\n S/PRST/1995/43.\n\n\n 250\n"
[251] " \"The Council also reaffirms its demands to the Bosnian Serb party to respect fully the\n rights of all such persons, to ensure their safety and to release them.\n \"The Council reiterates that all those who commit violations of international\n humanitarian law will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts.\n \"The Council takes note of the investigations that are being carried out by the\n International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of\n International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since\n 1991, established pursuant to its resolution 827 (1993). The Council reiterates in this context\n that all States shall cooperate fully with the Tribunal and its organs, including by providing\n access to sites the Tribunal deems important for its investigations.\n \"The Council requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts and to report to the\n Council no later than 6 October 1995 regarding compliance with resolution 1010 (1995) and\n any further relevant information that may become available.\n \"The Security Council will remain actively seized of the matter.\"\n\n\n Consideration of the item at the 3575th meeting (8 September 1995)\n\n At its 3575th meeting, on 8 September 1995, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey and\nUkraine, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The\nCouncil also invited Ambassador Dragomir Djokic, at his request, to address it in the\ncourse of the subsequent discussion. The President (Italy) then drew the attention of the\n 387\nCouncil members to several documents.\n At the meeting, the representative of the Russian Federation noted that his country\nhad requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council, to consider the situation that\nhad arisen in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of the bombing of Bosnian Serb\n\n\n\n 387\n Letter dated 7 September 1995 from the representative of the The Russian Federation n Federation\naddressed to the Secretary-General (S/1995/776); letter dated 7 September 1995 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of\nYugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/778); letter dated 8 September 1995 from the\nrepresentatives of France, Germany, the Russian Federation\n , the United Kingdom and the United States addressed to the Secretary-General (S/1995/780).\n\n\n\n 251\n"
[252] "positions by NATO aircraft. Russia was convinced that NATO’s air strikes and the\nshelling of the Bosnian Serbs by the Rapid Reaction Force were undermining, rather than\nstrengthening, efforts to reach a political settlement. Such steps were beyond the\ndecisions of the Security Council, changing the peacekeeping character of the United\nNations operation in Bosnia and involving the international community in a conflict\nagainst one of the parties. The speaker also raised a number of objections to the manner\nin which the air strikes had proceeded. Firstly, the agreed procedures for the use of force\nin Bosnia and Herzegovina had been seriously violated. Consultations had not been held\nwith members of the Council, despite the stipulation in resolution 844 (1993) that they\nshould take place, and the members of the Council had not been informed in a timely\nfashion of the actions taken. Those oversights were particularly inadmissible because the\nactions represented a qualitative change in the nature of the use of force. Secondly, the\nbombing and shelling had been “disproportionate and excessive”. Thirdly, there had been\na qualitative change in the “dual key” procedure, meaning that the United Nations had no\nauthority to end the use of force without NATO’s agreement. Fourthly, apparently a\nmemorandum of understanding had been drawn up between NATO and the United\nNations concerning the use of air power under the new conditions, according to which\nforce would be applied to areas outside the boundaries of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Such\na use of air power would be in direct violation of the resolutions of the Council. Lastly,\nthe active participation of the Rapid Reaction Force exceeded its mandate, as set out in\nresolution 988 (1995). The recent actions had not been taken to protect United Nations\npersonnel and humanitarian convoys. Rather, they amounted to virtual participation in\nmilitary action against one side. Thus, the Rapid Reaction Force no longer remained\nimpartial, even though it remained an integral part of the United Nations peacekeeping\n 388\noperation in Bosnia.\n\n\n The representative of the United Kingdom stated that his delegation was confident\nthat the recent United Nations/NATO action in Bosnia had been appropriate and justified.\nThe action had had clear and specific objectives, designed to protect the safe areas in line\n\n\n 388\n S/PV.3575, pp. 2-4.\n\n\n 252\n"
[253] "with Security Council resolutions. If the Bosnian Serbs were to comply with the\nrequirements explained to them by the United Nations commanders, then the action\n 389\nwould end.\n\n\n The representative of the France emphasized that the military action taken by the\nUnited Nations and NATO had been the outcome of decisions taken at the London\nConference of July 1994, as part of a plan to protect the safe areas. Those operations had\nbeen triggered by the shelling of the Sarajevo market and had been based upon the “dual\nkey” mechanism, whose legitimacy was beyond reproach, and on respect for the\nprerogatives of the Council and the responsibilities of the United Nations. He further\nstated that military firmness was an essential condition for the success of diplomatic\naction. It was essential that the siege of Sarajevo be lifted, that heavy weapons be\nwithdrawn beyond the exclusion zone, and that all attacks against the safe areas cease. 390\n\n\n The representative of the United States stated that in order to defend the\npossibility of a diplomatic solution, the international community had had no choice but to\nrespond forcefully to the Bosnian Serb attack on the Sarajevo marketplace. The Bosnian\nSerbs had been warned that continued attacks on the safe areas would lead to a strong\nresponse. They had chosen to ignore that warning and must accept the consequences of\ntheir actions. The United Nations and NATO had made it clear that they were not at war\nwith the Bosnian Serbs. The air strikes would end as soon as the Bosnian Serb leadership\ncomplied with certain conditions, which called for nothing more than the implementation\nof Security Council resolutions. The speaker further noted that these actions were fully\nauthorized by Security Council resolutions. The Security Council had created the safe\nareas and had given UNPROFOR the mandate to deter attacks and it should support\nUNPROFOR’s efforts to implement that mandate. 391\n\n\n\n\n 389\n Ibid., p. 4.\n 390\n Ibid., pp. 4-5.\n 391\n Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n\n\n 253\n"
[254] " The representative of Nigeria stated that the NATO air strikes had been an\nappropriate and measured response to the recent attack by the Bosnian Serb forces\nagainst a civilian center. At the same time, however, Nigeria regretted that it had become\nnecessary to employ such force. Nigeria hoped that the air strikes had not done\nirreparable harm to the neutrality of the United Nations. It was not too late to make a\n 392\nreassessment of strategy.\n\n\n The representative of China welcomed the progress achieved in Geneva. He\nnoted, however, that his country was not in favour of using air strikes to exert pressure.\nTaking such action would further complicate the situation and create obstacles to a\npolitical settlement. In light of the progress achieved, it was necessary to cease the air\nstrikes immediately, in order to create an environment conducive to a political\nsettlement. 393\n\n\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that her Government fully\nsupported the United Nations and NATO action against military targets of the Bosnian\nSerbs and considered the legitimacy of such actions to be beyond doubt, as they were\n 394\nbeing taken in accordance with resolution 836 (1993).\n\n\n The representative of Croatia stated that his country supported the operation of\nNATO in Bosnia. Croatia believed that it was necessary to continue exerting pressure on\nthe Bosnian Serb party, and that NATO’s course of action would decisively assist to\nbring about an overall lasting peaceful settlement in the region. It was assisting in that\neffort by allowing the use of its airspace by NATO air forces, and providing the use of its\nports for the rapid reaction capacity of UNPROFOR. While supporting the newest peace\ninitiative, the speaker emphasized the importance of mutual recognition of the countries\nin the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was essential to protect and\nunconditionally respect all international borders and territorial integrity of all the\n\n 392\n Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n 393\n Ibid., p. 8.\n 394\n Ibid., pp. 10-11.\n\n\n 254\n"
[255] "successor States of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. His delegation\nalso stated that Croatia did not find encouragement in the reluctance of the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia to subscribe to the basic principle of the peaceful reintegration of\nEastern Slavonia into the rest of Croatia. 395\n\n\n Mr. Djokic demanded that the Security Council take urgent measures to end the\nNATO air strikes and attacks by the Rapid Reaction Force against Bosnian Serb military\nand civilian targets. Noting that NATO air strikes had commenced as a retaliation for the\nshelling of Sarajevo, the speaker contended, however, that the scale, intensity and\nduration of the strikes went far beyond retaliatory measures, and their clear aim was to\ninflict serious injury on the Bosnian Serb military capability, economic infrastructure and\neven civilian facilities. Moreover, the scope and intensity of the bombing had greatly\nexceeded the mandate given to the Secretary-General and NATO by relevant Security\nCouncil resolutions with the aim of protecting the safe areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nBy departing from the traditional principles of peacekeeping, neutrality and impartiality,\nthe United Nations and NATO had set out on a “slippery slope”, which could lead to\nfurther involvement on the side of the Bosnian Muslims and full-scale war against the\nBosnian Serbs. At a time when a just and lasting peace was at last within reach, it was\nessential that that opportunity should not be missed, and that NATO air strikes be\n 396\nstopped.\n\n\n The representative of Ukraine stated that in view of the very encouraging progress\nwhich had been achieved in the process of securing a peace settlement in the Balkans, it\nwould be desirable to review the question of putting an end to any further bombing of\nmilitary targets belonging to the Bosnian Serbs by NATO. Such a step would help create\na favourable atmosphere at the talks and help to strengthen trust between the parties. A\n\n\n\n\n 395\n Ibid., p.12.\n 396\n Ibid., pp. 12-13.\n\n\n 255\n"
[256] "second matter, of even greater immediacy, was the question of lifting economic sanctions\nagainst the FRY. 397\n\n\n During the debate, other speakers supported the air operation conducted by\nNATO which was consistent with Security Council resolutions, and in particular\nresolution 836 (1993). 398 Some were of the view that the operation should continue until\n 399\nits objectives were fully met.\n\n\n Decision of 8 September 1995 (3576th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3576th meeting, on 8 September 1995, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate in\nthe discussion without the right to vote. The President (Italy) drew the attention of the\nmembers of the Council to a letter 400 dated 8 September 1995 from the representatives of\nFrance, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States\naddressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the text of the Joint Statement and\nAgreed Basic Principles signed on 8 September 1995, in Geneva, by the Ministers of\nForeign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). He then stated that, after consultations among\nmembers of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following\n 401\nstatement on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council welcomes the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) held under the auspices of the Contact Group in Geneva\n on 8 September 1995. It welcomes the joint statement issued at the conclusion of that\n\n\n 397\n Ibid., pp. 13-14.\n 398\n Ibid., Germany, pp.6-7; Czech Republic, p.7; Indonesia, pp.8-9; Argentina, p.9; Egypt, p.14-15; Turkey,\np.16; Pakistan, pp.16-17.\n 399\n Ibid., Egypt, pp. 14-15; Turkey, p.16.\n 400\n S/1995/780.\n 401\n S/PRST/1995/45.\n\n\n 256\n"
[257] " meeting and in particular the agreement by the parties on the Agreed Basic Principles. It\n strongly urges the parties to negotiate in good faith and expeditiously on the basis of those\n Principles with the aim of achieving a lasting peace throughout the region.\"\n\n\n Decision of 15 September 1995 (3578th meeting): resolution 1015 (1995)\n\n By a letter 402 dated 6 September 1995 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General transmitted the report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering\nCommittee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, concerning the\noperations of the International Conference’s Mission to the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The report contained the certification referred to in\nresolution 1003 (1993). 403\n At its 3578th meeting, on 15 September 1995, the Council included the above\nletter in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia and Ukraine, at their\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President (Italy)\nthen drew the attention of the Council members to the text of a draft resolution 404\nsubmitted by the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the\nUnited Kingdom and the United States.\n\n\n At the meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that the\nfindings of his Government differed drastically from those of the ICFY Mission.\nAccording to the Bosnian Government, deliveries of military assistance from the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia to the Bosnian Serbs had doubled between January and July. His\ndelegation was surprised that the draft resolution before the Council supported the\nsuspension of sanctions against the FRY for 180 days. At the same time it believed that\nthe time “when the international community was willing to be deceived by the regime in\n\n\n\n\n 402\n S/1995/768.\n 403\n See footnote 300.\n\n 404\n S/1995/789.\n\n\n 257\n"
[258] "Belgrade was irretrievably gone”. Bosnia hoped that the latest peace initiative would\nmean that the draft resolution would be the last in a series of sanctions resolutions. 405\n\n\n The representative of Ukraine considered the draft resolution to constitute a\nrecognition by the international community of the desire of the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia to cooperate for a peaceful settlement. Ukraine believed, however, that the\ncontinuation of the suspension of sanctions for a further 180 days was an inadequate step.\nRather, the Council should be considering lifting the sanctions altogether. A first step in\nthat direction could be renewing transit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of a list of\nindividual products, together with a lifting of the ban on trade in products not regarded as\nstrategic. In that connection, Ukraine welcomed paragraph 3 of the draft resolution,\nwhich made it possible for the Council to consider adjustments to the sanctions régime.\nBefore concluding, the speaker stated that the process for lifting the sanctions could take\nplace at the same time as the process of mutual recognition of the successor States of the\n 406\nformer Yugoslavia.\n\n\n The representative of Bulgaria, referring to the continuing sanctions against the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), noted that Bulgaria, as a State\nMember of the United Nations that was strictly observing the sanctions regardless of their\ndevastating effect on its economy, hoped that the peace process might lead to a\ndiscussion about the suspension and gradual lifting of the sanctions. Recalling the\nstatement of 18 May by the Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria, Greece, Moldova, Romania\nand Ukraine, which had expressed concern at the overall situation in the region\naggravated by the sanctions, the speaker reiterated his Government’s support for the\nconcrete proposals made by the Foreign Ministers to mitigate the impact of the sanctions.\nHe further emphasized that one of the major challenges facing the United Nations was the\n\n\n\n\n 405\n S/PV.3578, pp. 2-3.\n 406\n Ibid., pp. 3-5.\n\n\n 258\n"
[259] "extent to which it would be able to resolve the special economic problems of non-target\ncountries affected by the implementation of sanctions. 407\n\n\n The representative of Croatia noted that his delegation believed that the sanctions\nwere still one of the most effective instruments of the international community for\nbringing an end to the conflict. Eliminating that instrument would undermine the\nestablished balance and the international community’s leverage. His delegation also\nbelieved that the gradual lifting of the sanctions against Belgrade must be related to deeds\nand not promises. It also reminded the Council that resolution 871 (1993) had clearly\nestablished the linkage between ending Belgrade’s economic and political isolation, and\nits cooperation in ending the occupation of parts of Croatia. It warned that any exclusion\nof the question of the remaining occupied territories of Croatia from the comprehensive\npeace plan, including delinking them from the sanctions against Belgrade, would\ninevitably force the Croatian Government to consider other legitimate means of restoring\n 408\nits sovereignty.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of Indonesia took note of the\ncertification issued by the ICFY Mission. At the same time, Indonesia was concerned by\nthe continued shortcomings experienced in the border closure and, in particular, by the\nfact that uniformed personnel were continuing to cross the border between the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Clearly,\nit was possible to improve the closure of the border. Indonesia would vote in favour of\nthe draft resolution, however, for it believed that the closure of the border remained an\n 409\ninstrumental pillar for the achievement of a negotiated settlement.\n\n\n The representative of China noted that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had\nmade many efforts to implement the relevant resolutions of the Council, including\ncontinuing to meet its commitment to close the border with Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n\n 407\n Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n 408\n Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n 409\n Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n\n\n 259\n"
[260] "China was of the view that Belgrade’s efforts to meet its commitments should be\nrecognized and encouraged by the Council, through concrete action. China would vote in\nfavour of the draft resolution extending the partial suspension of sanctions against the\nFRY to 180 days. In keeping with its position on sanctions, however, China was not in\nfavour of using pressure tactics such as mandatory sanctions in the region of the former\nYugoslavia, for such steps would only complicate the issue and hurt innocent civilians.\nChina therefore believed that the Council should lift the sanctions against the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia and ease the remaining economic sanctions. Such a step would\nalleviate the suffering of the people in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, facilitate the\neconomic development of all the countries of the region, and contribute to restoring peace\n 410\nand stability.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that, in his delegation’s view,\nthe draft resolution was a significant improvement over previous resolutions on the\nsubject, in particular because it did not contain provisions pertaining to Belgrade’s\ndecision to close the border to all but humanitarian deliveries. Another step in the right\ndirection was the substantial increase in the time-frame for the next suspension of some\nsanctions. In light of those factors, Russia would support the draft. In a broader context, it\nbelieved that the constructive policy of the Yugoslav leadership should meet with an\nappropriate response from the international community. The sanctions should be lifted\nwithout delay, as their retention was hindering efforts to reach a political settlement.\nGiven Russia’s position in favour of an immediate lifting of the sanctions, it took note of\nparagraph 3, reaffirming the Council’s decision to consider further steps with regard to\nmeasures applicable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in\nlight of further progress. Such steps towards a further easing of sanctions might be\n 411\nadopted at any time, without waiting for the resolution’s deadline to expire.\n\n\n The representative of Honduras stated that maintaining sanctions indefinitely\nwould not help to resolve the conflict. Honduras hoped that lifting the sanctions would\n\n 410\n Ibid., p. 8.\n 411\n Ibid., pp. 8-9.\n\n\n 260\n"
[261] "lighten the burden upon the economic and social development of the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia and neighbouring countries. It further hoped that the draft resolution would\nmotivate the Belgrade authorities to continue cooperating with the international\ncommunity, so that the Council might consider revoking the sanctions régime. 412\n\n\n The representative of Botswana stated that the proposed length of the suspension\nof aspects of the sanctions was a clear recognition of the positive role played by Belgrade\nin the peace process in recent weeks. Botswana welcomed the agreement signed the\nprevious day for the withdrawal of the Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from Sarajevo.\nTurning to the question of the air strikes, the speaker cautioned against the appearance of\npartiality by the United Nations in the Balkan conflict. The shelling of the Sarajevo\nmarketplace in Sarajevo had constituted a cynical provocation against the authority of the\nUnited Nations and deserved a strong response. The United Nations should, however,\navoid the appearance of taking sides. It could not wage war in Bosnia and hope to make\npeace at the same time, without compromising the execution of one of those aims.\nFurthermore, it was critical that the Council guard against losing control of the transfer of\nauthority of the United Nations to regional arrangements. In such situations, the United\nNations should never assume the position of a bystander in an operation that was\n 413\nsupposed to be under the command and control of the Council.\n\n\n The representative of Nigeria noted with satisfaction Belgrade’s continuing\npolitical commitment to the closure of the border. Nigeria was concerned, however, at\nreports of continuing violations of that border. It therefore called on Belgrade to take\nadequate steps to put a stop to all illegal activities and border violations. It would support\nthe draft resolution, however, because it had seen signs that the Council’s “carrot-and-\nstick policy” was modifying the behaviour of the authorities in Belgrade. 414\n\n\n\n\n 412\n Ibid., p. 9.\n 413\n Ibid., pp. 9-10.\n 414\n Ibid., p. 10.\n\n\n 261\n"
[262] " The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 1015 (1995). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 943 (1994) of 23\n September 1994, 970 (1995) of 12 January 1995, 988 (1995) of 21 April 1995 and 1003\n (1995) of 5 July 1995,\n Calling upon all States and others concerned to respect the sovereignty, territorial\n integrity and international borders of all States in the region,\n Noting the measures taken by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro), in particular those detailed in the report transmitted by the letter dated 6\n September 1995 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, to\n maintain the effective closure of the international border between the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with\n respect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical supplies and clothing for essential\n humanitarian needs, and noting with satisfaction that the cooperation of the Mission of the\n International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro) continues to be generally good,\n Reaffirming the importance of further efforts by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro) to enhance the effectiveness of the closure of the international\n border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all goods except foodstuffs, medical\n supplies and clothing for essential humanitarian needs,\n Expressing its appreciation for the work of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee\n of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and of the Mission of the\n International Conference to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),\n and underlining the importance of the necessary resources being made available so as to\n strengthen the capacity of the Mission to carry out its tasks,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Decides that the restrictions and other measures referred to in paragraph 1 of resolution\n 943 (1994) shall be suspended until 18 March 1996;\n 2. Decides also that the arrangements referred to in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of\n resolution 988 (1995) shall continue to apply;\n\n\n\n 262\n"
[263] " 3. Reaffirms its decision to keep the situation closely under review and to consider further\n steps with regard to measures applicable to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro) in the light of further progress in the situation;\n 4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United States underlined some\nfundamental points about the resolution just adopted. First, the suspended sanctions were\nlimited strictly to cultural and sports exchanges, the restoration of passenger air transport\nto and from Belgrade, and ferry service to the port of Bar. There was no suspension of\neconomic sanctions, meaning that there had been no increase of sanctions relief. Rather,\nthe existing relief had been extended for six months. The United States continued to\nbelieve that further sanctions relief must follow real steps towards peace, such as mutual\nrecognition among the successor States to the former Yugoslavia. Secondly, the\nrequirements of resolution 988 (1995) remained in full force, including the requirement\nin paragraphs 14 and 15 that the Secretary-General report to the Council immediately if\nhe had evidence of non-compliance by the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro with the\nborder closure. If such a report were to be submitted, the suspension of the sanctions\nwould terminate. In that connection, there had been indications of shortcomings in the\nimplementation of Serbia and Montenegro’s commitment to close its border. In\nparticular, efforts by Serbia and Montenegro to assist the Bosnian Serbs in restoring their\nmilitary communications and air defence networks and providing other military\n 415\nassistance would violate the commitment to close the border.\n\n\n The representative of France stated that while the resolution just adopted was\ntechnical in nature, the improvement made to it – the extension of the suspension period\nto 180 days - reflected his delegation’s conviction that a dynamic of negotiation seemed\nto have begun and must be encouraged. France hoped that the Council would have the\nopportunity to decide, on the basis of the evolving situation, on the further alleviation of\nsanctions. 416\n\n\n 415\n Ibid., pp. 11-12.\n 416\n Ibid., pp. 12-13.\n\n\n 263\n"
[264] " Decision of 18 September 1995 (3580th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3580th meeting, on 18 September 1995, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion\nwithout the right to vote. The President (Italy) then stated that, after consultations among\nmembers of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following\nstatement 417 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council deplores the rapidly escalating military situation on the ground in\n the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and expresses its deep concern about the plight of\n the civilian population resulting therefrom.\n \"The Council demands that all the parties involved in offensive military activities and\n hostile acts in western Bosnia cease them immediately and respect fully the rights of the local\n population. It stresses the importance it attaches to intensified efforts to alleviate the plight of\n refugees and displaced persons and to the fullest cooperation in this regard by the parties with\n the United Nations Protection Force and the international humanitarian agencies. The\n Council reiterates that there can be no military solution to the conflict in the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina and urges all parties not to take military advantage of the present\n situation. It once again expresses its full support for the Agreed Basic Principles signed at\n Geneva on 8 September 1995, which provide a basis for negotiations with the aim of\n achieving a lasting peace throughout the region.\n \"The Council furthermore deplores the death of one Danish peacekeeper and injury to\n nine others and expresses its condolences to the Government of Denmark and to the family of\n the peacekeeper who lost his life.\"\n\n\n Decision of 21 September 1995 (3581st meeting): resolution 1016 (1995)\n\n At its 3581st meeting, on 21 September 1995, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate in\n\n\n 417\n S/PRST/1995/47.\n\n\n 264\n"
[265] "the discussion without the right to vote. The President (Italy) then drew the attention of\nthe Council members to the text of a draft resolution418 prepared in the course of the\nCouncil’s prior consultations and to several other documents. 419\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 1016 (1995). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions and the statement by its President of 18\n September 1995,\n Deeply concerned by the military situation on the ground in the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina and by the plight of the civilian population there, which constitutes a\n humanitarian crisis of significant proportions,\n Especially concerned by the humanitarian consequences, as a result of the recent fighting,\n including loss of life and suffering among the civilian population, and a new flow of tens of\n thousands of refugees and displaced persons,\n Reiterating its full support for the Agreed Basic Principles signed at Geneva on\n 8 September 1995,\n Gravely concerned about all offensives and hostile acts in the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina by the parties concerned, including those most recently undertaken,\n 1. Notes the assurances given by the Governments of the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia regarding offensive actions in western Bosnia and,\n while taking note of the reports that the offensive actions have slowed down, affirms the need\n for full compliance with the demands set out in the statement by its President of\n 18 September 1995;\n 2. Deplores the casualties suffered by the Danish peacekeepers, expresses its condolences\n to the Government of Denmark and to the families of the peacekeepers who lost their lives,\n and demands that all parties fully respect the safety of United Nations personnel;\n 3. Calls upon all parties and others concerned to refrain from violence and hostile acts\n and to reach immediately a ceasefire and a cessation of hostilities throughout the territory of\n the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n\n 418\n S/1995/810.\n 419\n S/1995/808, letter dated 19 September 1995 from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\naddressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1995/812, letter dated 20 September 1995 from the representative\nof Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council.\n\n\n 265\n"
[266] " 4. Calls upon Member States involved in promoting an overall peaceful settlement in the\n region to intensify their efforts to this end with the parties to ensure that they take no\n advantage from the current situation and show utmost restraint;\n 5. Demands that the parties negotiate in good faith on the basis of the Agreed Basic\n Principles signed at Geneva on 8 September 1995 with the aim of achieving lasting peace\n throughout the region;\n 6. Reiterates that there can be no military solution to the conflict in the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 7. Urges all States and international humanitarian organizations to intensify their efforts\n to help to alleviate the plight of refugees and displaced persons;\n 8. Requests the Secretary-General to provide to the Council as soon as possible\n information on the humanitarian situation, including information available through the United\n Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other sources;\n 9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Decision of 12 October 1995 (3587th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3587th meeting, on 12 October 1995, the Council resumed its consideration\nof the item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the\nright to vote. The President (Nigeria) then stated that, after consultations among members\nof the Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement 420 on\nbehalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council welcomes the entry into force of the ceasefire agreement of\n 5 October 1995 between the Bosnian parties.\n \"The Council takes this opportunity to express its gratitude to all those who negotiated\n the ceasefire agreement and to the United Nations Protection Force and others who, often at\n risk to their own lives, have made possible, with the cooperation of all the parties, the\n restoration of gas and electricity supplies to the inhabitants of Sarajevo, enabling them to live\n in more decent conditions.\n\n\n\n\n 420\n S/PRST/1995/52.\n\n\n 266\n"
[267] " \"The Council demands that all parties fully comply with the provisions of the ceasefire\nagreement and refrain from any military activity that could jeopardize the peace process. It\nexpresses its deepest concern at any operation that provokes large-scale movements of\npopulation detrimental to the peace process and a final and fair settlement. The Council is\nparticularly concerned about new reports related to the movements of the displaced\npopulation in the areas of Sanski Most and Mrkonjic Grad.\n \"The Council reiterates its strong condemnation of all practices of ethnic cleansing\nwherever they occur and by whomsoever committed. It demands their immediate cessation\nand underlines the need to alleviate the sufferings caused by these acts. The Council urges all\nBosnian parties to respect fully the rights of all communities, including their right to remain\nwhere they are or to return to their homes in safety.\n \"The Council is, in particular, deeply concerned about new reports concerning acts of\nethnic cleansing committed in the Banja Luka and Prijedor areas, especially about reports,\nincluding those by international humanitarian organizations, that non-Serb men and boys of\ndraft age are being taken away by Bosnian Serb and other paramilitary forces. The Council\ndemands that those persons be immediately released.\n \"The Council demands that the Bosnian Serb party grant United Nations personnel and\nthe representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross immediate and\nunimpeded access to all the areas of concern. It also demands that representatives of the\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross be allowed to visit and register any persons\ndetained against their will. The Council reiterates in this context the demands set out in\nresolution 1010 (1995) and in the statement by its President of 7 September 1995 on\nSrebrenica and Zepa.\n \"The Council reaffirms that those who have committed or have ordered the commission\nof violations of international humanitarian law will be held individually responsible for them.\nThe Council recalls in this context the establishment of the International Tribunal for the\nProsecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law\nCommitted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, pursuant to its resolution\n827 (1993) and reiterates that all States shall cooperate fully with the Tribunal and its organs.\n \"The Council will remain actively seized of the matter.”\n\n\n Decision of 30 November 1995 (3601st meeting): resolution 1026 (1995)\n\n\n\n\n 267\n"
[268] " On 23 November 1995, pursuant to resolutions 981 (1995), 982 (1995) and 983\n(1995), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report 421 on the three\npeacekeeping missions in the former Yugoslavia. 422 The report was intended to assist the\nCouncil in its deliberations on the future of these missions.\n In his report, the Secretary-General noted that the general framework agreement,\nwhich had been initialled by the Presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and\nSerbia on 21 November 1995 in Dayton, provided the basis for peace to become reality.\nThe framework agreement contained many aspects with far-reaching implications not\nonly for the UN peace-keeping forces deployed in the former Yugoslavia, but also for the\nfuture role of the Organization in that region, which had yet to be fully assessed and\nanalysed. In connection with UNPROFOR, the Secretary-General noted that since the\nagreement envisaged the implementation of the military and regional stabilization aspects\nto be the responsibility of a new Implementation Force (IFOR), to be authorized by the\nSecurity Council, a primary task for UNPROFOR was to arrange for the transfer of\nresponsibility to IFOR. Pending finalization of the arrangements for the transfer of\nresponsibility to IFOR, the Secretary-General recommended that the existing mandate of\nUNPROFOR be extended for two months, or until the appropriate transfer of authority\nhad been executed between UNPROFOR and the incoming Implementation Force,\nsubject to authorization of the Security Council.\n At its 3601st meeting, on 30 November 1995, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and included\nthe above report in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited\nthe representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The President (Oman) then drew the attention of the\nCouncil members to the text of a draft resolution 423 submitted by Argentina, the Czech\nRepublic, France, Germany, Honduras, Italy, the Russian Federation, the\n\n\n\n\n 421\n S/1995/987.\n 422\n This report was also considered by the Council at its 3600th meeting under the sub-item “ The situation in\nCroatia”.\n 423\n S/1995/995.\n\n\n 268\n"
[269] "United Kingdom and the United States, as well as to a letter 424 dated 29 November 1995\nfrom the representative of the United States addressed to the Secretary-General,\ntransmitting the text of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina.\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 1026 (1995). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 982 (1995) of\n 31 March 1995 and 998 (1995) of 16 June 1995,\n Reaffirming its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of\n the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Welcoming again the initialling of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in\n Bosnia and Herzegovina and the annexes thereto (collectively the “Peace Agreement”) by the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia and the other parties thereto on 21 November 1995 at Dayton, Ohio, signifying\n agreement between the parties to sign formally the Peace Agreement,\n Stressing the need for all parties to comply fully with all provisions of the Peace\n Agreement and, prior to the entry into force of that agreement, the need for all parties to\n cooperate fully with the United Nations Protection Force and to maintain the current ceasefire\n agreement,\n Welcoming the positive role played by the United Nations Protection Force, and paying\n tribute to the personnel of the Force in the performance of their mandate,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 23 November 1995,\n Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the\n personnel of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the territory of the former\n Yugoslavia, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 23 November 1995;\n 2. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force for a period\n terminating on 31 January 1996, pending further action by the Council with regard to the\n implementation of the Peace Agreement;\n\n\n\n 424\n S/1995/999.\n\n\n 269\n"
[270] " 3. Invites the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed of developments in the\n peace process and to submit as soon as possible to the Council reports, containing the\n necessary information and recommendations, on aspects of the implementation of the Peace\n Agreement as they affect the United Nations in order to enable the Council to take a decision\n ensuring an orderly transfer of authority as envisaged in the Peace Agreement;\n 4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Decision of 7 December 1995 (3603rd meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3603rd meeting, on 7 December 1995, the Council resumed its consideration\nof the item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the\nright to vote. The President (The Russian Federation) then stated that, after consultations\namong members of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following\nstatement 425 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council expresses deep concern over the looting and burning of houses by\n the forces of the Croatian Defence Council in the area of Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo, which\n have continued for some time, and it also notes with concern that similar acts have been\n committed by Bosnian Serb forces in other areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council is\n also deeply concerned by reports that the Croatian Defence Council is moving mine-laying\n equipment into the Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo areas.\n \"The Council considers that such actions are dangerous and detrimental to the spirit of\n confidence essential for the implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and\n Herzegovina.\n \"The Council demands that all such actions be stopped immediately and stresses the need\n for all parties to exercise maximum restraint and to demonstrate the cooperation essential for\n the successful implementation of the Peace Agreement.\"\n\n\n Decision of 15 December 1995 (3607th meeting): resolution 1031 (1995)\n\n\n\n\n 425\n S/PRST/1995/60.\n\n\n 270\n"
[271] " On 13 December 1995, pursuant to resolution 1026 (1995), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 426 on developments in the peace process in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina. The report noted that the most important development since the adoption of\nresolution 1026 (1995) was the Peace Implementation Conference convened in London\non 8 and 9 December which had resulted in the adoption of a document known as “ the\nLondon conclusions”. The Conference had also approved the designation of Mr. Carl\nBildt as High Representative and had invited the Security Council to agree to it. The\nreport also addressed aspects of implementation of the peace agreement that affected the\nUnited Nations and dealt with the future of certain existing United Nations activities\nwhich would either be discontinued or transferred to other agencies. The Secretary-\nGeneral observed that the Peace Agreement offered real hope of bringing an end to the\nconflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He welcomed the fact that Member States had\ndecided that the task of helping to implement the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina should not be entrusted to the United Nations alone. He noted, in that\nregard, that only a cooperative effort between many international organizations and\nMember States could generate the skills and resources, and above all, the political will\nrequired to end the fighting and start building the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\nReferring to the ways in which the United Nations could make its contribution to that\ncommon effort, he stated that the most important of them were in the fields of\nhumanitarian relief and return of refugees, and civilian police, where the parties had\nasked the Organization to deploy a United Nations civilian police greater than any\npreviously seen. Other areas, where the United Nations could make a contribution,\nincluded human rights.\n At its 3607th meeting, on 15 December 1995, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and included\nthe above report in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited\nthe representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Croatia, Egypt, Japan,\nMalaysia, Norway, Spain, Turkey and Ukraine, at their request, to participate in the\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The Council also invited Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, at\n\n\n\n 426\n S/1995/1031.\n\n\n 271\n"
[272] "his request, to address it in the course of the subsequent discussion. The President (the\nRussian Federation) then drew the attention of the Council members to the text of a draft\nresolution 427 submitted by Argentina, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the\nRussian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as to several other\ndocuments. 428\n\n\n At the meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina noted that the\nCouncil would be deciding upon a comprehensive resolution on the various aspects of the\nimplementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement. As a host country to the Implementation\nForce, Bosnia and Herzegovina pledged partnership in the implementation of the\nagreement. Bosnia and Herzegovina was committed to furthering existing democratic\ninstitutions and establishing new ones to restore the rule of law and order in every part of\nthe country, thus guaranteeing safety, justice and respect for all citizens of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, regardless of ethnic or religious background. The speaker argued that\nrestoration of mutual confidence would be possible if the Bosnian Serb authorities were\nto do the same in the territories under their control, including by bringing to justice those\nwho had committed war crimes and by preventing them from playing any future political\nrole. Finally, Sarajevo should again be not only a symbol of the ethnic, religious and\ncultural diversity and richness of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also the birthplace of new\n 429\ninternational hope and solidarity.\n\n\n The representative of Croatia noted that no matter how difficult and tragic the past\nfour years had been, the peace agreement would move Bosnia and the whole region\nforwards and the timely deployment of the IFOR, to be authorized by the draft resolution,\nwould continue the momentum for peace. It would also be necessary, however, to\nimplement the economic and electoral aspects of the Agreement with the same\n\n\n 427\n S/1995/1033.\n 428\n S/1995/999, letter dated 29 November 1995 from the representative of the United States addressed to the\nSecretary-General; S/1995/1021, letter dated 7 December 1995 from the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nand Croatia addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1995/1029, letter dated 11 December 1995 from the representative of\nthe United Kingdom addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1995/1034, letter dated 14 December 1995 from the\nSecretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council.\n 429\n S/PV.3607, pp. 3-4.\n\n\n 272\n"
[273] "commitment and vigour. IFOR alone could not secure a lasting and just peace in Bosnia.\nCroatia regretted that the agreement on the normalization of relations between it and\nBosnia and Herzegovina, including mutual recognition, had not been signed in Paris.\nCroatia’s position remained that unconditional recognition was a prerequisite for the\nequitable resolution of all outstanding issues between two sovereign States. Turning to\nthe draft resolution, the speaker emphasized paragraph 8, which recognized the right of\nall Bosnian refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes of origin in safety and\ncalled on the United Nations to play a leading role in their repatriation. Those refugees\nand displaced persons must be given the opportunity to return home or they must be\ncompensated for their property fairly and in a timely manner. The speaker concluded by\npresenting the position of his Government on the 13 December report of the Secretary-\n 430\nGeneral on the implementation of the Basic Agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja,\nand Western Sirmium. Croatia expressed concern that that report placed emphasis on\nexternal risks and not enough emphasis on the most important element of the agreement\nwhich was demilitarization. It could not accept an attempt to build a new and improved\nsafe area in the occupied Vukovar region. Therefore, the deployment of a large\ninternational force to Croatia was unacceptable. Rather, the military aspects of the\nimplementation force should be reduced and the civilian aspects strengthened. The\nspeaker further noted any delay in addressing the implementation of the Basic Agreement\nwould minimize the possibility of its success. The momentum for peace that was evident\nin implementing the Peace Agreement in Bosnia should be emulated and utilized to\n 431\nsecure peace in Croatia as well.\n\n\n Mr. Jovanovic noted that it had not been an easy task to achieve the Peace\nAgreement, but the essential thing was that peace had finally prevailed and that the\nimplementation of the Agreement would strengthen stability, not only in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina but also in the Balkans and Europe. The basic task ahead was full\nimplementation of the Peace Agreement. The responsibility for such implementation lay\nnot only with the Republic of Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation and other\n\n 430\n S/1995/1028.\n 431\n Ibid., pp. 4-6.\n\n\n 273\n"
[274] "interested parties, but also with international entities assigned major implementation\ntasks. For its part, Yugoslavia stood ready to implement fully the commitments it had\nundertaken under the Agreement. The speaker further stated that it was imperative that\nthe military and civilian components of the international presence in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina took an impartial and objective position towards all parties. It was also\nimperative that the Serbs of Sarajevo receive concrete guarantees that their freedom,\nsecurity, equality and human rights would be fairly and unconditionally respected.\nReferring to the question of sanctions, the speaker stated that his delegation expected\nthat, in accordance with the Peace Agreement, the Council would soon lift all sanctions\nagainst the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Having been “crippled” by international\nsanctions and isolated from the international community, the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia was eagerly seeking to restore its place in the family of nations. It believed\nthat, by pursuing a constructive policy for peace in the former Yugoslavia, it had earned\nthe right to normalize its status in all international organizations, and to normalize\nrelations with the European Union. As a founding Member, the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia requested that the Council allow it to resume its rightful place in the United\nNations without delay, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and\ninternational law. It was particularly unacceptable that additional conditions were being\nset for the normalization of the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United\nNations. With the signing of the Peace Agreement, it was only logical that Yugoslavia’s\n 432\nrights be fully restored.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that the\nconclusion of the Peace Agreement and the draft resolution before the Council sounded\nthe call for the most comprehensive operation to reconstruct a European country since the\nMarshall Plan half a century earlier. Sustaining that process would be vital, if the promise\nof peace were to become a reality. One important task was military in nature. IFOR’s role\nwould be even-handed and limited in scope and duration. The force would not be\nimposing the peace settlement, but it would take necessary action to ensure compliance.\n\n\n 432\n Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n\n\n 274\n"
[275] "Furthermore, should it be decided that IFOR would detain and transfer to the appropriate\nauthorities any persons indicted by the Tribunal with whom it came into contact, then the\nauthority to do so was provided by the draft resolution, when read in conjunction with the\nPeace Agreement. The implementation of the Peace Agreement, however, was simply not\na military task. IFOR was necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for rebuilding the\ncivil, political and economic institutions and structures that would form the basis of a\nunified, prosperous and stable society. The international community faced a huge\ncommitment in implementing the Peace Agreement. That commitment needed to be\nmatched by a similar determination on the part of the Bosnian people, the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia and Croatia. Before concluding, the speaker warned that failure\nby the Bosnian Serbs to cooperate would lead to the continuation of economic\n 433\nsanctions.\n\n\n The representative of Germany stated that the draft resolution conferred a\nchallenging responsibility upon the members of the Council. By an affirmative vote, the\nCouncil would set in motion an enormous international military and civilian operation.\nNoting that all parties had consented to the deployment of IFOR, including the use of\nforce if necessary, the speaker stated that it was essential that the parties comply with\ntheir commitment to refrain from the use of force, and that they cooperate fully with\nIFOR in the military side of the implementation of the Peace Agreement. However, while\nthe military component of the implementation of the Dayton Agreement represented the\nfoundation of peace, the construction of peace would be a civilian task. It was therefore\nnecessary to strengthen the political consensus achieved so far by holding free and fair\nelections. It was also necessary to assist the local security forces, to monitor human and\nminority rights, to undertake important humanitarian tasks, and to reconstruct and\ndevelop a devastated country and its economy. In that effort, the United Nations would\ncontinue to have an important peacekeeping role, and Germany fully supported the\nconcept of a strong International Police Task Force and of a United Nations civilian\nmission. Referring to the question of the admission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n\n\n 433\n Ibid., pp. 8-9.\n\n\n 275\n"
[276] "(Serbia and Montenegro) to the General Assembly, the speaker noted that his delegation\nwould welcome such a development under the conditions determined by the respective\norgans of the United Nations. Turning to the question of coordination of the civilian tasks\nto be carried out in the implementation of the Peace Agreement, the speaker stated that\nthe many international organizations involved must work in the same direction. It was\nimportant that there be no duplication of effort. In that respect, the draft resolution spelled\nout clearly the responsibilities of the High Representative, as the final authority in theatre\nregarding civilian implementation and as coordinator of the civilian operations with the\nauthority to give guidance as appropriate. In conclusion, the speaker stated that those\nresponsible for war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law must be\nbrought to justice. Without uncovering the truth and without justice, national\nreconciliation could not be achieved. The draft rightly stressed the importance of full\ncooperation with the International Tribunal and made it clear that IFOR had a role to play\n 434\nin that respect.\n\n\n The representative of Argentina stated that, as clearly set out in one of the\npreambular paragraphs of the draft resolution, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia\nremained a threat to international peace and security. That factor explained the\nwidespread concern that the principal role for the United Nations, through the Council,\nwould be to keep the implementation of the Peace Agreement under permanent review.\nWith the draft resolution, work of great importance to the United Nations would begin in\nsuch areas as the protection of human rights, humanitarian assistance, civil policing and\nthe removal of mines. Argentina was struck, however, by the fact that the supervision of\nelectoral processes, which was an area where the United Nations had unparalleled\nexperience and aptitude – had been assigned to the Organization for Security and\nCooperation in Europe (OSCE). It therefore supported the Secretary-General’s offer to\nthe OSCE that the invaluable experience of the United Nations might be put to use in\nBosnia. Argentina also emphasized the importance of the International Tribunal. Peace\n\n\n\n\n 434\n Ibid., pp. 9-11.\n\n\n 276\n"
[277] "would only be lasting if those responsible for atrocities were made to face the\nconsequences of their actions. 435\n\n\n The representative of China welcomed the positive developments in relation to\nthe situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Observing that the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia had made unremitting efforts in the peace process and should be\nacknowledged and encouraged by the international community, he stated that the Council\nshould resolve soon the question of the status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in\nthe United Nations. On the basis of China’s position in support of the peace process in\nthe former Yugoslavia, and the fact that the draft resolution called for extraordinary\naction in extraordinary circumstances, the Chinese delegation would vote in favour of the\ndraft resolution. That did not represent, however, a change in China’s position. China had\nlong disapproved of operations authorized by the Council when Chapter VII was invoked\nand mandatory measures adopted, and it could not approve the Council’s authorization of\nthe unlimited use of force. It therefore believed that IFOR must maintain neutrality and\nimpartiality and avoid the wanton use of force, in order not to damage the image of the\nUnited Nations. IFOR should thus provide the Council with timely and full reports on the\nimplementation of its tasks and should accept the necessary control of and guidance from\n 436\nthe Council.\n\n\n The representative of Nigeria noted that his delegation would have preferred a\nUnited Nations operation under the policy control of the Council and the managerial\nsupervision of the Secretary-General, in spite of the fact that the parties to the agreement\nhad requested a multinational force. Whilst mindful of the Secretary-General’s\nobservations about the inability of the United Nations to undertake such an operation at\nthat time, Nigeria believed that it was a lack of political backing and of the resource\nsupport of Member States that was preventing the Organization from undertaking directly\nthe enforcement operations envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter. Nigeria also\nbelieved that the Council should not continue to contract out what would normally be a\n\n 435\n Ibid., pp. 11-12.\n 436\n Ibid., pp. 13-14.\n\n\n 277\n"
[278] "United Nations responsibility to a group of powerful States. Questions about the time-\nframe and concept of operations were not quite clear, nor could one say exactly whence\nthe post of High Representative derived its legitimacy and authority. As Member States\nof the United Nations, the members of the Council should not support decisions that had\nthe effect of subordinating the Organization or its Secretary-General to another\norganization. The United Nations was still the most universal expression of the will of the\ninternational community. However, in view of its policy of supporting all peace\ninitiatives and of the primary objective of helping to resolve the Balkan conflict, Nigeria\n 437\nwould support the draft resolution.\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 1031 (1995). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions concerning the conflicts in the former\n Yugoslavia,\n Reaffirming its commitment to a negotiated political settlement of the conflicts in the\n former Yugoslavia preserving the territorial integrity of all States there within their\n internationally recognized borders,\n Welcoming the signing on 14 December 1995 at the Paris Peace Conference of the\n General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the annexes thereto\n (collectively the “Peace Agreement”) by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the\n Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other parties thereto,\n Welcoming also the Dayton Agreement on implementing the Federation of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina of 10 November 1995,\n Welcoming further the conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held in\n London on 8 and 9 December 1995 (the London Conference), and in particular its decision to\n establish a Peace Implementation Council and its Steering Board as referred to in those\n conclusions,\n Paying tribute to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia for its efforts\n aimed at achieving a peace settlement, and taking note of the decision of the London\n\n\n 437\n Ibid., pp. 14-15.\n\n\n 278\n"
[279] "Conference that the Peace Implementation Council will subsume the International\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 13 December 1995,\n Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to\ninternational peace and security,\n Determined to promote the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in accordance with the\npurposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n\n\n I\n\n\n 1. Welcomes and supports the Peace Agreement, and calls upon the parties to fulfil in\ngood faith the commitments entered into in that Agreement;\n 2. Expresses its intention to keep the implementation of the Peace Agreement under\nreview;\n 3. Welcomes the progress made towards mutual recognition among the successor States\nto the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, within their internationally\nrecognized borders;\n 4. Reaffirms its resolutions concerning compliance with international humanitarian law in\nthe former Yugoslavia, reaffirms also that all States shall cooperate fully with the\nInternational Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of\nInternational Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former since 1991 and its\norgans in accordance with the provisions of resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 and the\nstatute of the International Tribunal, and shall comply with requests for assistance or orders\nissued by a Trial Chamber under article 29 of the statute, and calls upon them to allow the\nestablishment of offices of the Tribunal;\n 5. Recognizes that the parties shall cooperate fully with all entities involved in the\nimplementation of the peace settlement, as described in the Peace Agreement, or which are\notherwise authorized by the Security Council, including the International Tribunal, and that\nthe parties have in particular authorized the multinational force referred to in paragraph 14\nbelow to take such actions as required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure\ncompliance with annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement;\n\n\n\n\n 279\n"
[280] " 6. Welcomes the agreement by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe\nto adopt and put in place a programme of elections for Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the request\nof the parties to annex 3 of the Peace Agreement;\n 7. Welcomes also the parties' commitment, as specified in the Peace Agreement, to\nsecuring for all persons within their jurisdiction the highest level of internationally\nrecognized human rights and fundamental freedoms, stresses that compliance with this\ncommitment is of vital importance in achieving a lasting peace, and welcomes the invitation\nby the parties to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, the Organization for\nSecurity and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human\nRights and other intergovernmental or regional human rights missions or organizations to\nmonitor closely the human rights situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 8. Welcomes further the parties' commitment to the right of all refugees and displaced\npersons freely to return to their homes of origin in safety, notes the leading humanitarian role\nwhich has been given by the Peace Agreement to the United Nations High Commissioner for\nRefugees, in coordination with other agencies involved and under the authority of the\nSecretary-General, in assisting with the repatriation and relief of refugees and displaced\npersons, and stresses the importance of repatriation being phased, gradual and orderly;\n 9. Emphasizes the importance of the creation of conditions conducive to the\nreconstruction and development of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and encourages Member States\nto provide assistance for the programme of reconstruction in that country;\n 10. Underlines the relationship, as described in the conclusions of the London\nConference, between the fulfilment by the parties of their commitments in the Peace\nAgreement and the readiness of the international community to commit financial resources\nfor reconstruction and development;\n 11. Welcomes the agreement of the parties to annex 1-B of the Peace Agreement that\nestablishment of progressive measures for regional stability and arms control is essential to\ncreating a stable peace in the region, emphasizes the importance of all Member States\nsupporting their efforts to this end, and supports the commitment of the Organization for\nSecurity and Cooperation in Europe to assist the parties with the negotiation and\nimplementation of such measures;\n\n\n II\n\n\n\n\n 280\n"
[281] " 12. Welcomes the willingness of the Member States acting through or in cooperation with\nthe organization referred to in annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to assist the parties to the\nPeace Agreement by deploying a multinational implementation force;\n 13. Notes the invitation of the parties to the international community to send to the region\nfor a period of approximately one year a multinational implementation force to assist in\nimplementation of the territorial and other militarily related provisions of annex 1-A of the\nPeace Agreement;\n 14. Authorizes the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization\nreferred to in annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to establish a multinational Implementation\nForce under unified command and control in order to fulfil the role specified in annexes 1-A\nand 2 of the Peace Agreement;\n 15. Authorizes the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above to take all necessary\nmeasures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with annex 1-A of the\nPeace Agreement, stresses that the parties shall be held equally responsible for compliance\nwith that annex and shall be equally subject to such enforcement action by the\nImplementation Force as may be necessary to ensure implementation of that annex and the\nprotection of the Force, and takes note that the parties have consented to the taking of such\nmeasures by the Implementation Force;\n 16. Authorizes the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above, in accordance with\nannex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with\nthe rules and procedures, to be established by the Commander of the Implementation Force,\ngoverning command and control of airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to all\ncivilian and military air traffic;\n 17. Authorizes Member States to take all necessary measures, at the request of the\nImplementation Force, either in defence of the Force or to assist the Force in carrying out its\nmission, and recognizes the right of the Force to take all necessary measures to defend itself\nfrom attack or threat of attack;\n 18. Demands that the parties respect the security and freedom of movement of the\nImplementation Force and other international personnel;\n 19. Decides that, with effect from the day on which the Secretary-General reports to the\nCouncil that the transfer of authority from the United Nations Protection Force to the\nImplementation Force has taken place, the authority to take certain measures conferred upon\nStates by resolutions 770 (1992) of 13 August 1992, 781 (1992) of 9 October 1992,\n816 (1993) of 31 March 1993, 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993, 844 (1993) of 18 June 1993 and\n\n\n 281\n"
[282] "958 (1994) of 19 November 1994 shall be terminated, and that the provisions of resolution\n824 (1993) of 6 May 1993 and subsequent resolutions regarding safe areas shall also be\nterminated from the same date;\n 20. Requests the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to cooperate with the\nCommander of the Implementation Force to ensure the effective management of the airports\nin Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the light of the responsibilities conferred on the Force by\nannex 1-A of the Peace Agreement with regard to the airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 21. Decides, with a view to terminating the authorization granted in paragraphs 14 to\n17 above one year after the transfer of authority from the United Nations Protection Force to\nthe Implementation Force, to review by that date and to take a decision whether that\nauthorization should continue, based upon the recommendations from the States participating\nin the Implementation Force and from the High Representative through the Secretary-\nGeneral;\n 22. Decides also that the embargo imposed by resolution 713 (1991) of\n25 September 1991 shall not apply to weapons and military equipment destined for the sole\nuse of the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above, or of international police forces;\n 23. Invites all States, in particular those in the region, to provide appropriate support and\nfacilities, including transit facilities, for the Member States acting under paragraph 14 above;\n 24. Welcomes the conclusion of the agreements concerning the status of forces as referred\nto in appendix B to annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement, and demands that the parties comply\nfully with those agreements;\n 25. Requests the Member States acting through or in cooperation with the organization\nreferred to in annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to report to the Council, through the\nappropriate channels and at least at monthly intervals, the first such report be made not later\nthan ten days following the adoption of the present resolution;\n 26. Endorses the establishment of a High Representative, following the request of the\nparties, who, in accordance with annex 10 on civilian implementation, will monitor the\nimplementation of the Peace Agreement and mobilize and, as appropriate, give guidance to\nand coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies involved, and agrees\nthe designation of Mr. Carl Bildt as High Representative;\n 27. Confirms that the High Representative is the final authority in theatre regarding\ninterpretation of annex 10 of the Peace Agreement on civilian implementation;\n 28. Decides that all States concerned, and in particular those where the High\nRepresentative establishes offices, shall ensure that the High Representative enjoys such legal\n\n\n 282\n"
[283] "capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of his functions, including the capacity to\ncontract and to acquire and dispose of real and personal property;\n 29. Notes that close cooperation between the Implementation Force, the High\nRepresentative and the agencies will be vital to ensure successful implementation;\n 30. Affirms the need for the implementation of the Peace Agreement in its entirety, and in\nthis context stresses the importance it attaches to the urgent implementation of annex 11 of\nthe Peace Agreement, decides to act expeditiously on the report of the Secretary-General\nrecommending the establishment of a United Nations civilian police force with the tasks set\nout in that annex, together with a civilian office with the responsibilities described in the\nreport of the Secretary-General, and further decides that in the interim civilian police,\ndemining, civil affairs and other personnel that might be required to carry out the tasks\ndescribed in that report shall continue in theatre, notwithstanding the provisions of\nparagraphs 33 and 34 below;\n 31. Stresses the need for early action in Sarajevo to create confidence between the\ncommunities, and, to this end, requests the Secretary-General to ensure the early\nredeployment of elements of United Nations civilian police from the Republic of Croatia to\nSarajevo;\n 32. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council reports from the High\nRepresentative, in accordance with annex 10 of the Peace Agreement and the conclusions of\nthe London Conference, on the implementation of the Peace Agreement;\n\n\n III\n\n\n 33. Decides that the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force shall terminate on\nthe date on which the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the transfer of authority\nfrom the United Nations Protection Force to the Implementation Force has taken place;\n 34. Approves the arrangements set out in the report of the Secretary-General on the\nwithdrawal of the United Nations Protection Force and headquarters elements from the\nUnited Nations Peace Force, including the arrangements for the command and control of the\nUnited Nations Protection Force following the transfer of authority from it to the\nImplementation Force;\n 35. Expresses its warmest appreciation to all United Nations Protection Force personnel\nwho have served the cause of peace in the former Yugoslavia, and pays tribute to those who\nhave given their lives and those who have suffered serious injuries in that service;\n\n\n 283\n"
[284] " 36. Authorizes the Member States, acting under paragraph 14 above, to use all necessary\n means to assist in the withdrawal of the United Nations Protection Force;\n 37. Calls upon the parties to ensure the safety and security of the United Nations\n Protection Force and confirms that the Force will continue to enjoy all existing privileges and\n immunities, including during the period of withdrawal;\n 38. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council when the withdrawal of the\n United Nations Protection Force is complete;\n\n\n IV\n\n\n 39. Recognizes the unique, extraordinary and complex character of the present situation\n in Bosnia and Herzegovina, requiring an exceptional response;\n 40. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United States stated that, while\nmuch of the Council’s work had borne fruit, often its resolutions and statements had\npromised much but accomplished little. Often the Council’s message to the people of\nBosnia had been a tragic one: “We cannot defend you and we will not let you defend\nyourselves”. Now, however, the Council’s message was different. It had helped Bosnia to\nnegotiate a peace agreement, it was authorizing a powerful military force to implement\nthat peace, and it would enable Bosnia to ensure that peace once the international\npresence had left. Noting that IFOR’s purpose was to make peace work, not to fight a war\nor to occupy, the speaker warned nevertheless that, if anyone were foolish enough to\nattack or threaten IFOR, then they would regret having done so. The speaker noted that\nthe resolution just adopted recognized that the parties must cooperate fully with the\nInternational Tribunal and that IFOR had authority to take actions, including the use of\nnecessary force, to ensure compliance with the relevant provisions of the Peace\nAgreement. That was a welcome supplement to the duties and authorities stemming from\nresolution 827 (1993). The NATO Council could now underscore the obligation of the\nparties to cooperate fully with the Tribunal by explicitly authorizing IFOR to transfer\nindicted persons to the Tribunal and to detain such persons for that purpose. The United\nStates also stressed the importance of every country’s obligation to cooperate with the\n\n\n 284\n"
[285] "Tribunal and to comply with its orders. Unless they complied with their obligations, the\nparties to the conflict could not expect to reap the benefits of peace, ensure the permanent\neasing of economic sanctions, or hope to rejoin fully the community of civilized nations,\nincluding as a Member of the United Nations. The speaker further stated that special\nattention must be given to holding democratic elections, ensuring respect for human\nrights, planning for the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, creating a\nprofessional police force, and initiating a comprehensive programme of economic\n 438\nreconstruction.\n\n\n The representative of France expressed his country’s view that the Council must\nassume three tasks. First, it must finalize the necessary arrangements to implement the\ncivilian and military aspects integral to the Peace Agreement. Second, it must maintain\nthe United Nations presence whenever that presence was indispensable. Third, the\nauthority of the Council must be affirmed. It was the Council, and the Council alone, that\nunder the Charter could give legitimacy to the military means to be used. It must also\nensure the overall coherence of the operation by regularly assessing both the civilian and\nmilitary aspects of its implementation. The speaker noted that the resolution just adopted\nmet those objectives. 439\n\n\n The President, speaking in his capacity as representative of the Russian\nFederation, emphasized what he considered as the most important feature of the\nresolution that the Member States providing forces to IFOR were authorized by the\nresolution to do only what the Bosnian parties themselves had agreed to. Thus, should\nforce be used against violators of the Agreement, the resolution clearly made those sides’\nagreement conditional on an equal, impartial approach to all sides to the Bosnian conflict.\nThe Russian Federation would consistently defend the need to avoid unjustified use of\nforce in the course of the operation. It was important that, under the resolution, the\nSecurity Council must take a decision a year later regarding the need to extend the\nmilitary component of the operation. That provision, together with regular reporting to\n\n 438\n Ibid., pp. 19-21.\n 439\n Ibid., pp. 21-22.\n\n\n 285\n"
[286] "the Council on the conduct of the entire operation, ensured reliable political control by\nthe Security Council and indicated that the massive military operation in no way\nrepresented a replacement of the United Nations by individual or regional organizations.\nThe speaker further noted that the resolution defined the need to strengthen regional\nstability and control over armaments, which meant that all sides must ensure that the\narms reserves of the Bosnian side should be reduced rather than increased. The Council\nhad also confirmed that the achievement of a just and lasting peace was impossible\nwithout securing internationally recognized human rights, including the right of refugees\nand displaced persons freely to return. Another necessity was the cooperation of all\nparties with the International Tribunal, in accordance with Council decisions and\ncommitments entered into by the parties themselves in Dayton. Of primary importance in\ncreating an appropriate climate between the parties were immediate measures to\nstrengthen and build confidence, particularly in areas where ethnic groups were living\nside by side. The most complex situation arose in Sarajevo, where there was an urgent\nneed to prevent a massive exodus of the Serbian population. The Russian Federation\nexpected the immediate implementation of tasks entrusted to the Secretary-General by\nthe resolution for ensuring a speedy redeployment to Sarajevo of additional contingents\nof the United Nations Civilian Police. The Russian Federation was also in favour of\ndeciding on an immediate repeal of sanctions against Belgrade and against the Serb\n 440\nRepublic, in order to foster the successful implementation of the Agreements.\n\n\n The representative of Ukraine stressed that the ultimate responsibility for the\nimplementation of the Peace Agreement lay with the conflicting parties. In that context,\nUkraine fully supported paragraph 10 of the resolution just adopted, underlining the\nrelationship between the fulfilment by the parties of their commitments in the Peace\nAgreement and the readiness of the international community to commit financial\nresources for reconstruction and development. Referring to the military aspects of the\nresolution just adopted, the speaker noted that his Government supported the\nauthorization by the Council of IFOR, which would provide monthly reports to the\n\n\n 440\n Ibid., pp. 24-26.\n\n\n 286\n"
[287] "Council on its activities, thus enabling an appropriate means of political monitoring by\nthe Council. The establishment of IFOR was a decisive step towards a comprehensive\nsettlement of the conflict. IFOR would be deployed as a neutral and impartial force,\ncapable of ensuring implementation of the Peace Agreement and of protecting itself. At\nthe same time, Ukraine hoped that IFOR commanders would take all necessary steps to\nensure that the right to take all necessary measures to defend against the threat of attack\nwas not abused. The speaker, finally, suggested that the establishment of a “special\nrégime” of participation in the rehabilitation and development of Bosnia might be\nappropriate for the States that had been most affected economically by their strict\nobservance of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Such an\ninitiative could be regarded as partial compensation for the billions of dollars in losses\n 441\nsuffered by the States neighbouring the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.\n\n\n The representative of Egypt welcomed the Peace Agreement and the resolution\njust adopted. Egypt hoped that a negotiated settlement would be reached by all concerned\nparties on outstanding issues related to the succession of States within the former\nYugoslavia, so that the successor States might resume the international role that the\nFederated Republic of Yugoslavia had played in the past. It also hoped that the peoples of\nthe successor States would be able to live in safety, security and dignity in the context of\nmutual friendly relations amongst all successor States. Egypt considered it important that\nthere be a guarantee of the voluntary return of all refugees and displaced persons, that\nthere be cooperation with the International Tribunal, and that IFOR would be deployed\nand would act in the context of a Security Council resolution, thus meaning that the force\n 442\nwould be acting on behalf of the international community.\n\n\n\n\n 441\n Ibid., pp. 28-30.\n 442\n Ibid., pp. 33-34.\n\n\n 287\n"
[288] " Decision of 21 December 1995: letter from the President\n\n On 13 December 1995, pursuant to resolution 1025 (1995), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 443 on aspects of the establishment by the Council of an\noperation consisting of a transitional administration and a transitional peacekeeping force\nto implement the relevant provisions of the Basic Agreement 444 on the region of Eastern\nSlavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, which had been signed on 12 November 1995.\n The Secretary-General observed that, although the conclusion of the Framework\nAgreement for peace in the neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina should contribute to a\nvastly improved climate in the region as a whole, the past record of the parties to the\nBasic Agreement in honouring their undertakings was not encouraging and the imprecise\nnature of the agreement made it unwise to assume that compliance would be readily\nforthcoming. The force deployed must therefore have a mandate under Chapter VII of the\nCharter, as well as the capacity to take the necessary action to maintain peace and\nsecurity, deter attack from any side, and defend itself. A Chapter VII mandate would also\nbe necessary to give the transitional administrator the power to “govern”, as stipulated in\nthe Agreement. The Secretary-General remained of the view that the deployment and\ncommand of the force required would best be entrusted to a coalition of Member States,\nrather than to the United Nations. One option was therefore for the Council to authorize\nMember States to establish a multinational force to conduct the operation. However, in\nconsultations with the Secretariat, some Member States had expressed a preference for\nthe Basic Agreement to be implemented by a United Nations force. If that point of view\nwere to be accepted by the Council, then the arguments in favour of giving the force a\nChapter VII mandate would remain no less compelling. The Secretary-General further\nnoted that, while effective demilitarization at the outset of the operation would be a major\nkey to success, it would be important for the implementation of the civilian aspects to\nbegin as soon as possible. He therefore recommended that the Council authorize the\nestablishment of the transitional council and local implementation committees. He would\nsoon nominate a suitable official to serve as the transitional administrator.\n\n\n 443\n S/1995/1028.\n 444\n S/1995/951, annex.\n\n\n 288\n"
[289] " By a letter 445 dated 21 December 1995, the President of the Security Council\ninformed the Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n The members of the Security Council have reviewed your report of 13 December 1995 on\n the implementation of the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and\n Western Sirmium. The members of the Council agree with you that the agreement merits full\n international support for its effective and timely implementation.\n In the agreement it is requested that the Council establish a transitional\n administration and authorize the deployment of an international force. The members of the\n Security Council, reaffirming resolution 1025 (1995) of 30 November 1995, stand ready to\n consider the option that both be components of a United Nations operation and, if the Council\n decides to establish such an operation, they stress the need for the necessary financial\n resources to be made available in a timely fashion.\n The members of the Council agree that the force should operate under an appropriate\n mandate and be provided with the necessary protection. They encourage you to accelerate\n discussions with possible troop contributors so that the force can be deployed at the earliest\n possible date.\n The members of the Council agree with your observation that implementation of the\n Agreement of 12 November will be complex and difficult. They recognize the danger that\n the two sides might have different interpretations of some of its provisions. They therefore\n welcome your decision to send an envoy to the region as soon as is convenient to discuss the\n implementation of the Agreement with the Government of Croatia and representatives of the\n local Serbs, and practical aspects of the establishment of a United Nations operation,\n including the possibilities for assistance from the host country in offsetting its cost.\n\n\n Decision of 21 December 1995 (3612th meeting): resolution 1034 (1995)\n\n On 27 November 1995, pursuant to resolution 1019 (1995), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 446 on violations of international humanitarian law and\nhuman rights in the areas of Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sanski Most. The\nSecretary-General noted that United Nations personnel had had very limited access to the\n\n\n 445\n S/1995/1053.\n 446\n S/1995/988.\n\n\n 289\n"
[290] "areas mentioned and that most of the information had been gathered from refugees and\ndisplaced persons. He reported that the last few months had seen further despicable acts\nof cruelty and violence. There were reports of a consistent pattern of summary\nexecutions, rape, mass expulsions, arbitrary detentions, forced labour and large-scale\ndisappearances, which had yet to be properly investigated. Access to the areas in question\nwas crucial and the international community should insist that the Bosnian Serb\nleadership provide full cooperation to all relevant international mechanisms, in order to\nenable events to be thoroughly investigated and the truth to be established. The Secretary-\nGeneral also noted that, on 16 November 1995, the International Tribunal had issued\nfurther indictments against the Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko\nMladic, for their direct and individual responsibilities in the atrocities committed against\nthe Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica in July 1995, after the fall of the enclave to\nBosnian Serb forces. They were charged with genocide, crimes against humanity and\nviolations of the laws or customs of war. It was imperative that the Prosecutor of the\nInternational Tribunal be provided with the ability and powers to gather the necessary\nevidence swiftly. Moreover, States had an obligation to take the actions needed to create\nthe conditions for the Tribunal to perform its task.\n At its 3612th meeting, on 21 December 1995, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the item and included the above report in its agenda. Following the\nadoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina and Turkey, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right\nto vote. The President (the Russian Federation) then drew the attention of the Council\nmembers to the text of a draft resolution 447 submitted by Argentina, France, Germany,\nItaly, the United Kingdom and the United States, and he read out some changes that had\nbeen made to the draft.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of Germany noted that the report of\nthe Secretary-General was a particularly worrying summary of the state of information on\nthe missing persons, executions and the involvement of Bosnian Serb leaders and of\n\n\n\n 447\n S/1995/1047.\n\n\n 290\n"
[291] "Serbian paramilitary forces in those crimes. His delegation, together with the French\ndelegation, had taken the initiative for the draft resolution, because it had felt that the\nCouncil could not shy away from a specific, clear and unequivocal reaction to the\nspecific crimes and violations of international law described in the report. The speaker\nreiterated his country position with regard to two fundamental principles. First, it was of\nthe utmost importance that the same legal standards, the same norms of law and the same\ncritical objectivity be applied. There must be no selectivity, no attempts to “diminish” or\n“enlarge”, for partisan reasons, the violations of international humanitarian law\ncommitted by one side. In the same manner, Germany opposed attempts to “balance” the\ncrimes committed by one side with human rights violations committed by another or to\nequate behaviours that cannot be equated. Second, it was equally important that the\nCouncil honour the general principle of the separation of powers, by seeing to it that the\njudicial prerogatives and competences of the International Tribunal were fully respected.\nIn order to establish the full truth about the crimes and human rights violations in\nquestion, three aspects were of particular importance: there must be a full investigation of\nthe violations in question; there must be access to the area; and the international\n 448\ncommunity must be firm in its support of the efforts of the International Tribunal.\n\n\n The representative of Oman stated that substantial evidence supported the\nconclusion that Bosnian Serb soldiers were responsible for the crime of genocide. Justice\nshould prevail and those who had committed crimes against humanity must be brought to\njustice. Oman hoped that IFOR would act according to its mandate, including by\n 449\napprehending those indicted by the International Tribunal.\n\n\n The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the adoption of the draft\nresolution would be the clearest signal that the Council had not forgotten what had\nhappened in Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sanski Most. The report of the Secretary-\nGeneral provided irrefutable evidence of atrocities in those places and elsewhere. Given\nthe scale of the human rights abuses, it was right that the Council should focus on those\n\n 448\n Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n 449\n Ibid., p. 7.\n\n\n 291\n"
[292] "events in particular. There should be no misunderstanding, however: the Council’s\ncommitment was to human rights, irrespective of ethnic background, nationality or\nreligion. By focusing on crimes against non-Serbs, the Council did not in any way\ncondone or ignore human rights violations committed against members of the Serb\npopulation. Nor did the draft seek to condemn the Bosnian Serb people. The crimes in\nquestion had been committed by individuals and those involved would be held\nresponsible as individuals. Noting that the Peace Agreement set out a road map designed\nto re-establish the rule of law throughout all the communities in Bosnia, the speaker\nobserved that implementation would be hindered if those responsible for the acts\ncontained in the report of the Secretary-General were not brought to justice. Thus, all\nshould support the work of the International Tribunal. It was also essential that UNHCR\nand the ICRC be given full access to those displaced or detained or missing from\nSrebrenica and elsewhere. If there were to be a durable peace in Bosnia, then it must be\nbased upon reconciliation between communities. That reconciliation would only be\n 450\ncomplete if accomplished by justice.\n\n\n The representative of China said that his delegation would vote in favour of the\ndraft resolution, however it believed that, in dealing with violations of international\nhumanitarian law, the Council should distinguish its purview from those of other bodies,\nand refrain from intervening in matters falling in the purview of others. China therefore\nexpressed reservations relating to elements of the draft resolution that should have been\n 451\ndealt with by the International Tribunal or other related United Nations bodies.\n\n\n The representative of the United States stated that the responsibility for the\natrocities committed in eastern Bosnia was not in doubt; it rested with the Bosnian Serbs,\nas it was made clear by the Secretary-General’s report. The Secretary-General’s report\nunderlined the importance of support for the work of the Tribunal and the necessity for\nthe parties to cooperate with the Tribunal in every way. The draft resolution also\ncondemned the burning and looting of houses and territory which, under the Dayton\n\n 450\n Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n 451\n Ibid., p. 10.\n\n\n 292\n"
[293] "Agreement, were to be returned to Bosnian Serb control. Although the nature and extent\nof those violations of human rights could not be equated to those committed by the\nBosnian Serbs, the United States deplored them and joined the Council in urging an end\nto all such practices. 452\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote, as orally revised in its provisional\nform, and it was adopted unanimously as resolution 1034 (1995). The resolution reads as\nfollows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Reaffirming all its earlier relevant resolutions on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n including resolution 1019 (1995) of 9 November 1995, and condemning the Bosnian Serb\n party's failure, despite repeated calls that it should do so, to comply with the demands\n contained therein,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 27 November 1995 pursuant to\n resolution 1019 (1995) on violations of international humanitarian law in the areas of\n Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sanski Most,\n Gravely concerned at the information contained in the above-mentioned report that there\n is overwhelming evidence of a consistent pattern of summary executions, rape, mass\n expulsion, arbitrary detentions, forced labour and large-scale disappearances,\n Reiterating its strong support for the work of the International Tribunal for the\n Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law\n Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, established pursuant to its\n resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993,\n Noting that the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and\n the annexes thereto (collectively the “Peace Agreement”), initialled at Dayton, Ohio, on\n 21 November 1995, provides that no person who is serving a sentence imposed by the\n International Tribunal and no person who is under indictment by the Tribunal and who has\n failed to comply with an order to appear before the Tribunal may stand as a candidate or hold\n any appointive, elective, or other public office in Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Condemning the failure of the Bosnian Serb party to comply with its commitments in\n respect of giving access to displaced persons and to persons detained or reported missing,\n\n\n\n 452\n Ibid., pp. 12-13.\n\n\n 293\n"
[294] " Reiterating its concern expressed in the statement by its President of 7 December 1995,\n Deeply concerned by the plight of hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced\npersons as a result of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia,\n 1. Strongly condemns all violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights\nin the territory of the former Yugoslavia, demands that all concerned comply fully with their\nobligations in this regard, and reiterates that all those who commit violations of international\nhumanitarian law will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;\n 2. Condemns in particular in the strongest possible terms the violations of international\nhumanitarian law and of human rights by Bosnian Serb and paramilitary forces in the areas of\nSrebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sanski Most as described in the report of the Secretary-\nGeneral of 27 November 1995 and showing a consistent pattern of summary executions, rape,\nmass expulsions, arbitrary detentions, forced labour and large-scale disappearances;\n 3. Notes with the utmost concern the substantial evidence referred to in the report of the\nSecretary-General that an unknown but large number of men in the area of Srebrenica,\nnamely in Nova Kasaba-Konjevic Polje (Kaldrumica), Kravice, Rasica Gai, Zabrde and two\nsites in Karakaj, and possibly also in Bratunac and Potocari, have been summarily executed\nby Bosnian Serb and paramilitary forces, and condemns in the strongest terms the\ncommission of such acts;\n 4. Reiterates its strong support for the efforts of the International Committee of the Red\nCross in seeking access to displaced persons and to persons detained or reported missing, and\ncalls upon all parties to comply with their commitments in respect of such access;\n 5. Reaffirms its demand that the Bosnian Serb party give representatives of the United\nNations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross and\nother international agencies immediate and unimpeded access to persons displaced and to\npersons detained or reported missing from Srebrenica, Zepa and the regions of Banja Luka\nand Sanski Most who are within the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of\nBosnian Serb forces and that the Bosnian Serb party permit representatives of the\nInternational Committee of the Red Cross (a) to visit and register any persons detained\nagainst their will, whether civilians or members of the forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and\n(b) to have access to any site it may deem important;\n 6. Affirms that the violations of humanitarian law and human rights in the areas of\nSrebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sanski Most from July to October 1995 must be fully and\nproperly investigated by the relevant United Nations and other international organizations and\ninstitutions;\n\n\n 294\n"
[295] " 7. Notes that the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for\nSerious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the\nFormer Yugoslavia since 1991, established pursuant to resolution 827 (1993), issued on\n16 November 1995 indictments against the Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and\nRatko Mladic for their direct and individual responsibilities for the atrocities committed\nagainst the Bosnian Muslim population of Srebrenica in July 1995;\n 8. Reaffirms its demand that the Bosnian Serb party give representatives of the relevant\nUnited Nations and other international organizations and institutions, including the Special\nRapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, immediate and unrestricted access to the\nareas in question, including for the purpose of the investigation of the atrocities;\n 9. Underlines in particular the urgent necessity for all the parties to enable the Prosecutor\nof the International Tribunal to gather effectively and swiftly the evidence necessary for the\nTribunal to perform its task;\n 10. Stresses the obligations of all the parties to cooperate with and provide unrestricted\naccess to the relevant United Nations and other international organizations and institutions so\nas to facilitate their investigations, and notes their commitment under the Peace Agreement in\nthis regard;\n 11. Reiterates its demand that all parties, and in particular the Bosnian Serb party, refrain\nfrom any action intended to destroy, alter, conceal or damage any evidence of violations of\ninternational humanitarian law and that they preserve such evidence;\n 12. Also reiterates its demand that all States, in particular those in the region of the\nformer Yugoslavia, and all parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, comply fully and\nin good faith with the obligations contained in paragraph 4 of resolution 827 (1993) to\ncooperate fully with the International Tribunal, and calls upon them to create the conditions\nessential for the Tribunal to perform the task for which it has been created, including the\nestablishment of offices of the Tribunal when the latter deems it necessary;\n 13. Further reiterates its demand that all detention camps throughout the territory of\nBosnia and Herzegovina should be immediately closed;\n 14. Urges the parties to ensure full respect for the norms of international humanitarian\nlaw and of human rights of the civilian population living in the areas in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina now under their control which under the Peace Agreement will be transferred to\nanother party;\n 15. Condemns the widespread looting and destruction of houses and other property, in\nparticular by the Croatian Defence Council forces in the area of Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo,\n\n\n 295\n"
[296] " and demands that all sides immediately stop such action, investigate them and make sure that\n those who violated the law be held individually responsible in respect of such acts;\n 16. Demands that all sides refrain from laying mines, in particular in those areas now\n under their control which under the Peace Agreement will be transferred to another party;\n 17. Urges Member States to continue to assist the efforts of the United Nations,\n humanitarian agencies and non-governmental organizations under way in the former\n Yugoslavia to alleviate the plight of hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons;\n 18. Also urges all the parties to the conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia to\n cooperate fully with these efforts with a view to creating conditions conducive to the\n repatriation and return of refugees and displaced persons in safety and dignity;\n 19. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed on progress\n reached in the investigation of the violations of international humanitarian law referred to in\n the report mentioned above;\n 20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n After the vote, the President, speaking in his capacity as representative of the\nRussian Federation, noted that the Council had again returned to the subject of violations\nof the norms of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. He stated that\nhis Government’s principled position remained unchanged. The Russian Federation\nfirmly condemned any violations of international humanitarian law and human rights on\nthe territory of the former Yugoslavia, no matter by whom or where they were\nperpetrated. The Russian Federation believed that the Council’s reaction to such\nviolations could not be selective or one-sided. It was satisfied therefore that the one-sided\nnature of the initial draft resolution had been corrected in the final text. 453\n\n\n Decision of 21 December 1995 (3613th meeting): resolution 1035 (1995)\n\n At its 3613th meeting, on 21 December 1995, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the item and included the report 454 of the Secretary-General of 13\nDecember 1995 in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited\n\n\n 453\n Ibid., pp. 15-16.\n 454\n S/1995/1031 and Add.1.\n\n\n 296\n"
[297] "the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The President (the Russian Federation ) then drew\nthe attention of the Council members to the text of a draft resolution 455 prepared in the\ncourse of the Council’s prior consultations.\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 1035 (1995). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling its resolution 1031 (1995) of 15 December 1995,\n Recalling also the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina\n and the annexes thereto (collectively the “Peace Agreement”),\n Having further considered the report of the Secretary-General of 13 December 1995,\n 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General and the proposals for involvement by the\n United Nations in the implementation of the Peace Agreement contained therein;\n 2. Decides to establish, for a period of one year from the transfer of authority from the\n United Nations Protection Force to the multinational Implementation Force, a United Nations\n civilian police force to be known as the International Police Task Force, to be entrusted with\n the tasks set out in annex 11 of the Peace Agreement, and a United Nations civilian office\n with the responsibilities set out in the report of the Secretary-General, and to that end\n endorses the arrangements set out in the report of the Secretary-General;\n 3. Notes with satisfaction that the International Police Task Force and the United Nations\n civilian office will be under the authority of the Secretary-General and subject to coordination\n and guidance as appropriate by the High Representative, welcomes the Secretary-General's\n intention to appoint a United Nations Coordinator, and requests the Secretary-General to\n submit to the Council, at least every three months, reports about the work of the IPTF and of\n the civilian office accordingly;\n 4. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n\n\n 455\n S/1995/1049.\n\n\n 297\n"
[298] " The situation in Croatia\n\n INITIAL PROCEEDINGS\n\n\n\n Decision of 14 September 1993 (3275th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3275th meeting, on 14 September 1993, the Council began its consideration\nof the item entitled “The situation in Croatia”. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\nCouncil invited the representative of Croatia, at his request, to participate in the\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The President (Venezuela) then stated that, after\nconsultations among members of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make\nthe following statement 456 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n “The Security Council expresses its profound concern at the reports from the Secretariat\n of recent military hostilities in Croatia, in particular the escalation of the means employed,\n and the grave threat they pose to the peace process in Geneva and overall stability in the\n former Yugoslavia.\n “The Council reaffirms its respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the\n Republic of Croatia, and calls on both sides to accept the proposal of the United Nations\n Protection Force for an immediate cease-fire. It calls on the Government of Croatia to\n withdraw its armed forces to positions occupied before 9 September 1993, on the basis of that\n proposal, and calls on the Serbian forces to halt all provocative military actions.”\n\n\n Decision of 7 February 1995 (3498th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3498th meeting, on 7 February 1995, the Council resumed its consideration\nof the situation in Croatia. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentative of Croatia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right\nto vote. The President (Botswana) drew the attention of the members of the Council to\nseveral documents. 457 The President then stated that, after consultations among members\n\n\n 456\n S/26436.\n 457\n S/1995/56, letter dated 18 January 1995 from the representative of Croatia addressed to the President of\nthe Security Council; S/1995/82 and S/1995/93, letters dated 25 and 31 January 1995, respectively, from the\nrepresentative of Croatia addressed to the Secretary-General.\n\n\n 298\n"
[299] "of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement 458 on\nbehalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council reiterates its support for the efforts to bring about a political\n settlement in the Republic of Croatia which ensures full respect for the sovereignty and\n territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia and which guarantees the security and rights of\n all communities living in a particular area irrespective of whether they constitute in this area\n the majority or a minority.\n \"The Council strongly supports the recent efforts of representatives of the International\n Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the European Union, the Russian Federation and the\n United States of America aimed at achieving a political settlement in the Republic of Croatia.\n The Council calls upon the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb\n authorities in the United Nations Protected Areas to enter urgently and without preconditions\n into negotiations on such a settlement, benefiting from proposals now made to them as part of\n these efforts. It calls upon all other relevant parties to support this process.\n \"The Council reaffirms its commitment to the search for an overall negotiated settlement\n of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of\n all the States there within their internationally recognized borders and stresses the importance\n it attaches to the mutual recognition thereof.\n \"The Council reaffirms its view that the continued and effective presence of the United\n Nations Protection Force in the Republic of Croatia is of vital importance for regional peace\n and security and expresses its desire that discussions over the weeks ahead will lead the\n Government of the Republic of Croatia to re-examine its position taken on 12 January 1995\n in relation to the continuing role of the Force in the Republic of Croatia.\"\n\n\n Decision of 28 April 1995 (3527th meeting): resolution 990 (1995)\n\n On 18 April 1995, pursuant to resolution 981 (1995), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 459 on the implementation of the mandate of the United\nNations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO). The report contained a\n\n\n\n\n 458\n S/PRST/1995/6.\n 459\n S/1995/320.\n\n\n 299\n"
[300] "detailed plan 460 for the implementation of UNCRO’s mandate, as well as an assessment\nof the resources needed, indicating that the strength of the United Nations forces\ncurrently in Croatia could be reduced to 8,750 troops and that their deployment could be\ncompleted by 30 June 1995. 461\n The Secretary-General observed that the plan did not have the formal acceptance\nand the full support of either the Government of Croatia or the local Serbs authorities.\nThus there was a risk that either or both sides would fail to cooperate with the United\nNations in its implementation. On the other hand, the plan provided for the pragmatic\nimplementation of paragraph 3 of resolution 981 (1995), and the alternative to its\nadoption would be the withdrawal of United Nations forces and the resumption of war. If\nthe two sides seriously wished to avoid a renewal of the conflict, it was up to them to\nprovide the necessary conditions for the new operation to discharge its responsibilities\nsuccessfully. He therefore recommended that the Council approve the arrangements\ncontained in the report and authorize the deployment of UNCRO to secure their\nimplementation.\n At its 3527th meeting, on 28 April 1995, the Council included the above report in\nits agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative\nof Croatia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The\nPresident (Czech Republic) then drew the attention of the Council members to the text of\na draft resolution 462 that had been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior\n 463\nconsultations and to a letter dated 28 April 1995 from the representative of Croatia\naddressed to the President of the Security Council.\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and was adopted as resolution 990\n(1995). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n\n\n 460\n For further details see para. 11 to 28 of the report of the Secretary-General.\n 461\n For further details see para. 29 of the report of the Secretary-General.\n 462\n S/1995/334.\n 463\n S/1995/339.\n\n\n 300\n"
[301] " The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the conflicts in the territory of the\n former Yugoslavia, in particular resolutions 981 (1995) and 982 (1995) of 31 March 1995,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 18 April 1995,\n Bearing in mind the importance of any information relevant to the implementation of all\n its previous resolutions being made available to the Secretary-General,\n Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security and freedom of movement of\n personnel of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the territory of the former\n Yugoslavia, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General, and in particular approves the\n arrangements in paragraphs 11 to 28 thereof for the implementation of the mandate of the\n United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO;\n 2. Decides to authorize the deployment of UNCRO as set out in paragraph 29 of the\n above-mentioned report;\n 3. Calls upon the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities to\n cooperate fully with UNCRO in the implementation of its mandate;\n 4. Expresses its concern that an agreement on the status of forces and other personnel has\n not yet been signed, calls once again on the Government of the Republic of Croatia to\n conclude expeditiously such an agreement, and requests the Secretary-General to report to the\n Council no later than 15 May 1995;\n 5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n Decision of 1 May 1995 (3529th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3529th meeting, on 1 May 1995, the Council continued its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of\nCroatia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The\nPresident (France) then stated that, after consultations among members of the Security\n 464\nCouncil, he had been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the\nCouncil:\n\n\n\n\n 464\n S/PRST/1995/23.\n\n\n 301\n"
[302] " “The Security Council is deeply concerned by the resumption of hostilities in the\n Republic of Croatia over the last few days.\n \"The Council demands that the Government of the Republic of Croatia put an end\n immediately to the military offensive launched by its forces in the area of Western Slavonia\n known as Sector West, which started on the morning of 1 May 1995 in violation of the\n ceasefire agreement of 29 March 1994.\n \"The Council also demands that the parties respect the economic agreement signed\n between them on 2 December 1994 and, in particular, take all necessary steps to ensure the\n safety and security of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway and its immediate environs.\n \"The Council urges the parties to cease hostilities and comply with the existing ceasefire\n agreement.\n \"The Council calls upon the parties to respect fully the safety and freedom of movement\n of all United Nations and European Community Monitoring Mission personnel in the area\n concerned, in the area known as Sector South and elsewhere, and therefore to remove all\n restrictions placed on United Nations personnel.\n \"The Council urges the parties, in order to achieve these objectives, to accept without\n delay the proposals put to them by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General.\n \"The Council expresses its full support to the Secretary-General and his Special\n Representative in their efforts. The Council further requests the Secretary-General to keep it\n informed of developments on the ground as well as in the ongoing talks.\"\n\n\n Decision of 4 May 1995 (3531st meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3531st meeting, on 4 May 1995, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of\nCroatia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The\n 465\nPresident (France) drew the attention of the members of the Council to two letters\nrespectively dated 2 and 3 May from the representative of Croatia addressed to the\nPresident of the Security Council. The President then stated that, after consultations\namong members of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following\nstatement 466 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n 465\n S/1995/349 and S/1995/351.\n 466\n S/PRST/1995/26.\n\n\n 302\n"
[303] " \"The Security Council is deeply concerned at the continuation of hostilities in the\nRepublic of Croatia.\n \"The Council reaffirms in this context its statement of 1 May 1995 in all its aspects and\ndemands that the parties comply with the requirements set out therein immediately and in\nfull.\n \"The Council condemns the incursions into the zone of separation by the forces of the\nGovernment of the Republic of Croatia in Sectors North and South and by both sides in\nSector East. It demands that the forces in question withdraw immediately.\n \"The Council also condemns the bombardment of Zagreb and other centres of civilian\npopulation by the forces of the local Serb authorities and demands that they cease\nimmediately.\n \"The Council further condemns acts of harassment and intimidation against United\nNations personnel and reminds the parties of their obligations to respect such personnel at all\ntimes and to ensure their safety, security and freedom of movement.\n \"The Council calls upon the parties to cooperate fully with the United Nations\nConfidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO, the Office of the\nUnited Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red\nCross in protecting and assisting the local civilian population and any displaced persons. The\nCouncil is deeply concerned by reports that the human rights of the Serb population of\nWestern Slavonia are being violated. It demands that the Government of the Republic of\nCroatia respect fully the rights of the Serb population concerned, in conformity with\ninternationally recognized standards.\n \"The Council insists that the authority of UNCRO be re-established and respected in\nSector West and other areas affected by the hostilities.\n \"The Council demands that the parties act in accordance with the proposals put to them\nby the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, that they cease all hostilities\nimmediately and that they cooperate fully with the Special Representative of the Secretary-\nGeneral and with UNCRO.\n \"The Council further calls upon the parties to enter without delay into the discussions at\nGeneva to which they have been invited by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of\nthe International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.\n \"The Council will remain actively seized of the matter and will be ready to consider\nfurther steps as necessary.\"\n\n\n 303\n"
[304] " Decision of 17 May 1995 (3537th meeting): resolution 994 (1995)\n\n At its 3537th meeting, on 17 May 1995, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of\nCroatia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The\nPresident (France) drew the attention of the Council members to the text of a draft\nresolution 467 submitted by France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United\nKingdom and the United States and read out some revisions that had been made to the\ndraft. He also drew the attention of the Council members to several other documents. 468\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote, as orally revised in its provisional\nform, and was adopted unanimously as resolution 994 (1995). The resolution reads as\nfollows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous resolutions on the conflicts in the territory of the former\n Yugoslavia and in particular resolutions 981 (1995) and 982 (1995) of 31 March 1995 and\n 990 (1995) of 28 April 1995,\n Deeply concerned that the objectives set out in the statements by the President of the\n Security Council of 1 May and 4 May 1995 have not been implemented in all their aspects\n and that the agreement reached by the parties on 7 May 1995 through the mediation of the\n United Nations Peace Forces headquarters has been violated, in particular regarding the\n withdrawal of forces from the zones of separation,\n Emphasizing the necessity for full compliance by the parties with the ceasefire agreement\n of 29 March 1994, and stressing the importance of such compliance for the implementation of\n the mandate of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is\n known as UNCRO,\n Emphasizing further that withdrawal from the zones of separation is a condition for the\n implementation of the mandate of UNCRO,\n\n 467\n S/1995/395.\n 468\n S/1995/363 and S/1995/397, letters dated 8 and 17 May 1995, respectively, from the representative of\nCroatia addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1995/383, letter dated 10 May 1995 from the chargé\nd’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security Council.\n\n\n 304\n"
[305] " Affirming its commitment to the search for an overall negotiated settlement of the\nconflicts in the former Yugoslavia ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the\nStates there within their internationally recognized borders, stressing the importance it\nattaches to the mutual recognition thereof, and in this context welcoming all international\nefforts to facilitate a negotiated solution to the conflict in the Republic of Croatia,\n Emphasizing that full observance of human rights, including appropriate international\nmonitoring thereof, in particular in the area of Western Slavonia known as Sector West, is an\nessential step towards restoration of confidence between the parties and building a durable\npeace,\n Condemning in the strongest terms all unacceptable acts which were directed at the\npersonnel of the United Nations peacekeeping forces, and determined to obtain strict respect\nof the status of such personnel in the Republic of Croatia as provided for in the Agreement\nbetween the United Nations and the Government of the Republic of Croatia signed on 15\nMay 1995,\n Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the\npersonnel of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the territory of the former\nYugoslavia, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Reaffirms the statements by the President of the Security Council of 1 May and 4 May\n1995 issued as a result of the military offensive launched by the forces of the Government of\nCroatia in the area of Western Slavonia known as Sector West on 1 May 1995 in violation of\nthe ceasefire agreement of 29 March 1994;\n 2. Notes with satisfaction the steps taken so far as to meet the requirements set out in the\nabove-mentioned statements, but demands that the parties complete without further delay the\nwithdrawal of all their troops from the zones of separation and refrain from any further\nviolations of those zones;\n 3. Stresses the need for the early re-establishment of the authority of UNCRO, in\naccordance with its mandate;\n 4. Requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements in order to ensure\nfull deployment of UNCRO, after the withdrawal of the troops of the parties, as provided for\nin its mandate established by resolutions 981 (1995) and 990 (1995);\n 5. Demands that the status and the mandate of UNCRO as well as the safety and security\nof its personnel be respected;\n 6. Demands also that the Government of the Republic of Croatia respect fully the rights\nof the Serb population, including their freedom of movement, and allow access to this\n\n\n 305\n"
[306] " population by international humanitarian organizations, in conformity with internationally\n recognized standards;\n 7. Requests the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the United Nations High\n Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the\n International Committee of the Red Cross and other relevant international humanitarian\n institutions, to assess the humanitarian situation of the local Serb population in Sector West,\n including the problem of refugees, and to report thereon as soon as possible;\n 8. Fully supports the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to\n achieve the objectives outlined in the statements by the President of the Security Council of 1\n and 4 May 1995, and requests the parties to cooperate fully to this end;\n 9. Calls upon the parties to respect the economic agreement signed by them on 2\n December 1994, and in particular to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety and security\n of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway and its immediate environs as provided for in that\n agreement;\n 10. Demands that the parties refrain from taking any further military measures or actions\n that could lead to the escalation of the situation, and warns that in the event of failure to\n comply with this demand it will consider further steps needed to ensure such compliance;\n 11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council for its consideration within\n two weeks on the implementation of the provisions of the present resolution, including on the\n modalities for the implementation of the mandate of UNCRO in Sector West;\n 12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of Italy stated that the resolution just\nadopted could and must encourage the parties to speed up their complete and\nunconditional withdrawal from the zones of separation in order to allow the complete and\nimmediate deployment of UNCRO, and the full implementation of its mandate as\noutlined in resolutions 981 (1995) and 990 (1995). Nevertheless, resolution 994 (1995)\nwas not merely an attempt to remedy a situation created on the ground by the recent\nCroatian offensive: it also looked to the future. In that regard, the speaker emphasized the\nimportance of paragraph 10, which contained a firm warning to the parties, demanding\nthat they refrain from taking any further military initiatives that could lead to a new\nescalation of the conflict. If the parties did not refrain from such initiatives, the Council\n\n\n\n 306\n"
[307] "should not hesitate to consider further measures to ensure compliance with that\ndemand. 469\n\n\n The representative of the United Kingdom noted that the resolution just adopted\ncondemned in the strongest possible terms any action against United Nations personnel.\nProgress towards the withdrawal of troops from the zones of separation was welcome, but\nit was essential that such a withdrawal be completed forthwith. Otherwise, there was little\nchance of getting the political process back on track, and only when withdrawal had been\ncompleted would UNCRO be able to redeploy so as to begin its tasks of implementing its\nmandate. It was also essential that the United Nations and other international bodies be\ngiven full access to Western Slavonia, so as to lay to rest concerns about human rights.\nThe report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 994 (1995), to be\nsubmitted within the following two weeks, would be important as the Council would\nneed to consider at that stage how best to ensure full deployment of UNCRO in\n 470\naccordance with its mandate.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that it was the non-\ncompliance with the demands set forth in the presidential statements of 1 and 4 May, that\nhad forced his delegation to consider the real need to adopt a resolution that would\ndemonstrate that the Council did not intend to go along with violations of its decisions.\nHis delegation assumed that the adoption of resolution 994 (1995) would lead to: a full\nrestoration of the mandate of UNCRO; a full withdrawal of the forces of all sides from\nthe zones of separation; and the appropriate implementation of the cease-fire agreement\nand the economic agreement. Referring to paragraph 6 of that resolution, the speaker said\nthat Russia expected that the Secretary-General would carry out the request to prepare a\nreport on the humanitarian situation of the Serb population in Sector West. He further\nnoted that his delegation would have preferred the resolution to contain a clearer\nassessment of the situation that had arose as a result of the Croatian attacks, such as the\nfailure to observe the military embargo against Croatia. He concluded by pointing out\n\n 469\n S/PV.3537, pp. 2-3.\n 470\n Ibid., pp. 3-4.\n\n\n 307\n"
[308] "that the resolution just adopted did not in any way conclude the Council’s consideration\nof Croatia. In that regard, he referred to paragraph 10 of the resolution in which the\nCouncil warned the parties that in the event they would not comply with the demand\ncontained in that paragraph, it would consider additional steps. 471\n\n\n The President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of France, recalled\nthat the Council had demanded in clear terms, in its presidential statements of 1 and 4\nMay, that an end be put to the armed incursions in the zones of separation in Croatia. He\nnoted that, in spite of the commitments announced in that respect by the Croatian\nauthorities, concrete withdrawal operations on the ground had been partial and delayed.\nThat was why France had voted in favour of resolution 994 (1995) which demanded that\na total withdraw be completed without further delay. That demand was also addressed to\nthe Croatian Serb forces which were still in the zones of separation. The situation could\nnot truly be stabilized unless both parties respect the buffer zones. 472\n\n\n Decision of 16 June 1995 (3545th meeting): statement by the President\n\n On 9 June 1995, pursuant to resolution 994 (1995), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 473 on the implementation of that resolution, including\non the modalities for the implementation of the mandate in Sector West of UNCRO, and\non the humanitarian situation of the local Serb population in Sector West.\n The Secretary-General noted that the Croatian military offensive in Sector West\non 1 May 1995 had underlined the reality that peacekeeping forces could not keep the\npeace without the cooperation of the parties. While the presence of United Nations forces\nwas critical for achieving the cessation-of-hostilities agreement of 3 May 1995, for\npreventing escalation and for monitoring the subsequent humanitarian and human rights\nsituation of Serbs in the Sector, it had not been sufficient to prevent the sequence of\nevents leading to the Croatian offensive nor to forestall the offensive itself. In these\n\n\n 471\n Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n 472\n Ibid., p. 7.\n 473\n S/1995/467.\n\n\n 308\n"
[309] "circumstances, he had seriously re-examined the role of UNCRO. In meetings with his\nSpecial Representative, both sides had stated their desire that the peace-keeping mission\nshould continue. But cooperation on the ground had been unsatisfactory and UNCRO\npersonnel had been put at risk. Concerning UNCRO’s mandate, there appeared to be\ncommon ground between the parties that the mission should fulfil the tasks arising from\nthe cease-fire and economic agreements and from its humanitarian and human rights\nmandates. The redeployment of the mission by 30 June 1995 was no longer possible\nhowever.\n The Secretary-General stated that the parties’s request that UNCRO should stay\nwas a positive deployment. He therefore intended to monitor closely the continuing level\nof the parties’ cooperation with UNCRO and particularly the extent to which they\ncomplied with the cease-fire agreement, allowed UNCRO full freedom of movement and\nmade serious efforts to protect its personnel. UNCRO would coordinate closely with the\nCroatian Government as well as with international organizations and agencies, to ensure\nfull respect for the human rights of the Serb minority in Sector West and to report on the\nextent to which purposeful policies of reconciliation and confidence-building were being\nimplemented in the Sector. The Secretary-General was conscious that there remained, on\nboth sides, influential elements that continued to be unreconciled to the objectives of the\ninternational community and who were inclined to pursue their ends by military means.\n\n\n At its 3545th meeting, on 16 June 1995, the Council included the above report in\nits agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative\nof Croatia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The\nPresident (Germany) then stated that, after consultations among members of the Security\nCouncil, he had been authorized to make the following statement 474 on behalf of the\nCouncil:\n\n\n “The Security Council has considered the report of the Secretary-General of 9 June 1995\n submitted pursuant to its resolution 994 (1995) of 17 May 1995. It is concerned at the\n situation described therein, and at the continuing failure of the parties to cooperate\n\n 474\n S/PRST/1995/30.\n\n\n 309\n"
[310] "satisfactorily with the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is\nknown as UNCRO, and to comply fully with the demands of the Council. It condemns in\nparticular the continuation of offensive actions and the intimidation of UNCRO personnel in\nviolation of its resolution 994 (1995).\n “The Council looks to the parties to cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNCRO in\nthe performance of its mandate and to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement\nof its personnel. The Council demands that they fulfil their commitment under the ceasefire\nagreement of 29 March 1994, in particular in respect of the withdrawal of all forces and\nheavy weapons from the zones of separation, and fully implement the agreement of\n2 December 1994 on economic confidence-building measures. It calls upon the parties, and\nin particular the Government of Croatia, to cease all military action in and around Sector\nSouth. It also calls upon all parties to respect fully the international border between the\nRepublic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to stop any action that\nextends the conflict across this border, since this is in violation of the Council's resolutions.\nIt reiterates its warning that in the event of failure to comply with the demand in its resolution\n994 (1995) that the parties refrain from taking any further military measures or actions that\ncould lead to the escalation of the situation, it will consider further steps needed to ensure\nsuch compliance.\n “The Council requests the Committee established under resolution 724 (1991) of\n15 December 1991 to continue to investigate, in accordance with its mandate, reports of\nviolations of resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991.\n “The Council welcomes the agreement of the Government of Croatia to a continued\nUNCRO presence in the area of Western Slavonia known as Sector West for the purposes of\nimplementing its mandate, in particular in respect of human rights, to which it continues to\nattach great importance. It endorses the Secretary-General's view as to the necessity for\nreconciliation and confidence-building in that Sector. It stresses the importance it attaches to\nfull respect for the human rights of the Serb population there. It encourages the Secretary-\nGeneral to continue his coordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Human\nRights as well as other international organizations and agencies in this regard.\n “The Council notes the Secretary-General's judgement that completion of the\nredeployment of United Nations peacekeeping personnel in the Republic of Croatia by\n30 June 1995 envisaged in its resolution 982 (1995) of 31 March 1995 is no longer possible.\nIt requests the Secretary-General to proceed as expeditiously as possible with this\n\n\n\n\n 310\n"
[311] " redeployment with the aim of fulfiling all tasks under the mandate of UNCRO. It demands\n that the parties cooperate with the efforts of UNCRO to implement fully its mandate.\n “The Council notes the fact that both parties have stated their desire that the\n peacekeeping mission should continue and that they are seeking the assistance of UNCRO. It\n welcomes the Secretary-General's intention to monitor closely their cooperation with\n UNCRO and their compliance with the ceasefire agreement of 29 March 1994, and requests\n him to keep the Council fully informed. Such cooperation and compliance are essential for\n the implementation of the mandate of UNCRO and for progress towards a negotiated\n settlement which respects fully the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of\n Croatia and which guarantees the security and rights of all communities.\n “The Council could not countenance moves by the local Serb authorities in the Republic\n of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to establish a union between them,\n since this would be inconsistent with the Council's commitment to the sovereignty and\n territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n “The Council stresses that there can be no military solution to the conflict and calls upon\n the parties to reaffirm their commitment to a peaceful resolution of their differences.\n “The Council notes with distress the loss of life and casualties which have been suffered\n by UNCRO and extends its condolences to the families of the bereaved.\n “The Council will remain seized of the matter.”\n\n\n Decision of 3 August 1995 (3560th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3560th meeting, on 3 August 1995, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of\nCroatia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The\nPresident (Indonesia) then stated that, after consultations among members of the Security\n 475\nCouncil, he had been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the\nCouncil:\n\n\n \"The Security Council is deeply concerned at the deterioration in the situation in and\n around the Republic of Croatia.\n\n\n\n\n 475\n S/PRST/1995/37.\n\n\n 311\n"
[312] " \"The Council fully supports the efforts of the Special Representative of the Secretary-\n General and of the Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference\n on the Former Yugoslavia to defuse the situation, in line with the Council's previous\n resolutions.\n \"The Council stresses that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Croatia and\n welcomes the holding of talks between the parties at Geneva earlier today. It calls on both\n parties to commit themselves fully to that process and to acceptance of the draft agreement\n drawn up by the Co-Chairman as a basis for continuing those talks.\n \"The Council demands that the parties halt all military actions and exercise the utmost\n restraint.\"\n\n\n Decision of 4 August 1995 (3561st meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3561st meeting, on 4 August 1995, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives of\nBosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate in the discussion\nwithout the right to vote. The President (Indonesia) drew the attention of the members of\nthe Council to a letter 476 dated 4 August 1995 from the representative of Croatia\naddressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting a letter of the same date\nfrom the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Croatia.\n The President then stated that, after consultations among members of the Security\n 477\nCouncil, he had been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the\nCouncil:\n\n\n \"The Security Council is deeply concerned at the resumption of hostilities in and around\n the Republic of Croatia. The Council recalls the statement by its President of 3 August 1995.\n It strongly deplores the decision by the Croatian Government to launch a broad military\n offensive, thereby unacceptably escalating the conflict, with the risk of further consequent\n attacks by whatever party, and demands that all military action cease immediately and that\n there be full compliance with all Council resolutions including resolution 994 (1995).\n\n\n\n 476\n S/1995/647.\n 477\n S/PRST/1995/38.\n\n\n 312\n"
[313] " \"The Council condemns any shelling of civilian targets. It demands that no military\n action be taken against civilians and that their human rights be fully respected. It reminds the\n parties of their responsibilities under international humanitarian law and reiterates that those\n who commit violations of international humanitarian law will be held individually\n responsible in respect of such acts. The Council calls on the parties to cooperate fully with\n the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known as\n UNCRO, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International\n Committee of the Red Cross in ensuring access and protection to the local civilian population\n as appropriate.\n \"The Council strongly condemns attacks by Croatian Government forces on personnel of\n the United Nations peacekeeping forces, which have resulted in casualties, including the\n death of one member of the peacekeeping forces. It demands that such attacks cease\n immediately and that all detained personnel be released. It also reminds the parties, and in\n particular the Croatian Government, that they have an obligation to respect United Nations\n personnel, to ensure their safety and freedom of movement at all times and to enable UNCRO\n to fulfil its mandate in accordance with the relevant Council resolutions. The Council\n expresses condolences to the Government of Denmark and to the family of the member of the\n United Nations peacekeeping forces who lost his life.\n \"The Council deeply regrets the breakdown of the talks which began at Geneva on\n 3 August 1995. It calls upon the Croatian Government to return to the talks. It reiterates that\n there can be no military solution to the conflict in Croatia. It reaffirms its call for an\n unreserved commitment to the search for a negotiated settlement and to resumption of talks\n on the basis of the draft agreement drawn up by the Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee\n of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.\n \"The Council will remain seized of the matter and will consider any further measures that\n may be necessary.\"\n\n\n Decision of 10 August 1995 (3563rd meeting): resolution 1009 (1995)\n\n On 3 August 1995, pursuant to resolution 981 (1995), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 478 on the situation in Croatia, including on the ability of\nUNCRO to implement its mandate. The Secretary-General reported that, although there\n\n\n 478\n S/1995/650.\n\n\n 313\n"
[314] "had been no large-scale hostilities since May 1995, there had been almost continuous\nskirmishes, exchanges of fire, incidents and troop deployments within the zones of\nseparation, and an increased number of violations of the heavy weapons withdrawal\nzones. Those actions, by both sides, had eroded the credibility of the cease-fire agreement\nto the point where neither side appeared committed to its key provisions. Moreover, the\nexisting military situation, coupled with restrictions on freedom of movement constantly\nimposed by both sides, had prevented UNCRO from taking any significant remedial\naction and, in some cases, from even monitoring the situation. Peacekeepers had been\nunable to position themselves between the warring factions and had been prevented from\ndeploying along the international border. The Secretary-General concluded that, given the\nhigh degree of uncertainty concerning developments in Croatia, it was not possible at that\ntime to make a recommendation as to the future of UNCRO. It was his intention,\nhowever, to revert to the Security Council with such a recommendation at an appropriate\ntime in the future.\n\n\n 479\n By a letter dated 7 August 1995 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General reported that on 4 August, the Croatian Army had\nlaunched a major offensive against the Krajina region, and a significant number of United\nNations observation posts had been overrun by the Croatian Army, with some coming\nunder fire. On two occasions, United Nations troops and Serb prisoners had been used as\nhuman shields by Croatian Army units. Subsequently, the United Nations had suffered a\ntotal of 18 casualties, three of which had been fatal. On 6 August, the Co-Chairmen of the\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and representatives of the European\nUnion had met in Geneva with the Foreign Minister of Croatia which had expressed\nconfidence that the Croatian military operation would be completed within 24 hours and\nhad indicated that Croatia would investigate incidents in which United Nations troops had\nbeen attacked. The Minister had also given assurances about granting humanitarian\norganizations access to civilians displaced by the fighting. The Secretary-General further\n\n\n\n\n 479\n S/1995/666.\n\n\n 314\n"
[315] "noted that a refugee crisis of major proportions had begun. Tensions remained high and\nthe possibility of continuing hostilities could not be ruled out.\n\n\n At its 3563rd meeting, on 10 August 1995, the Council included the above report\nand letter in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate in\nthe discussion without the right to vote. The Council also invited Ambassador Dragomir\nDjokic, at his request, to address the Council in the course of the subsequent discussion.\nThe President (Indonesia) then drew the attention of the Council members to the text of a\ndraft resolution 480 that had been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior\n 481\nconsultations and to several other documents.\n\n\n At the same meeting, the representative of Croatia stated that Croatia’s action had\nbeen carried out mostly on its internationally-recognized territory and in part of the\nterritory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at the express request of that Government, arguing\nthat establishing sovereignty and security on its own territory and coming to the aid of a\nfriendly Government were fully consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. The\nspeaker further claimed that the siege of Bihac, which had been a serious concern for the\ninternational community, had been resolved at minimal cost to the international\ncommunity and to the civilian population in the area. Croatia therefore regretted that the\nCouncil had not accepted an amendment that would have acknowledged that the siege of\nBihac had been successfully lifted. His Government had accepted responsibility for those\nand other casualties amongst United Nations personnel and had taken appropriate\nmeasures to remedy the costs of individual “indiscretions” and criminal acts against the\npeacekeepers. His Government also fully supported the new initiative by the United\n\n\n 480\n S/1995/676.\n 481\n S/1995/658 and S/1995/660, letters dated 7 August 1995 from the chargé d’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia\naddressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1995/656 and S/1995/663, letters dated 4 and 6 August 1995,\nrespectively, from the chargé d’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1995/662 and\nS/1995/664, letters dated 6 and 7 August 1995, respectively, from the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina\naddressed to the Secretary-General; S/1995/670, letter dated 8 August 1995 from the representative of Croatia\naddressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1995/672, letter dated 8 August 1995 from the representative of\nthe Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-General; and S/1995/675, letter dated 9 August 1995 from the\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council.\n\n\n 315\n"
[316] "States to restart the negotiating process in a timely manner, and it would support a new\nconference along the lines suggested by President Yeltsin of the Russian Federation. The\nnew negotiations should be based on the principle of mutual recognition among all\nsuccessor States of the former Yugoslavia and on the linkage of the sanctions régime\nagainst the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to its role in the\nimplementation of a negotiated settlement for the Serbian minority in Croatia. Such a\nlinkage would be important in respect of a successful resolution to the problem of the\nremaining occupied territory in Croatia - the Vukovar region (the former Sector East).\nThe speaker also contended that the Belgrade occupation of that territory could not be\nmore evident and warned that the premature easing of the sanctions régime before that\nproblem had been resolved might leave the Croatian Government with no option other\nthan a military one. Before concluding, the speaker noted that Croatia would look to\nUNCRO to assist it in resolving the problem of the Vukovar region peacefully. As\nUNCRO redefined its role in the “reintegrated areas” of Croatia, the Croatian\nGovernment would welcome a redeployment of its excess resources to the international\n 482\nborder in the Vukovar region.\n\n\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina argued that Croatia’s action had\nbeen in defence of its territories and rights and in promotion of peace and stability within\nits borders and had preserved the Bihac safe area. That was a victory of the Croatian\narmy over the terrorists and criminals among the Serbians who wanted to carry out\n 483\nviolence against innocent civilians on both sides.\n\n\n Mr. Djokic stated that, by opting for “all-out aggression”, Croatia had not simply\nattacked the Serb population, but also fragrantly violated the Security Council resolutions\nestablishing the United Nations protected areas in Krajina, and had breached the Vance\nplan. The Croatian Government had acted in total disregard of the unambiguous and\nclear-cut demands of the Security Council, that it refrain from taking any further actions\nthat could lead to the escalation of the situation, and particularly that it cease all military\n\n 482\n S/PV.3563, pp. 2-4.\n 483\n Ibid., pp. 5-7.\n\n\n 316\n"
[317] "actions in and around sector South. It was particularly worrisome that the Security\nCouncil and the international community had not condemned the “brutal” Croatian\naggression. Particular responsibility lay with the Security Council, whose primary role\nunder Chapter VII of the Charter was to maintain peace and security and protect the\nvictims of aggression, to take “concrete and resolute measures” against Croatia. The\nspeaker noted that it was particularly distressing that the Council did not demand that\nCroatian troops withdraw to the positions held prior to 4 August 1995 and that the calls\nfor the introduction of comprehensive actions against Croatia had been ignored. He\nfurther urged the Security Council to make Croatia allow access to representatives of the\nUnited Nations and humanitarian organizations to the territories of Krajina in order to\nconduct a thorough and objective investigation into the events that had taken place during\nthe Croatian offensive, including alleged massacres, torture, opening fire on refugees, and\nthe use of United Nations personnel and Serb soldiers and civilians as human shields.\n He added that the draft resolution before the Council represented a totally\n 484\ninadequate response to the drama that had been unfolding in Krajina.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of Germany stated that his delegation\ndeplored the Croatian Government’s decision to use military means to regain those\nterritories previously known as Sector South and Sector North. At the same time it was\nready to acknowledge that Croatia’s patience had been tested severely by the\nintransigence of the Croatian Serb leadership and by the great number of cease-fire\nviolations committed by Croatian Serb forces and their pattern of cross border attacks, in\nparticular in the area of Bihac. From the German view, there were now three priorities.\nFirst, the urgent humanitarian needs must be addressed, and full respect for human rights\nmust be ensured. Second, the situation in and around Croatia must be stabilized. Third,\nthe conflicting parties must be brought back to the negotiating table. Before concluding,\nthe speaker stated that Croatia needed to ensure that the human rights and minority rights\nof the Serbs of the former Sector East and Sector North were fully respected. Germany\nwas deeply concerned about the fate of the Croatian Serb refugees and considered it\n\n\n 484\n Ibid., pp. 7-9.\n\n\n 317\n"
[318] "crucial that Croatia guarantee the right of those refugees to return, and that the Croatian\nauthorities do everything in their power to create circumstances and a climate conductive\n 485\nto such a return.\n\n\n The representative of China stated that his delegation would vote in favour of the\ndraft resolution because it urged the parties to stop hostilities immediately and resume\nnegotiations at an early date, it called for an urgent solution to humanitarian problems,\nand it called upon the parties to ensure the freedom of movement of UNCRO personnel.\nChina maintained its reservation, however, with regard to the references in the draft\n 486\nresolution to Chapter VII of the Charter and resolution 816 (1993).\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the Croatian offensive\nhad brought to naught the efforts of the international community to find a political\nsolution. He argued that Zagreb had taken a stance of integrating Serb-populated regions\nby force, meaning that the principle of a just solution had been sacrificed to a philosophy\nof fait accompli. Russia believed that such an approach would have harmful\nconsequences both for the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis and for the role to be played\nby the United Nations in maintaining and restoring international peace and security. The\nspeaker stated that the gravity of the situation required the adoption of urgent measures.\nRussia therefore had taken an active part in the preparation of the draft resolution. Of\nspecial importance in Russia’s view was the demand that Croatia cease immediately all\nhostilities and comply with all relevant Council resolutions, including resolution 994\n(1995), and that it fully respect the rights of the local Serb population. No less important\nwas the demand by the Council that Croatia respect the status of United Nations\npersonnel, put an end to attacks on it and punish those guilty of perpetrating them. Noting\nthat the draft resolution referred with concern to reports of violations of resolution 713\n(1991, the speaker stated that the tragic events in Croatia had reaffirmed that if violations\nof the arms embargo went unpunished, the parties would be tempted to try to solve\ndisputes not around the negotiating table, but by force of arms. It was therefore necessary\n\n 485\n Ibid., pp. 11-12.\n 486\n Ibid., p. 12.\n\n\n 318\n"
[319] "to adopt additional measures to ensure effective compliance with resolution 713 (1991).\nAnother clear conclusion was that the United Nations peace-keeping operations in\nCroatia must continue in order to prevent a complete humanitarian catastrophe and to\nensure objective international observation of the actions of the Croatian authorities with\nregard to the Serbian population that had come under its control. In that regard, any\nviolations of international law required the adoption of effective and impartial measures,\nincluding by the Council. The situation in Croatia had to remain under the close scrutiny\nof the Council which would be prepared to consider further measures to achieve\ncompliance with the draft resolution. There were such measures that the Council could\ntake, and that should be remembered by those who believed that the Council’s decision\n 487\nwere not binding on them.\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 1009 (1995). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous resolutions on the conflicts in the territory of the former\n Yugoslavia, in particular resolutions 981 (1995) of 31 March 1995, 990 (1995) of 28 April\n 1995 and 994 (1995) of 17 May 1995,\n Reaffirming the statements by its President of 3 and 4 August 1995, and deeply\n concerned that the demands set out therein have not yet been fully complied with by the\n Government of the Republic of Croatia,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 3 August 1995 and his letter of\n 7 August 1995,\n Noting with concern reports of violations of resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991\n as reflected in the report of the Secretary-General of 3 August 1995,\n Deeply regretting the breakdown of the talks which began at Geneva on 3 August 1995,\n Affirming its commitment to the search for an overall negotiated settlement of the\n conflicts in the former Yugoslavia ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the\n States there within their internationally recognized borders, stressing the importance it\n\n\n\n 487\n Ibid., pp. 13-15.\n\n\n 319\n"
[320] "attaches to the mutual recognition thereof, and in this context welcoming all international\nefforts to facilitate a negotiated solution to the conflict in the Republic of Croatia,\n Strongly deploring the broad military offensive launched on 4 August 1995 by the\nGovernment of the Republic of Croatia, thereby unacceptably escalating the conflict, with the\nrisk of further consequent attacks by whatever party,\n Condemning the shelling of civilian targets,\n Deeply concerned at the grave situation of persons displaced from their homes as a result\nof the conflict and at reports of violations of international humanitarian law,\n Stressing the need to protect the rights of the local Serb population,\n Condemning in the strongest terms the unacceptable acts by Croatian Government forces\nagainst personnel of the United Nations peacekeeping forces, including those which have\nresulted in the death of one Danish and two Czech members of those forces, and expressing\nits condolences to the Governments concerned,\n Taking Note of the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and the United Nations\nPeace Forces signed on 6 August 1995, and stressing the need for the Government of the\nRepublic of Croatia to adhere strictly to its provisions,\n Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the\npersonnel of the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the territory of the former\nYugoslavia, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Demands that the Government of the Republic of Croatia cease immediately all\nmilitary actions and that there be full compliance with all Council resolutions, including\nresolution 994 (1995);\n 2. Demands also that the Government of the Republic of Croatia, in conformity with\ninternationally recognized standards and in compliance with the agreement of 6 August 1995\nbetween the Republic of Croatia and the United Nations Peace Forces, (a) respect fully the\nrights of the local Serb population, including their rights to remain, leave or return in safety,\n(b) allow access to this population by international humanitarian organizations and (c) create\nconditions conducive to the return of those persons who have left their homes;\n 3. Reminds the Government of the Republic of Croatia of its responsibility to allow\naccess for representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross to members of the\nlocal Serb forces who are detained by the Croatian Government forces;\n 4. Reiterates that all those who commit violations of international humanitarian law will\nbe held individually responsible in respect of such acts;\n\n\n\n\n 320\n"
[321] " 5. Requests the Secretary-General, in cooperation with the United Nations High\n Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the\n International Committee of the Red Cross and other relevant international humanitarian\n institutions, to assess the humanitarian situation of the local Serb population, including the\n problem of refugees and displaced persons, and to report thereon as soon as possible;\n 6. Demands that the Government of the Republic of Croatia fully respect the status of\n United Nations personnel, refrain from any attacks against them, bring to justice those\n responsible for any such attacks and ensure the safety and freedom of movement of United\n Nations personnel at all times, and requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council\n informed of steps taken and decisions rendered in this regard;\n 7. Urges the parties and others concerned to exercise maximum restraint in and around\n Sector East, and requests the Secretary-General to keep the situation there under review;\n 8. Reminds all parties of their obligation to comply fully with the provisions of resolution\n 816 (1993) of 31 March 1993;\n 9. Reiterates its call for a negotiated settlement that guarantees the rights of all\n communities, and urges the Government of the Republic of Croatia to resume talks under the\n auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on\n the Former Yugoslavia;\n 10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within three weeks of the\n adoption of the present resolution on its implementation and on the implications of the\n situation for the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is\n known as UNCRO, and expresses its readiness to consider promptly his recommendations in\n relation to UNCRO;\n 11. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter and to consider further measures to\n achieve compliance with the present resolution.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of France noted that while Sector North\nand Sector South, where the Croatian offensive unfolded, were part of Croatia, the Serb\npopulation in these regions did have rights recognized by the international community. In\nthat regard, he recalled that recognition of Croatia by the European Union was made\nexpressly contingent on recognition by that State of the rights of the Serb minority. The\nspeaker further stated that the resolutions of the Security Council made it incumbent upon\nthe Croatian authorities to turn to negotiation to bring about reintegration within the\n\n\n 321\n"
[322] "Republic of the territories in question. By putting an end to discussions in Geneva with\nthe Serb party in Croatia and deliberately choosing the military option to restore their\nauthority in these sectors, the Zagreb authorities had taken a decision contrary to their\ninternational obligations. Turning to the resolution, the speaker noted that the resolution\njust adopted was timely and fitting for three reasons. First, it placed very special\nemphasis on respect for the rights of civilians. The Serb populations must be free to move\nabout and those who had fled must be able to come back in satisfactory conditions of\nsafety and security to their region of origin. It was also essential that humanitarian\norganizations be able to monitor the situation. Secondly, the resolution embodied a very\nforceful condemnation of the behaviour of Croatian Government forces towards United\nNations forces. Those responsible for violations of the laws of war would have to be\nbrought to justice. Finally, the resolution clearly warned that hostilities should not be\npursued in the direction of Sector East, because that would raise by yet another notch the\n 488\nescalation and the risk of generalization of the conflict.\n\n\n The representative of the United States noted that her Government regretted the\ndecision by the Government of Croatia to launch an offensive against the Krajina region.\nIt also urged all parties to refrain from further attacks, whether within Croatia or Bosnia\nand Herzegovina. The speaker urged that it must be a priority for all parties to protect\ncivilian refugees who had been forced to flee the military operations. The rights of those\nSerbs who chose to remain in Croatia must also be respected and it was essential that\ninternational agencies had unimpeded access to observe conditions in Krajina and\nprovide humanitarian relief where needed. The United States expected the war-crimes\nTribunal to investigate allegations of abuse against unarmed civilians, and it joined in\ncondemning the wrongful acts committed against United Nations peacekeepers. The\nresolution just adopted reminded Croatia of its obligation to create conditions conducive\nto the safe return of those persons who had fled their homes, and it stressed the\nimportance of granting the ICRC access to those who had been detained. At the same\n\n\n\n\n 488\n Ibid., pp. 16-17.\n\n\n 322\n"
[323] "time, while the United States regretted the means used, it was also necessary to recognize\nthat the new safe area of Bihac was now open to humanitarian relief. 489\n\n\n The President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of Indonesia, stated\nthat his delegation had voted in favour of the resolution just adopted since it embodied\nprinciples that Indonesia had consistently espoused, including commitment to the search\nfor a comprehensive negotiated settlement of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, the\nneed to respect international humanitarian law and the inviolability of all United Nations\npersonnel, as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States of the former\n 490\nYugoslavia.\n\n\n Decision of 29 August 1995: letter from the President to the Secretary-General\n\n On 23 August 1995, pursuant to resolution 1009 (1995), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 491 on the implications of the situation in Croatia on the\nmandate of UNCRO.\n The Secretary-General reported that since his last report of 3 August and his\nletter of 7 August, neither party had ceased military actions, nor have they complied fully\nwith relevant Security Council resolutions. Tensions had remained high, especially in\nSector East, and the Croatian Army had not always prosecuted its campaigns with\nsufficient regard for the safety of United Nations personnel or Krajina Serb civilians.\nCroatia’s reintegration by force of the former Sectors West, South, and North had\neliminated the need for infantry battalions in these areas. The Theatre Force Commander\nhad therefore initiated the immediate reduction of UNCRO’s troop strength. The\nSecretary-General observed that UNCRO’s immediate task in Sector East was to try to\nre-establish the regime created by the cease-fire agreement. If that could be achieved, he\nwould be inclined to think that there would be a continuing role for United Nations forces\nin Sector East. He had instructed his Special Representative to consult with the Croatian\n\n\n 489\n Ibid., p. 20\n 490\n Ibid., p. 21.\n 491\n S/1995/730.\n\n\n 323\n"
[324] "Government and the local Serb leadership in Sector East, in order to define a possible\nmandate for UNCRO. He had also requested him to discuss with the Croatian\nGovernment what tasks, if any, UNCRO could perform elsewhere in Croatia. The\nSecretary-General recommended that the Security Council approve the further\nrepatriation, during the existing mandate, of all remaining battalions, with the exception\n 492\nof two in Sector East.\n\n\n By a letter 493 dated 29 August 1995, the President of the Security Council\ninformed the Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n “The members of the Security Council have considered your report of 23 August 1995\n pursuant to resolution 1009 (1995).\n “The members of the Council agree with your recommendation set out in paragraph 32 of\n that report concerning the repatriation of remaining battalions of the United Nations\n Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO, with the exception\n of the two in Sector East. They support the views you express concerning the possible future\n configuration and tasks of UNCRO and urge you to continue your contacts in this regard.\n They express their readiness to consider further recommendations in the light of those\n contacts. Pending such consideration, they stress the importance they attach to the retention\n of the current configuration and tasks of UNCRO in Sector East. They underline the need for\n a new spirit of cooperation with UNCRO there and elsewhere in the Republic of Croatia.\n “The members of the Council fully support you in your efforts to ensure that the parties\n and others concerned exercise maximum restraint in and around Sector East and pursue a\n negotiated solution.\n “The members of the Council note with concern the difficulties you report concerning\n implementation by the Croatian Government of the agreement on the status of forces. They\n look to the Croatian Government to implement fully and unconditionally the terms of that\n agreement in all aspects.\n “The members of the Council express their concern over the humanitarian problems\n described in your report. They stress the importance they attach to fulfilment of the\n\n\n\n 492\n Ibid., para.32\n 493\n S/1995/748.\n\n\n 324\n"
[325] " provisions of the Council's resolutions in this regard and to efforts by the international\n community to alleviate the plight of refugees and displaced persons.”\n\n\n Decision of 7 September 1995 (3573rd meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3573rd meeting, on 7 September 1995, the Council included the report of the\nSecretary-General of 23 August 1995 in its agenda. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representative of Croatia, at his request, to participate in\nthe discussion without the right to vote. The President (Italy) then stated that, after\nconsultations among members of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make\n 494\nthe following statement on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council has considered the report of the Secretary-General of\n 23 August 1995 submitted pursuant to its resolution 1009 (1995) of 10 August 1995 and in\n particular the humanitarian situation and human rights violations described therein.\n \"The Council expresses its deep concern at the grave situation of refugees and persons\n displaced during the Croatian offensive and at reports of violations of international\n humanitarian law as described in the report of the Secretary-General. The Council shares the\n view of the Secretary-General that the mass exodus of the local Serb population has created a\n humanitarian crisis of significant proportions. The Council is also concerned by reports of\n human rights violations, including the burning of houses, looting of property and killings, and\n demands that the Government of Croatia immediately investigate all such reports and take\n appropriate measures to put an end to such acts.\n \"The Council reiterates its demand that the Government of the Republic of Croatia\n respect fully the rights of the local Serb population, including their right to remain or return in\n safety.\n \"The Council welcomes efforts made by the Secretary-General in coordination with\n international humanitarian organizations in response to this acute humanitarian situation. It\n calls upon all Member States to provide urgent humanitarian relief and assistance to those\n refugees and displaced persons.\n \"The Council reiterates that all those who commit violations of international\n humanitarian law will be held individually responsible in respect of such acts. The Council\n\n\n 494\n S/PRST/1995/44.\n\n\n 325\n"
[326] " reiterates in this context that all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal for\n the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian\n Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, established pursuant\n to its resolution 827 (1993), and its organs.\n \"The Council will remain actively seized of the matter.\"\n\n\n Decision of 3 October 1995 (3584th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3584th meeting, on 3 October 1995, the Council continued its consideration\nof the item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate in the discussion\nwithout the right to vote. The President (Nigeria) then stated that, after consultations\namong members of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following\nstatement 495 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council expresses its concern at the humanitarian situation in and around\n the Republic of Croatia, including the situation of refugees from the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina.\n \"The Council is particularly concerned at the withdrawal of refugee status from and the\n consequent ending of assistance to many refugees from the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina at present in the Republic of Croatia. The decisions of the Government of\n Croatia in this regard may lead to the involuntary return of tens of thousands of people to an\n area that is neither safe nor prepared to receive them. The Council stresses the importance of\n the principle of non-refoulement set out in the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status\n of Refugees, to which Croatia is a party. The Council urges the Government of Croatia to\n continue to provide asylum to all refugees regardless of their origin.\n \"The Council is also seriously concerned at the situation of the refugees from the\n Republic of Croatia wishing to return, as well as of those ethnic Serbs who have chosen to\n remain in the Republic of Croatia. It reiterates its demands, contained, inter alia, in its\n resolution 1009 (1995), that the Government of Croatia respect fully the rights of the local\n Serb population, including their right to remain or return in safety, investigate all reports of\n human rights violations and take appropriate measures to put an end to such acts. The\n\n\n 495\n S/PRST/1995/49.\n\n\n 326\n"
[327] " Council calls upon the Government of Croatia to lift any time-limits placed on the return of\n refugees to Croatia to reclaim their property. The Council also calls upon the Government to\n cooperate with international humanitarian organizations in the creation of conditions\n conducive to the repatriation of refugees in safety and dignity.\n \"The Council will remain actively seized of the matter.\"\n\n\n Decision of 10 October 1995: letter from the President to the Secretary-General\n\n On 29 September 1995, pursuant to resolution 1009 (1995), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 496 on consultations held by his Special Representative\nwith the Croatian Government, Belgrade and the local Serb authorities in Sector East on\nUNCRO’s tasks. He reported that after intensive consultations, his Special Representative\nhad been assured by the parties that they were willing to resolve the issue of Sector East\nthrough negotiation. In addition, both sides had undertaken to improve their level of\ncompliance with existing agreements, and specific regard to cooperation with UNCRO.\nFollowing his discussions, his Special Representative had proposed a plan based on the\nsix following main tasks: (a) performing fully the functions envisaged in the Cease-fire\nAgreement between Croatia and the local Serb authorities in Sector East; (b) facilitating\nthe implementation of the sections of the Economic Agreement of 2 December 1994\nwhich were relevant to Sector East, and arranging local economic initiatives as\nappropriate; (c) facilitating the implementation of all relevant Council resolutions,\nincluding the functions identified in paragraph 72 of the Secretary-General’s report of 22\nMarch 1995, in particular the continuation of confidence-building and humanitarian\ntasks, such as assistance to refugees and displaced persons and the monitoring of the\ntreatment of ethnic minorities; (d) assisting in controlling, by monitoring and reporting,\nthe crossing of military personnel, equipment, supplies and weapons, over the\ninternational borders between Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia\nand Montenegro) at the border crossings where UNCRO was deployed; (e) monitoring\nthe demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula in accordance with resolution 779 (1992);\nand (f) observing and reporting on military incidents in the vicinity of the international\nborder between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Secretary-General therefore\n\n 496\n S/1995/835.\n\n\n 327\n"
[328] "recommended that the Council approve the plan. It would apply to the remainder of\nUNCRO’s current mandate, pending ongoing negotiations on the ultimate future of\nSector East in the context of an overall political settlement of the crisis in the former\nYugoslavia.\n 497\n By a letter dated 10 October 1995, the President of the Security Council\ninformed the Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n “The members of the Security Council have considered your report of\n 29 September 1995 submitted pursuant to Council resolution 1009 (1995). The members of\n the Council agree with the arrangements set out in that report for the remainder of the current\n mandate of the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known\n as UNCRO, pending, in the case of Eastern Slavonia, the outcome of the ongoing\n negotiations on the subject.”\n\n\n Decision of 22 November 1995 (3596th meeting): resolution 1023 (1995)\n\n By a letter 498 dated 15 November 1995 addressed to the Secretary-General, the\nrepresentative of Croatia transmitted the text of the basic agreement on the region of\nEastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, signed between the Government of the\nRepublic of Croatia and the local Croatian Serb authorities in Eastern Slavonia on 12\nNovember 1995, in Croatia. The Agreement provided, inter alia, that there would be a\ntransitional period of twelve months, extendable to twenty-four months if one of the\nparties so requested, and that the Security Council would establish a Transitional\nAdministration and an international force, respectively, to govern the region during that\ntransitional period and to maintain peace and security.\n At its 3596th meeting, on 22 November 1995, the Council included the above\nletter in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentative of Croatia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right\nto vote. The President (Oman) then drew the attention of the Council members to the text\n\n\n\n 497\n S/1995/859.\n 498\n S/1995/951.\n\n\n 328\n"
[329] "of a draft resolution 499 submitted by Argentina, the Czech Republic, France, Germany,\nHonduras, Italy, the Russian Federation, Rwanda, the United Kingdom and the United\n 500\nStates, as well as to several other documents.\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation pointed out\nthat the Basic Agreement on the Region of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium had\nbeen made possible by the parties realism and sense of responsibility, as well as the\nconsiderable contribution of international mediators and States members of the Contact\nGroup. The Basic Agreement provided for restoration of security guarantees that had\nbeen undermined for the entire population during the years of conflict, securing for\nCroats, Serbs and representatives of other nationalities, in equal measure, basic human\nrights and freedoms, adequate conditions for the return of refugees, and normalization of\nlife. The Agreement also removed the obstacles to the full normalization of relations\nbetween Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which was of decisive\nsignificance for a comprehensive settlement of the crisis in the Balkans. In that regard,\nRussia believed that the draft resolution before the Council was appropriate and timely.\nIn its view, the United Nations must play an important role in the promotion of the peace\nprocess, including the creation of a Transitional Administration and an international\nforce. Russia, for its part was prepared to continue its contribution to ensuring peace and\nsecurity in the region. It also supported the continuation and expansion of international\n 501\nefforts to ensure human rights in Croatia.\n\n\n The representative of China stated that his delegation would vote in favour of the\ndraft resolution on the basis of its position that, in any settlement of the Croatian\nquestion, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia should be respected and that\nthe Croatian Government and the local Serbian authorities should seek a solution\nacceptable to both sides to the conflict, through peaceful negotiation. Noting that the\nAgreement contained requests to the United Nations and the Security Council concerning\n\n\n 499\n S/1995/979.\n 500\n S/1995/843, letter dated 6 October 1995 from the representative of Croatia addressed to the President of\nthe Security Council; S/1995/964, letter dated 15 November 1995 from the representative of Ukraine addressed to the\nSecretary-General.\n 501\n S/PV.3596, pp. 2-3.\n\n\n 329\n"
[330] "authorization by the Council of a Transitional Administration and an international force,\nthe speaker cautioned that those requests involved many complicated political and legal\nissues, thus making it necessary to conduct careful studies and to refrain from making\nhasty decisions as to how the United Nations might facilitate and participate in the\n 502\nimplementation of the peace plan in the region.\n\n\n The representative of the Czech Republic stated that the cornerstone of the Basic\nAgreement was the setting up of a Transitional Administration in Sector East for one\nyear. His delegation had noted with concern, however, the generality of many of the\nprovisions of the Basic Agreement. It understood from that fact that the parties had\nagreed on general language but had been divided on the details, thus passing over to the\nCouncil the “hot potato” of the details. The parties were eager to pass the responsibility\nfor the consent of their Agreement to the Council, even while the Czech delegation had\nalways argued that the prime responsibility for shaping their future must reside with the\nparties in conflict themselves. 503\n\n\n The representative of Germany observed that the Basic Agreement was based on\ntwo important principles. On the one side, the sovereignty of Croatia with regard to\nEastern Slavonia was acknowledged. On the other hand, there needed to be full\nprotection of and guarantees for the rights of the local Serb population. The speaker\ncautioned, however, that there should be no misunderstanding: the Basic Agreement\nwould enter into force only upon the Council’s adoption of a resolution establishing a\nTransitional Administration and authorizing an international force. Thus, the Basic\nAgreement conferred upon the Security Council important responsibilities. In the\nfollowing days and weeks, the members of the Council would have to work intensively\non the details and modalities of the envisaged international force and Transitional\nAdministration. Ultimately, however, it was only the Government of Croatia and the\nlocal Serb party that could make the Basic Agreement a success. It was therefore right\nthat the draft resolution stressed the need for them to cooperate fully on the basis of the\n\n 502\n Ibid., p. 3.\n 503\n Ibid., p. 4.\n\n\n 330\n"
[331] "Agreement and to refrain from any measures that might hinder its implementation. That\nalso held true for the Government of the FRY. 504\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 1023 (1995). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions,\n Reaffirming its commitment to the search for an overall negotiated settlement of the\n conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the\n States there within their internationally recognized borders, and stressing the importance it\n attaches to the mutual recognition thereof,\n Reaffirming once again its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial\n integrity of the Republic of Croatia, and emphasizing in this regard that the territories of\n Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, known as Sector East, are integral parts of\n the Republic of Croatia,\n Affirming the importance it attaches to full respect for human rights and fundamental\n freedoms of all in those territories,\n Commending the continuing efforts of the representatives of the United Nations, the\n European Union, the Russian Federation and the United States of America to facilitate a\n negotiated solution to the conflict in the Republic of Croatia,\n 1. Welcomes the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and\n Western Sirmium between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb\n representatives, signed on 12 November 1995 in the presence of the United Nations mediator\n and the United States Ambassador to the Republic of Croatia;\n 2. Recognizes the request to it contained in the Basic Agreement to establish a transitional\n administration and authorize an appropriate international force, stands ready to consider the\n above request expeditiously in order to facilitate the implementation of the Agreement, and\n invites the Secretary-General to maintain the closest possible contact with all those concerned\n in order to assist with its work on the matter;\n 3. Stresses the need for the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb\n party to cooperate fully on the basis of the Basic Agreement and refrain from any military\n\n 504\n Ibid., pp. 4-5.\n\n\n 331\n"
[332] " activity or any measure that might hinder the implementation of the transitional arrangements\n set out in it, and reminds them of their obligation to cooperate fully with the United Nations\n Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO, and to ensure its\n safety and freedom of movement;\n 4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of France stated that the principle goal\nof the resolution just adopted, was to establish and guarantee a just and lasting peace for\nall the inhabitants of Eastern Slavonia. It was necessary to show that the international\ncommunity supported the peace process under way and the principles that had inspired it,\nincluding: the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia; the recognition and\nprotection of the fundamental rights of the whole population of the region; the need for\nthe rapid return of all displaced persons and refugees; and the guarantee that all the\ninhabitants of Eastern Slavonia would be able to live in peace and dignity. 505\n\n\n The representative of the United States noted that the resolution just adopted was\nan important step in building confidence between Croatians and Serbs, but much still\nremained to be done before a final peace was established. The parties to the Basic\nAgreement had asked the international community not only to underwrite, but also to\nadminister the region in its transition period. That was a large undertaking, which would\nrequire consultation, planning and coordination between interested parties. Before\nconcluding, the speaker noted that the efforts of the Security Council, including\nestablishing and enforcing sanctions, authorizing peacekeeping forces, and responding\naggressively to human rights violations on all sides, had finally come to fruition, through\n 506\nthe initialing of the Dayton Agreement and the adoption of the Basic Agreement.\n\n\n The President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of Oman, whilst\nwelcoming the signing of the Basic Agreement, cautioned that the Agreement was not an\nend in itself. Rather, it was a first step towards establishing peace and the normalization\n\n\n 505\n Ibid., p. 6.\n 506\n Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n\n\n 332\n"
[333] "of relations in that region. Referring to the resolution just adopted, he stated that the most\nimportant provision was the reference to mutual recognition between all States in the area\nof the former Yugoslavia. Such recognition would ensure the sovereignty and territorial\nintegrity of all the States within their internationally recognized borders, helping to\n 507\nestablish confidence between the States of the region.\n\n\n Decision of 30 November 1995 (3600th meeting): resolution 1025 (1995)\n\n On 23 November 1995, pursuant to resolutions 981 (1995), 982 (1995) and 983\n(1995), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report 508 on the peacekeeping\nmissions in the former Yugoslavia. The report was intended to assist the Council in its\ndeliberations on the future of those missions, as their mandates were due to terminate on\n30 November 1995. The Secretary-General observed that the Basic Agreement on the\nregion of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium was a landmark\naccomplishment that provided for the peaceful integration into Croatia of the region\nknown as Sector East. Recalling that the Basic Agreement requested the Council to\nestablish a transitional administration and to authorize an international force, he stressed\nthat timeliness of its implementation was of the essence for the present momentum of\npeace to be sustained and required full international support. Addressing the future of\nUNCRO, the Secretary-General stated that there appeared to be only two realistic\noptions. Either the Security Council could decide to terminate UNCRO’s functions when\nits mandate expired on 30 November 1995, in the expectation that interested States,\ninternational organizations and other institutions would assume responsibility for\nimplementing the Basic Agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and\nWestern Sirmium (the former Sector East), or the Council could decide to maintain\nUNCRO for a limited period, during which it would perform its existing tasks until the\ntransitional administration was established and an international force deployed.\n The Secretary-General further noted that, the President of Croatia had stated\nclearly that he could not agree to a further extension of UNCRO’s mandate, although he\n\n\n 507\n Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n 508\n S/1995/987.\n\n\n 333\n"
[334] "would agree to retain the two currently deployed UNCRO battalions as a transitional\narrangement. The President of Croatia had also insisted that the implementation of the\nBasic Agreement, particularly its demilitarization aspects, begin on 1 December. The\nSecretary-General warned, however, that to terminate the UNCRO mandate on 30\nNovember 1995, without certainty that other institutions were able to assume\nresponsibility for the implementation of the Basic Agreement, could severely destabilize\nthe area. He therefore recommended that the Council confirm UNCRO’s presence, for a\nperiod of two months, as a transitional arrangement pending the establishment of an\ninternational force; designate, as quickly as possible, a civilian transitional administrator\nfor the region; and determine the date on which implementation of the Basic Agreement\nshould begin.\n At its 3600th meeting, on 30 November 1995, the Council included the above\nreport in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentative of Croatia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right\nto vote. The President (Oman) then drew the attention of the Council members to the text\nof a draft resolution 509 submitted by Argentina, the Czech Republic, France, Germany,\nHonduras, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, as\n 510\nwell as to a letter dated 15 November 1995 from the representative of Croatia\naddressed to the Secretary-General.\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of China said that his delegation\nagreed in principle with the Secretary-General’s proposal that the mandate of the three\nUnited Nations peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia be extended so that\nstudies might be conducted on ways and means for the United Nations to participate in\npeacekeeping operations in that region in the future, and would vote in favour of the draft\nresolutions before the Council. The speaker pointed out that many lessons had been\nlearned from the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the region. For instance,\nmandatory action under Chapter VII of the Charter involving the use of force, including\nair power, had been “most improper” and had affected the legal and neutral status of\nthose peacekeeping operations. Noting that the Basic Agreement and the Dayton\n\n 509\n S/1995/994.\n 510\n S/1995/951.\n\n\n 334\n"
[335] "Agreement both contained requests for the implementation of peace in that region, the\nspeaker also observed that the United Nations and the Council would undoubtedly have\nto shoulder important responsibilities, since those requests involved many complex\npolitical, legal, military and financial questions. The Council therefore needed to study\nthose questions carefully and to discuss them thoroughly, in order to take a sound\ndecision. Referring to recent discussion on the potential deployment of implementation\nforces in the former Yugoslavia, the speaker cautioned that such deployment could\namount to a major operation. He argued that those operations should be placed under the\ncontrol and guidance of the Council, so that it could prevent the operations from\ndeparting from the principles governing United Nations peacekeeping operations and\navoid the “abuse of force” and involvement in the conflict. He cautioned that the Council\nshould not become a “rubber stamp” with regard to matters beyond its control and that no\n“blank cheques” should be written. In addressing such questions, the Council should\nadopt a prudent and responsible approach, rather than rushing into any commitments or\n 511\ndecisions.\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 1025 (1995). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions and in particular its resolution 981 (1995)\n of 31 March 1995,\n Recalling also the report of the Secretary-General of 29 September 1995 and the letter\n dated 10 October 1995 from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General,\n Reaffirming its resolution 1023 (1995) of 22 November 1995,\n Reaffirming once again its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial\n integrity of the Republic of Croatia, and emphasizing in this regard that the territories of\n Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, known as Sector East, are integral parts of\n the Republic of Croatia,\n Affirming the importance it attaches to full respect for the human rights and fundamental\n freedoms of all in those territories and elsewhere in the Republic of Croatia,\n\n\n\n 511\n S/PV.3600, pp. 2-3.\n\n\n 335\n"
[336] " Welcoming again the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and\n Western Sirmium between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb\n representatives, signed on 12 November 1995,\n Welcoming the positive role played by the United Nations Confidence Restoration\n Operation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO, and paying tribute to the personnel of\n UNCRO in the performance of their mandate,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 23 November 1995,\n Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the\n personnel of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the territory of the former\n Yugoslavia, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 23 November 1995;\n 2. Requests the Secretary-General to submit for consideration by the Council at the\n earliest possible date and no later than 14 December 1995 a report on all aspects of the\n establishment by the Council of an operation consisting of a transitional administration and a\n transitional peacekeeping force to implement the relevant provisions of the Basic Agreement\n on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, including on the\n possibilities for assistance from the host country in offsetting the costs of the operation;\n 3. Decides that, in order to allow for the orderly establishment of the operation referred to\n in paragraph 2 above, the mandate of UNCRO shall terminate after an interim period ending\n on 15 January 1996 or when the Council has decided on the deployment, including on the\n necessary period for the transfer of authority, of the transitional peacekeeping force referred\n to in that paragraph, whichever is sooner;\n 4. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Decision of 22 December 1995 (3615th meeting): statement by the President\n\n On 21 December 1995, pursuant to resolution 1019 (1995), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 512 on the human rights situation in Croatia. The\nSecretary-General observed that human rights violations continued to be reported in the\nformer Sectors North and South. The right of Krajina Serbs to remain in their homes had\nnot been adequately safeguarded. The remaining Serbs had faced extensive harassment\nand intimidation; looters and armed thieves had robbed Serb residents of both their\n\n\n 512\n S/1995/1051.\n\n\n 336\n"
[337] "property and their sense of security. Furthermore, the rights of the Serb population who\nhad fled during the military operation to return to their homes were being seriously\ncurtailed by the absence of constructive measures to facilitate their return. In addition, the\nrights of the minority population in Croatia were being restricted by changes in the\nConstitution. New legal provisions, such as the law concerning the return and reclamation\nof property, were inhibiting the full enjoyment of human rights and fundamental\nfreedoms. It was therefore necessary to ensure that the rights of the Serb minority were\nadequately safeguarded in Croatia’s legal and constitutional framework.\n At its 3615th meeting, on 22 December 1995, the Council included the above\nreport in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentative of Croatia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right\nto vote. The President (Russian Federation) then stated that, after consultations among\nmembers of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following\n 513\nstatement on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council takes note of the report of the Secretary-General of\n 21 December 1995, which it has just received.\n \"The Council, as a matter of urgency, expresses its grave concern that, according to\n information in that report, the Government of the Republic of Croatia has ignored the call of\n the Council in the statement by its President of 3 October 1995 that it lift any time-limits\n placed on the return of refugees to reclaim their property. The requirement that owners must\n reclaim their property by 27 December 1995 constitutes a virtually insurmountable obstacle\n for most Serb refugees.\n \"The Council strongly demands that the Government of the Republic of Croatia lift\n immediately any time-limits placed on the return of refugees to reclaim their property.\n \"The Council shall continue its consideration of the report of the Secretary-General.\"\n\n\n\n\n 513\n S/PRST/1995/63.\n\n\n 337\n"
[338] "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) missions in Kosovo,\n Sandzak and Vojvodina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro)\n\n\n INITIAL PROCEEDINGS\n\n\n By a letter 514 dated 20 July 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\n Council, the representative of Sweden transmitted the text of a letter of the same\n date from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers of the CSCE, in\n which, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter, he informed the Council that\n at the end of June 1993, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro) had withdrawn its acceptance of the CSCE missions in\n Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojdovina and its cooperation with them. The Chairman-in-\n Office also noted that it was the considered opinion of the CSCE participating\n States that the decision by the Belgrade authorities aggravated the existing threats\n to peace and security in the region.\n\n\n 515\n By a letter dated 23 July 1993 addressed to the President of the Council,\n the representative of Sweden transmitted copy of a letter of the same date from\n the Chairman-in-Office addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of\n Yugoslavia, as well as a related statement by the Chairman-in-Office. In his letter,\n the Chairman-in-Office called upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia to revoke its decision not to allow the CSCE missions to continue\n their activities and display its willingness to live up to the norms and principles it\n had accepted as a CSCE participating State.\n\n\n At its 3262nd meeting, on 9 August 1993, the Council included the item\n entitled “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) missions in\n Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n\n\n 514\n S/26121.\n 515\n S/26148.\n\n\n 338\n"
[339] "Montenegro)” in its agenda. The Council also included the two letters above in its\nagenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited Ambassador\nDragomir Djokić, at his request, to take a seat at the Council table during the\ncourse of the discussion of the item. The President (United States) then drew the\nattention of the Council members to the text of a draft resolution 516 that had been\nprepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations, as well as to two\nletters 517 dated 28 July and 3 August 1993 from the representative of Yugoslavia\naddressed to the Secretary-General. The letters transmitted letters dated 28 and 29\nJuly 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security Council and the Chairman-\nin-Office of the CSCE Council, respectively in which the Minister objected to the\nfact that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been suspended from\nparticipating in CSCE activities since 8 July 1992 and made the point that his\nGovernment was willing and ready to continue to cooperate with CSCE and\nwould allow the CSCE missions back, should Serbia and Montenegro be\nreintegrated into the CSCE.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of China contended that the\nissue of Kosovo was an internal affair of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and\nthat the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia should be respected, in line with the basic principles of\nthe United Nations Charter and international law. Based on that consideration, his\ndelegation believed that the Council should exercise extreme prudence and should\nact in strict conformity with the purposes and the principles of the Charter,\nespecially the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign\nStates. The speaker also contended that recourse to preventive diplomacy, as part\nof the pacific settlement of conflicts embodied in Chapter VI of the Charter,\nshould be carried out at the explicit request or with the prior consent of the States\nand parties concerned, and should never be imposed against their will. Practice\n\n516\n S/26263.\n517\n S/26210 and S/26234, respectively.\n\n\n 339\n"
[340] " over the years had shown that the consent and cooperation of the parties\n concerned were essential factors in ensuring the success of the endeavours of the\n United Nations and regional organizations. The dispute should therefore be solved\n through continued dialogue and consultation, without outside interference or\n pressure. The speaker observed that, when differences arose between a regional\n organization and a sovereign State, it was important to consider the question\n whether the Security Council should involve itself and, if so, according to what\n principle. He noted that, in the spirit of consensus, the Chinese delegation had\n offered specific amendments to the draft resolution. As those amendments had not\n been accepted, however, it would abstain from the voting on the draft\n 518\n resolution.\n\n\n Decision of 9 August 1993 (3262nd meeting): resolution 855 (1993)\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted by 14 votes to\nnone, with one abstention (China) as resolution 855 (1993). The resolution reads as\nfollows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Taking note of the letters of 20 and 23 July 1993 from the Chairman-in-Office of the\nCouncil of Ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,\n Also taking note of the letters of 28 July and 3 August 1993 circulated by the authorities\nof the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),\n Deeply concerned at the refusal of the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n(Serbia and Montenegro) to allow the CSCE missions of long duration to continue their\nactivities,\n Bearing in mind that the CSCE missions of long duration are an example of preventive\ndiplomacy undertaken within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation\nin Europe and have greatly contributed to promoting stability and counteracting the risk of\n\n\n\n\n 518\n S/PV.3262, pp. 3-5.\n\n\n 340\n"
[341] " violence in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro),\n Reaffirming its relevant resolutions aimed at putting an end to conflict in the former\n Yugoslavia,\n Determined to avoid any extension of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and in this\n context attaching great importance to the work of the CSCE missions and to the continued\n ability of the international community to monitor the situation in Kosovo, Sandzak and\n Vojvodina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),\n Stressing its commitment to the territorial integrity and political independence of all\n States in the region,\n 1. Endorses the efforts of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as\n described in the letters noted above from the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers\n of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;\n 2. Calls upon the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro) to reconsider their refusal to allow the continuation of the activities of the\n CSCE missions in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro), to cooperate with the Conference by taking the practical steps\n needed for the resumption of the activities of these missions and to agree to an increase in the\n number of monitors as decided by the Conference;\n 3. Also calls upon the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro) to assure the monitors' safety and security and to allow them free and\n unimpeded access necessary to accomplish their mission in full;\n 4. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of Hungary stated that the CSCE missions\nhad proven extremely valuable in promoting stability and counteracting the risk of\nethnically motivated violence in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojdovina. The Hungarian\ndelegation strongly believed that transparency in the protection of human rights was an\nimportant factor of stability and security, being a litmus test of a Government’s fulfilment\nof its obligations under the United Nations Charter and other relevant international\ninstruments. Hungary, like the CSCE community as a whole, was of the view that the\nexpulsion of the CSCE missions was an act that further aggravated the threat to peace and\n\n\n\n\n 341\n"
[342] "security in the Balkan region. It considered the Council’s call to the Belgrade\nGovernment to re-examine its position to be “a perfectly legitimate and sound action”. 519\n\n\n The representative of Brazil stated that his delegation had voted in favour of the\nresolution just adopted, bearing in mind that the consideration of the substantive aspects\nof the dispute fell within the competence of the regional arrangement represented by the\nrelationship between the CSCE and its member States. The Brazilian delegation hoped\nthat the resolution just adopted would help to create conditions for the adoption of\nmeasures of cooperation and ultimately for the solution of the differences between the\n 520\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia and the CSCE.\n\n\n The representative of France stated that his delegation was pleased that the\nCouncil was giving its support to the CSCE, so that the activities of its missions could\ncontinue. As stated in the letters of the Chairman-in-Office, it was a question of ensuring\nthe stability of the region. As the resolution just adopted emphasized, the activities of the\nmissions were in no way aimed at affecting the sovereignty of a State, but were designed\nto ensure respect for the fundamental principles to which all the member States of the\nCSCE, including the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), had\ncommitted themselves. The presence of the missions contributed to avoiding any\nextension of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia to Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojdovina. 521\n\n\n The representative of the United Kingdom reminded the authorities in Belgrade\nthat they continued to be bound by obligations which had been entered into in the context\nof the CSCE and the binding commitment under the “Moscow mechanisms”. The\nmissions were a source of objective information and they promoted security and dialogue\nbetween the communities, and would avoid the spread of conflict to other parts of the\n 522\nformer Yugoslavia.\n\n\n 519\n Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n 520\n Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n 521\n Ibid., pp. 9-10.\n 522\n Ibid., p. 14.\n\n\n 342\n"
[343] " The President, speaking in her capacity as the representative of the United States,\nstated that the United States strongly supported the activities of the CSCE missions, as\nthey were vital to the international community’s efforts to prevent the spread of the\nconflict in the former Yugoslavia. By monitoring the human rights situation in Kosovo,\nSandjak and Vojvodina, those missions had announced clearly to the authorities in\nBelgrade that the international community would not tolerate Serbian oppression of local\nnon-Serb populations. She warned that the United States was prepared to respond against\nSerbia in the event of a conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action. She also stressed\nthat human rights abuse would simply delay Serbia and Montenegro’s return to the\n 523\ncommunity of nations.\n\n\n In the course of the debate, other speakers shared the view that the CSCE\nmissions were fundamental to the maintenance of peace and stability in the region and\nthat their departure would further aggravate the existing threat to that peace and\nstability 524.\n\n\n\n\n 523\n Ibid., pp. 17-18.\n 524\n Ibid., Pakistan, pp. 7-9; Japan, pp. 10-11; Spain, pp. 12-13.\n\n\n 343\n"
[344] " Follow-up to resolution 817 (1993)\n\n Letter dated 26 May 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the\n\n President of the Security Council\n\n\n INITIAL PROCEEDINGS\n\n\n By a letter 525 dated 26 May 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General transmitted, pursuant to resolution 817 (1993), his\n 526\nreport of 14 May 1993 on the exercise of good offices by the Co-Chairmen of the\nSteering Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia, in respect\nof the difference that had arisen in connection with the request for admission to\nmembership in the United Nations of the State admitted as the former Yugoslav Republic\nof Macedonia. In doing so, he drew the attention of the members of the Council to the\nfact that an early endorsement by the Council of the proposals contained in Annex V of\nthe report would help the parties to reach agreement. Annex V contained a draft Treaty\nproposed by the Co-Chairmen Confirming the Existing Frontier and Establishing\nMeasures for Confidence Building, Friendship and Neighbourly Cooperation between the\nRepublic of Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.\n\n\n The Secretary-General noted that the draft Treaty presented to the parties by the\nCo-Chairmen had been prepared on the basis of extensive consultations with the parties.\nThe main outstanding point of contention remained the name to be used by the State that\nhad been admitted to the United Nations with the provisional name “the former Yugoslav\nRepublic of Macedonia”. The Greek delegation’s position was that the other party should\nnot use, whether for domestic or international purposes, a name that included the word\n“Macedonia”. It had indicated, however, that if that term were to be included in a name,\nthen the name “Slavomacedonia” could be envisaged. The delegation of the former\n\n\n 525\n S/25855 and Add.1 and 2.\n 526\n See Ibid, Annex I.\n\n\n 344\n"
[345] "Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, for its part, maintained that its name should be “The\nRepublic of Macedonia”. It was, however, prepared to discuss the modalities of the use of\nan alternative name, but for international purposes only. The Co-Chairmen proposed the\nname “The Republic of Nova Makedonia”, to be used for all official purposes.\n\n\n In addenda 1 and 2 to the report submitted on 3 June 1993, the Secretary-General\ntransmitted to the Council a statement made by the Greek Government on 27 May 1993\nand a letter dated 29 May 1993 from the President of the Former Yugoslav Republic of\nMacedonia, concerning the draft Treaty. In the statement the Greek Government\nreiterated his position and added that the name proposed by the Co-Chairmen posed\nserious difficulties. In his letter, the President of the former Yugoslav Republic of\nMacedonia raised objections to several provisions contained in the Co-Chairmen’s\nproposed draft Treaty and argued that the constitutional name, “The Republic of\nMacedonia”, did not imply territorial or other aspirations. To the contrary, confirmation\nof such a name would represent a significant contribution to the maintenance of peace\nand stability in the region, which was an essential requirement of resolution 817 (1993).\n\n\n At its 3243rd meeting, on 18 June 1993, the Council included the item entitled\n“Follow up to resolution 817 (1993)” and the above report of the Secretary-General in its\nagenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (Spain) drew the attention of\n 528\nthe Council members to the text of a draft resolution527 and to a letter dated 7 June\n1993 from the representative of Albania addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil.\n\n\n\n\nDecision of 18 June 1993 (3243rd meeting): resolution 845 (1993)\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 845 (1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n 527\n S/25968.\n 528\n S/25892.\n\n\n 345\n"
[346] " The Security Council,\n Recalling its resolution 817 (1993) of 7 April 1993, in which it urged Greece and the\n former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to continue to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen of\n the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in order to\n arrive at a speedy settlement of their difference,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 28 May and 3 June 1993\n submitted pursuant to resolution 817 (1993), together with the statement of the Government\n of Greece and the letter of the President of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia dated\n 27 and 29 May 1993, respectively, annexed thereto,\n 1. Expresses its appreciation to the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\n International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia for their efforts, and commends to the\n parties as a sound basis for the settlement of their difference the proposals set forth in annex\n V to the report of the Secretary-General;\n 2. Urges the parties to continue their efforts under the auspices of the Secretary-General\n to arrive at a speedy settlement of the remaining issues between them;\n 3. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed on the progress of these\n further efforts, the objective of which is to resolve the difference between the two parties\n before the commencement of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, and to report\n to the Council on their outcome in good time, and decides to resume consideration of the\n matter in the light of the report.\n\n\nDecision of 15 July 1993: letter from the President\n\n\n 529\n By a letter dated 13 July 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General reported that Mr. Cyrus Vance, the former Co-Chairman\nof the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,\nhad accepted his request to continue his good offices to help the parties reach an\nagreement. Mr. Vance would begin his assignment on 1 August 1993. The Secretary-\nGeneral hoped, as stated in resolution 845 (1993), that it would be possible to resolve the\n\n\n\n 529\n S/26088.\n\n\n 346\n"
[347] "difference between the parties before the commencement of the forty-eight session of the\nGeneral Assembly.\n\n\n By a letter 530 dated 15 July 1993, the President of the Security Council informed\nthe Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n “The members of the Council thank you for your letter of 13 July 1993 concerning\n Security Council resolution 845 (1993) and welcome the acceptance by Mr. Cyrus Vance of\n your invitation to continue his good offices with the objective of helping the parties to resolve\n the difference between them before the commencement of the forty-eighth session of the\n General Assembly.”\n\n\n Decision of 11 April 1994: letter from the President\n\n\n\n By a letter 531 dated 31 March 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General updated the Council on the progress of further efforts\nunder his auspices in relation to the difference between Greece and the Former Yugoslav\nRepublic of Macedonia. He reported that the parties had met separately with Mr. Vance\nin Geneva on 10 March 1994. Mr. Vance had told both parties that the situation had\nincreased in gravity, and that time had been of the essence in reaching an agreement. In\norder to help the parties to find common ground, he had submitted a draft accord\nconfirming the existing common frontier as an inviolable international border and\nestablishing measures for confidence-building, friendship and neighbourly cooperation,\nbased in substantial part on the draft treaty. Having expressed preliminary views on the\ndraft, the parties had agreed that Mr. Vance should continue to assist them to reach a\nsettlement on the remaining issues.\n By a letter 532 dated 11 April 1994, the President of the Security Council informed\nthe Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n 530\n S/26089.\n 531\n S/1994/376.\n 532\n S/1994/415.\n\n\n 347\n"
[348] " \"The members of the Security Council have considered your letter of 31 March 1994 in\n which you advised the Council of the progress of further efforts, under your auspices, in\n relation to the difference between Greece and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.\n \"The members of the Council have asked me to convey to you their support for your\n efforts and those of your Special Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance, and their hope that both parties\n will cooperate fully with you and Mr. Vance to resolve the difference between them.\n \"The members of the Council request you to keep them fully informed of developments.\"\n\n\n\nDecision of 7 June 1994: letter from the President\n\n\n On 27 May 1994, pursuant to resolution 845 (1993), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted an interim report 533 on the progress of further efforts taken under his auspices\nby his Special Envoy to resolve the difference between the Governments of Greece and\nthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. He reported that his Special Envoy had\nheld two series of discussions with the parties, with the aim of reaching an agreement on\na draft interim accord. The draft interim accord was a condensation of the draft accord\nwhich Mr. Vance had given the parties on 10 March 1994. It addressed a limited number\nof issues, including the question of the frontier between the parties, the interpretation of\nthe Constitution of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the question of “hostile\nactivities and propaganda”, and the “countermeasures” adopted by Greece. The other\nissues would be left to a second phase. However, it had still not been possible to reach\nagreement on all points. The parties had therefore agreed to participate in further talks,\nunder the auspices of the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy, around 13 June 1994.\n\n\n 534\n By a letter dated 7 June 1994, the President of the Security Council informed\nthe Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n\n\n 533\n S/1994/632.\n 534\n S/1994/679.\n\n\n 348\n"
[349] " \"The members of the Security Council have considered your report of 27 May 1994\n pursuant to resolution 845 (1993) concerning the difference between Greece and the Former\n Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.\n \"The members of the Council have asked me to convey to you their appreciation for your\n efforts and those of your Special Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance. They welcome the steps taken so\n far under your auspices and support your intention to proceed with further discussions as\n expeditiously as possible. They welcome the fact that both parties have agreed to take part in\n further talks at the Minister for Foreign Affairs level on or about 13 June 1994. They urge\n both parties to cooperate fully with you and Mr. Vance in order to reach agreement on\n outstanding issues as soon as possible.\n \"The members of the Council welcome your intention to report further on the substance\n of Mr. Vance's discussions after his meetings with the parties in June.\"\n\n\n\nDecision of 17 August 1994: letter from the President\n\n\n\n By a letter 535 dated 5 August 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General informed the Council on the progress of further efforts\nunder his auspices, in relation to the difference between Greece and the former Yugoslav\nRepublic of Macedonia. The talks planned for 13 June 1994 had been delayed, for\nreasons beyond the control of the parties. Instead, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-\nGeneral had met separately with both parties between 10 and 13 July 1994, and had\ndiscussed with them the issue of the name. Both parties had agreed to resume discussions\nwith the Special Envoy in the autumn. The Secretary-General himself had met with the\nForeign Minister of Greece on 12 July, and with the Foreign Minister of the former\nYugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 13 July 1994. He had emphasized to both parties his\nconcern that they reach an early agreement on a solution to their difference. Both\nMinisters had confirmed their Government’s desire to continue with the discussions\nunder his auspices and had expressly stated their strong preference that Mr. Vance should\ncontinue his mission of good offices.\n\n\n\n 535\n S/1994/978.\n\n\n 349\n"
[350] " By a letter 536 dated 17 August 1994, the President of the Security Council\ninformed the Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n \"The members of the Security Council have considered your letter of 5 August 1994\n pursuant to resolution 845 (1993) concerning the difference between Greece and the Former\n Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.\n \"The members of the Council have asked me to convey to you their continuing\n appreciation for your efforts and those of your Special Envoy, Mr. Cyrus Vance. They note\n that at the latest round of discussions both parties thoroughly reviewed a number of proposals\n addressing the principal difference of substance, the name.\n \"The members of the Council expressed some concern that, in spite of several rounds of\n discussions between the parties following the adoption of resolution 845 (1993) on 18 June\n 1993, the principal difference of substance - the name - remains unresolved. They were also\n concerned at the possible consequences that continuation of the current situation might have\n for the maintenance of peace and stability in the region. They fully shared the views you\n expressed on 12 and 13 July to the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Greece and the Former\n Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia that the parties should reach an early agreement on a\n solution to the difference between them.\n \"The members of the Council welcome the desire of both parties to continue with\n discussions under your auspices, and their commitment to resume those discussions with Mr.\n Vance this autumn. They call upon both parties to cooperate fully with you and Mr. Vance in\n order to reach agreement on outstanding issues as soon as possible.\"\n\n\n\nDecision of 15 September 1995 (3579th meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n 537\n By a letter dated 13 September 1995 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General informed the Council that the Foreign Ministers of Greece\nand the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia had signed a wide-ranging interim\n\n\n\n\n 536\n S/1994/979.\n 537\n S/1995/794.\n\n\n 350\n"
[351] "accord 538 that day at United Nations Headquarters in New York, in the presence of both\nhim and Mr. Vance. Article 5 of the accord provided, inter alia, that the Parties would\ncontinue negotiations, under the auspices of the Secretary-General and pursuant to\nresolutions 817 (1993) and 845 (1993), to resolve the difference between them with\nrespect to the name of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.\n\n\n At its 3579th meeting, on 15 September 1995, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the item and included in its agenda the sub-item “Interim Accord\nbetween Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. Following the\nadoption of the agenda, the President (Italy) stated that, after consultations among\nmembers of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following\n 539\nstatement on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council welcomes the signing of the Interim Accord between Greece and\n the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and looks forward to the establishment of a new\n relationship between the parties based on international law and peaceful, friendly relations.\n The Council believes the Accord will promote the strengthening of stability in the region.\n \"The Council commends both parties, the Secretary-General, the Special Envoy of the\n Secretary-General, Mr. Cyrus Vance, and the United States envoy, Mr. Matthew Nimetz, for\n their efforts in bringing about this important achievement, pursuant to Council resolutions\n 817 (1993) and 845 (1993). The Council encourages them to continue their efforts to resolve\n the remaining differences between the parties and urges the parties to implement fully the\n Interim Accord.\"\n\n\n\n\n 538\n See Ibid, Annex I.\n 539\n S/PRST/1995/46.\n\n\n 351\n"
[352] " The situation in the former Yugoslavia\n\n\n INITIAL PROCEEDINGS\n\n\n\n\nDecision of 6 October 1995 (3585th meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n At its 3585th meeting, on 6 October 1995, the Council included the item entitled\n“The situation in the former Yugoslavia” in its agenda. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at\ntheir request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.\n\n\n The President (Nigeria) then stated that, after consultations among members of\nthe Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement 540 on\nbehalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council welcomes the 5 October 1995 agreement by the Bosnian parties to\n a ceasefire, including the agreement to terminate all hostile military activities throughout the\n territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as of 10 October 1995, provided that\n full gas and electrical utility service is restored to Sarajevo. It welcomes all efforts to restore\n such service and calls upon the parties to cooperate fully with such efforts. The Council\n urges the parties fully to comply with all provisions in the ceasefire agreement once they\n come into effect.\n \"The Council also welcomes the decision of the Governments of the Republic of Bosnia\n and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia\n and Montenegro) to attend proximity peace talks by the end of this month, to be followed by\n a peace conference. It reiterates that there can be no military solution to the conflict in the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and strongly urges the parties to negotiate in good faith\n on the basis of the Agreed Basic Principles signed at Geneva on 8 September 1995, and the\n Further Agreed Principles of 26 September 1995.\n\n\n 540\n S/PRST/1995/50.\n\n\n 352\n"
[353] " \"The Council also welcomes the agreement of 3 October 1995 by the Government of the\n Republic of Croatia and the local Croatian Serb authorities in Eastern Slavonia to guiding\n basic principles for negotiations. It strongly urges both parties to negotiate in good faith\n towards a peaceful final settlement to the conflict consistent with the Council's resolutions.\"\n\n\nDecision of 9 November 1995 (3591st meeting): resolution 1019 (1995)\n\n\n At its 3591st meeting, on 9 November 1995, the Council resumed its consideration\nof the situation in the former Yugoslavia. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\nCouncil invited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The Council also invited\nMr. Vladislav Jovanovic, at his request, to take a seat at the side of the Council chamber.\n\n\n The President (Oman) then drew the attention of the Council members to the text\nof a draft resolution 541 submitted by Argentina, the Czech Republic, France, Germany,\nItaly, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. He also drew\nthe attention of the Council members to a letter 542 dated 31 October 1995 in which the\nPresident of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for\nSerious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the\nFormer Yugoslavia informed the President of the Council that an indictment against an\nindividual named Dragan Nikolić had been issued on 4 November 1994, and that the\nTribunal had requested that both the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the\nBosnian Serb administration issue a warrant for his arrest. The Government of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina had indicated that Mr. Nikolić was residing in territory outside their\ncontrol, but the Bosnian Serb administration had not responded to the Tribunal’s request.\nThe letter noted that, under Article 29 of the Statute of the Tribunal, States were\nobligated to cooperate with the Tribunal. It also recalled that, in resolution 771 (1992),\nthe Council had decided, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, that all parties in the\nformer Yugoslavia, and all military forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, should comply\n\n 541\n S/1995/940.\n 542\n S/1995/910.\n\n\n 353\n"
[354] "with the resolution, failing which the Council would need to take further measures under\nthe Charter. The letter further noted that, in order for the Tribunal to succeed in its\nmandate of prosecuting serious violations of international humanitarian law, all States in\nthe region – including self-proclaimed entities de facto exercising governmental functions\n– must comply with their legal obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of Germany recalled that his\ndelegation had taken the initiative in October for another attempt to establish the fate and\nthe whereabouts of the missing Bosnian men from Srebrenica, Zepa and the Banja Luka\narea. That initiative had led to the draft resolution before the Council. Noting that the\ndraft resolution also addressed the human rights situation in Croatia, the speaker stated\nthat, while his delegation was deeply concerned about the situation in Croatia, it was also\naware of the different qualitative and quantitative dimensions of the violations of\ninternational humanitarian law and human rights committed by the Bosnian Serbs. He\npointed out that the Croatian side had consistently granted access to human rights\nobservers to the Krajina region, whereas the Bosnian Serbs had systematically blocked all\naccess to the Bosnian Serb sites in question. That attitude had led to the formal request\nfrom the President of the Tribunal for the Security Council to consider further measures\nto achieve cooperation by the Bosnian Serbs with the Tribunal. Germany felt that there\nwas an urgent need for the Council to react to the strong indications of war crimes and to\nprevent further human rights violations in the area. It welcomed the request in the draft\nresolution to the Secretary-General to submit a written report on recent violations of\ninternational humanitarian law in Srebrenica, Zepa and the wider Banja Luka area as such\na report would provide a solid base of information upon which the Security Council could\n 543\nact.\n\n\n The representative of China stated that, as the main purpose of the draft resolution\nwas to call for the early settlement of the questions regarding persons detained or\nreported missing, his delegation would vote in favour of it. He argued, however, that each\n\n\n 543\n S/PV.3591, pp. 2-3.\n\n\n 354\n"
[355] "United Nations body had its own responsibilities and functions and should act\naccordingly to fulfil its own mandate, as set forth in the Charter. The Security Council\nshould not, in principle, deal with questions of human rights. Moreover, the Council\nshould refrain from involving itself in the Tribunal’s work, as the Tribunal had its own\nexplicit provisions for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of\ninternational humanitarian law. The Chinese delegation therefore had reservations with\n 544\nregard to the relevant portions of the draft resolution.\n\n\n The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the draft resolution\nunderlined the importance the Council attached to the highest respect for human rights\nand international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, making it clear that there\nwere no exceptions and that all parties must comply with their obligations. Against that\nbackground, however, it was right that the Council should address three recent and\ndeeply disturbing events: the disappearance of large numbers of civilians following the\nfall of Srebrenica and Zepa to Bosnian Serb forces; the brutal campaign of “ethnic\ncleansing” in the Banja Luka region; and systematic violations of the rights of Croatian\nSerbs in the Krajinas. The speaker reminded the parties of their obligation to cooperate\nfully with the work of the Tribunal, calling on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n(Serbia and Montenegro) to facilitate the establishment of an office of the Tribunal in that\ncountry without delay, and on the Bosnian Serbs to comply with the Tribunal’s orders\n 545\nand decisions.\n\n\n The representative of Botswana expressed the strong disquiet of his delegation at\nthe reported incidents of human rights violations perpetrated by the Bosnian Serbs and\ninsisted that they abide by the resolutions of the Council, and cooperate fully with the\nICRC and other international humanitarian organizations. Against that background\nBotswana would vote in favour of the draft resolution. The speaker noted, however, that\nwhile it was almost impossible to draw a line between the political and human rights\naspects of the war in Bosnia, it was important that the Security Council guard against the\n\n 544\n Ibid., p. 4.\n 545\n Ibid., p. 5.\n\n\n 355\n"
[356] "possibility of infringing on the responsibility of the competent bodies of the United\nNations, especially the International Tribunal. It was also important that the temptation to\npoliticize human rights be avoided. Botswana believed that all human rights violations in\nBosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia should be investigated and those found responsible\n 546\nshould be brought to justice.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation strongly supported the draft\nresolution’s condemnation of all violations of international humanitarian law and human\nrights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, regardless of who committed them.\nRussia was seriously concerned by reports on violations of international humanitarian\nlaw in Srebrenica and Zepa, as well as by the fact that representatives of UNHCR and the\nICRC had still not been allowed access to the regions where those violations were\nthought to have occurred. The wording of the draft resolution in that respect was “tough\nbut fair”, whilst setting out clearly the Council’s conviction that there must not be a\nselective approach to the protection of human rights in the former Yugoslavia. Before\nconcluding, the speaker noted that Russia supported the demand to all States and parties\nin the former Yugoslavia to cooperate with the Tribunal, and confirmed his delegation’s\nposition with regard to the inadmissibility of the use of the Tribunal’s activities to\n“demonize” any parties to the conflict. He argued that it was the task of the Tribunal to\nelucidate the truth and to punish appropriately those specific persons whose guilt of\ncrimes against humanity had been established, regardless of their ethnic or religious\n 547\naffiliation.\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 1019 (1995). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its earlier resolutions on the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina, and reaffirming its resolutions 1004 (1995) of 12 July 1995 and 1010 (1995) of\n\n\n 546\n Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n 547\n Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n\n\n 356\n"
[357] "10 August 1995 and the statements by its President of 7 September 1995 and\n12 October 1995, and deeply concerned that, despite repeated calls that it should do so, the\nBosnian Serb party has not complied with the demands contained therein,\n Gravely concerned at reports, including by the representative of the Secretary-General, of\ngrave violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights in and around\nSrebrenica and in the areas of Banja Luka and Sanski Most, including reports of mass\nmurder, unlawful detention and forced labour, rape, and deportation of civilians,\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions on the situation in the Republic of Croatia,\nand reaffirming its resolution 1009 (1995) of 10 August 1995 and the statements by its\nPresident of 7 September 1995, and 3 October 1995,\n Deeply concerned at reports, including by the United Nations Confidence Restoration\nOperation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO, and United Nations humanitarian agencies,\nof serious violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights in the former\nSectors West, North, and South, in the Republic of Croatia, including burning of houses,\nlooting of property, and killings of civilians,\n Reiterating its strong support for the efforts of the International Committee of the Red\nCross in seeking access to displaced persons and to persons detained or reported missing, and\ncondemning in the strongest possible terms the failure of the Bosnian Serb party to comply\nwith its commitments in respect of such access,\n Commending the efforts of the United Nations Peace Forces and other United Nations\npersonnel in the former Yugoslavia, in particular in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\ndespite extreme difficulties,\n Taking note of the letter dated 31 October 1995 to the President of the Security Council\nfrom the President of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible\nfor Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the\nformer Yugoslavia since 1991, established pursuant to resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993,\n Expressing its strong support for the work of the International Tribunal,\n 1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms all violations of international humanitarian\nlaw and of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and demands that all\nconcerned comply fully with their obligations in this regard;\n 2. Reaffirms its demand that the Bosnian Serb party give representatives of the United\nNations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross and\nother international agencies immediate and unimpeded access to persons displaced and to\npersons detained or reported missing from Srebrenica, Zepa and the regions of Banja Luka\n\n\n 357\n"
[358] "and Sanski Most who are within the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under\nthe control of Bosnian Serb forces and that the Bosnian Serb party permit representatives of\nthe International Committee of the Red Cross (a) to visit and register any persons detained\nagainst their will, whether civilians or members of the forces of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, and (b) to have access to any site it may deem important;\n 3. Also reaffirms its demand that the Bosnian Serb party respect fully the rights of all\nsuch persons, ensure their safety and release them immediately;\n 4. Reaffirms the obligation of all the parties to ensure the complete freedom of movement\nof personnel of the United Nations and other relevant international organizations throughout\nthe territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at all times;\n 5. Demands that all detention camps throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina be immediately closed;\n 6. Reaffirms its demand that the Government of the Republic of Croatia take urgent\nmeasures to put an end to violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights\nand investigate all reports of such violations so that those responsible in respect of such acts\nmay be judged and punished;\n 7. Reiterates its demand that the Government of the Republic of Croatia respect fully the\nrights of the local Serb population, including their right to remain or return in safety, and\nreiterates also its call upon the Government of the Republic of Croatia to lift any time-limits\nplaced on the return of refugees to Croatia to reclaim their property;\n 8. Demands that all States, in particular those in the region of the former Yugoslavia, and\nall parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia comply fully and in good faith with the\nobligations contained in paragraph 4 of resolution 827 (1993) to cooperate fully with the\nInternational Tribunal established pursuant to that resolution, including by providing access\nto individuals and sites the Tribunal deems important for its investigations and by complying\nwith requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under article 29 of the statute\nof the Tribunal, and calls upon them to allow the establishment of offices of the Tribunal;\n 9. Demands that all parties, and in particular the Bosnian Serb party, refrain from any\naction intended to destroy, alter, conceal, or damage any evidence of violations of\ninternational humanitarian law and that they preserve such evidence;\n 10. Reaffirms its support for the actions of the United Nations Peace Forces and other\nUnited Nations personnel, including the great importance of their contribution in the\nhumanitarian field, and demands that all parties fully ensure their safety and cooperate fully\nwith them;\n\n\n 358\n"
[359] " 11. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council as soon as possible a written\n report based on all information available to the United Nations concerning recent violations\n of international humanitarian law in the areas of Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sanski\n Most;\n 12. Also requests the Secretary-General to continue to inform the Council on a regular\n basis of measures taken by the Government of the Republic of Croatia to implement\n resolution 1009 (1995) and the present resolution;\n 13. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United States stressed that the\nBosnian Serb side must allow access to the sites and individuals which the Tribunal\ndeemed important for its investigations and that it must grant international agencies\naccess to the refugees displaced from the regions. He also stated that the authorities in\nBelgrade should allow the Tribunal to establish an office in Belgrade. His Government\nalso strongly believed that the Croatian Government must take steps to ensure that the\nrights of all its citizens were respected, whether they were Croats or Serbs. The US\nGovernment recognized that all violations of human rights were deplorable. It was also\nnecessary, however, to recognize the differences in the circumstances and magnitude of\ncrimes. The murder of large numbers of civilians by Bosnian Serb forces had not been the\nact of a few individuals acting alone. The systematic and apparently planned nature of the\n 548\natrocities was evidence of an active and “astonishingly brutal” Bosnian Serb policy.\n\n\nDecisions of 22 November 1995 (3595th meeting): resolutions 1021 (1995) and 1022\n(1995)\n\n\n At its 3595th meeting, on 22 November 1995, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Egypt,\nIran, Japan, Malaysia, Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia,\nSpain, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey and Ukraine, at their\n\n 548\n Ibid., pp. 12-13.\n\n\n 359\n"
[360] "request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The Council also invited\nMr. Vladislav Jovanovic, at his request, to address it in the course of the subsequent\ndiscussion.\n\n\n The President (Oman) then drew the attention of the Council members to the\ntexts of two draft resolutions. The first draft resolution 549 had been submitted by\nArgentina, France, Germany, Honduras, Indonesia, Italy, Oman, Rwanda, the United\nKingdom and the United States, and the second draft resolution 550 by Argentina, the\nCzech Republic, France, Germany, Honduras, Italy, the Russian Federation, Rwanda, the\nUnited Kingdom and the United States. The President then drew the attention of the\nmembers of the Council to a letter 551 dated 20 November 1995 from the representative of\nthe former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia addressed to the Secretary-General,\ntransmitting a letter of the same date from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the former\nYugoslav Republic of Macedonia.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom welcomed the\nPeace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been endorsed by the parties\nthe previous day at Dayton, Ohio. The speaker argued that the existence of the Peace\nAgreement was “the clearest possible vindication” of the Council’s use of economic\nsanctions to bring about change. It was therefore right that the Council should reward\nBelgrade’s contribution to the successful outcome of the Dayton negotiations by granting\nsubstantial sanctions relief. He cautioned, however, that the Council was giving a\nconditional reward. The draft resolutions before the Council held out the prospect of the\npermanent removal of sanctions, once the Agreement had been implemented and free and\nfair elections had been held. It also provided that sanctions relief could be retracted if\nthere was a failure to cooperate in the implementation of the Agreement. In addition, the\ndraft resolutions did not prejudice the complex issue of succession to the former Socialist\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia, providing that frozen assets subject to claims by any of\n\n\n 549\n S/1995/977.\n 550\n S/1995/978.\n 551\n S/1995/972.\n\n\n 360\n"
[361] "the successor States should remain frozen until such claims had been resolved. In that\ncontext, the British Government would when implementing the resolution interpret the\nreference to “claims” as meaning those raised in the current legal proceedings. The\nspeaker further argued that the Council was also right to allow a phased lifting of the\narms embargo, in the context of the implementation of the Peace Agreement and given\nthe shared interest of all the States in the region in concluding regional arms controls\narrangements. There could be no doubt that both the economic sanctions and the arms\nembargo had played an important part in containing the conflict and persuading the\nparties to negotiate in earnest. Finally, the draft resolutions referred only briefly to one\nvery important aspect of the Council’s policy towards the situation in Bosnia, namely the\nwork of the International Tribunal. It was as important as ever that all sides cooperate\nfully with the Tribunal, as the process of rebuilding a war-torn society required not just\nreconciliation, but also justice. No Government should suppose that it was at liberty to\n 552\nobstruct the Tribunal’s work.\n\n\n The representative of Germany stated that the draft resolutions before the Council\nmarked the first step in the implementation of the Peace Agreement. Noting that the arms\nembargo, which had not always been easy to reconcile with Article 51 of the Charter as it\nhad simultaneously covered both attacker and defender, would be lifted in three phases,\nthe speaker contended that both the arms embargo and the economic sanctions had\nproved to be important in the peace process. The German delegation shared the view that\nthe sanctions régime had essentially been effective. The speaker expressed the hope that\nthe “defreezing” of funds and assets that could be allocated to the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia, would enable it to re-establish trade links and commerce with other countries\nas soon as the sanctions had been suspended. He noted, however, that the draft resolution\nrequested that assets and funds subject to third-party claims should remain impounded or\nfrozen. Germany urged the successor States to seek agreement on disputed assets, funds\nand liabilities as soon as possible, so that they could be released and therefore contribute\nto the positive development of the economy in the countries concerned and the region as\n\n\n 552\n S/PV.3595, pp. 2-4.\n\n\n 361\n"
[362] "a whole. Germany also stressed the importance of achieving substantial arms control\nagreements, as outlined in Annex 1B of the Dayton Agreement, to offset the danger that\n 553\nthe lifting of the arms embargo might trigger a new regional arms race.\n\n\n The representative of Indonesia expressed the hope that the parties would make\nthe Peace Agreement work and that that Agreement would lead to the achievement of the\nultimate goal not only of preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single State under\ninternational law, but also of preserving the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina as one\nnation. Recalling that his delegation had consistently called on the Council to pronounce\nitself unequivocally on the non-applicability of resolution 713 (1991) to Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, he contended that the arms embargo had had the unintended effect of\nfreezing the advantage in weapons in favour of the Bosnian Serbs, thus denying Bosnia\nand Herzegovina the right to defend itself, as enshrined in the Charter. Long-term\nsecurity could only be realized through confidence-building measures rather than by a\nmassive arms build-up undertaken to compensate for perceived vulnerability and\ninsecurity. The international community therefore needed to encourage mutual\nconfidence and trust among the parties in the former Yugoslavia, and Indonesia hoped\nthat the Agreement on Regional Stabilization, set out in Annex 1B of the Dayton\nAgreement, would contribute to peace and security in the region. The speaker\nacknowledged the limitations of sanctions as an instrument to maintain or restore\ninternational security. Nevertheless, Indonesia believed that the Council had succeeded in\nclearly defining the objectives of the sanctions. The sanctions had not been punitive\nmeasures designed to inflict hardship on the people of the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia, but rather had been intended to encourage Belgrade to modify its policy by\nplaying a constructive role in the peace process. Indonesia welcomed the more positive\nrole that had been played recently by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and hence\ndeemed it appropriate for the Council to suspend the sanctions. Nevertheless, it\nemphasized that the continuation of the suspension of sanctions was contingent upon the\nfulfilment by the Bosnian Serbs of their obligations under the Peace Agreement. With\n\n\n 553\n Ibid., pp. 4-5.\n\n\n 362\n"
[363] "regard to the provisions contained in the draft resolution relating to funds and assets\nfrozen or impounded by Security Council’s resolutions, his delegation cautioned that\nfounds or assets should not be unfrozen prematurely, as hasty action might preempt a\nconsensual agreement among the successor States as to the disposition of such funds and\n 554\nassets.\n\n\n The representative of China stated that his delegation was of the view that any\naction by the Council should contribute to, rather than undermine, the consolidation of\nthe negotiation results. China feared that lifting the arms embargo at that stage might\nhave an adverse impact on peace and stability in the region. Furthermore, China had\nnever favoured exerting pressure by means of sanctions in the former Yugoslavia. It\nsupported the early lifting of the sanctions, believing that the international community\nshould acknowledge the efforts made by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to promote\nthe Bosnian peace process. The speaker contended that it was inappropriate to link the\nlifting of sanctions with the holding of elections in Bosnia, as it would set a bad\nprecedent. His delegation therefore expressed serious reservations. He also argued that\nthe status of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations should be\nreconsidered, once all parties had signed the Peace Agreement. The Chinese delegation\nwould vote in favour of the two draft resolutions, however, based on its position of\n 555\nsupporting the peaceful settlement of the question of the former Yugoslavia.\n\n\n The representative of Nigeria expressed the hope that none of the parties would\nview the lifting of the arms embargo as a license to relaunch any military campaign.\nRather, Nigeria hoped that the termination of the embargo would play a positive and\nreassuring role, by ensuring that all States of the region had the means to defend their\nsovereignty and territorial integrity. The speaker further stated that the suspension of the\nsanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was consistent with his delegation’s\nbelief that sanctions should not be punitive, but should be designed to modify the\nbehaviour of Governments. Nigeria hoped that such a flexible approach to sanctions\n\n 554\n Ibid., pp. 5-7.\n 555\n Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n\n\n 363\n"
[364] "would be applied to other sanctions régimes, as objective conditions on the ground\nchanged. 556\n\n\n The representative of the Czech Republic noted that the draft resolution easing the\nsanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia left open the possibility for\nreversing the suspension should the subjects of the sanctions fail to take the steps\nanticipated of them in Dayton. Noting that the draft resolution mentioned, in the\npreamble but not in the operative section of the draft, compliance with requests and\norders of the International Tribunal as an essential aspect of implementing the Peace\nAgreement, he warned against interpreting that fact as diminishing its importance.\nIndividual responsibility, established by and punished by the International Tribunal, was\nnecessary not only for justice to be done, but also to prevent the emergence in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina of a culture of impunity. The speaker further noted that one of the difficult\nissues among the south Slav States was the matter of succession. In that regard, the draft\nresolution rightly stressed the need for successors to the former Socialist Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia to reach agreements on the distribution of funds and assets. He\nalso observed that his Government was uncertain about the wisdom of lifting the arms\nembargo at a time when the implementation force would be deployed in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina. The Czech Republic was concerned about the potential for suffering\n 557\ncasualties as a result of a fresh inflow of weapons into Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation noted that his delegation attached\nparticular importance to the fact that, immediately after the initialing of the Dayton\nAgreement, the provision of the draft resolution relating to the indefinite suspension of\nthe sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian Serbs should\ncome into operation. Russia believed that the conclusion of the “economic blockade”\nagainst Yugoslavia was timely, as the humanitarian crisis there had worsened\nconsiderably over the preceding few months and required immediate steps. The speaker\nfurther observed that the draft resolution was a balanced document which envisaged\n\n 556\n Ibid., pp. 8-9.\n 557\n Ibid., pp. 9-10.\n\n\n 364\n"
[365] "various situations, including the possibility of the reintroduction of sanctions, should\nthere be any gross violation of the commitments made under the Peace Agreement. He\nnoted in that regard, that the Security Council would decide whether such violations were\ntaking place, based upon reports arising from joint consultations of senior leaders of the\ninternational military and civilian structures in Bosnia. Referring to the draft resolution\non the lifting of the arms embargo, the speaker noted that his country had serious doubts,\neven though the draft had certain merits, including an even approach to all the parties and\nthe fact that the Security Council would be exercising control over measures to prevent\nan arms race in the region. Nevertheless, neither the spirit nor the letter of the text of the\ndraft was in harmony with the logic of the political process, which aimed to end military\nconfrontation in the region. Russia was in favour not of an arms build-up in the region,\nbut of restriction and reduction of arms. Furthermore, it would have preferred the draft to\nprovide for a more clear-cut mechanism that would operate in the event that the peace\nprocess was derailed. Of particular importance in that connection would be the reports\nfrom the Secretary-General to the Council that the parties were in fact fulfiling their\nobligations on arms limitation. Nevertheless, in view of the fact that the first draft\nresolution was an integral part of the Dayton Agreement package, Russia would abstain\n 558\nin the voting.\n\n\n The first draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted by 14 votes\nto none, with one abstention (Russian Federation), as resolution 1021 (1995). The\nresolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions concerning the conflicts in the former\n Yugoslavia, and in particular its resolutions 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and 727 (1992)\n of 8 January 1992,\n Reaffirming its commitment to a negotiated political settlement of the conflicts in the\n former Yugoslavia, preserving the territorial integrity of all States there within their\n internationally recognized borders,\n\n\n 558\n Ibid., pp. 11-13.\n\n\n 365\n"
[366] " Welcoming the initialling of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina and the annexes thereto (collectively the “Peace Agreement”) by the Republic\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nand the other parties thereto on 21 November 1995 at Dayton, Ohio, signifying agreement\nbetween the parties to sign formally the Peace Agreement,\n Welcoming also the commitments of the parties set out in annex 1B (Agreement on\nRegional Stabilization) of the Peace Agreement,\n Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to\ninternational peace and security,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Decides that the embargo on deliveries of weapons and military equipment imposed by\nresolution 713 (1991) shall be terminated as follows, beginning from the day the Secretary-\nGeneral submits to the Council a report stating that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nthe Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have formally signed the\nPeace Agreement:\n (a) During the first ninety days following the submission of such a report, all the\nprovisions of the embargo shall remain in place;\n (b) During the second ninety days following the submission of such a report, all\nprovisions of the arms embargo shall be terminated, except that the delivery of heavy\nweapons (as defined in the Peace Agreement), ammunition therefore, mines, military aircraft\nand helicopters shall continue to be prohibited until the arms control agreement referred to in\nannex 1B has taken effect; and\n (c) After the one hundred and eightieth day following the submission of such a report and\nafter the submission of a report from the Secretary-General on the implementation of\nannex 1B as agreed by the parties, all provisions of the arms embargo terminate unless the\nCouncil decides otherwise;\n 2. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare in a timely way and to submit to the Council\nthe reports referred to in paragraph 1 above;\n 3. Maintains its commitment to progressive measures for regional stability and arms\ncontrol and, if the situation requires, to consider further action;\n 4. Requests the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution\n724 (1991) to review and to amend its guidelines in the light of the provisions of the present\nresolution;\n 5. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n 366\n"
[367] " The second draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted\nunanimously as resolution 1022 (1995). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions concerning the conflicts in the former\n Yugoslavia,\n Reaffirming its commitment to a negotiated political settlement of the conflicts in the\n former Yugoslavia, preserving the territorial integrity of all States there within their\n internationally recognized borders,\n Commending the efforts of the international community, including those of the Contact\n Group, to assist the parties in reaching a settlement,\n Praising the decision of the Governments of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the\n Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to attend and participate\n constructively in proximity talks in the United States of America, and acknowledging with\n appreciation the efforts made by these Governments to reach a lasting peace settlement in\n Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Welcoming the initialling of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and\n Herzegovina and the annexes thereto (collectively the “Peace Agreement”) by the Republic\n of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n and the other parties thereto on 21 November 1995 at Dayton, Ohio, signifying agreement\n between the parties to sign formally the Peace Agreement,\n Taking note of the Concluding Statement issued at the adjournment of the proximity\n talks, in which all parties undertook, inter alia, to assist in locating the two French pilots\n missing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to ensure their immediate and safe return,\n Stressing the need for all parties to comply fully with all provisions of the Peace\n Agreement,\n Noting that compliance with the requests and orders of the International Tribunal for the\n Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law\n Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 constitutes an essential\n aspect of implementing the Peace Agreement,\n Recognizing the interests of all States in the implementation of the suspension and\n subsequent termination of measures imposed by the Council and, in particular, the interests of\n the successor States to the State formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of\n\n 367\n"
[368] "Yugoslavia, with respect to the disposition of assets affected by the fact that that State has\nceased to exist, and the desirability of accelerating the process now under way under the\nauspices of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to reach a consensual\nagreement among the successor States as to the disposition of such assets,\n Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to\ninternational peace and security,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Decides that the measures imposed by or reaffirmed in resolutions 757 (1992) of 30\nMay 1992, 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992, 820 (1993) of 17 April 1993, 942 (1994) and\n943 (1994) of 23 September 1994, 988 (1995) of 21 April 1995, 992 (1995) of 11 May 1995,\n1003 (1995) of 5 July 1995 and 1015 (1995) of 15 September 1995 are suspended indefinitely\nwith immediate effect subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 to 5 below, and provided that,\nif the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has\nfailed formally to sign the Peace Agreement on the date announced by the Contact Group for\nsuch purpose and that the other parties thereto have expressed their readiness so to sign, the\nmeasures described above shall be automatically reimposed from the fifth day following the\ndate of such report;\n 2. Decides also that the suspension referred to in paragraph 1 above shall not apply to the\nmeasures imposed on the Bosnian Serb party until the day after the commander of the\ninternational force to be deployed in accordance with the Peace Agreement, on the basis of a\nreport transmitted through the appropriate political authorities, informs the Council through\nthe Secretary-General that all Bosnian Serb forces have withdrawn behind the zones of\nseparation established in the Peace Agreement, and urges all parties concerned to take all\nnecessary measures to assist in locating the two French pilots mission in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, and to ensure their immediate and safe return;\n 3. Decides further that if at any time, with regard to a matter within the scope of their\nrespective mandates and after joint consultation if appropriate, either the High Representative\ndescribed in the Peace Agreement, or the commander of the international force to be\ndeployed in accordance with the Peace Agreement, on the basis of a report transmitted\nthrough the appropriate political authorities, informs the Council through the Secretary-\nGeneral that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or the Bosnian Serb authorities are failing\nsignificantly to meet their obligations under the Peace Agreement, the suspension referred to\nin paragraph 1 above shall terminate on the fifth day following the Council's receipt of such a\n\n\n\n\n 368\n"
[369] "report, unless the Council decides otherwise taking into consideration the nature of the non-\ncompliance;\n 4. Decides that it will terminate the measures described in paragraph 1 above on the tenth\nday following the occurrence of the first free and fair elections provided for in annex 3 of the\nPeace Agreement, provided that the Bosnian Serb forces have withdrawn from, and have\ncontinued to respect, the zones of separation as provided in the Peace Agreement;\n 5. Decides also that, so long as the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above remain\nsuspended, or are terminated by a subsequent Council decision in accordance with paragraph\n4 above, all funds and assets previously frozen or impounded pursuant to resolutions\n757 (1992) and 820 (1993) may be released by States in accordance with law, provided that\nany such funds and assets that are subject to any claims, liens, judgements or encumbrances,\nor which are the funds or assets of any person, partnership, corporation or other entity found\nor deemed insolvent under law or the accounting principles prevailing in such State, shall\nremain frozen or impounded until released in accordance with applicable law, and decides\nfurther that obligations of States related to freezing or impounding funds and assets contained\nin such resolutions shall be suspended pursuant to paragraph 1 above with respect to all funds\nand assets not currently frozen or impounded until the measures concerned are terminated by\na subsequent Council decision;\n 6. Decides further that the suspension or termination of obligations pursuant to the\npresent resolution is without prejudice to claims of successor States to the former Socialist\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia with respect to funds and assets, stresses the need for the\nsuccessor States to reach agreement on the distribution of funds and assets and the allocation\nof liabilities of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, encourages all States to\nmake provision under their national law for addressing competing claims of States, as well as\nclaims of private parties affecting funds and assets, and further encourages States to take\nappropriate measures to facilitate the expeditious collection of any funds and assets by the\nappropriate parties and the resolution of claims related thereto;\n 7. Decides that all States shall continue to take the necessary measures to ensure that\nthere shall be no claim in connection with the performance of any contract or other\ntransaction where such performance was affected by the measures imposed by the resolutions\nreferred to in paragraph 1 above and related resolutions;\n 8. Requests the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution\n724 (1991) to review and to amend its guidelines in the light of the provisions of this\nresolution;\n\n\n 369\n"
[370] " 9. Pays tribute to the neighbouring States, the mission of the International Conference on\n the Former Yugoslavia, the European Union/Organization for Security and Cooperation in\n Europe Sanctions Coordinator, the Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications Centre\n and the Sanctions Assistance Missions, the Western European Union operation on the\n Danube and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Western European Union Sharp Guard\n operation in the Adriatic Sea for their significant contribution to the achievement of a\n negotiated peace;\n 10. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United States contended that it\nwas logical to lift the embargo against Bosnia, as an embargo should not be maintained\nagainst a country whose only crime had been to preserve its sovereignty and defend its\npeople. She noted, however, that the Council’s plan was to discourage an arms race and\nto encourage a stable balance of military power. Thus the Framework Agreement placed\nrestrictions on the military forces and heavy weapons of each party, established an arms\ncontrol mechanism, and called for talks on measures to increase the confidence of all\nsides that no side would seek to evade or take military advantage of the Agreement.\nTurning to resolution 1022 (1995), the speaker observed that the suspension of the\neconomic sanctions was a conditional step, as the sanctions would be reimposed if\nBelgrade failed to sign the formal Peace Agreement, or if Belgrade or the Bosnian Serbs\nfailed to meet their obligations under the Agreement. She underscored that the\ninternational community needed to be vigilant in monitoring compliance with the terms\nof the agreement and in heeding the explicit language of the resolution, which noted that\ncompliance with the requests and orders of the International Tribunal for the former\nYugoslavia was an essential part of the agreement’s implementation. She also noted that\nthe suspension of sanctions would not apply immediately to measures imposed on the\nBosnian Serbs. Those measures would remain in effect until all Bosnian Serb military\nforces had withdrawn behind the zones of separation established in the Peace Agreement.\n\n\n The speaker further observed that the adoption of resolution 1022 (1995) reflected\nnot a change in policy, but a change in circumstances. The Council had imposed\neconomic sanctions for the explicit purpose of encouraging Serbia to choose the path of\n\n 370\n"
[371] "peace, and the sanctions appeared to have achieved their purpose. Indeed, the much-\ncriticized sanctions tool had proved critical in bringing about the decision in Dayton, and\nthe leverage it had brought the Council would continue to serve it well in the complicated\ntask of implementation. The speaker noted, however, that the terms of resolution 1022\n(1995) were calibrated to the realities of the situation in the former Yugoslavia. If the\nGovernment in Belgrade or the Pale Serbs were to fail to fulfil their obligations, then the\nsanctions would be reimposed. With that possibility in mind, the United States believed\nthat the infrastructure established and a cadre of personnel assigned to monitor sanctions\nenforcement should remain in place until sanctions were fully and finally lifted. The\nUnited States also believed that there should be an orderly and equitable distribution of\nthe real and financial property of the former Yugoslavia between the successor States. To\nthat end, it did not intend to release any assets itself until all assets had been examined\nagainst possible claims by the successor States and against outstanding commercial or\nprivate claims. 559\n\n\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina argued that the arms embargo\nshould have been lifted much earlier. He underlined that the Council should make sure\nthat the suspension of sanctions be understood as a reprieve and not as an exoneration.\nFailure to honour the peace or Bosnia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity would result\nin the immediate reversal and re-imposition of sanctions. The speaker also warned that\nthe sanctions could not be terminated until the Peace Agreement had been implemented\nfully and there was genuine compliance on the part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\nwith human rights and democratic standards within its territory, as well as full\ncompliance with the International Tribunal. He contended that without such compliance\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could not be admitted as a Member of the United\nNations or other international institutions. 560\n\n\n The representative of Croatia stated that his country supported the resolutions just\nadopted. The sanctions régime had been a just and necessary mechanism to make leaders\n\n 559\n Ibid., pp. 14-16.\n 560\n Ibid., pp. 20-21.\n\n\n 371\n"
[372] "accept responsibility for the “ills” they had brought upon the people in Croatia and\nBosnia and Herzegovina. It was Croatia’s understanding that operative paragraphs 5 and\n6 of resolution 1022 (1995) would prevent the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia\nand Montenegro) from transferring and using common funds until there was agreement\namong all successor States on the succession and distribution of such assets and approval\nby the Council of such an agreement. The speaker argued that the Council should act\nimmediately to endorse the existing succession and distribution agreement proposed by\nthe European Union and the Russian Federation. He also expressed the hope that\nresolution 1021 (1995), lifting the arms embargo, would achieve its goal of maintaining a\nbalance of power in the region and that it would not become a new source of instability.\nIn that regard, Croatia called for prudent use of the resolution, within a broader\n 561\nframework of collective security arrangements in Europe.\n\n\n Mr. Jovanovic stated that the sanctions against the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia should cease immediately, and that the rights of the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia in the United Nations should be restored quickly. He contended that the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia had demonstrated unequivocally its commitment to\npeace and to ending the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina by its active contribution to\nthe negotiation of the Peace Agreement, and by its acceptance of all previous peace\nproposals in connection with the Bosnian crisis. The international community should treat\nall sides equally since equality was an essential element of the Peace Agreement and a\n 562\nbasic precondition if the Agreement was to be fully implemented by all sides.\n\n\n Referring to resolution 1022 (1995), the representative of Slovenia argued that it\nwas crucial that the suspension of sanctions did not apply to the frozen assets that were\nthe common property of the States of the former Yugoslavia, and he noted that the issue\nwas addressed in operative paragraphs 5 and 6 of the resolution. Slovenia requested that\nStates consider all assets owned or controlled by the Government or governmental\nagencies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to be assets on\n\n 561\n Ibid., pp. 21-23.\n 562\n Ibid., pp. 24-25.\n\n\n 372\n"
[373] "which Slovenia had a legal and legitimate claim. It urged that such assets remain frozen\nuntil a final resolution regarding the distribution of those assets and liabilities had been\nreached by the successor States. The speaker warned that any unilateral disposal of the\nrelevant funds would force Slovenia to take appropriate legal steps to have such\ntransactions declared null and void. Slovenia welcomed resolution 1021 (1995), lifting\nthe arms embargo and expected the immediate termination of the arms embargo as far as\n 563\nSlovenia was concerned.\n\n\n\n\n 563\n Ibid., pp. 38-40\n\n\n 373\n"
[374] "Participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the\n\n work of the Economic and Social Council\n\n INITIAL PROCEEDINGS\n\n\n At its 3204th meeting, on 28 April 1993, the Council included the item entitled\n“Participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the\nwork of the Economic and Social Council” in its agenda. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the President (Pakistan) drew the attention of the Council members to the text of\na draft resolution 564 submitted by France, Spain and the United Kingdom, and read out a\nrevision to be made to the draft in its provisional form. He also informed the Council\nmembers that the United States had joined as a sponsor of the draft resolution.\n\n\nDecision of 28 April 1993 (3204th meeting): resolution 821 (1993)\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote, as orally revised in its provisional\nform, and it was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions (China, Russian\nFederation) as resolution 821 (1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant\n resolutions,\n Considering that the State formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia has ceased to exist,\n Recalling its resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992, in which it noted that “the claim by\n the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to continue automatically the\n membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the United Nations has\n not been generally accepted”,\n Recalling also its resolution 777 (1992) of 19 September 1992, in which it recommended\n to the General Assembly that it decide that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n\n\n 564\n S/25675.\n\n\n 374\n"
[375] " Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and that it shall not\n participate in the work of the General Assembly,\n Recalling further that the General Assembly in its resolution 47/1 of 22 September 1992,\n having received the recommendation of the Security Council of 19 September 1992,\n considered that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) could not\n continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia in the United Nations and therefore decided that the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should apply for membership in the United Nations and\n that it shall not participate in the work of the General Assembly,\n Recalling that in its resolution 777 (1992) it decided to consider the matter again before\n the end of the main part of the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, and that in\n December 1992 the members of the Council agreed to keep the subject-matter of resolution\n 777 (1992) under continuous review and to consider it again at a later date,\n 1. Reaffirms that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) cannot\n continue automatically the membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia in the United Nations, and therefore recommends to the General Assembly that,\n further to the decisions taken in Assembly resolution 47/1, it decide that the Federal Republic\n of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) shall not participate in the work of the Economic and\n Social Council;\n 2. Decides to consider the matter again before the end of the forty-seventh session of the\nGeneral Assembly.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of China recalled that his delegation\nhad always held that all the Republics of the former Yugoslavia should take their own\nseats in the United Nations, and that no Republic should be excluded lightly. His\ndelegation considered that the resolution just adopted was a transitory arrangement. It\nhoped that the question of the seat of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia might be settled\nproperly and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would be able to obtain its own seat\nin the United Nations and the organs belonging to the United Nations system. 565\n\n\n\n\n 565\n Ibid., pp. 3-6.\n\n\n 375\n"
[376] " The representative of the United States stated that her delegation had voted in\nfavour of the resolution just adopted, as it continued to believe that the claim of the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia to membership in international organizations was legally\ninvalid. The United States would support the application of the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia for membership in the United Nations only when Serbia and Montenegro met\nthe criteria in the United Nations Charter. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia therefore\nmust show that it was a peace-loving State and must demonstrate its willingness to\ncomply fully with Chapter VII resolutions of the Security Council. The Belgrade\nauthorities must end their support for the Bosnian Serbs and for aggression in Bosnia and\n 566\nCroatia.\n\n\n The representative of Brazil recalled that his delegation had expressed its views\non the question of the participation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia when the issue\nhad been taken up by the General Assembly the previous September. Brazil remained\nconvinced that questions relating to admission, participation, suspension or expulsion\naffected the most basic rights of States in relation to the Organization, and that they\nshould therefore be treated with the utmost care and attention, bearing in mind the\nfundamental need to follow the Charter strictly. It was only in extraordinary\ncircumstances, such as the deteriorating situation in the territories of the former\nYugoslavia, and particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that the application of\nextraordinary measures could be justified. By voting in favour of the resolution just\nadopted, Brazil wished to signify its support for the urgent efforts of the Security Council\n 567\nto bring to an end to the conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation noted that his delegation had\nabstained in the voting on the resolution just adopted because it was against taking further\nsteps to separate Belgrade, and excluding it from the international organizations. He\ncontended that recent events in the Yugoslav crisis, combined with the fact that the\nleadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had undertaken specific steps to apply\n\n 566\n Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n 567\n Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n\n\n 376\n"
[377] "pressure on the Bosnian Serbs in order to ensure that they adhered to the Vance-Owen\nplan, rendered inappropriate the idea of meting out further punishment to Belgrade. The\nspeaker also cautioned that such action might give the impression that the international\ncommunity regarded such punishment as an end in itself, to the detriment of ongoing\n 568\nefforts to seek a peaceful settlement.\n\n\n Decision of 17 September 1993: letter from the President to the President of the\nGeneral Assembly\n\n\n 569\n By a letter dated 17 September 1993, the President of the Security Council\ninformed the President of the General Assembly as follows:\n\n\n “I have the honour to inform you that in consultations in connection with Security\n Council resolution 821 (1993) of 28 April 1993, the members of the Council agreed to keep\n the subject-matter of that resolution under continuous review and to consider it again at a\n later date.”\n\n\n\n\n 568\n Ibid., p. 8.\n 569\n S/26466.\n\n\n 377\n"
[378] " Letter dated 14 December 1994 from the Chairman of the Security Council\n Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia\n addressed to the President of the Security Council\n\n\n\n INITIAL PROCEEDINGS\n\n\n\n Decision of 14 December 1994 (3480th meeting): resolution 967 (1994)\n\n By a letter 570 dated 14 December 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established by resolution 724\n(1991) concerning Yugoslavia, reported that the Acting Executive Director of UNICEF\nhad informed the Committee that several countries in Central Asia and Eastern Europe\nwere facing a major resurgence of diphtheria and that the only available stocks of anti-\nserum to combat this serious condition were located in the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The Acting Executive Director of UNICEF had\ntherefore requested that the Committee facilitate the shipment of 12,000 vials of\ndiphtheria anti-serum from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)\nfor use in the affected countries. The Chairman noted that, taking into account the\nexceptional humanitarian circumstances of the situation, the Committee had decided to\nrecommend that the Council adopt a resolution permitting, for a period of thirty days, the\nexport from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of 12,000 vials\nof diphtheria anti-serum. The Committee had also recommended that any payments for\nsuch authorized shipments should be made only into frozen accounts.\n At its 3480th meeting, on 14 December 1994, the Council began its consideration\nof the item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (Rwanda) drew the\nattention of the Council members to the text of a draft resolution571 that had been\nprepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations. The draft resolution was then\n\n\n\n\n 570\n S/1994/1418.\n 571\n S/1994/1419.\n\n\n 378\n"
[379] "put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as resolution 967 (1994). The resolution\nreads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the situation in the Former Yugoslavia,\n in particular its resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992,\n Taking note of the letter dated 14 December 1994 from the Chairman of the Security\n Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia and\n the communication from the Acting Executive Director of the United Nations Children's\n Fund of 13 December 1994 annexed thereto, in which the Council is informed of a major\n resurgence of diphtheria and that the only available stocks of antiserum to combat this serious\n condition are located in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),\n Recognizing that the export of anti-serum from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro) will require an exemption from the provisions of resolution 757\n (1992) of 30 May 1992, and acting in this respect under Chapter VII of the Charter of the\n United Nations,\n 1. Decides to permit, for a period of thirty days from the date of the adoption of the\n present resolution, the export of 12,000 vials of diphtheria anti-serum from the Federal\n Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro);\n 2. Decides further that any payments for such authorized shipments shall be made only\n into frozen accounts;\n 3. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n\n\n 379\n"
[380] " Navigation on the Danube river 572\n\n\n\n INITIAL PROCEEDINGS\n\n\n\n 573\nDecision of 28 January 1993: note by the President\n\n By a letter 574 dated 27 January 1993 addressed to the President of the\nSecurity Council, the representative of Romania transmitted the declaration issued\nby his Government on 27 January 1993, concerning the situation created on the\nDanube river as a result of the flagrant violation of Security Council resolutions\n757 (1992) and 787 (1992) by Yugoslav vessels transporting petroleum products.\nThe representative of Romania underlined that the cooperation between riparian\nStates as well as international cooperation, including appropriate consideration\nand action by the Security Council, was necessary in order to compel the\nYugoslav authorities to take immediate measures to stop the violation of the\nembargo by the Yugoslav vessels.\n\n\n\n By a letter 575 dated 28 January 1993 addressed to the President of the\nSecurity Council, the representative of Bulgaria transmitted the text of a Press\nRelease of 27 January 1993 by his Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the\nrecent incident involving the unauthorized passage of the Serbian convoy towed\nby the tugship “Bihac” through the Bulgarian-Romanian sector of the Danube.\nThe Ministry stated that establishing close cooperation between Bulgarian and\nRomanian authorities was of decisive significance to prevent such incident in the\nfuture. He reiterated his appeal for the deployment of international sanctions\nmonitoring missions at all ports along the Danube and stressed the urgent need for\n\n\n1 This item began its life with the title “ Navigation on the Danube river in the FRY”. It was reformulated as\n“Navigation on the Danube river” as from the 3533rd meeting, held on 11 May 1995.\n573\n Statement to the media.\n574\n S/ 25189.\n575\n S/ 25182.\n\n\n 380\n"
[381] " substantial technical support to assist his country and Romania in the\n implementation of the sanctions.\n\n\n\nDecision of 28 January 1993: note by the President\n\n\n\n On 28 January 1993, after consultations with the members of the Council, the\n 576\nPresident made the following statement to the media on behalf of the members of the\nCouncil:\n\n “In connection with letters dated 27 January from the representative of Romania and 28\n January 1993 from the representative of Bulgaria to the President of the Security Council, the\n members of the Council heard a report from the Chairman of the Committee established by\n resolution 724 (1991) about Yugoslav vessels carrying oil from Ukraine to Serbia by way of\n the Danube, a flagrant violation of mandatory Security Council resolutions.\n “The members of the Council are concerned that these shipments are reported to have left\n Ukrainian territory after the adoption of resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May 1992 and indeed\n may have left after the adoption of resolution 787 (1992) of 16 November 1992. They call on\n the Government of Ukraine to ensure that no further such shipments are permitted.\n “The members of the Council are also extremely concerned that some of the vessels have\n already reached Serbia. In this regard, they demand that the authorities of the Federal\n Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) comply fully with the relevant resolutions.\n They have asked the President of the Council to convey their concern to the representatives of\n Romania and Bulgaria, to remind them of their clear obligations under the relevant\n resolutions and to seek an explanation of their failure to fulfil them. They have asked the\n President to draw particular attention to the relevant resolutions, which make clear the\n responsibility of all riparian States to take necessary measures to ensure that shipping on the\n Danube is in accordance with Council resolutions, including such enforcement measures\n commensurate with the specific circumstances as may be necessary to halt such shipping. The\n members of the Council reaffirm their support for vigorous enforcement of the relevant\n resolutions, and they are clear that the riparian States have the means to fulfil this obligation\n and that they must do so forthwith.”\n\n\n 576\n S/25190.\n\n\n 381\n"
[382] " 577\nDecision of 10 February 1993: note by the President\n\n\n\n On 10 February 1993, after consultations with the members of the Council, the\nPresident made the following statement to the media 578 on behalf of the members of the\nCouncil:\n\n “The members of the Security Council have heard a report from the Chairman of the\n Committee established by resolution 724 (1991) about the detention of Romanian vessels on\n the Danube by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\n Montenegro).\n “They have learned that the Minister of Transport of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro) has threatened to detain more Romanian vessels if Romania does\n not allow the passage of Yugoslav vessels on the Danube. They have also learned that that\n Minister has addressed a letter to the Chairman of the Committee established by resolution\n 724 (1991) informing him that the Romanian vessels would be released without further delay,\n which according to information provided by the Chargé d'affaires of the Permanent Mission\n of Romania to the United Nations has not yet happened.\n “The members of the Council recall their statement of 28 January 1993 about the\n responsibility of States to enforce mandatory Security Council resolutions, with particular\n reference to Yugoslav vessels attempting to violate those resolutions by way of the Danube.\n They commend the Romanian Government for the action it has since taken in this regard and\n reaffirm once again their full support for vigorous enforcement of the relevant resolutions.\n “They also recall that under Article 103 of the Charter, the obligations of the Members of\n the United Nations under the Charter prevail over their obligations under any other\n international agreement.\n “The members of the Council condemn any such retaliatory action and threats of such\n action by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It is\n wholly unacceptable for those authorities to take retaliatory measures in response to action by\n\n\n 577\n Statement to the media.\n 578\n S/25270.\n\n\n 382\n"
[383] " a State in fulfilment of its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. They demand\n that those authorities release forthwith the Romanian vessels they have unjustifiably detained,\n and that they desist from further unlawful detention.”\n\n\n\nDecision of 13 October 1993 (3290th meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n\n By a letter 579 dated 11 October 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of Hungary reported that the blockade on the Danube at\nBelgrade, which had been initiated in mid-July by two Serbian non-governmental\norganizations, was continuing unabated. Despite recent promises made by the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia to eliminate the blockade, Belgrade had taken no measures to\nremedy the situation. Moreover, the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\ncontinued to impose tolls on vessels wishing to transit the Yugoslav section of the\nDanube, in violation of the Danube Convention and despite the call made on 3 September\n1993 by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) to\ncease their illegal action. Hungary, while firm in its commitment to the full\nimplementation of its obligations arising in connection with the sanctions régime, was\nfacing an increasingly complex task of stopping shipments falling under that régime and\nlacking proper authorization or carrying falsified documents. The letter noted that those\nshipments had, in many instances, crossed several international borders before reaching\nHungary and it contended that Hungary’s commitment to implementing the sanctions\ncould be efficient only if it was sustained by the cooperation of all the States Member of\nthe United Nations, in observance of the relevant Security Council resolutions.\n\n\n At its 3290th meeting, on 13 October 1993, the Council included the above\n letter in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (Brazil) stated\n that, after consultations among members of the Security Council, he had been\n authorized to make the following statement 580 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n 579\n S/26562.\n 580\n S/26572.\n\n\n 383\n"
[384] " “The Security Council has learned with deep concern that the blocking of the Danube by\n two Serbian non-governmental organizations is still continuing and deplores the acquiescence\n of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), which is\n reflected in the fact that they have failed to take any action to prevent these acts. It condemns\n these deliberate and unjustified acts of interference with the river traffic of several Member\n States of the United Nations. It emphasizes the importance it attaches to the free and\n unhindered navigation on the Danube, which is essential for legitimate trade in the region. It\n reminds the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of\n their previous written commitment to secure free and safe navigation on this vital\n international waterway.\n “The Council is also concerned that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n (Serbia and Montenegro) continue to impose tolls on foreign vessels transiting the section of\n the Danube which passes through the territory of the Federal Republic. By extracting these\n payments, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) violates its\n international obligations. The Council rejects any attempt to justify, on whatever ground, the\n imposition of tolls on the Danube. It demands that the authorities of the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and any others imposing similar tolls cease such action\n immediately.\n “The Council condemns these illegal actions and reaffirms that it is wholly unacceptable\n for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to take retaliatory measures\n in response to action by a State in fulfilment of its obligations under the Charter of the United\n Nations. It reminds the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of its own\n international obligations and demands that its authorities ensure free movement of\n international traffic on the Danube.\n “The Council remains seized of the matter.”\n\n\n\n Decision of 14 March 1994 (3348th meeting): statement by the President\n\n At its 3348th meeting, on 14 March 1994, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (France) stated that, after\n\n\n\n\n 384\n"
[385] "consultations among members of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make\nthe following statement 581 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council has taken note of the letters dated 10 and 14 March 1994 from the\n Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In\n these documents, his Government acknowledges that the Bulgarian convoy, the Han Kubrat,\n composed of 6 barges transporting 6,000 tons of diesel oil on the Danube, entered the\n territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) on the morning of 6\n March 1994 at the port of Prahovo. The Government also recognizes that the cargo was\n unloaded and that the convoy returned to Bulgaria without it.\n \"The Council most strongly condemns this flagrant violation by the authorities of the\n Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of the relevant resolutions of the\n Council prohibiting the shipment of commodities and products to the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It holds the authorities of the Federal Republic of\n Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) fully accountable for the non-return of the cargo of the\n Han Kubrat.\n \"The Council welcomes the cooperative attitude of the Bulgarian Government. It calls\n upon the authorities of Bulgaria to assess the precise circumstances of this act and to\n prosecute those responsible for it.\n \"The Council reaffirms the importance it attaches to free and unimpeded navigation on\n the Danube, which is essential to legitimate commerce in the region. It again stresses that the\n authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) have undertaken\n in writing to guarantee the freedom and security of navigation on this crucial international\n waterway. It invites them to respect scrupulously their commitments in this regard.\n \"The Council stands ready to address the issue again in the future.\"\n\n\n\n Decision of 11 May 1995 (3533rd meeting): resolution 992 (1995)\n\n At its 3533rd meeting, on 11 May 1995, the Council included the item entitled\n“Navigation on the Danube river” in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda,\nthe President (France) drew the attention of the Council members to the text of a draft\n\n\n\n 581\n S/PRST/1994/10.\n\n\n 385\n"
[386] "resolution 582 that had been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations and\nto a letter 583 dated 8 May 1995 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee\nestablished pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) concerning Yugoslavia addressed to the\nPresident of the Security Council. The Chairman informed the Council that the\nGovernment of Romania, supported by other Danube riparian States, the Danube\nCommission and the European Union/Organization for Security and Cooperation in\nEurope (EU/OSCE) Sanctions Coordinator, had requested authorization for vessels of the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to be allowed to use the\nRomanian locks of the Iron Gates I system, on the left bank of the Danube, while repairs\nwere carried out to the locks on the right bank. The riparian States and international\norganizations concerned had asked for the Committee’s assistance, stressing the\nimportance for safe international navigation on the Danube of the Iron Gates I system\nbeing properly maintained and repaired. In considering the matter, the Committee had\ntaken into account the need and readiness of Romania to ensure that vessels of the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia, if allowed to use the Romanian locks of the system,\nwould not engage in any activities contravening the relevant Security Council resolutions.\nThe Committee had therefore recommended, in view of the exceptional circumstances as\nwell as the provisions contained in paragraph 16 of resolution 820 (1993), that the\nSecurity Council consider the adoption of a technical resolution on the matter.\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 992 (1995). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the former Yugoslavia, in particular its\n resolution 820 (1993) of 17 April 1993,\n Desiring to promote free and unhindered navigation on the Danube in accordance with\n those resolutions,\n\n\n\n\n 582\n S/1995/373.\n 583\n S/1995/372.\n\n\n 386\n"
[387] " Recalling statements made by the President of the Security Council on freedom of\nnavigation on the Danube, in particular that made on 13 October 1993 expressing concern\nabout the imposition of illegal tolls on foreign vessels transiting the section of the Danube\nwhich passes through the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro),\n Reminding States of their obligations under paragraph 5 of resolution 757 (1992) of 30\nMay 1992 not to make available to the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n(Serbia and Montenegro) or to any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking in the\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) any funds or any other financial or\neconomic resources and to prevent their nationals from making available to those authorities\nor to any such undertaking any such funds or resources, and noting that flag States may\nsubmit claims to the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) for reimbursement of tolls illegally imposed on their vessels transiting the\nsection of the Danube which passes through the territory of the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro),\n Taking note of the letter dated 8 May 1995 from the Chairman of the Security Council\nCommittee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) regarding the use by vessels\nregistered in, or owned or controlled by persons in, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia\n(Serbia and Montenegro) of the locks of the Iron Gates I system on the left bank of the\nDanube while repairs are carried out to the locks on the right bank,\n Recognizing that the use by vessels registered in, or owned or controlled by persons in,\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of these locks will require an\nexemption from the provisions of paragraph 16 of resolution 820 (1993) and acting, in this\nrespect, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Decides that the use of the locks of the Iron Gates I system on the left bank of the\nDanube by vessels (a) registered in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) or (b) in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or\nundertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) shall be permitted in accordance with this resolution;\n 2. Also decides that the present resolution shall come into force on the day following the\nreceipt by the Council from the Security Council Committee established pursuant to\nresolution 724 (1991) of a report by the Danube Commission that it is satisfied that\npreparations for the repairs to the locks of the Iron Gates I system on the right bank of the\nDanube have been completed, and that the present resolution shall remain in force, subject to\n\n\n 387\n"
[388] "paragraph 6 below, for a period of sixty days from the date on which it comes into force, and,\nunless the Council decides otherwise, for further periods of up to sixty days if the Council is\nnotified by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) that each such\nfurther period is required for completion of the necessary repairs;\n 3. Requests the Government of Romania, with the assistance of the European\nUnion/Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Sanctions Assistance Missions,\nstrictly to monitor this use, including, if necessary, by inspections of the vessels and their\ncargo, to ensure that no goods are loaded or unloaded during the passage by the vessels\nthrough the locks of the Iron Gates I system;\n 4. Also requests the Government of Romania to deny passage through the locks of the\nIron Gates I system on the left bank of the Danube to any vessel using the locks of the Iron\nGates I system under the authority of paragraph 1 above which is identified as being a party\nto any suspected or substantiated violation of the relevant Council resolutions;\n 5. Requests the Sanctions Assistance Missions Communications Centre to report to the\nCommittee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) and to the Romanian authorities\noperating the locks of the Iron Gates I system on the left bank of the Danube any suspected\nviolation of any of the relevant Council resolutions by vessels using the locks of the Iron\nGates I system under the authority of paragraph 1 above and to transmit to the Committee and\nto the Romanian authorities evidence that any such violation has in fact occurred; and decides\nthat the Chairman of the Committee shall, after consulting members of the Committee,\ntransmit to the Council any substantiated evidence of such a violation forthwith;\n 6. Decides that the exemption provided for in paragraph 1 above shall terminate on the\nthird working day after the Council receives substantiated evidence from the Chairman of the\nCommittee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) of a violation of any of the relevant\nresolutions of the Council by a vessel using the locks of the Iron Gates I system under the\nauthority of paragraph 1 above, unless the Council decides to the contrary, and that the\nGovernment of Romania shall be so informed immediately;\n 7. Requests the Executive Director of the Danube Commission to inform the Chairman of\nthe Committee established pursuant to resolution 724 (1991) of the date of completion of the\nrepairs, or, if the repairs have not been completed within sixty days of the entry into force of\nthe present resolution, or within the subsequent periods of up to sixty days for which the\nprovisions of the present resolution may be extended, to provide the Chairman with a report\non the state of the repairs ten days before the expiry of any such period;\n\n\n\n\n 388\n"
[389] " 8. Confirms that, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 760 (1992), the\nimportation into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of supplies\nessential to the repair of the locks on the right bank of the Danube may be approved in\naccordance with the procedures of the Committee established pursuant to resolution\n724 (1991) at a meeting or meetings of the Committee;\n 9. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n\n\n 389\n"
[390] " United Nations Protection Force 584\n\n\n\n INITIAL PROCEEDINGS\n\n\n\n Decision of 19 February 1993 (3174th meeting): resolution 807 (1993)\n\n On 10 February 1993, pursuant to resolution 743 (1992), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a further report 585 on the United Nations Protection Force\n(UNPROFOR). The report was intended to provide a basis for the Security Council to\ntake appropriate action on the future of the Force before its mandate expired on 21\nFebruary 1993. It focused primarily on the options available to the Council in relation to\nUNPROFOR’s mandate in Croatia.\n The Secretary-General observed that while the non-cooperation of the local Serb\nauthorities had seriously retarded the implementation of the United Nations peace-\nkeeping plan, the Croatian offensive on and after 22 January 1993 had significantly\naltered the realities on the ground. Following the offensive, the President of Croatia had\nindicated publicly that his Government was also prepared to invade the UNPA’s if\nUNPROFOR was unable to fulfil its mandate there. For its part, the Serb leadership in the\nUNPA’s had re-armed and remobilized its force in response to the Croatian offensive. In\naddition, the circumstances in which the peace-keeping plan had been drafted and agreed\nhad themselves changed. The plan had been envisaged as an interim arrangement pending\nan overall political solution to the Yugoslav crisis. The Government of Croatia claimed\nthere was no longer any “overall political solution” to negotiate. The only issue, in its\nview, was the return of the UNPA’s and the “pink zones” to Croatian control, with the\nSerb minority enjoying the rights granted by the Croatian Constitution and other legal\ninstruments. The Serb leadership in the UNPA’s, however, refused to consider those\nterritories to be part of Croatia and rejected talks on that basis. It further argued that the\n\n\n 584\n This item began its life with the title “Further report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 743\n(1992) (S/25264 and Corr.1)”. It was reformulated as “United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)” as from the\n3248th meeting, held on 30 June 1993.\n 585\n S/25264 and Corr.1.\n\n\n 390\n"
[391] "two parties to the original plan no longer have any locus standi in the area where\nUNPROFOR was deployed. The mandate and deployment of UNPROFOR must now be\ndiscussed with them as the sovereign “Republic of Serb Krajina”.\n Noting that these positions appeared to be irreconcilable, the Secretary-General\nproposed the following options with regard to UNPROFOR’s mandate: (a) to renew the\nmandate entrusted to UNPROFOR by resolution 743 (1992); (b) to modify that mandate;\nor (c) to give UNPROFOR no mandate in Croatia. Analysis of these options, however,\ndid not indicate any clear way forward in a difficult situation not foreseen when the\nSecurity Council had decided to establish UNPROFOR. Two factors needed to be\naddressed before taking any decision regarding UNPROFOR. The first was the failure to\nimplement the peacekeeping plan. The second was that it had not been possible to\nnegotiate an agreed settlement to the conflict between Croatia and the Serbs populations\nliving in the UNPAs and the pink zones. He had therefore asked the Co-Chairmen of the\nICFY Steering Committee to address those questions urgently, so that he could make a\nsubstantive recommendation for an extension of UNPROFOR’s mandate. As it was\nunlikely that those results could be achieved by 21 February 1993, when the existing\nUNPROFOR mandate was due to expire, the Secretary-General recommended that the\nSecurity Council extend UNPROFOR’s mandate for an interim period up to 31 March\n1993.\n At its 3174th meeting, on 19 February 1993, the Council included the item\nentitled: “Further report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution\n743 (1992) (S/25264 and Corr.1” in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\nCouncil invited the representative of Croatia, at his request, to participate in the\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The Council also invited Ambassador Dragomir\nDjokić, at his request, to address the Council in the course of the discussion. The\nPresident (Morocco) then drew the attention of the Council members to the text of a draft\nresolution 586 that had been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations and\nto several other documents. 587\n\n\n 586\n S/25306.\n 587\n S/25062 and 25288: letters dated 5 January and 12 February 1993, respectively, from the representative\nof Croatia addressed to the Secretary-General; S/25193, letter dated 29 January 1993 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of\n\n\n 391\n"
[392] " The representative of Croatia stated that his Government supported the Secretary-\nGeneral’s proposal for the provisional extension of UNPROFOR’s mandate, as it would\nprovide enough time for negotiations concerning all aspects of the UNPROFOR\noperation and for full implementation of the Vance plan. Referring to his letter dated 12\nFebruary 1993, he stressed that future United Nations operations in Croatia must be based\non the following basic elements: complete demilitarization of the UNPAs and pink zones;\nvoluntary return of the refugees; control of Croatian international borders; confidence-\nbuilding measures as a part of the process of reintegration of the UNPAs and the pink\nzones into the Croatian State; and protection of national minorities and other human\nrights. Croatia was prepared to implement Security Council resolution 802 (1993) as a\nfirst step in the demilitarization process that would be fully established through the\nimplementation of resolutions 762 (1992) and 769 (1992) and that would enable a\ncomprehensive political solution under the auspices of the Conference on the Former\nYugoslavia. Before concluding, the speaker expressed confidence that future decisions of\nthe Council would give added credibility to the UNPROFOR operation, and would\n 588\nprovide it with effective mechanisms to attain the goals foreseen in the Vance plan.\n\n\n Ambassador Djokić contended that the recent aggression of the Croatian Army\nagainst the UNPAs, UNPROFOR and the Serb civilian population, represented a flagrant\nviolation of the Vance peace plan and of relevant Security Council resolutions, including\nresolutions 724 (1991) and 762 (1992). He argued that Croatia had ignored recent\ndecisions of the Council, such as resolution 802 (1993) and the presidential statement of\n27 January 1993, and that the Council had an obligation to take all appropriate measures,\nincluding those envisaged in Chapter VII, to make Croatia honour the United Nations\nCharter and all relevant Security Council resolutions. For its part, the Federal Republic of\n\n\n\nYugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General; S/25218 and S/25237, letters dated 1 and 3 February 1993 from the\nChargé d’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/25222, letter dated 26 January\n1993 from the representatives of France, Spain and the United Kingdom addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, transmitting the text of the Declaration on the Former Yugoslavia adopted by the European Community on 25\nJanuary 1993; and S/25246, letter dated 5 February 1993 from the representative of Turkey addressed to the Secretary-\nGeneral.\n 588\n S/PV.3174, pp. 3-6.\n\n\n 392\n"
[393] "Yugoslavia had fulfiled all obligations undertaken under the Vance plan and supported\nfurther engagement of UNPROFOR and full implementation of resolution 802 (1993).\nThe speaker further argued that UNPROFOR had proved to be justified, thus creating the\nbasic prerequisites for all open questions to be resolved. The Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia had expected UNPROFOR’s mandate to be extended for a year, however it\nsupported the proposal contained in the draft resolution. It hoped that in the meantime the\nnecessary conditions would be created so that the mandate could be further extended, as\nenvisioned by the plan, until a comprehensive and peaceful solution was reached.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of France stated that the security of\nUNPROFOR personnel was a priority for his Government, in considering the question of\nrenewing UNPROFOR’s mandate. Recent events in Croatia had demonstrated that there\nwas an overriding need to endow the Force with both the legal basis and the military\nmeans to ensure its self-defence. In the circumstances, the Council’s only option was to\nextend the mandate for an interim period of six weeks, but even for that brief period it\nhad been “unthinkable” to extend the mandate in its current form. The French delegation\nhad therefore proposed a draft resolution placing UNPROFOR within the framework of\nChapter VII of the Charter, and it had suggested a series of concrete measures to ensure\ngreater stability in the areas where UNPROFOR was deployed. The reference to Chapter\nVII was not designed to change the nature of the Force from peacekeeping to\npeacemaking. Rather, the sole consideration was “preventive security”, which was\n 589\nreflected in the text of the draft resolution.\n\n\n\n\n The representative of China said that UNPROFOR’s mandate should be extended\nfor an interim period. His delegation shared the concern of other delegations relating to\nthe threat posed to the security of Force personnel and it supported the Secretary-\nGeneral’s taking appropriate measures to strengthen the security of UNPROFOR\npersonnel. In light of that consideration, and of the fact that it had been repeatedly stated\n\n\n 589\n Ibid., pp. 13-15.\n\n\n 393\n"
[394] "that the purpose of invoking Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter in the draft\nresolution was to take measures to increase appropriately UNPROFOR’s self-defence\ncapability, his delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution. The speaker,\nhowever, pointed out that UNPROFOR was a peacekeeping operation and that Chapter\nVII had not been invoked either in resolution 743 (1992) or in subsequent resolutions\nrelating to the matter, nor did the Secretary-General’s report contained such request. The\nquestion could have been settled through the expanded concept of self-defence and rules\nof engagement, and by taking appropriate measures without invoking Chapter VII. China\nwished to place on record its understanding that the practice of invoking Chapter VII was\n 590\nexceptional and did not constitute a precedent for future peacekeeping operations.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that his delegation considered\nthe demand contained in the draft resolution for the rapid implementation of resolution\n802 (1993) and other resolutions to be extremely important. It was important to exert a\n“balanced influence” over those involved in the Yugoslav crisis, in the interest of prompt\nsettlement. Russia believed that, should Croatia fail to meet the demands contained in\nresolution 802 (1993) and other Security Council resolutions, sanctions under Chapter\nVII of the United Nations Charter should also be applied to Croatia. Russia also\nsupported the provisions in the draft resolution that sought to strengthen the security of\nUNPROFOR personnel. 591\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 807 (1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992 and all subsequent resolutions\n relating to the United Nations Protection Force,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 10 February 1993,\n\n\n\n\n 590\n Ibid., pp. 19-21.\n 591\n Ibid., pp. 21-23.\n\n\n 394\n"
[395] " Deeply concerned by the lack of cooperation of the parties and others concerned in\nimplementing the United Nations peace-keeping plan in Croatia,\n Deeply concerned also by the recent and repeated violations by the parties and others\nconcerned of their cease-fire obligations,\n Determining that the situation thus created constitutes a threat to peace and security in the\nregion,\n Noting in that context the request of the Secretary-General to the Co-Chairmen of the\nSteering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, mentioned in\nhis report, to establish as soon as possible, through discussions with the parties, a basis on\nwhich the mandate of the Force could be renewed,\n Determined to ensure the security of the Force, and to this end acting under Chapter VII\nof the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Demands that the parties and others concerned comply fully with the United Nations\npeace-keeping plan in Croatia and with the other commitments they have undertaken and in\nparticular with their cease-fire obligations;\n 2. Demands also that the parties and others concerned refrain from positioning their\nforces in the proximity of units of the United Nations Protection Force in the United Nations\nProtected Areas and in the pink zones;\n 3. Demands the full and strict observance of all relevant Security Council resolutions\nrelating to the mandate and operations of the Force in the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina;\n 4. Demands further that the parties and others concerned respect fully unimpeded\nfreedom of movement of the Force, enabling it, inter alia, to carry out all necessary\nconcentrations and deployments, all movements of equipment and weapons and all\nhumanitarian and logistical activities;\n 5. Decides, in the context of these demands, to extend the mandate of the Force for an\ninterim period terminating on 31 March 1993;\n 6. Urges the parties and others concerned fully to cooperate with the Co-Chairmen of the\nSteering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia in the\ndiscussions under their auspices in order to ensure full implementation of the United Nations\npeace-keeping mandate in Croatia, including, inter alia, through the collection and\nsupervision of heavy weapons by the Force and the appropriate withdrawal of forces;\n 7. Invites the Secretary-General to work to achieve the rapid implementation of the\nUnited Nations peace-keeping mandate and of relevant Security Council resolutions,\n\n\n 395\n"
[396] " including resolution 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993, thus to ensure security and stability\n throughout the Protected Areas and the pink zones;\n 8. Also invites the Secretary-General, during the interim period and in consultation with\n the force-contributing States, to take, in accordance with paragraph 17 of his report, all\n appropriate measures to strengthen the security of the Force, in particular by providing it with\n the necessary defensive means, and to study the possibility of carrying out such local\n redeployment of military units as is required to ensure their protection;\n 9. Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report on the further extension of the\n mandate of the Force, including financial estimates for all its activities as proposed in his\n report of 10 February 1993;\n 10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Decision of 30 March 1993 (3189th meeting): resolution 815 (1993)\n\n On 25 March 1993, pursuant to resolution 807 (1993), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 592 on the further extension of UNPROFOR’s mandate.\nThe Secretary-General informed the Council that in accordance with resolution 807\n(1993), the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the ICFY had held several rounds\nof talks, in New York and Geneva, with representatives of the Government of Croatia and\nthe Serb population living in the UNPAs and the pink zones. While some progress had\nbeen made in the talks, fundamental differences remained. It appeared, therefore, that\nmore time would be needed to bring the negotiations to a meaningful conclusion.\nHowever, as any termination of UNPROFOR’s presence in Croatia would entail the\nstrong likelihood of an outbreak of renewed hostilities, the Secretary-General\nrecommended that UNPROFOR’s mandate be extended for a further interim period of\nthree months. In the meantime, the Secretary-General had requested the Co-Chairmen to\ncontinue their efforts to obtain renewed commitment by the parties to the United Nations\npeacekeeping plan and to the implementation of resolution 802 (1993) and other relevant\nresolutions.\n At its 3189th meeting, held on 30 March 1993, the Council continued its\nconsideration of the item entitled: “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security\n\n\n 592\n S/25470 and Add.1.\n\n\n 396\n"
[397] "Council resolution 807 (1993)”. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\ninvited the representative of Croatia, at his request, to participate in the discussion\nwithout the right to vote. The President (New Zealand) then drew the attention of the\nCouncil members to the text of a draft resolution 593 that had been prepared in the course\nof the Council’s prior consultations, to the above report and to several other\n 594\ndocuments.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of France stated that his delegation\nwelcomed the draft resolution, which strengthened the recourse to Chapter VII by\nextending it to the question of UNPROFOR’s freedom of movement. The draft resolution\nalso extended the Force’s mandate for an interim period and provided that the Council\nwould reconsider UNPROFOR’s situation within one month and, if necessary, would\ndraw the appropriate conclusions. He warned that, should the fighting continue, a series\nof firm measures would have to be considered and implemented. These measures could\ninclude: the use of all necessary measures to strengthen the monitoring of the embargo, or\nthe adoption of new measures; the deployment or reinforcement of observers on the\nBosnian-Croatian border; the broadening of the application of Chapter VII when the\nmandate of the Force was next renewed; or, if the situation called for it, the partial or\ntotal withdrawal of the Force. The speaker concluded by stating that the principle of\n 595\nrespect for Croatia’s territorial integrity must be solemnly established.\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 815 (1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n\n\n\n 593\n S/25481.\n 594\n S/25350, letter dated 1 March 1993 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Croatia addressed to the President\nof the Security Council; S/25454 and S/25477, letters dated 22 and 26 March from the representative of Croatia\naddressed to the President of the Security Council; S/25447, letter dated 19 March 1993 from the representative of\nCroatia addressed to the Secretary-General; S/25381 and S/25382, letters dated 8 March 1993 from the Chargé\nd’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General; and S/25449, letter dated 22 March 1993 from the\nChargé d’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security Council.\n 595\n S/PV.3189, pp. 3-6.\n\n\n 397\n"
[398] " Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992 and all subsequent resolutions\n relating to the United Nations Protection Force,\n Reaffirming in particular its commitment to ensure respect for the sovereignty and\n territorial integrity of Croatia and of the other Republics where the Force is deployed,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 25 and 26 March 1993,\n Deeply concerned at the continuing violations by the parties and others concerned of their\n cease-fire obligations,\n Determining that the situation thus created continues to constitute a threat to peace and\n security in the region,\n Determined to ensure the security of the Force and its freedom of movement for all its\n missions, and to these ends acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General, in particular its paragraph 5;\n 2. Reaffirms all the provisions of its resolutions 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993 and 807\n (1993) of 19 February 1993;\n 3. Decides to reconsider one month after the date of the adoption of the present\n resolution, or at any time at the request of the Secretary-General, the mandate of the United\n Nations Protection Force in the light of developments of the International Conference on the\n Former Yugoslavia and the situation on the ground;\n 4. Decides, in this context, further to extend the mandate of the Force for an additional\n interim period terminating on 30 June 1993;\n 5. Supports the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference\n on the Former Yugoslavia in their efforts to help to define the future status of those territories\n comprising the United Nations Protected Areas, which are integral parts of the territory of the\n Republic of Croatia, and demands full respect for international humanitarian law, and in\n particular the Geneva Conventions, in these Areas;\n 6. Requests the Secretary-General to report urgently to the Security Council on how the\n United Nations peace plan for Croatia can be effectively implemented;\n 7. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of Hungary stated that his country had\nvoted in favour of resolution 815 (1993), even though it could not yet indicate the tasks\nthat the United Nations would have to bear in the future in the settlement of the crisis of\nthe former Yugoslavia. He further noted that his delegation did not regard the resolution\n\n\n\n 398\n"
[399] "just adopted as merely a technical extension of UNPROFOR’s mandate for another three\nmonths. The resolution again reaffirmed that any future mandate must be based on\nrespect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia, and that the UNPAs were\nan integral part of the territory of the Republic of Croatia. The Security Council was\ntherefore clearly establishing the framework within which the parties in Croatia would\n 596\ncontinue political negotiations.\n\n\n The representative of the United States welcomed the resolution just adopted,\nwhich recognized that UNPROFOR was doing its best to contain the fighting and to\ncreate conditions for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Unfortunately, United\nNations efforts had not been totally successful. In Croatia, for example, the inability of\nUNPROFOR to implement the United Nations peacekeeping plan had been partially\nresponsible for the renewal of fighting. That was why the Council was acting to create\nconditions for the complete implementation of that plan. The United States also believed\nit important to stress that the UNPAs were integral parts of Croatia.597\n\n\n The representative of China noted that his delegation supported the principles\ncontained in the resolution just adopted, particularly that of ensuring the sovereignty and\nterritorial integrity of Croatia. He also reiterated his country’s position that the\napplication of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter was due to the special and\nspecific needs of Croatia and that it should not constitute a precedent for the\n 598\npeacekeeping operations of the United Nations.\n\n\n Decision of 30 June 1993 (3248th meeting): resolution 847 (1993)\n\n\n\n\n 596\n Ibid., pp. 8-12.\n 597\n Ibid., p. 12.\n 598\n Ibid., pp. 14-16.\n\n\n 399\n"
[400] " On 15 May 1993, pursuant to resolution 815 (1993), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 599 containing an interim assessment of developments\nrelating to UNPROFOR’s mandate in Croatia.\n The Secretary-General noted that developments since the establishment of\nUNPROFOR had done little to alleviate his original apprehension that there remained a\nnumber of unanswered questions about the extent to which the Force would receive the\nnecessary cooperation. The Serb side had taken the presence of UNPROFOR as a licence\nto freeze the status quo in place, under UNPROFOR “protection” while establishing a\n“state” of the Republic of Serb Krajina” in UNPROFOR’s area of responsibility. The\nCroatian side, meanwhile, had insisted that since the Plan was drafted, the “overall\npolitical solution” that was sought at the time had been found with the recognition of\nCroatia and its admission to the United Nations; the Serbs must therefore accept the\nauthority of Zagreb, which they had rebelled against in the first place.\n The Secretary-General further noted that while UNPROFOR had succeeded in\nensuring the complete withdrawal from the UNPAs, it had not been able to fulfil other\naspects of the original Peacekeeping Plan. The Serbs had failed to demilitarize the\nUNPAs and as a result, little progress had been made towards the return of refugees and\ndisplaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs. They had also refused to cooperate with\nUNPROFOR in the implementation of resolutions 762 (1992) and 769 (1992). They had\nimposed restrictions on UNPROFOR’s monitoring function. The Croatian side, in turn,\nhad manifested its impatience with the United Nations, launching military offensives\nacross the line of confrontation. The view of the Government of Croatia was that\nUNPROFOR should be given enforcement powers to oblige the Serbs to comply with\nSecurity Council resolutions, and to do so with specific objectives against a set timetable,\nfailing which the Government had made it clear it would not agree to further extensions\nof UNPROFOR’s mandate. In light of the virtually irreconcilable differences between the\nparties, the Secretary-General proposed the following options: (a) to declare the mandate\nunworkable and to withdraw the Force; (b) to accept the Croatian view and approve\nenforcement action to exact compliance from the Serbs; and (c) to leave UNPROFOR in\n\n\n\n 599\n S/25777 and Corr.1 and Add.1.\n\n\n 400\n"
[401] "place, with no change in mandate but with limited enhancements of its military capacity.\nIn addition, he proposed certain enhancements to the strength of UNPROFOR. 600\n The Secretary-General, however, decided to await a report from the Co-Chairman\nof the Steering Committee of the ICFY and Special Representative in the former\nYugoslavia before making any recommendations to the Council. The Secretary-General\nalso underscored the importance of pursuing, as soon as possible and parallel to the work\nof the peacekeeping force, a process of active negotiation under the auspices of the ICFY,\nin order to find long-term political solutions to the question of the UNPAs and the\nrelationship between Croats and Serbs in Croatia.\n On 24 June 1993, pursuant to resolution 815 (1993), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted a further report 601 on UNPROFOR. The report focused primarily on\nUNPROFOR’s activities in Croatia, as developments in the former Yugoslav Republic of\nMacedonia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina appeared to warrant an extension of the\nForce’s mandate in those areas.\n The Secretary-General reported that, although intensive efforts had been made by\nthe Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the ICFY and by UNPROFOR, no\nsignificant progress had occurred. At the same time, the presence of UNPROFOR was\nindispensable to control the conflict and to foster a climate in which negotiations between\nparties could be promoted. UNPROFOR’s continued presence could be justified by the\nfact that it was playing a role in preventing the resumption or escalation of conflict, by\nproviding a “breathing-space” for the continued efforts of the Co-Chairmen, and by\nsupporting the provision of essential humanitarian assistance to the victims of the\nconflict. According to the Co-Chairmen, the termination of the mandate would risk the\nresumption of a major conflict in the region and cause severe adverse consequences for\nhumanitarian relief operations. In view of those considerations, the Secretary-General\nrecommended that UNPROFOR be maintained with its existing mandate, and its mandate\nbe extended for a further period of three months, until 30 September 1993. He noted,\nhowever, that significant progress would be required in the “peacemaking” efforts of the\n\n 600\n The enhancements were outlined in paragraphs 22, 24 and 25 of the report, which were subsequently\nreferred to by the Council in resolution 847 (1993), operative paragraph 1. For details relating to the enhancements, see\nChapter V of the current supplement to the Repertoire.\n 601\n S/25993.\n\n\n 401\n"
[402] "Co-Chairmen if a further renewal were to be contemplated. He also warned that, should\nthe threats to the safety of security of United Nations personnel become even more\nserious, he would have to inform the Council that a viable basis for the continuation of\nthe Force no longer existed.\n At its 3248th meeting, on 30 June, the Council included in its agenda the item\nentitled: “United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)”, as well as the above reports.\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of Croatia, at\nhis request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President\n(Spain) then drew the attention of the Council members to the text of a draft resolution 602\nthat had been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations and to several\n 603\nother documents , including a letter dated 25 June from the representative of Croatia to\nthe Secretary-General. The letter transmitted a letter of the same date from the President\nof Croatia in which he stated that a limited extension of UNPROFOR’s mandate was only\npartially acceptable, i.e for the period of one month. However, if progress was made\nduring that one month period, Croatia would be willing to accept the prolongation of\nUNPROFOR’s role in Croatia under a new mandate. The new mandate must give\nUNPROFOR the authority and instructions to enforce and implement all the relevant\nresolutions of the Council in accordance with a specific timetable. Moreover, any\nagreement on the new mandate could be concluded only between Croatia and the United\nNations and be separated from the UNPROFOR mandates in Bosnia and Herzegovina\nand Macedonia. The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted\nunanimously as resolution 847 (1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992 and all subsequent resolutions\n relating to the United Nations Protection Force,\n Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of 15 and 25 May 1993 and of 24\n June 1993,\n\n\n 602\n S/26014.\n 603\n S/25973 and S/26002, letters dated 18 and 25 June 1993 from the representative of Croatia addressed to\nthe Secretary-General; S/26017, letter dated 30 June 1993 from the representative of Hungary addressed to the\nPresident of the Security Council.\n\n\n 402\n"
[403] " Having considered also the letter dated 26 June 1993 from the President of the Republic\nof Croatia addressed to the Secretary-General,\n Recalling the overwhelming importance of seeking, on the basis of the relevant\nresolutions of the Security Council, comprehensive political solutions to the conflicts in the\nterritory of the former Yugoslavia, and of sustaining confidence and stability in the former\nYugoslav Republic of Macedonia,\n Strongly condemning continuing military attacks within the territory of the Republic of\nCroatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reaffirming its commitment to\nensure respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia and of the other Member\nStates where the Force is deployed,\n Calling on the parties and others concerned to reach an agreement on confidence-building\nmeasures in the territory of Croatia, including the opening of the railroad between Zagreb and\nSplit, the highway between Zagreb and Zupanja, and the Adriatic oil pipeline, securing the\nuninterrupted traffic across the Maslenica straits, and restoring the supply of electricity and\nwater to all regions of Croatia, including the United Nations Protected Areas,\n Determined to ensure the security of the Force and its freedom of movement for all its\nmissions, and to these ends, as regards the Force in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina,\nacting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General of 24 June 1993 and the request for\nadditional resources contained in paragraphs 22, 24 and 25 of his report of 15 May 1993;\n 2. Requests the Secretary-General to report one month after the adoption of the present\nresolution on progress towards implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for\nCroatia and all relevant Security Council resolutions, taking into account the position of the\nGovernment of Croatia, and decides to reconsider, in the light of that report, the mandate of\nthe United Nations Protection Force in the territory of the Republic of Croatia;\n 3. Decides, in this context, to extend the mandate of the Force for an additional interim\nperiod terminating on 30 September 1993;\n 4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council regularly informed on\ndevelopments in regard to the implementation of the mandate of the Force;\n 5. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Decision of 20 August 1993: letter from the President to the Secretary-General\n\n\n\n\n 403\n"
[404] " By a letter 604 dated 18 August 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General reported that, following the necessary training exercises\nin coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations\nnow had the initial operational capability for the use of air power in support of the United\nNations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina.\n\n\n By a letter 605 dated 20 August 1993, the President of the Security Council\ninformed the Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n “I have the honour to inform you that I have shared the contents of your letter to me of 18\n August 1993, in which you informed me that the United Nations now has the initial\n operational capability for the use of air power in support of the United Nations Protection\n Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with all members of the Security Council.”\n\n\n\n Decision of 30 September 1993 (3284th meeting): resolution 869 (1993)\n\n On 20 September 1993, pursuant to resolution 743 (1993), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a further report 606 on UNPROFOR to assist the Council in its\ndeliberations on the renewal of the mandate of UNPROFOR.\n The Secretary-General reported that the President of Croatia, in a letter to him\ndated 13 September 1993, had advanced a number of considerations which he wished to\nbe taken into account. One of his suggestions was that UNPROFOR be divided into three\nparts – UNPROFOR (Croatia), UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and UNPROFOR\n(the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) – while retaining its integrated military,\nlogistical and administrative structure under the command of one Special Representative\nof the Secretary-General and one theatre Force Commander. In view of the importance\nattached by the Croatian authorities to such a division, and taking into account the\ncircumstances prevailing on the ground at that time, the Secretary General had decided to\ngrant this suggestion favourable consideration.\n\n 604\n S/26335.\n 605\n S/26336.\n 606\n S/26470 and Add.1.\n\n\n 404\n"
[405] " Turning to the question of UNPROFOR’s mandate, the Secretary-General\nreiterated that the fundamental solution to the conflict needed to be sought through\npolitical dialogue. The parties bore the primary responsibility for achieving such a\nsolution and they needed to take steps towards reconciliation. In that process, the\nprincipal objective of UNPROFOR could only be to keep the peace, thus permitting\nnegotiations to take place on an overall political settlement. Despite the fact that\nconditions on the ground had prevented UNPROFOR from carrying out essential\nelements of its mandate, its presence in Croatia had nevertheless helped to contain a\nvolatile situation. The Secretary-General therefore recommended that the Security\nCouncil renew UNPROFOR’s mandate for a period of six months; demand that the\nparties in Croatia conclude an immediate cease-fire and cooperate with UNPROFOR, so\nthat it might fulfil the peacekeeping aspects of its mandate; and direct the parties to\ncooperate with UNPROFOR in restoring water, power, communications and other\neconomic necessities. To enhance the security force, he had requested the extension of\nclose air support to the territory of Croatia. He would report to the Council by 30\nNovember 1993 on the progress achieved by the Co-Chairmen and UNPROFOR and\n 607\nmake further recommendations.\n At its 3284th meeting, on 30 September 1993, the Council included the item\nentitled: “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council Resolution 743\n(1992) (S/26470 and Add.1)” in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the\nPresident (Venezuela) drew the attention of the Council members to the text of a draft\nresolution 608 that had been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations and\nto other documents. 609\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 869 (1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n\n\n 607\n The Secretary-General’s recommendations were contained in paragraph 16 of his report, to which the\nCouncil subsequently referred in resolution 871 (1993), operative paragraph 1.\n 608\n S/26513.\n 609\n S/26464, letter dated 17 September 1993 from the Chargé d’affaires of Yugoslavia addressed to the\nSecretary-General; and S/26491, letter dated 24 September 1993 from the representative of Croatia addressed to the\nPresident of the Security Council.\n\n\n 405\n"
[406] " The Security Council,\n Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992 and all subsequent resolutions\n relating to the United Nations Protection Force,\n Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of the Force and its freedom of\n movement for all its missions, and to these ends, as regards the Force in the Republic of\n Croatia and in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under Chapter VII of the\n Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force for an additional\n period terminating on 1 October 1993;\n 2. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Decision of 1 October 1993 (3285th meeting): resolution 870 (1993)\n\n At its 3285th meeting, on 1 October 1993, the Council included the item entitled:\n“United Nations Protection Force: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security\nCouncil resolution 743 (1992) (S/26470 and Add.1)” in its agenda. Following the\nadoption of the agenda, the President (Brazil) drew the attention of the Council members\nto the text of a draft resolution 610 that had been prepared in the course of the Council’s\nprior consultations and to a revision that had been made to the draft in its provisional\nform.\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote as orally revised and it was adopted\nunanimously as resolution 870 (1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992 and all subsequent resolutions\n relating to the United Nations Protection Force,\n Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of the Force and its freedom of\n movement for all its missions, and to these ends, as regards the Force in the Republic of\n Croatia and in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under Chapter VII of the\n Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force for an additional\n period terminating on 5 October 1993;\n\n 610\n S/26525.\n\n\n 406\n"
[407] " 2. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Decision of 4 October 1993 (3286th meeting): resolution 871 (1993)\n\n At its 3286th meeting, on 4 October 1993, the Council included the item entitled:\n“United Nations Protection Force: further report of the Secretary-General pursuant to\nSecurity Council resolution 743 (1992) (S/26470 and Add.1”. Following the adoption of\nthe agenda, the Council invited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and\nCroatia, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in\naccordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council’s\nprovisional rules of procedure. The President (Brazil) then drew the attention of the\nCouncil members to the text of a draft resolution 611 that had been prepared in the course\n 612\nof the Council’s prior consultations and to several other documents , including a letter\ndated 24 September 1993 from the representative of Croatia addressed to the President of\nthe Security Council, transmitting a letter of the same date from the Minister for Foreign\nAffairs addressed to the President of the Security Council. In that letter, the Minister\noutlined certain measures which his Government insisted should be an essential part of\nthe future of UNPROFOR’s presence on the territory of Croatia. If such measures were\nnot incorporated in the Council’s resolution concerning the extension of the UNPROFOR\nmandate, Croatia would consider the mandate terminated and would request the\nwithdrawal of all UNPROFOR contingents by 30 November 1993.\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 871 (1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992 and all subsequent resolutions\n relating to the United Nations Protection Force,\n\n 611\n S/26518.\n 612\n S/S/26464, letter dated 17 September 1993 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia addressed to the\nSecretary-General; S/26468, letter dated 19 September 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of\nthe Security Council; S/26491, letter dated 24 September 1993 from the representative of Croatia addressed to the\nPresident of the Security Council; and S/26517, letter dated 30 September 1993 from the representatives of China,\nFrance, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States addressed to the Secretary-General,\ntransmitting the text of the statement issued on 30 September 1993 by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the five\npermanent members of the Security Council following a meeting with the Secretary-General.\n\n\n 407\n"
[408] " Reaffirming also its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent\nrelevant resolutions,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 20 September 1993,\n Having also considered the letter of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of\nCroatia dated 24 September 1993,\n Deeply concerned that the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of\nCroatia, and all relevant Council resolutions, in particular resolution 769 (1992) of 7 August\n1992, have not yet been fully implemented,\n Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of the Force and its freedom of\nmovement for all its missions, and to these ends, as regards the Force in the Republic of\nCroatia and in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under Chapter VII of the\nCharter of the United Nations,\n 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 20 September 1993, in particular\nparagraph 16 thereof;\n 2. Notes the intention of the Secretary-General to establish, as described in his report,\nthree subordinate commands within the United Nations Protection Force - UNPROFOR\n(Croatia), UNPROFOR (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and UNPROFOR (the former Yugoslav\nRepublic of Macedonia) - while retaining the existing dispositions in all other respects for the\ndirection and conduct of the United Nations operation in the territory of the former\nYugoslavia;\n 3. Condemns once again continuing military attacks within the territory of the Republic\nof Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reaffirms its commitment to\nensure respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia, of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina and of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where the Force is\ndeployed;\n 4. Reaffirms the crucial importance of the full and prompt implementation of the United\nNations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia, including the provisions of the plan\nconcerning the demilitarization of the United Nations Protected Areas, and calls upon the\nsignatories of that plan and all others concerned, in particular the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), to cooperate in its full implementation;\n 5. Declares that continued non-cooperation in the implementation of the relevant\nresolutions of the Security Council or external interference, in respect of the full\nimplementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia, would\nhave serious consequences, and in this connection affirms that full normalization of the\n\n\n 408\n"
[409] "international community's position towards those concerned will take into account their\nactions in implementing all relevant Council resolutions, including those relating to the\npeace-keeping plan for Croatia;\n 6. Calls for an immediate cease-fire agreement between the Government of Croatia and\nthe local Serb authorities in the Protected Areas, mediated under the auspices of the\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and urges them to cooperate fully and\nunconditionally in its implementation, as well as in the implementation of all the relevant\nCouncil resolutions;\n 7. Stresses the importance it attaches, as a first step towards the implementation of the\nUnited Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia, to the process of restoration\nof the authority of the Republic of Croatia in the pink zones, and in this context calls for the\nrevival of the Joint Commission established under the chairmanship of the United Nations\nProtection Force;\n 8. Urges all the parties and others concerned to cooperate with the Force in reaching and\nimplementing an agreement on confidence-building measures including the restoration of\nelectricity, water and communications in all regions of Croatia, and stresses in this context\nthe importance it attaches to the opening of the railroad between Zagreb and Split, the\nhighway between Zagreb and Zupanja, and the Adriatic oil pipeline, securing the\nuninterrupted traffic across the Maslenica strait, and restoring the supply of electricity and\nwater to all regions of Croatia including the Protected Areas;\n 9. Authorizes the Force, in carrying out its mandate in Croatia, acting in self-defence, to\ntake the necessary measures, including the use of force, to ensure its security and its freedom\nof movement;\n 10. Decides to continue to review urgently the extension of close air support to the Force\nin the territory of Croatia as recommended by the Secretary-General in his report of 20\nSeptember 1993;\n 11. Decides in this context to extend the mandate of the Force for an additional period\nterminating on 31 March 1994;\n 12. Requests the Secretary-General to report two months after the adoption of the present\nresolution on progress towards implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for\nthe Republic of Croatia and all relevant Security Council resolutions, taking into account the\nposition of the Croatian Government, as well as on the outcome of the negotiations within the\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, and decides to reconsider the mandate of\nthe Force in the light of that report;\n\n\n 409\n"
[410] " 13. Also requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed on\n developments in regard to the implementation of the Force's mandate;\n 14. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of France noted that it had not been\neasy to negotiate the resolution just adopted, for it had not been a “routine” extension of\nthe mandate of UNPROFOR. The Council had had to take into account the concerns of\nthe parties, as well as new operational needs. It had attempted to respond to Croatia’s\nrequests, without running the risk of promising more than it could deliver. He contended\nthat the resolution established a balance between the legitimate concerns of the Croatian\nGovernment and the means available to the Council and UNPROFOR. His delegation\nunderstood that the Council would be able to take action the following week on the\nSecretary-General’s proposal to extend close air support in Bosnia and Herzegovina to\nUNPROFOR’s operations in Croatia. 613\n\n\n The representative of the United States stated that her delegation considered the\nextension of UNPROFOR’s mandate essential to the international community’s efforts to\nminimize the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, prevent it from spreading, provide\nhumanitarian relief and, most important, facilitate negotiated solutions to all aspects of\nthe conflict. She also observed that, although much attention had been focused on the\noperations of UNPROFOR in Croatia, it was important to emphasize that UNPROFOR’s\nmandate and the effects of its extension applied with equal importance to Bosnia and\nHerzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. What was important also\nwas to look to the future and begin the difficult work of implementing the Vance plan in\ngood faith. Before concluding, she observed that, while UNPROFOR (Croatia) would\nbecome one of the subordinate commands within the integrated command structure of\nUNPROFOR as a whole, the resolution just adopted established no precedent for the\ncommand and control arrangements for any peacekeeping force that might be led by\n 614\nNATO in order to implement a peace agreement in Bosnia.\n\n\n 613\n S/PV.3286, pp. 5-6.\n 614\n Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n\n\n 410\n"
[411] " The representative of China noted that the consent of the parties was a\nprecondition to the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations and the\nextension of their mandates. Since the Croatian Government had agreed to the extension\nof the mandate, the Chinese delegation had voted in favour of the resolution just adopted.\nThe speaker further stated that China was not in favour of invoking Chapter VII of the\nCharter in peacekeeping operations, nor was it in favour of using sanctions as a means to\nresolve conflicts. His delegation therefore had reservations on certain elements in the\nresolution. In addition, prudence should be exercised with regard to the extension of air\nsupport to UNPROFOR in Croatia, so as to avoid further complicating the matter and\n 615\nadversely affecting the political settlement process.\n\n\n The representative of Hungary stated that his delegation had voted in favour of\nthe resolution just adopted because it wished to maintain UNPROFOR operations on the\nterritory of Croatia and to do everything possible to prevent a resurgence of armed\nhostilities along its southern borders. Hungary gave its full support to the resolution\nbecause it reflected the special problems facing Croatia and the region. It hoped that the\nresolution might help to create the necessary conditions for a peaceful settlement of all\ndisputes on the basis of respect for the principles of territorial integrity and the rights of\nethnic communities. 616\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that UNPROFOR was playing\na particularly important role in stabilizing the situation and creating conditions for the\nimplementation of agreements that remained to be signed. He cautioned that withdrawing\nUnited Nations forces from Croatia, could have “catastrophic consequences”, leading to\nan escalation of the entire conflict in the former Yugoslavia. He also noted that, pursuant\nto the resolution just adopted, the Council would continue to review urgently the question\nof extending close air support to UNPROFOR in Croatia. The Russian delegation\nunderstood that the mechanism for such an extension would be the same as that provided\n\n 615\n Ibid., pp. 7-9.\n 616\n Ibid., pp. 10-11.\n\n\n 411\n"
[412] "for in resolution 836 (1993). It was also important that an agreement be reached on\nconfidence-building measures, which could be promoted by restoring water and\nelectricity supplies and communications, and by satisfying other economic needs of the\npeople. 617\n\n\n Decision of 17 December 1993: letter from the President to the Secretary-General\n\n On 1 December 1993, pursuant to resolution 871 (1993), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 618 on progress towards implementation of the United\nNations peacekeeping plan for Croatia and all relevant Security Council resolutions, as\nwell as on the outcome of talks within the framework of ICFY.\n The Secretary-General reported that a series of talks, chaired by the ICFY, had\nbeen held between the parties during November 1993. The aims of the talks had been to\ndiscuss a cease-fire, economic reconstruction and political questions. While some\nprogress had been made towards a cease-fire and in identifying economic matters of\nmutual interest, both sides had requested modifications to the proposed cease-fire\nagreement. In the meantime, they had agreed to establish a military Joint Commission to\nwork on outstanding areas of dispute in relation to the lines of separation that would be\nused once the cease-fire was implemented.\n The Secretary-General observed that the various initiatives619 that were under\nway, could pave the way for implementation of the peace-keeping plan. Progress was\nslow and was quickly halted if one side attacked territory held by the other. He did not\nrecommend reconsideration by the Council of UNPROFOR’s mandate. However, it was\nessential that the two sides intensify their efforts for the achievement of a cease-fire\nagreement, for the institution of practical measures of economic cooperation and for the\n 620\nnegotiation of a lasting political settlement.\n\n\n\n 617\n Ibid., pp. 22-25.\n 618\n S/26828.\n 619\n The report mentioned President Tudjman’s “Peace Initiative” (S/26681,appendix), which addressed the\nsituations in the UN protected areas and in Bosnia, and future cooperation in the area of the former Yugoslavia.\n 620\n The Secretary-General’s observations were contained in paragraph 16 of the report, which was referred\nto in the subsequent letter addressed to him from the President of the Security Council.\n\n\n 412\n"
[413] " By a letter 621 dated 17 December 1993, the President of the Security Council\ninformed the Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n “The members of the Security Council have taken note of your report of 1 December\n 1993 submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 871 (1993), in the light of which they\n have completed the review provided for in paragraph 12 of that resolution.\n “They share the observations contained in paragraph 16 of this report regarding the\n mandate of the United Nations Protection Force.”\n\n\n Decision of 31 March 1994 (3356th meeting): resolution 908 (1994)\n\n On 11 March 1994, pursuant to resolution 900 (1994), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 622 on UNPROFOR.\n The Secretary-General noted that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was\nundergoing rapid changes, which had provided a multitude of new opportunities to make\nsignificant progress towards a peaceful settlement. The significant developments that had\ntaken place during the reporting period included the active and direct involvement of\nmajor powers in the negotiation process and the signature of a cease-fire agreement, on\n23 February in Zagreb, between the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian\nDefence Council (HVO). In addition, the signing on 1 March 1994 of the Framework\nAgreement establishing a Federation in the Areas of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina with a Majority Bosniac and Croatian Population, and the Outline of a\nPreliminary Agreement for a Confederation between the Republic of Croatia and that\nFederation had opened new avenues for a political settlement.\n Given that fluid situation, the Secretary-General could only provide an outline of\n 623\nthe major concepts and requirements of UNPROFOR. The Secretary-General also\ncommented on the utility of extending the concept of safe areas to Mostar, Vitez and\nMaglaj. While he did not believe there was a need to apply the protection defined in\n\n\n\n 621\n S/26890.\n 622\n S/1994/291 and Corr.1 and Add.1.\n 623\n For details see Section II of the report of the Secretary-General. Section II was subsequently endorsed by\nthe Council in resolution 908 (1994), operative paragraph 11.\n\n\n 413\n"
[414] "resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993) to Mostar and Vitez where the cease-fire\nprevailed, he was of the opinion that, in view of the continuing hostilities in and around\nMaglaj, there may be a merit in extending the safe area concept to this city.\n The Secretary-General further observed that the recent developments in Bosnia\nhad created a new situation, which should provide numerous opportunities for\nUNPROFOR to make substantial progress in the implementation of the mandates\nentrusted to it. At that critical juncture, however, UNPROFOR’s ability was severely\nlimited by the lack of military resources. He therefore recommended that the Council\nconsider increasing the authorized strength of UNPROFOR to 8,250 additional troops.\nShould the Council decide to extend the safe area concept to Maglaj, an additional 1,500\ntroops would be required.\n\n\n On 16 March 1994, pursuant to resolution 871 (1993), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 624 containing a comprehensive review of\nUNPROFOR’s role and functioning.\n The Secretary-General observed that the dilemma confronting the international\ncommunity as the expiry of UNPROFOR’s current mandate approached, was whether to\nconsider that the limited successes of UNPROFOR continued to justify the United\nNations enormous expenditure of resources and lives or whether the Force’s ability to\nimplement all the tasks assigned to it warrant an end to, or reduction of, its efforts.\nAnother option would be to redefine its mandates commensurate with the resources the\ninternational community was prepared to make available to UNPROFOR. However, he\ndid not believe that at that stage extensive redefinition was advisable. As he had\npreviously pointed out to the Council, the choice in Croatia was between continuing a\nmission that was clearly unable to fulfil its original mandate in full or withdrawing and\nrisking a renewed war that would probably result in appeals for UNPROFOR to return to\nrestore peace. Given such a choice, soldiering on in hope seemed preferable to\nwithdrawing in abdication. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the continued deployment of\nUNPROFOR would serve a three-pronged strategy: (a) to use military means for\n\n\n\n 624\n S/1994/300.\n\n\n 414\n"
[415] "humanitarian purposes; (b) to seek to end the conflict itself by creating conditions\nfavourable to diplomatic negotiations on a political settlement; and (c) to provide a\ncapacity to help the parties to implement agreements resulting from the diplomatic\nnegotiations. Since the demilitarization of Sarajevo in February 1994, the military means\nof the international community were being used more directly to serve its diplomatic\nobjectives. That offered new grounds for hope for an overall solution.\n The Secretary-General therefore recommended the renewal of UNPROFOR's\nmandate for a further 12 months beyond 31 March 1994. That period was proposed in the\ninterest of efficiency, although he would be prepared, should the situation on the ground\nimprove, to recommend reducing the duration of the Force's mandate. He also\nrecommended that authority for close air support be extended to the territory of Croatia.\n\n\n On 24 March 1994, pursuant to resolutions 844 (1993), 836 (1993) and 776\n(1992), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report 625 containing his plans to\ndirect UNPROFOR to reopen Tuzla airport for the delivery of humanitarian supplies and\nrelated purposes.\n The Secretary-General noted that the opening of Tuzla airport had been repeatedly\nrequested by the Tuzla authorities since the spring of 1993. While the Bosnian Serb\nauthorities on the ground had not previously raised objections to the opening of the airport\nunder United Nations control, Dr. Karadzic, at a meting on 18 November 1993 with the\nUnited Nations had refused to permit its opening prior to the conclusion of an overall\nsettlement, stating his strong fear of possible misuse of the airport for military purposes.\nThat same position was repeated on several other occasions. Given the increasing\nhumanitarian need, the Secretary-General had requested UNPROFOR to draw up a detailed\nplan for the opening of Tuzla airport. That plan described three scenarios based on varying\ndegrees of consent of the parties. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General had\nbeen liaising with the parties to open the airport with their consent. On 6 March, Dr.\nKaradzic had agreed to the opening of the airport in Tuzla for humanitarian purposes under\nUnited Nations control, on certain conditions which were rejected by the other party. The\n\n\n\n 625\n S/1994/333 and Add.1.\n\n\n 415\n"
[416] "Secretary-General, however, believed that the opening of Tuzla airport for UNPROFOR\npurposes was now feasible, and that humanitarian flights would be possible before long. His\nSpecial Representative was therefore continuing intensive negotiations with the parties in\norder to achieve an agreement which would govern the modalities of the full-fledged\nreopening of the airport. He also outlined the additional resources that would be required in\n 626\norder to support UNPROFOR’s activities at Tuzla airport. He further noted that, as the\nopening of Tuzla airport was being pursued for the purpose of improving the capability to\ndeliver humanitarian assistance, the activity would fall within the existing mandate given by\nCouncil resolutions 836 (1993) and 844 (1994). However, in light of the political\nimportance of such an action and of the need for additional resources to ensure the safe\noperation of the airport, he believed that the explicit approval and support of the Security\nCouncil was required. He therefore recommended that the Council approve UNPROFOR's\nplans for the opening of Tuzla airport for humanitarian purposes, as well as the additional\nresources requested for that purpose.\n\n\n By a letter 627 dated 30 March 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General informed the Council of the conclusion on 29 March 1994\nin Zagreb of a cease-fire agreement between the Croatian Government and the local Serb\nauthorities in the UNPAs, which copy of it was attached to the letter as an annex. He\nnoted that the implementation of the cease-fire agreement would involve, inter alia:\ninterpositioning UNPROFOR forces in a zone of separation; establishing additional\ncontrol points, observation posts and patrols; and monitoring the withdrawal of heavy\nweapons out of range of the contact line. He suggested that the Council might wish to\nwelcome that development and to authorize UNPROFOR to perform the functions called\nfor in the agreement. He also noted that UNPROFOR would require additional military\nresources in order to undertake those tasks, and he recommended that the Council\nauthorize the provision of those additional resources.\n\n\n\n 626\n The Secretary-General’s observations relating to the additional resource requirements were contained in\nparagraph 14 of the report, which was subsequently approved by the Council in resolution 908 (1994), operative\nparagraph 5. An estimate of the costs for the additional requirements was submitted as an addendum to the report.\n 627\n S/1994/367.\n\n\n 416\n"
[417] " At its 3356th meeting, on 31 March 1994, the Council included the above reports\nand the letter in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate in\nthe discussion without the right to vote. The President (France) then drew the attention of\nthe Council members to the text of a draft resolution628 that had been prepared in the\ncourse of the Council’s prior consultations and to several other documents 629, including a\nletter 630 dated 16 March addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting a letter of the\nsame date from the President of Croatia to the Secretary-General, in which he agreed to\nthe extension of UNPROFOR’s mandate and enclosed a series of goals and actions which\nhe considered to be necessary for the success of the renewed mandate.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of Pakistan stated that his delegation,\nalong with other members of the Non-Aligned Movement in the Council, had favoured\nthe designation of Maglaj as a safe area, and regretted that it had not found the support of\nall members in the Council. His delegation, however, would support the draft resolution\nbefore the Council. He added that the international community must demonstrate its\nresolve to arrive at a just and lasting solution to the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina by\ntaking all appropriate measures to reverse the consequences of aggression against that\ncountry. The lands seized by the use of force and “ ethnic cleansing” must be returned.\nThe sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and\n 631\nHerzegovina must be restored and respected.\n\n\n The representative of the Czech Republic questioned the Secretary-General’s\nsuggestion that 1,500 additional troops would be required to turn Maglaj into a safe area,\n\n\n 628\n S/1994/359.\n 629\n S/1994/302 and 336, letters dated 15 and 23 March 1994, respectively, from the representative of\nBulgaria addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1994/305 and Corr.1, letter dated 16 March 1994 from\nthe representative of Croatia addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1994/328, letter dated 22 March 1994 from the\nrepresentative of Greece addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1994/330, letter dated 22 March 1994\nfrom the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council; S/1994/331, letter dated 23 March 1994\nfrom the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General; and S/1994/350, letter dated 25 March\n1994 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia addressed to the President of the Security Council.\n 630\n S/1994/305 and Corr.1.\n 631\n Ibid., pp. 3-5.\n\n\n 417\n"
[418] "when Srebrenica and Zepa had been granted the status of safe areas with far fewer troops\nthan that. He contended that experience had shown that declaring an area safe\ncontributed, in and of itself, to the safety of the area, whether or not it was truly safe from\nthe military point of view. His delegation could not but regret that some of the energy the\nCouncil devoted to the almost moot issue of Maglaj had not been spent on what appeared\nto be an even worse situation in Banjaluka. The city had been in the hands of ethnic Serbs\n 632\nfor some time now and “ethnic cleansing” continued unabated there.\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 908 (1994). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the conflicts in the territory of the\n Former Yugoslavia, and reaffirming in this context its resolution 871 (1993) of 4 October\n 1993 on the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force,\n Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of 11 March, 16 March and 24\n March 1994 and his letter dated 30 March 1994,\n Having considered also the letter dated 16 March 1994 from the President of the\n Republic of Croatia addressed to the Secretary-General,\n Emphasizing the need for a negotiated settlement accepted by all parties, and welcoming\n the continuing efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International\n Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,\n Welcoming also the cease-fire agreement between the Government of the Republic of\n Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Croat party and the signature of the Washington\n Framework Agreement of 1 March 1994 between the Government of the Republic of Bosnia\n and Herzegovina and the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the Bosnian Croat party,\n as steps towards an overall settlement,\n Underlining the importance of involving the Bosnian Serb party in further efforts to\n achieve an overall negotiated settlement,\n Welcoming the cease-fire agreement signed on 29 March 1994 between the Republic of\n Croatia and the local Serb authorities in the United Nations Protected Areas, which was\n\n\n 632\n Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n\n\n 418\n"
[419] "facilitated by the Russian Federation, the United States of America, the European Union and\nthe International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,\n Welcoming also the discussions between the Republic of Croatia and the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), pursuant to the joint statement of 19\nJanuary 1994,\n Welcoming further the recent significant progress achieved in and around Sarajevo, and\nstressing that a strong and visible presence of the Force in this area, as well as in other areas\nof the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, within the\nframework of its mandate, is essential to consolidate such progress,\n Recalling the statement by the President of the Security Council of 14 March 1994 and\nthe joint letter of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia dated 17 March 1994, and in this\ncontext taking note of the recent developments in Maglaj,\n Determined to put an end to the suffering of the civilian population in and around Maglaj,\n Welcoming the ongoing efforts aimed at the reopening of the Tuzla airport for\nhumanitarian purposes,\n Welcoming also the work undertaken by the joint civil mission to Sarajevo of the\nGovernments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United\nStates of America,\n Welcoming further the dispatch of the European Union fact-finding mission to Mostar\nwith a view to helping improve living conditions in that city and contributing to the\nimplementation of the agreements between the parties on it,\n Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of the Force and its freedom of\nmovement in all its missions, and to these ends, as regards the Force in the Republic of\nCroatia and in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under Chapter VII of the\nCharter of the United Nations,\n\n\n A\n\n\n 1. Welcomes the reports of the Secretary-General of 11 March, 16 March and 24 March,\nand his letter dated 30 March 1994;\n 2. Reaffirms its commitment to ensure respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity\nof the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav\nRepublic of Macedonia, where the United Nations Protection Force is deployed;\n\n\n\n\n 419\n"
[420] " 3. Decides to extend the mandate of the Force for an additional period terminating on 30\nSeptember 1994;\n 4. Recognizes the need, following recent progress, for increased resources for the Force,\ndescribed in the reports of the Secretary-General of 11 and 16 March 1994 and his letter\ndated 30 March 1994, decides, as an initial step, to authorize an increase of Force personnel\nby up to 3,500 additional troops, and also decides to take action by 30 April 1994 at the latest\non the further troop requirements recommended by the Secretary-General in the\nabove-mentioned documents, with a view to providing the Force with the means necessary\nfor the implementation of its mandate;\n 5. Approves the Force's plans, described in the report of the Secretary-General of 24\nMarch 1994, for the reopening of the Tuzla airport for humanitarian purposes, and authorizes\nadditional resources requested in paragraph 14 of that report for these purposes;\n 6. Calls upon Member States to assist the Secretary-General to implement paragraphs 4\nand 5 above by contributing personnel, equipment and training;\n 7. Urges that necessary arrangements be concluded, including, where appropriate,\nagreements on the status of forces and other personnel with the Republic of Croatia, the\nFormer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia\nand Montenegro);\n 8. Decides that Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or\narrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close\ncoordination with the Secretary-General and the Force, all necessary measures to extend close\nair support to the territory of the Republic of Croatia, in defence of Force personnel in the\nperformance of the Force's mandate, as recommended by the Secretary-General in paragraph\n12 of his report of 16 March 1994;\n 9. Urges the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in the United Nations\nProtected Areas to comply with the cease-fire agreement signed on 29 March 1994, and\nwelcomes the efforts undertaken by the Force towards implementing this agreement;\n 10. Also urges all the parties and others concerned to cooperate with the Force in\nreaching and implementing an agreement on confidence-building measures in all regions of\nthe Republic of Croatia including the United Nations Protected Areas, further urges the\nRepublic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in the United Nations Protected Areas, inter\nalia, to revive the Joint Commission process with regard to communication links and\neconomic issues, and recognizes in this context the importance of the immediate reopening of\n\n\n\n\n 420\n"
[421] "the Adriatic oil pipeline for the economies of the Republic of Croatia and of the other\ncountries in the region;\n 11. Endorses the proposals in section II of the report of the Secretary-General of 11\nMarch 1994, on arrangements relating to the cease-fire and ensuring the freedom of\nmovement in and around Sarajevo, including the additional tasks set out in paragraph 14\nthereof, emphasizes the need for the Force to deploy its resources in a flexible manner, in\nparticular in and around the safe areas, and authorizes the Force to carry out these tasks in\nrelation to the cease-fire entered into by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina and the Bosnian Croat party and, following a report by the Secretary-General\nand within existing resources, in relation to any further cease-fire agreed between the parties\nin Bosnia and Herzegovina in pursuit of the peace process;\n 12. Encourages the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former\nYugoslavia, in cooperation with the authorities of the Former Yugoslav Republic of\nMacedonia, to use his good offices, as appropriate, to contribute to the maintenance of peace\nand stability in that Republic;\n 13. Urges the parties to seize the opportunity provided by the Force's continuation to\nbring the peace process to a successful conclusion;\n 14. Requests the Secretary-General to keep it regularly informed on progress towards\nimplementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of Croatia and all\nrelevant Security Council resolutions, taking into account the position of the Government of\nthe Republic of Croatia, as well as on the outcome of the negotiations within the International\nConference on the Former Yugoslavia, and decides to reconsider the mandate of the Force at\nany time according to the developments on the ground and in the negotiations;\n\n\n B\n 15. Welcomes the appointment by the Secretary-General of a senior civilian official for\nthe restoration of essential public services in and around Sarajevo in accordance with the\nprovisions of resolution 900 (1994) of 4 March 1994;\n 16. Commends in this context the setting up of the Interim Coordination Board to assess\nthe situation in Sarajevo in order to facilitate the task of this senior official;\n 17. Welcomes the establishment by the Secretary-General on 21 March 1994 of a\nvoluntary trust fund for the restoration of essential public services in and around Sarajevo, in\naccordance with the provisions of resolution 900 (1994), and strongly appeals to the\ninternational community to make voluntary financial contributions to this trust fund;\n\n\n 421\n"
[422] " 18. Notes with appreciation the steps being taken by the Secretary-General, the Force and\n other United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations to restore normal life to all\n areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, encourages them to continue their efforts,\n and in this context requests the Secretary-General to consider ways and means of further\n enhancing the work of the civilian component of the Force;\n 19. Calls on the parties to honour their commitments to ensure the Office of the United\n Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Force unimpeded access throughout the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in performance of their mandate, and in particular calls\n upon the Bosnian Croat party to release infrastructure equipment and material urgently\n needed for humanitarian relief;\n\n\n C\n\n\n 20. Welcomes the presence of Force personnel and the arrival of humanitarian convoys in\n Maglaj, but expresses once again its deep concern at the situation there;\n 21. Welcomes also the contribution of the Force, within its available resources, to the\n restoration of safety and security to the area in and around Maglaj in order to promote the\n well-being of its inhabitants;\n 22. Demands that the Bosnian Serb party cease forthwith all military operations against\n the town of Maglaj and remove all obstacles to free access to it, condemns all such obstacles,\n and calls upon all parties to show restraint;\n 23. Takes note of the assessment by the Secretary-General of the feasibility of extending\n the safe area concept to Maglaj, and requests him to keep the situation under review and to\n report to the Council as appropriate;\n\n\n D\n\n\n 24. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed on\n developments in regard to the implementation of the Force's mandate;\n 25. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that the\nimplementation of confidence-building measures in the UNPAs referred to in the\nresolution and the revival of the joint-commission process were steps which should be\n\n 422\n"
[423] "taken quickly, paving the way for a final settlement involving autonomy for the Serbs\nwithin the existing borders of Croatia. His delegation welcomed the increase in\nUNPROFOR’s strength provided for in the resolution just adopted, which would allow\nthose additional personnel already available from Member States to be deployed\nimmediately. It also welcomed the resolution’s authorization of additional personnel for\nthe reopening of Tuzla airport. The speaker cautioned, however, that further\nreinforcement of UNPROFOR would be needed if the cease-fires in central Bosnia and\nCroatia were to be implemented fully. He also argued that tasks could not be added\nindefinitely if the necessary resources were not available. His Government would have\nbeen prepared to join in authorizing all the additional personnel requested by the\nSecretary-General. In the following month the Council would need to act on the balance\n 633\nof those requests, for delay would put at risk the achievements of UNPROFOR.\n\n\n The representative of the United States stated that his Government had\nconsistently supported, and continued to support, UNPROFOR which had been called on\nto provide vital missions in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia. In recent weeks there\nhad been many encouraging developments in Bosnia-Herzegovia, and rapidly expanding\nchallenges that had taxed UNPROFOR’s resources to the limit. The United States agreed\nwith the members of the Council that UNPROFOR must have the necessary resources to\nmeet these challenges. In the context of the resolution just adopted, his Government’s\nconcern had been to ensure that the financial resources were available to sustain that vital\noperation. The resolution stated that the Council would review, within one month, the\nquestion of UNPROFOR’s requirements. During that month, the United States\nGovernment would be considering the question seriously and urgently, for peacekeeping\nwas so important that the international community must do its best to regularize the way\nit provided the money to support those operations. The speaker also commended the\nCouncil’s authorization of close air support for UNPROFOR troops operating in Croatia,\n\n\n\n\n 633\n Ibid., pp. 8-9.\n\n\n 423\n"
[424] "and pointed out that NATO implementation would require the agreement of the North\nAtlantic Council, which he was confident would be forthcoming. 634\n\n\n The representative of China noted that the Council’s approval of a further\nenlargement of UNPROFOR and an extension of its mandate reflected the hope that\nUNPROFOR’s presence would create favourable conditions for an early and\ncomprehensive political settlement. He reiterated the position of his country on questions\nrelated to UNPROFOR. First, the sovereignty of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, as\nwell as other countries in the region, should be fully respected. Secondly, China was not\nin favour of the use or threat of force, nor the invocation of Chapter VII in the\npeacekeeping operations of UNPROFOR. It therefore retained reservations on the\ninvocations of Chapter VII in the resolution just adopted. At the same time, however, it\nhad noted that the resolution specified certain limitations concerning that issue. Thirdly,\nin relation to the extension of close air support to UNPROFOR’s operations in Croatia,\nsuch air support should only be used to ensure the safety of UNPROFOR personnel in the\nperformance of its mandate and for self-defence, rather than for punitive purposes.\nFourthly, the settlement of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia could only be achieved\nby the people of that region themselves. Lastly, the difficulties faced by UNPROFOR\nwith regard to manpower and financial resources needed to be removed, although the\ndeployment of UNPROFOR troops should be undertaken in a flexible manner, according\n 635\nto the degree of urgency in each specific situation.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that, while favouring the\ncontinuation of UNPROFOR, his delegation believed that UNPROFOR’s efforts should\nbe directed towards the essential purpose for which it was established, paying particular\nattention to the priority tasks highlighted in paragraph 50 of the Secretary-General’s\nreport of 16 March, and taking into account the need to adopt a rational attitude towards\nthe limited resources available to the United Nations. Noting that the United Nations had\nbeen faced with new tasks, his delegation believed that those tasks should be performed\n\n 634\n Ibid., p. 9.\n 635\n Ibid., pp. 10-11.\n\n\n 424\n"
[425] "strictly in accordance with, and in the framework of, the existing mandate of\nUNPROFOR. If, however, it was felt necessary either to amend or expand the mandate,\nthat would require an additional decision to be taken by the Security Council. The\nRussian Federation also supported the extension of close air support to Croatia. At the\nsame time, it also supported the search for ways and means of achieving maximum\ncooperation between the United Nations and NATO, because it believed that deploying\nair forces in support of United Nations personnel should be carried out, as indicated in the\nrelevant resolutions, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close\n 636\ncoordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR.\n\n\n The President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of France, stated that\nhis delegation was particularly pleased with those aspects of the resolution which\nunambiguously strengthened the Council’s commitment to approve all the reinforcements\nrequested by the Secretary-General, for both Bosnia and Croatia, by the end of April.\nActions must now proceed in two directions. The international community must\nconsolidate what had been achieved on the ground, with UNPROFOR backing the\nparties’ will to make peace and, in that regard, UNPROFOR could never be used to\nprotect territorial gains. On the diplomatic level, discussions on the territorial questions\nwould soon have to resume and in that respect, the European Union’s plan seemed to be\n 637\nthe only basis for a possible agreement.\n\n\n Decision of 27 April 1994 (3369th meeting): resolution 914 (1994)\n\n At its 3369th meeting, on 27 April 1994, the Council included the reports of the\nSecretary-General of 11, 16 and 24 March, as well as the Secretary-General’s letter dated\n30 March 1994 in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited\nthe representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, at his request, to participate in the\ndiscussion without the right to vote. The President (New Zealand) then drew the attention\n\n\n\n\n 636\n Ibid., pp. 11-12.\n 637\n Ibid., pp. 13-14.\n\n\n 425\n"
[426] "of the Council members to the text of a draft resolution 638 submitted by France, the\nRussian Federation, Spain and the United Kingdom.\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 914 (1994). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Reaffirming its resolutions 908 (1994) of 31 March 1994 and 913 (1994) of 22 April\n 1994,\n Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of 11 March, 16 March and 24\n March 1994 and his letter dated 30 March 1994,\n Determined to strengthen the operations of the United Nations Protection Force in\n fulfilment of its mandate,\n Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of the Force and its freedom of\n movement in all its missions, and to these ends, as regards the Force in the Republic of\n Croatia and in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under Chapter VII of the\n Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Welcomes once again the reports of the Secretary-General of 11 March, 16 March and\n 24 March 1994 and his letter dated 30 March 1994;\n 2. Decides to authorize, as recommended by the Secretary-General in the above-\n mentioned documents, an increase of United Nations Protection Force personnel by up to\n 6,550 additional troops, 150 military observers and 275 civilian police monitors, in addition\n to the reinforcement already approved in resolution 908 (1994);\n 3. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of France welcomed the fact that the\nCouncil had granted UNPROFOR the reinforcements requested by the Secretary-General\nwhile stressing that the decision should have come at the end of March when the Force’s\nmandate had been extended. France could only regret that delay unjustifiable in view of\nthe situation on the ground. The Council, from a political standpoint, had not reflected the\nclear determination which the circumstances had required nor had it shown the support\nwhich UNPROFOR had a right to expect from it at a time when, faced with a constant\n\n\n 638\n S/1994/487.\n\n\n 426\n"
[427] "shortage of personnel, they were given additional missions in an increasingly dangerous\nenvironment. As the increases in personnel had been authorized, Member States now\n 639\nneeded to respond to the earnest requests of the Secretariat.\n\n\n The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the Council’s decision\nreaffirmed its support for UNPROFOR and signalled its determination to bring about a\ncessation of hostilities and a peaceful negotiated settlement in that country. He recalled\nthat, at its previous meeting on Bosnia, on 21 April, the Council had adopted resolution\n913 (1994), condemning the attacks by Bosnian Serb forces on Gorazde, demanding their\nwithdrawal, and calling for an end to the hostilities. In parallel, the United Nations and\nNATO had made it clear that force would be used if those elements were not complied\nwith. Thanks to the determination of UNPROFOR and NATO, the immediate threat in\nGorazde had ended. The United Kingdom called upon all parties to cooperate fully with\nUNPROFOR and other United Nations and relief personnel working in Gorazde. The\nspeaker warned that the Bosnian Serbs should not forget that the terms of the North\nAtlantic Council’s recent decisions remained in force, and that they applied to attacks\nagainst or threats to the other safe areas. His Government was giving its full support to\nefforts to bring more closely together the diplomatic activity of the United Nations, the\nEuropean Union, the United States and the Russian Federation, including the action taken\n 640\nthrough the establishment of a Contact Group.\n\n\n Decision of 11 August 1994 (3416th meeting): statement by the President\n 641\n By a letter dated 26 July 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General reported that serious difficulties had arisen for\nUNPROFOR operations in Croatia, as a result of blockades being implemented by\ndemonstrators against all UNPROFOR traffic into the UNPAs. The blockades had\nseverely undermined UNPROFOR’s ability to monitor the 29 March Cease-Fire\n\n\n 639\n S/PV.3369, pp. 2-3.\n 640\n Ibid., p. 3.\n 641\n S/1994/888.\n\n\n 427\n"
[428] "Agreement, resulting in an increased number of violations of that Agreement and causing\nrising tensions within the zone of separation. The blockades were also preventing\nUNPROFOR from performing its other basic tasks. The Special Representative of the\nSecretary-General had met with officials from the Croatian Government to impress upon\nthem the Government’s responsibility to ensure that UNPROFOR’s work was not\nimpeded. He had informed them that the Force had clear evidence of the participation of\nCroatian police in several of the blockades, rendering the Government in violations of\naspects of the Cease-Fire Agreement. While the Government might not have been fully in\ncontrol of the demonstrators, it was undeniably responsible for ensuring that their actions\ndid not prevent UNPROFOR from carrying out its mandate. The Secretary-General\nwarned that if the situation were not rectified UNPROFOR would not be able to function\nin pursuance of its mandates and he recommended that the Council call upon the Croatian\nGovernment to fulfil its obligations to UNPROFOR and end the blockade.\n At its 3416th meeting, on 11 August 1994, the Council included the above letter in\nits agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (Russian Federation)\nstated that, after consultations among members of the Security Council, he had been\nauthorized to make the following statement 642 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council is deeply concerned by the letter from the Secretary-General dated\n 26 July 1994 and by further reports from the Secretariat of continuing difficulties that have\n arisen for the operations of the United Nations Protection Force in Croatia owing to\n blockades of Force traffic into the United Nations Protected Areas by demonstrators. The\n Council considers that such blockades by Croatian citizens as well as related impediments\n imposed by the Croatian authorities on the freedom of movement of the Force are\n inadmissible. In that context the Council deplores the remaining blockades of access roads to\n the United Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia.\n \"The Council is encouraged by the signing on 4 August 1994 of an agreement between\n the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the United Nations Protection Force regarding\n the procedures regulating Force traffic to and from the United Nations Protected Areas, and\n calls on the Croatian authorities to implement its provisions faithfully. The Council\n welcomes the progress that has been made since the signature of this agreement to open\n\n 642\n S/PRST/1994/44.\n\n\n 428\n"
[429] " eleven of nineteen crossing points. However, the Council reminds the Government of the\n Republic of Croatia of its obligation to facilitate the unimpeded access of the Force to all\n nineteen crossing points agreed upon in the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994.\n \"In this context the Council is also concerned about the continuing unacceptable practice\n of the Government of the Republic of Croatia of levying tolls and other taxes on the Force for\n the use of roads and airports in the Republic of Croatia. The Council strongly disapproves of\n any action that would both impede the functioning of the Force and add to the already high\n cost of the peace-keeping operation in Croatia. Recalling paragraph 7 of its resolution 908\n (1994) of 31 March 1994, the Council again urges the Government of the Republic of Croatia\n to conclude without further delay a status-of-forces agreement with the United Nations\n Protection Force and to resolve the above and any other issues in accordance with the\n provisions of that agreement.\n \"The Council reaffirms its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the\n Republic of Croatia and the right of all displaced persons and refugees to return to their\n homes. The Council expects the Government of the Republic of Croatia to cooperate fully\n with the efforts of the Force.\"\n\n\n Decision of 30 September 1994 (3434th meeting): resolution 947 (1994)\n\n On 9 May 1994, pursuant to resolutions 836 (1993) and 844 (1993), the\nSecretary-General submitted to the Council a report 643 to inform the Council of the\nresults achieved and lessons learned in the implementation of the safe areas concept in\nBosnia and Herzegovina, as well as to propose some improvements in the short term. .\n The Secretary-General noted that the existing approach to safe areas required\nreworking. In his view, the successful implementation of the safe area concept required\nthe acceptance of three overriding principles: (a) the intention of safe areas was primarily\nto protect people and not to defend territory; (b) the method of execution of the safe area\ntask should not detract from, but rather enhance, UNPROFOR’s original mandates,\nnamely supporting humanitarian assistance and contributing to the overall peace process\nthrough the implementation of cease-fires and local disengagements; and (c) the mandate\nmust take into account UNPROFOR’s resource limitations.\n\n\n\n 643\n S/1994/555.\n\n\n 429\n"
[430] " The Secretary-General did not believe that extending the safe area concept to\nother parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be advisable. While reaffirming the\nCouncil’s commitments in relation to existing safe areas, he believed that sources of\ntension elsewhere in the Republic needed to be dealt with by other measures, including\nlocal cease-fires and modest deployments of UNPROFOR observers. In addition to the\narrangements already in place for protection of safe areas it was necessary that: (a)\nUNPROFOR’s mission in the safe areas be clearly defined; (b) the safe areas be clearly\ndelineated; (c) the safe areas be respected; and (d) complete freedom of movement, on a\n“notification basis” be ensured for the provision of humanitarian aid to safe areas. While\nsafe areas could be made more effective and manageable, they did not in themselves\nrepresent a long-term solution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rather, the safe\narea concept should be viewed as a temporary mechanism by which some vulnerable\npopulations could be protected pending a comprehensive negotiated political settlement.\nThe Secretary-General therefore recommended that the Security Council approve the\nstatement of UNPROFOR’s mission in relation to the safe areas, authorize UNPROFOR\nto promulgate precise boundaries for those areas and approve the arrangements outlined\nin his report.\n\n\n On 17 September 1994, pursuant to resolution 908 (1994), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 644 intended to assist the Council in its deliberations on\nthe renewal of UNPROFOR’s mandate.\n The Secretary-General noted that the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were\nclosely interrelated and had a direct impact on UNPROFOR’s operations in Croatia,\nBosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In that\ncontext, the work of the Contact Group which involved five major Powers working with\nthe Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the ICFY, could be of great significance\nfor UNPROFOR’s future.\n With regard to Croatia, the Secretary-General outlined four problem areas in\nUNPROFOR’s mandate which required assessment: the demilitarization of the UNPAs;\n\n\n\n 644\n S/1994/1067 and Add.1.\n\n\n 430\n"
[431] "the restoration of Croatian authority in the “pink zones”; the establishment of border\ncontrols; and assistance for the return of refugees and displaced persons. All four required\neither enforcement or the consent of both parties for their implementation. UNPROFOR\nhad neither the means nor the mandate for enforcement action of that nature and the\ncooperation of the parties had been elusive.\n The Secretary-General further noted that progress in Croatia had been slow and\nhad proved insufficient to moderate Croatian impatience for a quick solution to the\nproblem of reintegration of the UNPAs into Croatia. Assistance in the creation of\nconditions that would permit the voluntary return of displaced persons to their homes in\nor near the UNPAs continued to be of the highest priority for UNPROFOR and\ndiscussions were taking place among UNHCR, UNPROFOR and both parties on the\nimplementation of a pilot project for voluntary return to a few selected villages in or near\n 645\nthe zone of separation.\n In considering the various options for UNPROFOR’s presence in Croatia, the\nSecretary-General was aware that the situation on the ground could be frozen in a\nstalemate in which UNPROFOR’s continued presence contributed only to the\nmaintenance of an unsatisfactory status quo. In the current circumstances, however, it\nwas very important to secure continued respect for the cease-fire agreement. At the same\ntime, further efforts would have to be made for the reopening of negotiations. These tasks\nwould require the continued presence of UNPROFOR in Croatia.\n With regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, experience gained over the last six\nmonths had enhanced mutual understanding, joint planning and cooperation between\nUNPROFOR and NATO, and the successful deployment of long-awaited additional\nforces had enabled UNPROFOR to improve its ability to seize opportunities for progress.\nNevertheless, the possibility of a further exacerbation and intensification of the conflict in\nBosnia and Herzegovina had highlighted UNPROFOR’s limitations, and underlined a\nnumber of areas of concern. The Secretary-General acknowledged that some Member\nStates might believe that the international community’s strategy of deploying\n\n\n 645\n The Secretary-General’s comments relating to the return of refugees and displaced persons appeared in\nparagraph 39 of the report, to which the Council subsequently referred in resolution 947 (1994), operative paragraph\n13.\n\n\n 431\n"
[432] "peacekeeping operations only upon the active cooperation of the parties was no longer\nadequate to serve the objectives proclaimed in the Council’s resolutions. He warned,\nhowever, that the use of disincentives would change the nature of the United Nations\npresence in the area, entailing unacceptable risks to UNPROFOR. The result would be a\nfundamental shift from the logic of peacekeeping to the logic of war and would require\nthe withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Secretary-General\nhad therefore directed that plans be made for a potential withdrawal at short notice. Any\nconsideration of decisions leading to the withdrawal of UNPROFOR had, however, to be\nweighed against the tasks that were currently being implemented successfully by\nUNPROFOR and in the absence of an overall political settlement acceptable to all the\nparties. He did not, therefore, recommend the withdrawal of the Force at that time. He did\nrecommend, however, that due to the continued harassment of minorities in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, particularly by the Bosnian Serbs, the Security Council might consider\nproviding UNPROFOR with a more comprehensive, uniform UNCIVPOL mandate\nthroughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, similar to that already mandated for\nCroatia.\n The Secretary-General also recommended the renewal of UNPROFOR mandate\nfor a further period of six months. He further suggested that the Council might wish to\nendorse the Force’s activities in relation to mine-clearing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and\nsupport the acquisition of a small number of protected vehicles for uses in areas of mine\nhazard. He also recommended that the Council endorse UNPROFOR’s public\ninformation policy and programmes, including the establishment of an independent radio\nstation to provide the population within the mission area access to impartial, factual and\ntimely information, thereby increasing public understanding and support for\nUNPROFOR’s “peace-making” efforts in the former Yugoslavia.\n\n\n At its 3434th meeting, on 30 September 1994, the Council included the report of\nthe Secretary-General of 17 September 1994 in its agenda. Following the adoption of the\nagenda, the Council invited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at\ntheir request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The Council also\ninvited Mr. Vladislav Jovanovic, at his request, to address the Council in the course of its\n\n\n 432\n"
[433] "consideration of the item. The President (Spain) then drew the attention of the Council\nmembers to the text of a draft resolution 646, submitted by France, Spain and the United\nKingdom, and read out some revisions that had been made to the draft in its provisional\nform. He also drew the attention of the Council members to several other documents. 647\n At the same meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina outlined two\nreflections with respect to the renewal of UNPROFOR’s mandate. First, every Security\nCouncil resolution mandating UNPROFOR had reflected the commitment of the Council\nto the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Secondly, although\nsome might wish to characterize UNPROFOR as a peacekeeping mission, its mandate\nwas more complex. Within the mandate there was no reference to peacekeeping, while\nthere was reference to specific assignments calling for “necessary measures” and\nappropriate responses to attacks on civilian safe areas and violations of humanitarian\nstandards. The speaker contended that, in that context, any threats directed at Bosnia and\nHerzegovina and its defence forces exercising the responsibility of defending its civilians\nand its territorial integrity and sovereignty must be viewed as contrary to the word and\nspirit of the relevant Security Council resolutions. He argued that the mandate should not\nbe redefined, but rather that if there was a “practical incapacity to execute the original\nmandate”, then additional resources should be provided or the mandate must be\nterminated. It was necessary to re-establish the clear objectives of the UNPROFOR\n 648\nmandate.\n\n\n The representative of Croatia stated that his Government remained bound by the\ndecision of the Croatian parliament on the UNPROFOR mandate and it welcomed the\nelements of that decision which had been incorporated in the draft resolution, especially\nin respect of the “pink zones”, the border monitors and the pilot project for the return of\ndisplaced persons to their homes in the occupied areas. His delegation believed that the\n\n\n 646\n S/1994/1120.\n 647\n S/1994/1045 and 1108, letters dated 9 and 28 September 1994, respectively, from the Chargé d’affaires\na.i. of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1994/1058 and 1095, letters dated 15 and 26 September 1994,\nrespectively, from the representative of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council; and S/1994/1062,\nletter dated 16 September 1994 from the representative of Croatia addressed to the Secretary-General.\n 648\n S/PV.3434, pp. 2-3.\n\n\n 433\n"
[434] "draft resolution pointed the solution-seeking process in the right direction and it hoped\nthat the Contact Group and the United Nations would immediately begin to pursue\nmeasures consistent with the letter and spirit of the draft resolution so that the relevant\nparties would not be compelled to consider a new UNPROFOR mandate after 100 days.\nIt also emphasized that the decision to accept the new UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia\nhad been made with the view that the Contact Group would immediately commence work\non the comprehensive reintegration plan for Croatia, which would provide local\nautonomy in pre-war Serbian majority areas in Croatia, with the same\nacceptance/rejection measures that should be applied to the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and its “proxies” in Knin. It further underlined the\nimportance of the mutual recognition of existing borders between Croatia and the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) as the next step for the Contact Group’s\nactivities. Before concluding, the speaker expressed regret that the Federal Republic of\nYugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had been permitted to address the Council. His\nGovernment had taken the position that the UNPROFOR mandate only applied to the\nterritories of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of\nMacedonia, and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) did not\n 649\ntherefore possess any special status in relation to the UNPROFOR issue.\n\n\n Mr. Jovanovic stated that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considered that the\nconditions for terminating the UNPROFOR peace operation had not yet been created and\nthat its continued presence in the protected areas was necessary until an overall political\nsolution was reached. UNPROFOR’s presence in the protected areas had been of vital\nimportance for the protection of the Serbian civilian population of Krajina. He contended\nthat the question of extending UNPROFOR’s mandate should be viewed apart from the\nsearch for a political solution to the crisis. The extension of UNPROFOR’s mandate and\nthe protection of the Serbian population could not be used by one side as an instrument\nfor exerting political pressure in the negotiating process. On the contrary, the presence of\nUNPROFOR was a precondition for facilitating a political solution. His delegation fully\n\n\n 649\n Ibid., pp. 3-4.\n\n\n 434\n"
[435] "agreed with the Secretary-General’s assessment that resort to a military option would\nhave incalculable consequences. It also shared the Secretary-General view that not all\nefforts towards the peaceful resolution of the conflict had yet been exhausted. The\nFederal Republic of Yugoslavia was convinced that a three-phase policy was the only\nway to achieve peace. Building on the results of the cease-fire, negotiations should be\nspeedily resumed on confidence-building measures and the re-establishment of economic\nrelations and infrastructure, which would enable the Vance Plan to be realized. The\nspeaker further stated that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had given its full support\nto the Contact Group’s plan and had tried to convince the Bosnian Serb leadership to\naccept it. He hinted that a clear-cut, written agreement by the Contact Group that the\nBosnian Serbs should have the equal right to establish confederal ties with the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia would open the door for the Bosnian Serbs to agree to the\nContact Group. Turning to the draft resolution before the Council, he expressed regret\nthat it contained certain provisions which, he contended, dealt with issues that should not\nhave been addressed in a “technical resolution” on the extension of UNPROFOR’s\nmandate. In that respect, he referred in particular to the third and fifth preambular\nparagraphs, as well as to operative paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13 and 14. He further\ncontended that the provisions of operative paragraph 14 attempted to impose political\nsolutions which were in “flagrant contravention” of the Vance Plan, as the Vance Plan\nprovided that the political status of the protected areas should be resolved only after all of\n 650\nthe Plan’s provisions had been implemented.\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote, as orally revised in its provisional\nform, and it was adopted unanimously as resolution 947 (1994). The resolution reads as\nfollows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the conflicts in the territory of the\n Former Yugoslavia, and reaffirming in this context its resolution 908 (1994) of 31 March\n 1994, on the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force,\n\n\n\n 650\n Ibid., pp. 4-6.\n\n\n 435\n"
[436] " Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General of 9 May and 17 September\n1994,\n Affirming its commitment to the search for an overall negotiated settlement of the\nconflicts in the Former Yugoslavia ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the\nStates there within their internationally recognized borders, and stressing the importance it\nattaches to the mutual recognition thereof,\n Welcoming the continuing efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,\n Welcoming also the efforts of Member States in the context of the Contact Group, and\nemphasizing the utmost importance of the work of the Contact Group and its role in the\noverall peace process in the area,\n Recognizing that the major provisions of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the\nRepublic of Croatia and relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 871\n(1993) of 4 October 1993, still remain to be implemented,\n Stressing that the Force plays an essential role in preventing and containing hostilities\nand thus creating the conditions for achieving an overall political settlement,\n Paying tribute to the Force personnel in the performance of the mandate of the Force, in\nparticular in assisting the delivery of humanitarian assistance and monitoring the cease-fires,\n Reiterating its determination to ensure the security of the Force and its freedom of\nmovement in all its missions, and to these ends, as regards the Force in the Republic of\nCroatia and in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, acting under Chapter VII of the\nCharter of the United Nations,\n 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 17 September 1994, and approves the\nproposals therein concerning the activities of the United Nations Protection Force in relation\nto mine clearance, public information and civilian police;\n 2. Decides to extend the mandate of the Force for an additional period terminating on 31\nMarch 1995;\n 3. Urges all the parties and others concerned to cooperate with the Force in carrying out\nits mandate, to refrain from any hostile and provocative acts against Force personnel, and to\nensure their security and their freedom of movement;\n 4. Requests the Secretary-General to report no later than 20 January 1995 on progress\ntowards the implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan for the Republic of\nCroatia and all relevant Security Council resolutions, taking into account the position of the\n\n\n\n\n 436\n"
[437] "Croatian Government, and decides to reconsider the mandate of the Force in the light of that\nreport;\n 5. Also requests the Secretary-General, in the light of resolution 871 (1993), to include in\nthat report information on progress towards (a) opening the road and railway communications\nwith the United Nations Protected Areas and the rest of the Republic of Croatia, (b)\nestablishing the water and electricity supply in all regions of Croatia for the mutual benefit of\nall its citizens, and (c) opening the Adriatic pipeline;\n 6. Invites the Secretary-General to update his report submitted pursuant to Security\nCouncil resolution 838 (1993) of 10 June 1993 and to expand it as appropriate to cover other\nareas where the Force is deployed;\n 7. Affirms the right of all displaced persons to return voluntarily to their homes of origin\nin safety and dignity with the assistance of the international community;\n 8. Reaffirms its support for the established principle that all statements or commitments\nmade under duress, particularly those regarding land and ownership, are null and void;\n 9. Calls on all parties and others concerned fully to comply with all Security Council\nresolutions regarding the situation in the Former Yugoslavia and concerning in particular the\nForce in Croatia, to create the conditions that would facilitate the full implementation of its\nmandate;\n 10. Expresses its concern that the necessary arrangements, including, where appropriate,\nagreements on the status of forces and other personnel, have not yet been concluded by the\nRepublic of Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the Federal Republic\nof Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), and calls upon them to conclude such arrangements\nwithout delay;\n 11. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed on progress\nwith regard to the implementation of the mandate of the Force, and to report, as necessary, on\nany developments on the ground and other circumstances affecting the mandate of the Force;\n 12. Urges the Bosnian Serb party fully to respect the territorial integrity of the Republic\nof Croatia and to refrain from any actions that are threatening its security;\n 13. Also urges that the pilot project described in paragraph 39 of the report of the\nSecretary-General of 17 September 1994 be put into effect as soon as possible;\n 14. Declares that the restoration of the authority of the Republic of Croatia in the \"pink\nzones\", to the extent that it is compatible with the 29 March 1994 cease-fire agreement, must\nbe accomplished under the close supervision of the Force, and in such a manner as to avoid\nany further destabilization of the region;\n\n\n 437\n"
[438] " 15. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of France contended that without\nUNPROFOR there would have been increased suffering for the civilian population,\nincreased movements of refugees and irreversible developments on the ground that would\nhave confronted the international community with an insoluble problem. While\nacknowledging that more could have been done, he pointed out that UNPROFOR had\nneither the mandate nor the military means to impose peace. The speaker further stated\nthat UNPROFOR had reached a turning point in its history. Either a dynamic for peace\nwould gain strength in the coming weeks, or, on the contrary hope of a negotiated\nsettlement would fade, and then decisions would inevitably have to be taken involving\nthe withdrawal of UNPROFOR. Thus that was undoubtedly the last time that the Council\nwould be extending UNPROFOR’s mandate in a routine manner. In the next stage,\nwhich would be crucial, UNPROFOR would have to strive to ensure strict\nimplementation of the Council’s decisions, particularly those concerning safe areas. That\nmight imply the use of force, if necessary, especially to ensure respect for the exclusion\nzones. The French Government therefore hoped that explicit instructions along those\n 651\nlines would be issued to the leaders of the Force.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that his delegation supported\nthe resolution just adopted because it believed that UNPROFOR was playing an\nextremely important role in efforts to settle the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. He\ncautioned that everything needed to be done to ensure that UNPROFOR did not become a\nparty to the conflict or a “hostage” to the forces participating in it. He emphasized that\nUNPROFOR’s effectiveness depended to a large extent on the good will of the parties. In\nCroatia, it was clear that the unimpeded fulfilment by the Force of its mandate in the\nUNPAs was the most important prerequisite for the implementation of the Vance plan.\nRussia also attached particular importance to the continued efforts of the countries of the\nContact Group to develop their cooperation with the Security Council. It was important to\n\n\n\n 651\n Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n\n\n 438\n"
[439] "increase pressure on all parties to promote a comprehensive peace settlement Such a\nsettlement should be based on a territorial arrangement and on constitutional principles\n 652\nplacing all parties on an equal footing.\n\n\n The representative of New Zealand welcomed the Council’s decision to extend\nUNPROFOR’s mandate for a further six months. He cautioned, however, that if\nUNPROFOR were to continue to be supported, the status quo could not be continued. He\ntherefore urged the parties to reinvigorate the progress towards implementation of the\npeace plan. Recalling that the Council had adopted the previous week a series of\nmeasures, the speaker noted that those measures needed to be followed up with further\nspecific steps. First, there should be early recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina and\nCroatia. Secondly, there needed to be firm and united resolve on the part of UNPROFOR\nand NATO to use force where warranted for the protection of the safe areas and the\nenforcement of the exclusion zones. Thirdly, the “strangulation” of Sarajevo must cease.\nFourthly, the progressive withdrawal of the Bosnian Serbs to positions consistent with the\nterritorial settlement proposal should be pursued. The speaker also observed that the\nresolution just adopted was less specific than his delegation would have liked on the\nquestion of the mutual recognition of international boundaries in the region of the former\nYugoslavia. He emphasized that it was the view of his delegation that mutual recognition\nshould be the starting point for the overall settlement of the conflict in the former\n 653\nYugoslavia.\n\n\n The representative of the United States observed that, in Bosnia, the most\nimportant development had been the Contact Group’s presentation of its territorial\nproposal to the parties. Unfortunately, while the Bosnian Federation had accepted the\nproposal, the Bosnian Serbs had not. The United States would continue to demand that\nthe Bosnian Serbs accept the proposal, which represented the best opportunity for a just\nand equitable settlement to the conflict. Just a week earlier, with its adoption of a\nresolution tightening sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs, the Council had reminded the\n\n 652\n Ibid., p. 8.\n 653\n Ibid., pp. 8-9.\n\n\n 439\n"
[440] "Bosnian Serbs that their continuing “obstinacy” was incurring substantial costs. In respect\nof the situation in Croatia, the United States Government strongly supported the basic\nprecept, reflected in the resolution just adopted, that a settlement of the conflict must be\nin conformity with Croatia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The speaker also\nexpressed her Government’s concern at the increasing violations of the exclusion zones,\nas well as its commitment to their strict enforcement. She expressed confidence that,\nshould strict enforcement continue to be necessary, UNPROFOR would work closely\nwith NATO to ensure that the intent of the Council to protect the safe areas was carried\nout. Before concluding, she noted that the resolution just adopted lay upon the parties –\nand her Government interpreted that to refer especially to the Serb party – the\nresponsibility to create the conditions that would allow UNPROFOR to fulfil its\n 654\nmandate.\n\n\n Decisions of 31 March 1995 (3512th meeting): resolutions 981 (1995), 982 (1995)\nand 983 (1995)\n\n On 22 March 1995, pursuant to resolution 947 (1994), the Secretary-General\nsubmitted to the Council a report 655 on UNPROFOR. The report was intended, in\nconjunction with the report of the Secretary-General dated 14 January 1995, to assist the\nCouncil in its consideration of the mandate of UNPROFOR. It contained an overview of\nthe UNPROFOR’s activities of the Force, as well as the Secretary-General’s proposals\nfor its future mandate.\n The Secretary-General recalled that in his interim report of 14 January 1995, he\nhad noted that, despite the earlier inability of UNPROFOR to fulfil important parts of its\nmandate under the United Nations peace-keeping plan in Croatia, the successful\nimplementation of the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994 and the conclusion of the\neconomic agreement on 2 December 1994 had been positive steps towards confidence-\nbuilding and reconciliation. He had expressed disappointment that the potential for\nsuccess through the three-step approach-cessation of hostilities, economic normalization\n\n\n 654\n Ibid., pp. 9-10.\n 655\n S/1995/222 and Corr.1 and 2.\n\n\n 440\n"
[441] "and political negotiations- had not been fully explored before the Croatian Government’s\ndecision on 12 January 1995 to with draw its support for UNPROFOR’s continuing role.\n 656\nThe Secretary-General therefore welcomed the announcement on 12 March 1995 by\nCroatia’s President that he had agreed to UNPROFOR’s retention. The maintenance of a\nreduced force in Croatia under a new mandate thus seemed the only way to reduce the\nrisks of a renewed major war, while permitting continued progress in implementing the\neconomic agreement and beginning political negotiations. He had instructed his Special\nEnvoy to conduct negotiations with the parties on the mandate of a future United Nations\npeace-keeping force in Croatia. The gulf between the positions of the Government of\nCroatia and the Krajina Serb authorities on the role and functions of the new force\nremained wide. Further negotiations were necessary. The Secretary-General was,\nhowever, able to report the basis could be established for agreement that the mandate\nshould include the following: (a) support for the implementation of the cease-fire\nagreement of 29 March 1994; (b) support for the implementation of the economic\nagreement of 2 December 1994; and (c) implementation of these elements of the existing\nUnited Nations peacekeeping plan for Croatia that were accepted by both parties as\nhaving continuing relevance. In addition to that “core mandate”, the new force would\ncontinue to perform functions arising from the accord on the Prevlaka peninsula and from\nrelevant resolutions of the Security Council, such as monitoring the “no-fly zone” and the\nextension of close air support in Croatia.\n Concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Secretary-General observed that\nUNPROFOR’s inability to deter attacks on Bihac had brought to the fore some of the key\nissues addressed in previous reports on the concept of safe areas. Until the Council was\nable to provide clear guidance on those matters, it was unlikely that the commitment of\nthe parties or UNPROFOR’s performance in the safe areas would improve, and there was\na danger that situations such as that in Bihac would recur. The Secretary-General further\n\n\n 656\n In the announcement the President of Croatia stated that his country would seek to negotiate a new\nmandate for an international presence in Croatia that would: (a) control the international borders between Croatia and\nthe FRY and between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina; (b) control access and communications for UNPROFOR\nand other international humanitarian operations to Bosnia through territory not under the control of Croatia; and (c)\nfacilitate the continued implementation of existing and future Agreements and the relevant Security Council and\nGeneral Assembly resolutions. In the meantime, the Government of Croatia agreed to the continuation of the current\nforce.\n\n\n 441\n"
[442] "noted that the current impasse on the Contact Group’s proposal had created a vacuum in\nwhich the Force had little or no political context for the pursuit of local initiatives, and\nthe parties had little or no incentive to cooperate. He appealed to the members of the\ncontact Group to renew their efforts to fill the current vacuum.\n Regarding the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Secretary-General\nsuggested that the Council might wish to call, in the context of Article 50 of the Charter,\nfor increased international economic support to be provided to the former Yugoslav\nRepublic of Macedonia.\n The Secretary-General further reported that the Governments of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, had expressed\nthe wish that the United Nations in their countries should be separate from UNPROFOR.\nHe therefore proposed that UNPROFOR be replaced by three separate, but interlinked,\npeace-keeping operations: United Nations Peace Force – One (UNPF-1) in Croatia,\nUNPF-2 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and UNPF-3 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of\n 657\nMacedonia.\n The Secretary-General accordingly recommended that the Security Council\napprove the following: (a) the restructuring of UNPROFOR into three forces, each with a\nmandate extending to 30 November 1995; (b) the negotiation, on the basis of the\nelements previously identified, of a new mandate and functions for UNPF-1, which\nwould be significantly smaller that the existing UNPROFOR strength in Croatia. [The\nmandate would come into effect as soon as the Council approved a report from him,\ncontaining the recommended mandate, undertakings by the two parties to cooperate in its\nimplementation, and confirmation of the conclusion of a status-of-forces agreement with\nthe Croatian Government]; (c) the conversion of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and\nHerzegovina and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia into UNPF-2 and UNPF-3,\nrespectively, with the same responsibilities and composition as UNPROFOR had\npossessed in those Republics; (d) appeals to the respective Governments to conclude\nstatus-of-forces agreements with the United Nations and to grant it suitable broadcasting\n\n\n 657\n These proposals were outlined in paragraph 84 of the report, which was subsequently endorsed by the\nCouncil in: resolution 981 (1995), operative paragraphs 1, 2; resolution 982 (1995), operative paragraph 1; resolution\n983 (1995), operative paragraph 1.\n\n\n 442\n"
[443] "facilities 658; and (e) the transfer to the three United Nations Peace Forces of the\napplicability of all relevant Security Council resolutions relating to the functioning of\nUNPROFOR in the territories of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the former\nYugoslav Republic of Macedonia, respectively.\n\n\n At its 3512th meeting, on 31 March 1995, the Council included the above report in\nits agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, at\ntheir request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President\n(China) then drew the attention of the Council members to the text of three draft\nresolutions 659 submitted by Argentina, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, the\nRussian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as to several other\ndocuments. 660\n The representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina charged that UNPROFOR had\nbecome a “substitute for real peacemaking” in his country. After three years of that\nimposed role, UNPROFOR must be judged a failure. Moreover, those behind the strategy\nof “usurping” UNPROFOR for the purpose of substituting it for peacemaking must be\njudged guilty also of allowing aggression and genocide to continue, of endangering\ninternational peace and security, and of betraying their responsibilities to the United\nNations. He further contended that UNPROFOR’s limited success in providing\nhumanitarian assistance was gradually eroding and that UNPROFOR’s mission was\nactually being brought into contradiction with efforts to bring about peace. For that\nreason, the delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had requested that UNPROFOR’s\n\n\n 658\n The appeal to facilitate suitable radio and television broadcasts for the United Nations was contained in\nparagraphs 47 to 51 of the report. The appeal was subsequently endorsed by the Council in: resolution 981 (1995),\noperative paragraph 12; resolution 982 (1995), operative paragraph 10.\n 659\n S/1995/242, 243 and 244.\n 660\n S/1995/214, letter dated 22 March 1995 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Yugoslavia addressed to the\nPresident of the Security Council; S/1995/216, S/1995/227, and S/1995/245, letters dated 22, 28 and 29 March 1995\nfrom the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the Secretary-General; S/1995/221, S/1995/223,\nS/1995/229, and S/1995/232, letters dated 22, 27, 28 and 29 March 1995 from the representative of Croatia addressed\nto the Secretary-General; S/1995/236, letter dated 29 March 1995 from the representative of the former Yugoslav\nRepublic of Macedonia addressed to the Secretary-General; and S/1995/246, letter dated 30 March 1995 from the\nrepresentative of Croatia, transmitting the text of a letter of the same date from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minster\nfor Foreign Affairs of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council.\n\n\n 443\n"
[444] "mandate be comprehensively reviewed. The modalities and a time-frame must be\nestablished for that review. Most important, the review should incorporate the\ncontributions of the Security Council, of the troop contributors, of interested regional\norganizations and Member States. Referring to the situation in and around Sarajevo, the\nspeaker argued that the “Blue Route” must be placed under United Nations protection,\nthe Sarajevo airport access routes must be freed of roadblocks, and Sarajevo citizens must\nbe liberated from snipers. Those requests were not new, nor did they require fresh\nSecurity Council action; authority already existed for such steps. All that was needed was\nthe will to carry out that existing authority.\n Referring to the report of the Secretary-General, the speaker requested that\nmodalities be established to prevent further violations of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s\nterritorial integrity and sovereignty by the Krajina Serbs, and he noted that Bosnia and\nHerzegovina supported Croatia’s efforts to have those borders sealed. He also argued that\nthe international arms embargo restricted Bosnia and Herzegovina’s capacity for self-\ndefence, making it even more dependent upon the international community’s\n 661\nresponsibility for preserving international peace and security.\n\n\n The representative of Croatia stated that UNPROFOR had contributed positively\nby keeping relative peace in Croatia and had given the international community time to\nestablish a political framework and binding legal decisions that would assist in\nreintegrating the occupied territories and their residents into Croatia peacefully and in a\nmanner consistent with Croatia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. But its mission had\nfallen short because of the uncompromising resistance of the local Croatian Serbs and\nBelgrade. His Government emphasized that it had an exclusive right of veto in the\nupcoming negotiations over the operational definitions for the new arrangements within\nits sovereign territory granted by the Charter and the relevant resolutions. Croatia\ndisputed the Vance plan per se as a legal basis for the new arrangement but remained\ncommitted to the unfulfiled humanitarian elements of the Vance plan.\n\n\n\n\n 661\n S/PV.3512, pp. 2-5.\n\n\n 444\n"
[445] " His Government welcomed the draft resolution, which not only recognized\nCroatia’s sovereignty over its occupied territories and defined its international borders,\nbut also called for control and demarcation of those borders. The draft resolution gave the\nUnited Nations ample legal ground to control the relevant borders of Croatia. Croatia also\nattached the utmost importance to paragraph 3 (d), which should be thoroughly planned\nand effectively executed. It believed that a peaceful settlement in Croatia was possible\nonly if that paragraph was strictly implemented. The border mechanism could be made\neffective by undertaking measures beyond those expressed in the Vance plan and by\nimposing punitive measures against violators, in the form of sanctions. He noted, in that\nregard, that the Council had already established in resolution 871 (1993) that the\nsanctions régime imposed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and\nMontenegro) could be linked to developments in the occupied territories in Croatia.\n Croatia also welcomed operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution, which stated\nthat the final political solution in regard to the rights of the Croatian Serb minority must\nbe consistent with the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Croatia. That paragraph,\nalong with the third and fourth preambular paragraphs, confirmed and supported the\nterritorial integrity of Croatia in its internationally recognized borders. Croatia hoped that\nboth Knin and Belgrade would understand that message and would finally accept that the\nonly way to achieve a solution to the problem of the occupied territories was for Belgrade\nto recognize Croatia and for Knin to permit the peaceful reintegration of the occupied\nterritories into the legal and administrative systems of Croatia. The speaker expressed the\nconcern of his delegation that the draft resolution did not give enough consideration to\nthe right of displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes. His delegation hoped\n 662\nthat the upcoming report of the Secretary-General might mitigate those concerns.\n\n\n Speaking before the votes on the draft resolutions, the representative of Indonesia\nstated that Croatia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity could not be compromised. That\nmust also remain a guiding principle for the United Nations presence in Croatia and in\nBosnia and Herzegovina. In relation to the new UNCRO, he stressed the importance of\n\n\n 662\n Ibid., pp. 5-8.\n\n\n 445\n"
[446] "controlling the manner in which military personnel, equipment, supplies and weapons\ncrossed the international borders between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and\nbetween Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). He\nalso emphasized that the troop strength of UNCRO should be sufficient not only to\nimplement the operation’s mandate, but also to serve a deterrent function. Another\nimportant element of UNCRO’s mandate was facilitating the delivery of humanitarian\nassistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina through Croatian territory. In relation to the\noperations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the speaker noted that his delegation wished to\ndraw attention to the past discrepancies between UNPROFOR’s mandate and its\nimplementation, and to emphasize the importance of effective implementation. In that\nconnection, his delegation emphasized the importance of the tenth preambular paragraph\nof the draft resolution (S/1995/243) on the need for Member States to take appropriate\n 663\nsteps to enhance UNPROFOR’s capacity to execute its mandate.\n\n\n The representative of Germany pointed out that the fact that a new mandate for\nthe presence of the United Nations had become necessary was, in his delegation’s view, a\nconsequence of the obstructive attitude of the Croatian Serbs toward the United Nations\npeace-keeping plan for Croatia. Also the Serbian refusal to implement the Vance plan had\nbecome a major problem for UNPROFOR in Croatia. The speaker welcomed the decision\nof the Croatian President to agree to a continued but modified presence of the United\nNations. Germany shared the view of the Secretary-General that a three-phase process of\nnegotiations – cease-fire; implementation of the Economic Agreement; and political\nnegotiations – was the only practical path to durable peace. It welcomed the fact that that\nwas also the basic approach underlying the mandate of UNCRO. He expressed concern at\nthe continued refusal of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia\nand Montenegro) to recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, which he suggested\nwas effectively blocking the peace process. Finally, the speaker stressed that close\n 664\ncooperation between the three peacekeeping operations and NATO would be essential.\n\n\n\n 663\n Ibid., pp. 9-10.\n 664\n Ibid., pp. 11-13.\n\n\n 446\n"
[447] " The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the adoption of a new\nmandate for the operation in Croatia was absolutely necessary, but was only a first step.\nThe Secretary-General had work of the utmost importance to do on continuing the\nconsultations on the implementation of the mandate and the modalities for the operation,\nall aspects of which had to be acceptable to both parties. The Croatian Government and\nlocal Serb authorities must demonstrate a constructive attitude to the discussions. Turning\nto the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the speaker urged the parties to abide strictly\nby the agreements on a cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities and to cooperate with\nUNPROFOR in carrying out the provisions of those agreements. He also urged the\nBosnian Serbs to accept the Contact Group plan. He contended that the flare-up of\nhostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina was linked to the illegal supplies of arms to the\nregion, which were hardening the positions of the parties and creating the impression that\nthe conflict could be resolved by military means. There must be a “clamp-down” in\nimplementing the arms embargo against all the Republics of the former Yugoslavia,\nestablished by resolution 713 (1991). The Security Council must pay greater attention to\nthe issue and the Committee on sanctions should take up the problem of the violations of\nthe embargo, as the Council had instructed it to do. The Russian Federation attached\nparticular importance to the fact that the Security Council, in reorganizing UNPROFOR\nand establishing three independent peacekeeping operations, had taken the important\n 665\ndecision to maintain a unified political and military command for the three operations.\n\n\n The first draft resolution was then put to the vote and adopted unanimously as\nresolution 981 (1995), which reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the conflicts in the territory of the\n former Yugoslavia,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 22 March 1995,\n Affirming its commitment to the search for an overall negotiated settlement of the\n conflicts in the former Yugoslavia ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the\n\n\n 665\n Ibid., pp. 18-20.\n\n\n 447\n"
[448] "States there within their internationally recognized borders, and stressing the importance it\nattaches to the mutual recognition thereof,\n Reaffirming its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of\nthe Republic of Croatia, including its rights and obligations in respect of control over its\ninternational trade,\n Welcoming the continuing efforts of representatives of the United Nations, the European\nUnion, the Russian Federation and the United States of America to facilitate a negotiated\nsolution to the conflict in the Republic of Croatia, and reaffirming its call upon the\nGovernment of the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities to enter into the\nnegotiations, urgently and without preconditions, for such a settlement, making full use of the\nplan presented to them by those representatives,\n Recognizing that major provisions of the United Nations peacekeeping plan for the\nRepublic of Croatia remain to be implemented, in particular those regarding demilitarization\nof the areas under the control of the local Serb authorities, the return of all refugees and\ndisplaced persons to their homes and the establishment of local police forces to carry out their\nduties without discrimination against persons of any nationality in order to protect the human\nrights of all residents, and urging the parties to agree to their implementation,\n Recognizing also that major provisions of relevant Security Council resolutions, in\nparticular resolutions 871 (1993) of 4 October 1993 and 947 (1994) of 30 September 1994,\nstill remain to be implemented,\n Noting that the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force in the Republic of Croatia\nexpires on 31 March 1995, in conformity with resolution 947 (1994),\n Noting also the letter dated 17 March 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the\nRepublic of Croatia to the United Nations regarding his Government's views on the\nestablishment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Republic of Croatia,\n Emphasizing that improved observance of human rights, including appropriate\ninternational monitoring thereof, is an essential step towards restoration of confidence\nbetween the parties and building a durable peace,\n Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security and freedom of movement of\npersonnel of United Nations peacekeeping operations in the territory of the former\nYugoslavia, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 22 March 1995, and in particular\napproves the arrangements in paragraph 84 thereof;\n\n\n\n\n 448\n"
[449] " 2. Decides to establish under its authority the United Nations Confidence Restoration\nOperation in Croatia, which shall be known as UNCRO, in accordance with paragraph 84 of\nthe above-mentioned report, for a period terminating on 30 November 1995, and requests the\nSecretary-General to take the measures necessary to ensure its earliest possible deployment;\n 3. Decides that, in accordance with the report of the Secretary-General, and based on the\nUnited Nations peacekeeping plan for the Republic of Croatia, relevant resolutions of the\nSecurity Council, the ceasefire agreement of 29 March 1994 between the Republic of Croatia\nand the local Serb authorities and the economic agreement of 2 December 1994 concluded\nunder the auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former\nYugoslavia, the mandate of UNCRO shall include:\n (a) Performing fully the functions envisaged in the ceasefire agreement of\n29 March 1994;\n (b) Facilitating implementation of the economic agreement of 2 December 1994;\n (c) Facilitating implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions, including the\nfunctions identified in paragraph 72 of the above-mentioned report;\n (d) Assisting in controlling, by monitoring and reporting, the crossing of military\npersonnel, equipment, supplies and weapons, over the international borders between the\nRepublic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Republic of Croatia\nand the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) at the border crossings for\nwhich UNCRO is responsible, as specified in the United Nations peacekeeping plan for the\nRepublic of Croatia;\n (e) Facilitating the delivery of international humanitarian assistance to the Republic of\nBosnia and Herzegovina through the territory of the Republic of Croatia;\n (f) Monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula in accordance with\nresolution 779 (1992) of 6 October 1992;\n 4. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his consultations with all concerned on the\ndetailed implementation of the mandate outlined in paragraph 3 above and to report to the\nCouncil not later than 21 April 1995 for its approval;\n 5. Decides that UNCRO shall be an interim arrangement to create the conditions that will\nfacilitate a negotiated settlement consistent with the territorial integrity of the Republic of\nCroatia and guaranteeing the security and rights of all communities living in a particular area\nof the Republic of Croatia, irrespective of whether they constitute in this area a majority or\nminority;\n\n\n\n\n 449\n"
[450] " 6. Decides that Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or\n arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close\n coordination with the Secretary-General and the United Nations Theatre Force Commander,\n using the existing procedures which have been agreed with the Secretary-General, all\n necessary measures to extend close air support to the territory of the Republic of Croatia in\n defence of UNCRO personnel in the performance of the UNCRO mandate, and requests the\n Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on any use of close air support;\n 7. Emphasizes the responsibility of the parties and others concerned in the Republic of\n Croatia for the security and safety of UNCRO, and in this context demands that all parties\n and others concerned refrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against UNCRO;\n 8. Calls upon the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the local Serb authorities to\n refrain from the threat or use of force and to reaffirm their commitment to a peaceful\n resolution of their differences;\n 9. Invites the Secretary-General to report as appropriate and not less than every four\n months on progress towards a peaceful political settlement and the situation on the ground,\n including the ability of UNCRO to implement its mandate as described above, and undertakes\n in this connection to examine without delay any recommendations that the Secretary-General\n may make in his reports and adopt appropriate decisions;\n 10. Calls upon Member States to consider favourably requests by the Secretary-General\n for necessary assistance to UNCRO in the performance of its mandate;\n 11. Stresses the importance of the necessary arrangements, including agreements on the\n status of forces and other personnel, being concluded by the Republic of Croatia, calls upon it\n to agree to such arrangements without delay, and requests the Secretary-General to inform the\n Council of progress on this issue in the report mentioned in paragraph 4 above;\n 12. Urges the Government of the Republic of Croatia to provide suitable radio\n broadcasting frequencies and television broadcasting slots at no cost to the United Nations as\n described in paragraphs 47 to 51 of the report of the Secretary-General of 22 March 1995;\n 13. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n The second draft resolution was then put to the vote and adopted unanimously as\nresolution 982 (1995), which reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n\n\n\n 450\n"
[451] " Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions on the conflicts in the territory of the\nformer Yugoslavia, and reaffirming in this context its resolution 947 (1994) of\n30 September 1994 on the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force and subsequent\nrelevant resolutions,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 22 March 1995,\n Affirming its commitment to the search for an overall negotiated settlement of the\nconflicts in the former Yugoslavia ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the\nStates there within their internationally recognized borders, and stressing the importance it\nattaches to the mutual recognition thereof,\n Reaffirming its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of\nthe Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Welcoming the continuing efforts of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the\nInternational Conference on the Former Yugoslavia,\n Welcoming also the efforts of Member States, in particular those of the Contact Group,\nand emphasizing the utmost importance of the work of the Contact Group in the overall peace\nprocess in the area,\n Welcoming further the acceptance by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina of the Contact Group peace plan,\n Welcoming the agreements between the Bosnian parties on a ceasefire and on the\ncomplete cessation of hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, concluded on\n23 and 31 December 1994, and the essential role the United Nations Protection Force plays in\nimplementation of these agreements, and stressing the importance it places thereupon,\n Wishing to encourage the efforts of the United Nations Protection Force, as part of its\nactivities to facilitate an overall settlement of the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina and as detailed in paragraphs 30 to 32 of the above-mentioned report of the\nSecretary-General, to help the parties to implement the Washington agreements regarding the\nFederation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Recognizing the need for Member States to take appropriate steps to enhance the capacity\nof the United Nations Protection Force in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to execute\nits mandate as set out in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, including providing\nthe Secretary-General with all the resources authorized by previous resolutions of the\nSecurity Council,\n Reiterating the importance of maintaining Sarajevo, the capital of the Republic of Bosnia\nand Herzegovina, as a united city and a multicultural, multi-ethnic and pluri-religious centre,\n\n\n 451\n"
[452] "and noting in this context the positive contribution that agreement between the parties on the\ndemilitarization of Sarajevo could make to this end, to the restoration of normal life in\nSarajevo and to achieving an overall settlement, consistent with the Contact Group peace\nplan,\n Noting that the United Nations Protection Force plays an essential role in preventing and\ncontaining hostilities, thus creating the conditions for achieving an overall political\nsettlement, and paying tribute to all Force personnel, especially those who have given their\nlives for the cause of peace,\n Noting also that the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force expires on\n31 March 1995, in conformity with resolution 947 (1994),\n Noting further the letter dated 29 March 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-\nGeneral,\n Noting the letter dated 17 March 1995 from the Permanent Representative of the\nRepublic of Croatia to the United Nations regarding his Government's views on the continued\npresence of the United Nations Protection Force in the Republic of Croatia,\n Paying tribute to the United Nations Protection Force personnel in the performance of the\nmandate of the Force, in particular in assisting the delivery of humanitarian assistance and\nmonitoring the ceasefires,\n Emphasizing that improved observance of human rights, including appropriate\ninternational monitoring thereof, is an essential step towards restoration of confidence\nbetween the parties and building a durable peace,\n Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security of the United Nations Protection\nForce and its freedom of movement for all its missions, and, to these ends, acting under\nChapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, as regards the Force in the Republic of\nCroatia and in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 22 March 1995, and in particular\napproves the arrangements contained in paragraph 84 thereof;\n 2. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force in the Republic\nof Bosnia and Herzegovina for an additional period terminating on 30 November 1995, and\nfurther decides that all previous relevant resolutions relating to the Force shall continue to\napply;\n 3. Authorizes the Secretary-General to redeploy before 30 June 1995 all United Nations\nProtection Force personnel and assets from the Republic of Croatia with the exception of\n\n\n 452\n"
[453] "those whose continued presence in the Republic of Croatia is required for United Nations\nConfidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO, or for the\nfunctions referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 below;\n 4. Decides that the United Nations Protection Force shall continue to perform fully the\nfunctions envisaged in the implementation of the ceasefire agreement of 29 March 1994 and\nthe economic agreement of 2 December 1994 between the Republic of Croatia and the local\nSerb authorities and all relevant Security Council resolutions, including the functions\nidentified in paragraph 72 of the report of the Secretary-General of 22 March 1995, and to\nfacilitate the delivery of international humanitarian assistance to the Republic of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina through the territory of the Republic of Croatia until the effective deployment of\nUNCRO or 30 June 1995, whichever is sooner;\n 5. Decides that the United Nations Protection Force shall retain its existing support\nstructures in the Republic of Croatia, including the operation of its headquarters;\n 6. Emphasizes the responsibility of the parties and others concerned in the Republic of\nCroatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the security and safety of the United\nNations Protection Force, and in this context demands that all parties and others concerned\nrefrain from any acts of intimidation or violence against the Force;\n 7. Reiterates the importance it attaches to full compliance with the agreements between\nthe Bosnian parties on a ceasefire and on a complete cessation of hostilities in the Republic of\nBosnia and Herzegovina, calls upon them to agree to a further extension and implementation\nof these agreements beyond 30 April 1995 and to use that period to negotiate an overall\npeaceful settlement on the basis of the acceptance of the Contact Group peace plan as a\nstarting point, and further calls upon the Bosnian Serb party to accept this;\n 8. Calls upon Member States to consider favourably requests by the Secretary-General\nfor necessary assistance to the United Nations Protection Force in the performance of its\nmandate;\n 9. Calls upon all parties and others concerned to comply fully with all Security Council\nresolutions regarding the situation in the former Yugoslavia to create the conditions that\nwould facilitate the full implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Protection\nForce;\n 10. Notes with satisfaction the progress made in the discussions between the Government\nof the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the United Nations referred to in paragraph\n49 of the report of the Secretary-General of 22 March 1995, and urges the Government of the\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to provide suitable radio broadcasting frequencies and\n\n\n 453\n"
[454] " television broadcasting slots at no cost to the United Nations for the purposes described in\n paragraphs 47 to 51 of that report;\n 11. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of progress\n with regard to the implementation of the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force and\n to report, as necessary, on any developments on the ground, the attitude of the parties and\n other circumstances affecting the mandate of the Force, and in particular to report within\n eight weeks of the adoption of the present resolution, taking into account, inter alia, the\n concerns raised by the members of the Council and issues raised by the Government of the\n Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 12. Urges the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to implement fully\n the provisions of the status-of-forces agreement of 15 May 1993 between that Government\n and the United Nations;\n 13. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n The third draft resolution was then put to the vote and adopted unanimously as\nresolution 983 (1995), which reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling its resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December 1992 and all subsequent relevant\n resolutions,\n Affirming its commitment to the search for an overall negotiated settlement of the\n conflicts in the former Yugoslavia ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the\n States there within their internationally recognized borders, and stressing the importance it\n attaches to the mutual recognition thereof,\n Reaffirming its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of\n the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,\n Recalling its concern about possible developments which could undermine confidence\n and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or threaten its territory,\n Welcoming the positive role played by the United Nations Protection Force in the former\n Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and paying tribute to the personnel of the Force in the\n performance of its mandate in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,\n Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General of 22 March 1995,\n 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General of 22 March 1995, and in particular\n approves the arrangements contained in paragraph 84 thereof;\n\n 454\n"
[455] " 2. Decides that the United Nations Protection Force within the former Yugoslav Republic\n of Macedonia shall be known as the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force, with the\n mandate set out in paragraph 85 of the report of the Secretary-General of 22 March 1995, and\n that the mandate of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force shall continue for a\n period terminating on 30 November 1995;\n 3. Urges the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force to continue the current\n cooperation between the United Nations Protection Force and the mission of the Organization\n for Security and Cooperation in Europe;\n 4. Calls upon Member States to consider favourably requests by the Secretary-General\n for necessary assistance to the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in the\n performance of its mandate;\n 5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of any\n developments on the ground and other circumstances affecting the mandate of the United\n Nations Preventive Deployment Force;\n 6. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United States stated that the\ncreation of the new force in Croatia underlined the Council’s commitment to the\nsovereignty and territorial integrity of that country within its internationally recognized\nborders. His Government was concerned that goods were crossing those borders in\nviolation of paragraph 12 of resolution 820 (1993), without Croatia’s permission or\nknowledge. In Bosnia, his Government was concerned by the recent violations of the\ncease-fire. With regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the speaker noted that the presence of\nUnited Nations forces there was not an end in itself: to have meaning, it must contribute\nto political progress. Such progress was dependent, in turn, on the will of the parties.\nHere the responsibilities for failure rested on the Bosnian Serb party for its unwillingness\nto enter into negotiations on the basis of the Contact Group Plan. He stated that the\nchanges to UNPROFOR acknowledged that the circumstances in the three countries\ndiffered and that specifically tailored mandates were required. At the same time, by\nretaining important links between the forces the Council was recognizing that tensions\n\n\n\n\n 455\n"
[456] "and conflict in the region were closely connected and that the efficiency of the operations\nwas essential. 666\n\n\n The representative of France stated that the resolution just adopted, in relation to\nthe situation in Croatia, should permit UNCRO to carry out several essential missions:\nimplementation of the Cease-Fire Agreement, the application of the Economic\nAgreement, and the monitoring of Croatia’s international borders, which reflected the\nCouncil’s concern that its sovereignty and territorial integrity be preserved. Keeping\nUNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not an end in itself. It sole purpose was to\nfacilitate the conclusion of a political settlement. Referring to the restructuring of\nUNPROFOR into three distinct operations, the speaker stated that his delegation was\nsatisfied that the solution chosen preserved the unity of command and political leadership\nover the entire theatre, as well as the logistical and organizational interrelationship\nbetween the three Forces. His delegation believed that respect for that principle of unity\nstrengthened both the security of the troops deployed and the means available to the\nUnited Nations. It emphasized that the theatre commander must continue to exercise full\nauthority over all the Blue Helmets deployed throughout the territories of successor\nStates to the former Yugoslavia. That meant that the civilian authorities under the Special\nRepresentative of the Secretary-General would not assume responsibilities within the\nchain of military command, and that the theatre commander would have full\nresponsibility for the implementation of the three mandates entrusted to the United\n 667\nNations forces.\n\n\n The representative of the United Kingdom noted that UNCRO would need to\ncontinue to monitor the cease-fire, which was vital to continued stability, and it would\nalso need to facilitate the implementation of the Economic Agreement and monitor\nCroatia’s internationally recognized borders. The United Kingdom remained fully\ncommitted to Croatia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the same time, it was\nessential that a satisfactory autonomous status and protection for individual rights be\n\n 666\n Ibid., pp. 20-22.\n 667\n Ibid., pp. 22-23.\n\n\n 456\n"
[457] "firmly established for the Krajina Serbs. The deployment of UNCRO would clear the way\nfor further talks on economic normalization and on a political solution. In Bosnia, the\nUnited Kingdom appealed to all sides to show restraint and to cooperate with\nUNPROFOR in implementing the cessation-of-hostilities agreement, which should be\nextended in order to permit the political process to continue. The United Kingdom also\n 668\nurged the parties to respond constructively to the proposals of the Contact Group.\n\n\n The President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of China, reiterated\nChina’s position that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States of the region\nshould be respected. Settlement of the conflict would ultimately depend on the peoples of\nthe region themselves and must be achieved through peaceful means, with the United\nNations peacekeeping operations playing only a complementary role. China hoped that\nthe division of UNPROFOR into three parts, as proposed by the Secretary-General,\nwould give further impetus to the political settlement process. For those reasons, the\nChinese delegation had voted in favour of the three resolutions just adopted. The\nPresident stated that the United Nations peacekeeping operations should conform strictly\nto the purposes and principles of the Charter and should enjoy the consent and support of\nthe parties concerned. He also reiterated China’s reservations in relation to enforcement\naction and the use of force in peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII of the\n 669\nCharter.\n\n\n Decision of 16 June 1995 (3543rd meeting): resolution 998 (1995)\n\n On 30 May 1995, pursuant to resolutions 982 (1995) and 987 (1995), the\nSecretary-General submitted to the Council a report 670 on UNPROFOR.\n\n\n The Secretary-General reported that hostilities had intensified in and around\nSarajevo, particularly after the expiry of the cessation-of-hostilities agreement on 1 May\n1995, despite the persistent efforts of his Special Representative to obtain its renewal.\n\n 668\n Ibid., pp. 24-25.\n 669\n Ibid., p. 28.\n 670\n S/1995/444.\n\n\n 457\n"
[458] "That had led to the sustained use of heavy weapons by the two sides, increased civilian\nand UNPROFOR casualties and mounting calls for stricter enforcement of the exclusion\nzone. As previous measures had failed and as neither side had appeared ready to stop\nfighting, UNPROFOR had decided to use all available means to restore compliance with\nthe Sarajevo agreement of February 1994. At the expiration of an ultimatum by\nUNPROFOR addressed to both parties, air strikes had taken place on 25 and 26 May\n1995. Bosnian Serb forces had reacted by surrounding additional weapons collection\npoints, taking United Nations military observers into custody and using a number of them\nas human shields and by cutting electricity to the city. A relative calm had eventually\nprevailed in Sarajevo at a high cost for UNPROFOR. The ability of UNPROFOR,\nhowever, to operate effectively throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina was seriously\ncompromised.\n The Secretary-General noted that UNPROFOR remained deployed in a war\nsituation where there was no peace to keep. Its position was complicated by the fact that\nits original peacekeeping mandate, which could not be implemented without the\ncooperation of the parties, had gradually been enlarged to include elements of\nenforcement, which caused it to be seen as a party to the conflict. The safe-areas\nmandate, for instance, required it to cooperate and negotiate with a party upon whom it\nwas also expected to call air strikes. Similarly, the United Nations had imposed sanctions\nupon one party, whilst at the same time sending out a Force that was obliged to work with\nthe consent and cooperation of that party. The result was that Bosnian Serb leaders had\nlargely withdrawn their consent and cooperation from UNPROFOR, declaring that they\nwere applying their own “sanctions” to the United Nations in response to United Nations\nsanctions on them. As a result of those contradictions, UNPROFOR found itself in an\nintolerable predicament. Urgent measures needed to be taken to release the hostages, to\nadapt UNPROFOR’s mandate and its implementation to the political and operational\nrealities on the ground and to relaunch the peace process.\n The Secretary-General presented four options as to UNPROFOR’s future role:\nwithdraw UNPROFOR, leaving only a small political mission, if the parties so wished;\nretain its existing tasks and methods; change the existing mandate to permit the greater\nuse of force; or revise the mandate to include only those tasks that a peacekeeping\n\n\n 458\n"
[459] "operation could realistically be expected to perform in the circumstances prevailing in\nBosnia and Herzegovina. The Secretary-General was of the opinion that the fourth option\nwould give UNPROFOR a realistic mandate.\n\n\n 671\n By a letter dated 9 June 1995 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General conveyed a proposal 672 by the Governments of France,\nthe Netherlands and the United Kingdom to provide military reinforcements for\nUNPROFOR in order to reduce the vulnerability of its personnel and enhance its capacity\nto carry out its mandate. The three Governments had made it clear that their intention was\nthat the reinforced UNPROFOR would continue to be a peace-keeping mission. The\nSecretary-General noted that the proposal would provide the Commander of\nUNPROFOR with well-armed and mobile forces, with which to respond promptly to\nthreats to United Nations personnel. He therefore recommended that the Security Council\naccept the proposal, as it would enhance UNPROFOR’s ability to continue its\nhumanitarian efforts, with less danger to its personnel. In order to accommodate the\nadditional troops that would be required under the reinforcements, the Council would\nneed to increase the authorized UNPROFOR troop levels by 12,500.\n\n\n At its 3543rd meeting, on 16 June 1995, the Council included the above report and\nletter in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the\nrepresentatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Malaysia and Turkey, at their\nrequest, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President\n(Germany) then drew the attention of the Council members to the text of a draft\nresolution 673 submitted by the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Honduras, Netherlands,\nOman and the United Kingdom. He also read out a revision 674 that had been made to the\ndraft in its provisional form and referred to several other documents. 675\n\n\n 671\n S/1995/470 and Add.1.\n 672\n Ibid., annex.\n 673\n S/1995/478.\n 674\n S/PV.3543, p. 2.\n 675\n S/1995/477, identical letters dated 12 June 1995 from the representative of Morocco addressed to the\n\n\n 459\n"
[460] " At the same meeting, the representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina stated that the\nmeasures offered to his country by the United Nations, which had helped to sustain its\npeople, had almost totally “evaporated”. Sarajevo, Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac\nwere being denied any humanitarian assistance, and the “stranglehold” was tightening\nwithout response. Furthermore, Serbian forces had become so emboldened as to take\nUnited Nations personnel as human shields. In addition, the exclusion zone was being\nviolated by the Serbs and ignored by those who were obligated to enforce it. The\nGovernment of Bosnia and Herzegovina looked forward to the deployment of the rapid-\nreaction force and expected that it would enable the United Nations mission to be fully\n 676\nand faithfully implemented.\n\n\n The representative of Malaysia stated that by taking United Nations peacekeepers\nhostage and defying Security Council resolutions, the Bosnian Serbs were giving the\nimpression that the United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, was\nineffective in addressing a threat to international peace and security. His delegation did\nnot agree with the attempt to characterize UNPROFOR as merely a peacekeeping\noperation and to downplay UNPROFOR’s mandate relating to its enforcement\nresponsibilities. UNPROFOR’s mandate had been clearly spelled out in the relevant\nSecurity Council resolutions, including in the context of Chapter VII of the Charter and\nits enforcement. He further stated that the existing mandate was suffering from a lack of\nimplementation, and UNPROFOR should be provided with the means necessary for its\nfull implementation. Of the four options proposed by the Secretary-General, the\nMalaysian delegation favoured option C, being of the view that assertive action could be\ntaken without changing the existing mandate. It did not agree that option D was the way\nto move forward and argued that that option would weaken UNPROFOR’s mandate\nrather than strengthen it. Malaysia welcomed the establishment of the rapid reaction\n\n\nSecretary-General and the President of the Security Council; S/1995/480, letter dated 12 June 1995 from the\nrepresentative of Kazakhstan addressed to the Secretary-General; and S/1995/483, letter dated 14 June 1995 from the\nrepresentative of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the text of a\nletter of the same date from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of\nthe Security Council.\n 676\n S/PV.3543, pp. 2-3.\n\n\n 460\n"
[461] "capacity to assist UNPROFOR in the robust implementation of its mandate. The rapid\nreaction capacity should also be used for the protection of the civilian population,\nparticularly in the safe areas, with air support from NATO, in addition to the protection\nof UNPROFOR personnel. The Rapid Reaction Capacity (RRC) should also establish\nland corridors for humanitarian aid. It was also necessary to withdraw the United Nations\nmilitary observers, who had become “pawns” in the Serb strategy to embarrass the United\nNations. Malaysia also stressed the need for security guarantees for the Bosnian\nGovernment in terms of its right to self-defence, as provided for in the United Nations\n 677\nCharter, including by lifting the arms embargo.\n\n\n The representative of Egypt commented on some aspects of the Secretary-\nGeneral’s report. First, in order to ensure the credibility of the United Nations and to\nforce the Serb party to respect international legality, the provisions of the Charter should\nbe applied, and the resolutions of the Council should be implemented. Secondly, the\ninternational community must not accept the demilitarization of the safe areas. While the\npurpose of the safe area was to provide international protection for the territories and\ntheir population, their demilitarization would mean that they would be under the Serb\nforces’ domination if the international forces withdraw or were unable to ensure their\ndefence. Thirdly, the options available to the Council must be studied in the light of the\ndetailed information contained in the report, because the four operations could not be\nstudied in isolation from other options and possibilities. The third option would\npresuppose a strengthening of the mandate, but it would also mean modifying that\nmandate. That was not possible because UNPROFOR’s current mandate was sufficient.\nLastly, Egypt supported the conclusions of the Secretary-General that the international\nmediation efforts had come to a standstill, and that the Council should therefore reassess\n 678\nthe situation and adopt another initiative to relaunch the peace process.\n\n\n The representative of Croatia stated that his country welcomed the establishment\nof the rapid reaction force and was ready to provide logistical support. It was Croatia’s\n\n 677\n Ibid., pp. 3-5.\n 678\n Ibid., pp. 5-6.\n\n\n 461\n"
[462] "understanding that, while the rapid reaction force would use some command and logistic\nfacilities on the territory of Croatia, its theatre of operation would be exclusively on the\nterritory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croatian Government was of the firm view that\nany operational use of the rapid reaction force on Croatian territory could proceed only\n 679\nwith its prior consent.\n\n\n The representative of Turkey stated that the international community was\ncommitted, under General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, to preserving the\nterritorial integrity, unity and independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He noted that\nalmost all of the Security Council resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina referred to\nChapter VII of the Charter and he contended that UNPROFOR had been established as a\nprotection force and had therefore never been a traditional peacekeeping force. It was the\nstrong conviction of his Government that UNPROFOR should be reinforced so that it\ncould implement its existing mandate robustly and in full. Noting that UNPROFOR’s\ncommitment to protect the safe areas pursuant to resolutions 824 (1993) and 836 (1993)\nhad yet to be carried out, he argued that UNPROFOR needed to be strengthened in such a\nway as to enable it to act vigorously to deter attacks on the safe areas. His delegation also\nsupported the establishment of the rapid reaction force. 680\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of Nigeria observed that, although all\narguments seemed to militate in favour of a total withdrawal of the United Nations from\nBosnia and Herzegovina, there was agreement that Bosnia should not be abandoned, that\nhumanitarian assistance must continue to be rendered and that the civilian populations\nmust be protected to the extent possible. There was also agreement that the war must be\ncontained and that the credibility of the United Nations must not be allowed to suffer\nirreparably through a precipitate withdrawal. The Security Council’s response to the\nreport of the Secretary-General – to increase the number of troops in Bosnia to protect\nUNPROFOR better and enhance its ability to discharge its duties – did not answer some\nof the pertinent questions raised by the Secretary-General. Nigeria would go along with\n\n 679\n Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n 680\n Ibid., pp. 7-8.\n\n\n 462\n"
[463] "the draft resolution, however, due to its belief that countries in the region had a primary\nresponsibility to resolve the crisis, and in light of its commitment not to abandon Bosnia\nas it tried to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Nigerian Government\nalso hoped that initiatives on the diplomatic political track would resume and would be\n 681\npursued with vigour.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that, while measures must be\ntaken to prevent attacks against United Nations personnel, the main lessons to be drawn\nfrom the Bosnian crisis were that the use of force was not a panacea, and that decisive\naction was needed to achieve a breakthrough for a political settlement. In principle,\nRussia favoured enhancing the security of United Nations personnel, including through\nproviding UNPROFOR with a rapid reaction capability. Strengthening UNPROFOR’s\nability to protect the lives and safety of its peacekeepers, however, should in no way\nmake them a party to the conflict. Referring to the draft resolution, the speaker noted that\nit was of paramount importance that it called for the maintenance of UNPROFOR’s\nimpartial, peace-keeping nature. He further noted that the sponsors of the draft resolution\ndid take into account several of Russia’s proposals. The draft resolution, however, did not\nmanage to avoid the impression that the rapid reaction force was intended to operate\nagainst one of the Bosnian parties. While sharing the anger of others over the\ninadmissible acts that had been committed by the Bosnian Serbs, his delegation could not\nfail to note that the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina bore responsibility for\nprovocations, for violating agreements and for direct attacks on UNPROFOR. His\ndelegation had also proposed a reference to the inadmissible violations of the arms\nembargo in the former Yugoslavia, but it had not been incorporated. The Security\nCouncil must take genuine steps to put an end to such violations. Russia was also\nconcerned at the haste with which the draft resolution had been brought before the\nCouncil, meaning that the Council had not had time to agree on reliable guarantees\n\n\n\n\n 681\n Ibid., pp. 8-9.\n\n\n 463\n"
[464] "against attempts to use the rapid reaction force to involve UNPROFOR in the conflict. In\nlight of those circumstances, Russia would be forced to abstain in the voting. 682\n\n\n The representative of Indonesia stated that his delegation endorsed the paramount\nobjective of the draft resolution, which was to provide UNPROFOR with the necessary\nmeans to implement its mandate. The establishment of the rapid reaction force was an\nimportant step in pursuing that objective. Although the support and cooperation of the\nparties was a prerequisite for any peacekeeping operation, in the case of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina that requirement had been manipulated by the Bosnian Serbs, thereby\neroding UNPROFOR’s authority. It was necessary to address such tactics with\ndecisiveness, in order to ensure the effective implementation of Security Council\nresolutions. The deployment of a rapid reaction force should enhance UNPROFOR’s\ncapability to ensure the security of the civilian population in the safe areas, which was\none of its most important tasks. While his delegation was cognizant of the calls for the\ndemilitarization of safe areas as a means to enhance the protection of the civilian\npopulation therein, it believed, however, that demilitarization which was confined to the\nsafe areas was inherently unjust. It was tantamount to depriving the victims of the\nnecessary means to protect themselves while leaving the aggressors free to continue and\nintensify their attacks from the surrounding areas. It was in that context that the Non-\nAligned Movement Caucus had proposed that demilitarization based on mutual\nagreements should apply not only to safe areas, but also to their immediate surroundings.\nThe speaker further emphasized that the demilitarization of the safe areas and their\nsurrounding areas should be carried out with due regard for the need to respect the\nsovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in\n 683\naccordance with the Charter of the United Nations, including its right to defend itself.\n\n\n The representative of Honduras stated that UNPROFOR’s purpose was to keep\nthe peace, not to impose it. A revision of UNPROFOR’s mandate in order to allow it to\ntake military action without the cooperation of one of the parties or to ensure the\n\n 682\n Ibid., pp. 9-11.\n 683\n Ibid., pp. 11-12.\n\n\n 464\n"
[465] "protection of its own personnel was not a viable possibility. His delegation supported the\nproposal for the integration of a rapid reaction force under United Nations command and\navailable to UNPROFOR, not only because its objective was to strengthen\nUNPROFOR’s capacity to fulfil its mandate, but also because it would enable\nUNPROFOR to continue as a peacekeeping operation. Referring to the question of the\nsafe areas, the speaker argued that the military presence of the parties in the “safe areas”\nwas totally inconsistent with the fundamental principles that should govern those areas.\nHis delegation therefore agreed with the provisions of the draft resolution relating to the\n 684\nneed to demilitarize the safe areas by mutual agreement.\n\n\n The representative of China stated that the establishment of the rapid reaction\nforce under Chapter VII of the Charter was for the purpose of enforcement actions and\ntherefore brought about a de facto change in the status of UNPROFOR. Once the force\nwas put into action, UNPROFOR was bound to become a party to the conflict, thus\ndepriving it of its status as a peacekeeping force. The establishment of the rapid reaction\nforce would also increase substantially the peacekeeping expenditure of the United\nNations. Given that the United Nations was experiencing a financial crisis, it was all the\nmore necessary for the Security Council to act within the means available to it, without\nwillfully increasing the burden of the States Member of the United Nations. It was neither\nappropriate nor desirable to finance the establishment of the rapid reaction force from the\nUnited Nations peacekeeping budget. The Chinese delegation could not support the draft\nresolution, since many of its elements ran counter to its principled position. Taking into\naccount, however, the fact that many developing countries wished the Security Council to\ntake appropriate measures to alleviate the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as\nthe fact that the draft resolution stressed the importance of a political settlement and of\nprotecting the security of United Nations personnel, and as the draft had incorporated\n 685\nsome of its proposed amendments, China would abstain from the subsequent vote.\n\n\n\n\n 684\n Ibid., pp. 12-13.\n 685\n Ibid., pp. 13-14.\n\n\n 465\n"
[466] " The representative of the Czech Republic stated that the draft resolution preserved\nthe peacekeeping nature of UNPROFOR. It was easy to argue that there was no peace to\nkeep in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The important aspect, however, was that, peace or not,\nUNPROFOR was not turning into a peacemaking or a peace-enforcement operation. The\nCzech delegation was satisfied that Chapter VII of the Charter was invoked only in the\ncontext of UNPROFOR’s self-defence and freedom of movement. The Security Council\nwould therefore be emphasizing once more, through the draft resolution, that peaceful\n 686\nnegotiations, not war, were the way to settle the conflict.\n\n\n The representative of the United States stated that her Government supported the\ndeployment of a rapid reaction force for the purpose of defending UNPROFOR personnel\nand enabling the peacekeeping mission to fulfil its mandate in a more robust and\nsuccessful fashion. However, because of the enormous cost of UNPROFOR and the\nexisting budgetary situation in Washington, the United States could not agree to funding\nthe rapid deployment force through the normal United Nations peacekeeping assessment\nprocess. Nevertheless, it stood ready to consider all reasonable alternatives. 687\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote, as orally revised in its provisional\nform, and it was adopted by 13 votes to none, with two abstentions (China, the Russian\nFederation), as resolution 998 (1995). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its earlier relevant resolutions,\n Reaffirming the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force as referred to in\n resolution 982 (1995) of 31 March 1995 and the need for its full implementation,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 30 May 1995,\n Having considered also the letter dated 9 June 1995 from the Secretary-General to the\n President of the Security Council and the annex thereto,\n\n\n\n\n 686\n Ibid., pp. 15-16.\n 687\n Ibid., pp. 16-17.\n\n\n 466\n"
[467] " Noting that the rapid reaction force referred to in the above-mentioned letter will be an\nintegral part of the existing United Nations peacekeeping operation and that the status of the\nUnited Nations Protection Force and its impartiality will be maintained,\n Deeply concerned by the continuing armed hostilities in the territory of the Republic of\nBosnia and Herzegovina,\n Expressing its deep regret that the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina\nhas continued to deteriorate and that the parties were not able to agree to a further ceasefire\nfollowing the breakdown of the ceasefire agreement of 23 December 1994 and its subsequent\nexpiration on 1 May 1995,\n Gravely concerned that the regular obstruction of deliveries of humanitarian assistance,\nand the denial of the use of Sarajevo airport by the Bosnian Serb side threaten the ability of\nthe United Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina to carry out its mandate,\n Condemning in the strongest possible terms all attacks by the parties on United Nations\nProtection Force personnel,\n Condemning also the increasing attacks on the civilian population by Bosnian Serb\nforces,\n Determined to enhance the protection of the United Nations Protection Force and to\nenable it to carry out its mandate,\n Noting the letter dated 14 June 1995 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council,\nwelcoming the reinforcement of the United Nations Protection Force,\n Stressing the importance at this juncture of renewed efforts to achieve an overall peaceful\nsettlement,\n Underlining once again the urgent need for acceptance by the Bosnian Serb party of the\nContact Group peace plan as a starting point, opening the way to the negotiation of such an\noverall peaceful settlement,\n Reaffirming the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the\nRepublic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,\n Reaffirming further that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a State Member of\nthe United Nations, enjoys the rights provided for in the Charter of the United Nations,\n Determining that the situation in the former Yugoslavia continues to be a threat to\ninternational peace and security,\n Reaffirming its determination to ensure the security of the United Nations Peace\nForces/United Nations Protection Force and freedom of movement for the accomplishment of\n\n\n 467\n"
[468] "all its missions, and, to these ends, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United\nNations,\n 1. Demands that the Bosnian Serb forces release immediately and unconditionally all\nremaining detained United Nations Protection Force personnel, and further demands that all\nparties fully respect the safety of Force personnel and others engaged in the delivery of\nhumanitarian assistance and ensure their complete freedom of movement;\n 2. Emphasizes that there can be no military solution to the conflict, stresses the\nimportance it attaches to vigorous pursuit of a political settlement, and reiterates its demand\nthat the Bosnian Serb party accept the Contact Group peace plan as a starting point;\n 3. Calls upon the parties to agree without further delay to a ceasefire and a complete\ncessation of hostilities in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina;\n 4. Demands that all parties allow unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance to all\nparts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and, in particular, to the safe areas;\n 5. Demands also that the Bosnian Serb forces comply immediately with the agreement of\n5 June 1992 (S/24075, annex) and ensure unimpeded access by land to Sarajevo;\n 6. Demands further that the parties respect fully the status of the safe areas and, in\nparticular, the need to ensure the safety of the civilian population therein;\n 7. Underlines the need for a mutually agreed demilitarization of the safe areas and their\nimmediate surroundings and the benefits this would bring to all parties in terms of the\ncessation of attacks on the safe areas and of launching military attacks therefrom;\n 8. Encourages, in this context, the Secretary-General further to intensify efforts aimed at\nreaching agreement with the parties on the modalities for demilitarization, taking particular\naccount of the need to ensure the safety of the civilian population, and calls upon the parties\nto cooperate fully with these efforts;\n 9. Welcomes the letter dated 9 June 1995 from the Secretary-General on the\nreinforcement of the United Nations Protection Force and the establishment of a rapid\nreaction capacity to enable the United Nations Peace Forces/United Nations Protection Force\nto carry out its mandate;\n 10. Decides accordingly to authorize an increase in United Nations Peace Forces/United\nNations Protection Force personnel, acting under the present mandate and on the terms set out\nin the above-mentioned letter, by up to 12,500 additional troops, the modalities of financing\nto be determined later;\n\n\n\n\n 468\n"
[469] " 11. Authorizes the Secretary-General to carry forward the implementation of paragraphs 9\n and 10 above, maintaining close contact with the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and\n Herzegovina and others concerned;\n 12. Requests the Secretary-General, in taking any decisions with respect to the\n deployment of United Nations Protection Force personnel, to take full account of the need to\n enhance their security and minimize the dangers to which they might be exposed;\n 13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom welcomed the\nresolution just adopted. The increase in reinforcements would provide United Nations\ncommanders, for the first time, with a credible rapid reaction capability. He argued that it\nwas clear that UNPROFOR’s mission remained one of peacekeeping. Its purpose was to\nfacilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid, to assist the parties in developing and\nimplementing cease-fire agreements and to provide a “breathing space” for the political\nprocess. His Government was determined to do everything possible to ensure that\nUNPROFOR was able to remain in Bosnia. But, ultimately, whether it did so was up to\nthe parties themselves, UNPROFOR could only be successful if it had the continued\nconsent and cooperation of all sides. The speaker, however, warned that if the parties\ninstead insist on embracing the military option, if UNPROFOR was prevented from\ncarrying out its tasks or it faced unacceptable risks, then there might be no choice but to\nwithdraw UNPROFOR. Turning to the draft resolution, he speaker noted that his\ndelegation had accepted the addition of the words at the end of paragraph 10 because it\nunderstood the domestic political difficulties facing the United States at that time. He\nargued, however, that the Security Council had no locus to take decisions on financial\nquestions, as the Charter reserved to the General Assembly the responsibility for\nbudgetary and financial matters. Therefore, the amendment of paragraph 10 could not\n 688\nchange the financial procedures followed by the Organization.\n\n\n The representative of France stated that providing UNPROFOR with new means\nhad a twofold objective, to assure the security of its personnel and to enable UNPROFOR\n\n\n 688\n Ibid., pp. 17-19.\n\n\n 469\n"
[470] "to fulfil its mission. He emphasized that UNPROFOR’s nature would not change. The\nelements of the rapid reaction force would act in support of UNPROFOR within the\nframework of its mandate. The missions of that force would consist essentially of\nemergency actions to help isolated or threatened units to help in the redeployment of\nUNPROFOR elements in order to make them less vulnerable or facilitate their freedom\nof movement. He noted that the resolution contained a provision relating to the\nsubsequent determination of the financial modalities and stated that his country\nunderstood that provision to mean that it was not up to the Council itself to establish the\nmodalities for financing an operation upon which it had decided. Faced with\nUNPROFOR’s serious difficulties on the ground, the Governments of France, the United\nKingdom and the Netherlands, rather than electing to withdraw from Bosnia, had\nproposed that additional means be made available to the United Nations. The French\n 689\nGovernment expected these new means to be used judiciously, but not weakly.\n\n\n The representative of Argentina stated that his delegation agreed with the\nSecretary-General that the peace process should be relaunched and intensified through\nnew political initiatives. It therefore attached particular importance to paragraph 2 of the\nresolution just adopted. Referring to the rapid reaction force, the speaker argued that the\nuse of force should be restricted to self-defence and should be engaged in with great care,\nlest the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement be crossed. 690\n\n\n Decision of 19 August 1995 (3568th meeting): statement by the President\n 691\n By a letter dated 17 August 1995 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General reported that his Special Representative for the former\nYugoslavia and the UNPF/UNPROFOR Force Commander had undertaken consultations\nwith the Governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, with a view to facilitating\nthe deployment of the additional troops authorized by the Council under resolution 998\n(1995) and the freedom of movement of the units of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF).\n\n 689\n Ibid., pp. 19-20.\n 690\n Ibid., pp. 21-22.\n 691\n S/1995/707.\n\n\n 470\n"
[471] "Both Governments had taken the position that the additional troops were not part of the\nUNPF/UNPROFOR and were therefore not covered by the relevant Status of Forces\nAgreement (SOFA). The Governments further maintained that resolution 998 (1995) had\nbeen adopted after the conclusion of the SOFA. The Special Representative had outlined\nthe position of the United Nations, which was that the Council’s decision to authorize the\naddition of the RRF did not exclude the expanded UNPF/UNPROFOR from the scope of\nthe SOFA. Once the Council had authorized a peacekeeping operation, it could at any\ntime reduce or expand the strength of the operation, without having to conclude\nadditional agreements. The Secretary-General warned that the position of the two\nGovernments had delayed the deployment of the RRF, which could have serious\nconsequences for the United Nations forces already deployed. Furthermore, the local\nCroat authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina had been demanding that the United Nations\nsign an agreement with them governing the status of the RRF. The United Nations was of\nthe view that the SOFA was applicable throughout the entire territory, and it was not\nnecessary to enter into such an agreement with the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.\nThe Special Representative had suggested to the Bosnian authorities that supplementary\narrangements, as envisaged in Article VIII of the existing SOFA, be concluded to cover\nthe issues in question. The United Nations would require that the supplementary\narrangements contain a clause providing that, in the event of conflict between the\nsupplementary arrangements and the SOFA, the latter should prevail.\n\n\n At its 3568th meeting, on 19 August, the Council included the above letter in its\nagenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives of\nBosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate in the discussion\nwithout the right to vote. The President (Indonesia) drew the attention of the members of\nthe Council to a letter 692 dated 18 August 1995 from the representative of Bosnia and\nHerzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council and stated that, after\n\n\n\n\n 692\n S/1995/710.\n\n\n 471\n"
[472] "consultations among members of the Security Council, he had been authorized to make\nthe following statement 693 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council is deeply concerned by the contents of the letter dated 17 August\n 1995 from the Secretary-General regarding the continued impediments to the functioning and\n deployment of the rapid reaction force established by resolution 998 (1995) of 16 June 1995.\n \"The Council reaffirms in this regard that the rapid reaction force is an integral part of the\n United Nations Peace Forces/United Nations Protection Force and that its deployment is\n crucial for the strengthening of the capacity of the United Nations Protection Force to carry\n out its mandate in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It shares the Secretary-General's\n view that the existing status-of-forces agreements constitute an appropriate and sufficient\n basis for the presence of the United Nations Peace Forces/United Nations Protection Force,\n including the rapid reaction force.\n \"The Council is deeply concerned at the implications of the continued impediments to the\n functioning of the rapid reaction force for the effectiveness of the United Nations mission in\n the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It calls upon the Governments of the Republic of\n Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina immediately to remove all impediments\n and to give clear undertakings concerning the freedom of movement and provision of\n facilities for the rapid reaction force, in order that it may perform its tasks without further\n delay. It further calls upon them to resolve forthwith within the framework of the existing\n status-of-forces agreements any outstanding difficulties with the relevant United Nations\n authorities.\n \"The Council supports fully the efforts of the Secretary-General in this matter and will\n return to this question in the light of a further report which the Council requests the\n Secretary-General to submit no later than 24 August 1995.\"\n\n\n Decision of 2 December 1993: letter from the President to the Secretary-General\n\n By a letter 694 dated 1 December 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General referred to the senior-level staffing of the United Nations\npeacemaking and peace-keeping efforts related to the former Yugoslavia. He recalled that\n\n\n 693\n S/PRST/1995/40.\n 694\n S/26838.\n\n\n 472\n"
[473] "in May 1993 Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg had been appointed as both Special\nRepresentative of the Secretary-General and Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of\nthe ICFY. At that time it had been hoped that the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia and\nHerzegovina would shortly be agreed and that thereafter the main focus of United\nNations activities in the former Yugoslavia would be implementation of that plan on the\nground, together with continuing efforts to implement the Vance plan related to the\nUnited Nations Protected Areas in Croatia. However, as the members of the Council were\naware, the Vance-Owen plan had not been accepted and Mr. Stoltenberg remained\nheavily engaged in continuing negotiations. That had left him insufficient time to carry\nout in full the functions of Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Chief of\nMission of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Accordingly, and after\nconsulting Mr. Stoltenberg and contacting the heads of Government and other parties\ndirectly concerned in the former Yugoslavia, the Secretary-General had come to the\nconclusion that the resumption of negotiations in Geneva, following the meeting there\nbetween the Foreign Ministers of the European Union, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering\nCommittee of the Conference and the parties on 29 November 1993, made it necessary to\nseparate the functions of Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee and Special\nRepresentative. Therefore, it was the Secretary-General's intention that Mr. Stoltenberg\nshould continue to serve as Co-Chairman and that Mr. Yasushi Akashi, until recently the\nSecretary-General's Special Representative for Cambodia, should be appointed to the post\nof Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia and Chief of Mission of\nUNPROFOR. The Secretary-General further stated that he had so informed the heads of\n 695\nGovernment and other parties directly concerned in the former Yugoslavia. By a letter\ndated 2 December 1993, the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-\nGeneral as follows:\n\n\n “I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 1 December 1993 concerning the\n staffing of the United Nations peace-keeping and peacemaking efforts in the former\n Yugoslavia has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They take note\n of the information contained in your letter and agree with the proposal mentioned therein.”]\n\n 695\n S/26839.\n\n\n 473\n"
[474] " The situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia\n\n\n INITIAL PROCEEDINGS\n\n\n At its 3239th meeting, on 18 June 1993, the Council included the item entitled\n“The situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” as well as a letter 696\ndated 15 June 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil in its agenda. In that letter, the Secretary-General transmitted a letter dated 11\nJune 1993 from the representative of the United States, stating that the United States had\ndecided to offer a reinforced company team of approximately 300 troops to operate with\nthe United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) forces stationed in the former\nYugoslav Republic of Macedonia.\n\n\n Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (Spain) drew the attention of\nthe Council members to the text of a draft resolution697 that had been prepared in the\ncourse of the Council’s prior consultations.\n\n\nDecision of 18 June 1993 (3239th meeting): resolution 842 (1993)\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 842 (1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Reaffirming its resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992 and all subsequent resolutions\n relating to the United Nations Protection Force,\n Recalling in particular resolution 795 (1992) of 11 December 1992, by which it\n authorized the presence of the Force in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,\n Welcoming the important contribution of the existing Force presence in the former\n Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to stability in the region,\n\n\n 696\n S/25954 and Add.1. For details see Chapter V of the present supplement.\n 697\n S/25955.\n\n\n 474\n"
[475] " Seeking to support efforts for a peaceful resolution of the situation in the former\n Yugoslavia as it relates to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as provided for in the\n report of the Secretary-General of 9 December 1992 and approved in resolution 795 (1992) of\n 11 December 1992,\n Noting with appreciation the offer made by a Member State (S/25954 and Add.1) to\n contribute additional personnel to the Force presence in the former Yugoslav Republic of\n Macedonia, and the latter Government's favourable response thereto,\n 1. Welcomes the offer made by a Member State to contribute additional personnel to the\n presence of the United Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslav Republic of\n Macedonia, and decides to expand the size of the Force accordingly and to authorize the\n deployment of these additional personnel;\n 2. Decides to remain seized of the matter.\n\n\n\n\nDecision of 22 July 1993: letter from the President\n\n\n On 13 July 1993, pursuant to Security Council resolution 795 (1992), the\n 698\nSecretary-General submitted to the Council a report on the deployment and activities\nof the United Nations Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslav Republic of\nMacedonia prior to its expansion. The Secretary-General noted that UNPROFOR had so\nfar been successful in its preventive mandate in the former Yugoslav Republic of\nMacedonia. However, it was still too early to draw definitive conclusions about the\neffectiveness of that deployment in the highly volatile situation prevailing in the region.\nHe recalled that in proposing the initial deployment of UNPROFOR in the former\n 699\nYugoslav Republic of Macedonia on 9 December 1992 , he had expressed the belief\nthat a small preventive United Nations deployment would help the countries concerned\n“to make safe passage through a potentially turbulent and hazardous period”. That\nremained his hope at a time when the conflagration in other parts of the former\nYugoslavia showed little sign of abating.\n\n\n 698\n S/26099.\n 699\n See S/24923.\n\n\n 475\n"
[476] " By a letter 700 dated 22 July 1993, the President of the Security Council informed\nthe Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n “The members of the Security Council have noted your report of 13 July 1993 pursuant\n to resolution 795 (1992) on the deployment and activities of the United Nations Protection\n Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, prior to its expansion\n in accordance with resolution 842 (1993) of 18 June 1993. They welcome the fact that,\n subsequent to the events recorded in your report, the further addition to UNPROFOR's\n strength pursuant to the latter resolution has now been completed. The members of the\n Council are conscious of the important contribution made by UNPROFOR in the former\n Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to stability in the region. They welcome the establishment\n of close coordination with the CSCE missions there, as called for in paragraph 4 of resolution\n 795 (1992) of 11 December 1992, and welcome UNPROFOR's increased ability to fulfil its\n mandate in the implementation of all relevant resolutions of the Security Council.\n “The members of the Council look forward to receiving further reports in due course on\n UNPROFOR's activities in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.”\n\n\nDecision of 30 November 1995 (3602nd meeting): resolution 1027 (1995)\n\n\n On 23 November 1995, pursuant to resolutions 981 (1995), 982 (1995) and 983\n(1995), the Secretary-General submitted to the Council a report 701 on peacekeeping\nmissions in the former Yugoslavia, including the United Nations Preventive Deployment\nForce (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The report was\nintended to assist the Council in its deliberations on the future of the missions.\n\n\n The Secretary-General noted that UNPREDEP’s preventive deployment role had\ncontributed greatly to the peace and stability of the southern Balkans. The operation had\nproved that preventive deployment was an effective form of peacekeeping and that results\n\n\n\n 700\n S/26130.\n 701\n S/1995/987.\n\n\n 476\n"
[477] "could be achieved even with a small, almost symbolic deployment of United Nations\npeacekeepers, if it was done at the right time and with a clear mandate. He noted,\nhowever, that the Government of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was of the\nopinion, which he shared, that the causes leading to the establishment of UNPREDEP\nhad not ceased to exist. The continued presence of UNPREDEP, with basically the same\nmandate, strength and troop composition, was vital to the maintenance of peace and\nstability in the country. The Secretary-General recommended that the mandate of\nUNPREDEP should be renewed for a further 12-month period. He also noted that it was\nhis intention to make, as soon as possible, recommendations relating to the establishment\nof UNPREDEP on “a fully independent footing”, which would report directly to New\nYork.\n\n\n At its 3602nd meeting, on 30 November 1995, the Council resumed its\nconsideration of the item entitled “The situation in the former Yugoslav Republic of\nMacedonia” and included the above report of the Secretary-General in its agenda.\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of the former\nYugoslav Republic of Macedonia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without\nthe right to vote. The President (Oman) then drew the attention of the Council members\nto the text of a draft resolution 702 submitted by Argentina, the Czech Republic, France,\nGermany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, the United States and\nHonduras.\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 1027 (1995). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions and in particular its resolution 983 (1995)\n of 31 March 1995,\n Reaffirming its commitment to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of\n the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,\n\n\n\n\n 702\n S/1995/996.\n\n\n 477\n"
[478] " Recalling its concern about possible developments which could undermine confidence\n and stability in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia or threaten its territory,\n Welcoming the positive role played by the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force,\n and paying tribute to the personnel of the Force in the performance of their mandate,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 23 November 1995,\n 1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General;\n 2. Decides to extend the mandate of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force for\n a period terminating on 30 May 1996;\n 3. Urges the Force to continue its cooperation with the mission of the Organization for\n Security and Cooperation in Europe;\n 4. Calls upon Member States to consider favourably requests by the Secretary-General\n for necessary assistance to the Force in the performance of its mandate;\n 5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed of any\n developments on the ground and other circumstances affecting the mandate of the Force, and\n in particular to submit, if possible by 31 January 1996, a report on all aspects of the Force, in\n the light of developments in the region, for review by the Council;\n 6. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the former Yugoslav Republic of\nMacedonia stated that it was his Government’s view that UNPREDEP should become a\ncompletely independent United Nations operation reporting directly to the Secretary-\nGeneral, with its base, military command and logistics structure located in Skopje. His\nGovernment also requested that the mandate of UNPREDEP be extended until 30\n 703\nNovember 1996.\n\n\n\n\n 703\n S/PV.3602, pp. 2-5.\n\n\n 478\n"
[479] " Establishment of an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons\n responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in\n the territory of the former Yugoslavia\n\n\n\n INITIAL PROCEEDINGS\n\n\n At its 3175th meeting, on 22 February 1993, the Council included the item entitled\n“Establishment of an international tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for\nserious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the\nFormer Yugoslavia” in its agenda. The Council also included the following documents in\n 704\nits agenda: a letter dated 10 February 1993 from the representative of France addressed\nto the Secretary-General, attaching the report of a Committee of French Jurists set up to\nstudy the establishment of an International Criminal Tribunal to judge the crimes\ncommitted in the former Yugoslavia; a letter 705 dated 16 February 1993 from the\nrepresentative of Italy addressed to the Secretary-General, forwarding a draft statute for a\nTribunal for War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity Committed in the Territory of the\nFormer Yugoslavia; and a letter 706 dated 18 February 1993 from the representative of\nSweden addressed to the Secretary-General, transmitting the decision by the CSCE\nmeeting on a proposal for an International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former\nYugoslavia made by the Rapporteurs under the CSCE Moscow Human Dimension\nMechanism to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.\n Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representatives of\nBosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to participate in the discussion\nwithout the right to vote. The President (Morocco) then drew the attention of the Council\n 707\nmembers to several documents and to the text of a draft resolution 708 that had been\nprepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations.\n\n\n 704\n S/25266.\n 705\n S/25300.\n 706\n S/25307.\n 707\n S/25221, report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the International Conference on the Former\nYugoslavia; S/25274, letter dated 9 February 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the\nSecurity Council, transmitting the interim report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to resolution 780\n\n\n 479\n"
[480] " Speaking before the vote, the representative of Brazil stated that the information\ngathered by the Commission of Experts and by the Special Rapporteur of the\nCommission on Human Rights had provided substantial evidence of grave breaches of\nhumanitarian law being committed on a massive scale and in a systematic fashion. The\ninternational community could not allow that to continue unpunished. These grave\nbreaches of the most elementary norms of humanity must be treated as what they were:\ncriminal acts, crimes against women and children and other defenceless victims, but also\ncrimes against humanity. Brazil favoured strong action to ensure the full ascertainment of\nthe truth about each of the cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in\nthe territory of the former Yugoslavia and, in that regard, supported the establishment of\nan international criminal tribunal to bring to justice the individuals found to be\nresponsible for such “abominable acts”.\n\n\n The speaker further observed that it was of particular importance that the\ninternational tribunal should rest on a solid legal foundation, in order to ensure the\neffectiveness of its actions. Addressing the question of the best method for establishing\nan ad hoc international criminal tribunal, he noted that the authority of the Security\nCouncil was not self-constituted but originated from a delegation of powers by the whole\nmembership of the Organization. The Security Council, in the exercise of its\nresponsibilities, acted on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations, in\naccordance with Article 24, paragraph 1, of the Charter. Its powers could not be created,\nrecreated or reinterpreted by decisions of the Council itself, but must be based on specific\nCharter provisions. Because the Council exercised a delegated responsibility, the task of\ninterpreting its competence called for extreme caution, in particular when invoking\nChapter VII of the Charter. The Security Council should play a strong and positive role in\npromoting the implementation of the various elements that would contribute to the peace\n\n\n(1992) to provide the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the Geneva\nConventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former\nYugoslavia; and S/25240, letter dated 2 February 1993 from the representative of Denmark addressed to the Secretary-\nGeneral, forwarding the final report of the investigative mission into the treatment of Muslim women in the former\nYugoslavia.\n 708\n S/25314.\n\n\n 480\n"
[481] "efforts developed by the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, but that role\nshould remain within the scope of the powers expressly granted to the Security Council in\naccordance with the United Nations Charter. In a rapidly changing world, Brazil\nconsidered it increasingly important to promote the rule of law in international relations\nby acting to ensure strict respect for the provisions of the Charter and other norms of\n 709\ninternational law.\n\n\n The representative of China stated that his delegation supported the thrust of the\ndraft resolution and would therefore vote in favour. That vote would not, however,\n 710\nprejudge China’s position on future Security Council actions on the subject.\n\n\nDecision of 22 February 1993 (3175th meeting): resolution 808 (1993)\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted as resolution 808\n(1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant\n resolutions,\n Recalling paragraph 10 of its resolution 764 (1992) of 13 July 1992, in which it\n reaffirmed that all parties are bound to comply with the obligations under international\n humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and that persons\n who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the Conventions are individually\n responsible in respect of such breaches,\n Recalling also its resolution 771 (1992) of 13 August 1992, in which, inter alia, it\n demanded that all parties and others concerned in the former Yugoslavia, and all military\n forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, immediately cease and desist from all breaches of\n international humanitarian law,\n Recalling further its resolution 780 (1992) of 6 October 1992, in which it requested the\n Secretary-General to establish, as a matter of urgency, an impartial commission of experts to\n\n\n 709\n S/PV.3175, pp. 4-7.\n 710\n Ibid., pp. 7.\n\n\n 481\n"
[482] "examine and analyse the information submitted pursuant to resolutions 771 (1992) and 780\n(1992), together with such further information as the commission may obtain, with a view to\nproviding the Secretary-General with its conclusions on the evidence of grave breaches of the\nGeneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law committed in the\nterritory of the former Yugoslavia,\n Having considered the interim report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant\nto resolution 780 (1992), in which the Commission observed that a decision to establish an ad\nhoc international tribunal in relation to events in the territory of the former Yugoslavia would\nbe consistent with the direction of its work,\n Expressing once again its grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread violations of\ninternational humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former Yugoslavia,\nincluding reports of mass killings and the continuance of the practice of “ethnic cleansing”,\n Determining that this situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security,\n Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to justice\nthe persons who are responsible for them,\n Convinced that in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia the\nestablishment of an international tribunal would enable this aim to be achieved and would\ncontribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace,\n Noting in this regard the recommendation by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee\nof the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia for the establishment of such a\ntribunal,\n Taking note with grave concern of the report of the European Community investigative\nmission into the treatment of Muslim women in the former Yugoslavia,\n Taking note of the report of the committee of jurists submitted by France, the report of\nthe commission of jurists submitted by Italy, and the report transmitted by the Permanent\nRepresentative of Sweden on behalf of the Chairman-in-Office of the Conference on Security\nand Cooperation in Europe,\n 1. Decides that an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of\npersons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the\nterritory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991;\n 2. Requests the Secretary-General to submit for consideration by the Council at the\nearliest possible date, and if possible no later than sixty days after the adoption of the present\nresolution, a report on all aspects of this matter, including specific proposals and where\nappropriate options for the effective and expeditious implementation of the decision\n\n\n 482\n"
[483] " contained in paragraph 1 above, taking into account suggestions put forward in this regard by\n Member States;\n 3. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of France stated that the atrocities\ncommitted by all sides in the Yugoslav crisis had given rise to an intolerable situation\nwhich was fanning the flames of conflict and, therefore, constituted a threat to\ninternational peace and security. Prosecuting the guilty was necessary in order to do\njustice to the victims and to the international community. It would also send a clear\nmessage to those continuing to commit such crimes that they would be held responsible\nfor their acts. For the United Nations and, particularly, for the Security Council,\nprosecuting the guilty was also a matter of doing their duty to maintain and restore peace.\nWith those considerations in mind, the French Foreign Minister had asked a group of\njurists to draw up a report on setting up an international criminal tribunal that could\nprosecute persons responsible for the serious violations of international humanitarian law\nthat had been committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since the beginning of\nYugoslavia’s dissolution. The report had concluded that the creation of an international\ntribunal for the former Yugoslavia could be decided on by the Security Council, within\nthe framework of its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter to maintain or restore\ninternational peace and security. France had endorsed that conclusion and had taken the\ninitiative of proposing to the Security Council a draft resolution for its implementation.\n\n\n The speaker further observed that the Security Council had taken a decision of\nmajor significance. For the first time in history, the United Nations would be setting up\nan international criminal jurisdiction – one that would be competent to try those who had\ncommitted serious violations of international humanitarian law in the territory of the\nformer Yugoslavia. The tribunal should be established as soon as possible, through a\nfurther decision of the Security Council under the provisions of Chapter VII, which\n\n\n\n\n 483\n"
[484] "established the Council’s competence in the maintenance and restoration of international\npeace and security. 711\n\n\n The representative of the United States stated that her delegation strongly\nsupported the historic resolution just adopted, which took the first step in establishing an\nad hoc tribunal to prosecute persons accused of war crimes and other serious violations of\ninternational humanitarian law in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Her delegation\nlooked forward to working with the Secretary-General to accomplish expeditiously his\ntask of providing the Council with options for a statute and rules of procedure of the\ntribunal. Once the Secretary-General’s report had been received, the United States would\nact quickly, along with the other members of the Council, to establish a tribunal under\n 712\nChapter VII.\n\n\n The representative of the United Kingdom said that it was vital that an\ninternational legal mechanism be established to bring those accused of war crimes, from\nwhatever party to the conflict, to justice. His delegation welcomed the valuable work that\nhad been done on possible mechanisms and which would contribute to the study by the\nSecretary-General of the most effective and feasible way of establishing a tribunal or a\ncourt. The Secretary-General’s task would not be easy. The Commission of Experts’\ninterim report noted the difficulties of identifying the perpetrators of those crimes. It was\nvital that whatever court or tribunal was established would be provided with the\nnecessary evidence. The Commission must therefore be given adequate resources to\ncontinue its work. He noted that the “court” was an ad hoc legal framework to deal with\n 713\nwar crimes committed only in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.\n\n\n The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the resolution just\nadopted reflected the international community’s will to exert its influence on all parties to\nthe conflict in order to accelerate the peace process. The legal basis, status, composition\n\n 711\n Ibid., pp. 8-11.\n 712\n Ibid., pp. 11-14.\n 713\n Ibid., pp. 14-15.\n\n\n 484\n"
[485] "and powers of the international tribunal, and the modalities for its establishment and\nfunctioning, would be decided by the Council subsequently, but already the resolution\nshould serve the purpose of “bringing to their senses” those who were ready to sacrifice\nthe lives and dignity of hundreds of thousands of innocent people. The Russian\ndelegation believed that resolution 808 (1993) would also serve as a warning to those\nguilty of mass crimes and flagrant violations of human rights in other parts of the\n 714\nworld.\n\n\n The representative of Hungary considered the Security Council’s decision of the\nprevious October to set up a Commission of Experts charged with studying and analyzing\ninformation on the grave violations of international humanitarian law in the former\nYugoslavia, to be of great importance. Information and reports from various sources\nconfirmed that the gravity and massive nature of those violations constituted a threat to\ninternational peace and security. Consequently, there should be no doubt about the\n 715\ncompetence of the Security Council to deal with the matter.\n\n\n The representative of Spain stated that his delegation understood that some might\nharbour certain doubts about the competence of the Council to take the step of\nestablishing a tribunal, as it was a novel one. Spain did not share those doubts, however,\nfor it was a limited and precise action with the clear objective of restoring peace, which\nwas perfectly in keeping with the competence of the Council. In fact, the Council was not\nattempting to establish a new jurisdictional or legislative framework of a permanent\nnature. It was not setting itself up as a permanent judge or legislator. It was only\nattempting to create an ad hoc mechanism that, by applying existing laws, would assign\nresponsibility for acts committed in an ongoing conflict that had already been seen to\nthreaten and undermine peace. That mechanism would contribute, by means of recourse\nto justice and punishment of the guilty, to restoring the peace and ensuring its\nmaintenance, so as to deter the repetition of similar acts in the future. The speaker noted\nthat Spain would have preferred the establishment of a criminal tribunal with universal\n\n 714\n Ibid., p. 16.\n 715\n Ibid., pp. 18-21.\n\n\n 485\n"
[486] "jurisdiction, but it recognized that to create one would have required more time than was\navailable. Nevertheless, the Spanish delegation was confident that the resolution just\nadopted was the first step towards the future creation of an international, universal,\npermanent criminal jurisdiction, and it would continue to support and promote the efforts\n 716\ntowards that end being made in other forums within the Organization.\n\n\n Decision of 25 May 1993 (3217th meeting): resolution 827 (1993)\n\n\n On 3 May 1993, pursuant to resolution 808 (1993), the Secretary-General\n 717\nsubmitted to the Council a report on the establishment of an International Tribunal to\nprosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law\ncommitted in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, which contained a draft\nstatute in annex. The Secretary-General believed that the international tribunal should be\nestablished by a decision of the Security Council on the basis of Chapter VII of the\nCharter of the United Nations. Such a decision would constitute a measure to maintain or\nrestore international peace and security, following the requisite determination of the\nexistence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. It would also\nhave the advantage of being expeditious and of being immediately effective, as all States\nwould be under a binding obligation to take whatever action was required to carry out a\ndecision taken as an enforcement measure under Chapter VII. The Secretary-General also\nbelieved that the establishment of the international tribunal by means of a Chapter VII\ndecision would be legally justified, both in terms of the object and purpose of the\ndecision and of past Security Council practice. He recalled, in that regard, that the\nCouncil had on various occasions adopted decisions under Chapter VII, aimed at\nrestoring of maintaining international peace and security, which had involved the\nestablishment of subsidiary organs for a variety of purposes.\n\n\n\n\n 716\n Ibid., pp. 21-26.\n 717\n S/25704 and Add.1and Corr.1.\n\n\n 486\n"
[487] " The Secretary-General pointed out that the Security Council would be\nestablishing a subsidiary organ within the terms of Article 29 of the Charter, but one of a\njudicial nature. The organ would have to perform its functions independently of political\nconsiderations; it would not be subject to the authority or control of the Security Council\nwith regard to the performance of its judicial functions. As an enforcement measure\nunder Chapter VII, however, the life span of the international tribunal would be linked to\nthe restoration and maintenance of international peace and security in the territory of the\nformer Yugoslavia. In assigning to the international tribunal the task of prosecuting\npersons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law, the Security\nCouncil would not, however, be creating nor purporting to “legislate” that law. Rather,\nthe international tribunal would have the task of applying existing international\nhumanitarian law. The Secretary-General therefore proposed that the Security Council,\nacting under Chapter VII of the Charter, establish the international tribunal.\n\n\n At its 3217th meeting, on 25 May 1993, the Council included the report of the\nSecretary-General in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council\ninvited the representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, at their request, to\nparticipate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President (Russian Federation)\ndrew the attention of the Council members to the text of a draft resolution 718 submitted\nby France, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the\nUnited States that had been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations\n 719\nand to several other documents.\n\n\n\n\n 718\n S/25826.\n 719\n S/25417, note verbale dated 12 March 1993 from the representative of Mexico addressed to the\nSecretary-General; S/25504, letter dated 31 March 1993 from the representative of Canada addressed to the Secretary-\nGeneral; S/25594, letter dated 13 April 1993 from the representative of Canada addressed to the Secretary-General;\nS/25537, letter dated 5 April 1993 from the representative of the Russian Federation addressed to the Secretary-\nGeneral; S/25540, letter dated 6 April 1993 from the representative of Brazil addressed to the Secretary-General;\nS/25575, letter dated 5 April 1993 from the representative of the United States addressed to the Secretary-General;\nS/25652, letter dated 20 April 1993 from the representative of Slovenia addressed to the Secretary-General; S/25716,\nnote verbale dated 30 April 1993 from the representative of the Netherlands addressed to the Secretary-General;\nS/25765, letter dated 11 May 1993 from the representative of Canada addressed to the Secretary-General; S/25801,\nletter dated 19 May 1993 from the representative of Yugoslavia addressed to the Secretary-General; and S/25829, letter\ndated 24 May 1993 from the representatives of France, the Russian Federation, Spain, the United Kingdom and the\nUnited States addressed to the President of the Security Council.\n\n\n 487\n"
[488] " The draft resolution was then put to the vote and it was adopted unanimously as\nresolution 827 (1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant\n resolutions,\n Having considered the report of the Secretary-General of 3 and 17 May 1993 pursuant to\n paragraph 2 of resolution 808 (1993),\n Expressing once again its grave alarm at continuing reports of widespread and flagrant\n violations of international humanitarian law occurring within the territory of the former\n Yugoslavia, and especially in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, including reports of\n mass killings, massive, organized and systematic detention and rape of women and the\n continuance of the practice of “ethnic cleansing”, including for the acquisition and the\n holding of territory,\n Determining that this situation continues to constitute a threat to international peace and\n security,\n Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to justice\n the persons who are responsible for them,\n Convinced that in the particular circumstances of the former Yugoslavia the\n establishment as an ad hoc measure by the Council of an international tribunal and the\n prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law\n would enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to the restoration and maintenance\n of peace,\n Believing that the establishment of an international tribunal and the prosecution of\n persons responsible for the above-mentioned violations of international humanitarian law will\n contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively redressed,\n Noting in this regard the recommendation by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee\n of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia for the establishment of such a\n tribunal,\n Reaffirming in this regard its decision in resolution 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993 that\n an international tribunal shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for\n serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former\n Yugoslavia since 1991,\n\n\n\n 488\n"
[489] " Considering that, pending the appointment of the prosecutor of the international tribunal,\nthe Commission of Experts established pursuant to resolution 780 (1992) should continue on\nan urgent basis the collection of information relating to evidence of grave breaches of the\nGeneva Conventions and other violations of international humanitarian law as proposed in its\ninterim report,\n Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,\n 1. Approves the report of the Secretary-General;\n 2. Decides hereby to establish an international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting\npersons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the\nterritory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be determined by the\nSecurity Council upon the restoration of peace and to this end to adopt the statute of the\nInternational Tribunal annexed to the report of the Secretary-General;\n 3. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the judges of the International Tribunal,\nupon their election, any suggestions received from States for the rules of procedure and\nevidence called for in article 15 of the statute of the Tribunal;\n 4. Decides that all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its\norgans in accordance with the present resolution and the statute of the Tribunal and that\nconsequently all States shall take any measures necessary under their domestic law to\nimplement the provisions of the present resolution and the statute, including the obligation of\nStates to comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a trial chamber under article\n29 of the statute;\n 5. Urges States and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to contribute\nfunds, equipment and services to the International Tribunal, including the offer of expert\npersonnel;\n 6. Decides that the determination of the seat of the International Tribunal is subject to the\nconclusion of appropriate arrangements between the United Nations and the Netherlands\nacceptable to the Council, and that the Tribunal may sit elsewhere when it considers it\nnecessary for the efficient exercise of its functions;\n 7. Decides also that the work of the International Tribunal shall be carried out without\nprejudice to the right of the victims to seek, through appropriate means, compensation for\ndamages incurred as a result of violations of international humanitarian law;\n 8. Requests the Secretary-General to implement urgently the present resolution and in\nparticular to make practical arrangements for the effective functioning of the International\nTribunal at the earliest time and to report periodically to the Council;\n\n\n 489\n"
[490] " 9. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of Venezuela recalled that his\ndelegation had voted in favour of resolution 808 (1993), because it had been convinced of\nthe duty incumbent upon the international community to reaffirm that the commission of\ncrimes such as those committed in the former Yugoslavia could not pass without political\ncondemnation and penal sanctions. The Venezuelan delegation recognized that the\nTribunal was intended to deal with a specific and limited crisis that the Council had been\naddressing under Chapter VII of the Charter. It also recognized that the Tribunal, as a\nsubsidiary organ of the Council, would not be empowered with – nor would the Council\nbe assuming – the ability to set down norms of international law or to legislate with\nrespect to those rights. The Tribunal simply applied existing international humanitarian\nlaw. It further acknowledged that, in adopting the draft statute, the Council was also\ntaking exceptional action. Venezuela believed that the ad hoc Tribunal had thus been\n 720\nestablished to act in support of the purposes and principles of the Charter.\n\n\n The representative of France noted that, through resolution 827 (1993), the\nCouncil had established an International Tribunal that would prosecute, judge and punish\npeople from any community who had committed or continued to commit crimes in the\nterritory of the former Yugoslavia. He also noted that resolution 827 (1993) had been\nadopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. The threat to international peace and security\ncreated by the situation in the former Yugoslavia justified recourse to those provisions.\nAs a decision within the meaning of Article 25 of the Charter, that resolution applied to\nall States, meaning that all States were required to cooperate fully with the Tribunal, even\nif that obliged them to amend certain provisions of their domestic law. The speaker also\n 721\nmade comments relating to the Statute of the Tribunal.\n\n\n The representative of the United States stated that the crimes being committed in\nthe former Yugoslavia were often the systematic and orchestrated crimes of Government\n\n 720\n S/PV.3217, pp. 6-10.\n 721\n Ibid., pp. 10-12.\n\n\n 490\n"
[491] "officials, military commanders, and disciplined artillerymen and foot soldiers. The men\nand women behind those crimes were individually responsible for the crimes of those\nthey purported to control; the fact that their power was often self-proclaimed did not\nlessen their culpability. Addressing those “who derided the tribunal as being powerless\nbecause the suspects may avoid arrest”, she argued that the tribunal would issue\nindictments whether or not suspects could be taken into custody. While they might be\nable to hide within the borders of Serbia or in parts of Bosnia or Croatia, they would be\nimprisoned for the rest of their lives within their own land. She further stressed that under\nthe resolution just adopted every Government, including each one in the former\nYugoslavia, would be obliged to hand over those indicted by the Tribunal.\n\n\n Regarding resolution 827 (1993), she made the following remarks. First, the\nUnited Nations Commission of Experts would continue to pursue its work of establishing\na database and preparing evidence during the interim period before the appointment of\nthe Tribunal’s Prosecutor, and hiring of staff to begin authoritative investigations and\npreparations for trials. At the appropriate time, her delegation expected that the\nCommission would cease to exist and its work would be “folded” into the Prosecutor’s\noffice. Secondly, States were encouraged to submit proposals for the rules of evidence\nand procedure for consideration by the judges of the Tribunal. Thirdly, States should take\nmeasures under their domestic law to enable them to implement the provisions of the\n 722\nStatute. The speaker also commented on the Statute of the Tribunal.\n\n\n The representative of the United Kingdom stated that all parties in the former\nYugoslavia shared some responsibility for the crimes committed and that it was important\nto emphasize that the Council’s action of that day was not aimed at one party alone. The\nSecurity Council had repeatedly demanded the immediate cessation of such atrocities, but\nthose demands had not been heeded. It was essential that those who committed such acts\nbe in no doubt that they would be held individually responsible and that those atrocities\nbe investigated and the perpetrators called to account. The establishment of the Tribunal\n\n\n 722\n Ibid., pp. 12-17.\n\n\n 491\n"
[492] "was an exceptional step needed to deal with exceptional circumstances. At the same time,\nthe Government of the United Kingdom continued to support the work of the\nInternational Law Commission, which would result in the establishment of an\ninternational criminal court with general jurisdiction. Like the previous speakers, the\n 723\nspeaker commented on the Statute of the Tribunal.\n\n\n The representative of New Zealand noted that the establishment of the Tribunal\nand the prosecution of persons suspected of crimes against international humanitarian law\nwere closely related to the wider efforts to restore peace and security to the former\nYugoslavia. He stressed that the Tribunal was a court, with the task of applying\nindependently and impartially the rules of customary international law and conventional\nlaw applicable in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The Tribunal must be left to\ncarry out its work until it had discharged its mandate under its Statute or until the Council\ndecided that its work should be brought to an end. 724\n\n\n The representative of Japan suggested that perhaps more extensive legal studies\ncould have been undertaken on various aspects of the Statute. At the same time, Japan\nfully shared the determination of the international community, which called for the\nexhaustion of all possible measures, including the expeditious establishment of the\nTribunal, to put an end to the ongoing atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and to restore\njustice. That was why Japan supported the adoption of the resolution and why it intended\nto cooperate in its implementation to the best of its ability, in accordance with the spirit\nof international established principles on criminal matters and within its Constitution.\n The speaker contended that the Statute of the Tribunal reflected the way of\nthinking of the Security Council. First, the commencement of activities by the Tribunal in\nno way relieved the parties of their obligation to enforce international humanitarian law.\nSecondly, such legal remedies in no way relieved the Security Council of its\nresponsibility to address the Yugoslav crisis in its entirety. Thirdly, cooperation and\nassistance on the part of the States concerned was essential to guarantee the smooth\n\n 723\n Ibid., pp. 17-19.\n 724\n Ibid., pp. 22-23.\n\n\n 492\n"
[493] "functioning of the Tribunal. All States must exhaust all means to cooperate in good faith.\nBefore concluding, the speaker stated that the Security Council was obliged to take the\nexceptional measures it was taking that day. Yet it could not be argued that those\nmeasures lay outside the Council’s jurisdiction, for the complexity of the threat and the\ngravity of the crisis had made the Council’s action inevitable. On the contrary, it might be\nargued that, without a comprehensive strategy on the part of the international community,\n 725\nthe complex situation in the former Yugoslavia could not be properly addressed.\n\n\n The representative of Morocco noted that it had always been his delegation’s view\nthat an international tribunal must be but one element of a plan, based on the principles of\nthe United Nations Charter, to put an end to Serb aggression, to demand the return of\nterritory acquired by force and “ethnic cleansing” and fully to restore the territorial\nintegrity, unity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The tribunal must seek to\npunish serious violations of international humanitarian law in the broadest sense as\ncrimes against international peace and security. He argued that the legitimacy and\nlegality of the tribunal should not be questioned, and that the Tribunal should hand down\ndeterrent sentences both for those who committed crimes and for their accomplices, and\nshould not ignore appropriate compensations for victims and their families, nor the\nresponsibility of States for breaches of international law attributable to them. He also\n 726\nstressed that States had the obligation to cooperate with and support the Tribunal.\n\n\n The representative of Cape Verde expressed the belief that the establishment of\nthe International Tribunal should be but the first step in a long and complex process. His\ndelegation considered that the establishment of the Tribunal would be a positive step only\nif it was viewed as closely connected to a suitably comprehensive peace plan capable of\npreserving international peace and security throughout the territory of the former\n\n\n\n\n 725\n Ibid., pp. 23-26.\n 726\n Ibid., pp. 26-28.\n\n\n 493\n"
[494] "Yugoslavia. His delegation considered the establishment of the Tribunal to be an\ninstrument for the promotion of international peace and security. 727\n\n\n The representative of Pakistan argued that “ethnic cleansing”, genocide and other\nheinous crimes had been committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in flagrant violation of\ninternational humanitarian law, with the specific objective of acquiring territory and as a\ndeliberate campaign to exterminate Bosnia and Herzegovina, a sovereign State Member\nof the United Nations. His delegation hoped that the establishment of the Tribunal would\nhelp to halt such crimes and would lead to the vacating by the aggressors of territories\nforcefully occupied and to the full restoration of the unity, territorial integrity and\nsovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Pakistan believed that the resolution just adopted\nwas an important element of the Vance-Owen plan and fell squarely within its ambit. The\nspeaker further stated that the international community must halt the aggression, reverse\nit through withdrawals from all territories occupied by the use of force and “ethnic\ncleansing” and restore international legality. He contended that the Security Council\nneeded to move swiftly to take further appropriate and effective enforcement actions in\nthat direction. The Pakistan delegation could not accept, even by implication, the status\nquo imposed by aggression, the use of force and “ethnic cleansing”, as that would set a\n 728\ndangerous precedent for the civilized world.\n\n\n The representative of China stated that, bearing in mind the particular\ncircumstances in the former Yugoslavia and the urgency of restoring and maintaining\nworld peace, the Chinese delegation had voted in favour of the resolution just adopted.\nHe cautioned, however, that that should not be construed as an endorsement of the legal\napproach involved. China had always held that, to avoid setting any precedent for\nabusing Chapter VII of the Charter, a prudent attitude should be adopted with regard to\nthe establishment of an international tribunal by means of Security Council resolutions\nunder Chapter VII. It was the consistent position of the Chinese delegation that an\ninternational tribunal should be established by concluding a treaty so as to provide a solid\n\n 727\n Ibid., pp. 28-31.\n 728\n Ibid., pp. 31-32.\n\n\n 494\n"
[495] "legal foundation for it and ensure its effective functioning. Furthermore, the Statute of the\nInternational Tribunal just adopted was a legal instrument with the attributes of an\ninternational treaty, involving complicated legal and financial questions. It ought to\nbecome effective only after having been negotiated and concluded by sovereign States\nand ratified by their national legislative organs in accordance with domestic laws.\nTherefore, to adopt by a Security Council resolution a Statute that gave the Tribunal both\npreferential and exclusive jurisdiction was not in compliance with the principle of State\njudicial sovereignty. The adoption of the Statute of the International Tribunal by the\nSecurity Council through a resolution invoking Chapter VII meant that United Nations\nMember States must implement it to fulfil their obligations under the Charter. That would\nbring many problems and difficulties both in theory and in practice. For that reason,\nChina had consistently maintained its reservations. In short, the Chinese delegation\nemphasized that the International Tribunal established in the current manner could only\nbe an ad hoc arrangement, suited only to the special circumstances of the former\n 729\nYugoslavia. It should not constitute a precedent.\n\n\n The representative of Brazil observed that the proposals for the establishment by\nthe Security Council of an international tribunal had posed intricate and not unimportant\nlegal difficulties, many of which had not been resolved to the satisfaction of his\ndelegation. It had only been the consideration of the “unique and exceptionally serious\ncircumstances” in the former Yugoslavia that had determined the vote cast by Brazil on\nthe resolution just adopted. The positive Brazilian vote should not be construed as an\noverall endorsement of legal formulas involved in the foundation or in the Statute of the\nInternational Tribunal.\n\n\n The speaker believed that the matter should also have been brought to the\nattention of the General Assembly. The views of the Brazilian Government on the main\nlegal issues had been expressed when the Council had adopted resolution 808 (1993). In\nparticular, Brazil had expressed the view that the most appropriate and effective method\n\n\n 729\n Ibid., pp. 33-34.\n\n\n 495\n"
[496] "for establishing the International Tribunal would have been the conclusion of a\nconvention setting up an ad hoc international criminal jurisdiction and containing the\nterms of reference for its exercise. The option of establishing the Tribunal through a\nresolution of the Security Council, which Brazil had not favoured, left unresolved a\nnumber of serious legal issues relating to the powers and competencies attributed to the\nCouncil by the United Nations Charter. It was the view of the Brazilian delegation that\nthe resolution just adopted was aimed at addressing a specific and unique situation with a\nview to producing one specific result: bringing to justice the persons responsible for\nserious violations of international humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia. Both the\nresolution and the Statute it adopted were thus not meant to establish new norms or\nprecedents of international law. The representative of Brazil stated that by adopting the\nresolution, the Council was not creating, nor purporting to legislate, international\nhumanitarian law. Rather, the International Tribunal would have the task of applying\nexisting norms of international humanitarian law. Before concluding, the speaker noted\nthat for the work of the International Tribunal to be effective, it would need to receive the\nfullest cooperation from all States. That was a clear obligation resulting from the\n 730\nresolution just adopted.\n\n\n The representative of Spain stated that the Statute of the Tribunal could be\nimproved upon. Nevertheless, Spain had preferred to retain the form proposed by the\nSecretary-General in its entirety for several reasons. First, certain clarifications could be\nfound by reading the Statute in the light of the explanations provided in the Secretary-\nGeneral’s report with respect to each Article. Other clarifications could be contributed by\nthe Tribunal itself when it drafted its rules of procedure and began carrying out its\njudicial activities. Moreover, the goal of restoring peace in the territory of the former\nYugoslavia required prompt action, which might have been compromised through a\nprolonged and detailed discussion of a Statute which satisfied the fundamental\nprerequisites for ensuring the achievement of that goal. Although the Statute lacked\nexpress provisions in that respect, the tribunal was clearly an independent organ and that\n\n\n 730\n Ibid., pp. 34-37.\n\n\n 496\n"
[497] "such independence was not at all incompatible with the Tribunal’s formal character as a\nsubsidiary organ of the Council, as was borne out by the International Court of Justice\nwith respect to the United Nations Administrative Tribunal and its relations with the\nGeneral Assembly. Second, the Tribunal was an impartial body governed by the law\nitself in fulfiling its duties. Its jurisdiction encompassed all of the territory of the former\nYugoslavia and actions by all parties involved in the conflict. Third, as there was a wish\nfor the Tribunal to be effective, it was indispensable to impose upon States an obligation\nto cooperate with the Tribunal that was based upon Chapter VII of the Charter. That\nobligation implied the duty to promulgate any domestic legal measures that might be\nnecessary. A particularly important feature of that obligation was the primacy accorded\nthe International Tribunal over national courts. Lastly, the resolution created an ad hoc\nbody with a jurisdiction limited not only geographically and temporally, but also\nmaterially, in that it would be circumscribed to applying the international law in force. In\nfact, with the establishment of the Tribunal the aim was not to create new international\n 731\nlaw nor to change existing law, but to guarantee respect for that law.\n\n\n The President, speaking in his capacity as the representative of the Russian\nFederation, stated that his delegation favoured the establishment of the International\nTribunal because it saw it as an instrument of justice to restore international legality and\nthe faith of the world community in the triumph of justice and reason. That was why the\nSecurity Council had assumed, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the\nresponsibility for implementing the appropriate specific measures contained in the\nresolution just adopted, including the establishment of the International Tribunal. While\nsupporting the tribunal, the Russian delegation believed that that body would not abolish\nnor replace national tribunals. The speaker further stated that the establishment of the\nInternational Tribunal, apart from possessing great juridical meaning, also represented an\nimportant political act taken by the international community, which at the same time\n 732\nfulfiled a preventive function and promoted the restoration of peace in the region.\n\n\n\n 731\n Ibid., pp. 38-41.\n 732\n Ibid., pp. 43-46.\n\n\n 497\n"
[498] " Decision of 20 August 1993 (3265th meeting): resolution 857 (1993)\n\n\n At its 3265th meeting, on 20 August 1993, the Council resumed its consideration\nof the item and included in its agenda the sub-item: “Establishment of the list of\ncandidates for judges”. Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (United\nStates) drew the attention of the Council members to the text of a draft resolution 733 that\nhad been prepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations and to revisions to be\nmade to the draft in its provisional form.\n\n\n The draft resolution was then put to the vote as orally revised in its provisional\nform and it was adopted unanimously as resolution 857 (1993). The resolution reads as\nfollows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling its resolutions 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993 and 827 (1993) of 25 May\n 1993,\n Having decided to consider the nominations for Judges of the International Tribunal\n received by the Secretary-General before 16 August 1993,\n Establishes the following list of candidates in accordance with article 13 of the statute of\n the International Tribunal:\n Mr. Georges Michel ABI-SAAB (Egypt)\n Mr. Julio A. BARBERIS (Argentina)\n Mr. Raphaël BARRAS (Switzerland)\n Mr. Sikhe CAMARA (Guinea)\n Mr. Antonio CASSESE (Italy)\n Mr. Hans Axel Valdemar CORELL (Sweden)\n Mr. Alfonso DE LOS HEROS (Peru)\n Mr. Jules DESCHENES (Canada)\n Mr. Jerzy JASINSKI (Poland)\n Mr. Heike JUNG (Germany)\n Mr. Adolphus Godwin KARIBI-WHYTE (Nigeria)\n\n 733\n S/26331.\n\n\n 498\n"
[499] " Mr. Valentin G. KISILEV (Russian Federation)\n Mr. Germain LE FOYER DE COSTIL (France)\n Mr. LI Haopei (China)\n Ms. Gabrielle Kirk McDONALD (United States of America)\n Mr. Amadou N'DIAYE (Mali)\n Mr. Daniel David Ntanda NSEREKO (Uganda)\n Ms. Elizabeth ODIO BENITO (Costa Rica)\n Mr. Hüseyin PAZARCI (Turkey)\n Mr. Moragodage Christopher Walter PINTO (Sri Lanka)\n Mr. Rustam S. SIDHWA (Pakistan)\n Sir Ninian STEPHEN (Australia)\n Mr. Lal Chan VOHRAH (Malaysia)\n\n\n\n Decision of 21 October 1993 (3296th meeting): resolution 877 (1993)\n\n\n At its 3296th meeting, on 21 October 1993, the Council resumed its consideration\nof the item and included in its agenda the sub-item: “Appointment of the Prosecutor”.\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the President (Brazil) drew the attention of the\nCouncil members to the text of a draft resolution 734 that had been prepared in the course\nof the Council’s prior consultations.\n\n\n The Council then adopted the draft resolution, without a vote, as resolution 877\n(1993). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling its resolutions 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993 and 827 (1993) of 25 May\n 1993,\n Having regard to article 16, paragraph 4, of the statute of the International Tribunal for\n the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian\n Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991,\n\n\n\n 734\n S/26608.\n\n\n 499\n"
[500] " Having considered the nomination by the Secretary-General of Mr. Ramón Escovar-\n Salom for the position of Prosecutor of the International Tribunal,\n Appoints Mr. Ramón Escovar-Salom as Prosecutor of the International Tribunal.\n\n\n Decision of 8 July 1994 (3401st meeting): resolution 936 (1994)\n\n\n At its 3401st meeting, on 8 July 1994, the Council resumed its consideration of the\nitem and included in its agenda the sub-item: “Appointment of the Prosecutor”.\nFollowing the adoption of the agenda, the President (Pakistan) drew the attention of the\nCouncil members to the text of a draft resolution 735 that had been prepared in the course\nof the Council’s prior consultations.\n\n\n The Council then adopted the draft resolution, without a vote, as resolution 936\n(1994). The resolution reads as follows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Recalling its resolutions 808 (1993) of 22 February 1993 and 827 (1993) of 25 May\n 1993,\n Having regard to article 16, paragraph 4, of the statute of the International Tribunal for\n the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian\n Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991,\n Having considered the nomination by the Secretary-General of Mr. Richard J. Goldstone\n for the position of Prosecutor of the International Tribunal,\n Appoints Mr. Richard J. Goldstone as Prosecutor of the International Tribunal.\n\n\n Decision of 25 July 1994: letter from the President\n\n By a letter 736 dated 14 July 1994 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General transmitted copies of the agreement between the United\nNations and the Netherlands concerning the Headquarters of the International Tribunal\n\n\n 735\n S/1994/805.\n 736\n S/1994/848.\n\n\n 500\n"
[501] "for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International\nHumanitarian Law in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 and requested\nthat the Security Council confirmed that the arrangements were acceptable and that the\nseat of the Tribunal had been determined to be at the Hague.\n\n\n 737\n By a letter dated 25 July 1994, the President of the Security Council informed\nthe Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n \"I have the honour to refer to your letter of 14 July 1994 transmitting copies of the\n agreement between the United Nations and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning the\n Headquarters of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for\n Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the\n Former Yugoslavia since 1991 and the Agreement for Tenancy of Churchillplein 1, The\n Hague.\n \"I have the honour to inform you that, in accordance with paragraph 6 of its resolution\n 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 and without prejudice to consideration of the arrangements by the\n General Assembly, the Security Council finds the arrangements between the United Nations\n and the Netherlands acceptable. The Council confirms that the seat of the Tribunal has been\n determined to be in The Hague.\"\n\n\n Decision of 23 September 1994: letter from the President\n 738\n By a letter dated 23 September 1994, the President of the Security Council\ninformed the Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n \"Article 27 of the statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,\n adopted by the Security Council in its resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993, prescribes that\n imprisonment imposed by the International Tribunal on a convicted person shall be served in\n a State designated by the International Tribunal from a list of States which have indicated to\n the Council their willingness to accept convicted persons. In the report on the statute of the\n International Tribunal presented by the Secretary-General to the Council, it is suggested that\n\n 737\n S/1994/849.\n 738\n S/1994/1090.\n\n\n 501\n"
[502] "the Council make appropriate arrangements to obtain from States an indication of their\nwillingness to accept convicted persons. This information would be communicated to the\nRegistrar of the International Tribunal who would prepare a list of States in which the\nenforcement of sentences would be carried out.\n \"On behalf of the Security Council, I hereby kindly request that you assist the Council in\nobtaining such indications from States.\"\n\n\n\n\n 502\n"
[503] " The situation prevailing in and adjacent to the United Nations Protected\n Areas in Croatia\n\n\n INITIAL PROCEEDINGS\n\n\n By a letter 739 dated 25 January 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the representative of France requested the immediate convening of a Security\nCouncil meeting to consider the grave situation existing in the United Nations protected\nareas in Croatia, and especially the attacks to which UNPROFOR personnel in those\nareas had been subjected.\n\n\n At its 3163rd meeting, held on 25 January 1993 in response to the request\ncontained in the above letter, the Council begun consideration of the item and included\nthat letter in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (Japan) drew\nthe attention of the Council members to the text of a draft resolution740 that had been\n 741\nprepared in the course of the Council’s prior consultations and to a revision that had\nbeen made to the draft. He also drew the attention of the Council members to two\nletters 742 dated respectively 24 and 25 January from the representatives of the Federal\nRepublic of Yugoslavia and Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council. In\nhis letter, the representative of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia transmitted a letter of\nthe same day from the Vice-President in which the latter denounced the Croatian\n“aggression” against the Republic of Serbian Krajina and requested an urgent meeting of\nthe Security Council “to condemn that aggression and order the Croatian troops to\nimmediately stop all military operations and withdraw to their original positions”. In his\nletter, the representative of Croatia informed the Council that “the limited action of the\nCroatian Police forces and Croatian Army units on the territory of Croatia – within the\nso-called “pink zones” – aimed at securing the perimeter of the Maslenica-bridge\n\n\n 739\n S/25156.\n 740\n S/25160.\n 741\n S/PV.3163, pp. 2-3.\n 742\n S/25154 and S/25159.\n\n\n 503\n"
[504] "rebuilding site, had been terminated upon completion of its goal”. His Government\ndeplored the loss of life of members of UNPROFOR who were caught in the cross-fire\nduring the said conflict and reiterated its view that “the legitimate authorities of one\ncountry could not be regarded as aggressors on their own territory”.\n\n\n Speaking before the vote, the representative of France noted that his Government\nhad requested that the Security Council meet immediately to consider the situation\ncreated by the attack by the Croatian Army in the region of Maslenica. He contended that\nthe offensive, which had taken place at a particularly important point in the ongoing\npeace process in Geneva and had cost the lives of two French soldiers serving in\n(UNPROFOR), could only further jeopardize the implementation of the United Nations\npeace plan in the region. It was very important that the Security Council reacted to these\nevents, condemned these deliberate attacks against UNPROFOR and demanded the\ncessation of military activities by the Croatian Army directed against UNPROFOR in the\nUnited Nations protected areas. The French Government also was pleased that the\nCouncil was demanding that the parties respect the safety of United Nations personnel\nand that it was inviting the Secretary-General to take all necessary steps to ensure their\nsafety. The fundamental obligation to ensure the safety of United Nations personnel was\ntoo often disregarded by parties involved in conflicts, but it was an obligation to which\nthe United Nations should scrupulously attend. The speaker also noted that it was no less\nimportant that the Council was calling upon the parties to cooperate with UNPROFOR to\nresolve questions related to the implementation of the United Nations peace plan and to\nrefrain from any action or threat that might undermine the efforts for peace that were\n 743\nbeing made in Geneva.\n\n\nDecision of 25 January 1993 (3163rd meeting): resolution 802 (1993)\n\n\n\n\n 743\n S/PV.3163, pp. 3-4.\n\n\n 504\n"
[505] " The draft resolution was then put to the vote, as orally revised in its provisional\nform, and it was adopted unanimously as resolution 802 (1993). The resolution reads as\nfollows:\n\n\n The Security Council,\n Reaffirming its resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991 and all subsequent relevant\n resolutions,\n Reaffirming in particular its commitment to the United Nations peace-keeping plan,\n Deeply concerned by the information provided by the Secretary-General to the Security\n Council on 25 January 1993 on the rapid and violent deterioration of the situation in Croatia\n as a result of military attacks by Croatian armed forces on the areas under the protection of\n the United Nations Protection Force,\n Strongly condemning those attacks which have led to casualties and loss of life in the\n Force, as well as among the civilian population,\n Deeply concerned also by the lack of cooperation in recent months by the Serb local\n authorities in the areas under the protection of the Force, by the recent seizure by them of\n heavy weapons under control of the Force, and by threats to widen the conflict,\n 1. Demands the immediate cessation of hostile activities by Croatian armed forces within\n or adjacent to the United Nations Protected Areas and the withdrawal of the Croatian armed\n forces from these areas;\n 2. Strongly condemns the attacks by these forces against the United Nations Protection\n Force in the conduct of its duty of protecting civilians in the Protected Areas and demands\n their immediate cessation;\n 3. Demands also that the heavy weapons seized from the storage areas controlled by the\n Force be returned immediately to the Force;\n 4. Demands further that all parties and others concerned comply strictly with the\n cease-fire arrangements already agreed and cooperate fully and unconditionally in the\n implementation of the United Nations peace-keeping plan, including the disbanding and\n demobilization of the Serb territorial defence units or other units of similar functions;\n 5. Expresses its condolences to the families of the personnel of the Force who have lost\n their lives;\n 6. Demands that all parties and others concerned respect fully the safety of United\n Nations personnel;\n\n\n\n 505\n"
[506] " 7. Invites the Secretary-General to take all necessary steps to ensure the safety of the\n Force personnel concerned;\n 8. Calls upon all parties and others concerned to cooperate with the Force in resolving all\n remaining issues connected with the implementation of the peace-keeping plan, including\n allowing civilian traffic freely to use the Maslenica crossing;\n 9. Calls again upon all parties and others concerned to cooperate fully with the\n International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and to refrain from any actions or threats\n which might undermine the current efforts aimed at reaching a political settlement;\n 10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.\n\n\n Speaking after the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation argued that\nthe military operations of the Croatian Army in the Serbian Krajina region represented\nanother link in the chain of violations by Zagreb of the demands of the Security Council.\nHe stated that the Croatian side had been ignoring for a long time the ban on flights over\nthe air space of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that it had been shipping arms into that\nRepublic, and that it was also conducting military operations against the Muslims in\nBosnia. He contended that the attack being mounted by Croatian armed forces in areas\nunder United Nations protection constituted a direct challenge to the peace-keeping\nmission of the United Nations in the former Yugoslavia. The attempt to resolve the\nproblem of Krajina by military means was all the more regrettable because the leaders of\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia had seemed to be close to achieving a\nmutually acceptable agreement. The Russian Federation was particularly concerned that\nCroatia was ignoring the demands of the Security Council and that the Croatian army was\ncontinuing its offensive actions in Serb-populated areas of Croatia. He contended that\nZagreb was not only refusing to restore the status quo and withdraw from the territories it\nhad seized through invasion, but was also seeking to extend the area in which it was\ncarrying out military action. He argued that the Croatian attack was not only a gross\nviolation of Security Council resolutions, but was also endangering the Geneva\nnegotiations for a peaceful settlement in the former Yugoslavia, which were at a crucial\nand sensitive stage. Having taken all those factors into account, the delegation of the\nRussian Federation had voted in favour of the resolution just adopted. He warned,\nhowever, that if the Croatian side were to fail to meet the demands of that and other\n\n\n 506\n"
[507] "relevant resolutions of the Security Council, then sanctions would have to be imposed on\nCroatia to the same extent as those imposed against the Federal Republic of\n 744\nYugoslavia.\n\n\n Decision of 27 January 1993 (3165th meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n At its 3165th meeting, on 27 January 1993, the Council included the letter dated\n25 January from the representative of France addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil in its agenda. Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (Japan) stated\nthat, after consultations among members of the Security Council, he had been authorized\nto make the following statement 745 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n “The Security Council is deeply concerned to learn from the Secretary-General that the\n offensive by the Croatian armed forces continues unabated in flagrant violation of resolution\n 802 (1993) of 25 January 1993, at a crucial time in the peace process.\n “The Council demands that military action by all parties and others concerned cease\n immediately. It further demands that all parties and others concerned comply fully and\n immediately with all the provisions of resolution 802 (1993) and with other relevant Council\n resolutions.\n “The Council once again demands that all parties and others concerned respect fully the\n safety of United Nations personnel and guarantee their freedom of movement. The Council\n reiterates that it will hold the political and military leaders involved in the conflict responsible\n and accountable for the safety of the United Nations peace-keeping personnel in the area.\n “The Council will remain actively seized of the matter, in particular with a view to\n considering what further steps might be necessary to ensure that resolution 802 (1993) and\n other relevant Council resolutions are fully implemented.”\n\n\n Decision of 8 June 1993 (3231st meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n\n\n 744\n Ibid., pp. 6-7.\n 745\n S/25178.\n\n\n 507\n"
[508] " At its 3231st meeting, on 8 June 1993, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of\nCroatia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The\nPresident (Spain) then stated that, after consultations among members of the Security\n 746\nCouncil, he had been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the\nCouncil:\n\n\n “Having examined the situation in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in the\n Republic of Croatia, the Security Council is deeply concerned by the failure of the Krajina\n Serbs to participate in talks on the implementation of its resolution 802 (1993) of 25 January\n 1993 which were to be held in Zagreb on 26 May 1993. It deplores the interruption of the\n dialogue between the parties, which had recently produced encouraging signs of progress.\n “The Council stresses its support for the peace process under the auspices of the Co-\n Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and urges the parties to\n solve all problems which might arise by peaceful means and resume the talks immediately\n with a view to the rapid implementation of resolution 802 (1993) and all other relevant\n resolutions. The Council expresses its willingness to help ensure the implementation of an\n agreement on this basis reached by the parties, including respect for the rights of the local\n Serb population.\n “The Council reminds the parties that the UNPAs are integral parts of the territory of\n Croatia, and that no action inconsistent with this would be acceptable.\n “The Council reiterates its demand that international humanitarian law be fully respected\n in the UNPAs.\n “The Council urges the Government of the Republic of Croatia, in cooperation with other\n interested parties, to take all necessary measures to ensure the full protection of the rights of\n all residents of the UNPAs when Croatia exercises fully its authority in these Areas.”\n\n\n Decision of 15 July 1993 (3255th meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n\n\n 746\n S/25897.\n\n\n\n 508\n"
[509] " At its 3255th meeting, on 15 July 1993, the Council included a letter 747 dated 14\nJuly 1993 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council\nin its agenda. The Secretary-General informed the Council that, in a letter dated 13 July\n1993, the Croatian authorities had conveyed to UNPROFOR their intention to reopen the\nMaslenica bridge and the Zemunik airport on 18 July 1993. They had also requested\nUNPROFOR to take all necessary measures to “ensure that the event will pass without\nincident”. He further informed the Council that the local Serb authorities and the\nauthorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not consider the planned event to be\nin conformity with Security Council resolutions 802 (1993) and 847 (1993) and that they\nperceived the planned events as a provocation. The Secretary-General had come to the\nconclusion that developments at the Maslenica bridge and the Zemunik airport in Croatia\ndeserved the urgent attention of the Council, which might wish to consider the danger\nposed by that situation and decide upon appropriate action.\n\n\n Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (United Kingdom) drew the\n 748\nattention of the members of the Council to a letter dated 12 July 1993 from the\nrepresentative of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council in which he\nstated that his Government expected the Council and UNPROFOR to take the steps\nnecessary to ensure that the reopening of the Maslenica bridge would not be interrupted.\n The President then stated that, after consultations among members of the Security\n 749\nCouncil, he had been authorized to make the following statement on behalf of the\nCouncil:\n\n\n “The Security Council is deeply concerned at the information contained in the letter of\n the Secretary-General dated 14 July 1993 on the situation in and around the United Nations\n Protected Areas (UNPAs) in the Republic of Croatia.67 It recalls its resolutions 802 (1993) of\n 25 January 1993 and 847 (1993) of 30 June 1993 and in particular the demand in the former\n that all parties and others concerned comply strictly with the cease-fire arrangements already\n\n\n\n 747\n S/26082.\n 748\n S/26074.\n 749\n S/26084.\n\n\n 509\n"
[510] " agreed and the call on them in the latter to reach an agreement on confidence-building\n measures.\n “The Council expresses its deep concern at the latest report on hostilities in the UNPAs,\n including in particular by the Krajina Serbs, and demands that these hostilities cease\n immediately.\n “The Council continues to attach the highest importance to securing the reopening of the\n Maslenica crossing to civilian traffic. In this context it reaffirms its support for the\n sovereignty and territorial integrity of Croatia. It recognizes the real and legitimate concern of\n the Government of Croatia in such reopening, as set out in the letter dated 12 July 1993 from\n the Permanent Representative of Croatia. It also recalls the demand in its resolution 802\n (1993) that the Croatian armed forces withdraw from the areas in question.\n “The Council considers that the planned unilateral reopening of the Maslenica bridge and\n of Zemunik airport on 18 July 1993, in the absence of agreement between the parties and\n others concerned in cooperation with the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR),\n would jeopardize the objectives of the Council's resolutions and in particular the call in its\n resolution 847 (1993) for agreement on confidence-building measures and the efforts of the\n Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and UNPROFOR to\n achieve a negotiated settlement to the problem. It urges the Government of Croatia to refrain\n from this action.\n “The Council expresses its support for the efforts of the Co-Chairmen and UNPROFOR\n and calls on the parties and others concerned to cooperate fully with them in this regard and\n to conclude rapidly the agreement on confidence-building measures called for in its\n resolution 847 (1993). It joins the Secretary-General in his call to the parties and others\n concerned to act in a manner conducive to the maintenance of peace and to refrain from any\n action which would undermine these efforts, and calls upon the parties to assure\n UNPROFOR's freedom of access in particular to the area surrounding the Maslenica\n crossing.”\n\n\n Decision of 30 July 1993 (3260th meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n At its 3260th meeting, on 30 July 1993, the Council resumed its consideration of\nthe item. Following the adoption of the agenda, the President (United Kingdom) stated\n\n\n\n\n 510\n"
[511] "that, after consultations among members of the Security Council, he had been authorized\nto make the following statement 750 on behalf of the Council:\n\n\n “The Security Council has heard with deep concern the report from the Special\n Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia on the situation in and\n around the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in the Republic of Croatia and in\n particular in respect of the Maslenica crossing.\n “The Council reaffirms the presidential statement of 15 July 1993. Following this\n statement the parties reached an agreement on 15/16 July 1993 at Erdut which requires the\n withdrawal of Croatian armed forces and police from the area of the Maslenica bridge by 31\n July 1993 and the placing of the bridge under the exclusive control of the United Nations\n Protection Force (UNPROFOR).\n “The Council demands that the Croatian forces withdraw forthwith in conformity with\n the above-mentioned agreement and that they permit the immediate deployment of\n UNPROFOR. The Council also demands that the Krajina Serb forces refrain from entering\n the area. The Council calls for maximum restraint from all the parties, including the\n observance of a cease-fire.\n “The Council warns of the serious consequences of any failure to implement the above-\n mentioned agreement.\n “The Council will remain actively seized of the matter.”\n\n\n Decision of 27 August 1993: letter from the President to the Secretary-General\n\n\n 751\n By a letter dated 20 August 1993 addressed to the President of the Security\nCouncil, the Secretary-General, recalling resolutions 771 (1992) of 15 August 1992 and\n780 (1992) of 6 October 1992, stated that the Commission of Experts established\npursuant to resolution 780 (1992) had been attempting to examine and analyse\ninformation relating to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and other violations of\nhumanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and to uncover and\nestablish evidence at mass grave sites in the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in\n\n 750\n S/26199.\n 751\n S/26373.\n\n\n 511\n"
[512] "Croatia. The Government of the Netherlands had offered to provide free of cost an armed\nmilitary engineer unit of up to 50 personnel to assist in the excavation of a mass grave\nsite at Ovcara near Vukovar. The Secretary-General believed that this task could best be\ncarried out by including the unit, on a temporary basis, in the United Nations Protection\nForce (UNPROFOR). The additional elements of the Force would be deployed in the area\nfor a period of 10 weeks starting 1 September 1993, subject to the extension of the\nmandate of UNPROFOR which would expire on 30 September 1993. The Secretary-\nGeneral stated that he would proceed on that basis, subject to the concurrence of the\nmembers of the Council.\n\n\n 752\n By a letter of 27 August 1993, the President of the Security Council informed\nthe Secretary-General as follows:\n\n\n “The members of the Security Council have considered your letter of 20 August 1993\n referring to Council resolutions 771 (1992) and 780 (1992). The members agree with your\n suggestion to accept the offer of the Government of the Netherlands to provide free of cost to\n the United Nations a 50-person engineering unit to assist in the excavation of a mass grave\n site at Ovcara near Vukovar, in the United Nations Protected Areas in Croatia, in the context\n of the work of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to resolution 780 (1992).\n They note the information contained in the letter, and agree with the proposal contained\n therein.\n “The members understand that the connection of the United Nations Protection Force\n with the engineering unit will be the provision of administrative and logistic support and\n protection.”]\n\n\n Decision of 17 January 1995 (3491st meeting): statement by the President\n\n\n At its 3491st meeting, on 17 January 1995, the Council included a letter 753 dated\n12 January 1995 from the representative of Croatia addressed to the Secretary-General in\nits agenda. By that letter, the representative of Croatia transmitted a letter of the same\n\n 752\n S/26374.\n 753\n S/1995/28.\n\n\n 512\n"
[513] "date from the President of the Republic of Croatia to the Secretary-General in which he\nstated that despite its endeavours, UNPROFOR had been unable to implement the most\nimportant provisions of the Vance Plan and subsequent Security Council resolutions.\nMoreover, Croatia found the continued presence of UNPROFOR in the occupied\nterritories to be largely counterproductive to the peace process. He further contented that\nthe Serb intransigence and UNPROFOR’s reserve were de facto allowing and promoting\nthe occupation of parts of Croatia’s territory. The “freezing” of a negative status quo was\nunacceptable. The President concluded that, although UNPROFOR had played an\nimportant role in stopping violence and major conflicts in Croatia, it was an indisputable\nfact that the present character of the UNPROFOR mission did not provide conditions\nnecessary for establishing lasting peace and order in Croatia. Croatia was therefore\nterminating the UNPROFOR mandate, effective 31 March 1995, in accordance with\nSecurity Council resolution 947 (1994).\n\n\n Following the adoption of the agenda, the Council invited the representative of\nCroatia, at his request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote.\n The President (Argentina) then stated that, after consultations among members of\n 754\nthe Security Council, he had been authorized to make the following statement on\nbehalf of the Council:\n\n\n \"The Security Council, which has begun its consideration of the report of the Secretary-\n General of 14 January 1995 submitted pursuant to resolution 947 (1994), has learned with\n concern of the position adopted by the Republic of Croatia on the extension of the mandate of\n the United Nations Protection Force in Croatia beyond 31 March 1995, as set out in the letter\n dated 12 January 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations\n addressed to the Secretary-General. It is particularly concerned about the wider implications\n of this development for the peace process throughout the former Yugoslavia.\n \"The Council reiterates its commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the\n Republic of Croatia within its internationally recognized borders. It understands the concerns\n of the Croatian Government about the lack of implementation of major provisions of the\n\n\n\n 754\n S/PRST/1995/2.\n\n\n 513\n"
[514] "United Nations peacekeeping plan for Croatia. It will not accept the status quo becoming an\nindefinite situation. It believes, however, that the continued presence of the United Nations\nProtection Force in the Republic of Croatia is of vital importance for regional peace and\nsecurity and that the United Nations, in general, and the Force, in particular, have a positive\nrole to play in achieving the further implementation of the peacekeeping plan and bringing\nabout a settlement which ensures full respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of\nCroatia. It recalls the important role the United Nations Protection Force plays in helping to\nsustain the ceasefire in Croatia, facilitating humanitarian activities and international relief\nwork and supporting implementation of the economic agreement of 2 December 1994.\n \"It is in that perspective that the Council hopes that discussions over the weeks ahead will\nlead to a re-examination of the position now taken in relation to the continuing role of the\nUnited Nations Protection Force in the Republic of Croatia.\n \"Meanwhile, the Council calls upon all parties and others concerned to avoid any action\nor statement which might lead to an increase in tension. It welcomes the conclusion, under\nthe auspices of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the Conference on the Former\nYugoslavia, of the economic agreement of 2 December 1994 and urges the parties to\ncontinue, and accelerate, its implementation; it notes the need for adequate international\nfinancial support and encourages the international community to respond to this need. It calls\nfor the intensification in the coming weeks of all these efforts to consolidate this achievement\nand to bring about a political settlement in Croatia and it calls upon the parties to cooperate\nwith these efforts and to negotiate in earnest to that end.\n \"The Council affirms its commitment to the search for an overall negotiated settlement of\nthe conflicts in the former Yugoslavia ensuring the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all\nthe States there within their internationally recognized borders and stresses the importance it\nattaches to the mutual recognition thereof.\"\n\n\n\n\n 514\n" #additional packages
library(tidyverse)── Attaching packages ─────────────────────────────────────── tidyverse 1.3.2 ──
✔ ggplot2 3.4.0 ✔ readr 2.1.3
✔ tibble 3.1.8 ✔ purrr 0.3.5
✔ tidyr 1.2.1 ✔ forcats 0.5.2
── Conflicts ────────────────────────────────────────── tidyverse_conflicts() ──
✖ dplyr::filter() masks stats::filter()
✖ dplyr::lag() masks stats::lag()library(tm) #A framework for text mining applications within R. See https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/tm/vignettes/tm.pdfLoading required package: NLP
Attaching package: 'NLP'
The following object is masked from 'package:ggplot2':
annotatelibrary(broom) #The broom package takes the messy output of built-in functions in R, such as lm, nls, or t.test, and turns them into tidy tibbles. See: https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/broom/vignettes/broom.html
pdf_converted <- Corpus(VectorSource(pdf_content)) %>%
DocumentTermMatrix()pdf_frame =pdf_converted %>%
tidy() %>%
filter(!grepl("[0-9]+", term)) #filters out nongrepl (string) digitsAs an example, here we will use the newspaper article that we scraped.
The first step is to load the data that we saved in the last project. It was saved as an R Object, so we can load it the following way:
load("multiple_url_paragraphs.RData")This loads the saved R data object into our working environment to allow us to begin working with the data. As you can see, it’s loaded as what we saved the object as previously, multi_df.
We now need to work on cleaning the data to render it into a format that we can use for text analysis. For this tutorial, we will be using the tidyverse text analysis method so begin by loading the tidytext package and installing it if not installed yet. This will be one of the core packages needed for our work.
# install.packages("tidytext")
library(tidytext)Now we can begin to work with the data and transform it into something usable.
Begin by tokenizing the data, or separating the paragraphs and sentences into words instead of the format they are currently in.
tidy_paragraphs <- multi_df %>%
unnest_tokens(word, text)If we look at tidy_paragraphs, we can see that the text is broken down by word and noted by the paragraph it is found in:
Now we want to begin cleaning the corpus by removing unnecessary words. These are words that convey no meaningful information but appear frequently, usually referred to as “stop words” such as but, and, if, then, and similar words.
tidy_paragraphs <- tidy_paragraphs %>%
anti_join(stop_words)Joining, by = "word"This uses the “stop words” dataset from tidyverse to remove the most common stop words.
We can then look at the top words using the following function:
tidy_paragraphs %>%
count(word, sort = TRUE) This shows that the top words in these articles, with stop words removed, are Munich, western, Ukraine, war, countries, and Germany.
You can also clean words that aren’t stop words. This can be especially useful if you accidentally include advertisements or other unnecessary data in your scraping.
tidy_paragraphs <-tidy_paragraphs %>%
filter(!word %in% c("Politico","reporting")) #Add in the word you'd like to remove here to filter them outThe most commonly used words can be visualized using a word cloud. Two packages, devtools and wordcloud2, are needed to do this.
library(wordcloud2)
library(devtools)Loading required package: usethisFirst, we must figure out the word counts:
t_para <- tidy_paragraphs %>%
count(word, sort = TRUE) You can make a very simple wordcloud using the wordcloud2() function.
wordcloud2(t_para)This then outputs a simple wordcloud of the most commonly use words in our articles.
Now we can look at other ways to analyze the text data we have scraped.
We can use the function unnest_tokens as used earlier in order to tokenize into consecutive sequences of words, called n-grams. By seeing how often word X is followed by word Y, we can then build a model of the relationships between them.
We do this by adding the token = “ngrams” option to unnest_tokens(), and setting n to the number of words we wish to capture in each n-gram. When we set n to 2, we are examining pairs of two consecutive words, often called “bigrams”:
tidy_bigrams <- multi_df %>%
unnest_tokens(bigram, text, token = "ngrams", n = 2) %>%
filter(!is.na(bigram))Our usual tidy tools apply equally well to n-gram analysis. We can examine the most common bigrams using dplyr’s count():
tidy_bigrams %>%
count(bigram, sort = TRUE)It then shows the pairs of words that frequently appear together. Looking at it, you can see that the words are often two stop words and thus, uninteresting. We can clean the data in order to filter the stop words and focus on the interesting text.
This is a useful time to use tidyr’s separate(), which splits a column into multiple based on a delimiter. This lets us separate it into two columns, “word1” and “word2”, at which point we can remove cases where either is a stop-word.
library(tidyr)
bigrams_separated <- tidy_bigrams %>%
separate(bigram, c("word1", "word2"), sep = " ")
bigrams_filtered <- bigrams_separated %>%
filter(!word1 %in% stop_words$word) %>%
filter(!word2 %in% stop_words$word)
# new bigram counts:
bigram_counts <- bigrams_filtered %>%
count(word1, word2, sort = TRUE)Now we can see the more interesting results:
When human readers approach a text, we use our understanding of the emotional intent of words to infer whether a section of text is positive or negative, or perhaps characterized by some other more nuanced emotion like surprise or disgust. We can use the tools of text mining to approach the emotional content of text programmatically, as shown below:
There are quite a few existing dictionaries and methods for sentiment analysis that make our work easier. The tidytext package provides access to several sentiment lexicons.
All three of these lexicons are based on unigrams, i.e., single words. These lexicons contain many English words and the words are assigned scores for positive/negative sentiment, and also possibly emotions like joy, anger, or sadness.
The function get_sentiments() allows us to get specific sentiment lexicons with the appropriate measures for each one.
The following code is an example of how to use a sentiment dictionary to analyze the paragraphs we scraped earlier. In order to make the analysis interesting, we can separate the analysis by document. To do this, we will use the pdf files scraped earlier.
First, rename the “term” column in pdf_frame to word so it’s easier to join with the sentiment dictionary.
colnames(pdf_frame)[2] ="word"Now, run this code to join the sentiment dictionary with the scraped text and derive a sentiment score. This uses the “bing” sentiment dictionary, which comes with the tidyverse packages:
multi_doc_sentiment <- pdf_frame %>%
inner_join(get_sentiments("bing"), by="word") %>%
count(document, sentiment) %>%
pivot_wider(names_from = sentiment, values_from = n, values_fill = 0) %>%
mutate(sentiment = positive - negative)Now we can compare the sentiments between documents, just as an example of what you can do with sentiment analysis. This can be done via ggplot2.
p2 <- ggplot(multi_doc_sentiment, aes(document, sentiment, fill = document)) +
geom_col(show.legend = FALSE) +
facet_wrap(~document, ncol = 2, scales = "free_x")p2
As shown in these graphs, documents 4 and 5 are signficantly more negative in sentiment than the othe rthree documents.